THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS AND THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPI NE

ISLANDS
B.II EtlfILIANO LAZARO \' MINA "
r. DEFINITION AND DISTINCTION
A. Definition
I think it highly imporlanl" in a science so vast and intri
cate as. the law, to empl oy terms in a flhtl l'p. technical
defin ition to pl 'event and bewilderment.
The phl'ase "Stare Decisis" from the Latin verb "sto"
whi ch means "to be quiet" and the word (lecisltm, "settled thing,"
if; a Latin maxim conveying t he idea of the policy of some coul1;s
to abide by 0 1' adhere to decided case!;. It is t he abbl'e\' iated
expression of the Latin maxim "Stal'e Deei siR et non quieta mo
vere" which means ';lo adhere to clecid'ed cases and not to
di !'ltlll'b settled Quest ions." When a point 01' quest i on propel'i ),
decided in a pre\'ious case comes rlgai)) in litigation, it was
deemed advi sable and more convenient to adopt the opinion and
tourse of I'eal';oning of t he judge the fOl'mer decision,'
It is a maxim, meaning, to adhere to pl'ecedent5, and not to
unsettled things which are
The doctrine, in general. i!'i to the that where a poin t
has been once settled by decision it forms, a precedent which is
not aftenvards to be departed from. "
B. Distil/ctio!!."!
Stare Decisis differs from Res Adjudicata. The former
relates chiefly to law; the latter to facts.' The doctrine of reg
adjudicata bean; upon parties, and others privy to the imme-
diat.e parties, alld restrains them from liliU'ating anew s uch mat-
teI'S as hm'e previously been drawn into contl'ovel' s), between
them 01' those representing them, and ha.\'"e been allthol'itatively
decided by a competent COlll'to" One case can make up the doc
trine of res adjudicata; several that of stul'e FOI'
LL.B., Univ'!l"! it)' of the Philil'piu'!s.
, Bouvier's L;l\\' Dictional'Y, p. 1028.
' COI'PUS Jul"is, Vol. 58, p. 1318.
Ruling CIl.!!(> Law, Vol. 7, II, 1000.
'Same v. Same 34 Mich, 21 1.
Packet Co. \' . Sickl.:s, 5 Wal lace G!l2.
DOCTRINE OF STAHE DECI SI S
lu5
unlike I'es adjudieat.a, which may I'efer to a single caUtie of action
or defense determined by a final judgment, stare I'efers
to t. he law or the pl'illciple applied in the past and which may be
controlling on future cases altho cases may al'ise f'1'om dif-
ferent of action or defenses and involving di fferent pal'-
ties.
Stal'e Decisis also diffe]'s from Obiter Di ctum. The latter
j "l llot a decision 1" and therefore cannot in any way be the basis
of st.ale decisi s which always connote a decision in aJI senses
of the term. Obiter dicta are not controlling in decisions of the
Supreme Court. - Where a question the court "sub si
lcncio", the case is not binding upon the court and will not pr e-
clude it from later passing upon its validity where the question
is properly t'aisoo. o The reason for this is well stated by Chief
Justice Marshall in these wOI'ds: " The question actually before
lhe court is investigated with car e, and considered in its full
extent; other principles, which may serve to illustrate it, ar e
considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible
bearing ill all othE' I' CMes if' seldom completely investigated'." '"
On the other hand, the rule is almost universal for the court:;; to
udhel'e to the doctrinc of stare decisis. It .is an adjudicated
qllef'ltion and the subject of its COITectness is a sealed book. "
Sbu'e Decisis may also be di stingui shed fl'om jeopardy, In
w; much as the plea of once in jeopardy is the res adjudicata of
the cri minul it should possess the same distinctions which
the doctl"ine of res adjudicata bear s to stare decisis. The mean-
ing of jeopardy is, that a party shall not be tl'ied a second time
f!)l' the samE:' offense artel' he nas been once convicted or ac-
quitted of the offensc charged by the verdict of the jury and
j udgment has passed lhereon for or against him. '1
n. ANALYSIS OF TilE DOCTIONE OF SnRE DECISIS
A. Sfalemn .. i uf the DOCt1i,lR.
The rule of stare deci sis is the authority of judicial deci-
",iOns as precedent. in s ubsequent litigations." The pl'inciple of
" " an Rt's Adjuflicuw. Vol. 1. !I.
1 Wt.l\s, The Doetl' jill! of Res A<ljudicata &. Stur< Deci sis. )1. 527.
' Uy Po ,'. CoJl ecto!" of 34 Phil. 15:t
" "" cGil'!" v. Hllnliltoll &. Abl'CU, 30 Phil. 568.
,. i\lBl"bul"), \'. i\hUJi SOIl, 2 Law Edition, (;0.
" Seal" v. Mi tchell. 5 Cal. 4(13.
" Alb".-t. Law (jf Criminal P r llccdUl'C, fl. 180.
" Story 1111 the Constitu.tioll , 51h Edition, St!c. 17,:j7 .
.. Suthcrlal1(l, Statutory Constl'uciion, 2nd F.:d . Vol. Z, 1'. 8D8.
P HILIPPI NE LA W JOURNAL
precedent is sometimes the doctrine of stare decisis.'" The
doctrine is s hortly this: a deci sion by a court of competent
jtll' isdiction of a point of law lying so squarel y in the pathway
of judichli judgment that the ca1-ie could not be adjudged without
deciding it, is not only binding upon the parties to t he cause in
judgment but the point so decided. becomes, until it is l'eversea
fII" overruled, evidence of what. the law is in like cases. which
the cou rts are bound to follow, not only in cases precisely like
the one which was (j r st determined but also in those. which,
however different in their origin 01' special circumstances, stand,
or are consider ed to upon the same principles.
' u
After a
legal principle has t hus been well settled, it becomes <l binding
rule, to be applied in all case,:,; of II similar nature. "
B. iVa/m'r (/lId COllct'pf of rhe Doctrill(>
The doctrine is not founded upon n mere \'Ute of practice,
changeable at t he p!casu I'e of the courts, but upon the solid basis
of justice, and vitally ::tnd essentially affects the rights and in-
lerests of defendants. It is a ,oule applicable to all questions of
law, whether declaring n pdnciple of common law or the con-
st ruction of a stat.ute. A rleliberate deci sion on a point of law
giYen in a case becomes authority in other like cases; it is then
lhe highest evi(lence of what the law is applicabl e to the subject:
:t should be followed ,'evc'osed Ly a s uperior court or
changed by the legislature, lIllless the law was manifestly mis-
understood or misapplied in the case decided: and even then,
llftel' long adherence to that error, it become fixed and in-
capable of j udicial cOlTection.'
It js a fundament: .. l law that a pl'ecedent must be a concIu-
"ion, a decision in a cause; and not a proceSl> of reasoning, an
illll st l'ation, 01' analogy .f. The member of a court often agree
in a decision, but differ decidedly to the reaSODS and prill-
c-ipJes by which their minds have been led to a common conelu-
If the major which is the law of the case. may
ce stated in several forms. and is stated diffe,'entiy by diJrerent
memben; of the COlll't who j oin in the conclusion, t his diversity
will impai,' the force of ]J,ececlent. A judicial decision should
be l'egal'(led as conclusive, not only on Ute points presented in
.. GambQa, Elementary Law, p. l:t
" Ibid., citing Ditk.n, pp. 1:1-1 L
Some TClldenciE:S in the Law, II.
" Sutherland, Statutory 2nd E: d .. Vol, .:!. pp. IWI:\!I,
The Doctrine of Res Adjtldicata & Stare Decisis. p. 530.
THE DOCTRI NE OF STARE DECISIS 407
and expressly decided. but also of every other propo-
sition involved in I'eachi ng the condusion
The rule is :;tare decisis, not stal'e opinioniblLS 0 1' even sta.n :
,esplm.:f'is. Opi nions are not legaliy I'equin:d in most states
llnd in these, a decision without an opinion may none the less be
binding. The opinion may not logically lead to the decision at
all. There may be ot her and better for t he decision
than those in the opini on. There may be and even con
h'adictOl' Y opinions. In all t hese situations. the decision is as
"bindi ng" as it \vas before. Opinions have only a force call ed
authority which derive it from the personality and character
of the judge, from the standing of the t r ibu:nal, and from the
inherent qualities of the
C. GnnmdH of the A l6tho,,.ify of the Doott'ille
The operation of pl'ecedents is based on the legal pres ump-
t ion of the correctness of jltdicial decisions. It is an application
of the maxi m, Res jlldiCflta pro 'Vlll'it(tie accipitu1. A matter
once formally decided is decided once 1'01' all. The cour ts will
listen to no a llegation that they have been mistaken nOl' will
they open fl. mattel' once litigated and determi ned. That which
has been delivered in judgment must be t llk(!n for establi!\hed
tJ'uth. For in all pI'obability it is true in fact, a nd even if not,
it is expedient that it should be held as true none the less.
When, therefore, 11 question has been judicially considered and
ans\vel'ed, it must be answered in t he same way in all subse-
quent cases in which the same question again nrises. Only thru
this l' ule ca n that consistency of judicial decision be obtained,
which ilt e!\sential to the admini stration of By thi s
reliance in the la w is
A precedent therefore, is a judicial decision which contains
ill itself a principle. This underlying pri nciple is often termed
the ,.rlin cleride11di whi ch alone has the force -of law as r egards
t.he wor ld at large.
D. I mpu'rt{t t)Cfl (unt Re{tHIJIlS oj Ihl' J) oct"' hlc
The policy of the doctri ne is Lo give uniformity, certainty.
and stability to t he law ;111 (1 above all to afford the citizen n
.. Suthcdand, Stalutol'Y Const.ruction, 2nd Ed., Vo l. 2, pp. 908-9,
" Max Rad in. 33 Califol'ni a Law Review, Feb. 19<13 .
.,. Sal mond. J urisprudence, 7th Edition, p. 198.
,. Halcomb ". Bonnell. 32 Mich. 8.
408
LAW J OURNAL
pl'ompt and speedy a:dminLs ll'alion of justice. An absQlute dis-
regat'd of doctrine would lead to chaos and con-
fusion, a nd lea"c the law liS uncer tain and undevel oped at the
(mel as well as in t he beginning.
1
'
The legal ground on which this practice is now suppor ted
is that long continued usage a contemporaneolls COJ1-
which must pl'evail ovel' the mere technical import of
wOrds. t '
Fo)" it i:; an establis hed 1'\I!e t o abide by former precedellts,
where t he !'lame poi nts come again in li t igati on: afl well as to keep
the sc., le of justice even and ::;teady, and not liable to waver
with every new judge's opin ion; as al so because the law in that
ea.'iC being solemnl y declared and determined, what before Waf>
unce rtain, ,mc\ pel'hap:; indifferent , has now become a perma-
nent rule which is not in the bl'east. of any subsequent judge to
:llt e,' 01' va)'y from acconting to his own pri vate judgment, but
acconl ing to th<' known laws and Cll stoms of the land,,; not de-
legated to pronounce a new Jaw but to maintain and expound
the ol d one."" 1t s hould I'equil'e. ever.\" controlling considera-
tiOlU; to induce any court to bre"k down H former decisi on, and
Jay again the foundat ion>: of the law."' F or t hi s maxim is tI
fu ndament.al concept in the organization of jlwal
E. CIM8e!) nj P1ecedeut.<;
PI'ececlents be declarator y. one which merely lhe
ilJ)plication of an already exist ing rule of law ; or 3n ol"iginal
precedenl, one which creates and applies a lIew nile. In the
for mel' case, the l'ule iF- applied hecause it is already law; in the
case, it i " \:lw for the future beca use it is now applied.
The legal authority of each is exactly the
are fll r t hel' di vis ible into authoritative and pt'.r-
:<\Iushe. These two classe" differ in I'especl of the kind of in-
ference which they upon the fut ure course of t he admin-
i:'.U'ati on of ju:-\tice, An il lllhOJ jlati ve precedent j i' one wh ich
.Judges must foli o\\' rcgllrdJl!'i of their Leliefs 01" cf!nvicti om; . 11
i$ bindi ng upon them anc! ext\udes thei r judicial di scretion. P(' l" -
... Wl11iam v. Go,.ney, 1014 indiana , .
, Sutherland. Statutor), Construuion, 2nd Ed .. Vol. 2. p . j!),! .
.. Blackstone, Laws; of England, 4t h Ed. , Vol. 1, pp_ 62-63.
" Hoga tt. v. Bingaman, 7 How (Miss) 569.
' Blar: k, Th .. Law of .J udgme nt, Vo!' 2, P. 599.
'" Salmond, J U)'i s pl"udunce, 7t h Edi tion, pp.
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DE:e IS IS
".uasj,'e, when the judges ar e under no obligation to follow, altho
may attach weight and merit to them as may be walTanted.
fieneratly, decisions of slIperio)' courts are authoritative; those
of lower courts, merely persuasive.'"
Authoritative precedcnti; al'e of two kinds: either absolute
or conditional. In the first case. the decision is unconditionally
followed without Question however unreasonable or erroneous it
be considered to be. It has a legal claim Lo implicit and
unquestioning obedience. In the second case, the precedent po!"-
;;esses merely conditional authority when the courls It
tain limited POWCI' of disregarding itY
F. Appficalim! olld Effect ()f the Doctri'le
The following rule", are generally l'ecog-nized for the appli-
cation of precedents : (a) Each COllrt i>; bound by the ,dec.i,, ;oll
of COllrt!< above it : (b) Any l'elevant judgment of any coun is :J
:-.tl'ong argument entitled to respectful consideration; (c) a judg-
JIlent is authol'itative only all to its I'nfi() decidendi; (d) a pl'e,
is not abrogated by lapse of ti me: (e) Ancient precedent"
are not. in pr actice, commonly applicable to modern cirCllm-
These rules are practical and of salutary effect,'"
There is a distinction in the application of the principle 01
decisis between which concern practice OJ" thOM'
rules of conduct which have a mere present importance, and
those which affect the validity <tlld control the construction of
c' ontr acts 01' r ules of property, A;; to the former. legal preced-
are followed unless they are manifestly wrong, As to tl1c
latter, they are followed with mOL'e
No absolute rule can be gh'en as to when stare decisis iii.
imperative, so much (iepends on the particular case in which it
nlay be invoked, It mll ::;t be said however, that COIIl'ts al'e not
required in the exer cise of thei r wide judicial 'd iscI"et lon, to over,
turn principles which have been considered and acted upon as
con ect, and thereby disturb contract", and property, and involv{'
everything in inexplicable confusion. There al'e where
ihe decision do not constitute a bUl'liness rule, and where a change
would invalidate no business transactions conducted upon the
faith of the adjudication. As an iIIush'atlon, lake a Cl.l .-;e in-
,
volving pel'sonal liberty: a of his liberty claim,
Ibid., p, HIt.
' Ibid., p. 192 .
... Allen, Law in the "'laking, 2nu Edition, p. .
.. Sl.Ith(,Iland, Stlltutot'y 2nd Ed., Vol. ::! p. 8fl9.
PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL
to be discha L'ged under some constitutional provision; the court
erroneously decides him; the same question arises again,
To change such a decision would destroy no rights acquired in
the past; it would only give bette I' protection in the future , The
I'tlaxim in such a case would be entitled to but very little weight.
:md mere regard for stabilit.y ought not to be allowed to prevent
a morc perfect admini stration of justice. But when a decision
relates to certain modes of doing bllsinei'ls, which business enters
lal'gely into the transactions of the people, and a change of de-
cision must necessari ly invalioate everything done in the mode
pl'escl'ibed by the first, then, when a decision has once been made
and acted upon for an,Y considel'able length of time, the maxim
becomes imperative, and no court is at liberty to chunge,Jt
They are rules of property on which t he repose of tne countr y
depends; titles acquired under the pl'oceedings of courts of com
petent jurisdiction must be deemed invi olable in collateral action
or none can knOw what i:, his own." From t hence, it is the
sacred duty of a court to adhere to such decisions on property
unless there are the most convincing and overwhelming reasons
for overruling them. 3c That judge who, from petty vanity, a nd
fo r the sake of showing himself more wise and learned than his
predecessors. would overturn a rule , .... hich f or years had settled
t he rights of property should be regarded as t he com m Oll enemy
of mankind, and
l
unworthy of the high trust that had been con
fided to him,31 There would be no reliance wher e precedents
would be nothing more than a precarious temporary security."
C, LimittiOllS of the /Joct1'ill
The doctrine of stare decisis is not altogether absolute
(\1' infl exible, In some instances it can be set aside. But even
;n such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a
new law, but to vindicate the old olle from mi srepresentation.
For if it be found that the fOI'mer decision is manifestly absurd
or unjust. it is declared, not that such a statement was a bad law,
but that what is not reason is not law. In that case, the inter-
pretation becomes the spi rit of the old 18\\,.1" In order that Ii.
court is justified in di sr egal'ding a conditi onally author,itative
... Sutherland, St.at.utolY Constl'uction, 2nd VII!. 2, 1111. 1023.
Grignon's LeSSL't' v. Astor, 2 Howald
Lindsay v. Li ndsny, ..\7 I ndiana 286.
WE' lch v, Sullivun, 8 Cal. J88.
A Hibu V. COlll'US, 81 C:II. 402 .
.. Blackstone, Laws of Enit lund, -Ilh Editi(!n, VoJ. 1, p. 1)2.
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
pl'ecedent, two conditions must be fulfilled, In the first place.
the decision must be a wmng decision, that is, contrary to law.
when there is already in existence an established rille of law on
the point in question, and the decision fails to conform to it. In
the second place, the decision must be a wrong decision, that is,
wrong being contrary to reason. When there is no settled law
to declare and follow, the courts may make law fOl' the occasion,
and in so doing, it is their duty to follow reason, and so far
as they fail to do 80, their decisions are wr ong, and the princi-
ples involved in them are defective authority. Unreasonableness
ia one of t he vice:; of a precedent no less than of a custom and
of certain fOI'ms of subordinate legislation, H
Authori ties agree that there are indeed good r easons why
the doctrine of stare decisis should not be so rigidly applied t:o
the constitutional a!l to othel' laws, In cases of purely private
import, the chief desideratum is that the law I'emain certain,
and, therefore, where ;1 l'Ule nas been judicially declal'ed and
private l'ights created thereunder, the courts will not, .xcept
in the clear est case!) of enol', depart from the doct ri ne of star e
deci sis, 'Vhen, however, public interests are involved. and
tially when the question is one of constitutional construction,
t he matter is otherwise," In the formel' case, mis takes may be
conected either by the higher COUlt 01' by legislation, while in
j'he latter case there ii' no method of cOl'I'ection available except
thyu the ovel'l'uling of a misUlken decision and in
aJl cases, a departure from constitutional interpretat,ions must
be with grave j'easong,'" However, ther e are two iP'ounds of
Justification in departing from even a single decision which has
become a general nile of propel'ty, namely; (a) the nece"sity
of preventing continued injustice; and (b) the necessity of
dicating clear and obvious principles of law,' And so, even if
a rule of property is established by a series of decisions, result-
ing, however, in a dangel'ouS precedent of monopoly, and in
effect setting aside a wholesome provision in the constitut ion
designed to i5uppress sLlch abuse of the rights of j)I'operty, the
rule thus established, may properly be abrogated, by ovelTulillg
the decisions under which it gl'ew LIP to so dangerous, and over-
.. Salmond, Jm'ispl'udencc, 7th Edition, pp, lfl3-1!l-l,
" WillOughby, Constitutional La w, p, 52, ,
" l'Iiatth('ws, The Amel'ican Cons titutional System, p,
" Black, Constitutional Law, p, 81, 3rd Edition,
" l. ion v, Burtis!!, 20 J ohns 487,
PHI LIPPINE: LAW JOURNAL
whelming an influence in contravention of public policy,' "
also, any error may be con ected when no substantial in jUl1' is
to be expected! from the change, or when the evi ls of adherence
are manifestly gre,ater than t hose of departm'e, 1 n this case,
t he consideration is the e\'entual result-s,' "
Anot her limitation should nlso be born in mind, The doc-
trine of star e decisis, is only applicable, in its full force, within
the tenilol'ial jurisdiction of the courts making the decision.
:-ince t here alone can such decisions be "egarded as having esrab-
iished any rules. Rulings made llllder a similar legal systE>m
t'lsewhere may be cited and r especter! fa ,' their reasons. but al'e
not necessarily to be accepted as guides. except in so far as those
reasons commend t hemseh-es to the judicial mind. Great Bri
tain and the t hi r teen states had each substantially the same sys-
tem of comnwll Jaw origi nally. and a decision now by Olle of the
". igher courts of Great Britain as to what the common law is
upon every point is cel'taitlly entiUed to great \'es pecl in any
of t he states, though not necessal'i ly to be accepted m; hinding
fluthori ty any more than the in anyone of the other
states upon the same pointy
H , on Ihe J) fJcll'ine
Some of t he ob,jections put forth by cl'itics against the ap-
plicati on of the doctrine of decisis are:
Firstly, case law is law made by judges and not b}' the peo-
ple. It shou1d be noticed, however . t.hat in all constitutions of
all modern states, provisions exist. ass uring t.he impartiality ann
integl"i ty of t he judges on pain of removal. The judge must
consider the requirements of fai r dealing, even at the expense
of popul ar disapproval. Altho the fact remains that case Ja\\"
is t he product of judges and not by t he people, yet it is not so
much a defect but a characteristic of
Secondly. case law cannot refOl'm t he law by abolition of
unwanted ,ules. It can only add an increasing number of ex
cept!ons to exiE;ting r ules, thus increasing the compl e..xity of a
legal system,
Thirdly. as Bentham objected, case law is "dog law" ill that
t he infringer of rule only becomes consciolls of his errOl" aftel'
.. San Fl"anc.isco \' . S. V. W, W, 48, Cal. 509,
"' Well!;. The of Rell Adjudicata &- Stal"(" p, 576.
"Cooley, Const itutional Limitations, 7th Ed" II. 85,
" Keelon. Elem, Principles of J ul"ispl"udenet!, Jlp. 68-69.
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECI S IS
the infringement has t a.ken place. and so, in some cases at least
he would no (lpporlllnity whatever of avoiding wrong,
doing,
Lastly, it s hould be noticed that not everything contained
in a judicial decision is in strictne!:s a binding of law, but
only so much as is necessary for the formation of a decision by
t he judge upon the facts before
h!\ve been restive under the angry criticism to which
lhey have been s lIbjeded and' have J'eacted in one of thr ee ways :
either by defiantly maintaint ing stare decisis, by painfully
tionalizing it, or by boldly rejecting it. It often happens,
er, that the defiant maintenance and bold reject ion al'e both
merely SCI'eelli' behind which COL1rts in fact <1'0 the opposite of
what they
HI. STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE OF STARt: DECISIS IN
VAR IOUS JURISDICTION
A. ROllHtn J uri.'{J)/-ude1IcI'
Tn the Roman sy:;tem, precedents most celtainly were not
binding until the t ime of Augustus, but the righlusually known
:I S j11.,) l'eRp011(le1urf. confcned upon certai n eminent jl11'j sts.
seems to have made the precedents embodyi ng their replieR bind-
illg. Justi ni an himself expressly forbade any "inter pretation"
or hi s legislation, judicial 01' otherwise, and altho this
Hon proved impossible in practice, precedents wer e never
t: d as binding und'er the Jater
B. SOI/lf'l Conl,i, /(, jIf,,", hlri.slJ1'IU/(,IICC
I n Ger ma ny. during the l\ l iddle Ages, there was con1'ider
.. ble de\'e!opment of ca1' C law, but t.his :"ouree. in more recent
times; haR been allowed 10 fall largely out of usc. Tn Fnlllce,
judicin) decisi on>, al'e not regarded a!> binding; t he Ci vil Code
expressly forbids the use of pl'ecedents, the idea in thi" case
being obviou!ily the l'i ame a.'i Justinian's-thl.\t the code s hould
be the sole authori tative source of The codes of Pr ussia
<lnd AnstI'ia expl'esi<ly pruvide that judgment shall not have t he
fc; r ce of law. Altho t he codes of and Belgium are si lent
" Ibid .. p. 69 .
.. Ibid., p. 69.
"lax Radin, California Law Review, Feb, 1933,
.. Keeton, El em. Prin. of Jurispruden<:e. p. 66.
Ibi!., p, 66,
PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL
on the point. their tendency is that pl'evioli s decis ions are
:;iructive but not allthorit"ltive. "
Spain does not seem to adhere to stare decisis. Before
J312, the function of the judiciHl' Y was to apply the plai n words
llf t he law to cases pl'esented before them, The judges \Ver'e
fC01'bidden to, give opinions and in case.'; of doubtful nature they
were to consult the king who will settle t he matter once for all. $S
But by the enactment of the Constitution of 1812, the Spanish
courts were reorgan ized and t he Supreme Cour t was given the
power to review by means of the "l'ecli l' so de l1ulidad" all
cases, civi l and criminal. decided by infer ior courts. But this
practice wa:. abolished hy t he Ro.val Decree of J une 23. 1778,
Later, the practice of re\'iew WHS again revived by t he "Enjui-
t'lamiento Mc.I'cantil" wh ich required the mel'cantil tribunals to
lllsel't in their decisions the ground:! whether of law 01' fact upon
which their detel'minations were based. This pract,ice was fol.
lowed by the other of the ki ngdom by vir t ue of the Royal
Decr ee of November 4, 1838. Then came the "Ley de Enjuicia.
miento" of 1856 which provided among other t hings that all deci
handed down by all court s s hall distinctly state the grounds
upon which t. hey are based. and t hat all such decisions mUf:.t be
published in t.he "Gazeta de IHadl'id" . III spite of this legal prO-
the judges contin ued t.o decide cases according to the pe-
culiarities and ci rcumstances without t urning back to what had
been (lecided before: lawyers did
l
not til1d ready and practical
help fr om what were published in t he gazette and for that rea
son the de\'elopment of t he law of precedent retarded,
This historical account point s plainly to the fact that nO
J'orcc was given to pl'e\' iotl" decisions as gui ding precedents in
Spain. And this is best proved by citing Al1.icle 6 of lhe
Spanish Civil Code which m'l kes no mention of judicial decisions
;):< one of the sou rces of law and therefore t he controlling facto]'
III the di sposition of a case, This omission prompted the learned
commentator, Sanchez Roman t o comment that "thel'e ill :'111 ap-
pa rent lack of logic in the draft ing" of t ht! Spanish Civil
Thi s is to be expected Spanish jlll'ispl'uclence is based
upon the Civil Law of Rome which disr egards previous deci
;: iolls COl' present adjudications.
Holland, Jurisprudence, pp. 68-69.
Ordenan7.8 de Alcala, Book I, Titl e 28 .
... Sanchez Roman, Treatise on the Civil Code, Vol. 2, ' p.
TtlF. DOCTRI NE OF STARE DECISIS
C, E110lish htri.'{l)1'{ule-nce
The hi story of the Common Law reven[s that in enriy times
the pl'acticE' of deciding ca,o: es by precedents was unknown to
the English judges, Later, howeyel', for r easons of convenience
and expediency, they allowed litigant!:; to cite c.a:;es in court to
l1 upport theil' l'espcctive claims, This pl'actice began during the
reign of Edward I altho the decisions were :;tated by Lord Hale
to be "less than law, though greater evidence ther eof than the
opinion of any private person." W Bracton'8 use of cases is by
Way of illustration merely; the Yearbooks collect togethel' cases
(01' reference and study because they wel'e .intel'esting. By the
seventeenth century, anel at the time of Coke, precedents have
become fu lJ y binding. The era of Lord Mansfield with hi s spe
cially tmined juries may be said to mark the Age of
English Case Law. At this per iod, pl'ece(l ent is indubitably the
most importaut of English law, At the present time,
precedents are aR fu!),\' binding as at any period in their his-
tory. but their importance aR a source of law has been consider
ably diminished! thru the enormous increase of
But while this iR truc, courts r emain tied to t he rule of pre-
cedents.
D. Ame1'iculI Jurispl'udence.
The policy of the ear ly American cOllrts with r egard to
previous decision was the same as t.hat of the Bl'itish courts at.
that time andl was followcd without qualification fo r -yea r s ann
:vears duri ng the English sovereignty over the American colo-
nies, However, the declarati on of independence of the colonies
marked a completely new era in American jurisprudence, Since
t hen, thel'c .o,;eem to be a tendency in American courts to deviate
from the "iew;.: of Briti sh courts and had relaxed the doctrine
of stare deci sis. On t his point, Chief Justice Marshall sa id:
'; The inter pretation of British statutes adopted in the States
are not with absolute authority, lf the British courts vary
thei r constl' uctiol1 of a statute which is common to both coun
tries, we do not hold ourselves bound to flu ctuate with lhem."
Deci sions of the United Sbltes Supreme Court as to ques
tions which al'e federal in natur e are bindillg upon all courts in
the United States, wllethel' Jedel' al or state COUl'ts., But in
cases not aris.ing fr om the construction of the constitution, laws,
" Holland, Jurisprudence, p. 69 .
Keeton, EJem. Prin. of J urisprud'nce, Pr>o G667,
,. CBtheal1. V. 5 Pet . 280.
416 PH/L1PPI:-':E LAW JuURNAL
.tne! treat.ie,. of the tederal government, the decis ion . ., of till'
Sup,-eme Court of the L-nited fire not bindi ng upon the
supl'('me courtR qf the :<everaJ States of the Union as prece-
dcnts,"" The l'ule in courts of coordinate jurisdiction consti
lutint-! IJtlt it i'.ingle Ry:< tcm ji'. !h:it a decision in one sha\! be can
lroiling in the other, until l'eyer:<ed b.\' the appellate court. I
Without the aiel nf federal constitution <ind the iegi!51atioll
of ('ungl'cs!':, n?gl1l<iting the interstate eHed (,I' lJublic acts, ,'e-
cor ds. I'l.nd ,1udicial proceedinJ,t;;, the judgment' and decrees of
each Stille would be regarded a" for eign judgments in the COUl't::;
of e"pr.\' other :;tale and their effect would have to bf' deter-
mined by the plinciples of international la\\-. by lhe preponder-
'Ulc' of judicial npinions, al' by :-s uch other cOIl15ider:.lt.iOll a!; al'e
infiuenl hll in fixing the statui'. of judicial rccor ds brought from
foreign land:-.
J
But decision:,; of Slate ,:upreme COlll't:; are
binding lIjlOll inferior courts of t he sa me State.'"
IV, STAr:!!: DECISIS P HIl.!I' PI:o.JE
A. S!II tl',o of the Ph ililmiul!.,<
_\ ... wa':! "<tOlLed by J u.:; tite There is in the Philip-
pine lsland:-; a unique legal :'i.\':-tem, ill which the two great
:-:,treams of the law t he civil . the legacy of Rome to Spain, com-
ilJg from the West. and the common, the inheritance of lhe
Cnited Slate" from Great Britain, applied by American writ-
ten coming' fl'om the Ea:-:I have met and blended_'"
Our civil I;{\\' i!'l mo:<tl...- of ol'igin: QlIt' pl'ocedllral
la\\,:-; aI'' altogether American, I n the interpl'etati on of the:.:c
la\\-s we re;;;urt to theil' :>ulI l'ce (d Origill and adopt i[ not
ab.'O(lhltel.\' identical construction. For it i:'1 n general rule thnt
whel e :.! State adopt,. a "tatulr d a nother State:; , it adopt .. ;11:::0
the cunsu'uction placed nil l!l:tt ::latute by the ClJlll'i ,;; of the
Slates, be('<:llse it is r cgnnled 11 conc1l1:; i\-e pl't''''t1mption thaT
the legi.:;iatllr. in the act, knew what con.';tl'llCtion had
Itt'ell placed UlJon it by the court,.; of the State whf't1ce it \Va."
horrowed:' OUl' hound by the !'uling . ..;; of the
StlJH'eme COUl't of the Ullited State:; in C(Ill!'ll'uing and applying
:-;tatut.Ol-Y ellnct.mell t$ m()delled upon ur l;ol' l' uwed from Engli sh
,., ". ChamiKol's :,;j Cal. 1;;15 .
" . G(H'I'cy lOG Fet!' 11.
... Tay/oJ' v, B>l l' l'"n, li4 A!!l{'Ylcan DcCil'IOll:;; 28L
"" Wi ggin!! Pen's C .... '-. Chic:n((, Rd. ('0" ] J Fer!. :UH .
.. Guml)oll , Ek'ml,nt:u'y Law, II. :l2. citing .Justice i\Iuk ... lm.
'" Berni" v. n .ehe,, I 2018,
THE DOCTlHNE: OF S T.\HJ.; DEnS1S
117
and American or iginal:;.' " That a doctrine establit;hed b)' Amer-
if'an .Jurisprudence, not cont\'adicted ..
will be accepted h,v the Supreme Cuu!'C"" And abo, in the ah
of local la\\' , the 01' the Supreme Cour t of the
l 'nited States based upon general principle" of commercial IttW
il.re binding upon the Supr eme Court of the Philippine Tsht nds,'"
Wit h thi s state. of ou r legal ;.;y!'lem where two di ffe rent
jul'ispl' udence al'e equall y cont]'olling, it difficult to make a
general conclusion as t(1 what is the !'>tatll,:: of the doctrine of
, tal'e decis
i
::; in OUI' iUl'i::;dictlOn. Before ventul'ing fo!' an an-
S\\'e]', it will be advisable to ]'e\-]ew the few cases on sta]'C rle_
!'i sis decided by OUI' ;.;upl'eme CC!II't. Afte)' that. thp reade)'
,;hall , I hope, have 1'1. better ;md more plHlI,;ihle ]'cve!ation than
mine, as to the attitude u1 our Supreme Court with respect to
the doetl'ine now under CO!lsid('ration,
B. S()11/1' Philippi., f' C".<;c Oil Stal'e Decisis
( a) f{ IU'1U:r(! , Stll',,1 & Cn. t', lllli/J/m (',,/l eel m' of ('IIHtIlO/lo.; _
12 Phil. J7,-T he pl a intiff,; imported cel'hlin cotton gnocj:.: in
these Isla nd",; in 1906 upon which the Co\lcctOl' of Customs im-
posed a dll ty of 18 "i- pel' ki lo accol'ding to Article 11 7 of the
;.a l'iff laws, pIll ::' <. SlIl'tax of 30'r, The plaintiff cOlltendecl
that t he sm' tax could not be legally imposed upon goodi'i be-
e,llse thai part of Article 117 pro\-jcling for all additional sur-
tax, ]'efers to stamped, pr;nted, 01' manufactu rcd with
d,ved yam a nd not to textilf'S which al'e plain and wilhout
nj[U)' es, The defendant. 011 the othcThand contende(1 thnt the
contr al'Y interpretation was followed sine!! :\o\'. 12, ]901 and
l ilerefol'e ought not to be fl'C' m , Thc ccntention flf thf'
plnintiff did not prosper in the Court of First Instance and sO
he appealed but t he Supreme COllrt the vic\\' of the
;uwer, sayi ng: "It i::; a I'lile es-tablished in the interpl'etation
(If' Custom laws that when:' there ha:- been a long acquie.5CellCe ill
a regulation by which the right of part ie" 1'0]' yen I'" have he:>!1
riete l'mined and <ldjusted, !"ur:h intel'pretatiml be followed
in the a bsence of the cogent nnd pCI'l'>ual'>ive !'CafHHl;;; to thl?
contrary. "
(b) J1ollf(l))O C, 1I/,'>1I/tl) (;(1/"/ .. l.! Phil. ,' .:i'4.-This ca"r
cHllcd fo r the construction of an Act of Congl'eils regardi ng till::
... Cuyugan v. Sant(ls, 34 Phil. WO,
Aldez \'. Gay, 7 Phil. 268 .
... Loudon Co, v. Amel'icHn BUllk, 7 Phil. 255,
rHILIPPI NF. LAW .JOURNAL
socalled "Manglares" in the The Supreme Court
t he following construction: "Under the unceltain 311d
somewhat unsatisfactory cond ition of the law, the custom had
grown up of converting "Mangla"es" and nipa lands into fishe-
ries which became a common feature of settlements a long the
coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty consti-
tuted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which custom. would destroy vested rights and
cause a public disaster. 1n our opi nion it was the object of
Congress not to work such a result, but on the contrary, in fur-
therance of t he of the Treaty of Paris to recognize
l!nd safeguard such p"()pe,'ty."
(c) McGilT 1' . 30 Phil. 568.-This was a case
;n which the const itutionality of Act 1627 of the Philippine leg-
isl atul'e was jnvol\'ed. This Act was previouslr applied and
followed by the Supreme COUl't itself, but its illegality was
never raised before. The Supr eme Court disregarding aU pre-
vious decis ioll l':' declared tbe Act to be unconstitutional because
it said, that t he question of' constitutionality was passed Hsub
silencio".
(d) In the Matf.cr fit tll(' Involwd(l1"!1 hmo/veney of Rafael
/-' (')'/wndez, G. R. No . . 'J8398.-The issue in this case is whether
or not the claims of 1 he Philippine Trllst Company and Smith.
Rell and Company, Ltd .. in its capacity trustee of the pro-
pertie::: of t he San Ni co\:.li' iron Works, Ltd. , pl'esented in the In-
voluntary insolvency proecedings of Rafael Fernandez, should
be ci<lssifi(!d as OI'dilulI'Y or prefcned. A resolution of the is-
!me in tUI'Il depends on an to the question of whether or
1I 0t claims not classified a" under the Insolvency Law,
gclin a specia l right of priority unde, t he Civil Code. This ques-
Lion has all'end.\' been decided in a fOl'mer case. Involuntal'Y
In.solvency of Mariano & Co., 1930, XXIX O. G. 2868,
\vhei'e it held that the p,'eiel'entilli l'ight of the civil law
should be trcatcd ag approximately equivalent to the lien of
the Lnw :mel that the :>taf.utory pI'eferenccs furnished
bl.' the Civil C/Jdc were not dcstroyed by the Imiolvency Law.
spite of the decision in l hat Vela..;co ca)o;e, the Supreme Court
in the p"csent case disl'egal'Cied it, holding that claims not clas-
;.;ifierl as pl'eferred uncleI' the Insolvency Law cannot be thus
classified with the aid of the Civil Code and gain no special
right of priority under the Insolvency Law which is exclusively
t'ontl'olling.
'rUE DOCTRINE OF' STARE DECl Sls
-'11\)
The Court stated fu r ther: "Is the Court with new membet'
ship compelled to follow blindly the doctrine of the Velasco
case? The rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect. Stabil-
ity in t he law, pl1rticularly in the business field, js desirable.
But .idolatrous reverence for precedent, simply as pJ'ecedent.
no longer rules, More important t han anything else is that the
court shoul d be right. And particularly is it not wise to sub-
OJ'dinate legal t'eaSOll to case law uno by so doing perpetuate
eITOI' when it is brought to mind that the views now expressed
conform in principle to the original and' that since the first de
cision to t he contrary was set forth there has existed a respect-
able opinion of non-conformity in the Court. Tndeed, on at
least on one occasion has the court bt'oken away f rom t he l'C-
\-amped doctrine, while even in the last case.in point t he COU l' t
was as evenly divided as it was possible to be andl still reach a
decision," (Pel' lVlalcolm, with J ustices Santos, Hull, Vickers,
Butte, nnd Diaz concurring, Justices Imperial, Villa-Real, alld
AVanceiia, dissented fl'om the decision),
V, CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
The doctrine of stare decis is is the authority of judicini de-
cisions as precedents in subsequent li tigations. To afford to
the citi zen a sound administration of justice is the just.ification
of its existence, Cel-tainly, stability, and symmetry in any sys-
tem of jurisprudence al'e the necessary r esults of its applica-
tion, But the r ule is not inflexible; it may be di sr egarded when
the evils of adherence are manifestly greater than those of de"
parture, Thus, d'ecisiolls on constitutional question are mor e
liable to changes than decisions on property rights.
Common taw have venerated the doctrine; civilluw
countr ies have shown disrespect fOJ' it, In Philippine jurispru-
dence, t he status of the doctrine of stare decisis is uncertain.
Our Supl'eme COLlrt had applied the doct r ine in the paRt al tho
recent cases have been decided in the contnll'Y,
The writer suggests that om' hi gh tribunal set certain fixed
ldndmarks .in t heil' decisions, approaching correctness, though
not per fection, of com'Re f or the deter mination af.\ to when the
doctrine of stare decisis should appl y. A provision in t he con-
stitution h; not necessary, But a cOll sistellt and well defined
attitude on the part of the court is indispensable,