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Dissonance-Congruence and the Perception of Public Opinion

Author(s): Kenneth W. Eckhardt and Gerry Hendershot


Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Sep., 1967), pp. 226-234
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Dissonance-Congruence and the Perception of Public Opinion'
Kenneth W. Eckhardt and Gerry Hendershot
ABSTRACT
The discrepancy between prevailing public opinion and what various community mem-
bers estimate as public opinion has traditionally been explained through either the social or
psychological characteristics of respondents. In this paper we attempt to account for degrees
of public-opinion awareness through a model based on the relationships among an indi-
vidual's opinion, his cognitive set, and the majority opinion of public members. A theory of
imbalance is developed and tested in the context of public opinion in a college community.
Public opinion on social issues is seldom
unanimous, and, while its development is a
collective process, not all individuals con-
tribute equally to its formation, nor are all
members of the public equally informed as
to the character and direction of the com-
posite opinion.2 The discrepancy between
one's estimate of public opinion and the
actual distribution of opinion in the com-
munity has been the focal point of research
for several decades.3 Working primarily
within the traditions of their own fields,
psychologists and sociologists have been
developing complementary but disparate
theories in an attempt to explain the differ-
ential assessments of public opinion held
by individuals. Theorists approaching the
problem within the framework of psychol-
ogy have tended to emphasize attitudinal
and personality components in their search
for explanatory variables,4 while theorists
in the tradition of sociology have stressed
interaction variables and especially the in-
dividual's position in the communication
network.5
As the evidence has accumulated, it has
become increasingly evident that as self-
contained theories neither approach offers
much promise. It is generally established
that attitudinal and personality components
enter into an individual's perception and
assimilation of information6 and that situ-
'
We gratefully acknowledge the financial assist-
ance provided by the Committee on Faculty Devel-
opment at the College of Wooster.
2
Conceptually the term "public opinion" is
ambiguous. Although most theorists recognize the
social-interaction dimension in the development
of public opinion, the concept has been opera-
tionally defined in a variety of ways, e.g., (1)
as the summation of individual opinions on a social
issue, (2) what individuals think are the opinions
of others, and (3) what a collectivity of individuals
has quasi-formally decided to be the "view" of the
public. In this article we treat public opinion
as the summation of individual opinions on a social
issue as they have been shaped by social interaction.
For discussions of the theoretical and methodologi-
cal issues in the concepts "public" and "public
opinion," see G. D. Wiebe, "Some Implications
of Separating Opinions from Attitudes," Public
Opinion Quarterly, XVII (Fall, 1953), 328-52;
H. H. Hyman, "Towards a Theory of Public
Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXI (Spring,
1957), 54-60; and E. Freidson, "Prerequisite for
Participation in the Public Opinion Process," Public
Opinion Quarterly, XIX (Summer, 1958), 91-106.
3
The most recent treatment of the problem
appears to be W. Breed and T. Ktsanes, "Pluralistic
Ignorance in the Process of Opinion Formation,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, XXV (Winter, 1961),
382-92.
'An adequate review of psychological variables
and processes is contained in Arthur R. Cohen,
Attitude Change and Social Influence (New York:
Basic Books, 1964).
'An enlightened sociological perspective is pre-
sented by J. WV. Riley and M. W. Riley, "Mass
Communication and the Social System" in
R. Merton et al. (eds.), Sociology Today (New
York: Basic Books, 1959), pp. 537-78.
6D. Kretch, R. S. Crutchfield, and E. Ballachey,
Individual in Society (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1962), pp. 17 ff.
226
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DISSONANCE-CONGRUENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION 227
ational and interactional variables influence
the individual's exposure to communica-
tion.7 What is required, therefore, if we
are to move toward explaining the differen-
tial assessments of public opinion held by
individual members, is a general theory
which incorporates both perspectives. Such
a theory must be flexible enough to include
both psychological and sociological vari-
ables and yet remain logically consistent
and empirically sound. In this paper we
attempt to provide such a theory.
Our purpose is to present a theoretical
model which generalizes the findings of past
research and permits the deduction of em-
pirically testable hypotheses. The body of
the paper is divided into two sections: Part
I is concerned with theory construction,
while Part II presents empirical data sup-
portive of the model.
I. GENERAL THEORY
The model proposed herein is constructed
on the basis of two familiar and widely
accepted assumptions.8 While it is recog-
nized that the assumptions require qualifi-
cation in certain contexts, they are stated
in a universally valid form for purposes of
discourse. Assumption 1: Individuals seek
to validate their attitudes, opinions, and
behaviors. Assumption 2: Individuals seek
to make related attitudes, opinions, and be-
haviors consistent.
Assumption 1 accepts as valid the social
psychological notion that individuals are
continually engaged in a process of relating
their ideas and behaviors to experience.
When one speaks of an individual as seek-
ing to validate his behaviors (mental or
physical), the reference is to the notion
that the individual is continually referring
his behaviors to either (1) cognitive pat-
terns he has developed through socializa-
tion, (2) group opinions, values, and norms
which serve as points of reference, or (3)
both cognitive patterns and group opinions,
values, and norms.
The level of validation or support re-
quired by an individual is, of course, varia-
ble and is related to (1) the significance of
the behavior to past cognitions and (2) the
relevance and centrality of the behavior
to membership-reference groups.
Assumption 2 provides the necessary mo-
tive power for the individual to either (1)
reorganize his cognitive set or (2) orient
himself to new reference groups if a dis-
crepancy occurs between his action and
sources of validation.
These assumptions and their implications
permit the development of a four-cell para-
digm which locates the position of an in-
dividual for any given point in time.9
RELATIONSHIP OF RELATIONSHIP OF BEHAVIOR TO
BEHAVIOR TO COGNITIVE SET
GROUP OPINIONS,
NORMS, AND
VALUES Consonant Dissonant
Congruent..... Consonant- Dissonant-
congruent congruent
(situation a) (situation b)
Non-congruent. Consonant- Dissonant-
non-congru- non-congru-
ent (situation ent (situation
c) d)
An examination of the paradigm reveals
that it is constructed on the basis of rela-
tionships which exist between the individu-
al's behavior and (1) his past cognitions
and (2) reference-group opinions, values,
9 In this paper we are not concerned with the
dynamics of opinion change but only the in-
dividual's ability to assess public opinion at a
given time. Only in situation a, however, is the
individual not under some pressure (either psy-
chological, social, or both) to change his position.
7A summary of structural variables can be found
in R. E. Lane and D. 0. Sears, Public Opinion
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964),
pp.
33 fif.
8 These assumptions are drawn from the literature
and are given extended treatment in the theories
of Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Disso-
nance (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957);
Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Re-
lations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958);
and C. E. Osgood and P. H. Tannebaum, "The
Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude
Change," Psychological Review, LXII (1955), 42-
55.
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228 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
and norms. Where an individual's behavior
finds support in his cognitions, the relation-
ship is one of consonance; where it does
not, it is one of dissonance. Where an in-
dividual's behavior finds support in group
opinions, values, or norms, the relationship
is one of congruence; where it does not, it
is one of non-congruence.
A hypothetical illustration of these events
is provided below.
Type
Consonant- The discriminatory opinion of
congruent a prejudiced southern white
(situation a) is consonant with his cog-
nitive set and congruent
with southern public opin-
ion.
Dissonant- The discriminatory opinion of
congruent a non-prejudiced southern
(situation b) white is dissonant with his
cognitive set but congruent
with southern public opin-
ion.
Consonant-non- The liberal opinion of a non-
congruent prejudiced southern white is
(situation c) consonant with his cogni-
tive set but non-congruent
with southern public opin-
ion.
Dissonant-non- The liberal opinion of a prej-
congruent udiced southern white is
(situation d) dissonant with his cogni-
tions and non-congruent
with southern public opin-
ion.
According to the assumptions on which
this paradigm has been constructed, the
consonant-congruent individual is the only
person who finds it possible to validate his
opinion on both dimensions. Individuals
who find themselves in any of the three
remaining situations-(b, c, and d) dis-
sonant-congruent, consonant-non-congru-
ent, or dissonant-non-congruent-are in
either a partial or total state of imbalance
-that is, they lack support either from
cognitive set or public opinion or from
both.10
Since we have posited that the individual
finds the state of imbalance psychologically
and socially uncomfortable, we infer that
the individual will attempt to reduce the
imbalance in predictable ways. As we are
primarily interested in the relationship be-
tween individual opinion and public opin-
ion, we analyze the situation of an individ-
ual who holds an opinion which may or may
not be in balance with his cognitive set and
public opinion (group values and norms).
In situation a (consonant-congruent),
the individual's opinion can be validated
by reference to either his cognitive set or
public opinion. Since his opinion is con-
sonant with his cognitive set, he experi-
ences no psychological strain, and since his
opinion is congruent with public opinion,
whatever interaction he has with others who
share similar views only reinforces his own
position. Unless his position in the social
system requires an assessment of the public
position, there exists little or no need for
him to actively ascertain and assess the
position of others." In terms of psycho-
logical utility, the individual is under no
pressure to determine accurately the dis-
tribution of public opinion, since such
knowledge is of little reinforcement value.
In situation b (dissonant-congruent),
the individual's opinion can be validated
only along one dimension: its relationship
to public opinion. As the individual has
offered an opinion contrary to his cogni-
tive set, he experiences discomfort. This
discomfort or dissonance, however, can be
reduced, if not eliminated, by seeking the
support of others. Since we have posited
a relationship of congruency, the individ-
ual fi-nds it rewarding to assess the opinion
'?Here we are considering only the relationship
between personal opinion and public opinion.
Although the individual may lack support from the
public, he may find support in other membership-
reference groups.
'
Clearly some individuals find it more nec-
essary to be informed of group public opinion
than others. See K. Chowdhry and T. M. New-
comb, "The Relative Abilities of Leaders and
Non-Leaders to Estimate Opinions of Their Own
Groups," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy-
chology, XLVII (1952), 51-57.
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DISSONANCE-CONGRUENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION 229
of the public. In fact, the more aware he
becomes of the congruence between his
opinion and the opinions of others, the
greater the validation or support he obtains
for his own opinion. Other conditions be-
ing equal, therefore, individuals in a dis-
sonant-congruent relationship have greater
reason to be more aware of the distribution
of public opinion than persons in a con-
sonant-congruent relationship.
Persons in situations c and d differ mark-
edly in their relationships from persons in
situations a and b. In situation c, the indi-
vidual's opinion and cognitive set are con-
sonant, but he is non-congruent with public
opinion. The more visible his deviance, the
greater the negative sanctions he experi-
ences from the public. Not only are nega-
tive sanctions increased with the visible
display of deviance through interaction, but
the greater extent to which the public
serves as a reference group, the greater his
psychological discomfort. His discomfort is
reduced by validating his opinion with his
cognitive set and by remaining ignorant of
public opinion and avoiding interaction on
this issue. Whatever motivation the indi-
vidual originally possessed for determining
public opinion is reduced through contact
with the public. In a sense, awareness of
public opinion is psychologically and so-
cially punishing. Consonant-non-congruent
individuals are therefore less likely to be
informed concerning public opinion than
consonant-congruents who in turn are less
aware than dissonant-congruents.
Individuals who find themselves in situ-
ation d (dissonant-non-congruent) are con-
fronted with a double dilemma. Validation
for their opinions can be found neither
through reference to their cognitive set nor
through reference to public opinion. Per-
sons in this situation are likely to be un-
stable in their opinions, cognitive sets, or
reference groups. Precisely which relation-
ship will change and under what conditions
is subject to a variety of variables, and
their examination is beyond the scope of
this paper. For reasons developed above,
however, the dissonant-non-congruent is
unlikely to seek out public opinion, and his
assessment of its distribution will be mis-
informed or distorted. As he is also con-
fronted with a discrepancy between opin-
ion and cognitive set, we can predict in-
stability and a general unwillingness to
consciously focus on the issue being dis-
cussed by the public.
The general hypothesis generated from
the theory concerning the rank order of
prediction is as follows: Assuming structur-
al equivalence of social position and access
to communication, dissonant-congruents
should be the best estimators of public opin-
ion, while dissonant-non-congruents should
be the least informed. The rank-order pre-
diction for persons in situations a and c is
less clear since they are intermediate types,
but the theory suggests that consonant-
congruents should be better predictors of
public opinion than consonant-non-con-
gruents, since information acquired by the
latter is punitive and serves only to increase
discomfort. The rank order for prediction
of public opinion is hypothesized to be as
follows: best predictors: (1) dissonant-con-
gruents, (2) consonant-congruents, (3)
consonant-non-congruents; poorest predic-
tors: (4) dissonant-non-congruents. Hav-
ing developed the theory, the remainder
of this paper is devoted to the presentation
of empirical data testing the model.
II. AN EMPIRICAL TEST
In order to test the rank-order predic-
tions genera)ted by the theory, it was neces-
sary to collect data on one dependent and
two independent variables. The dependent
variable was the accuracy of an individual's
estimate of public opinion, while the in-
dependent variables were the individual's
cognitive set and his opinion on a given
issue.
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
To collect the necessary data, a question-
naire was constructed and administered to
a stratified random sample of two hundred
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230 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
undergraduates at a midwestern coeduca-
tional liberal-arts college in the fall of 1965.
The variables under consideration were
operationally defined and measured in the
following ways.
Cognitive set.-Prior to the collection of
data, a series of opinion items was sub-
mitted to a panel of judges composed of
students and faculty (N = 80). From this
series, the panel selected ten items which
in their judgment formed a cognitive pat-
tern, that is, were internally consistent
along a liberal-conservative dimension. As
a reliability check on adequacy and con-
sistency, the items were pretested on sev-
enty-five students. Respondents in the pre-
test were scored and Likert-scaled accord-
ing to their responses on the items.'2 Using
the upper and lower quartiles as test aggre-
gates, the items were deemed adequate as
an index to liberal-conservative cognitive
set, since no item possessed a discriminative
power of less than .90.
In similar manner, the two hundred re-
spondents in the final sample were scored
and Likert-scaled according to their re-
sponses to the test items. Respondents in
the upper quartile of the Likert scale were
classified as possessing a liberal cognitive
set and respondents in the lower quartile
as possessing a conservative cognitive set.
Individual opinion.-Personal opinion
for each respondent was measured by his
response to the ten opinion items. Respond-
ents were asked to indicate the strength of
their opinions for each item on a four-point
scale ranging from strong endorsement to
strong opposition. Endorsement or non.
endorsement of the item measured his
opinion on the issue.
Public opinion.-The distribution of
public opinion for each issue,considered by
the sample was computed by summing indi-
vidual opinions on the items. Using the ran-
dom sample (N = 200) as a base, the pa-
rameters of public opinions in the college
community (N = 1482) were estimated.
By treating each item as a social issue
around which publics were forming, the
distribution of ten public opinions was as-
certained.
Table 1 presents the items utilized in
measuring cognitive set,'3 individual opin-
ion, and the strength and direction of public
opinion.
Public-opinion estimates.-For each item
on which a respondent recorded his own
opinion, he was also asked to estimate the
percentage of students in the college com-
munity who would basically agree with the
stated opinion. In this way it was possible
to measure the strength and direction of
public opinion of ten issues as they were
perceived by the respondents in the sample.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The first step in analysis consisted of
classifying individuals according to the re-
lationship between personal opinion and
public opinion. The relationship was con-
gruent when an individual's views were in
the same direction on a given issue as the
majorty of the population. The relationship
was non-congruent when an individual's
views were in the opposite direction from
the majority of the population.
This procedure entailed an important as-
sumption. We assumed an empirical equiva-
lence between 'the notion of reference group
and public. Our decision to classify indi-
viduals as congruent or non-congruent to
the public as a reference group follows from
that assumption. From a theoretical per-
spective, the concepts "reference group" and
"public" are neither conterminous nor mu-
tually exclusive. Standard usage in sociolog-
ical theory indicates that reference groups
are real or imaginary collectivities utilized
by the individual for self-evaluation and
goal direction,'4 while a public is viewed
'
W. J. Goode and P. K. Hatt, Methods in
Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Co., 1952), pp. 270 ff.
13 Endorsement of items A, D, E, H, and I and
opposition to items B, C, F, G, and J measured
the conservative cognitive set, while the reverse
pattern constituted the liberal cognitive set.
"'See, e.g., Tamotsu Shibutani, Society and
Personality: An Interactionist Approach to Social
Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1961), pp. 249 ff.
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DISSONANCE-CONGRUENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION 231
as a large number of persons interacting on
a socially open issue through initiating and
reacting to communications and opinions.'5
It follows that when public opinion is
formed, individuals may utilize the public
as a reference group. The empirical ques-
tion is whether a particular public is serv-
ing as a reference group for the individual.
We have taken the position that, for our
sample of college students, fellow student
peers serve as both the public and the refer-
ence group. The utility of this assumption
has been demonstrated in several articles
in order to explain empirical findings.16 The
basis for assuming an identity between
reference group and public in our own
study stems from the characteristics of the
institution and population from which the
sample was drawn.'7
From the theory developed in Part I of
this paper, we hypothesized that congruents
are more accurate estimators of the direc-
tion of public opinion than non-congruents.
Table 2 presents the resulting distribution.
An examination of Table 2 reveals that
congruents in general were more accurately
informed than non-congruents concerning
the distribution of public opinion. On the
basis of interaction theory, congruents
TABLE 1
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC OPINION ON TEN
SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE COLLEGE
COMMUNITY (N = 200)
Strengtb of
Majority
Opinion
Direction of
Majority Opinion
(Per Cent)
Statements majority agreed with:
A. The United States has a definite
responsibility to the free world
to prevent the spread of com-
munism .................... 36
B. Red China must be admitted to
the United Nations if we are to
move toward establishing a
lasting
world
peace .......... 70
C. The President of the United
States should use the power of
his office to influence the price
policies of our major industries
whenever necessary .......... 53
D. The Medicare program would
be a better program if it were
not compulsory for all citizens 59
Statements majority disagreed with:
E. Even if the majority of the
members of the United Nations
favor the admission of Red
China, the United States should
continue to oppose Red China's
admission ................... 74
F. The seat on the United Nations
Security Council now held by
Nationalist China should be
given to Red China
..........
74
G. Labor unions have a right to re-
quire new employees to join the
local union .................. 79
H. Management should be allowed
to settle its differences with la-
bor without government inter-
vention
..................... 57
I. Medicare represents just one
more step toward a socialized
society where a government
makes decisions which proper-
ly belong to the individual.... 54
J. The Medicare bill was a signifi-
cant step toward meeting the
needs of American citizens
without encroaching on the
sphere of individual freedom.. 53
15
Cf. Arnold Rose, "Public Opinion Research
Techniques Suggested by Sociological Theory,"
Theory and Method in Social Sciences (Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), pp.
210-19.
16
See, e.g., Theodore M. Newcomb, Person-
ality and Social Change (New York: Dryden Press,
1943); Peter Blau, "Orientation of Students
toward International Relations," American Journal
of Sociology, LIX (1953), 205-14; and James A.
Davis, "The Campus as a Frog Pond," American
Journal of Sociology, LXXII (1966), 17-31.
'
The sample was drawn from a small, liberal-
arts, residential institution which restricts the
opportunity for students to interact with others
and therefore to form significant membership-
reference groups beyond the college community.
The social-class and ethnic homogeneity of the stu-
dent body further constrains the development of
multiple student subcultures of the type available
at larger, more heterogeneous universities. In a
study of a similar type, Blau remarks on the
social pressure of student peers: "These findings
suggest that it is not primarily the logical in-
consistency of a student's political ideology but
rather the influence of his or her associates
which induces a strain towards consistency" (op.
cit., p. 210).
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232 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
should be more aware of public opinion
than non-congruents. Theoretically, non-
congruents not only fail to receive support
or approval for their own opinions but,
since their actions are non-rewarding to
others in the public, the result should be
reduced communicative interaction.'8
At this point we invite the reader's atten-
tion to an alternate interpretation which
also accounts for these findings. It could
be assumed that people project their views
on others (in this case the public) and that
non-congruents simply have the "wrong"
opinions, thus resulting in misperception of
public opinion. This assumption accounts
for the observed differences between con-
gruents and non-congruents, but it does not
account for the observed variations within
each group.
Some congruents perceived public opinion
inaccurately, while some non-congruents
perceived public opinion accurately. In the
projection interpretation, these would have
to be regarded as deviant cases. The theory
we offer provides an explanation for the
differences between congruents and non-
congruents and for the differences within
each group. Additional support for the dis-
sonant-congruent model was obtained by
correlating the proportion of non-congruents
correctly perceiving public opinion with
the size of the majority in the public. We
hypothesized that if interaction was a sig-
nificant variable, the proportion of non-
congruents-those not agreeing with the
majority-who failed to accurately per-
ceive public opinion should decrease as the
size of the majority increased. If projection
accounts for the misperception of non-
congruents, there should be little change
within the category of non-congruents as a
function of the strength of majority opin-
ion. The latter interpretation did not find
support, as r = .74 (P < .01). Thus the
size of the majority constituting public
opinion significantly influenced the ability
of non-congruents to correctly identify
TABLE 2
PROPORTION ACCURATELY PERCEIVING PUBLIC OPINION
AMONG CONGRUENTS AND NON-CONGRUENTS
CONGRUENTS AND NON-CONGRUENTS Ac-
CURATELY PERCEIVING THE DIRECTION
OF MAJORITY OPINION*
DIRECTION OF MAJORITY
P
OPINION Congruents Non-Congruents
Per Cent N Per Cent N
Statements majority agreed
with:
A .................. 96 160 79 19 9.64 .01
B .................. 63 129 64 53 0.03 .90
C .................. 55 88 42 92 2.66 .20
D ..74....... . 74 106 49 74 9.22 .01
Statements majority disa-
greed with:
E .................. 61 136 55 47 .47 .50
F ................... 80 132 60 50 7.92 .01
G . 65 141 40 35 7.46 .01
H .... 47 106 27 71 7.45 .01
I................ 61 100 36 81 11.37 .001
J................ 53 92 38 87 2.60 .20
*
Sample size varies, since not all respondents answered each item.
18
S. Schachter makes this point very clear in
his article "Deviation, Rejection and Communica-
tion," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
XLVI (1951), 190-207.
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DISSONANCE-CONGRUENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION 233
public opinion.19 In view of the supporting
data and in the -absence of a crucial test of
the two theories, our interpretation seems
to have greater explanatory power.
The next step was to determine whether
introduction of the relationship between
individual opinion and cognitive set had
any impact on public-opinion awareness.
This was accomplished by comparing the
individual's opinion with the opinion pre-
dicted on the basis of his cognitive set. A
respondent's cognitive set had previously
been determined by the extent of his en-
dorsement or non-endorsement of a series
of liberal-conservative items. To strengthen
the analysis, we selected only respondents
classified as having a highly liberal or con-
servative cognitive set-the upper and lower
quartiles of the liberal-conservative scale.
We then compared the individual's opinion
on a given item with his predicted opinion
on the basis of his scale score and opera-
tionally defined the relationship as one of
consonance or dissonance.
If the opinion was in the same direction
as his cognitive set predicted, the relation-
ship was defined as consonant; if the opin-
ion was in the reverse direction, the rela-
ti'onship was defined as dissonant. This
resulted in the classification of individuals
into four role situations: consonant-con-
gruents, dissonant-congruents, consonant-
non-congruents, and dissonant-non-con-
gruents. The percentage of individuals in
each category correctly predicting the dis-
tribution of public opinion for each issue
was then determined. These data are pre-
sented in Table 3.
Formally the hypothesis read: The rank-
order prediction of public opinion would
descend from dissonant-congruents to con-
sonant-congruents, to consonant-non-con-
gruents, to dissonant-non-congruents. The
data were organized according to the hy-
pothesis and cast into the form presented
in Table 4.
Examination of Table 4 discloses that the
TABLE 3
PROPORTION ACCURATELY PERCEIVING PUBLIC OPINION AMONG DISSONANT-
CONGRUENTS, CONSONANT-CONGRUENTS, CONSONANT-NON-CONGRUENTS,
AND DISSONANT-NON-CONGRUENTS*
DISSONANT- CONSONANT- CONSONANT- DIssONANT-
CONGRUENTS CONGRUENTS NON-CONGRUENTS NON-CONGRUENTS
ITEM
I II III IV
Per Cent N Per Cent N Per Cent N Per Cent N
A .. 98 50 88 43 91 11 25 4
B ... 81 16 79 63 74 31 ........ ........
C ... 83 23 59 59 68 28 33. 3
D ... 86 29 77 44 69 35 33 3
E . 50 44 73 41 2 52 21
F.... 45 47 29 24 57 23 23 13
G. 43 35 39 33 61 28 36 14
H. 75 54 64 58 38 40 25 4
I ... 67 39 76 21 50 44 38 8
I ... 46 11 56 43 37 51 25 4
*
The upper and lower quartiles of the liberal and conservative scales are used in this analysis. Group
size varies, since not all respondents answered each item.
19M. J. Rosenberg and R. P. Abelson make this
point indirectly when they suggest that another way
of coping with imbalance is to "stop thinking"
about the elements which have fallen into an
imbalanced configuration. To "stop thinking" about
the imbalance requires at a minimum avoiding
communicative interaction about the discrepancy
(M. J. Rosenberg, C. I. Hovland, W. J. McGuire,
R. P. Abelson, and J. W. Brehm, Attitude, Organ-
ization and Change: An Analysis of Consistency
among Attitude Components [New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1960]).
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234 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
hypothesis was upheld. Of the ten items
tested, two (D and H) resulted in perfect
rank ordering of the four dissonant-con-
gruent types, while four others (A, C, I,
and J) contained only one error. If these
are defined as "successful" outcomes, then
the probability of the observed ranked
orderings is less than .001. It should be
noted that dissonant-congruents always
predict more accurately than dissonant-
non-congruents but that the rank order for
consonant-congruents and consonant-non-
congruents is less stable.
TABLE 4
RANK ORDER OF DISSONANT-CONGRUENTS
CONSONANT-CONGRUJENTS, CONSONANT-NON-
CONGRUENTS, AND DISSONANT-NON-CON-
GRUENTS CORRECTLY PERCEIVING DIREC-
TION OF PUBLIC OPINION*
Consonant- Dissonant-
Item
Dissonants
Consonant- Non- Non-
Congruents Congruents Congruents Congruents
A 1 3 2 4
B 1 2 3 ........
C .... 1 3 2 4
D . . . 1 2 3 4
E . . . 3 1 4 2
F . . .. 2 3 1 4
G . . . 2 3 1 4
H . . . 1 2 3 4
I . . . 2 1 3 4
J . . . . 2 1 3 4
Total 16 21 25 34
* Z score for number of successful rank orderings = 3.69;
P < .001.
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study we have attempted to an-
alyze the relationship between awareness of
public opinion (dependent variable) and
personal opinion and cognitive set (inde-
pendent variables) according to a balance
model related to the work of Festinger,
Heider, and Osgood.20 In many ways it
parallels the efforts of Cartwright, Davis,
Newcomb,21 and others to develop a struc-
tural model embodying social psychological
postulates.
By comparing personal opinion and cog-
nitive set, we arrived at a structural rela-
tionship of consonance or dissonance; by
comparing personal opinion and public
opinion, we arrived at a structural relation-
ship of congruence or non-congruence. Com-
bining these relationships led to a typology
of four types: dissonance-congruence, con-
sonance-congruence, consonance-non-con-
gruence, and dissonance-non-congruence.
Given the assumption that people seek to
balance these relationships, we derived a
model which permitted prediction of which
set of relationships led to accurate percep-
tion of public opinion.
The model was then tested on a series of
public-opinion issues using a random sam-
ple of college students. Statistical analysis
confirmed the hypotheses generated from
the model. Although social position in the
communication network was relatively un-
controlled, the theory permits these vari-
ables to enter into analysis by linking social
psychological theory to the relationships
between an individual and others.
The theory is an improvement on those
models which explain awareness of group
opinion solely on structural position. The
latter, for example, fail to explain the dif-
ferences between persons occupying a simi-
lar structural position, that is, why some
leaders are more aware of group opinion
than other leaders or why some non-leaders
are better predictors than leaders.22 In
these instances it would seem necessary to
introduce variables which account for the
individual's failure to exploit his structural
position or for his distorted perception of
public opinion. It is toward the solution of
this type of problem that our theory ap-
pears to offer promise.
COLLEGE OF WOOSTER
'
Festinger, op. cit.; Heider, op. cit.; Osgood and
Tannebaum, op. cit.
'
Dorwin Cartwright and Frank Harary, "Struc-
tural Balance: A Generalization of Heider's The-
ory," Psychological Review, LXIII (1956), 277-93;
James Davis, "Structural Balance, Mechanical Sol-
idarity, and Interpersonal Relations," American
Journal of Sociology, LXVIII (1963), 444-62; and
Theodore Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study
of Communicative Acts," Psychological Review,
LX (1953), 393-404.
22See, e.g., Chowdhry and Newcomb, op. cit.
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