Articles Clutter Free

Iran Transit
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Aug 29 2012, 03:56 hrs

Iran Transit
Senior officials from India, Iran and Afghanistan meeting on the margins of the NAM
summit in Tehran on Sunday have agreed to promote an ambitious trilateral economic
partnership.
A joint working group (JWG) of the three countries will soon meet to find ways to expand
trilateral trade, transit and investment cooperation starting with the Chabahar port on
Iran's southeastern coast.
This is an important step forward, but there is a long way to go before Iran's Chabahar
becomes India's gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
For India, going to Afghanistan through Iran is like holding your nose by wrapping your
arm around the head. India's natural access to Afghanistan is through the Khyber and Bolan
passes. Today, both of those are in Pakistan.
Islamabad lets Afghan goods traverse Pakistani territory into India, but it does not give New
Delhi overland transit facilities in the other direction.
Pakistan's civilian leaders and businessmen see the logic of offering India the full transit
rights and benefiting from it. But for the Pakistan army, allowing India to deepen its
commercial presence in Afghanistan is a big political taboo.
That leaves Delhi with no option but to explore the more circuitous route to Afghanistan
through Iran.
US Concerns
India's search to deepen regional economic cooperation with Iran will indeed raise some
political hackles in Washington. But Delhi can't simply abandon its engagement with Iran,
which will always be an important part of India's neighbourhood and a critical factor in
shaping the future of Afghanistan.
To be sure, the Obama administration appreciates India's need for physical access to
Afghanistan. Over the last few years, Washington has indeed urged Pakistan to offer transit
facilities to India.
Washington hoped that the trade and transit treaty signed by Pakistan and Afghanistan in
June 2011 would be extended to include India.
Promoting the development of trade and transport corridors among Afghanistan, Pakistan
and India has been central to the US strategy of building a "New Silk Road" connecting the
subcontinent with Central Asia. But Rawalpindi is yet to be persuaded.
Chabahar dreams
The idea of developing Chabahar as a regional commercial hub was first discussed when
Iran's President Mohammed Khatami came to Delhi as the chief guest for the Republic Day
celebrations in January 2003.
It has taken nearly a decade to begin serious talks on the project. Sunday's trilateral
agreement to establish a JWG underlines the procedural framework for the negotiations.
The high politics of Chabahar and the fine print on the terms of engagement remain to be
sorted out before Delhi commits big money for the project.
Investing in the port becomes attractive to India only if Tehran lays out a reasonable
framework for moving goods in and out of Afghanistan through Chabahar. It was no
surprise then that the three key words in Sunday's joint statement are, "transit", "trade" and
"investment".
That a trade and transit agreement would benefit Delhi, Tehran and Kabul is not in doubt.
Landlocked Afghanistan will be able to reduce its current complete dependence on
Pakistan's territory for access to the Arabian Sea.
Delhi will gain an indirect but reliable physical access to Afghanistan. This in turn will allow
Indian companies to participate in the development of Afghanistan's mineral resources.
India, for example, has won the rights to develop the iron ore deposits at Hajigak in
Afghanistan. If there is a sustainable transit deal with Iran, India's plans to invest $11 billion
in the project, which will include the building of a steel plant and other associated
infrastructure, will become more viable.
Iran can turn Chabahar into a logistical hub, make money on goods moving through its
territory, and accelerate the economic development of its eastern provinces.
But converging interests do not always translate into effective cooperation between
countries. Nor is it easy to convert lines on the map into projects on the ground.
India is approaching Chabahar from the perspective of accessing Afghanistan. While
Afghanistan is very important for Iran, Tehran's priority is to draw India onto its side in its
growing conflicts with the United States and Arab neighbours.
Delhi wants to stay neutral in those wars, but wants a stronger partnership with Tehran in
Afghanistan. The mismatch between Indian and Iranian priorities might yet delay if not
derail the Chabahar project.
The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Tehran Summit: Egypt is the only
winner
C. Raja Mohan : New Delhi, Mon Sep 03 2012, 12:46 hrs
The Sixteenth summit of the Non-aligned Movement concluded in Tehran over the weekend
belying much of the political hopes and fears and that preceded it.
Tehran projected the NAM summit as a historic moment when a resurgent Global South
would rally behind Iran in its political confrontation with the West.
The United States expended much political capital in trying, rather unsuccessfully, to
dissuade world leaders from traveling to Tehran.
At the end of the summit, both Washington and Tehran look rather sheepish. The Tehran
summit revealed the deep political fissures in the Middle East and the utter incoherence of
the NAM as a collective political entity.
Delhi, which claimed that NAM remains relevant needs to reflect on the fact that the PM has
little to show for the four days spent in Tehran.
If there was a winner from the NAM summit, it was undoubtedly, Mohamed Morsi, the
President of Egypt. The NAM summit provided Morsi a perfect stage to demonstrate that a
newly democratic Egypt will claim its rightful place in the world.
Morsi was in Tehran for barely six hours. But they were enough for Morsi to signal
unambiguously that Egypt's prolonged marginalization from regional affairs, under the
autocratic rule of Hosni Mubarak, has come to an end.
By going to Tehran, despite much criticism from the United States, Morsi signalled that
others could no longer guide Egypt's regional policy. By the time he finished speaking at the
NAM summit, Tehran had every reason to wonder if Morsi's presence was such a great idea.
The first visit by an Egyptian President to Iran in more than three decades was to have been
an important part Tehran's political celebrations last week.
Morsi, however, rained on Tehran's party by strongly supporting the Syrian people fighting
the regime of Bashar al Assad, a close ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In denouncing Damascus, Morsi was more vehement that any of the Western governments
criticizing Syria. He also positioned himself far away from the traditionalists of the NAM
like India that were mouthing the old slogans of 'non-intervention' in the deepening Syrian
crisis.
"We should urge all parties to recommit themselves to resolving the crisis peacefully
through a Syrian-led inclusive political process that can meet the legitimate aspirations of
all Syrian citizens." That was the diplomatic gobbledygook from Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh at Tehran.
Morsi in contrast was muscular: "our solidarity with the children of beloved Syria against an
oppressive regime that has lost its legitimacy is a moral duty as much as a political and
strategic necessity that stems from our belief in a coming future for the free proud Syria".
Reports from the region now say, the official Persian interpreter at the NAM misrepresented
many of Morsi's remarks that did not fit with the Iranian positions.
Having built up Morsi's visit as a diplomatic triumph, the establishment in Tehran probably
had few options. For those hearing Morsi's speech in Arabic, there was little confusion. The
Syrian delegation found Morsi's remarks offensive enough to walk out.
Morsi's bold diplomacy, however, has electrified Egypt. His readiness to defy the United
States, publicly assert Egypt's interests in Syria, and challenge many of Iran's political
positions has won huge praise in the Arab world.
The return of Egypt as a political force at the Terhan summit should compel Washington
and Delhi to rethink many of their traditional assumptions about the Middle East.
The deepening divisions in the region and the NAM's utter inability to bridge them have
important political lessons for the United States and India.
Washington should stop demonizing the NAM, an organization whose bark is worse than its
bite. India in turn should stop pretending to worship at that altar of NAM.
(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi.)

New lines of influence
C. Raja Mohan : Tue Sep 04 2012, 02:13 hrs
General Liang Guanglie's visit to India this week, the first by a Chinese defence minister in
eight years, should help put the bilateral military relations on a firmer footing.
The conversation between Liang and Defence Minister A.K. Antony must necessarily go
beyond the bilateral to include the new and potentially dangerous military dynamic that has
begun to envelop Asia.
Liang comes barely three months after US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta came to Delhi
and declared India the "lynchpin" of the new American military strategy in Asia. While both
India and the United States have declared that their expanding defence cooperation is not
directed at third parties, Beijing, unsurprisingly, is concerned about the potential Indian
role in the unfolding US military pivot in Asia.
That Liang is coming to Delhi via Colombo, where he announced new military assistance to
Sri Lanka, is of interest, if not concern, to the Indian strategic community. Put simply, there
are many defence matters, both bilateral and regional, that Liang and Antony need to talk
about.
In 2006, during the then defence minister Pranab Mukherjee's visit to Beijing, the two sides
agreed to a broad framework of military exchanges. The defence interaction between the
two Asian giants was stalled two years ago, when Beijing refused to grant a normal visa to a
senior Indian general serving in Jammu and Kashmir. India responded by cancelling the
visit and putting defence exchanges on hold. Delhi and Beijing have since put the
controversy behind them and resumed military contacts.
The last few years have also seen rising military tensions on the border. Strengthening peace
and tranquility on the border has been a repeatedly reaffirmed political objective of the two
countries for nearly a quarter of a century.
But the situation on the ground has altered significantly in recent years. China's rapid
modernisation of the border infrastructure in Tibet has improved the mobility and punch of
the People's Liberation Army on India's northern frontiers. Delhi, in turn, has unveiled
plans to upgrade its own border infrastructure and raise additional army divisions to cope
with the changed military context. Both sides are also enhancing air power deployments on
the border.
As the Sino-Indian border becomes more militarised, Delhi and Beijing need to widen and
deepen military communication to avoid misconceptions and prevent the escalation of
tensions on the border.
The defence challenges before Delhi and Beijing, however, are no longer limited to their
land borders. China's interests in the Indian Ocean are growing and Beijing is determined to
secure them by establishing a credible naval presence there.
While this might take time, there is no denying Beijing's interests and political will. China
has begun to develop strong naval contacts with India's smaller neighbours in South Asia
and the Indian Ocean, especially with such island states as Seychelles and Sri Lanka.
China's construction of civilian ports at Gwadar (Pakistan) and Hambantota (Sri Lanka) has
also rung alarm bells in Delhi about possible Chinese maritime encirclement. With the PLA
Navy mounting sustained naval operations in the Indian Ocean since the end of 2008,
Beijing has intensified the search for access arrangements in the littoral. Seychelles has
already agreed to provide relief and resupply facilities to the PLA Navy.
In the first ever visit to Sri Lanka by a Chinese defence minister, Liang declared Beijing's
determination to expand defence ties not just with Colombo but with all South Asian
nations. In an address to a military audience in Colombo last week, Liang said, "The PLA's
efforts in conducting friendly exchanges and cooperation with its counterparts in the South
Asian nations are intended for maintaining regional security and stability and not targeted
at any third party." Not everyone in Delhi will be reassured by that statement.
Meanwhile, India's own stakes in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific are rising
and Delhi has steadily expanded its naval diplomacy in the waters that Beijing considers
crucial for its own security.
At a time when China's relations with the US and many of its Asian neighbours have become
tense, Delhi is deepening its military engagement with Washington, Tokyo, Hanoi and the
ASEAN region in general.
Much like the growing suspicion in Delhi about China's military diplomacy in South Asia
and the Indian Ocean, there is real concern in Beijing about India's activism in the South
China Sea and the Western Pacific.
As China rapidly rises to become a great power and India emerges somewhat slowly, their
militaries are rubbing against each other, not just in the Great Himalayas but also in the
Indian and Pacific Oceans.
The intensification and expansion of contested zones between China and India demands a
substantive and sustained dialogue between the defence establishments in Beijing and
Delhi.
China and India have often issued statements that they are not a threat to each other. Such
political rhetoric is not likely to alleviate the concerns in both countries about the growing
military presence of the other in their respective backyards.
The plain fact is that Delhi is not in a position to block China's expanding military
cooperation with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and other neighbours in the Indian Ocean. Similarly,
Beijing can't exercise a veto over India's defence cooperation with the US, Japan and
Vietnam in the Western Pacific.
What Delhi and Beijing can and must do is to begin a frank dialogue on their respective
regional security interests, find ways to reduce the new military friction, and explore the
prospects for the joint promotion of stability and security in Asia and its waters.
The writer is a consulting editor with 'The Indian Express'
express@expressindia.com

Island Hopping
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Sep 05 2012, 02:54 hrs
Island Hopping
Even before General Liang Guanglie completed the first ever visit by a Chinese defence
minister to Sri Lanka last week, the president of Maldives, Mohamed Waheed, was catching
a flight to China.
Together, these two events help underline the current intensive Chinese engagement with
Sri Lanka and Maldives and the extraordinary importance that island states have acquired
in Beijing's naval strategy.
In the East and South China Seas, small islands are at the very heart of China's deepening
territorial conflicts with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. In the Indian Ocean, Beijing's
focus is on developing strong comprehensive partnerships with Sri Lanka, Maldives,
Seychelles and Mauritius.
These island states are located along the critical sea lines of communication that ferry
energy and mineral resources from the Persian Gulf and the east coast of Africa to the
industrial heartland on China's eastern seaboard. As protecting China's lifelines through the
Indian Ocean becomes a vital national interest for Beijing, China has devoted sustained
high-level political attention and relentless operational engagement with the island states.
In Sri Lanka, the Press Trust of India reported from Colombo, Liang pledged assistance
worth $100 million for various welfare projects initiated by the Sri Lankan army in northern
and eastern Sri Lanka that witnessed prolonged Tamil insurgency. Liang visited some of
these areas during his extended tour of Sri Lanka.
In China, President Waheed signed agreements for economic assistance worth $500
million. The Chinese package includes $150 million for housing and infrastructure and
$350 million from China's EXIM Bank.
Beijing has also actively encouraged tourist flows from China into both Sri Lanka and
Maldives. China opened its embassy in Maldives last November when the island nation was
hosting an annual South Asian summit.
Non-Intervention
India is taking China's strategic outreach to Sri Lanka and Maldives in its stride. But Delhi
would want to reflect on the reported comments of President Waheed praising China's
policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of nations and contrasting it to India's
meddling in its neighbourhood.
It does not really matter whether Waheed actually said words to this effect in interview to
the official Chinese news agency, Xinhua. But it does underscore an important difference
between the Indian and Chinese policies towards the subcontinent.
For India, its general rhetoric on the principle of non-intervention (most recently heard at
the NAM summit) does not apply to the subcontinent. For, Delhi's stakes in a peaceful and
stable neighbourhood are too large to take a detached view of the internal developments
within its smaller neighbours. Whether it is the question of Tamil minority rights in Sri
Lanka, or promoting reconciliation between contending political groups in Nepal and
Maldives, Delhi is "hands on", shall we say, when it comes to the neighbourhood.
Beijing, in contrast, has the luxury of affirming non-interference as a high principle in the
subcontinent. Whether it is Pakistan or Sri Lanka, China has decided to focus on dealing
with whoever is in power rather than taking sides in internal political battles. This has
yielded handsome dividends for Beijing, although occasionally it finds itself wrong-footed
when there are big internal changes and China is on the side of status quo.
For India, the problem is that competing groups within the smaller countries constantly
seek Delhi's support to alter the internal balance and deeply resent when it is not
forthcoming in their own favour.
Internal Politics
For India's neighbourhood policy, the external is almost always internal too. Delhi's
dealings with Sri Lanka, for example, have long been constrained by the ruling party's
political calculus in Tamil Nadu.
The weaker the Central government in Delhi, the stronger the appeasement of Chennai in
the making of the Sri Lanka policy. India is in one of those awful phases right now. This, in
turn, has increased the political distance between Delhi and Colombo and opened the door
for a larger Chinese security role in Sri Lanka.
India, for example, had initialled a defence cooperation agreement with Sri Lanka nearly a
decade ago, but is unable to formalise it, fearing opposition from Tamil Nadu.
With China's military profile rising in Sri Lanka, political parties in Tamil Nadu are
competing with each other to undermine Delhi's military engagement with Colombo. While
the domestic constraints are real, it is Delhi's duty to protect India's national interests. But
is the UPA government capable of drawing a line? Anywhere?
The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a
contributing editor with 'The Indian Express'

Delhis Choice: Known Obama or Unknown
Romney
C. Raja Mohan : New Delhi, Mon Sep 10 2012, 13:25 hrs
As American Presidential campaign gets into top gear, the foreign policy establishment in Delhi
might be looking for continuity rather than change in the White House.
This preference might seem counter-intuitive for many reasons. For one, in recent decades, India
has had greater political comfort doing business with the Republicans rather than Democrats.
For another, Delhi was deeply anxious about the Obama presidency four years ago. Obama's
thesis that Pakistan will be more cooperative on Afghanistan if India could be brought around to
make compromises on Kashmir deeply worried India.
India's then ambassador to Washington, Ronen Sen, mounted a massive campaign to prevent the
inclusion of J ammu & Kashmir in the mandate for Obama's special envoy to South Asia, Richard
Holbrooke, who was appointed within a few days of the new president being sworn in.
Delhi was also concerned at the Obama Administration's talk on making China, the top strategic
partner of the United States in Asia. There was informal talk of a G-2, or a Sino-US
condominium, running Asian and world affairs that alarmed New Delhi.
India was also anxious if Obama, who as a Senator from Illinois had raised many questions about
the US-India nuclear deal, would help implement it as President.
Obama's record at the White House has helped dispel many of India's concerns. He has done
everything possible for the quick implementation of the nuclear deal, despite the deep
reservations within the Democratic Party's foreign policy establishment.
Obama was quick to walk away from the untenable idea of an American mediation on Kashmir.
And then some. Obama has turned the traditional US policy towards Pakistan on its head.
After his initial effort to woo Pakistan with additional economic and military assistance failed,
Obama has taken a very muscular approach to dealing with the sources of international terrorism
in Pakistan.
He ordered US Special Forces to launch a bold raid on Osama bin Laden's hideout deep inside
Pakistan. He has rained drones on Pakistan's western borderlands to dismantle the terror
sanctuaries.
Last week he has designated the Haqqani network as an international terror organization, despite
the deep reservations in Pakistan.
On China too, Obama turned on the dime. In his visit to China at the end of 2009, the President
offered a strategic partnership to Beijing only to be spurned by the communist leaders.
And as Beijing began to assert itself in the waters of East and South China Seas, Obama
announced a controversial 'pivot to Asia'. He reaffirmed the US commitment to maintain the
balance of power in Asia amidst the rise of China.
Most of India's traditional complaints about America were about Washington's intimate ties with
Rawalpindi and Beijing. With American relations with India's challenging neighbours at their
lowest ebb in decades, Delhi has little reason to complain about Obama's policies.
The US President has gone out of the way and defied the
India-sceptics in the Democratic Party to deepen Washington's
strategic partnership with Delhi.
It is the UPA government's political drift at home that has slowed the forward movement in the
U.S.-India relationship and not the lack of strategic interest in Washington.
To be sure, there are many in Mitt Romney's camp calling for a
stronger relationship with India. The Republican Party's electoral platform has indeed declared
India as a 'geopolitical ally' of the United States.
On trade-related issues, the Republicans tend to be less critical of outsourcing and less
protectionist. Unlike Obama, Romney is not likely to denounce Bengaluru in talking about
America's economic future.
For all the seeming advantages to India from a Republican presidency, Delhi, which is intensely
risk averse, should be happy dealing with the familiar Obama in the next four years than cope
with the turbulence that might be generated by a change of guard in the White House.
India enjoys strong bipartisan political support today in the United States. The direction and
intensity of Delhi's partnership with Washington are not tied to the outcome of the presidential
elections.
India's big challenge is to restore Delhi's rapidly declining
credibility in the United States as a purposeful state that can act in its own interests, cut political
deals and implement them.
(C. Raja Mohan is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a
Contributing Editor with 'The Indian Express'.)

Talibans Turn?

Taliban's Turn?
Flexibility has never been a notable feature of the Taliban's worldview. But the London-based
Royal United Services Institute released a report this week suggesting the opposite.
Based on interviews with four important Taliban leaders, researchers from the RUSI say that the
Taliban leadership might be ready to dissociate the organisation from
al-Qaeda, one of the principal demands of the United States.
In a major surprise, the report says, the Taliban might be willing to accept the residual presence
of American military forces in Afghanistan well beyond 2014, when the Obama administration
plans to end the US combat role there. Conditions, of course, will apply.
The RUSI report comes as the US steps up its diplomatic efforts to engage the Taliban and find a
political solution to the long-festering war in Afghanistan. Sceptics would want to hold their
breath.
The Taliban had opportunities in the past to cut a deal with the US by separating itself from al-
Qaeda. Washington reached out to the Taliban in the wake of the bombings on US embassies in
East Africa in 1998 by al-Qaeda, which had secured a sanctuary in Afghanistan.
After the 9/11 attacks on Washington and New York, the Bush administration embarked on an
intensive effort to separate the Taliban from al-Qaeda. The supreme leader of the Taliban,
Mullah Omar, did not bite and was willing to accept the consequences.
The RUSI report now says the interviews "revealed for the first time the emerging consensus of
the Taliban leadership, a far more pragmatic picture of the Taliban than has previously been
made public, with the Taliban willing to take part in peace negotiations in exchange for political
leverage after 2014."
The Taliban apparently will not negotiate with the Hamid Karzai government but is ready to
engage the US. The Taliban's flexibility in the proposed negotiations with the US, the RUSI
report says, is subject entirely to the approval of Mullah Omar.
Pessimists would say the hints of moderation are part of a Taliban deception to trap the US into a
negotiation, play on the eagerness in the West to find any face-saving solution, divide the
international coalition and separate Washington from the Karzai government in Kabul.
Whatever the motivations of the Taliban might be, optimists would argue, it is worth engaging
them and winning over at least a section of them. The realists would demand that the US
maintain pressure on the Taliban even as it prepares to talk to them.
Ceasefire
Central to any peace process that seeks reconciliation among warring parties is a ceasefire. The
RUSI report says Mullah Omar is open to a ceasefire as part of a general political settlement in
Afghanistan.
Such a ceasefire, according to the Taliban, must be a "bridge between confidence-building
measures and the core issue of the distribution of political power in Afghanistan."
According to the RUSI report, the Taliban leaders prefer a "general ceasefire" linked to a
national reconciliation plan rather than district-level ceasefires focusing on the reintegration of
local commanders and fighters. The former would clearly give the Taliban better control over the
peace process than the latter. The Taliban leaders interviewed by RUSI believe that a ceasefire
would "require strong Islamic justification" to avoid any impression of political surrender.
Safe Passage
With the stage being set for a possible dialogue between the US and the Taliban, Pakistan has
reportedly agreed to provide "safe passage" to the Afghan leaders willing to join the talks on
reconciliation.
The "safe passage working group" involving officials from the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan
met in Islamabad last week to discuss procedures for facilitating travel by the Taliban leaders.
The first meeting of the working group took place in April.
The top leaders of the Taliban stay in Pakistan, which in the past has been rather reluctant to let
them engage the rest of the world on their own. The Pakistan army has sought to be the sole
window through which any international transactions with the Taliban must be conducted.
Rawalpindi had to ease up on this claim amidst great pressure from Washington. The softening
of the Pakistani position does not in any way reduce the extraordinary influence that the ISI
wields over the Taliban.
contributing editor with 'The Indian Express'

Spring storm
C. Raja Mohan : Fri Sep 14 2012, 03:30 hrs
The brutal killing of the US ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens, in Benghazi and
the storming of the American embassy in Cairo following the release of a film in the US that
is seen to be offensive to Islam underline how unpredictable the consequences of the "Arab
Spring" have been. Last year, the popular upsurge in the Arab street against the ruling
regimes was widely heralded as a definitive turn of the Middle East towards democracy.
The surge of Islamists in the elections that followed and the recrudescence of violent anti-
Americanism in the region have begun to disillusion many in the US who offered strong
support to political modernisation in the region. The violence in Benghazi and Cairo has
encouraged the sceptics to declare that the end of the "new beginning" in the Middle East is
at hand.
If the international celebration of the Arab Spring last year was breathless, its
condemnation amidst the awful incidents of this week is entirely premature.
Change was inevitable in the long stagnant Middle East. But political change does not come
in neat, predetermined lines that ideologues of our age fondly hope for. In the West, the
framework of "democracy versus dictatorship" has become the simplistic, but entirely
unhelpful, device to debate the unravelling of the old Middle East.
Both liberals and neoconservatives in the US have long claimed that democracy is the
answer to all the problems in the Middle East. America is not the only one with a blinkered
view of the Middle East. India has its own shibboleth: the preference for secular regimes in
the region.
India's fear of religious extremism in the Middle East and its impact on the subcontinent,
and the platitudes on non-intervention, have muddled the debate in Delhi on the Syrian
crisis.
The Middle East will not evolve according to American or Indian preferences. It has a
political motor of its own. Given the pivotal nature of the region, change in the Middle East
will have significant consequences for the rest of the world.
The pace and direction of this change will be influenced by many factors. But none of them
is more important than the future of Egypt's orientation under its first elected leader,
Mohamed Morsi. It is in Egypt that the current struggle for the Arab political soul will be
won or lost. Much like the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 that altered the geopolitics of
the Middle East, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is bound to have a lasting
impact on the region.
Unlike Iran, which is Persian and Shia, Egypt is at the very heart of the Sunni Arab world.
As the champion of Afro-Asian solidarity and one of the founding members of the non-
aligned movement, Egypt was indeed the Arab voice in the post-war world. Under Hosni
Mubarak, though, Egypt's prolonged economic and political stagnation at home was
matched by Cairo's steady marginalisation in the Middle East and beyond.
In the few weeks that he has been Egypt's president, Mohamed Morsi has quickly
consolidated his position at home and signalled his determination to reclaim Egypt's natural
leadership in the region. Having pushed aside the old guard in the military that tried to limit
the scope of his presidency, Morsi now enjoys as much power as Mubarak did.
By asserting an independent foreign policy, Morsi has restored the sense of Egyptian pride
and won more than 75 per cent of popular approval. He defied the US by travelling to the
non-aligned summit in Tehran last month. As the first Egyptian leader in Iran in more than
three decades, Morsi challenged the Iranian position on Syria by arguing that it is the moral
duty of the world to support the fight of the Syrian people against the oppressive regime of
Bashar al-Assad. At the same time, Morsi recognised the importance of drawing Tehran into
a regional initiative by proposing a contact group on Syria that includes Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey and Iran.
In his first trip outside the Middle East, Morsi travelled to China and won Beijing's promise
to support the economic development of Egypt. There is speculation that Beijing might help
modernise Egyptian armed forces. This week he is in Brussels engaging the leaders of the
European Union. In a few days, he will be in New York addressing the United Nations
General Assembly and outlining the new Egypt's international policies. He will also meet US
President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the UN gathering.
While his diplomacy has been impressive, Morsi will need to quickly put Egypt on the path
of rapid economic growth and tackle the country's manifold challenges of development.
Morsi will face even bigger problems in preventing the extremist forces in Egypt from
pushing their divisive agenda at home. After the latest incidents in Cairo, Morsi will have to
demonstrate the will to stand up against those who want to undermine his plans to reorder
the relationship with the US on the basis of mutual respect.
Unlike other major powers, India has been slow in its outreach to the new Egypt. The end of
the Mubarak era, which saw growing distance between Delhi and Cairo, is a historic
opportunity for India to restore the old political warmth in the bilateral relationship and
inject it with substantive economic content.
Beyond the bilateral, strategic cooperation with the new Egypt will be critical to the pursuit
of India's broader interests in a rapidly changing Middle East in strengthening regional
security, promoting political moderation and economic modernisation.
Delhi's first step is to arrange Morsi's visit to India at an early but appropriate occasion and
begin a productive conversation with him on reinventing the old partnership between India
and Egypt.
The writer, a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, is contributing
editor for 'The Indian Express', express@expressindia.com

United States and Pakistan: Getting
Together Again?
C. Raja Mohan : Mon Sep 17 2012, 12:02 hrs
As Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari and his foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar head to
the United States this week, there is talk of rebuilding (again) the strategic partnership
between the two countries.
Sceptics argue that rekindling the strategic romance between the United States and Pakistan
might not be easy after the kind of turbulence and mutual recrimination that engulfed the
bilateral relations during the last two years.
But realists point to the fact that Washington and Rawalpindi do need each other. While
they can't stand each other, the United States and Pakistan can't stay away from each other
for too long.
The two governments recognize that popular support in both countries towards the bilateral
relationship has never been as low as it is today. After bin Laden was found hiding in
Pakistan and killed by American Special Forces in May 2011, many in the US Congress are
deeply angered by the fact that Pakistan has been playing both sides of the street in the war
against terror.
Following the attack on a Pakistani military post in November 2011 by the NATO forces
Rawalpindi shut down the US overland access to Afghanistan and whipped up anti-
American sentiments. US in turn cut off military aid to Pakistan.
Since then, the two sides have slowly worked towards normalisation of bilateral relations. A
few weeks ago Pakistan reopened the supply routes through its territory in return for a
vaguely worded apology from Washington. The US resumed aid to Pakistan after that.
Despite the frustration with Pakistan army, US still needs
Rawalpindi's support in supplying American forces in Afghanistan and facilitate their exit in
the coming months.
The US also knows that there can be no successful political solution to the conflict in
Afghanistan without Rawalpindi's support. Pakistan needs American economic and military
assistance more than ever, given its current parlous financial condition.
Last week, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, Marc Grossman was in Islamabad and Rawalpindi meeting the top political and
military leaders there.
Grossman's task was to prepare the ground for the visits by Khar and Zardari, both of whom
are travelling to New York next week to attend the annual session of the United Nations
General Assembly. Khar is also visiting Washington for high level political consultations
with the Obama Administration.
While both sides are keen to strengthen bilateral relations, a number of contentious issues
remain. The United States has named the Haqqani network as a foreign terrorist
organisation. While Pakistan did not protest, it is seething at the American targeting of a
close partner of the ISI.
Islamabad wants the Americans to stop the relentless drone attacks on North Waziristan.
Washington wants Rawalpindi to clean up the terror sanctuaries in Pakistan that are the
source of the destabilisation of Afghanistan.
The US also wants the Pakistan army to nudge its other ally, the Taliban into negotiations
with Washington and Kabul. Rawalpindi might be willing to do this, if the US is ready to
give Pakistan a significant influence over the future political arrangements in Afghanistan.
Producing a mutually satisfactory resolution of these differences will not be easy. Pakistan is
entering the talks somewhat chastened, but must be expected to drive a hard bargain.
(C. Raja Mohan is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and
Contributing Editor for The Indian Express.)

A visit to Pakistan
In his address to the Planning Commission on Saturday, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
underlined the importance of taking risks in initiating new reforms and accelerating India's
economic growth.
The theme of risks and rewards is back in the PM's vocabulary. The last one heard of this
was when Singh tried to calm the critics of the historic India-US civil nuclear initiative more
than half a decade ago.
Responding to charges that the nuclear deal would undermine India's foreign policy and
national security, Singh pointed to the experience of reforms in the first decade of the 1990s,
when he opened the Indian economy to globalisation despite the massive fears at home.
Taking some risk then put the nation on a high growth path and elevated its international
position.
The PM's readiness to take risks again, one hopes, is not limited to the making of economic
policy. India's diplomacy, especially towards its neighbours, could do with some risk-taking
of the kind Singh demonstrated in transforming relations with the United States during his
first term as PM.
Through his tenure as PM, Singh consistently articulated a bold vision for regionalism in the
subcontinent. Persisting with the good neighbourly policy that he had inherited from Atal
Bihari Vajpayee, Singh added a vital economic dimension to it and made some big political
moves.
But at critical moments, Singh preferred caution to courage. Consider the many paradoxes
of his Pakistan policy. Few prime ministers before him have invested this kind of effort into
transforming relations with Pakistan. Yet he has tied himself in knots over the simple
question of making a visit across the border.
Vajpayee, accused of leading a "Hindu nationalist" government, travelled to Pakistan twice
in his six years at the helm (1998-2004). But Singh is still wringing his hands in the ninth
calendar year of his prime ministership. The "secularist" Congress appears to have deep
reservations about Singh's visit to Pakistan. Vajpayee had to confront similar objections
from his BJP colleagues in the cabinet, not to mention the RSS. Yet he took risks by defying
the conservatives in his party while framing his Pakistan policy.
Singh went much farther than Vajpayee in exploring solutions to such thorny issues as
Siachen and Sir Creek. He embarked on substantive negotiations on the Kashmir question,
for the first time in four decades, with Pakistan. Singh has also negotiated a road map for
the normalisation of bilateral trade with Pakistan and concluded an agreement to liberalise
a four decades-old restrictive visa regime with Pakistan. Compared to what has already been
done, the case for visiting Pakistan is an open and shut one.
Singh's reluctance to take risks has been even more tragic in the case of Bangladesh. Having
found a forward-looking partner in Sheikh Hasina, who became the prime minister of
Bangladesh in 2008, Singh launched a bold effort to resolve all outstanding issues with
Dhaka in 2010. At the very moment this unprecedented effort was to bear fruit during his
visit to Bangladesh last September Singh held back, unwilling as he was to confront the
tantrums of West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee.
As the prime minister of the republic, Singh had every right to sign the Teesta River waters
agreement with Bangladesh that was crafted with much care. Yet the PM buckled. As a
result, a transformative moment in the ties with Bangladesh was lost. So was a transit
agreement with Dhaka that would have significantly contributed to economic growth in
West Bengal and in the Northeastern states.
One important consequence of Singh's hesitations on Pakistan and Bangladesh has been the
weakening of the PM's sole prerogative to conduct of India's external affairs. He has let the
bureaucracy and state leaders exercise a veto over foreign policy decisions. If he accepts his
own advice on taking calculated political risks and showing some political courage in
defence of the national interest, the PM can easily reclaim his leadership on the foreign
policy front.
Announcing a visit to Pakistan will put pressure on the establishments of both sides to
produce some substantive outcomes. On Bangladesh, the PM must look for the earliest
opportunity to sign the Teesta and transit agreements that will boost the prospects for the
eastern subcontinent as a whole.
To be sure, bold initiatives towards neighbours will draw political flak. But it is a
controversy that the PM would want to welcome. For it is a rare opportunity to contrast the
PM's bold vision for the nation and the region with the crass opportunism of the opposition
parties.
The PM can count on the BJP to oppose the Pakistan visit (the party has no desire to recall
the visits of Vajpayee and Advani to Pakistan) and the Trinamool Congress to simulate
outrage. But the PM can also bet on the left parties' support for his regional peace
initiatives.
Singh can gamble even bigger on China. While there are many strategic contentions
between Delhi and Beijing, on the economic front there is much complementarity waiting to
be exploited. The PM should actively attract Chinese FDI into infrastructure development
and allow Beijing to develop special economic zones in India. The left parties might oppose
FDI from the West but will not utter a squeak against Chinese money.
The PM could go a step further and offer to develop joint projects with China in our
neighbouring countries to promote connectivity and integration within the subcontinent as
well as between South Asia and the abutting regions.
Put simply, taking bold diplomatic initiatives towards the neighbours is smart domestic
politics, sensible economics, and a wise national strategy.
The writer, a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi, is
contributing editor for 'The Indian Express'

Patriotic Fires
C. Raja Mohan : Thu Sep 20 2012, 00:19 hrs
Patriotic Fires
This week marks the 81st anniversary of an incident in Manchuria that Japan used to launch
its occupation of China. The anniversary has helped intensify the Chinese protests against
the latest Japanese moves to purchase small islands that are claimed by both.
The Japanese call them Senkaku and the Chinese, Diaoyu. These uninhabited islands lie
along critical sea lines of communication in the Western Pacific. The contested waters
around the islands are rich in fisheries and the seabed is believed to have significant energy
resources.
While Beijing has encouraged popular protests against Japan, it has also sought to carefully
regulate them. The Chinese Communist Party is acutely conscious of the danger of the anti-
Japanese rallies turning against the government in Beijing.
Official Chinese media is calling for restraint. "Wisdom is needed in the expression of
patriotism", the Xinhua news agency said in an editorial this week. "When our territorial
sovereignty is challenged", Xinhua said, "Chinese people should and must show our clear-
cut attitude. At the same time", it insists, "the expression of patriotic feelings should not
come at the cost of disrupting domestic social order."
Beijing is not the only one having trouble controlling the rising nationalist sentiment at
home. Tokyo, which has been defensive in dealing with China all these decades, is now
under pressure from the nationalists to stand up against Beijing's assertiveness.
Asia Burning
The nationalist resurgence in China and Japan has set the stage for what could be the first
serious great power conflict since the end of the Cold War.
The talk of a war in east Asia seemed laughable until recently, for good reasons. East Asia
had enjoyed a prolonged peace that facilitated the rapid economic integration of the region
and generated unprecedented levels of prosperity. Economic interdependence, it was widely
held, would help dampen nationalism and move east Asia away from its many historic
animosities.
All these assumptions of the region are being questioned amidst the mounting maritime
territorial tensions between China and Japan. Leaders from the region and beyond are no
longer dismissing the possibility of an armed conflict between Beijing and Tokyo.
US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, who is in Tokyo and Beijing this week, has underlined
the potential dangers. "Provocations of one kind or another over these various islands",
Panetta said, could lead to "a misjudgment on one side or the other" that could lead to
violence. "And that conflict would then have the potential of expanding," he added.
That is probably an understatement. Even a limited conflict between China and Japan could
shake down the geopolitics of Asia and the world.
The stock markets in east Asia have begun to react as Japanese businesses pull the shutters
down in China and the region's cross-border production chains become vulnerable to
political passions.
China and Japan are the world's second and third largest economies. They are each other's
biggest trading partners. Any conflict between them would draw in the world's number one
economy, the US.
Acting East
Delhi tends to view its relations with Beijing, Tokyo and Washington through the limiting
prism of bilateralism. India must now begin to focus purposefully on the unfolding
triangular dynamic between China, Japan and the US.
Japan is a military ally of the US, while Beijing is an important partner for Washington.
With neither China nor Japan backing off in their disputes, the US is under pressure to
produce a fine balancing act.
Tokyo would want to know if the US has the political will to defend Japan against China.
Beijing, on the other hand, is warning that US support to Japan would be a hostile act.
For the moment, the US interest is in trying to prevent a further escalation of tensions
between China and Japan rather than clarifying the implications of the US-Japan mutual
defence treaty.
India's relations with all the three have been transformed over the last two decades. As their
conflict escalates, both Beijing and Tokyo would want India's understanding of their
respective positions.
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Indian national movement was deeply touched by the conflict
between China and Japan. In the 1950s, independent India actively promoted peace in
northeast Asia. India now needs to reclaim some of that spirit and contribute vigorously to
the maintenance of peace and stability in east Asia.

Approaching Kabul
C. Raja Mohan : Mon Sep 24 2012, 23:30 hrs
As the US withdraws and Beijing steps in, Delhi must be bolder in its Afghan strategy
The visit of a top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader to Kabul over the weekend as well
as the triangular talks among senior Indian, Afghan and American officials in the United
States this week underline the rapidly evolving dynamic in the northwestern subcontinent.
Both the events are unprecedented. The unannounced appearance of Zhou Yongkang, a
member of the CCP's politburo standing committee, in Kabul on Saturday is the first by a
senior Chinese leader in half a century. Liu Shaoqi, China's president, had showed up in
Kabul in 1966. The triangular talks in New York this week among India, Afghanistan and the
US is the first such exercise ever. The proposal for the triangular dialogue was announced
last June, when External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna met US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton in Washington for the third round of the annual strategic dialogue.
China's rising profile in Kabul and the prospects for Indo-US cooperation in Afghanistan are
rooted in two important structural changes in our neighbourhood. One is the declining
American military footprint in Afghanistan and the end to the US's combat role there by
2014. The other is the growing international disappointment with Pakistan's negative role in
Afghanistan.
This month, the "military surge" that was announced by President Barack Obama nearly two
years ago came to an end. The 33,000 additional troops that Obama deployed then have
returned home. Obama plans to steadily reduce the remaining 70,000 troops in the coming
months, if he is re-elected as president this November. He has announced plans to leave a
small residual force of an unspecified number after 2014, which will help the Afghan
National Army fight the insurgency.
Obama's Republican rival, Mitt Romney, has not really contested his Afghan strategy. In
fact, Romney did not even mention the decade-long American war in Afghanistan in his
acceptance speech at the Republican convention. While America is committed to stabilising
Afghanistan and is bound to maintain a significant presence there for quite some time to
come, the domestic support in the US for the longest foreign war has begun to evaporate
quickly.
Until now, it has been quite convenient for China and India to have the Americans
defending Afghanistan against violent extremism that threatens not only the US but also the
entire region. Beijing and Delhi must now necessarily pick up some of the slack resulting
from the reduced American military weight in Afghanistan.
India became the first country to sign a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan a
year ago. Beijing is the second non-Western power to develop such a partnership with
Kabul. During his brief stay in Kabul, Zhou signed a variety of agreements with Afghanistan,
including one to "train, fund and equip" the Afghan security forces.
Beijing's latest Afghanistan initiative "is in line with the fundamental interests of the two
peoples for China and Afghanistan to strengthen a strategic and cooperative partnership
which is also conducive to regional peace, stability and development," Zhou said in a
statement after his talks in Kabul. Beijing's strategic outreach to Kabul is at once the
reflection of its growing economic and political interests in Afghanistan and a growing
doubt in China's mind about the Pakistan army's ability to protect them.
Until now China has been quite comfortable in deferring to its "all weather friend" Pakistan
in Afghanistan. That Beijing has chosen to cosy up to the current regime in Kabul, which is
despised by Rawalpindi, suggests China is no longer willing to put all its bets on the
Pakistan army and its proxies, the Taliban and the Haqqani network.
The reasons for the US's willingness to intensify the engagement with India on Afghanistan
are not very different. Much like China, the US can no longer rely on Pakistan as the sole
regional partner in securing and stabilising Afghanistan. Washington is coming to terms
with the fact that the contradiction between its interests in Afghanistan and those of the
Pakistan army might be irreconcilable. While the US will continue to need the support of the
Pakistan army in Afghanistan, Washington has begun to hedge its bets by looking towards
India.
The triangular talks signal a sea change in US policy towards India's role in Afghanistan.
The Bush administration, for all its warmth towards India, had sought to discourage an
Indian security role in Afghanistan. The Obama administration, which started four years
ago with the notion that India is part of the problem in Afghanistan, has increasingly seen
Delhi as a potentially significant element of the solution.
For Delhi, the new dialogue with Washington and Kabul is an important part of its strategy
to engage all those with a stake in a stable Afghanistan. Last month, on the margins of the
Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Tehran, India held the first ever trilateral talks with Iran
and Afghanistan. The focus of the meeting was on developing transport corridors into
landlocked Afghanistan, which today is totally reliant on Pakistan for access to the sea.
Instead of seeing China's entry into Afghanistan as a threat, Delhi must explore the
prospects for three-way talks with Beijing and Kabul on regional stability. For India, the
most important triangular engagement is the one that is not taking place with Pakistan
and Afghanistan. For peace will ultimately depend upon a regional reconciliation in the
subcontinent. While Delhi and Kabul are eager to find common ground with Islamabad,
Rawalpindi remains opposed.
As Delhi steps up its trilateral diplomacy on Afghanistan, it can't afford to go slow on the
bilateral track. Despite its declared commitment to strengthen Afghan armed forces, Delhi's
indecisiveness has begun to disappoint Kabul. Beijing's readiness to provide military
equipment to Kabul, Washington's support to a larger Indian role, Tehran's interest in
providing India access, and Pakistan's declining credibility should encourage Delhi to adopt
a bolder strategic policy in Afghanistan.
The writer, a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi, is a
Contributing Editor for 'The Indian Express'

India and Chinas First Aircraft Carrier

The commissioning of Beijing's first aircraft carrier, named
'Liaoning' after China's Northeastern province, on Tuesday will be remembered as a defining
moment in Asia's maritime history. It marks the arrival of China as a naval power of
consequence and the incipient transformation of India's maritime security environment.
It also underlines Beijing's determination to irrevocably alter the strategic seascape of the Pacific
and Indian Oceans.
China's carrier has come into service at a moment when Beijing's maritime territorial disputes
with its neighbours in the
Pacificincluding J apan, Vietnam and the Philippineshave acquired a sharp edge and its
economic interests in the Indian Ocean are growing.
The 'Liaoning' is a reflection of the massive investment Beijing has made in the rapid
modernization of its naval forces and the
unwillingness of its leaders to play second fiddle to the United
States, which has dominated the Pacific and Indian Oceans for decades.
The significance of the occasion was underscored by the presence of President Hu J intao and
Premier Wen J iabao at the ceremony in Dallian port where the Chinese Navy formally received
the carrier.
Sceptics in the West point to the fact that it will be a while before 'Liaoning' will be an effective
military platform. The pilots of the PLA Navy are still learning the tricks of landing and taking
off from the carrier. It will be years before the PLAN builds an operational carrier battle group
around the 'Liaoning'.
Unsurprisingly some experts in the United States have called it a 'stepping stone' rather than a
'milestone' in the rise of China as a naval power. Many in the Indian defence establishment,
which has operated aircraft carriers for decades, insist that it is one thing to acquire the carrier
and entirely another to master the operational arts associated with it.
The fact, however, is that military analysts in the United States and India have long
underestimated the pace of China's military modernization and the political logic underlying it.
As in so many other military sectors, China might surprise its Asian neighbours and the United
States by the speed with which it will turn the carrier into an effective strategic platform.
In the initial phase, the 'Liaoning' is likely to be used for training missions and scientific
research. Having taken long to commission the Liaoning, which it bought as scrap from Ukraine
in 1998, China has plans to build many more of them in the coming years.
Once it builds three or four carriers in the next two decades, China's naval power and maritime
reach will have a decisive impact on the balance of power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
It will be a matter of time before 'Liaoning' sails into the Indian Ocean. Well before it becomes
an awesome instrument of war, the 'Liaoning', as a symbol of China's new political will, will
have considerable diplomatic impact on the littoral of the Indian Ocean.
If coping with China's inevitable rise as a naval power is a long-term strategic challenge for
India, dealing with Beijing's new naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean backed by the 'Liaoning'
will test India's statecraft in the near term.
(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a Contributing
Editor for 'The Indian Express')

Zardari at UN
C. Raja Mohan : Thu Sep 27 2012, 02:20 hrs
A fortnightly column on the high politics of the Af-Pak region, the fulcrum of global power
play in India's neighbourhood
Zardari at UN
There is good news and bad news from Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari's speech at the
United Nations General Assembly this week. The former is about the commitment of
Pakistan's democratically elected leaders to pursue regional cooperation and reconciliation.
The latter is about Zardari's inability to push the Pakistan army and the ISI on ending their
support to terror groups.
The good news first. Zardari underlined the importance of strengthening democracy in
Pakistan and blamed the international community for embracing Pakistan's military
dictators in the past.
"These dictators and their regimes are responsible for suffocating and throttling Pakistan,
Pakistan's institutions, and Pakistani democracy," Zardari said. While he did not refer to the
Pakistan army directly, there is no doubt on who the target of his public criticism from an
international podium was.
Zardari reminded the world that his "will be the first civilian government in Pakistan's 66-
year history to complete its full, five-year term". Among the many accomplishments he
claimed for his elected government was the effort to promote peace and harmony in the
region.
"The growing regional pivot in Pakistan's foreign policy is a reflection of our democratic
policymaking. In engaging with our region, we are changing the future," Zardari declared.
In a bid to dispel the widespread international criticism that Pakistan is undermining the
efforts for peace in Afghanistan, Zardari insisted that a "sovereign, stable and secure
Afghanistan" is in Pakistan's interests.
Rather than emphasise the special role in the Afghan peace process that the Pakistan army
often claims, Zardari said he supports Kabul's attempts to reconcile with the Taliban.
Kashmir posture
Part of his new regional approach, Zardari suggested, was his effort to engage India. Zardari
reminded the international audience of his frequent meetings with Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh five times in the last four years.
Even as he talked of the bridge-building exercise with India, Zardari touched on the theme
of Kashmir. "We will continue to support the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to
peacefully choose their destiny in accordance with the UN Security Council's longstanding
resolutions on this matter."
Softening the blow somewhat, Zardari said that the resolution of this issue "can only be
arrived in an environment of cooperation." Zardari also underlined his effort to improve
commercial ties with India. "By normalising trade relations we want to create a regional
South Asian narrative," Zardari said.
This is not the first time that the Zardari government has returned to the old rhetoric on
Kashmir and the UN resolutions. After avoiding polemics on Kashmir in multilateral forums
for a few years, Pakistan is inching back to the bad old days.
Zardari's predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf had in fact negotiated with India on
Kashmir without a reference to the UN resolutions during 2005-07. India-Pakistan Kashmir
talks stalled after General Ashfaq Kayani became the army chief in 2007.
When he took charge of Pakistan in 2008, Zardari made bold to argue that the Kashmir
issue should be put aside and suggested that the two sides must focus instead on trade and
economic cooperation. He was quickly reprimanded by the army headquarters in
Rawalpindi.
One wonders if Zardari's renewed rhetoric on Kashmir and the UN resolutions is a result of
pressure from the army and conservatives in the Pakistani establishment. Having broken
the political taboo on trade, does Zardari feel compelled to compen-sate by reviving the
dogma on Kashmir?
Terror talk
Zardari's comments on Kashmir are perhaps less important than his helpless pleading at the
UN on his government's inability to do more on terror. The United States and the
international community as well as Pakistan's neighbours, India and Afghanistan, have been
urging Islamabad to do more in combatting the sources of international terrorism on
Pakistani soil.
No one in the world accuses Zardari of having control over his army and the ISI. Neither
New Delhi nor Kabul is betting that Zardari can alter the army's support to jihadi groups in
Pakistan that are destabilising India and Afghanistan.
The burden of Zardari's argument at the UN was that Pakistan is a victim of terrorism, has
made great sacrifices in the war against terror and the world can't ask it to do more. We can
only assume that this part of Zardari's song at the UN was scripted at the army headquarters
in Rawalpindi.

Mishra transformed Indias foreign policy
C. Raja Mohan : Sat Sep 29 2012, 03:27 hrs

Brajesh Chandra Mishra, who passed away late Friday evening in Delhi, will be long
remembered for his extraordinary role in transforming India's foreign policy, reshaping its
nuclear orientation and modernising its national security system.
Few civil servants in modern India's history have had as much influence in shaping India's
statecraft as Mishra, who joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1951.
Mishra, the son of well known Congressman and former Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh
Dwaraka Prasad Mishra, came into his own after retiring from the government and joining the
BJ P in the early 1990s.
Mishra's moment came when he was appointed as the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee in March 1998. With Vajpayee giving him full support, Mishra had the
intellectual conviction as well as bureaucratic skill to lay the foundations for reordering India's
engagement with the world.
Within a few weeks of taking charge as the Principal Secretary, Mishra was preparing the ground
for the Shakti series of nuclear tests in May 1998.
If conducting nuclear tests and declaring India as a nuclear weapon state was easy, coping with
its international consequences was very challenging. As the world powers joined to condemn
India's decision and imposed sanctions, Delhi needed political determination, bureaucratic
purposefulness and diplomatic skill to break out of the international isolation.
Those were the precise qualities that Mishra brought to the Prime Minister's Office in steering
India's ship of state in those difficult moments and helping turn the critics of Delhi's nuclear
adventure into eventual partners.
Even as he coordinated India's nuclear diplomacy, Mishra had the bigger task of making India a
credible nuclear weapon power. This involved the development of an effective nuclear doctrine
as well as the organisational structures to manage India's fledgeling nuclear forces.
His concurrent appointment as India's first national security adviser in November 1998, Mishra
had the sweeping authority to recast the nation's foreign and defence policies.
The surprise of the Kargil war in the summer of 1999 provided the occasion for Mishra to set in
motion a comprehensive review and reform of India's national security apparatus.
Mishra's tenure as the first national security adviser saw a rare boldness in the conduct of India's
foreign policy and the readiness to discard many of the inherited political shibboleths.
Together with J aswant Singh, who became Vajpayee's external affairs minister at the end of
1998, Mishra set to out restructure India's three most difficult relations with Pakistan, China
and the United States.
While there were twists and turns in India's ties with these three countries, Mishra's initiatives
helped define a new framework for dealing with each of these countries.
Every one of the moves by the BJ P-led government towards Pakistan, China and the United
States generated much political controversy. That the Manmohan Singh government persisted
with these policies underlined Mishra's contribution to the building of a new foreign policy
consensus.
Mishra's greatest contribution was in generating the confidence in Delhi to imagine India as a
great power that is in harmony with its neighbours and is capable of playing a larger role in
world affairs.
In the Delhi durbar, Mishra won fierce loyalty among the mandarins who worked with him and
much respect from his many political adversaries, for no one doubted his commitment to make
India a strong nation.
Even as he exuded great authority and did not suffer fools, Mishra was accessible to the media
and the strategic community always eager to explain the national security transformation
underway.
Behind the forbidding demeanour and towering presence, Mishra had a warm persona that
endeared him to all those who got to know him a little bit.
The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a Contributing
Editor for The Indian Express

Across the Radcliffe Line:
Reconnecting the Punjab
C. Raja Mohan : Mon Oct 01 2012, 10:40 hrs
If all goes well in the next few weeks, overland trade between India and Pakistan across the
international border in the Punjab will get a big boost.
After decades of restrictions that stifled commerce across what was a single economic space
until the Partition, the open door for bilateral trade across the Radcliffe Line could help
alter the politics of India-Pakistan relations in both countries.
As part of the road map on trade normalisation between the two countries, Pakistan has
agreed, in principle, to allow the import of all tradable items across the Wagah-Attari border
in the Punjab.
Earlier this year, Pakistan had started trading with India on the basis of a small negative list
of about 1,200 items. By the end of this year, Pakistan is expected to implement the most-
favoured-status for India.
Under the rules of the World Trading Organisation, the MFN status is about lifting
discriminatory practices against another country.
The MFN status would not have meant much for the divided states of the Punjab, because
Pakistan has allowed, until now, only 137 items to be imported via the land border in the
Punjab.
The commerce ministry in Pakistan has now moved the cabinet to remove the constraints
on overland trade between the two countries. If the cabinet approves, the flood gates for
commerce in the Punjab could open by the end of October.
Traders on both sides of the Radcliffe Line have long demanded the lifting of all barriers
against commerce between India and Pakistan.
Historically, the Punjab connected the subcontinent to inner Asia and the Persian Gulf
through the trans-Indus territories. The Partition of the Subcontinent resulted not just in
the political division of the Punjab but also its economic marginalisation.
Not surprisingly the chief ministers of Punjab on both sides have become major champions
of reviving the trade and commercial relations across the Radcliffe Line.
Shabaz Sharif, the Chief Minister of West Punjab, and Prakash Singh Badal, his counter part
in East Punjab are in political opposition to the ruling parties at the national level--the
Pakistan People's Party in Islamabad and and the Indian National Congress in Delhi.
Yet, they have been the strongest champions of expanded engagement between India and
Pakistan. This adds an interesting twist to the foreign policy debates in Islamabad and
Delhi.
In Pakistan, there is a rare consensus today among the major political parties for the
normalisation of economic relations with India. The reservations come from the army and
the Islamist parties.
In India, the BJP, which had taken many initiatives towards improving ties with Pakistan
when it was in power at the centre during 1998-2004, has long forgotten the foreign policy
legacy of Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
It now opposes every move that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh makes towards Pakistan.
But the BJP would want to take a deep breath on the question of trade between the two
Punjabs.
For its long standing political ally in the Punajb, the Akali Dal, is the one leading the charge
towards a liberal Pakistan policy.
When Vajpayee was the Prime Minister making bold overtures to Pakistan, the Congress
chief minister in Chandigarh, Amarinder Singh complemented Delhi with his local initiative
on strengthening contacts with Lahore.
Put simply, the people of the Punjab, the greatest victims of the Partition, have a big stake in
transcending it.
Unlike the BJP leadership and the conservatives in the foreign policy establishment in
Delhi, the political and commercial classes in the Punjab are ready to back all peace
initiatives towards Islamabad.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh can easily end some of his current defensiveness on
Pakistan by flaunting the strong support in the Punjab for the normalisation of relations
with Islamabad.
As hopes for land trade in the Punjab rise, there are growing demands in Rajasthan and the
Sindh for opening the old trade routes between the two provinces.
If you combine this with a liberalisation of trade across the Line of Control in Jammu &
Kashmir and the promotion of seaborne commerce between Mumbai and Gujarat on the
Indian side and Karachi across the waters of the Arabian Sea, it is not difficult to imagine a
major change in the Indian political debate on Pakistan.
(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a
Contributing Editor for 'The Indian Express')

Second Carrier
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Oct 03 2012, 02:39 hrs
Second Carrier
China, which commissioned its first aircraft carrier, called the Liaoning, last month, has
denied reports that a second carrier is under construction in Shanghai and might be
launched later this year.
"Such reports are inaccurate," a spokesman for China's ministry of defence said two days
after the PLA Navy inducted the Liaoning. "We will take into consideration national
economic development, the needs of national defence and military construction when we
make further plans for our carriers," the spokesman added.
The denial, however, is misleading. The Global Times newspaper, known for its nationalist
views, pointed out that the spokesman did not say which part of the report on the second
carrier was untrue. "People can assume that China is building follow-up carriers, but only
the second one will not be launched later this year, or it will not be built in Shanghai," the
Times concluded.
Most of China's neighbours in Asia, including India, will rightly assume that Beijing's quest
for naval plans includes the construction of more than one additional carrier.
On the question of the development of a carrier battle group, the spokesman of the defence
ministry said the navy is carefully studying the concept.
Political Logic
The Chinese Communist Party newspaper, the People's Daily, laid out last week with great
clarity the strategic rationale behind China's carrier development.
First, according the Daily, "the Liaoning reflects China's comprehensive national strength,
enhances the sense of national pride and promotes people's awareness of maritime rights
and interest [in it]."
Second, "it raises the level of China's naval combat power, facilitates national defence
modernisation and motivates the development of technology and capability-building in
[the] defence industry", the Daily said.
Third, the carrier "diversifies the means of safeguarding national sovereignty, security and
development." Last but not least, "the first aircraft carrier in active service is conducive to
strengthening maritime cooperation, dealing with non-traditional security threats and
contributing to world peace and common development," the Daily's editorial insisted.
The Daily has no difficulty in recognising that the carrier will add to the perception of a
growing threat from a rising China, but there "is no need to take it seriously".
"We should create a favourable international environment for China's long-term
development by adhering to defensive military strategy and the road of peaceful
development, as well as firmly defending its legitimate interests," the paper argued.
Great Sea Wall?
The commissioning of the Liaoning, many military experts suggest, marks a crucial step for
China in shifting from the traditional emphasis on land power to a new focus on sea power.
Historically, all major threats to Beijing's national security had come from land, especially
from the "barbarians" who invaded China from the northwest.
The emperors in Beijing built the Great Wall of China to protect themselves against these
land-based threats. Some analysts see the induction of the carrier as part of China's effort to
build a "Great Sea Wall" along its seaboard in the east.
China has long resented, the argument goes, the American naval dominance in the Western
Pacific and Washington's capacity to stop Beijing from integrating Taiwan with the
mainland.
It is true that Beijing has its hands full dealing with the extraordinary naval might of the
United States and the substantive maritime capabilities of Japan. China's naval strategists
are indeed determined to expand their room for manoeuvre in the Western Pacific against
the US and its allies.
Besides the imperative of unifying Taiwan, China is locked in a large number of territorial
disputes with its neighbours, including Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines.
These disputed waters are believed to contain substantive energy resources and add an
economic dimension to the territorial disputes.
Not everyone agrees with the notion that China's naval build-up is entirely defensive. The
recent Chinese assertiveness in the Pacific, according to the second school, points to the
offensive dimension of Beijing's naval strategy.
As a rising power whose economy imports massive amounts of natural resources and
exports industrial goods to markets around the world, China's interests extend way beyond
the Pacific. Securing its long sea lines of communication and projecting power into the
Indian Ocean and beyond have become important objectives of China's naval
modernisation.

As Russia warms to Pakistan
Delhi must strengthen its own ability to influence developments in Afghanistan
Moscow's warm reception to the Pakistan army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, last week,
Beijing's recent outreach to Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, and Washington's latest
move to resume aid to Pakistan underline the great power adaptation to the unfolding
uncertainty in the Af-Pak region.
Russia now seems determined to reduce the political distance between itself and Pakistan.
For decades now, Moscow's South Asia policy had focused on cultivating a special
relationship with India and keeping Pakistan at arms length.
China, despite its "all-weather" partnership with Pakistan, has begun to diversify its regional
policy. While Rawalpindi remains its principal partner in the subcontinent, Beijing is
stepping up an independent engagement with Kabul. China has now signalled its intent to
develop a strategic partnership with Afghanistan.
The United States, whose relationship with Pakistan has been on a roller coaster over the
last couple of years, does not want to let the the bilateral ties deteriorate any further. Not
surprisingly, the Obama administration has waived the conditions imposed by the US
Congress for disbursing military and economic assistance to Pakistan.
Together, the Russian, Chinese and American decisions underscore two important strategic
realities. When circumstances change and interests are redefined, great powers have no
hesitation in recasting their foreign policies. There is no room here for sentimentalism.
Consider for example the twists and turns of the Sino-US relationship over the last few
decades.
During 1950-53, America and China fought a costly war in the Korean peninsula. America
saw the death of 40,000 soldiers in that war, and Chinese casualties are estimated at
400,000. Less than two decades later, Washington and Beijing became allies against the
Soviet Union.
Less than four years ago, the Obama administration was actively considering the idea of a
geopolitical accommodation with China. Now Washington is pursuing a military "pivot to
Asia" to counter Beijing's assertiveness.
If the first factor underlines the inevitability of change, the second is about the permanence
of geography. Given its geopolitical location at the crossroads of subcontinent, Central Asia
and the Gulf, Pakistan has always had great strategic value for major powers.
This is especially true when it comes to Afghanistan. Thanks to its long and open border
with Afghanistan, Pakistan remains the principal external determinant of Afghanistan's
future.
Any major power with interests in Afghanistan must necessarily engage Pakistan, in
particular its army that has nurtured the capabilities of intervening across the Durand Line.
In judging the policies of Moscow, Beijing and Washington towards Afghanistan and
Pakistan, India needs to carefully differentiate between the transient and the enduring.
Seen from this perspective, there is little reason for New Delhi to lose sleep over Moscow's
current enthusiasm to befriend Pakistan. For quite some time now, Moscow has put out
signals that it would like to build a productive relationship with Pakistan. Islamabad, for its
part, has been more than eager to develop a deeper relationship with Moscow.
While Moscow's decision to embrace Rawalpindi has generated some anguish in Delhi, it is
useful to recall that Russia was not always aloof towards Pakistan.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Russia had a measure of economic and political engagement
with Pakistan. After the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, it was Moscow that assumed
the role of neutral peacemaker at Tashkent in January 1966.
Moscow's strategic tilt towards India in 1971 arose out of a number of factors the Cold
War with America, the Sino-Soviet rift, and the Sino-Indian conflict, the China-Pakistan
alignment and India's leftwards drift at home under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
That historical moment has long passed. The end of the Cold War, the expansion of India's
relations with the US and China have left a big gap between Moscow and Islamabad that
was going to be bridged sooner than later.
In recent years, Delhi has often tried to hold Russia down to an exclusive relationship with
itself and limit the ties between Moscow and Islamabad.
That approach is clearly unsustainable. If the US and China have sought to develop more
balanced relations with India and Pakistan, Delhi must recognise that Russia is bound to do
the same.
This does not necessarily mean Russia would want to give up its special relationship with
India. Russia's gambit towards Pakistan has just begun and is unlikely to acquire any
alarming dimension in the near term.
Consider, for example, the new talk about Moscow selling weapons to Rawalpindi. Russia is
not unaware that India's arms market is much bigger and Pakistan does not have the
financial resources to become an attractive customer like India.
Although Russia now faces competition in Delhi's arms bazaar from the US, Europe and
Israel, playing the Pakistan card beyond a limit could only undermine Moscow's privileged
position that perdures in India.
Yet, Russia has significant concerns about the prospect of instability in Afghanistan after
2014, when the US plans to end its combat role there, that could spill over into Moscow's
sensitive buffer zones in Central Asia.
Rawalpindi is acutely conscious of its unique position in Afghanistan, whose future is
turning uncertain, and unsurprisingly wants to cash in at the political counters in Moscow,
Washington and Beijing.
As America retreats from Afghanistan, China seeks to expand its influence in Kabul, and
Russia wants to protect its interests in Central Asia, they all need the Pakistan army's
cooperation.
In the short term, its role as a spoiler in Afghanistan gives the Pakistan army much political
leverage. But over the longer term, Rawalpindi's incapacity to stabilise Afghanistan can only
sharpen the contradictions between Pakistan's policies across the Durand Line and the
interests of the major powers.
Rather than protest Russian and other great power engagement with Pakistan, Delhi must
focus on strengthening its own ability to influence the developments in Afghanistan.

Romney on 2014
Romney on 2014
In his much awaited speech on foreign policy delivered at a military institute on Monday,
Mitt Romney, the Republican challenger to incumbent Barack Obama in the US presidential
election, had very little to say on the US strategy towards Afghanistan. The focus of the
speech was almost entirely on the Middle East.
Romney's team has apparently bet that the Middle East is the chink in Obama's foreign
policy armour that must be attacked. Romney's main objective was to reverse the
widespread perception in the United States that Obama has been an effective commander-
in-chief.
Until now, the main focus of Romney's campaign has been on the economy, the weakest
point of Obama's record. Romney had calculated that there was little traction in making
foreign policy a debating point in this election. That approach has now been reversed.
The controversy over the killing of the US ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens, in
Benghazi last month and the Obama administration's vacillations in responding to the Arab
Spring have provided the context for Romney's fusillade against Obama's leadership on the
foreign policy front.
It is difficult to quibble with Obama on Af-Pak issues when he flaunts his success in locating
and executing Osama bin Ladin and his relentless drone attacks on the sanctuaries in
Pakistan.
In the few words that he devoted to Afghanistan, where the US military involvement has
lasted more than a decade, Romney was careful not to challenge the main lines of Obama's
strategy while highlighting a few differences.
For example, Romney has not rejected Obama's deadline of 2014 to end America's active
combat role in Afghanistan. While claiming that he is not for an "endless war" in
Afghanistan, Romney suggested Obama's policy has been guided by domestic political
considerations.
"I will evaluate conditions on the ground and weigh the best advice of our military
commanders" in Afghanistan, Romney declared. "I will affirm that my duty is not to my
political prospects but to the security of the nation," he added.
Experts in Washington say Romney, if elected president, might alter the pace of the US
military drawdown in Afghanistan, but is unlikely to prolong the military intervention
beyond 2014.
Drone Warfare
Romney had even less to say on Pakistan, which has drawn so much American military and
political energies over the last decade. His passing reference to Pakistan was in the context
of the war on terror.
Welcoming Obama's drone warfare, Romney said, "America can take pride in the blows that
our military and intelligence professionals have inflicted on al-Qaeda in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, including the killing of Osama bin Laden."
Pointing to al-Qaeda's growing presence beyond the Af-Pak region, Romney insisted that
drones "are no substitute for a national security strategy in the Middle East".
Romney, of course, would not explain what that alternative strategy might be. For all his
tough talk on the Middle East, Romney seemed careful not to lock himself into policy
positions that cannot be sustained in office.
Pivot to Asia
If Obama's proclaimed "pivot to Asia" to balance the rise of China has become the most
important US national security initiative in the last few years, Romney had only an off-hand
remark to offer.
Romney criticised the concept of the pivot even as he argued that "China's recent
assertiveness is sending chills" through the Asia Pacific region. He pointed to the concerns
that the US might be moving away from its "oldest allies" and "young democracies" in
Europe that continue to seek American protection.
But he indirectly addressed the concerns of many in Asia about the US capacity to sustain a
larger military presence there amidst the rapidly growing military prowess of China and
America's relative economic decline.
"I will roll back President Obama's deep and arbitrary cuts to our national defence that
would devastate our military. I will make the critical defence investments that we need to
remain secure."
Romney emphasised the importance of rebuilding America's naval might. "The size of our
navy is at levels not seen since 1916. I will restore our navy to the size needed to fulfil our
missions by building 15 ships per year, including three submarines."
While Romney's tall talk on defence build-up is impressive, the big question remains on
how he plans to maintain current levels of spending on defence while reducing the massive
and growing US budgetary deficit.

The Romney Resurrection and India
A week, it is said, is a long time in politics. That sounds truer than ever as we look at the
dramatic turn in the political fortunes of Mitt Romney, the Republican contender for
American Presidency in the US elections.
A week ago, the talk was all about the implosion of the Romney campaign. Some were
describing it as one of the worst led Republican campaigns in recent memory.
Barack Obama enjoyed a seemingly unbeatable lead of many points in most opinion polls.
On top of it, Romney seemed to be trailing in all the important battle ground states like
Ohio and Florida.
But within days after the first presidential debate between Obama and Romney last week
watched by a record 70 million viewers, the electoral dynamic has turned upside down.
More than two thirds of those polled after the debate said Romney had won the debate
hands down. Supporters of Obama are shell-shocked at the President's off-colour
performance.
For the first time since he got the Republican nomination, Romney has now gained a
slender lead over Obama in the opinion polls.
Even in the critical states like Ohio, Romney has closed in. Put simply, there is now a
reasonable prospect that President Obama might not be able to win the second term.
To be sure, the Obama campaign will fight back to regain the high ground before the polling
takes place on November 6. But there is no denying that it is a race and a tight one at that.
Until now, most of America's major external interlocutors were generally complacent with
the notion of continuity in Washington. India has been no exception.
Foreign policy establishments everywhere are comfortable dealing with status quo rather
than change, which always introduces a measure of unpredictability into diplomacy.
Four years ago, Delhi was deeply uncomfortable with the prospects of the Obama
presidency. The fear was that Obama might reverse or slow down some of the big initiatives
of his predecessor who was much liked in India--George W. Bush.
Whatever the initial concerns of India and the impulses of Obama might have been, the
India U.S. relationship has advanced steadily in the last four years. Four more years of
Obama should help consolidate the bilateral relationship further.
Could a Romney presidency create new complications for the bilateral relationship? On the
face of it, no. That he did not mention India in a major foreign policy speech on Monday is
not the issue. The speech was not about policy but finding line a political attack on Obama's
perceived failures in the Middle East.
The Republican Party has in fact been far more enthusiastic about a strategic partnership
with India. Its political platform has hailed India as a 'geopolitical ally'.
Beyond the general rhetoric though, Romney seems to have little personal interest in India.
A lot would depend on the kind of people he would appoint to the top slots in the
Administration. As some would say personnel is often the policy.
Obama's secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, was deeply committed to the bilateral
partnership with India. As the first lady in her husband's Administration and a member of
the U.S. Senate and head of the India caucus in the U.S. Congress during the Bush years,
Hillary Clinton brought great energy to the objective of boosting ties with Delhi.
A new President will take time to settle down. Romney will be further hampered by the
deepening divisions within the Republican foreign policy establishment on how best to deal
with the external challenges confronting America.
India should be prepared to manage a brief hiatus in the relationship with the U.S. and
Delhi's foreign policy managers must begin to scroll down their list of top Republican
contacts.
Contributing Editor for the Indian Express)

Malala Episode: A turning point for
Pakistan?
Malala Yusufzai, the brave school girl from Swat who took on the Taliban, appears to have
stirred, as never before, the conscience of the Pakistani elite against the outrages of religious
extremism.
Last week, as Malala was returning from school, Taliban militants shot and wounded her
critically. Malala, who has been fighting for her life in a military hospital, has been flown out
Monday morning to United Kingdom for extended care.
Malala earned the wrath of the Pakistani Taliban for writing about their obnoxious behavior
when they took over the Swat Valley in 2009.
Taliban's writ over Swat ended after an extended operation by the Pakistan army. Malala
has since been championing the cause of education for girl children.
The Pak army chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani was among the first to condemn the attack
and visit Malala in hospital. Calling Malala an icon of courage and hope, Kayani said the
attack shows how low the militants "can fall in their cruel ambition to impose their twisted
ideology".
Fifty clerics of Pakistan's Sunni Ittehad Council issued a 'fatwa' criticising the attempted
assassination of Malala as 'un-Islamic'. They declared Taliban's acts against the female
education are "repugnant to the teachings of Islam".
Pakistan's main Islamic parties have criticized the shooting, but have also tried to change
the subject away from the Taliban threat to the American drone attacks.
The political parties have expressed anguish, but only the MQM has called for army
operations against the Taliban.
There have been major protests by liberal civil society groups against the attack and
defending the right of the girl child for education. In the biggest demonstration so far, tens
of thousands gathered in Karachi on Sunday to criticise the Taliban.
Could this be a defining moment for a long overdue change in Pakistan's internal and
external orientation? Might this one awful episode bring to an end decades of the elite
tolerance in Pakistan of militant Islam at home and the deliberate use violent extremism to
destabilize Afghanistan and India.
Those optimistic about Pakistan point to the fact that Gen. Kayani was quick to condemn
the attacks. They draw the contrast with Kayani's deafening silence when Salman Taseer,
the governor of Punjab, was killed by one of his security guards in January 2011.
When the assasin, Mumtaz Qadri, was produced in court, the lawyers in Lahore showered
him with rose petals.
Pessimists concede that the reaction to the attack on Malala has indeed been different. But
they wonder if it has been intense enough to change the course of Pakistan's dalliance with
extremism that was institutionalized since the late 1970s when Gen Zia-ul-Haque took
charge of Pakistan.
Realists underline the difficulties of overcoming the institutional inertia in Pakistan,
especially since the question of religion is involved.
They also point to the fact that militants have gained so much ground over the last few
decades. Marginalizing them, let alone defeating them, would involve the expenditure of
much blood and treasure.
A serious confrontation with violent extremism, then, demands, strong will and purposeful
leadership, which can only come from the Army.
The army chief has said all the right things. But there is no evidence, so far, that he is ready
to take on the Taliban. May be he will, but don't bet on it.
Contributing Editor for The Indian Express)

Japanese Navy
C. Raja Mohan : Thu Oct 18 2012, 03:13 hrs
Japanese Navy
With Asia's focus riveted on the rapid modernisation of the Chinese navy, it is not just the
United States that is recalibrating its military strategy in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. All
the lesser powers in the Indo-Pacific are making their own moves to cope with the
increasing assertiveness of Beijing in the waters of Asia. None of them is more important
than Japan, which has stepped out of the shadows to flex its own maritime muscles this
week.
The occasion was the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Maritime Self-
Defence Force. On Sunday, Japan organised a naval parade showing off 45 ships and nearly
8,000 sailors. Japan holds a fleet review every three years, but this one has been specially
large and comes at a time when Tokyo's maritime territorial and other disputes with Beijing
in their shared waters have acquired a sharp edge.
Three countries the US, Australia and Singapore sent ships to participate in the fleet
review. Twenty other countries, including China, sent their diplomats to observe the fleet
review.
One of the well trained and best equipped forces in the region, the Japanese navy has
traditionally been focused on dealing with the threat from the Soviet Union. Since the end of
the Cold War, the Japanese navy has begun to undertake responsibilities for such
cooperative security activity as humanitarian and disaster relief.
In recent years, the Japanese navy has also begun to participate in the anti-piracy
operations in the Indian Ocean. With the dramatic rise in the capabilities of the Chinese
navy, Japan now has huge maritime challenges closer home to deal with.
Noda surprise
Speaking at the fleet review, Japan's Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda talked about the navy's
"new responsibilities". He directly referred to the threats from North Korea's nuclear and
missile programmes.
More significant was his veiled reference to the Chinese naval threat. While he did not
mention Beijing directly, Noda left no one in any doubt when he pointed to a more difficult
"security environment surrounding our nation". Speaking from the deck of a destroyer,
Noda said, "We are facing various cases related to territory and sovereignty."
Noda, widely perceived as a weak leader, used the occasion to signal commitment to the
defence of Japan's maritime territorial interests. His use of some old-fashioned phrases in
the speech surprised many observers of Japanese politics.
Noda called on the troops to put in "more strenuous efforts and hard work". It would seem a
rather simple thing for any political leader to say.
But not in Japan.
The expression is part of a slogan used by Admiral Heihachiro Togo, a commander of the
Japanese Imperial Navy who was called "Nelson of the East", during the victorious war
against Russia in 1904-05.
Since the end of World War II, any reference to past Japanese military glory has been a
major political taboo. Noda also read out the "Five Mottos" long recited by Japanese naval
cadets. They call for sincerity, discipline and hard work.
Analysts in Tokyo say this is the first time a Japanese PM read the Five Mottos in front of
the troops and call it "extraordinary". Although Noda's office has downplayed the remarks,
there is no denying the subtle but definitive invocation to Japanese nationalism in coping
with the military consequences of China's rise.
Southern Islands
Besides defending its claims to island territories that are also claimed by China, the
Japanese navy is under pressure to secure the waters around its southern islands that
separate the East China Sea from the wider Pacific Ocean.
The PLA navy has long felt hemmed in by the naval might of the US and Japan. With greater
self-confidence now, China's naval leaders have undertaken bolder exercises that
demonstrate the capacity to break out of the Japanese island chain into the Pacific. A flotilla
of seven Chinese warships have sailed through one of the passages of Japan's southern
island chain for the first time. Japanese officials know that this will not be the last time.
Those in New Delhi who worry about China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean should
recognise that the mounting naval tensions between Beijing and Tokyo in the Pacific are
likely to be a much bigger factor in shaping the maritime future of the Indo-Pacific.
The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and
contributing editor, 'The Indian Express'

The contested periphery
C. Raja Mohan : Thu Oct 18 2012, 23:44 hrs
The 50th anniversary of the military clashes with China has led to an outpouring of
anguished commentary in India. While the public discourse is on overdrive, Delhi refuses to
say a word, for it is a subject that the government of India has never agreed to engage with.
Beijing, too, maintains a stony silence and its official media have largely stayed away from
the discussion on 1962.
The military conflict with India in 1962 has never been a moment to publicly recall, let alone
celebrate, in Beijing. The war against Japanese occupation and the war in Korea with the
United States are the ones that have considerable significance in the modern Chinese
political consciousness.
At a time when relations with the US have entered a difficult phase, and with maritime
territorial disputes with Japan and the Southeast Asian nations on the boil, China has no
reason to spoil the atmospherics of its relations with India by venturing into the debate on
1962. Beijing has been hoping that the 50th anniversary will pass quickly and it can get back
to regular business.
In India, the debate on 1962 generates more heat than light. Much of the problem lies in the
fact that the government of India is not willing to put out a comprehensive version of its
story or open its archives to the scholarly community to construct an objective account.
With no effort to historicise the conflict, all kinds of myths and half-truths have acquired
lives of their own.
"Chinese betrayal", Nehru's policy failures, and the incompetence of the Indian military
leadership, to name a few, are dredged up again and again, with no excavation of new
information on the sources of the Sino-Indian border conflict, its evolution during 1959-62
and the consequences.
India, however, cannot afford to wallow forever in self-pity over 1962. The opportunities
that beckon and the challenges that China presents for India are of an immensely larger
magnitude than at the turn of the 1960s.
In the 1950s, India and China were weak developing countries and had little to offer each
other except political rhetoric and presumed solidarity. Today, China is the world's second-
largest economy and India is in the top ten.
If the opportunities for mutually beneficial economic engagement are real, the costs of
political and military conflict are much larger. Both are nuclear powers and their
conventional military capabilities are rather impressive.
Yet, there is no denying that the sources of Delhi's conflict with Beijing, rooted in territorial
nationalism, are alive despite
the growing economic and political cooperation between the two Asian giants over the last
two decades.
For one, the logic of forward policy that brought Indian and Chinese military forces face to
face in 1962 remains in play. The phrase "forward policy" is usually associated with Nehru's
presumed failures on the northern borders.
The fact is China had an even more ambitious forward policy that resulted in its control over
Tibet and Xinjiang. As a result, Delhi's buffers to the north vanished, making China a new
neighbour of India.
It makes little sense at this stage to apportion blame between Mao and Nehru. Both
represented the rise of modern territorial nationalism in China and India, and had no
option but to extend their boundaries to the farthest possible extent.
Large parts of Xinjiang, Kashmir, Tibet, Yunnan and India's northeast were for centuries
loosely governed territories in between the large empires that surrounded them. The
imposition of modern borders with clearly expressed territorial sovereignty over these
regions was bound to generate conflict between the new states.
Two, while drawing lines on the map was easy for China and India, integrating these
frontier regions into the new nations has been quite difficult for both Beijing and Delhi.
China has done an impressive job promoting economic integration with these frontier
regions in the last two decades. But as the continuing turbulence in Xinjiang and Tibet
shows, economic growth alone is not enough to win the political loyalty of the people in its
peripheral territories.
India extended political democracy into these border regions but has failed to bring
economic prosperity, internal security and reasonable governance to them. For all the
criticism of Nehru's policy, Delhi is struggling to provide, 50 years later, basic road
connectivity to its frontier regions.
Half a century after 1962, China and India remain major obstacles to the consolidation of
the territoriality of the other. China's claims on Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir are
contested by India. Beijing resents Delhi's historically close relationship with Tibet.
China tilts towards Pakistan in its dispute with India over Kashmir and has supported, in
the past, rebel movements in India's Northeast. India too has armed Tibetan insurgents in
the past and continues to provide a safe haven for the Dalai Lama.
China and India can't complete the consolidation of their territoriality without each making
a major political compromise with the other. Ten years ago, the two sides agreed that such a
compromise cannot be produced on the basis of legal or historical claims.
The search over the last political decade for a solution from a political perspective has
produced some gains, but the talks have stalled again amidst the inability to agree on a
mutually acceptable territorial compromise and the two countries' changing relations with
other powers, such as the US.
The final resolution of the contested territoriality between China and India can only come as
part of the construction of a larger political equilibrium between a rising China and an
emerging India. Such an equilibrium must necessarily involve, in Delhi and Beijing, a new
political imagination of their own peripheries, a framework for trans-frontier connectivity
and cooperation, avoiding competition in their shared Asian spaces and greater cooperation
in the international arena.
The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a
contributing editor for 'The Indian Express', express@expressindia.com

Look East, Look Sharp
C. Raja Mohan : Sat Oct 20 2012, 02:35 hrs

Book: Great Game East India, China and the struggle for Asia's most volatile
frontier
Author: Bertil Lintner
Publisher: Harper Collins
Price: Rs. 699
Pages: 442
The much-used metaphor of the Great Game initially described the extended rivalry
between Calcutta and Moscow through most of the 19 th and early 20 th centuries for
influence in Afghanistan, Iran and the Khanates of Central Asia.
Bertil Lintner, the well-known journalist and chronicler of Myanmar and the regions that
connects India, China and Southeast Asia, reminds us that the Great Game was never
limited to the subcontinent's North-western marches.
Lintner narrates the less-told story of the Great Game in the northeastern frontiers of the
subcontinent and its new relevance for India amidst the rise of China as a great power.
The Great Game was, in essence, about the British Raj's determination to keep the rival
European powers at arms length from the subcontinent.
Although Calcutta was mostly concerned about the Russian threat, it had to deal with the
French forays in the late 18 th and 19 th centuries and the German advances in the 20 th.
The Raj created a variety of administrative (inner lines and outer lines of territorial
sovereignty) and political arrangements (buffer states and client regimes) in the frontier
regions that few empires had ever exercised full control over for any length of time.
In the northwest, the Raj was sought a measure of control over the lawless lands beyond the
great Indus making Afghanistan a protectorate of the Raj.
In the northeast the Great Game was about the adventures of the Raj across the mighty
Brahmaputra that led to the annexation of Burma in 1885 and the opening up of Tibet in
1903-04.
China's decline through the 19 th century, the difficult terrain of the mountains and jungles
of Burma, and the ability to fend off European powers in Asia, seemed to make the
northeastern frontiers of the Raj quite secure.
If Japan shook the Raj out of its complacency in the 1940s by occupying Burma and setting
up a nationalist government in the Andamans, the rise of Communist China enormously
complicated the management of independent India's northeastern frontiers.
The partition of the subcontinent relieved India of the direct burdens of the Great Game in
the northwest. India no longer had physical access to Afghanistan and Iran and it was
Pakistan that continued the Great Game in partnership with the United States.
The partition, however, severely tested India in the northeast where it had to cope with new
and challenging geographic realities Chinese control of Tibet, the emergence of East
Pakistan, the collaboration between Pakistan and China, and an independent but weak state
in Burma.
Further complicating the situation was the fact that unlike the empires of the past, the
nationalist governments in China, India and Burma could no longer treat their frontier
regions as buffer zones.
Those empires had no emotional attachment to far-flung territories; they were mere
instruments in the management relations with other empires.
For the nation-states that succeeded them, asserting territorial sovereignty over what were
only loosely linked regions was a grand ideological imperative.
If nationalism was a burning motivation to consolidate territorial sovereignty, the new
rulers had a hard time following through on the ground. Their efforts to promote centralised
control over the peripheral regions were not always successful and created deep resentment
and persistent revolts in Tibet, India's northeast, and Burma's northern territories.
The disaffection of those in the frontiers provided opportunities for the states in the region
as well as the great powers for destabilisation and political leverage.
Lintner, who has travelled extensively in these regions legally and illegally tells us
stories from these volatile frontiers, the aspirations for separation and autonomy among the
indigenous peoples, and the external support to dissident movements across the borders.
His experience as a journalist and mastery over detail makes this narrative easy to absorb.
Linter begins the story in Tibet, the Chinese occupation in the 1950s, the flight of the Dalai
Lama to India in 1959, the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, and the U.S. efforts to support
Tibetan rebels from India and Nepal.
If China was angry with what it saw as Indian intervention in its internal affairs, Beijing,
supported by Pakistan's I.S.I., began to back the rebel movements in India's northeast from
the 1960s to late 1980s, when Delhi and Beijing began their slow normalsation of their
bilateral relations.
After he covers the internal and external dimensions of the conflicts in Nagaland, Mizoram
and Manipur, Linter surveys the complex dynamic between Assam and Bangladesh, the
enormous consequences of migration on the ethnic balances and the aggravation of regional
conflict.
Lintner's fabulous tale then turns to Burma and the impact of its internal dynamics on
India's northeast and China's South Western Province of Yunnan and its special importance
in the unfolding Sino-Indian rivalry.
Linter's grand survey of the Great Game in the East concludes in the islands of Andaman
and Nicobar and extension of the Sino-Indian rivalry into the Indian Ocean.
In sketching the complexities of the geopolitical arc stretching from Tibet to the Andaman
Sea, Linter helps us better understand the mounting challenges on our northern and eastern
frontiers amidst the rapid rise of Chinese power.
The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a
Contributing Editor for The Indian Express

Indian Diplomacy: Salman Khurshids
Challenge

At 59, India's new foreign minister, Salman Khurshid is more than two decades younger than his
predecessor, S M Krishna, and will undoubtedly bring greater energy to the conduct of India's
diplomacy.
Beyond vigour we can also expect some political grace from Khurshid. His first statement to the
media Sunday afternoon as he took charge of the foreign office underlines new possibilities.
The new minister acknowledged the responsibility bestowed on him by the Congress leadership
and the contributions made by his many illustrious predecessors.
Khurshid also paid handsome compliments to the officers of the Indian Foreign Service who will
do all the hard work for him. All right things to say for India's new chief diplomat.
At the Foreign Office, Khurshid's main challenge is not really about mastering the negotiating
briefs with external interlocutors. His task is to strengthen the domestic political consensus in
favour of foreign policy.
Khurshid comes to South Block at a rare moment, when most major powers want good relations
with Delhi. Even the perennially difficult relations with China, Pakistan and other neighbours are
in good shape.
India's diplomatic clout has never been as large as it is today,
thanks to the economic growth of the last two decades. Yet,
dysfunctional governance at home has largely prevented India from taking full advantage of the
favourable external environment.
Part of the problem has been the lack of political backbone in the UPA government. It has been
too willing to step back from major diplomatic initiatives at the first sign of bureaucratic or
political resistance.
The reluctance to lead has been compounded by the inability of the government to mobilize
public support for foreign policy goals. The new foreign minister is nothing if he is not articulate.
Salman Khurshid is better positioned than many of predecessors to make the public case for
India's many stalled diplomatic initiatives.
A second task for Khurshid is to sustain a high level political
engagement with the UPA coalition partners. Mamata Banerjee was never quite amenable to
reason, and blocked many initiatives including the attempt by Manmohan Singh to transform the
ties with Dhaka. Many other partners of the UPA are less obstreperous. Khurshid must try and
keep them in good political humour.
Even more important, Khurshid must forever be ready to devote personal energies to persuade
his Congress colleagues to think big about India's national interests.
Conservative by nature and raised in another political era, some of Khurshid's senior colleagues
are out of sync with India's new strategic imperatives. They have killed many of PM's initiatives
with simple trickdo nothing.
If the PM does not want to exercise the authority of his office over his Cabinet colleagues,
Khurshid can use his political skills to convince the senior congressmen to so some out-of-the
box thinking.
As the minister of external affairs, Khurshid will be sitting in on
the powerful Cabinet Committee on Security and will have a major role in shaping India's
approach to many critical issues.
Salman Khurshid can make big difference if he can demonstrate that a bold foreign policy could
also be good domestic politics.
(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a Contributing
Editor for 'The Indian Express').

Durand Line
Durand Line
The Durand Line is back in the news thanks to the assertion of a top US diplomat that it
constitutes the "international border" between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The remarks by the US special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Marc Grossman,
during a recent visit to the region, have drawn an angry response from Kabul.
No one in Afghanistan, not even the Taliban that is widely seen as a proxy for Pakistan, is
willing to accept the Durand
Line as the nation's legitimate eastern border.
The 2,600 km line is named after Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, undivided India's foreign
secretary who "negotiated" it with the Amir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman Khan, in 1893.
At the end of the 19th century, when the power of the Raj was at its apogee, the rulers of
Kabul had no choice but to acquiesce. After the Partition of the subcontinent, the Afghans
were less obliged to accept the claims of Pakistan that inherited the Durand Line.
Protesting Grossman's remarks, the foreign office in Kabul said it "rejects and considers
irrelevant any statement by anyone about the legal status of this line". Meanwhile, the
ministry of foreign affairs in Islamabad insisted the Durand Line between Pakistan and
Afghanistan is "a closed and settled issue".
Although London and Washington have long supported Pakistan's claims on the Durand
Line, some Western scholars say the decision was motivated by the logic of mobilising
Pakistan's support in the Cold War. A report of the House of Commons Library published in
June 2010 argues, "The legal status of the Durand Line has never been definitively settled."
It suggests there is much credibility to the Afghan claim that the Durand Line was never
meant to mark the separation of the territorial sovereignties of the Raj and Afghanistan.
The line, according to some scholars, was about differentiating the spheres of influence of
Calcutta and Kabul in the Pashtun lands across the Indus rather than defining the
boundary.
Indian View
India has largely stayed away from the controversy over the legitimacy of the Durand Line.
Its silence though is widely interpreted as supporting Pakistan's position.
In 1978, after the communist revolution in Afghanistan, India's then foreign minister, Atal
Bihari Vajpayee, reportedly called on the new government to respect the Durand Line and
urged Kabul and Islamabad to settle their differences through negotiations.
Sections of the Indian strategic community feel India is too passive on the disputes between
Kabul and Islamabad. Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran has underlined the virtues of
Indian diplomatic ambiguity on the Durand Line.
"It may be worthwhile for us to signal that we do not necessarily recognise the Durand Line
as a legitimate frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan," Saran wrote about two years
ago. For a New Delhi that shuns all political risk, that might be too bold a course.
Borders & Orders
A border becomes one only when both sides accept its legitimacy. Consider for example
Delhi's oft- repeated position that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and it
does not recognise any dispute over the territory.
In the real world, Pakistan does not accept India's claim, is in occupation of a part of J&K,
and has proxies operating across the Line of Control. Much like Kashmir that has put India
and Pakistan at odds for so long, the dispute over the Durand Line deeply divides Kabul and
Islamabad.
While claiming it to be an international border, Pakistan does everything to undermine the
Durand Line. The Pakistan army and the ISI behave as if the line does not exist, intervene in
Afghanistan's internal affairs, and support insurgent groups trying
to destabilise Kabul.
From another perspective, the war in Afghanistan has already spilled over into Pakistan; the
US rains drones from across the Durand Line. Some Pakistani insurgent groups take shelter
in Afghanistan and launch repeated raids across the Line. The Durand Line, then, is only on
the map. Rawalpindi's own search for strategic depth in Afghanistan has undone what little
legitimacy the Line had.
The problem of the Durand Line can only be settled as part of a larger political
reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such reconciliation would involve skirting
the question of sovereignty, promoting transborder economic connectivity and cooperation,
meeting the aspirations of the Pashtuns on both sides of the Line, and ending support to
cross-border terrorism.
The writer is distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and

Oceans Nineteen
C. Raja Mohan : Fri Nov 02 2012, 03:08 hrs

A leading historian of the Indian Ocean region, Kenneth McPherson, called it the "ugly
duckling". Foreign ministers from that inchoate multilateral institution called the Indian Ocean
Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) have gathered at Gurgaon near Delhi this
week to reflect on their collective prospects for the next decade.
The IOR-ARC, now 15 years old, could either turn into a powerful bird that soars high or the
flightless dodo that once inhabited the islands of the Western Indian Ocean. The big question is
whether India can provide the leadership to transform the IOR-ARC into an effective forum.
No one in the vast littoral questions the IOR-ARC's mission to renew the regional identity of the
Indian Ocean that thrived until the end of the 18th century. Some, though, would want the
organisation to find a name that is easier on the tongue (Indocom, for Indian Ocean Community,
is our offering).
But few in the region's political and business classes are even aware of the existence of the IOR-
ARC. And those who study regional institutions have every reason to put the IOR-ARC at the
very top of the list of "failed organisations". Why, then, is South Block trying to whip up some
enthusiasm for the "moribund" IOR-ARC? The political decision in Delhi a couple of years ago,
to revive the IOR-ARC, was driven by a number of factors.
For decades, the Indian Ocean was a boutique theme that excited a tiny section of Delhi's
strategic community. It included navalists who were nostalgic about the undivided subcontinent's
primacy in the Indian Ocean under the Raj. Delhi's diplomatic rhetoric was focused on getting
great powers out of the Indian Ocean. With the Indian economy turning inwards, India's historic
commercial ties with the Indian Ocean atrophied. Political Delhi forced the Indian armed forces
into a prolonged isolation and decreed against military contact with other states in the region and
beyond.
Although J awaharlal Nehru and K.M. Panikkar wrote about the importance of regional
cooperation in the Indian Ocean in the 1940s, Delhi had little to offer the littoral in the decades
after Independence. After the Cold War, the idea of Indian Ocean regionalism presented itself
again to Delhi. India, however, was a hesitant globaliser in the 1990s and its security
establishment was uncomfortable with the prospect of discussing political issues in multilateral
forums. India then actively limited the scope of the IOR-ARC charter.
If caution was the watchword in the 1990s, activism is the current imperative. As India's
economic momentum picked up in the last decade, the Indian Ocean began to loom large. India's
trade with the littoral has grown eight-fold over ten years to reach $156 billion last year. India's
energy and economic security is now linked inextricably to the stability of the Indian Ocean
littoral.
Beyond India's own expanding economic engagement, the region has begun to reconnect to
itself. Unlike in the last two centuries, when the rich natural resources of the littoral powered the
industrial growth of the West, today they head increasingly in the direction of the economies in
the East, including China, J apan and Korea. Between 2001 and 2010, intra-regional trade in the
Indian Ocean has tripled from $ 1.1. trillion to $ 3.5 trillion. It now constitutes a quarter of total
global commerce.
It is not the IOR-ARC but market forces that have boosted the new regional integration by
rediscovering the natural synergies in the region. But markets alone can't help sustain the
emerging economic growth in the region. Governments must step in to create effective regional
mechanisms to deepen trade and security cooperation. Given the vast size of the region, the
geographically dispersed membership and the diversity of regimes, the IOR-ARC will not be
able to construct a single free trade area for the whole region. Trade liberalisation is already
moving forward in different parts of the littoral. The IOR-ARC, then, is rightly focused on trade
and investment facilitation. This involves the region-wide mobilisation of political support for a
range of reforms, from simplifying customs procedures to modernising infrastructure.
The second priority is maritime security. Although the IOR-ARC was initially hesitant to discuss
security issues, it has begun to recognise that there can be no prosperity in the region without
peace and stability. While the littoral countries must take larger responsibilities for securing the
Indian Ocean, it makes no sense to frame it in terms of "regional versus extra-regional" powers.
The IOR-ARC must necessarily engage the major powers of the world to build a secure Indian
Ocean. China and J apan are already "dialogue partners" for the IOR-ARC and the United States
now wants to associate itself with the organisation. Even as it integrates with itself, the Indian
Ocean has acquired much significance for the rest of the world. Its resources, markets and seas
matter to the entire world. The littoral can't return to the centuries when it was a closed
geopolitical space.
The IOR-ARC's progress in the next decade depends on the kind of leadership that Delhi is
willing to provide. As the largest economy in the region, India must strive to become the engine
of growth for the entire Indian Ocean. As one of the most capable militaries in the Indian Ocean
and one that has good relations with most regional and extra-regional actors, Delhi must help
create a sound basis for regional security cooperation.
Delhi has signalled the political will to promote Indian Ocean regionalism. If it can follow
through with consequential actions, there is a reasonable chance the IOR-ARC will not remain
an ugly duckling a decade from now.
contributing editor for 'The Indian Express' express@expressindia.com

Under the Lahore Sun: Another Badal
in Pakistan
C. Raja Mohan : Mon Nov 05 2012, 13:34 hrs
In February 1999, when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made bold to visit Lahore, he
took the Chief Minister of Punjab, Parkash Singh Badal with him.
A decade and a half later, Badal's son Sukhbir Singh headed out to Pakistan today armed
with big ideas about deepening cooperation between the two Punjabs and changing the
geopolitics of the Subcontinent.
Vajpayee understood that the peace process between India and Pakistan can't really take off
without a reconciliation between the two Punjabs that paid the biggest price for the
partition of the Subcontinent.
As Pakistan's aggression across the Line of Control in the Kargil sector came to light within
a few weeks after Vajpayee's Lahore trip, the peace process had to be put on the respirator.
But Vajpayee's insight on the centrality of the Punjab in the India-Pakistan peace process
remains on the mark.
During the Lahore summit, Prakash Singh Badal was a fly on the wall. He had the
opportunity, of course, to engage his counterpart from West Punjab, Shabaz Sharif.
But the possibilities for Punjab-Punjab cooperation went up in smoke of the Kargil fire.
This week, Sukhbir Singh Badal will be the centre of all attention in Lahore, where the
enthusiasm for trade and commercial cooperation with India has become infectious.
Sukhbir Singh Badal owes debt of gratitude to two of his political opponents from the
Congress Party for the sea change in the atmospherics between the two Punjabs.
One is Amarinder Singh, the former chief minister of Punjab. After Vajpayee breathed fresh
life into the peace process in April 2003, Amarinder Singh had the opportunity to ramp up
contacts with the government, political leaders and civil society in West Punjab.
The other is Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who has persisted with the peace process
despite much political scepticism and bureaucratic resistance in Delhi. One of the fruits
from the PM's patient effort has been the agreed road map for the normalisation of trade
relations.
Pakistan has expanded the room for bilateral commercial cooperation by significantly
expanding the list of items that India can export. Delhi in turn has addressed many of
Pakistan's concerns on India's non-tariff barriers.
Islamabad has promised to lift the existing restrictions on overland trade between the two
countries across the Attari--Wagah border. This in turn has generated much excitement
among the businessmen in Amritsar and Lahore.
Sukhbir Singh Badal has said Pakistan's decision to open the gates of Wagah will be a 'game
changer' not only for the two Punjabs, but all northern regions of the Subcontinent.
Badal is accompanied by a large business delegation whose members are confident of
quickly expanding trade volumes across the Radcliffe Line. When it comes to cooperation
with Pakistan, it is never a good idea to get ahead of the story.
While progress on the trade front is real, there is no denying the potential for reversal of the
current trends in Pakistan. It must be the objective of Sukhbir Singh Badal to emphasize the
mutuality of interest in Punjab--Punjab cooperation.
He must also reassure businessmen across the border that trade will not flow just in one
direction and that the Indian market will become open to a wide range of exports from
Pakistan.
contributing editor for 'The Indian Express'.)

Burying Mao
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Nov 07 2012, 02:12 hrs
Burying Mao
The founder of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong, might never get a real burial.
His body is likely to rest for quite some time to come in the Tienanmen Square mausoleum.
But the 18th Congress of the CPC, beginning this week, is all set to bury the last formal
references to Maoist ideology. This Monday, official Chinese media reported that the
Central Committee has approved an important amendment to the constitution of the CPC.
While no details were given, the amendment is expected to remove "Mao Zedong Thought"
from the ideological banner of the party. The CPC has held up "Marxism-Leninism and Mao
Zedong Thought" as the guiding principles for many decades.
As it opened up to the world from the late 1970s under the reformist leadership of Deng
Xiaoping, Marxism-Leninism was steadily de-emphasised. Deng's guidance, instead, was on
building "socialism with Chinese characteristics". (Critics would say Deng was laying the
foundation for "capitalism with Chinese characteristics".)
But the problem of dealing with Mao's disastrous political legacy remained. Denouncing
him in the manner that the Russian Communists did with Joseph Stalin (after the dictator's
death) was not an option.
Deng, ever the pragmatist, chose to simply abandon Maoism while letting Mao's popular
deification continue. While it worked well for Deng's successors, they might have good
political reasons now to dump Mao Zedong thought.
Dangerous leftism
Having endured Mao's terrible experiments the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural
Revolution" Deng was convinced that "leftism" would remain the bigger threat to the
modernisation of China than "rightism".
After violently crushing the challenge from the liberal pro-democracy movement in the
summer of 1989, Deng had no desire to let the leftists regain political control of China.
In early 1992, Deng went out on a tour of China's southern provinces and called for renewed
economic reforms while maintaining the political dominance of the CPC.
Deng's logic of building "Red Capitalism" without formally discarding Maoism seemed
sensible until one adventurer, Bo Xilai, a member of the Politburo of the CPC until recently,
sought to exploit the contradiction for his own ends.
As the party boss in Chongqing, Bo Xilai revived the Maoist-era slogans and past techniques
of political mobilisation to project himself as a potential top leader of the CPC.
Even as he became popular in Chongqing and generated some enthusiasm among the
surviving leftists in the CPC, Bo fell foul of the party leadership.
When Bo was ousted from power last March, Premier Wen Jiabao talked about the dangers
of China losing its many hard-won gains in recent decades amidst the possible return of left-
wing populism.
Wen explicitly touched upon the taboo subject of Mao's Cultural Revolution and warned
against the return of that "historical tragedy". "Leftism" was once again proclaimed a threat
and it was a matter of time before Mao Zedong Thought was consigned to the dustbin.
New banner
In an important speech delivered a few weeks after Bo's ouster, Xi Jinping, who will be
anointed the supreme leader of the party at the 18th Congress, laid out the new ideological
framework of the CPC that was shorn of "Mao Zedong Thought".
"Let us uphold the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, Deng Xiaoping Theory
and the Three Represents and fully implement the scientific concept of development," Xi
declared.
Xi elevated Dengism to top of the list and paid respects to the ideological contributions of
his two immediate predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
"Deng Xiaoping Theory" underlines the importance of economic pragmatism and centrality
of China's rapid development. It was written into the CPC constitution in 1997 and stood
next to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.
Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" refers to the importance of the CPC using advanced forces
of production, embracing an advanced political culture and representing the interests of all
sections of society, including China's new capitalists. This was inscribed into the party
constitution in 2002.
"Scientific Development", the theoretical offering from Hu Jintao, now gets that distinction
and preserves the political legacy of the outgoing leader.
It is about addressing the new challenges of development in a scientific manner, ensuring
sustainability amidst environmental problems and building a harmonious society that can
overcome emerging internal political and social tensions.
By the end of his 10-year tenure, if all goes well, Xi Jinping will have his own theory that
would be inserted into the CPC constitution. But right now his focus is on removing the
poison of "leftism" from China's body-politic.
The writer is distinguished fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and contributing
editor for 'The Indian Express'

A pivotal moment
C. Raja Mohan : Thu Nov 08 2012, 10:55 hrs
Obama's return should prompt Delhi to think big about bilateral ties with Washington
Official Delhi, including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, was quick to welcome the
election of Barack Obama for a second term as the president of the United States. India is
undoubtedly happy with political continuity in Washington for the next four years. The
conventional wisdom in Delhi is that the Republicans are more empathetic than the
Democrats to India's political aspirations at the regional and global level. The Republican
electoral platform this year was indeed effusive in its call for a "geopolitical alliance" with
India.
Yet, the reality is that Barack Obama, despite many initial reservations in Delhi, has
expanded the basis for India-US cooperation, the foundation for which was laid by his
Republican predecessor, George W. Bush. That India did not figure at all in the foreign
policy argumentation between the Democrats and Republicans this year pointed to the
absence of internal squabbling about Washington's approach to Delhi. The current obstacles
to the advancement of the bilateral relationship, however, are not in Washington, but in
Delhi, where the political drift of the last few years has slowed down progress.
Four years ago, Delhi was deeply concerned about Obama's approach to Pakistan and China,
two major external factors that have historically clouded India's relationship with the US.
After initially musing about a possible American mediation between India and Pakistan on
Jammu and Kashmir, Obama quickly backtracked and has refused to involve Washington in
India-Pakistan disputes.
In 2009, Obama seemed to accept Pakistan's argument that India is part of the problem in
Afghanistan. By the end of his term he was seeking Delhi's deeper involvement in the
economic and political stabilisation of Afghanistan. Obama has been more purposeful in
confronting the sources of international terrorism in Pakistan. Beyond raining drone attacks
on terror sanctuaries in Islamabad's western borderlands, Obama boldly raided Osama bin
Laden's hideout deep inside Pakistan, executed him, and laid bare Pakistan's play on both
sides of the war on terror. Under Obama's watch, counter-terror cooperation between Delhi
and Washington has significantly expanded.
On China too, Obama's policy turned the full circle in the last four years. In 2009, he began
with the notion that Washington can build a wide-ranging partnership many in India and
the world were concerned about the dangers of a US-China condominium to address the
problems of Asia and the world. Barely two years later, the Obama administration began
talking about a diplomatic and military "pivot" in Asia to balance the growing assertiveness
of a rising China. Obama has been urging Delhi to take on larger responsibilities in
promoting a stable balance of power in Asia.
Obama also quickly dispelled India's doubts about his commitment to the historic civil
nuclear initiative negotiated under Bush. He not only pushed through its implementation,
but went a step beyond to support India's integration into various multilateral non-
proliferation export control groupings like the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
While issues relating to India's international access to enrichment and reprocessing
technologies and the problems associated with India's nuclear liability law remain to be
sorted out, Delhi's standing in the international nuclear order continues to rise. Obama also
supported India's candidature for the permanent membership of the United Nations
Security Council.
Beyond his contribution to the bilateral partnership, Obama's attempt to reset relations with
Russia, a task that remains unfinished and is likely to be taken up in the second term, will
enhance India's ability to manage the changing dynamic among the great powers.
Although he has not been entirely successful, Obama has tried to end American
adventurism in the Middle East, thereby reducing the traditional friction between
Washington and Delhi in this very sensitive region.
Obama, who began his first term by offering a hand of friendship to Iran, has presided over
sharpening tensions between Washington and Tehran on the nuclear issue that has created
some difficulties for Delhi. To his credit, Obama has shown some understanding of India's
interest in a sustained engagement with Iran. If the reports that Obama is likely to launch a
fresh bid for direct dialogue with Tehran turn out to be true, Iran's negative salience in
India-US ties could begin to ease a bit.
Despite the positive dynamic in India-US relations under Obama, there is no denying that
UPA 2 has failed to take full advantage. In his first term, despite the hostility from the Left,
the PM made bold moves towards the US. In his second term, Manmohan Singh has not
been able to demonstrate the same political enthusiasm.
Sections of the ruling Congress party and senior members of the cabinet signal self-doubt
and have often resorted to default posturing of the past. The BJP, which initiated the bold
outreach to the US in the late 1990s, has been opportunistic in opposing various moves of
the UPA government to strengthen cooperation with Washington.
Meanwhile, the solid bipartisan American consensus in favour of deepening ties with India
is being undermined by increasing bureaucratic frustration at the daily difficulties of
engaging the Indian system. Some in Washington are beginning to ask if the current
energies being devoted to India are worth the time and effort.
As the political clock begins to run out on the UPA government, it has barely a year to make
something out of Obama's second term. Obama will be at the peak of his power in 2013, and
this is a moment for Delhi to think big again about the bilateral partnership with the US.
Unlike in the past, when the US severely constrained Delhi's strategic space in the regions to
the west and east of India, Obama's Af-Pak and East Asian policies have opened
extraordinary geopolitical opportunities for India.
It is up to Delhi now to get its act together and build irreversible momentum behind the
India-US partnership in Obama's second term.

Ambassadors to Pakistan
As India's regional leaders boldly reach out to Pakistan, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
appears to have tamely ruled out a visit to Islamabad in the near future. The deputy chief
minister of Punjab, Sukhbir Singh Badal, has just returned from Lahore, claiming that a
historic moment in the relations between the two Punjabs is at hand.
Even before Badal crossed the border at Wagah, Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar was
arriving to a warm welcome in Karachi. That neither of these visits has got much attention
in Delhi underlines how out of touch the "national" establishment is with the "regional"
imperatives shaping India's foreign policy.
Badal's Akali Dal and the Nitish Kumar's Janata Dal (United) are both both allies of the
BJP. Their embrace of Pakistan stands in contrast to the BJP's reflexive hawkishness.
If the BJP has abandoned the peace legacy of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Congress has not had
the courage of conviction to follow through its own initiatives. Conservatives in the UPA
cabinet, like Defence Minister A.K. Antony, have repeatedly blocked the PM's initiatives,
including his plans to visit Pakistan a few years ago.
The PM has also allowed the intelligence agencies, the armed forces and the civilian
bureaucracy to exercise a veto over his regional initiatives. These agencies are supposed to
give professional inputs, but it is the PM's prerogative and responsibility to make policy.
In its reluctance to put politics in command of the nation's neighbourhood diplomacy, the
Congress has ceded the initiative not to the BJP, but to regional leaders.
Badal and Nitish Kumar are filling the political vacuum by developing ideas that Vajpayee
and Manmohan Singh have articulated since the late 1990s. Badal is only retracing the path
of Amarinder Singh, the Congress chief minister who took the first steps to promote
cooperation between the two Punjabs. And Nitish Kumar is following Lalu Prasad, who
made a hugely successful visit to Pakistan a few years ago. The difference is that Badal and
Nitish Kumar have high political stakes in deepening ties with Pakistan.
Badal has argued that the economic future of East Punjab rests with the renewal of
commercial engagement with West Punjab and the reopening of post-Partition borders that
were locked down after the 1965 and 1971 wars. In his talks with West Punjab Chief Minister
Shahbaz Sharif and other political and business leaders, Badal has laid out an ambitious
agenda for the two Punjabs.
On the economic side, Badal called for opening additional trade routes besides the current
one at Wagah-Attari, and the establishment of joint industrial zones on the Radcliffe Line
with duty-free access to India and Pakistan. Badal and Sharif have agreed to set up a
working committee with representatives from the two Punjabs to monitor, promote and
facilitate trade across the Radcliffe Line.
Within a few weeks, Sharif, accompanied by a large business delegation, is expected to
arrive in Amritsar, reciprocating Badal's visit. Badal also wants India and Pakistan to ease
the many current restrictions on travel across the Radcliffe Line. He has urged Delhi and
Islamabad to set up consulates in Lahore and Amritsar.
Badal is not the only one demanding that India and Pakistan redress the many negative
effects of Partition on the people of the subcontinent. There are millions of people across the
country, including in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, who have great stakes in a normal
relationship between India and Pakistan.
The bitter legacies of Partition are not confined to our western frontiers. The division of
Bengal in 1947 has left a huge trail of its own unresolved problems. The UPA government
has sought a genuine transformation of relations with Pakistan. It had also made great
headway with Bangladesh, until the chief minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, threw
a spanner into the works.
The Congress party's political timidity, the PM's unwillingness to impose his authority on
his cabinet colleagues, the UPA's reluctance to call the bluff of allies like Banerjee and its
hesitation to command the bureaucracy, have severely constrained Delhi.
The Congress leadership has every reason to welcome the Pakistan visits by Badal and
Nitish Kumar, for they open up much-needed political space for the UPA government on
regional diplomacy. The PM must encourage other chief ministers to travel frequently to
Pakistan and Bangladesh and widen the peace constituencies on both sides of the border.
While the chief ministers and local forces can generate a more conducive environment for
trans-border cooperation in the subcontinent, the power to alter the structure of relations
remains with the federal governments.
In the case of Pakistan, it is not clear how tolerant the army might be of cross-border, sub-
national cooperation in the Punjab. But there is no denying that the civilian leaders in
Pakistan are enthusiastic.
For its part, Delhi must bite the bullet and make the political case for moving forward boldly
with Islamabad and Dhaka. Minor policy adjustments in Delhi could lead to massive
changes in the lives of those who have had to endure the tragic consequences of Partition.
Nothing will demonstrate India's commitment to transforming its relations with its
neighbours more than an early visit, however brief it might be, to Pakistan by the prime
minister. Laying down no pre-conditions and seeking no deliverables, Manmohan Singh
could use the visit to outline his vision for a very different subcontinent, of the kind that
Badal and Nitish Kumar have begun to talk about.
If he does, the Congress might find that a forward-looking neighbourhood policy is also
good domestic politics. After all, the millions of people living along India's frontiers are
pressing for borders that are open and user-friendly.

Obama and Pak
Obama and Pak
Pakistan's strategic community was among the least enthusiastic in the world about Barack
Obama's re-election as president of the United States. This is not surprising, for few
American leaders have played such hard ball with Pakistan as Obama.
In raiding Osama bin Laden's hideout without informing Rawalpindi and relentlessly
raining drones on terror sanctuaries in Pakistan's western borderlands, Obama had made
himself quite unpopular with the army and its proxies in Pakistan.
Obama also called Rawalpindi's bluff on denying America overland access to Afghanistan
through Pakistani territory. While the alternative routes to supply US troops in Afghanistan
were expensive, Washington demonstrated that it has other options.
The confrontation and recrimination of the last two years between Washington and
Rawalpindi need not necessarily be a guide to US-Pakistan relations in the second term.
For its part, the Obama administration wants to renew the engagement with Pakistan.
Rawalpindi's support is critical in ensuring an orderly US military exit from Afghanistan.
Even more important, without the Pakistan army's cooperation, the US can't bring stability
to Afghanistan.
These important objectives are likely to drive the Obama administration to establish a
transactional relationship with the Pakistan army.
Rawalpindi is much chastened after its confrontation with Obama. Rawalpindi's claims that
it could do without US support and that its alliance with Beijing would replace that with
Washington has turned out to be unsustainable bravado.
Washington and Rawalpindi might have begun to dislike each other intensely over the last
two years. Yet, they can't do without each other, at least for a while longer. So long as
Afghanistan remains at the top of the agenda in Washington, so will Pakistan.
Give and Take
Although New Delhi is not surprised by the renewed engagement between Washington and
Rawalpindi, it would want to closely monitor the give-and-take between the two sides.
For its part, Rawalpindi claims that it has turned a new leaf, recognises the dangers of
supporting religious extremism, and is willing to support political reconciliation in
Afghanistan.
In return for a change of course, Rawalpindi would want something substantive from
Washington. One set of its demands would be about protecting its interests in Afghanistan.
The problem is not about the principle, but the terms
in which it is framed. If Pakistan wants a friendly neighbour, the demand is entirely
understandable.
What the Pakistan army wants instead is a "special relationship" that will give Rawalpindi
extra-territorial privileges in Afghanistan, especially in its southern and eastern provinces
dominated by the Pashtuns.
Rawalpindi has also claimed a right to intervene in Afghanistan's internal affairs and shape
its internal structures in the name of acquiring "strategic depth".
It is this record that generates deep misgivings in Afghanistan about Pakistan's role and
concerns about how far Washington might go in its concessions to Pakistan.
For its part, Rawalpindi now claims that it is no longer interested in "strategic depth" and
that it will support a political structure in Kabul that includes all elements of Afghan society
and not just the Taliban.
This week, Pakistan is hosting the Afghan Peace Council that is trying to promote an
understanding between Kabul and the Taliban. Rawalpindi has also begun to make contact
with non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan. All this is fine, sceptics would say. And where is
the evidence of change in Rawalpindi's mindset, they ask.
Re-hyphenation?
As the US and Pakistan reconnect, Delhi would rightly be concerned about the kind of
demands that Rawalpindi might make vis-a-vis India.
Rawalpindi wants the US to supply advanced weapons systems to counter what it sees as the
expanding strategic gap with Delhi. Pakistan has never made any secret of its demand for a
civil nuclear initiative of the kind Washington has negotiated with India.
Sections of the establishment in Delhi are concerned that in its eagerness to win
Rawalpindi's support, the Obama administration might give away the store.
Not so fast, others would say. For the triangular dynamic between India, Pakistan and the
US is no longer what it was. But there is no denying that any attempt in Washington to put
the hyphen back between India and Pakistan will be deeply resented in Delhi.
In the next few months, Delhi must be prepared to leverage its growing weight in the region
to shape the policy debates in Washington, Kabul and Islamabad.
The writer is distinguished fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and contributing
editor,
'The Indian Express'

Chinas Xi signals a new political style

In his first address to China and the world, the new general secretary of the Chinese Communist
Party, Xi J inping adopted a frank and practical tone that is likely to go down well at home and
abroad.
Unlike his predecessor, Hu J intao, who was wooden and formal in public settings, Xi, the son of
a famous revolutionary communist, was quite at ease as he arrived at the Great Hall of People
after his selection as the new General Secretary at the end of the 18th Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party.
Xi introduced his six colleagues from the all-powerful seven member standing committee of the
politburo of the CCP. He even offered an apology for starting late, quite unusual for China's
modern emperors.
Dressed in dark suits, the seven men are now perched at the very top of the political heap in
China. They will be responsible for steering the ship of the party-state for the next five years.
Xi broke from custom to make a lengthy speech at the press conference. Read in translation, the
speech seemed designed to convey a new political style and an eagerness to connect and
communicate with the Chinese people and international audiences.
Xi avoided the usual jargon of communist party apparatchiks. The contrast with Hu's speech ten
years ago when he was installed at the top of the CCP, could not have been starker.
Unlike Hu who paid verbal obeisance to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng
Xiaoping theory, Xi shunned the old mantra and invoked no deities.
But there was no real softening of the message. Nor was there any promise of undeliverable
political reforms.
Xi recalled the CCP's contributions to the modernization of China and its continuing centrality in
the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics. At the same time, Xi was frank enough to
admit the problems facing the party and offer to make amends.
The CCP, Xi declared, "has rallied and led the people, it made great efforts and turned the poor
and backward China into a new China, ever closer to the goal of national prosperity and
strength."
Arguing that the CCP can't rest on its laurels, Xi pointed to the many challenges facing the party,
especially graft and corruption, the growing isolation from the people and bureaucratism.
"Our responsibility is to work with all comrades in the party, to make sure the party supervises
its own conduct and enforces strict discipline", Xi said in an attempt to reassure Chinese people
that the party will not be above the law. Whether he can deliver on the promise or not, he was
pressing the right buttons.
To the rest of the world, Xi's message was a simple one. "China needs to know more about the
world; and the world also needs to know more about China". He asked the international press to
facilitate greater mutual understanding between China and the world.
Xi had no interest in projecting either victimhood or defiance of the world to please nationalists
at home. He was underlining the fact that China needs the world to prosper and the world needs
China to move forward. What better basis could there be for Beijing's international engagement
under a new leader?
Contributing Editor for The Indian Express.)

Delhi on duty
C. Raja Mohan : Tue Nov 20 2012, 02:20 hrs
At the East Asia Summit, India must articulate its political obligations in the region
At the annual East Asia Summit (EAS) in Phnom Penh this week, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh must address the many questions on where India stands in the rapidly
deteriorating regional security environment.
Two decades ago, when India began its pivot to Asia, in the name of "Looking East", the
region was sceptical about Delhi's role in promoting East Asian peace or prosperity. India
then was eager to reconnect with Asia, after having turned its back on it since the mid-
1950s, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) rather hesitantly opened
the door for Delhi. Now the region wants India to actively contribute to the construction of a
stable balance of power in Asia. Delhi, however, seems preoccupied with its own concerns.
Bridging the gap between India's potential and performance in East Asia is emerging as a
long-term policy challenge for Delhi.
Over the last few years, the prime minister has invested much of his political energy in
pushing India into deeper economic integration with East Asia. Under Manmohan Singh's
watch, India has signed free trade agreements with the ASEAN, South Korea and Japan. At
the meetings in Phnom Penh, the prime minister will have to outline India's response to the
new proposal on the table the negotiation of an Asia-wide free trade agreement. Called
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the proposed agreement will
bind the 10 nations of the ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and
India into a massive framework for Asian economic integration.
While India has taken a productive approach to emerging Asian economic regionalism, it
falls short on the political front. When India became a dialogue partner to the ASEAN in
1992, the advice from the country's well-wishers in the region was that it should adopt a low
profile. India took this advice to heart. As the East Asian leaders turn to India today, they
find Delhi's political voice muted. While India has become a full partner of the ASEAN and a
member of all its forums, including those dealing with defence and security, its participation
has been less than impressive.
Until now, India has had the luxury of extending rhetorical support to ASEAN's centrality in
promoting an open and inclusive architecture. But the changing regional context demands a
more purposeful Indian intervention in the unfolding debate on Asian security. Two major
assumptions about the Asian regional order are now beginning to unravel. One was the
proposition that there would be no great power competition in East Asia and the other was
the belief that the ASEAN would remain a strong and coherent force.
For nearly four decades, Sino-American rapprochement and deepening economic
interdependence between them underwrote Asian stability. But Beijing's recent
assertiveness and Washington's response to it have begun to generate a new strategic
dynamic in the region. Many of Beijing's Asian neighbours are looking to the US to balance
a rising China. Washington has announced a strategic pivot to Asia and plans to deploy 60
per cent of its armed forces in the Pacific theatre. To cope with the dramatic expansion of
Chinese military clout, America is strengthening its traditional military alliances in the
region and building new partnerships.
Beijing, unsurprisingly, sees the pivot as an American attempt to constrain China's natural
preponderance in Asia. Although Beijing and Washington are not yet locked in an
irreversible confrontation, the growing tension between them has cast a shadow over the
region.
The ASEAN has found it difficult to sustain its political unity in the face of China's rising
power. Not all its members have been willing to stand by Vietnam and the Philippines,
which have been locked in escalating maritime territorial disputes with Beijing. The last
ministerial meeting of the ASEAN in Phnom Penh a few months ago ended without an
agreed statement because the host nation, Cambodia, was apparently opposed to including
any references that might irk Beijing.
The re-election of Barack Obama as president of the US suggests that the American pivot to
Asia will continue. In his first trip abroad after the election, Obama is travelling to
Cambodia to attend the EAS and making stops in Myanmar and Thailand, two important
continental neighbours of China. The US is quite clearly unwilling to let China neutralise its
Asian periphery. Undoubtedly, the smaller nations of Asia are caught in a bind. They
desperately seek a balance among the great powers, but are wary of a potential
confrontation between China and the US.
Until now, India's discourse has been limited to assessing the political costs and geopolitical
opportunities that it will accrue from the rise of China and the US pivot to Asia. The focus in
Delhi has been on the merits of strategic autonomy and geopolitical balancing. While this
debate on national options must continue, India can't afford to ignore its larger political
obligations to the rest of Asia. Six decades ago, with little power and even less economic
clout, India was offering ideas on how to make Asia an area of peace.
India today, with one of the biggest economies and largest militaries in the region, has the
responsibility to mitigate great power tensions and defuse regional conflicts in Asia. It must
also enhance the security of small states through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms.
India's independent foreign policy was never simply about looking after itself. It was always
about shaping a sustainable order in Asia and beyond.
As the rest of Asia looks up to Delhi, Manmohan Singh needs to articulate in Phnom Penh a
substantive Indian approach to peace and prosperity in Asia and signal the political will in
Delhi to help calm its turbulent waters.

Talking to Taliban
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Nov 21 2012, 02:58 hrs
Talking to Taliban
Pakistan's decision to free some members of the Taliban last week has been welcomed in
Kabul and Washington as an important step towards a political reconciliation in
Afghanistan and a major shift in Pakistan's policy.
The move came during a visit to Pakistan by the High Peace Council of Afghanistan, headed
by Salahuddin Rabbani. The council was set up by Kabul to reach out to the Taliban, but has
not had much success so far.
Pakistan has promised to give safe passage to these leaders to engage in a dialogue with
Kabul and Washington. The released leaders will then be free to take up residence in
Afghanistan or a third country.
Until now, the Pakistan army has been reluctant to facilitate talks with the Taliban leaders
based on its soil. In fact, Rawalpindi detained anyone from the Taliban it suspected of
establishing contact with Kabul or Washington.
Rawalpindi had seen itself as the principal channel of communication between the Taliban
and the international community. Having invested in the Taliban for decades as the
instrument to promote its interests in Afghanistan, the Pakistan army was naturally
reluctant to allow the group to develop an independent engagement with either Kabul or
Washington.
Relentless pressure from the US in the last two years appears to have compelled the
Pakistan army to signal a measure of flexibility. The release of the Taliban captives is part of
a renewed attempt by the US and Pakistan to rebuild bilateral relations after the turbulence
of 2011-12.
Sceptics in Delhi would say Pakistan's move is a tactical one. They insist that Pakistan is
playing a waiting game and its small gestures should not be seen as a fundamental policy
shift.
They also argue that Pakistan has no real interest in losing control over the endgame in
Afghanistan and is merely cashing in on the growing impatience in Kabul and Washington
to sit down with the Taliban.
UN Sanctions
During the High Peace Council's visit to Pakistan, the two sides agreed to press the
international community to remove potential Taliban negotiators from the UN sanctions
list. The sanctions include a travel ban, arms embargo and assets freeze.
According to media reports, Washington, Kabul and Islamabad have already discussed a
potential list of about 24 such names. Consultations are apparently on in New York to get
the UNSC to act in the near future. In early 2010, some Taliban figures were removed from
UN sanctions at the behest of the US, which decided to open a dialogue with the Taliban.
The attempt faltered amidst differences on the release of some key Taliban prisoners from
the US detention centre in Guantanamo Bay.
Amidst expectations that US President Barack Obama is determined to revive talks with the
Taliban, Pakistan is asking Washington to show its good faith with an early gesture on the
prisoners' issue.
While the US is eager to send positive signals to the Taliban, it is continuing to mount
pressure on the Haqqani network, which enjoys the patronage of the ISI and the Pakistan
army and is the main perpetrator of violence in Afghanistan.
Last September, the US designated the Haqqani network as a foreign terrorist organisation.
Earlier this month, the UN followed through by adding it to the UN sanctions list. This
approach is meant to clearly differentiate between potential reconcilable and irreconcilable
elements among the Afghan militant groups.
Indian Policy
With both Washington and Kabul eager to engage the Taliban, the time has come for India
to discard the old mantra that there is no such thing as "good Taliban". Instead, India must
formally signal its readiness to engage the Taliban.
To be sure, the Taliban has dismissed the latest Pakistani prisoner release as irrelevant. It
refuses to recognise the Afghan government as legitimate and to negotiate with it. The
Taliban says it is open to talks with Washington, but there is no betting they will succeed.
Any realistic assessment would suggest that the Taliban holds the key to the Afghan peace
process. An Indian engagement with the Taliban does not mean a political endorsement of
its ideology or worldview. Finding a way to talk to the Taliban must necessarily be a part of
Delhi's Afghan policy mix.
The writer is distinguished fellow, the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and

Beijing-Delhi Express
The second round of the India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, held in Delhi today, is
expected to generate a preliminary agreement to explore Beijing's participation in the long
overdue modernisation of Indian railways.
India is said to be considering three major areas for collaboration with China the
development of high-speed rail networks, expansion of heavy freight haulage and the
upgrading of major train stations. In all these fields, India is a laggard and can help itself by
opening the door to the new world leader, China. Beijing has the money, technology,
expertise and experience to accelerate the transformation of Indian railways.
The rail sector, in fact, captures the story of the divergent developmental trajectories that
Delhi and Beijing have pursued in the last few decades and explains why India has fallen
behind China in so many areas. But is Delhi capable of grasping the counter-intuitive truth
that the road to political parity with Beijing runs through deeper economic collaboration
with Beijing?
At the turn of the 20th century, Chinese nationalists and communists understood the
centrality of railways in the political unification and economic modernisation of the country.
Few leaders of the Indian national movement matched the vision for railway development
that the founder of modern China, Sun Yat-sen, had. Nearly a century ago, Sun Yat-sen, who
took charge as the first president of the provisional Republic of China, outlined a blueprint
for the building of 1,60,000 kilometres of rail network.
Mao Zedong, who established the People's Republic, understood the importance of railways
in uniting the country and focused on expanding the rail network to western China. Deng
Xiaoping and his successors have invested heavily in the expansion and modernisation of
railways as part of their reconstruction of China after the Maoist era. Communist China,
which had barely 27,000 km of rail routes in 1949, now has a network that is nearly
1,00,000 km. Much of the Chinese expansion has occurred in the last three decades. India,
which inherited from the British nearly 54,000 km of network, has added just about 11,000
in the last six and a half decades.
If China's vision for railways was driven by nationalism, Sun's strategy focused on the
importance of active external collaboration with America, Europe and Russia. After an
initial inward orientation, China's communists turned towards international cooperation.
India's narrowly constructed ideology of "self-reliance" meant it never had the resources or
technology for transforming the rail network.
By confidently collaborating with advanced countries, playing one against the other,
leveraging its size to get good terms on technology transfer, and designing effective policies
for technology absorption, China has now become the world's top dog in railways. In the
19th century, Chinese labour was indispensable in the construction of trans-continental
North American railroads. Today, Beijing is offering capital and technology to build high-
speed train networks in the United States.
For Sun Yat Sen, railways were not just about national unification; they were about
integrating China with the rest of the world. Sun dreamt of linking China's railroads with
those of Europe and extending them to India and Africa. China has brought its railroads to
the borders of India through Xinjiang, Tibet and Yunnan provinces. It has plans to extend
them into Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh.
India, meanwhile, is struggling to extend the rail network to sensitive regions of Kashmir
and the Northeast. Its Raj-era rail links to Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh are in acute
disrepair. Let alone offering a vision for railways, successive governments in Delhi have
been wilful in their neglect and the politicians ruthless in milking it dry for parochial ends.
The nitpicking bureaucrats at Rail Bhavan have tended to squander the recent opportunities
that have come India's way. Recall their delaying tactics in response to the Japanese offer
seven years ago to build the Delhi-Mumbai freight corridor.
The railways are too important for India's future to be left to bureaucrats and engineers.
India's challenges of national integration, inclusive development, industrialisation,
economic efficiency, employment generation, environmental management and urban
development, to name just a few, depend critically on the rapid modernisation of its
railways.
It is up to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, then, to make sure that the current opportunity
for collaboration with China does not become just another MoU that will gather dust. To be
sure, there are many technical issues that will need to be addressed before a large Chinese
participation in Indian railway development can occur. That, precisely, is where the PM
must demonstrate leadership in resolving contentious policy issues expeditiously.
With the Rail Bhavan in the hands of the Congress, a rare opportunity is at hand for the PM
to push forward purposefully with China. More broadly, the rail sector allows Delhi to
demonstrate that it is ready for serious government-to-government collaboration with
Beijing.
Until now, India's private sector has pulled the train of India-China commercial
cooperation. While a large number of Indian corporates recognise that China is a growth
opportunity, much of the government is paralysed by fears about an expansive commercial
engagement with Beijing.
The second round of the strategic economic dialogue is the right moment for India to end its
ambiguous signals on industrial cooperation with China, which is now the world's second
largest economy and might replace the US as the first within the next two decades.
While Delhi must necessarily exclude Beijing's presence in a small set of areas on national
security considerations, it must actively facilitate Chinese participation in the rest. The
railways are a good place to start welcoming what could be consequential Chinese
contribution to India's industrial and technological rejuvenation.

Towards a Pak-Afghan Reconciliation?
C. Raja Mohan : Mon Dec 03 2012, 12:47 hrs
Can Pakistan and Afghanistan be real friends? Should Delhi be worried about the talk of a
'strategic partnership' between Kabul and Islamabad? My answer to the first question is a
conditional 'yes', and a clear 'no' to the second.
Afghan foreign minister Zalmai Rassoul's visit to Pakistan last weekend has raised the
prospects for a fundamental shift in Pak-Afghan relations. For the first time in years, the
two sides seemed eager to find common ground.
During the talks with Rassoul, the Pakistani foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar reportedly
handed over a draft of the proposed strategic partnership agreement.
India should stay out of the current dynamic between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is
especially important given the widespread perception in Pakistan and the United States that
India comes in the way of reconciliation between Kabul and Islamabad.
But facts speak otherwise. Ever since the Partition of the Subcontinent, Pakistan and
Afghanistan have had difficult relations. Whether it is the dispute over the British drawn
Durand Line as the boundary between the two countries or Afghanistan's trade rights in
Pakistan as a land-locked state or Rawalpindi's support for the Taliban, the two nations
have found it difficult structure a framework for peaceful co-existence. These disputes had
little to do with India.
Over the decades, the Afghans have deeply resented Pakistan army's unending intervention
in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Yet, the geographic reality2600 km of open border
between the two countriesdemanded that Kabul seek a cooperative relationship with
Islamabad.
Afghan president Hamid Karzai knows that so long as the Pak army shelters the Taliban
there was no way his government can secure peace at home. But Rawalpindi set its own
terms for reconciliation that no self-respecting Afghan leader could accept.
What has changed now is that the Pakistan army is a bit chastened since the US forces
raided and executed Osama bin Laden in May 2011. Rawalpindi's attempt to blackmail
Washington by cutting off overland access to Afghanistan came a cropper amidst the
deepening economic crisis in Pakistan, the relentless U.S. bombing of Islamabad's western
borderlands, and the reluctance of Beijing to replace Washington as Pakistan's principal
benefactor.
Under American pressure, the Pakistan has now signaled some flexibility. It has disclaimed
the long-standing Pak army's doctrine of seeking 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan and
released some of the captive Taliban leaders to facilitate talks between Kabul and its main
political opposition.
In return for being nice to Kabul, Rawalpindi wants its interests in Afghanistan codified by a
bilateral strategic partnership agreement. The prospects for such an agreement, however,
depend upon two factorsPakistan's political sincerity and Kabul's readiness to trust
Rawalpindi.
As Afghanistan and Pakistan begin a new engagement, Delhi should keep its eyes and ears
open and mouth shut.
(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a

China Dream
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Dec 05 2012, 02:40 hrs
China Dream
In his second public appearance since the conclusion of the 18th Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party last month, Xi Jinping declared that China is on the cusp of re-emerging
as a great nation and the party will ensure this historic transition.
If the occasion for the new leader's appearance seemed just right to celebrate Chinese
nationalism, Xi made full use of it by setting a new political marker and urging the party
cadre to avoid empty talk and focus on the hard work of rejuvenating the nation.
The venue was an exhibition at the National Museum in Beijing titled "Road to Renewal",
and depicting China's progress since the First Opium War (1839-42) imposed on it by the
British Raj. The exhibits included the first Chinese version of the Communist Manifesto,
photos relating to the founding of the CPC in 1921, the first national flag of the People's
Republic of China, and pictures on the Third Plenary Session of the December 1978 Central
Committee meeting at which Deng Xiaoping launched the reform and opening up of China.
Appearing with all his six colleagues from the powerful standing committee of the Politburo,
Xi was reportedly at ease, spoke without notes, and wrapped his words around some
memorable words of Mao Zedong and the lines of an ancient Chinese poet, Li Bai.
"Everyone is talking about a China dream. I believe the revival of the Chinese nation is the
greatest dream of the nation since modern times," Xi said. The speech went viral on Chinese
internet sites minutes after Xi spoke.
Xi's avoidance of communist jargon and his focus on reviving the great Chinese nation
appears to be resonating with the people, at least for the moment. Xi affirmed his conviction
that China will realise (under his leadership) the newly set goal of becoming a "moderately
prosperous society" by the time the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC is
celebrated in 2021.
Barring unforeseen turbulence, Xi will remain China's top leader until 2022, when the 20th
Congress of the CPC convenes. The 18th Congress had set the target of doubling China's per
capita income by 2020. Last year, the per capita income in China stood at around US
$5,000.
Border Disputes
As Xi relies on the Chinese nationalist spirit to boost the legitimacy and authority of the
party, the betting is that Beijing will have even less political space for any significant
concessions in its territorial disputes with its Asian neighbours, especially Japan, Vietnam,
the Philippines and India.
China's decision to put its map as the watermark in its passport pages has evoked strong
reactions from its neighbours, who have reacted with their own measures. New rules
announced last week by the island province of Hainan that promise tougher action against
ships entering its waters in the South China Sea has added to these concerns.
Unlike the waters of East Asia, where China's territorial disputes have become much
sharper in the last two years, the contested Himalayan frontier between Delhi and Beijing
has been relatively tranquil. While the two sides continue to negotiate on the border
dispute, the focus may inevitably turn towards advancing the bilateral relationship. A
decade ago, India began the new round of boundary negotiations with the express objective
of finding an early settlement.
Beijing, which seemed to accept that proposition then, has been suggesting for some time
that the two sides should leave the difficult boundary issue to future generations and
concentrate on the deepening of bilateral partnership.
Russia Returns
After prolonged marginalisation from the geopolitics of Southeast Asia, Russia seems
determined to reclaim a role in the troubled waters of the South China Sea.
After the recent visit to Vietnam by Russia's prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, speculation
is mounting that the Russian navy might return to Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay.
Following the American defeat in Vietnam in 1975,
the Soviet Union gained access to the Cam Ranh Bay that offers a commanding position to
any great power seeking to define the seascape of Southeast Asia. Unable to sustain its
presence, Russia pulled out of the base in 2002. Now, amidst plans to revitalise the Russian
navy, Moscow's gaze is turning once again towards Cam Ranh Bay.
Meanwhile, Vietnam, under pressure from China, has been looking for strategic partners
and has sought to rebuild the once-strong military cooperation with Moscow.

The Male takeaway
C. Raja Mohan : Tue Dec 11 2012, 03:46 hrs
Delhi's reluctance to support Indian companies abroad will cost it
Delhi may have good reason to downplay last week's ouster of GMR from the Maldives. That
a small neighbour has targeted a major investment by an Indian company has surely set
teeth gnashing in South Block. But anger management is one of the first principles of
diplomacy.
India, which has many other interests in the Maldives besides the GMR investment in Male
airport, does not want to make the situation any worse by reacting aggressively. India is
acutely conscious of the geopolitical significance of the Maldives, which sits astride the
Indian Ocean sea lines of communication. So are China and the United States. Pakistan is
pursuing its own agenda in the tiny nation of barely 3,20,000 people.
Delhi signed a wide-ranging partnership agreement with Male in 2011 that has defined the
basis for strong Indian involvement in the development of the Maldives and a major role for
the Indian navy in helping the island nation secure its vast exclusive economic zone. GMR
will certainly not be the last Indian company caught in the whirlpool of the local politics of
another nation. Nor is India the first country to experience this. All great powers, old and
new, often find smaller countries targeting their assets, personnel and companies for a
variety of political reasons. The US and other Western powers have struggled to cope with
this for ages.
As its global commercial footprint grows, China is constantly confronting the political
vicissitudes of having its companies operate in foreign lands. Consider, for example,
Myanmar's decision in September 2011 to suspend the implementation of the $4 billion
Chinese project to build a large dam on the Irrawaddy River at Myitsone. An angry Beijing
had to hold its tongue. This happened despite China's strong support to Myanmar during its
long years of international isolation and Western sanctions. The scale and scope of China's
relationship with Myanmar is certainly much larger than that between Delhi and Male. Yet
China had no option but to demonstrate patience.
There has been some media speculation in recent days about India cutting off aid to the
Maldives. Any action on those lines would have been terribly unwise. India's current aid,
running in tens of millions of dollars, is meagre in comparison with what others could offer
Male. During a visit to China by President Mohamed Waheed earlier this year, Beijing has
reportedly offered an aid package of $500 million to the Maldives.
The current problem between Delhi and Male is not about the lack of "gratitude" on the part
of the Waheed government. Recall that it was India's quick recognition of Waheed after the
coup against President Mohamed Nasheed earlier this year that lent legitimacy to the new
government. Many have criticised India for that decision and for abandoning the
"friendship" with Nasheed, who played a major part in deepening the partnership with
India. "Gratitude" and "friendship" are emotional terms and not very useful analytical tools
to understand inter-state relations.
That said, Delhi must necessarily review its responses to the recent developments in the
Maldives. It would be a pity, however, if we miss the larger lesson from the GMR debacle in
the Maldives.
The big question here is not whether India picked the "right horse" at a critical moment of
power struggle in the Maldives. The real lesson is that India is utterly unprepared to protect
the interests of its companies operating abroad. At the very moment when India's economic
interests have become global nearly 40 per cent of India's GDP is linked to imports and
exports and the Indian corporate sector is investing tens of billions of dollars abroad
every year, South Block appears unwilling to help.
Note, for example, some of the official comments from South Block last week, that what
happened to GMR will not have an effect on bilateral relations with the Maldives. Officials
have also stated that it is alright with India as long as Male sticks to the letter of the law in
the GMR case.
The implied proposition, that Indian business abroad and the conduct of foreign policy are
two separate realms, is unacceptable, given the rapidly changing nature of India's external
interests.
The fact is that GMR has been targeted precisely because it is an Indian company. If it was
merely an industrial dispute between the Maldives and GMR, the problem could have been
solved in many different ways. Unlike the Chinese companies that embarked on a "go out
policy" more than a decade ago with strong and unstinting support from Beijing, Indian
companies have ventured abroad covering the potential political risks on their own. Two
decades after economic reform, Delhi seems hesitant to be seen holding the hand of the
nation's business in difficult alien places.
The Indian Foreign Service, which traces its origins to the Indian Political Service of the Raj
era, remains largely disdainful of aligning with the business sector in the discharge of its
duties. And when South Block looks to cooperation from Indian business to develop
strategic leverage in different parts of the world, it finds these companies wanting.
The Indian economy today is utterly dependent on imports of critical natural resources and
external markets for its products. This, in turn, demands that Delhi actively cultivate special
political relationships with many countries and help its businesses develop the capacity to
navigate their internal dynamics.
Our national security is now inextricably linked to the establishment of a credible and
sustainable presence in many strategic corners in our neighbourhood and beyond. The
longer we take to build synergy between Indian business and diplomacy, the greater the
costs to the nation. Some of the losses could indeed be irreversible in the near term.
The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a contributing

Maliks visit
C. Raja Mohan : Thu Dec 13 2012, 02:36 hrs

A fortnightly column on the high politics of the Af-Pak region, the fulcrum of global power play
in India's neighbourhood
Malik's visit
Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik comes to New Delhi this week when there is a
significant dynamism on Islamabad's western frontiers. To be sure, Delhi's focus in the talks with
Malik is on the bilateral agenda especially justice for the plotters of the 26/11 attacks on
Mumbai.
But it is in India's interest to widen the conversation with Malik to include the latest
developments in Afghanistan where Islamabad has begun to make some big moves.
In fact, Malik is coming to India straight from a meeting between Asif Ali Zardari and Hamid
Karzai, the presidents of Pakistan and Afghanistan respectively, organised by Turkey in Ankara.
The intensified Pak-Afghan dialogue is part of a larger diplomatic effort to develop a framework
for regional reconciliation in 2013 as the United States prepares to end its combat role in
Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
Pakistan has put itself back at the centre of the new regional diplomacy on Afghanistan. Whether
Pakistan succeeds or not, what happens on its western borders will have a big impact on India's
own security.
Since the 1970s, the developments in Afghanistan have set the stage for the radicalisation of
Pakistan, facilitated the growth of violent religious extremism in the region, and undermined
Indo-Pak relations.
If Pakistan's Afghanistan policy has arrived at another defining moment, India would want to get
a firsthand account from Malik.
Endgame
In the last two months, the US and Pakistan have put aside the bitterness of the last two years and
have decided to revive their bilateral cooperation. Many in Washington's political establishment
believe Pakistan holds the key to the future stability of Afghanistan and might be willing to pay
the price for Rawalpindi's support.
Many others are sceptical. A recent report from the Pentagon, for example, points to the fact that
Pakistan continues to offer safe havens to extremist groups trying to destabilise Afghanistan. So
is Karzai, who suspects the hand of the ISI in the recent attack on his intelligence chief.
But the Pakistan army might have done just enough to raise hopes in Washington and Kabul that
it could be helpful in promoting Afghan peace.
By promising to facilitate negotiations with the Taliban and suggesting the possibilities for a
ceasefire and power-sharing agreement, Pakistan thinks it is back in the driver's seat in
Afghanistan.
In order to assuage Kabul, Pakistan has declared it no longer seeks "strategic depth" in
Afghanistan and is prepared for a good neighbourly relationship. It has even offered the draft of
a strategic partnership agreement to Kabul.
At the same time, Rawalpindi is making a major move to pacify the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan,
that has been the principal source of threat to Pakistan's security in recent years. Western media
reports say attempts are on to oust the current extremist leadership of the TTP and bring in more
moderate elements that are amenable to deals with the Pakistan army.
Delhi's role
Rawalpindi has been wary of Delhi's ties with Kabul and many of Pakistan's friends in the West
had declared that India is part of the problem in Afghanistan. For more than two years, Delhi has
said it is ready to talk to Pakistan on its concerns about India's role in Afghanistan.
Islamabad, however, has been reluctant. Malik's visit offers Delhi a political opportunity to
signal India's strong interest in the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan and deepening economic
integration with them.
If its two Western neighbours find a way to resolve their differences and move towards
reconciliation, Delhi must tell Malik that India is prepared to lend all the support it can. Cynics
in Delhi will say, Rawalpindi has no reason to talk to India on Afghanistan at a time when it is
gaining the upper hand on its western borders.
In 1980, just weeks after Russia invaded Afghanistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent
external affairs minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to Islamabad suggesting a joint effort by India and
Pakistan to cope with the new challenge to regional security.
General Zia-ul-Haq had no interest, none at all. Maybe General Ashfaq Kayani too is not
interested.
But Delhi loses nothing by formally conveying to Pakistan's leadership as well as the
international community India's positive approach to regional cooperation on Afghanistan.
The writer is distinguished fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and contributing editor,
The dragon in the room
C. Raja Mohan : Thu Dec 20 2012, 01:48 hrs
ASEAN expects Delhi to play a bigger role in regional security
A rare summit this week in Delhi, between the leaders of the ten-member ASEAN, marks
one of the most productive periods of India's interaction with Asia in modern times. Two
decades of India's Look East policy and ten years of annual high-level engagement with the
Association of South East Asian Nations have produced one of India's most robust
international partnerships.
The celebrations, however, must be tempered by the recognition that the next phase in the
relations between India and the ASEAN will be a lot more demanding and test the skills of
Delhi's statecraft. As the rapidly changing geopolitical environment makes Asia look for a
larger Indian security role in the region, Delhi appears hesitant and ambiguous. To be sure,
the summit might call for greater maritime security cooperation between India and the
ASEAN, underline the importance of the Law of the Sea in resolving maritime territorial
disputes, and emphasise the principle of freedom of navigation.
All these catch-phrases are meant to convey India's diplomatic support to the current
security concerns of the ASEAN members, especially their worries about the growing
military capabilities of China and Beijing's increasing political assertiveness in its territorial
disputes in the South China Sea.
But is Delhi really prepared to go beyond the diplomatic and meet the growing ASEAN
expectations for a stronger Indian contribution to the regional balance of power? No one at
the summit is likely to mention the "C" word, but there is no denying the dragon in the
room. It is not that either India or ASEAN want to define their partnership in terms of
China. But both are aware that most of the emerging security challenges in Southeast Asia
are about the geopolitical consequences for China's rise.
But, let's return for a moment to the celebrations of India's ties with Southeast Asia. A
century ago, the discovery of historic civilisational links with Southeast Asia was a booster
shot for Indian nationalism and helped it reclaim its natural place in Asia. A little over two
decades ago, when India was down and out its economic model in a shambles and its
international isolation stark it was Southeast Asia that extended valuable solidarity.
The ASEAN provided the most acceptable international benchmarks for India's own
economic liberalisation. It was also the ASEAN that helped Delhi cope with the new
imperatives of regionalism in Asia. It was with the ASEAN member states that India
negotiated some of its early free trade agreements at a bilateral level. Nearly three years ago,
India implemented its first free trade agreement in goods with the ASEAN as a whole.
This week India and ASEAN will finalise a new agreement that liberalises trade in services
and investments. India has already agreed last month to join the ambitious negotiations for
a free trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, with the
ASEAN and its other economic partners China, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
India's ASEAN partnership has been emblematic of the country's own economic
transformation internal and external since it began the reforms at the turn of the
1990s. The ASEAN is also becoming the test-bed for India's potential role as a provider of
security to other nations and as a swing state in the Asian balance of power.
After more than three decades of peace and tranquility, Southeast Asia now confronts a
period of great turbulence, marked by mounting tensions among the major powers and the
deepening regional conflicts. China's deepening territorial conflict with Japan and its new
rivalry with the United States have injected fluidity into Asia's great power relations.
Beijing's relations with some of its Southeast Asian neighbours, especially Vietnam and the
Philippines, have headed south amid competing territorial claims in the South China Sea.
The coherence of the ASEAN itself is under question as member states take divergent
approaches to dealing with a rising China. The hope that the region can devise a collective
security framework has been dashed amid these new developments.
Individually and collectively, then, the ASEAN members are looking to restore the balance
of power in the region. Some of them are turning to the US to strengthen their security and
others are deeply wary about the dangers of being caught up in a new Cold War between
Beijing and Washington. All of them are importing advanced weapons systems and paving
the way for an arms race in Southeast Asia.
In seeking a larger role from India in regional security, the ASEAN has no illusion that India
is the white knight that will ride to the rescue of the region threatened by China. Southeast
Asia's expectations from India in the defence arena are limited and three-fold.
One, an end to India's current passive participation in the multilateral security mechanisms,
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the annual defence-ministerial meetings of the
ASEAN and its partner nations. Second, the ASEAN wants Delhi to inject some life into the
many bilateral defence agreements it has signed with its member states. Although India
provides some military training and other support to many Southeast Asian countries, there
is much more it can do enhance the material capacities of the ASEAN defence
establishments. Finally, the ASEAN would like to see a more purposeful Indian defence
policy in Southeast Asia, which can stabilise the regional security environment in
collaboration with other major powers.
India has indeed sounded the trumpet of defence diplomacy as part of its engagement with
the ASEAN over the last two decades. The notes of India's trumpet, however, must become a
lot more certain. If Delhi does not help promote a stable balance of power in Southeast Asia
now, India's own security challenges in the future could get a lot more daunting.

US on Arunachal
C. Raja Mohan : Fri Dec 21 2012, 02:18 hrs
US on Arunachal
As territorial disputes between China and its neighbours acquire a sharper edge, how
America talks about them becomes an important part of the unfolding geopolitical dynamic
in Asia.
In the East and South China Seas, which have become the new theatres of regional rivalry,
Washington has carefully avoided backing the territorial claims of any of the parties
neither those of China nor of its allies. On the India-China border dispute, in contrast, we
have been just reminded that Washington recognises India's sovereignty over Arunachal
Pradesh.
During her visit to Guwahati last week, the US ambassador to India, Nancy Powell,
reportedly said that the US acknowledges the McMahon Line as the legitimate border
between India and China. Powell's comments apparently came in response to questions
from local reporters. The US envoy added that this is not a new American position and has
been in place since 1962, when New Delhi and Beijing clashed with each other.
While that is a separate story in itself, Powell's decision to reaffirm the US approach to
Arunachal and the McMahon Line might be of some political significance. It has been years
since the US formally articulated this long-standing position on the India-China border
dispute. It is one thing for a country to have a position and entirely another for it to state it,
or restate it, in public. What matters is the context.
At a moment when US-China relations have entered an uncertain phase, and the India-
China boundary dispute remains unresolved, American support to India's sovereignty over
Arunachal adds one more layer to the complex triangular relationship between Delhi,
Beijing and Washington.
Legacy of 1962
An American scholar, Jeff M. Smith, has recently published a brief account of how the
Kennedy administration decided to back India against China on the McMahon Line.
As India-China tensions on the border began to boil over in 1959, Smith writes, then US
Secretary of State, Christian Archibald Herter, made it clear that Washington did not take
sides in the territorial dispute between India and China.
As push came to shove in 1962, US Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, pressed
Washington to endorse Delhi's territorial claims on the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA),
since renamed as Arunachal Pradesh. The US State Department was reluctant and instead
proposed a "study" of the issue, a classic bureaucratic device to delay and deny change!
Galbraith would not give up and got President John F. Kennedy to overrule the State
Department.
A week into the war, Galbraith announced the following in Delhi on October 27, 1962: "The
McMahon Line is the accepted international border and is sanctioned by modern usage.
Accordingly we regard it as the northern border of the [North East Frontier Agency] region."
Note that Galbraith's statement 50 years ago, and that of Powell last week, are silent on the
disputed western sector in Kashmir. Smith tells us that Galbraith was not convinced of
India's claims of sovereignty over Aksai Chin. Washington's current position is that Aksai
Chin is a disputed area that is claimed by India but administered by China.
Smith, a fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, concluded that American support to
India's sovereignty over Arunachal has been an enduring legacy from the Kennedy
administration that has been forgotten in Washington, Delhi and Beijing. "Not really,"
Powell is saying. The State Department, like any good foreign office, can always remember
when it wants to.
Asian dilemmas
While the India-China border is relatively tranquil at the moment, the real challenge for US
policy comes in East Asia, where China's growing power is testing American alliances.
America's allies that feel bullied by China have no option but to rely on US power. But many
in Washington, despite the recently proclaimed pivot to Asia, are concerned about giving a
blank cheque to allies.
An American commitment that is too strong and open-ended, they worry, might encourage
the allies to provoke China and drag Washington into a fight against Beijing over small
islands that America has no real reason to bother about.
An ambiguous American commitment, on the other hand, would leave China free to take
one small bite at a time, none big enough to provoke an American reaction. If America must
carefully navigate between the dangers of "entrapment" and "abandonment", China is
unlikely to make it easy for the US.
contributing editor for

Looking West
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Dec 26 2012, 02:02 hrs
Looking West
The gathering of southeast Asian leaders last week at a summit in Delhi was a celebration of
India's Look East policy. Could we imagine a similar "Look West" strategy towards the
Arabian Peninsula?
Delhi has often mused about Looking West, but there has never been a serious political
effort to initiate one. Like southeast Asia, the Arabian Peninsula is linked tightly to India
through history, culture and commerce. Just as the 10-member Association of South East
Asian Nations emerged as a major partner for India over the last two decades, the six-
member Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates) has become a critical region for our economy.
If India did $80 billion worth of trade with ASEAN this year, its annual commerce with the
GCC is now close to $120 billion. The GCC countries provide more than 40 per cent of
India's rapidly growing petroleum imports and host nearly six million migrant workers. The
GCC is India's largest trading partner and together with ASEAN, the GCC accounts for more
than a quarter of India's annual two-way trade in goods. But the GCC is a long way from
acquiring an ASEAN-like profile in Delhi.
India's political leaders travel less frequently to the Gulf. ASEAN's expansive institutional
processes have compelled Delhi to sustain a relentless interaction at all levels. The GCC's
institutions are yet to mature and Delhi is under less compulsion for a sustained whole of
the government engagement with the Arab states of the Gulf. That could be changing as the
GCC seeks a more credible regional identity.
Gulf Union
Faced with growing external and internal threats to the future of the political order in the
Gulf, its leaders have sought to deepen their economic and political integration. Although
they have talked the talk of customs union, free trade area, common monetary policy and
defence integration, the members of the GCC have found it hard to walk the talk.
At the annual year-end GCC summit last year, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia asked the
region "to move from a stage of cooperation to a stage of union into a single entity". The
ambitious Saudi call for a Gulf union came in the wake of the political disturbances in
Bahrain and the collective GCC military intervention there in March 2011.
The Saudis are nervous about rising Iranian power and occasionally accuse Tehran of
encouraging fellow Shia to revolt against Sunni Arab monarchies. Saudi Arabia and Qatar
from the GCC have backed Sunni opposition to the repressive regime of Bashar al-Assad in
Syria. There has been talk of inviting the Sunni monarchs from Jordan and Morocco to join
the GCC.
But not all countries in the GCC are enthusiastic about limiting their national sovereignty
and establishing a Gulf political Union. It is unlikely that any progress will be made towards
the union at this week's GCC summit in Bahrain. A separate special GCC summit is likely to
be called next year to bring the political debate on the union to a close. As Iran and Syria
dominate this year's summit level discussion, there is no denying that the GCC, established
in 1981 following the Islamic revolution in Iran, has arrived at a fork on the road.
India's role
Even if they succeed in generating greater unity, the weak and vulnerable regimes of the
GCC will continue to depend on great power support for peace and stability in the region.
Through the modern period it was the British Raj that was the principal provider of security
to the Arab Gulf kingdoms. After the Partition of India, and
the withdrawal of Great Britain from east of Suez, the United States has been the main
guarantor of
Gulf security.
Although the US is likely to remain the dominant power in the Gulf for the foreseeable
future, the region is increasingly concerned about the constancy of American policies and is
looking towards a diversification of its security partnerships. No wonder the GCC countries
want a stronger political dialogue, deeper economic engagement and substantive defence
cooperation with India. It is entirely up to India, then, to craft a purposeful Look West
policy.

A year of lassitude
C. Raja Mohan : Fri Dec 28 2012, 02:31 hrs
As UPA 2 enters the last full year of its tenure, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh needs to
devote substantive energies to advance India's three most important bilateral relationships
with Pakistan, China and America. He must overcome the current political conservatism
on foreign policy in the government, and make some big moves towards Islamabad, Beijing
and Washington in 2013. Failure to act boldly, however, could see major setbacks on all
three fronts.
Eight and a half years ago, the UPA government inherited an ambitious foreign policy
agenda from the BJP-led NDA regime. Breaking the defensive tradition of Indian
diplomacy, Atal Bihari Vajpayee set out to transform Delhi's ties with America, China, and
Pakistan.
If Vajpayee's decision to conduct the nuclear tests in May 1998 put India in crisis mode with
the three countries, his post-Pokhran diplomacy attempted to restructure relations with all
of them. Vajpayee sought to end India's prolonged international nuclear isolation in
collaboration with the US and find a way to address India's long-standing territorial
disputes with Pakistan and China.
Unlike the Congress leadership, Vajpayee had no baggage to carry from the past and was
unconstrained by the conventional wisdom on foreign policy. Although he could not bring
any of his initiatives to fruition, he successfully altered the political framework for engaging
America, China and Pakistan.
In the first term of the UPA government, Manmohan Singh ran with the baton. He invested
much of his political capital to negotiate and implement the historic civil nuclear initiative
and deepen the partnership with the US. Vajpayee's search for an early boundary settlement
with China saw the first substantive results under Singh when Delhi and Beijing signed an
agreement in 2005 defining the political parameters and guiding principles for the
resolution of the dispute.
With Pakistan, Vajpayee's exploration on Kashmir became a full-fledged negotiation under
UPA 1. It is now well-known that the back channel between Singh and General Pervez
Musharraf made much progress in the only serious talks on Kashmir since 1962-63. During
UPA 1, Delhi and Rawalpindi also came close to finding mutually acceptable solutions to the
disputes on Siachen and Sir Creek.
Delhi's political lassitude under UPA 2, however, resulted in the steady loss of momentum
on all the three fronts. The mismanagement of the nuclear liability legislation has cast a
dark shadow over the prospects for India's civil nuclear cooperation with other powers.
Having put in so much political effort into lifting the international technological blockade in
the first term, the UPA shot itself in the foot in the second. Hustled into passing a bad
legislation, Delhi has put off foreign and domestic suppliers to India's nuclear programme.
On the bilateral front, the relationship with the US has hit a plateau. While there is a new
breadth and depth to the ties, Delhi has seemed unable to muster the political will to
advance in such critical areas as defence. With China, the talks on the boundary disputes
have stalled in the second phase focused on mutually acceptable territorial give-and-take.
The outrageous terror attack on Mumbai at the end of November 2008 complicated the
pursuit of the ambitious agenda towards Pakistan.
To his credit, Singh revived the dialogue with Pakistan despite much internal political
resistance. While there has been some progress on visa and trade liberalisation, Pakistan's
inability to bring the plotters of 26/11 to book has cast a shadow over the bilateral ties.
As we look ahead to 2013, three major challenges confront India. One, with India's
economic slowdown, many of the diplomatic advantages flowing from the international
perception of India's rise have begun to dissipate. Two, the benign regional environment
that India enjoyed in the last decade is beginning to fade away. A decade-long stability in
Afghanistan could disappear as the US prepares to end its combat role there by 2014. To the
east, the long peace in Asia is yielding place to new conflicts.
Finally, the bilateral relations among America, Pakistan and China are beginning to evolve
rapidly and generate new foreign policy challenges for Delhi and constrain its diplomacy.
After two years of recrimination, America is moving closer to Pakistan as part of its effort to
manage its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan's natural geographic advantages have
put Rawalpindi back in the driver's seat in the international search for a political settlement
in Afghanistan. China's growing political assertiveness and America's pivot to Asia have
begun to put Beijing and Washington at odds with each other in Asia for the first time since
the Sino-US rapprochement in the early 1970s.
In dealing with this extremely demanding regional environment, Delhi will be sorely
tempted to sit back and point to the inevitable negative consequences for India's own
security. Doing nothing will also paralyse Delhi as America and China circle each other in
Asia. The sensible alternative is to initiate major diplomatic moves towards America,
Pakistan and China. In the past, India did not have the capacity to influence the outcomes in
the bilateral relations among the three countries.
India, today, has the heft to influence the geopolitical dynamic around it. In pushing for
improved relations with one, India's ability to enhance ties with the other two will
significantly improve. Masterly inactivity, on the other hand, would surely make India lose
ground with all the three.
Vajpayee will be remembered for boldly re-imagining India's national security strategy
under difficult circumstances. Manmohan Singh would not want to go down as the one who
lost his nerve when so much was in the realm of the possible for India's foreign policy.
The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a
contributing editor for 'The Indian Express', express@expressindia.com

Shinzos ARC
C. Raja Mohan : Wed J an 02 2013, 02:24 hrs

Shinzo's ARC
J apan's new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has not taken too long to affirm his strong desire to
restore the balance of power in Asia amidst the rise of China and Beijing's political assertiveness.
As tensions between J apan and China over disputed islands in the East China Sea escalate and
diplomatic observers warn against the dangers of a shooting match between their armed forces in
2013, Abe has begun his new tenure with a strong focus on national security.
Speaking to a leading J apanese newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, immediately after he was sworn
in last week, Abe emphasised the importance of strengthening the longstanding alliance with the
United States and deepening the new partnerships with India, Indonesia and Australia.
J apan already has formal declarations on security cooperation with both India and Australia and
is hoping to build one with Indonesia. In his earlier brief tenure as PM, during 2006-07, Abe
talked of cooperation among Asian democracies as part of a grand strategy to build "an arc of
freedom of prosperity".
The challenge from China has risen so rapidly in the last few years that J apan no longer has the
luxury of limiting
its partnerships to those countries that share the
values of democracy and political pluralism.
Among the first leaders that Abe got in touch with over the telephone last week were Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Australian
Prime Minister J ulia Gillard.
More interesting were Abe's calls to Russian President Vladimir Putin and Vietnamese Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. Neither Russia nor Vietnam has been part of Abe's earlier
conception of Asia's democratic arc.
But both are important neighbours of China and have a critical role in shaping the Asian balance
of power. While J apan and Vietnam have developed strong economic links in recent years, Abe's
Russia initiative will be closely watched in Asian capitals.
RUSSIA CARD
The absence of good neighbourly relations with Russia has long been a major weakness of
J apan's foreign policy since World War II.
Moscow and Tokyo never signed a formal peace treaty thanks to the dispute over four islands
Russia calls them the Kuriles and J apan, the Northern Territories occupied by the Red Army
at the end of the war.
J apan's military alliance with the US made the two countries irreconcilable adversaries in the
Cold War.
The Gorbachev era in the late 1980s had opened a brief window of opportunity for Tokyo to
normalise relations with Moscow. Unlike the West Germans who seized the moment to buy
Russian consent for German reunification, the J apanese were too slow to clinch a territorial
settlement.
Abe has now spoken about the responsibility of the current generation of J apanese leaders to end
the territorial dispute with Russia. Putin, who has a strong interest in elevating Russia's standing
in East Asia, should be equally interested in playing the J apan card.
Abe is expected to travel to Russia quite early in the new year and the two leaders have agreed to
fast-track the negotiations on the peace treaty.
WOOING MYANMAR
As Abe outlines the strategy to restore the Asian balance
of power, his close ally and Deputy Prime Minister
Taro Aso is heading to Myanmar, which has emerged as a critical theatre in Asian geopolitics.
Aso, who is also the finance minister in the new J apanese cabinet, will meet President Thein Sein
this week and discuss plans to write off nearly $6 billion of Myanmar's debt to J apan and
announce a large new aid package.
Aso will give a big political boost to the many J apanese corporations that have set up shop in
Myanmar and review the progress in building the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at the Thilawa
deep sea port near Yangon. Aso could also be preparing the ground for an early visit to Myanmar
by Abe.
The 2,400 hectare SEZ at Thilawa is being developed
by a joint consortium of J apanese companies and Myanmarese entities. According to Reuters,
J apan might agree to provide nearly $13 billion in the coming years to help build infrastructure
around Thilawa.
In the first phase expected to completed by 2015, 450 hectares of the SEZ will be thrown open to
J apanese
and global manufacturers. Given India's own economic and strategic interests, there is much
room for joint Indo-J apanese initiatives in Myanmar.
The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, and contributing editor,

When the Great Game Dawned
C. Raja Mohan : Sat J an 05 2013, 02:47 hrs
BooK: Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan
Author: William Dalrymple
Publisher: Bloomsbury
Price: Rs 799
Pages: 567
Like so much else in India's recent past, the First Afghan War (1839-42) means little to
India's elites. But the military history of the British Raj has been a specially neglected
domain. With their many other preoccupations, India's historians have had little time for
the story of war, peace and statecraft in the subcontinent before independence or after.
As America's longest war comes to a close in Afghanistan, there is considerable interest in
the West in the history of the Afghan wars. That the American occupation is ending in
failure, a quarter century after the Russian troops retreated from Afghanistan, has enhanced
the reputation of the country as a "graveyard of empires".
In writing this fascinating account of the First Afghan War, William Dalrymple is inspired
by the image of tenacious Afghans ousting foreign rulers and the striking similarities
between America's faltering war in Afghanistan and the first and most disastrous foray of
British India into the country.
With his diligent historical research and lucid storytelling, Dalrymple paints the First
Afghan War in great detail. Locating the war in the context of the Great Game between
Great Britain and Russia, Dalrymple narrates the misadventures of the East India
Company's army on the Indus in Afghanistan.
After quick success at regime change in Kabul replacing Dost Mohammed Khan with
Shah Shuja the Raj is lulled into complacence and is overwhelmed by a ferocious
insurrection. A promised safe passage to the embattled Company troops turns into a
massacre of the retreating columns. Calcutta responds by sending a new force of retribution
that burns down parts of Kabul but is quickly convinced that withdrawal of troops and
restoration of Dost Mohammed Khan is better than prolonged confrontation in Afghanistan.
Dalrymple approvingly quotes the assessment of the chaplain of the British Indian army,
Reverend G.R. Kleig in 1843 that the First Afghan War was "begun for no wise purpose,
carried on with a strange mixture of rashness and timidity, and brought to a close after
suffering and disaster, without much glory attached to the government which directed, or
the great body of troops which waged it".
Others have told the terrible tale recently. Most notably Jules Stewart's Crimson Snow:
Britain's First Disaster in Afghanistan provides a historical perspective that enriches the
current debate on military strategy.
In the hands of Dalrymple, the drama of the war comes alive and presents a definitive
message about the danger of exaggerating threats the Russian one in the case of the Great
Game and the al Qaeda more recently and the grandiloquent agenda of nation-building in
other societies.
"We in the West may have forgotten the details of this history that did so much to mould the
Afghans' hatred of foreign rule, but the Afghans have not," Dalrymple observes.
"The West's fourth war in the country looks certain to end with as few political gains as the
first three, and like them terminate in an embarrassing withdrawal after a humiliating
defeat, with Afghanistan yet again left in tribal chaos and quite possibly ruled by the same
government which the war was originally fought to overthrow," he concludes.
The real prospect of the Taliban returning to power after more than a decade of American
occupation underlines Dalrymple's insights into the First Afghan War. But there is a
problem.
In Dalrymple's story of arrogant West versus fiercely independent tribals, India is largely
incidental. The first three Afghan wars were not just about the Great Game the rivalry
between Great Britain and Russia. They were also about securing India's northwestern
frontiers.
Dalrymple does concede that the First Afghan War had produced a stable frontier for the
Raj for a while. But the Afghan wars were part of a much larger story about modern India:
the very construction of the subcontinent's territoriality.
The Afghan wars in the north-west, Anglo-Burmese wars in the east, Calcutta's quest for
influence in Xinjiang and Tibet, and the turning of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim into
protectorates were all about defining secure frontiers for the Raj. They were part of a great
debate in the Raj about the rewards and dangers of the "forward policy" in the 19th century,
on where and how to affix India's borders and delimit its territorial sovereignty.
Nearly 170 years after the First Afghan War, that is still a work in progress. Pakistan is
struggling to stabilise its Afghan frontier. The last two Afghan wars are not simply failed
interventions from Russia and America. They were and are about Pakistan's successful
manipulation of the internal politics of Afghanistan, its provision of sanctuaries to
insurgents and its nurturing of extremist ideologies. Like the Raj, Rawalpindi today seeks a
client state in Kabul.
The story of Afghanistan does not begin or end with Western interventions. All great Indian
empires not just the Raj, but also the Mughals and the Mauryans had trouble
controlling the territories across the Indus. These empires faced continual threats from the
north-western frontiers and when the empires of the plains became too weak, they had to
endure devastating invasions from rulers based in Afghanistan.
Dalrymple's rewarding excavation of the Raj's military history will hopefully inspire a few
Indian writers to look beyond the current Western angst on Afghanistan, unravel the
complex interactive dynamic between trans-Indus territories and the empires built on the
Gangetic plains.
The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a
Contributing Editor for The Indian Express

Connecting Asia: India Talks, China
Builds
C. Raja Mohan : New Delhi, Sat J an 05 2013, 16:35 hrs
At the recently concluded summit in Delhi with the leaders of South East Asia, India
declared its strong political commitment to improving connectivity between the two regions.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the South East Asian leaders showed up at a
celebration in the national capital to mark the conclusion of the ASEAN-India car rally. The
participants in the rally drove nearly 8000 km through South East Asia and eastern India to
arrive in Delhi in time for the special summit.
If Delhi is good at declarations and symbolic gestures, Beijing has set a scorching pace for
the construction of infrastructure projects and the promotion of connectivity between China
and the nations across its borders.
This week alone a clutch of mega Chinese infrastructure initiatives have been reported from
South East Asia.
In the first a large Chinese iron and steel company in Cambodia has tied up with China
Railway to build a 400 km rail line to connect a green field steel plant in the northern part of
the country to a port on Koh Kong, the southern commercial island in the Gulf of Thailand.
The steel plant could cost up to $2 billion and the rail link will come at an estimated price
tag of nearly $10 billion, according a report by the Reuters. Analysts following Cambodian
economy say this could be the largest project ever in the nation.
Meanwhile another Chinese company Sinomach Perfect Machinery has tied up with
Cambodian Petrochemical to build an oil refinery capable of processing five million metric
tons of crude oil a year. The price tag is nearly $2.5 billion.
In the neighbouring land-locked Laos, the 'New York Times' reported, China has announced
plans to build a high-speed train link between Kunming in the South Western Yunnan
province and Vientiane, the capital of Laos.
The cost of the 400 km railway line estimated at $7 billion will be borne by Laos. Chinese
banks will lend the money. Laos is said to be pledging its national mineral wealth as
collateral.
Experts with the international development agencies have strongly criticized the deal as
imposing massive future financial burden on Laos. The ruling communists in Vientiane
appear to have taken a political decision in favour of the project.
While international development experts and a few voices in Laos and Cambodia fear that
the two countries are being subject to China's 'neo-colonialism', there is no denying the
dramatic expansion of Beijing's influence in a critical region of South East Asia.
The scale of financing and scope of the projects that China can deliver has begun to
eliminate the traditional dependence of small nations on multilateral lending agencies for
large projects.
Japan and the United States, which once had the leadership of development initiatives, have
lost much ground to China in recent years. While Washington and Tokyo are scrambling to
respond the dramatic rise in Chinese influence in Indo China, Delhi is in the danger of
becoming an outlier in the economic development of the region.
While the foreign office in Delhi sees the strategic significance of promoting connectivity,
especially the East-West corridors linking the subcontinent to South East Asia, it is not clear
if there is real competence in the rest of the government to make this happen. Most of
India's plans for connectivity with South East Asia have remained on paper.
If the government is unable to move, much the same can be said about the Indian private
sector. While the Indian FDI has grown rapidly in South East Asia, the Indian corporates
remain invisible in the strategic sectors of the region.
Cambodia and Laos, along with Vietnam, were once known as "Indo-China". This was where
the Indian and Chinese civilizations met. But as Beijing integrates these bordering regions
into its own economy and Delhi remains paralysed, 'Indo-China' might soon be a
misnomer.
(C. Raja Mohan is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a
contributing editor of 'The Indian Express').

Doubting Delhi
C. Raja Mohan : Tue J an 08 2013, 01:27 hrs
Washington is discussing whether India is ready for a serious relationship
As Barack Obama readies for the second term of his presidency, many key decision-makers
in his administration who promoted the bilateral relationship with India in the last four
years are about to depart.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who enthusiastically led the Obama administration's
engagement with India, will step down soon. Her designated successor, Senator John Kerry,
unfortunately, has been dubbed by some analysts as being less than warm towards India
and "soft on Pakistan".
Such preemptive labelling is not of much help in the conduct of India's diplomacy. Yet, there
is no denying the concerns in Delhi that America might offer too many concessions to the
Pakistan army and the Taliban as it prepares to end its combat role in Afghanistan by 2014.
Within the State Department, India has had a very supportive South Asia bureau led by
Assistant Secretary Robert Blake, who might be moving on. Blake and many of the deputies
had served in Delhi earlier, understood India's concerns and rooted for a strong
partnership.
Kurt Campbell, currently assistant secretary of state for East Asia, was at the forefront of a
bold effort to compel the US establishment to see Delhi from the perspective of Asian
balance of power rather than India's quarrels with Pakistan. Campbell too is said to be
leaving the administration.
There will also be a change of guard at the Pentagon, where the current Secretary of Defence
Leon Panetta and his deputy Ash Carter have sought to lift the current US restrictions on
defence collaboration with India.
In both Washington and Delhi, personnel are often policy. While Delhi should prepare itself
for the current round of changes in the US government, its real concern should be about an
argument that has gained some traction in Washington's policy community. Put simply, the
proposition is that the prospects for a partnership with India were "oversold" in Washington
by the Bush administration. The argument has four parts.
First, the civil nuclear initiative, which the US launched at "great cost" to the
nonproliferation regime, has not produced the promised "rewards" for Washington. India is
nowhere close to buying nuclear reactors from the United States.
Second, if commerce has not flowed from the deal, the argument goes, the political gains
have been conspicuous in their absence. On multilateral issues, India has shown no signs of
drawing closer to the US and on the Middle East, Delhi remains at odds with Washington.
Third, on the US pivot to Asia, Delhi's ambiguity has disproved the widespread assumption
in Washington that India is a natural partner in balancing China.
Finally, the civil nuclear initiative has not in any way reduced American difficulties in
dealing with the Indian bureaucracy, which is either truculent or lacks the bandwidth to
cope with the dramatic expansion of American interest in India.
The argument in Washington that India is not ready for a serious relationship with America
has not gone uncontested. Ashley Tellis, who played a key role in transforming the India-US
relationship over the last decade and more, has challenged the premises and logic of the
sceptics.
In a study to be released this week in Washington by the Carnegie Endowment, Tellis argues
that the substantive expansion of the bilateral relationship over the last few years could not
have taken place without the historic civil nuclear initiative.
The report titled, "Opportunities Unbound: Sustaining the Transformation in US-Indian
Relations", recalls that the civil nuclear initiative was about "conclusively eliminating" the
"most significant source of alienation" between the two countries for more than three
decades the question of India's place in the global nuclear order.
Tellis insists that the US investment in the nuclear initiative was not about winning
immediate commercial contracts, nor was it based on any expectation that India would
become a camp-follower of the United States on the global stage. He posits that the Bush
initiative towards India was rooted in America's own self-interest and "shaped by what US
policy makers believed was critical to the success of American aims in Asia". This in turn,
according to Tellis, was not about containing China or isolating it both are hopelessly
unrealistic objectives for the US but strengthening other powers in Asia and facilitating
cooperation among them.
"New Delhi's part in this plan," Tellis argues, "hinges not so much on what India does for
the United States, but on whether it rises rapidly enough to produce an Asian strategic
balance that advances American interests." Hence the American policy of assisting India's
rise on the Asian and world stage.
Besides setting the record straight on the evolution of US relations with India, Tellis has
outlined a forward-looking agenda for the second term of the Obama administration. He
urges Delhi to accelerate India's economic reforms and calls on Washington to actively
consider negotiations with India on a free trade agreement.
Deepening defence cooperation is high on Tellis's list for the bilateral ties. He asks
Washington to make it easier for India to acquire advanced defence technologies and build a
modern defence industrial base. Tellis wants India to shed its current inhibitions about
operational ties with the US military. He also calls for greater consultation and coordination
between Washington and Delhi on regional security, especially on Iran and Afghanistan.
Tellis has effectively countered the American misperceptions about the making of the India-
US partnership. But there is no escaping the international perception that Delhi has lost the
political will to pursue strategic partnerships with any of its friendly interlocutors.
From America to Bangladesh and Australia to Europe, those who bet on big breakthroughs
with India in the last few years can't hide their disappointment at its seeming inability to
seize the opportunities at hand. It is up to Delhi to prove that the concerns of its friends and
partners around the world are misplaced.

Karzai in DC
Karzai in DC
Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai is in Washington this week for what are being billed as
definitive consultations with the Obama administration on the organisation of the American
withdrawal from Afghanistan through 2013-14. The broad outline of how America's decade-
long occupation of Afghanistan comes to an end is quite clear. But the devil, as always, is in
the detail.
Last May, US President Barack Obama signed a strategic partnership agreement with Karzai
to underline America's strong commitment to the security and stability of Afghanistan.
Obama followed up by mobilising the support of NATO allies for a decade-long
international commitment to finance the Afghan armed forces and provide sustained
developmental assistance.
As political support for Western occupation of Afghanistan rapidly evaporates and the
financial crisis squeezes defence spending everywhere in the West, the credibility of the
declared American strategy has come under a shadow.
There are deep differences in Washington on the structuring of the transition the
withdrawal of US forces and the assumption of security responsibilities by the Afghan
national forces in the coming months. Consider for example, the question on how large the
residual American military presence in Afghanistan after 2014 should be. The US currently
has about 66,000 troops in Afghanistan.
Obama has already decided that by the end of 2014, American forces will end their combat
role in Afghanistan and focus on a different mission: to train and assist the Afghan armed
forces as they take charge of the country's security. Besides assisting the Afghan armed
forces, the residual force will also be involved in counter-terror duties focused on attacking
the bases of al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the Afghan neighbourhood.
Within this framework, the US military leadership wants to keep as many forces in place as
long as possible. Put another way, the generals want to leave the maximum number of
troops available for the coming fighting season this year.
The political leadership is not so enthusiastic. The liberals in the Obama administration and
in the Democratic party want a steady withdrawal through 2013 and a quick handover of all
security responsibilities to the Afghans. The US military's interest in having a residual force
of 20,000 to 30,000 was widely reported a few months ago. The president and the civilian
advisors have apparently ruled out such a large force and are now reportedly considering
three options on the size of the residual force at 3,000, 6,000, or 9,000.
Finding a compromise
If the US is divided, Washington and Kabul are at odds with each other on a number of
issues. The most important differences relate to the conditions under which the US forces
will stay in Afghanistan after the occupation comes to an end.
Washington and Kabul are negotiating the "status of forces agreement" (SOFA) that will
identify the legal terms under which US forces will operate, and the nature of American
control over its military bases in Afghanistan. The US wants its forces to be subject to
American rather than Afghan law. But Karzai, under growing pressure to demonstrate his
independence from the US, is naturally emphasising the question of Afghan sovereignty.
The question of immunity for American troops led to the breakdown of the negotiations
between Washington and Baghdad on the presence of a residual American force in Iraq after
2010. But unlike the Iraqi government, Karzai needs the presence of the US troops to ensure
the stability of his regime. While he will drive a hard bargain, Karzai will have to find some
compromise with Washington.
Meanwhile, the Taliban, which is being wooed intensely by the US with the help of the
Pakistan army, has declared the presence of even a single foreign soldier in Afghanistan
after 2014 is unacceptable.
Arms Supply
Karzai has demands of his own on Washington. He wants the US to commit to a substantive
arms supplies and the modernisation of Afghan armed forces. Of particular interest to
Karzai is the upgradation of the Afghan air force.
The Pakistan army, however, is likely to oppose
any American moves in that direction. Rawalpindi must be expected to fully leverage its
emerging role in the Afghan peace process to prevent Washington from making any
significant offers on future arms transfers
to Kabul.

A call to leadership
C. Raja Mohan : Mon J an 14 2013, 01:10 hrs

UPA's political leadership must take back charge of the India-Pak story that has spun out
of its control
With the armies of India and Pakistan locked in a shooting match, the fire on the Line of
Control in Kashmir, one would have assumed, is the top story in both countries. But the
headlines in the Indian and Pakistani media during the last couple of days provide a
surprising contrast.
On the Indian side, the media, especially television news channels, are in a frenzy.
Delhi's talking heads, so easily enraged, are beating the drums of war.
On the Pakistan side, renewed military tension with India is by no means the headline.
Consider the front-page stories in the Sunday editions of the Pakistani papers.
Right on top is last Thursday's tragedy in Quetta, Balochistan, where Sunni extremist
suicide bombers killed nearly 100 people, mostly Hazara Shias. The bombing, claimed by
Lashkar-e-J hangvi, is the latest and most brazen campaign against the Shia minority in
Pakistan. The Shia community in Quetta has refused to bury the dead and has blocked the
streets with the coffins, demanding greater security and the imposition of army rule in
Quetta.
A second headline is about the Pakistan army's attempts at pacifying the Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) that has mounted a series of bold attacks in recent years on the nation's
military establishments. The reports refer to an alleged new decision by the TTP to avoid
attacking Pakistani forces and concentrate instead on the US and NATO forces in
Afghanistan and step up the jihad in Kashmir.
A third story is on the planned "million-man march" led by Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, a
Canadian cleric of Pakistani origin, that began on Sunday and will culminate in
Islamabad on Monday.
Qadri is widely suspected of acting on behalf of the "deep state" or Pakistan's military
establishment. He has come from nowhere to question civilian rule at a moment when the
government led by Asif Ali Zardari is about to complete a full five-year term a rare
achievement in Pakistan.
Qadri wants the dissolution of the present government, postponement of elections due in
the next few months, and the formation of an interim regime of technocrats that will
cleanse the current system and devise a new political framework for Pakistan.
Finally, the drone attacks by the US on Pakistan's western borderlands continue, despite
the much-proclaimed American embrace of the Pakistan army in the last few months. On
Thursday, when the Shia massacre took place, the US launched its seventh drone attack
in ten days.
Pakistan has multiple problems, India is just one of them, and certainly not the most
important. It was not easy, then, to find space on the front pages of the Pakistan papers
for the alleged threats from Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne.
To be sure, there are many in Pakistan who would be happy to return to an "India-centric"
national security narrative that could help the establishment paper over the deepening
domestic faultlines.
If the UPA government lets the hawkishness in Delhi both within and outside the
government shape the Indian response to the ugly turn of events on the Line of
Control, it would be doing the India-baiters in Pakistan a huge favour.
As it struggles to regain control over a story that has spun out of control, the political
leadership of the UPA needs to do three important things. For one, it must remind the
armed forces and security agencies that the ceasefire on the LoC is of considerable value
and its preservation is a major national security priority for the country's political
leadership.
The ceasefire has not solved any of India's problems with Pakistan. But keeping the guns
silent on the LoC has been an important part of India's effort over the last decade to
manage the difficult relationship with Pakistan.
The ceasefire has helped India focus on advancing the bilateral ties in some areas and
insulating them from external intervention there are any number of busybodies around
the world who would like to mediate between Delhi and Rawalpindi.
Second, if the near decade-long ceasefire has been welcome, Delhi had made a big
mistake taking it for granted. With two large armies staring at each other along an
unnatural line across a difficult terrain, stuff was bound to happen. The ceasefire has been
under test for quite some time.
The existing mechanisms of weekly telephonic contact between the DGMOs and flag
meetings at the local level are not adequate in coping with the violations on either side.
Delhi needs to propose a framework for higher-level consultations between the two
security establishments to continually review the situation on the LoC and manage the
problems before they escalate.
Finally, the government needs to act decisively on the long overdue reform of the higher
defence organisation in the country. The civilian leadership of the ministry of defence
at the bureaucratic and political level has never been as weak as it is today. The MoD's
utter inability to lead the armed forces, formulate and implement strategies for national
security, has been repeatedly exposed in the last few years.
On top of it all, the UPA government has allowed the withering away of the Prime
Minister's Office as the ultimate source of authority in policy-making. Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh's reluctance or inability to supervise individual ministries, departments
and agencies has played havoc with governance in general.
But the PMO's abandonment of its responsibility for national defence is unpardonable
and could yet produce a major political disaster. The latest developments on the LoC
demand that the Congress party focus urgently on revamping the defence establishment
and reclaiming the PMO's authority to coordinate national security policy.

Looking South
LOOKING SOUTH
With a wary eye on Beijing and a determination to raise Tokyo's regional profile, Japan's
Shinzo Abe is heading to southeast Asia this week on his first trip abroad after he was sworn
in as prime minister last month.
Abe wanted to make his first foreign visit to Washington for an early meeting with President
Barack Obama to strengthen the alliance with the United States amidst the deepening
military tensions with China. But problems in scheduling a meeting with Obama, who will
begin his second term next week, have delayed Abe's trip to Washington.
Abe's journey to the south comes as the region becomes the theatre of great-power rivalry.
As China's economic weight and political influence grows in southeast Asia, there is anxious
search for a stable balance of power in the region.
At the end of last year, Obama became the first American president to travel to Myanmar
and Cambodia. Last month, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
elevated their ties to a strategic partnership.
This year also marks the 40th anniversary of Japan's relations with the ASEAN. Abe's visit
ends Japan's political neglect of the region in the last few years. The most recent bilateral
visits to southeast Asia by a Japanese premier have been to Thailand in 2002 and Indonesia
in 2007.
The new importance of southeast Asia in Abe's foreign policy calculus has been highlighted
by travel to the region in the last couple of weeks by his senior cabinet colleagues.
Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso travelled to Myanmar within days of the new government
taking charge in Tokyo. Last week, Japan's new foreign minister, Fumio Kishida, swung
through the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore and Australia.
Abe's four-day trip, beginning Wednesday, will take him to Vietnam, Thailand and
Indonesia. During the visit, the Japanese premier is expected to announce the contours of
his government's basic policies towards Asia.
ABE DOCTRINE
Previews of the main speech, to be made in Jakarta, have suggested the premier will
announce the "Abe Doctrine" that will spell out new initiatives to deepen Japan's economic,
political and security ties with southeast Asia.
Abe's emphasis is likely to be on developing strategic economic relations with the region
amidst China's emergence as the largest trading partner for most nations in southeast Asia.
As deteriorating relations with Beijing threaten the future of Japan's massive trade and
investment ties to China, Japan has another reason to look at southeast Asia as a major
alternative destination for Japanese overseas investment.
Like Japan, some ASEAN members, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, are locked in
escalating maritime disputes with China. Abe would want to translate the shared concerns
on China's assertiveness into concrete political cooperation between Tokyo and the ASEAN
as a collective, and bilaterally with key individual members.
MILITARY DIPLOMACY
Security cooperation (with countries other than the US) is no longer a taboo in Japan's
foreign policy. Tokyo announced plans last year to offer 10 coast guard vessels to Manila,
which has been desperately seeking foreign support to cope with the Chinese navy's
manoeuvres in the waters adjacent to the Philippines.
Last week, Kishida promised Manila Japan would quickly implement the decision and
discussed the financing of the transfer through a credit from Tokyo. The Philippines, in
turn, has backed Tokyo's plans to boost the capabilities of Japan's armed forces.
The incipient maritime security cooperation between Tokyo and Manila has drawn sharp
comment from Beijing. In a stinging editorial, the China Daily said: "The Philippines, which
suffered Japanese atrocities during World War II, has surprisingly supported the revival of
militarism in Japan, which has the tacit backing of the United States."
Until recently, Japan, a major donor of development assistance, was very careful in avoiding
military ties with its Asian neighbours. Shedding some of that inhibition in recent years,
Tokyo has signed declarations on security cooperation with India and Australia.
Japan has provided limited military aid recently to East Timor and Cambodia. It is also
reported to be in talks with Vietnam to train its submarine crews. Abe's southern sojourn
this week could reveal how far he is willing to advance Japan's new military diplomacy.

Pivot to America
C. Raja Mohan : Mon J an 21 2013, 09:59 hrs
Obama's second term may be about recognising the limits to US power in a changing
world
Second term presidencies in the United States always begin with great expectations and
soaring rhetoric from the re-elected leader. Unburdened by the compulsions of re-election,
it is said, the president is free to pursue big ideas and secure his legacy in the White House.
Barack Obama, sworn-in again on Sunday, is deeply aware of the political opportunities and
limitations of the second term. On the hopeful side, Obama is presiding over what might be
called a transition to, arguably, a Democratic majority in the US.
His convincing victory over his Republican rival Mitt Romney last November is said to be
rooted in the changing demographic profile of America and the emergence of a coalition of
urban middle classes, working people, minorities, and women. The earlier Republican
majority built around suburban populations, rural populations, small businesses, the
religious right, social conservatives appears to be unravelling.
Liberal supporters of the president are pressing Obama to go all guns blazing to crack
irrevocably the Republican coalition and consolidate the emerging Democratic majority.
Obama, however, sees the dangers of over-reach in the second term and the difficulties of
translating an electoral majority into policy hegemony.
His predecessor, George W. Bush, could not convert the Republican control of the White
House and the majority in both Houses of the Congress produced by the 2004 elections
into support for reforming the US social security system. Bush's attempt to change the
immigration laws produced a backlash in the Republican Party.
Worse still, most second-term presidencies begin to lose energy quickly and get mired in
controversy. Bush was hobbled by the failure of the American occupation in Iraq, Bill
Clinton by the Monica Lewinsky affair, and Ronald Reagan by the Iran-Contra scandal, to
recall the most recent second-term presidencies.
Yet, there is no denying Obama's political boldness in the weeks since the election. He has
compelled the Republicans to abandon the dogma against raising taxes, challenged the
powerful gun lobby, and defied the pro-Israeli lobby in nominating former Senator Chuck
Hagel as the Secretary of Defence.
While these moves are impressive, Obama is bound to face much resistance, including from
his own party, in getting Congress to approve the long overdue economic and social change
in the US.
By the time the mid-term elections take place in 2014, if the past is a guide, Obama could
well become a lame duck. The campaign for the next presidential election in 2016 will begin
in earnest by then. By the sixth year of a presidency, senior figures in the administration
tend to abandon ship and drain the president's ability to govern.
A lame duck president at home need not necessarily be an ineffective one abroad. In fact,
the conventional wisdom is that second-term presidents have greater political freedom and
incentive to pursue major foreign policy initiatives.
Clinton pushed for an Israeli-Palestinian accord until his very last day in the White House.
Regan advanced an ambitious nuclear arms control agenda with Mikhail Gorbachev of the
erstwhile Soviet Union. A lame-duck Bush pushed the US Congress to approve the civilian
nuclear initiative with India in the final months of his presidency in 2008.
On the foreign policy front though, Obama is caught in a paradoxical situation. His
emphasis has been on ending America's adventurism abroad and injecting a much-needed
realism into the US worldview. That template is not conducive to dramatic new foreign
policy moves.
Obama has been bold enough to proclaim that America must pivot home rather than expend
its energies in solving the world's problems. Bringing America's costly wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan to a close has been at the top of Obama's political agenda.
If Bush employed soaring rhetoric about America's obligation to promote democracy around
the world in his second inaugural speech in January 2005, Obama is emphasising the
importance of nation-building at home, a theme that he articulated throughout his re-
election campaign.
The political right, including the neo-conservatives, has not been the only source of
America's post-Cold War interventionism. The liberals on the left, who dominate the foreign
policy establishment of the Democratic Party, have been equally enthusiastic about
deploying US power to change the world.
Through his first term, Obama confronted relentless pressure from the left for muscular
intervention in the Middle East. Whether it was in Libya, Syria or now Mali, Obama chose to
limit American involvement. He has skirted calls for use of force against Iran.
Obama has made it clear that America will no longer send its armies for largescale military
operations abroad. The strategy of counter-insurgency the flip side of nation-building
is likely to be a footnote after the drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan.
This does not make Obama a peacenik; but underlines his political prudence. Obama's
strategy is to deploy small numbers of Special Forces and drones to achieve American
security objectives abroad. Above all, it is about letting other powers, like France and
Britain, do more in Europe's North African neighbourhood. Obama is convinced that
America can no longer be the first military resort in managing the security challenges
around the world.
For Obama, national security strategy is about defining priorities, avoiding a squandering of
America's military resources, focusing on areas of vital national interest. The US pivot to
East Asia, away from the Middle East, during Obama's first term must be seen in this
context.
If Obama stays the current realist course on foreign policy, resists the liberal temptation to
intervene everywhere, sustains the focus on rejuvenating America, pares down the
definition of US national interests, the world will be dealing with a very different America.
Obama's legacy, then, might be about adapting America to the logic of austerity at home and
recognising the limits to its power in a changing world.
The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and contributing
editor, 'The Indian Express'

Obama, the Realist
Obama, the Realist
US President Barack Obama may have disappointed Washington's foreign policy
community by refusing to delve at length on America's external agenda at his second
inauguration on Monday. His speech focused, instead, on a sweeping set of political goals
that he hopes to pursue at home in the next four years. At the top of Obama's domestic
priorities are promoting growth, reducing economic inequality and protecting the essence of
the welfare state. Liberalism is back with a bang in America.
The other concerns of the president are gay rights, gun control and immigration reform. The
message from Obama is quite clear. Under his watch, America will try and scale down
foreign policy adventures and concentrate on nation-building at home.
One particular issue he highlighted was climate change. Obama presented it as a domestic
challenge rather than a foreign policy one. "The path towards sustainable energy sources
will be long and sometimes difficult", Obama said. "But America cannot resist this
transition; we must lead it", he insisted. "We cannot cede to other nations the technology
that will power new jobs and new industries we must claim its promise."
Obama's emphasis on the domestic does not mean Yankee is going home. America will
carefully select its areas of engagement. Obama declared that "America will remain the
anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe, and we will renew those institutions
that extend our capacity to manage crises abroad".
Obama is emphasising the enduring relevance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
and the continuation of America's pivot to Asia that the president had launched in his first
term to cope with an assertive China.
Middle East Caution
The liberal internationalists as well as neo-conservatives, obsessed as they are with the
Middle East, would have loved to hear the president's commitment to support the Arab
spring, revive the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, intervene in Syria,
confront Iran and threaten al-Qaeda.
Obama did not take the bait. To be sure, there was a broad reference to America's support
for democracy around the world: "We will support democracy from Asia to Africa, from the
Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on
behalf of those who long for freedom". This is pro-forma rhetoric from Obama and very
different from the clarion call for democracy promotion issued by his predecessor George
W. Bush eight years ago at his second inaugural.
Despite the seeming resurgence of al-Qaeda in north Africa, Obama was not willing to
sound the drums of the great war on terror. While affirming that the US will remain
"vigilant against those who would do us harm", Obama declared that "enduring security and
lasting peace do not require perpetual war".
On Iran, Obama signalled conciliation rather than confrontation: "We will show the courage
to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully not because we are nave
about the dangers we face but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and
fear".
Obama had begun his first term by reaching out to Iran, but without much success. In
explicitly rejecting the call to use force against Iran now, Obama is suggesting he might be
ready to explore again the prospects for a deal with Tehran.
War and Diplomacy
In his speech, Obama offered effusive praise to American armed forces: "Our brave men and
women in uniform tempered by the flames of battle are unmatched in skill and courage".
While acknowledging their sacrifices in securing America, Obama underlined the
importance of diplomacy. "We are also heirs to those who won the peace, and not just the
war. Who turn sworn enemies into the surest of friends. And we must carry those lessons
into this time as well".
Obama, who has had major differences with the leadership of the armed forces in defining
the Afghan strategy over the last four years, is drawing a new line. After a decade of
exhausting wars, he will turn to diplomacy to promote reconciliation with adversaries.
As Obama downsizes the US military presence in Afghanistan, seeks negotiations with the
Taliban and wants Rawalpindi's support to facilitate the exit, there is no giving up on drone
attacks against Pakistan. That is part of Obama's new political realism.
Bhutan Rebalance
Bhutan Rebalance
The week-long visit to India by the king of Bhutan, Jigme Khesar Wangchuck, has been
marked by a reaffirmation of mutual goodwill and a shared commitment to tighten the
bonds of friendship. Behind closed doors though, the future of Bhutan's relationship with
China must have figured right on top of the bilateral agenda. Right now, Bhutan is the only
country in the subcontinent that does not have diplomatic ties with China.
In recent years, Thimphu has been signalling its desire to end this political anomaly. In an
important advance last summer, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met his Bhutanese
counterpart, Jigme Yoser Thinley, on the margins of an international conference in Brazil.
The two leaders reportedly agreed to establish diplomatic relations in the near future. But
there is a widespread perception that Delhi is wary of normal neighbourly ties between
Thimphu and Beijing. It is in India's interest to dispel this impression at the earliest.
Changes in Bhutan's internal and external orientation have long suggested that India can no
longer treat the Himalayan kingdom as a protectorate. Delhi understood this when it
renegotiated the 1949 treaty of friendship with Thimphu. The new treaty, signed in 2007,
put the relationship on a footing of mutual respect and equality. The democratic transition
at home, Thimphu's search for a larger international profile and the intensifying overtures
from Beijing make the warming of Sino-Bhutanese ties inevitable.
Delhi must gracefully come to terms with this reality. Supporting the normalisation of
relations between Bhutan and China might be a good gesture on Delhi's part as Thimphu
tries to win a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council. A lot trickier, of course, is the
prospect of an early boundary settlement between Bhutan and China. Beijing is reportedly
offering an attractive deal to Thimphu. The problem for India is that such a settlement will
move the Sino-Bhutanese border southwards, closer to India, in the strategically sensitive
Chumbi valley.
The diplomatic challenge for Delhi lies in finding a way to let Thimphu move forward in its
boundary negotiations with Beijing while securing India's defences at the trijunction in the
Chumbi valley.
Rockets Raining
Moving from the impudent Himalayan mountains to the emptiness of outer space, last
Sunday saw rockets raining all across Asia. China made a big splash by announcing the
successful test of a missile that could shoot down another in flight. Military analysts,
however, say the test is about developing the capability to shoot down military satellites.
China had demonstrated these technologies twice before, in 2007 and 2010, and this is part
of its strategy to counter the American domination of outer space.
On Sunday, the US too announced a missile defence test of its own. This coincidental testing
is proof, if it was ever needed, that Beijing and Washington are now locked in a race to build
space weapons. Sunday also saw Japan launch two spy satellites atop its powerful H-IIA
rocket from the Tanegashima space centre. The satellites will boost Japan's capabilities for
military surveillance of its Asian neighbours. Japan, which in the past had focused
exclusively on peaceful uses of outer space, is now determined to build up its military space
capabilities. The immediate provocation for Japan's military space programme has been
North Korea's testing of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. But Tokyo is conscious of
the more significant long-term challenge from China's rapid military modernisation and its
impact on the regional balance of power.
Korean Wait
It is not just the big three of East Asia the US, China and Japan that are expanding
their space programmes. If all goes well, South Korea will join the ranks of Asia's space
powers on Wednesday.
The much anticipated launch of the Korean Space Launch Vehicle 1, built with Russian
collaboration, comes after a series of failures. In 2010, the KSLV exploded two minutes after
take-off. In 2009, the KSLV reached the targeted height but failed to properly release the
satellite on board. For years, South Korea has watched from the sidelines North Korea's
muscle-flexing in space. Washington, which could not stop North Korea's missile
programme, was restraining South Korea's space effort all these decades. As the fourth-
largest economy in Asia, South Korea is now ready to take its rightful place in the global
space hierarchy.

Talk Time
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Feb 06 2013, 01:50 hrs
Talk Time
As the Obama administration debates the speed of its military withdrawal from Afghanistan
between now and 2014, there is mounting pressure on all parties to find negotiated
solutions.
Meeting in London earlier this week, the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Hamid
Karzai and Asif Ali Zardari respectively, set themselves the ambitious target of achieving
peace in just six months.
After nearly four decades of war in Afghanistan, six months would seem a tad too short to
build peace. Sceptics might say that Karzai and Zardari were probably saying it for the
benefit of their host, British Prime Minister David Cameron. A joint statement issued after
their trilateral summit held in Cameron's country home outside London said that the
leaders "committed themselves to take all necessary measures to achieve the goal of a
peaceful settlement over the next six months." The party that is critical for the peace
process, the Taliban, was not present at the London talks.
Even if the joint statement meant what it said, Zardari has no say over those who really
control the Taliban the Pakistan army and the ISI. And the Taliban has repeatedly
reaffirmed that it has no intention to talk to Karzai or his representative.
The joint statement also supported "the opening of an office in Doha for the purpose of
negotiations between the Taliban and the High Peace Council as part of an Afghan-led peace
process".
It is not clear if the statement marks a resolution of the differences between Karzai and the
West on the terms of the talks with the Taliban. Until recently, Karzai had insisted that the
main purpose of the Doha office should be talks with the Afghan government.
He is rightly concerned that Doha will be used for the legitimisation of the Taliban and
holding talks with them behind Kabul's back. Washington and London seem desperate for
talks with the Taliban and any deal that would let them declare victory and get out of
Afghanistan.
Military Training
While few in India would take seriously the good neighbourly talk between Karzai and
Zardari in London, Delhi might want to pay closer attention to the recent visit to Pakistan by
General Bismillah Khan Ahmadi, the Afghan defence minister.
Ahmadi's consultations with the Pakistan army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, lends some
credence to the London joint statement underlining the commitment of Karzai and Zardari
to start negotiating a strategic partnership agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
An official statement issued in Rawalpindi after Kayani's talks with Ahmadi said the two
leaders focused on "enhancing mutual defence cooperation and measures that the Afghan
National Army and Pakistan Army intend to initiate for an enduring training relationship".
Rawalpindi has long been pressing Kabul to send its forces for training in Pakistan and has
deeply resented the military relationship between India and Afghanistan. Pakistani officials
also pointed out that Ahmadi is a non-Pashtun and a Tajik by origin.
The engagement with Ahmadi, the officials said, underlines the Pakistan army's determined
effort to reach out to the non-Pashtun minorities that have long viewed Rawalpindi's
support to the Taliban with great hostility. The message, credible or not, from Rawalpindi is
that Pakistan is no longer taking sides in the Afghan conflict that it wants "peaceful, stable,
united Afghanistan".
Other Taliban
As Pakistan consolidates its primacy in the Afghan conflict resolution, it is also exploring a
peace deal with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that has emerged as the biggest
security threat to the nation.
Last week, the TTP has laid down its terms for the talks. Among them are the release of
some its top leaders held by Pakistan's security forces and the naming of three opposition
leaders former PM Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, Maulana Fazlur
Rehman of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Munawar Hasan of the Jamaat-e-Islami
as guarantors for the talks.
Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik did not respond to these demands but said the
government is ready to talk to the TTP. The army and many political parties have become
weary of the prolonged conflict with the TTP and are eager to see an end. Many in Pakistan
suspect that the TTP is not serious and fear that a weak government might be tempted to
appease them.
The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi, and a

Forget Gwadar, China has Karachi
C. Raja Mohan : Fri Feb 08 2013, 15:19 hrs
The Government of India is finding it increasingly hard to speak with one voice on issues
relating to China. Consider for example the reaction of two of India's senior ministers in
response to the reports that Pakistan is about to hand over the Gwadar port to a Chinese
company.
As India's diplomat-in-chief, the external affairs minister Salman Khurshid sought to down
play the story. He was quoted as saying "I don't think we should overreact to everything that
Pakistan does or everything that China is involved in. We need to take these matters in our
stride and in the normal course".
That was last week. This week at the inauguration of the air show in Bengaluru, the defence
minister, A. K. Antony was cryptic but quite clear. India is "concerned' about the
development that could bring Chinese navy closer to India's shores.
The absence of coherent policy articulation in Delhi is made worse by a media debate that
has no space for putting a story in perspective or bring some facts into play.
The prospect of China running the Gwadar port in Pakistan, currently being run by a
subsidiary of the Port of Singapore Authority, has been around for a while. After the
American raid on Abbottabad and the execution of Osama bin Ladin in May 2011, angry
Pakistani leaders were quite open in offering Gwadar as a base for the Chinese navy. It was
Beijing that said, "thank, but no thanks".
Last week the Pakistani Cabinet has taken a decision to hand it over to a Chinese company.
The port, on a small island off the Makran coast of Balochistan, was built with Chinese
financial assistance in the last decade. Has China changed its mind? Is it ready to build a
naval facility at Gwadar, that is so close to the sensitive Persian Gulf and next door to India?
Facts speak otherwise. For all the hype, Gwadar is not an attractive place for the Chinese
navy. It is located in one of the most backward regions of Pakistan. The Baloch insurgency
has frequently targeted Chinese nationals doing project work in the region.
Gwadar does not have the kind of infrastructure that navies look for. What Gwadar lacks,
Karachi has in plenty. Since it first showed up in the Indian Ocean nearly three decades ago,
Karachi has been the favourite port of call for the Chinese navy.
Chinese companies have long partnered the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works
which is assembling the Chinese supplied frigates there. Karachi has enough infrastructure
to service Chinese naval vessels and potential deployment of Chinese maritime aircraft in
the Indian Ocean.
Someday, Gwadar might well emerge as a full-fledged Chinese naval facility. For now,
Karachi already serves as a major facility for the projection of Chinese naval power into the
Indian Ocean.

Beijings Nukes

Beijing's Nukes
United States President Barack Obama's expected announcement Tuesday night (at the time of
going to press), in his annual State of the Union address to the US Congress, on plans to reduce
the American nuclear arsenal to about 1,000 weapons is unlikely to make a big impression on
China.
Beijing has long called for drastic, verifiable and irreversible reductions of the arsenals of the US
and Russia, which hold most of the world's nuclear weapons. China, however, is unwilling to
make cuts of its own nuclear arsenal at this stage. It has insisted that other nuclear weapon states
should join the process of reductions only when conditions are "ripe".
This approach leaves Beijing much leeway in responding to Obama's latest nuclear initiative. It
allows Beijing to hold the high diplomatic ground on supporting the long-term goal of global
zero, promising to join multilateral talks on nuclear reductions when it is convenient, and leaving
room for its nuclear weapon modernisation in the interim.
According to a report in The New York Times earlier this week, Obama has plans to work out an
informal agreement in the next few months with President Vladimir Putin of Russia to make
deeper cuts in their nuclear arsenals.
Under a treaty called "New START", which the two countries signed in 2010, Washington and
Moscow agreed to bring down their deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550 each by 2018. If Obama
can get Putin to agree this is by no means certain, given the current lack of warmth between
the two the two sides could trim the size of their bloated nuclear armouries by a third.
China knows that further negotiated nuclear cuts are possible only when Washington and
Moscow sort out their differences on missile defence, which might yet take some doing. Like
Moscow, Beijing also opposes the US development of missile defences.
China is also certain that fiscal pressures to significantly cut American defence expenditure are
as much behind the logic of deep cuts as the traditional framework of arms control with Russia.
Much like the West that saw Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's nuclear disarmament initiatives
nearly three decades ago as stemming from Russia's economic weakness, China could interpret
Obama's moves as reflecting long-term American decline.
Asian concerns
If China is unconcerned about deep cuts in American nuclear weaponry, some among its East
Asian neighbours are deeply worried about the credibility of America's "extended deterrence".
America's Asian allies, especially J apan and South Korea, chose not to develop their own nuclear
weapons, on the bet that the US "nuclear umbrella" works for them. During the Cold War, the
US extended deterrence against the Soviet threat seemed credible for Washington's allies.
Today, amidst the rise of China and its increasing political assertiveness, many in J apan and
South Korea wonder about the sustainability of US nuclear guarantees if Washington brings
about rapid reductions in the size of its arsenal.
Many American arms controllers dismiss the Asian fears about extended deterrence as
overblown. But for East Asia, living through a historic shift in the regional balance in favour of
China, deep cuts in the US nuclear arsenal may reinforce their apprehensions about America's
ability to sustain the regional balance of power.
Delhi's View
In contrast to some in East Asia, India has every reason to welcome Obama's plans to negotiate
deeper nuclear cuts with Russia. Like China, India has seen deep cuts in the US and Russian
arsenals as an important first step on the road towards nuclear disarmament.
When Obama came to India in November 2010, he and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
reaffirmed their shared commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world and called for "meaningful
dialogue among all states possessing nuclear weapons to build trust and confidence and for
reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs".
This is not very different from China's call for multilateral nuclear arms control at an appropriate
stage. The differences are essentially about timing and the list of participants and other
conditions.
Yet, there is no denying that India's disarmament policy shares much common ground with the
stated positions of the US, France, Russia and China. This is a good moment for India to actively
intervene in the global nuclear debate, articulate the priorities and seek to promote a nuclear
consensus among the major powers.

The next tango with Paris
C. Raja Mohan : Thu Feb 14 2013, 02:59 hrs
India, France must integrate the strands of bilateral cooperation in the maritime domain
There will be much to celebrate when the president of France, Francois Hollande, arrives in
Delhi on Valentine's Day to review the state of bilateral relations with Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and chart out an ambitious future course.
Two decades of political romance with Paris has produced one of the most productive
bilateral relationships for Delhi. By choosing India as one of the first major foreign
destinations, Hollande is signalling his determination to deepen the partnership that was
founded and built by his two predecessors, Nicolas Sarkozy and Jacques Chirac. Whether it
was Delhi's integration into the global nuclear order or the recognition that its rise on the
global stage is inevitable, it was Paris that first articulated big new ideas about India in the
last two decades. This week, the two leaders have work to do finalising the terms for many
large transformative projects that are in the pipeline. Two of them have grabbed most of the
headlines.
One is the plan to build six large nuclear reactors in Jaitapur, Maharashtra. Besides the
reactors, France is committed to developing "full civil nuclear cooperation" with India. Delhi
expects French cooperation in building commercial uranium enrichment facilities that
would fuel the new Indian reactors as well supply other nuclear power stations in the region.
More broadly, the civil nuclear collaboration between Delhi and Paris could help develop
India as a joint base for providing nuclear services in Asia and beyond.
The other is the deal to supply 126 Rafale medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) to
the Indian Air Force. This is not just a one-time transaction to equip the IAF with modern
fighters but facilitates a significant expansion of India's defence industrial base. In the
civilian nuclear arena as well as in defence, France promises to differentiate itself from
other suppliers on the critical question of technology transfer. This makes the role of France
a very special one in the development of India's strategic capabilities.
Prime Minister Singh and President Hollande are not expected to dot the many 'i's and cross
the 't's of the two agreements. Their task is to recognise the special salience of the current
moment in bilateral relations, demonstrate maximum flexibility in what each has to offer
and push the two bureaucracies into clinching final agreements. Hollande needs early
closure as part of his effort to revive the sclerotic economic growth in France, and the PM
can't afford endless haggling, the default Indian negotiating style, on these two strategic
projects.
As they wrap up the pressing nuclear and defence agenda from the past and look ahead, one
important new area of cooperation presents itself maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
India's domestic discourse on the Indian Ocean has long been shaped by the US and more
recently by China. The awareness of France as an Indian Ocean power and the appreciation
of the benefits of a strong naval partnership with it remain rather limited.
Although India's naval engagement with the US has grown manifold in the last decade,
there are many inhibitions that prevent the realisation of its full potential. While the US is
likely to remain a major Indian Ocean power for a long time to come, its priorities are
shifting to the Pacific, where it must cope with the challenges to its long-standing naval
primacy.
With America's rapidly declining dependence on imported oil from the Middle East, its
unfolding pivot to Asia and the fiscal pressures to cut military expenditure, the importance
of the Indian Ocean is likely to progressively decline in the coming years for Washington.
Meanwhile, Delhi must indeed prepare for the inevitable emergence of China as a full-
fledged naval power in the Indian Ocean in the longer term. In the interim, as India seeks to
consolidate its natural advantages in the Indian Ocean, France is a compelling naval
partner.
The possession of territories in the Indian Ocean has long made France a resident power in
India's extended maritime neighbourhood. Its island territories the Reunion and Mayotte
islands are located astride critical sea lines of communication in the Western Indian
Ocean.
Besides military presence on these islands, France also has a base in its former colony
Djibouti, which sits at the mouth of the Red Sea, oversees the traffic between the
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
More recently, France has also acquired a military base in Abu Dhabi, right inside the
volatile Persian Gulf. Together, these military bases constitute a "French Quadrilateral" that
covers important choke points in the Western Indian Ocean. The size of the French naval
profile in the Indian Ocean is smaller than that of the US. But it is likely to be more
enduring, thanks to the country's dependence on energy imports from the Middle East and
its big political stakes in Africa.
France already contributes to bolstering Delhi's naval strength as a partner in the
construction of its Scorpene submarines in India. The planned launch of the jointly
developed SARAL satellite for ocean mapping later this month underlines the broad scope
of current maritime cooperation between India and France.
As the geopolitical weight of the Indian Ocean grows, Delhi and Paris need to integrate
different strands of current bilateral cooperation in the maritime domain. Given the
deepening political comfort between Delhi and Paris, Manmohan Singh and Hollande must
declare that deepening maritime collaboration is a shared strategic objective and order their
defence establishments to begin operational military cooperation in the Indian Ocean.
This could include sharing of naval intelligence, providing access to each other's facilities in
the Indian Ocean, helping smaller countries, especially critical island states, develop their
maritime capacities, providing mutual logistical support, mounting joint scientific
expeditions, developing submersible vehicles that can operate in the deep, and pursuing
cooperative naval missions in the Indian Ocean.

Staying with Kabul
C. Raja Mohan : Tue Feb 19 2013, 02:28 hrs
As Afghanistan enters a new phase, sulking cannot be Delhi's strategy
As America and Britain prepare to leave Afghanistan by 2014, Delhi appears to have gone
into a sulk. Instead of objecting to the inevitable Anglo-American retreat, India must deepen
the dialogue with Washington and London on the future of Afghanistan.
Sceptics in Delhi wonder if Washington and London, in the rush for Afghan exits, want to
talk to India at all. Delhi has two important diplomatic opportunities this week to find out.
Talks are scheduled on Tuesday with senior American and Afghan officials who will attend
the second round of the trilateral dialogue. Afghanistan will also figure at the top of Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh's conversation today with the British premier, David Cameron.
Together, they should give Delhi first-hand accounts of the current efforts in Washington,
London and Kabul to seek reconciliation with the Taliban with the help of the Pakistan
army.
Earlier this month, after a trilateral summit in London with Pakistan's President Asif Ali
Zardari and the Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai, Cameron raised hopes that peace might break
out in the next six months. Some in Delhi are deeply wary of London's Af-Pak delusions.
They think Cameron is trying to present Western genuflection to Rawalpindi as a big
breakthrough for the Afghan peace process. Others have convinced themselves that the new
US secretary of state, John Kerry is ready to pay any price including the handing over of
parts of Afghanistan to the Taliban and the ISI in return for a mere promise from General
Ashfaq Kayani to make the Western retreat smooth.
A calmer Indian approach, however, would begin by acknowledging that the Fifth Afghan
War, which began with American occupation at the end of 2001, is coming to an end. The
British Raj fought the first three Afghan Wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The
fourth was when the West promoted jihadi extremism in response to Soviet Russia's
occupation of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan became
the home for international terrorism and the base from which al-Qaeda launched attacks on
the United States on September 11, 2001. The ferocious American response to 9/11 came in
the form of the Fifth Afghan War.
India had a great run in Afghanistan as America sought to rebuild the war-torn nation. But
that moment is coming to an end. India must prepare for a difficult period as the Afghan
people try and cope with the resurgence of the Taliban, backed by Pakistan and the
imminent steep decline in the Western military footprint. As it adapts to life after the Fifth
Afghan War, the last thing Delhi would want to do is remind its Anglo-American friends
that they have been had by the Pakistan army.
Delhi might be accurate in pointing out that America lost the war in Afghanistan because it
could not stop the Pakistan army from nurturing the Taliban and other militant groups that
destabilised Kabul and killed American troops. But Indian diplomacy, one hopes, is not in
the business of telling the truth about other people's strategic blunders. Instead, it must
recognise what is inevitable in Afghanistan, find some common ground with the West, limit
the potential damage to India's interests where it can, and counter the unacceptable trends
where it must.
After the 9/11 attacks, we might recall, Atal Bihari Vajpayee's government offered all
possible help to the US, although it knew very well that the geographic imperative would
compel Washington to reach out to Rawalpindi. In refusing to accept the logic of a zero-
sum-game with the US and Pakistan, Vajpayee laid the foundation for a strong relationship
with Washington. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh too resisted the temptation to protest
the resumption of American arms supplies to Pakistan in March 2005. Manmohan Singh's
focus on India's bilateral cooperation at that moment led to the historic civil nuclear
initiative that ended India's prolonged nuclear isolation.
India's new approach must begin with the recognition that political support for the
occupation of Afghanistan has all but evaporated in the West. Second, India must
acknowledge the importance of engaging the Taliban and underline its own readiness to talk
to its leaders when they come out of the Pakistan army's shadow. At the same time, India
must remind its Western interlocutors that appeasing the Taliban will break the fragile
internal balance between the Pashtuns and the non-Pashtun minorities and that Delhi will
be compelled to make choices of its own. Third, India must signal its recognition that any
durable political settlement in Afghanistan would require addressing Pakistan's legitimate
interests, but will not accept their definition by Rawalpindi. Fourth, India should welcome
the prospects of a genuine reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, so critical for
the stability of its north-western frontiers.
India must hear out the formal arguments from London, Washington and Kabul that there
is a significant shift in the attitude of the Pakistani army, and that it is ready for peace in the
region. Although this proposition might not seem credible, dismissing it out of hand is not
smart diplomacy. India must reaffirm that it is not in competition with Pakistan in
Afghanistan and is prepared to address Islamabad's concerns about India's policy in
Afghanistan and consider a new framework for trilateral economic and political cooperation
between Delhi, Islamabad and Kabul. If the Pakistan army continues to derail those
possibilities and revives Afghanistan as a base from which to mount attacks on India, Delhi
has no choice but to mount a countervailing coalition.
As a new phase begins in the tragic history of its north-western marches, sulking can't be
Delhi's strategy. India must keep an open mind, engage all the major Afghan formations,
intensify the dialogue with all the regional and international stakeholders, and find ways to
influence the outcomes.

Shia Slaughter
C. Raja Mohan : Fri Feb 22 2013, 02:43 hrs
Shia Slaughter
The protests by the Hazara Shia community in Quetta, Balochistan came to an end Tuesday
when Islamabad promised to launch "targeted" operations against Sunni extremist groups.
But there is little hope that the Pakistan army is prepared to confront the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
that has launched repeated and brazen murderous assaults on the Shia in Quetta and
beyond.
This year alone more than 200 Shia in Quetta died in these attacks. In January, the suicide
bombing of a snooker hall in Quetta killed 93 and injured nearly 200 people. When the Shia
refused to bury the dead until Quetta was handed over to the army, Islamabad responded by
dismissing the regional government and imposing governor's rule.
Last Sunday, in a terror blast at a busy market in Quetta, 89 Shia were killed and nearly 100
injured. The LeJ claimed credit for the attack. The Shia took to the streets again, as the
governor of the province blamed the law enforcement agencies for "being too scared or
clueless".
In their talks with the Shia leaders in Quetta, the government claimed that it has "detained"
nearly 170 suspects and that there will be "targeted" operations against the LeJ with the
help of the army.
Although the protests have ended, the violent sectarian extremism of the LeJ has thrived
amidst the permissive political environment in Pakistan that has turned a blind eye to the
mounting attacks on sectarian Muslim minorities as well as the Hindu minority.
Pakistan's army and intelligence agencies have a huge presence in Quetta, from where they
conduct the campaign against a separatist insurgency by the Baloch nationalists, keep a
close eye on Afghan groups that enjoy its patronage, and monitor the turbulent border with
Iran.
The security forces, including the army, do not consider Sunni extremist groups like the LeJ
as "anti-state" and have been willing to live with its excesses. Their current focus is on
countering groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan that have confronted the military in
Pakistan.
The LeJ was banned more than a decade ago under American pressure on Pakistan
following the 9/11 attacks on the US. But the group operates openly in Pakistan under the
very nose of the security forces.
Bahrain Trouble
The deepening tension between Shia and Sunni is not limited to Pakistan and has enveloped
the Arabian Peninsula. From Bahrain in the east to Syria in the north, the conflict has
enveloped most other faultlines within and across the region.
Bahrain marked the second anniversary of the uprising two years ago for political reform
with renewed clashes between security forces and protesters. What started out as a non-
sectarian movement for democratic change soon became a conflict between the Sunni
monarchy and the Shia majority. The Shia constitute nearly 70 per cent of the population
and complain about their condition as a virtual underclass.
Bahrain's internal conflict acquired a regional dimension as the Sunni monarchy blamed
Iran for fomenting the rebellion and invited a military intervention led by Saudi Arabia.
Attempts to find reconciliation between the Sunni minority regime and the Shia majority
appear to be breaking down amidst the renewed violence.
Iraq and Syria
As the Shia in Bahrain fight for majority rights, the recently empowered Shia majority in
Iraq has big problems finding peace with the Sunni minority.
Until the American military intervention to oust the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, a
Sunni minority ruled over the Shia majority and marginalised the ethnic Kurds.
There was much hope that Iraq would ensure the rights of minorities in the new democratic
framework. But those hopes have been dashed amidst growing conflict between Shia and
Sunni.
The difficulties of the young democracy in Iraq to finding a balance between redressing
historic injustices and protecting minority rights has been exacerbated by the
Shia-Sunni conflict in Syria.
While the Shia of Iraq have no empathy for Bashar
al-Assad, they deeply fear the consequences of the collapse of his minority regime led by the
Alawites, a variant of Shia Islam.
The Sunni dissidents in Iraq meanwhile are being drawn into a deeper embrace with Assad's
opponents, who claim to speak on behalf of the oppressed Sunni majority in Syria.
With Sunni Turkey opposing Assad and Shia Iran supporting him, it has become difficult to
separate the regional conflicts from the sectarian divide.

China Oil
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Mar 06 2013, 02:37 hrs
CHINA OIL
In what could turn out to be a tectonic shift in global energy markets, China has overtaken
the United States as the world's largest importer of oil.
According to preliminary data on world petroleum trade in December 2012, China's net oil
imports surged to 6.12 million barrels per day (Mbd) while America's net imports declined
to 5.98 Mbd, the lowest figure since 1992.
Although these numbers could flip back in favour of the US during the winter months, there
is no mistaking the trend line. China is all set to replace the US as the world's largest
importer of oil either this year or the next.
As America's domestic oil production grows amidst the shale-gas boom, the US is closer
than ever before to reducing its massive dependence on energy imports from the OPEC
countries.
The use of new technologies most notably hydraulic fracturing or fracking, and horizontal
drilling have opened up massive hydrocarbon resources in America.
The US oil production has surged by more than 8,00,000 barrels per day in 2012. It is said
to be the biggest annual increase in oil production since the hydrocarbon era began in the
US in the late 19th century.
According to the International Energy Agency's latest report, America will overtake Saudi
Arabia as the leading oil producer by about 2017 and will become a net oil exporter by 2030.
Energy independence is a popular political goal in the US and the White House recently
claimed that America's dependence on foreign oil has gone down every single year since
President Obama took office. As part of his strategy to increase safe, responsible oil
production in the US, Obama has freed millions of new acres for oil and gas exploration.
TRADING PLACES
As China replaces the US as the largest importer of oil, might Beijing step into American
shoes as the principal security guarantor of the oil-rich Persian Gulf?
Beijing is unlikely to become the gendarme of the Gulf in the near future. But the logic of its
growing dependence on the region's resources is bound to compel China to seek a more
decisive role in shaping Persian Gulf security.
Meanwhile, Washington might want to reconsider its longstanding role as the guarantor of
regional security. If greater oil production at home and more imports from the Western
hemisphere reduce the incentive for a strong American role in the Gulf, the pressures on the
US defence budget have begun to constrain its military presence in the region.
The Pentagon has been operating two aircraft carriers for many years in the Persian Gulf for
many years. The current squeeze on spending in Washington has meant cuts of nearly $85
billion in the US defence budget. This has forced the Pentagon to cancel the deployment of
one carrier to the region this year.
EAST OF SUEZ
The British Raj policed the Gulf for nearly two centuries, thanks to the massive resource
base of the undivided subcontinent and its unrivalled naval primacy in the Indian Ocean.
With its power ebbing rapidly after World War II, Great Britain announced in 1968 the
withdrawal of its military presence "East of Suez". Since then, it has been the burden of the
US to police the waters of the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Is the US on the verge of an East of Suez
moment of its own? Not really; for it is rather easy to overstate the nature of America's
relative decline.
Yet, at a time of fiscal austerity, there will be much political questioning in Washington of
the logic of a significant American military presence in the Gulf.
There are many in Washington who are asking why China, Japan, India and other big oil
importers should have a free ride at the expense of America, which pays for the securing of
the critical sea lines of communication between the Persian Gulf and the rest of Asia.
This US domestic debate will take a while to sort itself out. It might be sensible, however, for
New Delhi to focus its attention on the potential consequences of a reduced American
military presence in the Arabian Sea and a Chinese pivot to the Persian Gulf.
Japan is back
JAPAN IS BACK
Defying American ambivalence and Chinese outrage, Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
declared in Washington last week that Japan will remain a first-rate power in the world.
Addressing a Washington audience after he met US President Barack Obama in the White
House, Abe spoke in English, unusual for a Japanese premier, and asserted that "Japan is
not, and will never be, a second-tier country."
After a series of weak PMs and persistent economic recession in the last few years, the
widespread assumption in Washington and beyond has been that Japan is slowly but
certainly fading out of the world's centrestage. In the last few weeks he has been in power,
Abe has sought to shake Japan, East Asia and the world out of the certitudes on Japan's
inevitable decline. Making bold moves to revive the economy, standing up to Chinese
pressure over the disputed islands that Beijing calls Diaoyu and Japan Senkaku, proposing
an increase in defence spending and calling for far-reaching changes in Japan's peace
constitution, Abe has generated shock waves.
"I make a pledge," Abe declared in Washington, "I will bring back a strong Japan, strong
enough to do even more good for the betterment of the world." For a country that has never
stopped offering apologies for its imperial conduct in World War II, the use of the phrase
"Japan is back" has grated on Chinese nerves. Worse still, Abe made bold to accuse the
Communist Party of China of mobilising patriotism and stoking up territorial quarrels with
neighbours to shore up its sagging domestic political legitimacy.
This was red rag to the Chinese bull, and a spokesman of the foreign office in Beijing
declared that Abe's personal purpose was to "distort facts, attack and defame China and stir
up confrontation between the two countries". Unfazed by the Chinese criticism, Abe said in
Washington that he is not for confrontation with Beijing and is willing to engage China for
mutual benefit. On the territorial dispute, though, Abe gave no quarter to Beijing. "No
nation should make any miscalculation about the firmness of our resolve" to defend Japan's
claim to the Senkakus.
OBAMA'S SNUB?
While China is angry with Abe, it is apparently pleased with Obama's seeming reluctance to
publicly back the Japanese premier against Beijing. Media commentary in China noted that
Obama had turned down Abe's request to visit Washington in January. Beijing has also
noted that John Kerry has not followed his predecessor Hillary Clinton's footsteps in
making the first foreign trip as secretary of state to Asia. Kerry has chosen to go to Europe
and the Middle East, adding to Chinese speculation that Washington is having second
thoughts on the US pivot to Asia.
While the two leaders reaffirmed the centrality of the US-Japan alliance, Chinese media
noted, Obama carefully avoided any mention of China and refused to answer questions from
Japanese reporters on the territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing in the East China
Sea. Beijing is fully conscious of the debate in Washington where a large section of the
foreign policy community has been wary of Japan's assertiveness under Abe. Many have
suggested that the US should not get dragged into a conflict between Japan and China and
that Washington should not encourage Abe to confront China.
Chinese news agency Xinhua said what transpired in Washington was "contrary to Abe's
great hope of showing off the 'robust' US-Japan alliance and prodding the US into taking
Japan's side in its spiralling dispute with neighbouring China over the Diaoyu Islands."
INDIA MISSING
As the triangular dynamic between Washington, Beijing and Tokyo acquires a sharp edge,
India appears to be falling out of the new power play in Asia. In his Washington speech, Abe
did not mention India when he talked of his pet political project building an alliance of
Asian democracies. Nor did he cite the current trilateral dialogue between Japan, India and
the US.
Among Japanese leaders, Abe has been the most vigorous champion of deepening the
partnership with India. His return to power was widely expected to give a big boost to India-
Japan relations. It is not easy to explain, then, the current drift in relations between New
Delhi and Tokyo. One of the capitals, it would seem, has curbed strategic enthusiasm for the
other.

India-Myanmar Naval Diplomacy
C. Raja Mohan : New Delhi, Mon Mar 11 2013, 14:18 hrs
In an important advance in the bilateral security cooperation between Delhi and Yangon,
two naval vessels from Myanmar have arrived over the weekend in Vishakhapatnam for
joint exercises. This important step follows the visit of Defence Minister AK Antony to
Myanmar earlier this year and the agreement to boost bilateral defence cooperation.
Until now the military cooperation between the two neighbours has been limited essentially
to the armies. Confronting restiveness on their remote frontiersin India's North East and
Myanmar's Norththe security forces of the two countries have over the last two decades
deepened their counter-insurgency cooperation.
Preoccupied for decades with its vast land frontiers, India has turned to the seas in the early
1990s. As it launched naval diplomacy two decades, Delhi inevitably looked to Myanmar
with which it shares a long maritime frontier.
For nearly a decade, India's naval ships frequently called at
Myanmar's ports that were on the way to the east. Delhi was also pleased to see Myanmar's
participation in the biennial 'Milan' exercises that its navy holds in the Bay of Bengal off the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
This is the first time though that Myanmar's shipsa frigate and a corvette-- have come to a
port on India's mainland. Form there the ships of the two countries will conduct an exercise
in joint patrolling in Southern Bay of Bengal.
Slowly but surely, Myanmar is becoming increasingly conscious of its strategic location at
the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Although Myanmar does not face the Western Pacific, it sits right on top of the Malacca
Straits that connects the two oceans.
Given its growing interests in the Indian Ocean, Beijing too is paying greater attention to
maritime engagement with Myanmar. In the past there was much speculation about
Chinese presence in Myanmar's Cocos Islands in the Andaman Sea.
That speculation turned out to be false. Yangon went out of the way to reassure Delhi that it
has no intention to provide naval facilities to any foreign power. But there is no denying
China's growing interest in naval cooperation with Myanmar.
Chinese naval ships traveling back and forth to the Arabian Sea, where it has been
conducting anti-piracy operations since the end of 2008, have occasionally called on the
Myanmar's ports.
Given its long coastline, Yangon is bound to pay greater attention to its maritime security in
the coming years. While India's naval diplomacy with Myanmar is headed in the right
direction, Delhi needs to step up the pace of cooperation and take bolder steps in assisting
Yangon build its naval and maritime capabilities.
(C. Raja Mohan is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and
a Contributing Editor for The Indian Express)

Bengal's Waters
BENGAL'S WATERS
The Bay of Bengal, India thinks, is its backwaters. It should think again; for Beijing is all set
to transform the geo-economics of the Bay of Bengal. The China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) is about to complete the construction of the natural gas pipeline from
Myanmar's Rakhine coast to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan in south-western China.
The pipeline traverses nearly 800 km north-east from the island of Kyaukpyu (pronounced
"Tchapru") to enter Yunnan. It is designed to carry nearly 12 billion cubic metres of gas per
year, nearly a third of current Chinese imports of natural gas. A small portion of the gas will
be consumed along the way in Myanmar.
Myanmar and China announced the project in 2008 after Yangon failed to secure an
agreement with New Delhi and Dhaka on a trilateral pipeline project that was endlessly
debated but could not be moved forward.
Work began on the project after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Myanmar in 2010.
That it took barely three years to complete it underlines China's purposeful implementation
of major cross-border projects.
Despite the recent setbacks to Chinese investments in Myanmar, Beijing's economic
presence in the country will continue to grow. While Myanmar looks for more commercial
partners, China is likely to remain its most important one.
In 2011, Myanmar ordered the suspension of work on the Myitsone hydel project that was
being developed by China Power Investment Corporation, creating a big flutter in the
relations between Yangon and Beijing.
Lack of a credible assessment of environmental impact, the massive displacement of people
and the plans to ship most of the electricity to Yunnan saw largescale protests by the local
population, compelling Yangon to act.
More recently, protests have enveloped a major project by China's Norinco Company to
develop one of the world's largest copper deposits in Myanmar. Meanwhile, Beijing's
ambitious infrastructure projects are connecting China to the Bay of Bengal through
Myanmar.
KYAUKPYU TERMINUS
The natural gas pipeline is only one of the many projects that are centred on the Kyaukpyu
Island. CNPC is also building an oil pipeline along the same alignment as the gas pipeline.
The oil pipeline is expected to carry nearly 22 million tonnes of oil a year from Kyaukpyu to
Yunnan.
An oil terminal is being built by Chinese companies near port de Bruno, the capital of
Kyaukpyu special administrative zone. Once operational, ultra-large crude carriers (ULCC)
sailing back and forth from Kyaukpyu will be a common sight in the Bay of Bengal.
This large capacity oil transportation route will not be an alternative to the Malacca Straits
through which most of Chinese oil imports pass through. But it will provide a useful
complement and a short-cut to moving hydrocarbons into western China.
China also plans to build a highway between Kyaukpyu and Yunnan as well as a high-speed
rail link. Chinese companies are developing a large special economic zone in Kyaukpyu and
power plants to fuel it.
Beijing also has plans to build a deep water commercial seaport at Kyaukpyu's natural
harbour. The betting is that Kyaukpyu could become a major port for transshipment in the
Bay of Bengal.
Authorities in Yangon are reportedly considering China's plans to build a "mini-Singapore"
on the Kyaukpyu Island. Chinese investments in Kyaukpyu could amount to nearly $100
billion if all the current plans materialise over the next two decades.
Would it be illogical, then, for Beijing to consider securing its massive investments in
Kyaukpyu with a credible naval presence in the Bay of Bengal?
DREAMING SOUTH
It was the British Raj that first thought of developing a transport corridor into western
China through Myanmar in the late 19th century. The Raj of course lacked the financial
resources. Its successors in Delhi could not imagine the economic possibilities of the Bay of
Bengal. But Beijing's rulers in the 20th century have never stopped dreaming of the
southern waters.
The Qing dynasty in the early 20th century considered building roads to the Bay of Bengal
through Myanmar. The nationalist government that followed drew up plans for a rail link to
the Indian Ocean. In the 1950s, the People's Republic considered similar proposals. As
China's resources now match Beijing's ambitious policy of "looking south", the Bay of
Bengal will never be the same again.

The new cyber axis
C. Raja Mohan : Mon Mar 18 2013, 02:53 hrs
A Sino-US dialogue may alter the international discourse on cyber security
Last week, US National Security Advisor Tom Donilon pointed to the unacceptable
frequency and intensity of Chinese cyber attacks on American corporations and called for a
comprehensive dialogue with Beijing. Until now, the global debate on cyber security has
focused on the challenges of controlling internet crime, coping with hostile attacks on
critical infrastructure like electricity grids in one country by another, and developing legal
norms to limit cyber conflicts among nations. Donilon's remarks at the Asia Society in New
York last week helped draw international attention to the impact of cyber warfare on the
global economy and the future of US-China commercial ties.
Donilon urged Beijing to recognise the dangers that the cyber theft of American intellectual
property poses to the stability of the global economy, investigate and put an end to these
attacks, and start negotiations on drafting a code of conduct. A few days before Donilon
spoke, the US cyber security firm Mandiant published a report which traced most of the
cyber attacks on the US corporations to a secret Chinese military unit, numbered 61398,
located in a 12-story building in Shanghai.
That corporations spy on each other within and across nations is not a startling
development. What is new is the Chinese military's decision to deploy its massive cyber
resources against the US companies. The PLA's objective is widely seen as part of an effort
to alter the strategic balance between China and the US by narrowing the gap between the
two countries in the high technology sector. China's massive cyber efforts have begun to blur
the distinction between commercial espionage and national security and the US is eager to
work out a set of mutually acceptable constraints.
This outreach to Beijing complements Obama's determination to defend the US economy,
critical national infrastructure and American corporations against cyber attacks originating
from China and other external sources. Obama also met last week with the CEOs of 13 major
US corporations to discuss collaboration between the government and business on
strengthening America's cyber security.
Responding to the recent barrage of American charges of cyber warfare, officials and media
commentators in Beijing say China is being unfairly targeted for political reasons by
Washington. They say China is also a major victim of cyber attacks and insist that most of
those originate from the US. They call for an end to "irresponsible criticism" of China and to
jointly develop rules of the road for international cooperation in cyber space.
The question of cyber security in the economic realm also came up in the phone
conversation between Obama and Chinese leader Xi Jinping after he was formally elected
president of China last week. In his congratulatory call to Xi, Obama described cyber
security as a "shared challenge" that must be addressed in the overall context of the all-
important bilateral economic relationship between the US and China. Xi apparently agreed
to start talks with the US on cyber security and the new prime minister, Li Keqiang,
affirmed on Sunday China's interest in building a new and sustainable relationship with
America.
US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, who is in China this week, is expected to probe the Chinese
leaders for the terms of the bilateral dialogue on cyber security. While the US is deeply
concerned about Chinese cyber attacks, there is a new tone that has begun to emerge from
Washington underlining the importance of bilateral cooperation with Beijing.
The need to avoid confrontation with China came through clearly in Donilon's remarks at
the Asia Society: "Economies as large as the United States and China have a tremendous
shared stake in ensuring that the internet remains open, interoperable, secure, reliable, and
stable."
Both countries face risks when it comes to protecting personal data and communications,
financial transactions, critical infrastructure, or the intellectual property and trade secrets
that are so vital to innovation and economic growth," Donilon added.
Despite the many tensions in the bilateral relationship, the Chinese public reaction to the
spate of recent US allegations on cyber theft and commercial espionage has been moderate.
There have been substantive Track Two conversations between the US and China on the
economic dimension of cyber warfare and the need to build mutual trust.
The incipient Sino-US bilateral dialogue has the potential to alter the current international
discourse on cyber security. Until now, Russia has led the debate in multilateral forums like
the United Nations on information security. Russia, China and many developing countries
have also ranged themselves against the US and the West on questions relating to internet
freedom and the sovereign right of states to regulate and control cyberspace.
Although these ideological issues might retain some salience, the new Sino-US dialogue is
about managing the profound interdependence between the world's two largest economies
in the cyber age. Just as the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union defined the nuclear
discourse in the last century, Washington and Beijing are likely to shape the international
regulation of the cyber domain in the coming decades.
India, then, must resist the temptation to hang its cyber rhetoric on familiar tropes of
multilateralism. New Delhi must focus instead on building robust capacities at home for
defence, offence and espionage in cyberspace.
Without a strong internal capability, Delhi will be unable to influence the international
debates on regulating cyberspace at the UN General Assembly and the International
Telecommunications Union. Even more important is India's bilateral engagement with both
the US and China on cyber security issues. So is the founding of a solid cyber partnership
between the Union government in Delhi and the large private corporations in Mumbai.

Reviving India-Egypt Defence
Cooperation
C. Raja Mohan : New Delhi, Tue Mar 19 2013, 16:07 hrs
At the joint press appearance with the visiting Egyptian President, Mohamed Morsi, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh said the two countries have agreed to initiate military exchanges
and defence cooperation.
In an interview to an Indian newspaper on the eve of his visit, Morsy expressed his interest
in establishing security cooperation with India. Morsy told 'The Hindu' newspaper that he is
keen to build a special relationship with India that will include defence cooperation.
He identified military navigation, electronics and maintenance as some priority areas of
interest. Although no further details were given out, defence engagement between Delhi and
Cairo is welcome and long overdue.
Although both countries are distracted by domestic political concerns, establishing a strong
institutional links between the two military establishments will benefit both countries.
After extraordinary bonhomie in the 1950s, the two countries drifted apart since the 1970s.
Morsy's visit to India, the first by an elected Egyptian President, will hopefully set the stage
for a comprehensive partnership in the coming years.
Egypt was among the few countries in the developing world that India sought to cooperation
in the defence sector in the years after India's independence. The close friendship between
Jawaharlal Nehru and the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser provided the basis for
ambitious bilateral defence cooperation.
India participated in the development of a jet fighter and jet engine in Egypt from the late
1950s to the late 1960s. Nehru saw cooperation with Egypt as being complementary to
India's own efforts at developing an indigenous aerospace industry.
According to one account, Nehru's India "participated in Egypt's 'Helena' HA-300 jet fighter
program and sent various professionals from its aeronautics industry and the Indian Air
Force on detached service to Egypt, where they joined the local aircraft project.
India also participated with contributions of money, experts and equipment in Egypt's
attempt to produce an indigenous jet turbine engine, the 'Brandner E-300'.
Critically, Nehru hoped that this engine would have a viable market by pledging to power
India's own indigenous jet fighter, the HAL HF-24 "Marut," with the Egyptian engine.
Although the projects did not succeed, they underlined Nehru's deep interest in defence
collaboration with friends and political partners, notwithstanding his opposition to military
alliances.
Unlike in the 1950s, future defence collaboration between Delhi and Cairo might have better
future in the coming years, thanks to the advances in India's capabilities over the last few
decades.
(C. Raja Mohan is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and
a Contributing Editor for The Indian Express.)

Chennai Kowtow
Chennai Kowtow
In pandering to the DMK leader M. Karunanidhi so eagerly on the policy towards Sri Lanka,
the UPA government has further diminished India's credibility in the region. Karunanidhi's
decision to leave the UPA might put an end to the misery of the government, but only for the
moment. For the burden of coping with politics in Chennai has long limited Delhi's options
with Colombo.
That internal considerations play an important role in the making of foreign policy is true of
most countries. The impact of domestic politics on diplomacy is more evident in
democracies, where different pressure groups actively seek to influence the nation's external
orientation on various issues. But the central government of any country, which has the
constitutional responsibility to conduct foreign policy, must find the balance between the
duty to protect national interests and the political need to address the concerns of different
domestic groups.
UPA 2 has found it hard to achieve that balance in coping with the tantrums of Mamata
Banerjee in dealing with Dhaka and DMK's posturing in addressing the challenges with
Colombo. Last year, the Indian vote against Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council was
widely seen to be a response to political pressure from Tamil Nadu. The UPA government
has done worse this year in trying to give the DMK a say in India's diplomacy at Geneva.
It has sent three Union cabinet ministers to apparently negotiate the wording of the
resolution being discussed among the member states of the UNHRC. The failure of this
effort does not mask the dangerous precedent UPA 2 was setting. UPA 2 looked pitiful
because it was no secret that Karunanidhi was simply posturing on the issue of Tamils in
Lanka.
When Colombo was fighting its last ferocious battles in the civil war during the summer of
2009, Karunanidhi was the CM of Tamil Nadu. He held a token hunger strike and was quite
happy to wink and nod as Delhi helped Colombo defeat the Tamil Tigers. If the UPA
handled with ease the more challenging situation in 2009, UPA 2 has not demonstrated the
political skill to manage the tricky situations that it has repeatedly confronted.
Sack of Potatoes
While Karunanidhi's cynicism is unsurprising, it is quite tragic to see the Delhi Durbar
become a political sack of potatoes, formless and malleable, that is ready to be kicked
around by any domestic pressure group. Political pusillanimity at home has consequences
abroad. India lost much goodwill in Sri Lanka after Delhi voted against Colombo at the
UNHRC last year. It could be a lot worse if Delhi once again signals that its foreign policy is
all about accommodating domestic pressures.
Once upon a time, the neighbouring countries feared Congress governments in Delhi.
Congress PMs were both generous and muscular in their dealings with the neighbours. The
imperious attitudes of Congress PMs kept the neighbours on tenterhooks. Delhi's
appeasement of domestic constituencies today makes it appear like a rather weak
interlocutor to our neighbours.
Defence Dialogue
Delhi's lack of political will, of course, is not a laughing matter when we consider the
damage some of which could be lasting being inflicted on India's national security
interests in the region by UPA 2.
There is no denying that the condition of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka is of real concern,
not just in Chennai but India as a whole. But Delhi has also many interests in Sri Lanka
other than supporting the rights of the Tamil minority there. These interests range from the
economic to cultural and defence. Yet we have seen Delhi reschedule the annual defence
dialogue to be held in Colombo later this week. It is one thing to pray at the feet of regional
warlords. It is entirely another to wilfully undermine valuable strategic cooperation with the
neighbours.
Playing fast and loose with long-term security interests has made it much easier for other
powers like China and Pakistan to expand their presence in Sri Lanka. Both Beijing and
Rawalpindi deeply appreciate the geopolitical significance of Sri Lanka, which is located at
the heart of the Indian Ocean. Both of them have become major defence partners for Sri
Lanka. Can we blame them for taking full advantage of UPA 2's willingness to outsource its
Lanka policy to Chennai?

Steel in Xi's message
C. Raja Mohan : Tue Mar 26 2013, 10:42 hrs
Respect for China, not romantic notions of an Eastern bloc, must guide Indian diplomacy
Chinese leader Xi Jinping's first tour abroad as the president of the People's Republic
should give the world a good measure of the personal style and worldview of a man who will
be at the helm in Beijing for a whole decade. Few successors of Deng Xiaoping have begun
their tenure at the top with the kind of power that Xi has accumulated at home. And no
modern Chinese leader has had as much say in world affairs as Xi is bound to enjoy in the
coming decade.
Xi has already broken a major taboo by deciding to travel with his wife, Peng Liyuan, a
celebrated singer and star in her own right in China. In the Chinese communist political
tradition, the wives of the top leaders were neither to be seen nor heard. If the wooden Hu
Jintao could not go beyond communist jargon, Xi has already demonstrated carefully
scripted political spontaneity in his public appearances at home. Unlike Hu, Xi is likely to be
an engaging and energetic leader on the diplomatic stage.
If personal style makes Xi an attractive leader, there is no mistaking the steel in his political
message. At home, Xi has emphasised the "renewal of the Chinese nation". Abroad, Xi is
leaving no one in doubt that China will be uncompromising in the defence of its core
national interests. Equally important is the message that China will no longer hide its
capabilities and bide its time. China under Xi is ready to lead. It is not clear if China's
interlocutors both friends and foes are prepared for this.
At the first stop on his tour, Moscow, Xi underlined the importance of Russia as the most
valued great-power partner for China and touched on the familiar anti-Western themes
including the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations that
have much resonance in Moscow these days. At the Durban summit this week, Xi will lead
Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa in laying the foundations for non-Western financial
institutions like the proposed BRICS Bank.
The focus on Xi's tough rhetoric in Moscow and his performance at the BRICS summit
should not in any way reduce the importance of Xi's two other stops on the tour Tanzania
and Congo. Xi's predecessor, Hu Jintao, travelled four times to Africa in his decade-long
tenure as China's president. Xi is ready to devote even greater strategic attention to Africa.
Unlike in Asia, where China's territorial disputes and historical antagonisms have
constrained Beijing, Africa offers much greater freedom of strategic manoeuvre to China's
new leaders.
If China is having a free run in Africa, the continent also underlines some of the political
problems associated with China's emergence as a great power. China's economic and
political profile in Africa has risen rapidly over the last decade. But Beijing has also invited a
mild backlash to the economic model it has promoted in the continent. Beijing's intensive
diplomacy with Africa over the last decade has seen a dramatic rise in China's trade with the
continent from barely $10 billion in 2000 to nearly $200 bn in 2012. China's massive
investments in Africa's mineral sector have been accompanied by an expansive emphasis on
building transport infrastructure that links the continent to itself and the world markets.
Beijing has also emerged as a major donor of economic assistance to Africa. Unlike the
West, China does not put any conditions for the aid or give lectures on good governance to
Africa.
China's emphasis on non-intervention in internal affairs and the size of its economic
assistance last year Beijing offered loans worth $20 bn has given Africa greater room
vis-a-vis the Western powers that have long dominated its political and economic landscape.
At the same time, China's Africa policy has drawn charges of "neo-colonialism". It is not just
Western governments and activist groups that are accusing Beijing of an exploitative
relationship with Africa. Earlier this month, the chairman of Nigeria's central bank, Lamido
Sanusi, urged Africa to reconsider its romance with China. Writing in the Financial Times,
Sanusi pointed out: "China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This
was also the essence of colonialism." Through his sojourn in Africa, Xi is likely to try and
correct this perception. This criticism does not necessarily mean any significant reduction in
the political value of a partnership with China for African leaders. The many consequential
agreements that Xi plans to sign in Tanzania and Congo will reflect the deepening African
economic and political bonds with China.
In the end, Xi's first visit abroad is about asserting China's leadership on the global stage.
The Western nations that have urged China to become a "responsible stakeholder" might
not be entirely pleased as Xi seeks to protect China's growing international interests and
demands a rewriting of international rules.
Meanwhile, those in New Delhi and Moscow who think they can line up behind Beijing on
multilateral issues and improve their leverage with the United States may also be in for a
rude shock. For, the strategic imbalance between China on the one hand, and India and
Russia on the other, is growing fast even as the power gap between Beijing and Washington
narrows. China is now the unquestioned senior partner in the BRICS. This historic power
shift means forums like the BRICS improve Beijing's leverage with Washington and help Xi
set the terms for an accommodation between a rising China and a US that is in relative
decline.
A healthy respect for China's power under Xi and an appreciation of what it means for
international relations, rather than romantic notions about building an Eastern Bloc against
the West, must guide Indian diplomacy in Durban.

Tanzanian Pearl
TANZANIAN PEARL
Whether the "string of pearls" theory is credible or not, China continues to invest in the
development of new ports all across the Indian Ocean littoral. After building deep-water sea
ports in Gwadar (Pakistan) and Hambantota in Sri Lanka and outlining plans for another in
Kyaukphyu (Myanmar), China is now ready to build another at Bagamoyo, on Tanzania's
coast.
While these ports are civilian, they also help the Chinese navy operate worldwide. As Xu
Guangyu, from the China Arms Control Association, told a Hong Kong newspaper this week,
the Chinese navy needs resupply bases as it ventures far from home waters.
China's plans for Bagamoyo came into international view during Chinese President Xi
Jinping's visit to Tanzania this week en-route to the BRICS summit. The port at Bagamoyo,
which happens to be near the hometown of Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, is
expected to cost around $10 billion and would help relieve the pressure on the country's
only port in the capital city, Dar es Salaam. A Chinese state-owned company, China
Merchants Group, will lead the port construction. Beijing also has plans to develop a special
economic zone near Bagamoyo.
Xi signed 16 separate agreements for economic cooperation and sealed what Beijing calls an
"all-weather" friendship with Tanzania. China is already Tanzania's biggest trading partner
and the second-largest investor. China and Tanzania also have an expanding defence
cooperation. China supplies a range of basic military equipment to Tanzanian armed forces.
The Tanzanian navy and coast guard are built around Chinese vessels. Chinese trainers
stepped in when India pulled out in the 1980s from a military college at Arusha that it had
helped set up after the liberation of Tanzania.
Since 2000, when two ships of the Chinese navy called at Dar es Salaam, maritime
cooperation between the two countries has steadily expanded. Chinese naval units
conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden frequently call on Dar es Salaam.
The discovery of massive natural gas deposits off the coast of Tanzania and neighbouring
Mozambique has lent a new dimension to China's strategic interest in the waters of East
Africa.
HISTORIC TIES
The "all-weather" partnership between China and Tanzania has not been built in a day.
Political warmth and strategic cooperation between the two dates back to the founding of
modern Tanzania by Julius Nyerere in 1964. Nyerere maintained close ties with Beijing at a
time when China was isolated and actively campaigned for its entry into the United Nations
as a permanent member of the Security Council in the 1960s.
Beijing's support to infrastructure development in Tanzania goes back to the 1960s, when
Mao Zedong sent thousands of Chinese engineers and workers to build a railway line
between Zambia's interior and Tanzania's coast. The Tanzania Zambia rail system
(TAZARA) eliminated Zambia's dependence on South Africa and Rhodesia, then under
white minority rule, for the export of its massive copper resources. During his visit to
Tanzania, Xi visited the memorial for the Chinese citizens who died in the country during
the construction of the railroad.
ZANZIBAR and china
Xi's political engagements in Dar es Salaam included a meeting with the president of
Zanzibar, Ali Mohamed Shein. The Zanzibar archipelago consists of a group of islands off
the East African coast. Tanzania was formed in 1964 by a union between Tanganyika and
Zanzibar. The archipelago is now an autonomous region within the Tanzanian union. The
discovery of massive off-shore natural deposits has generated some friction between the two
on the question of ownership, exploitation and use.
There had been some pressure on Zanzibar, especially from Islamist groups on the island,
for removing the oil sector from the control of the union. Tanzania and Zanzibar are now
negotiating a compromise that will allow the rapid development of the country's
hydrocarbon riches.
In his meeting with Shein, who earlier served as vice president of Tanzania, Xi offered
assistance in the development of maritime infrastructure and the exploitation of marine
resources.
Zanzibar, which has deep historic and cultural links with India was a protectorate of the Raj,
and administered from Mumbai until the early decades of the last century. India has much
goodwill and many equities in Tanzania and Zanzibar. But they have long ceased to be part
of New Delhi's strategic imagination. Might that change as China drops anchor in the
western Indian Ocean?

Singh and Xi: A Political Mismatch?
C. Raja Mohan : New Delhi, Thu Mar 28 2013, 14:59 hrs
India media is always tempted to hype up the brief encounters between Indian prime
ministers and leaders of other countries in multilateral conferences in distant lands. Such
meetings rarely extend beyond exchange of pleasantries and the signaling of mutual good
will.
Reports from Durban say, the first meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and
the new Chinese President Xi Jinping on the margins of the BRICS summit went reasonably
well.
But there is one structural problem though. Seen from outside, Dr. Singh's power is ebbing
in Delhi. After nine years at the helm, the UPA government appears to have run out of
steam. Xi, in contrast, has just emerged as the all-powerful leader of the Chinese
Communist party.
The priority for Dr. Singh, then, is to build personal rapport with Xi and create a framework,
which his successors can build on, for engaging the new leadership in Beijing that is very
conscious of China's rapid rise in the international system.
Brief conversations such as the one Dr. Singh and Xi had in Durban are certainly useful in
promoting familiarity between the top leaders and help ease communications between the
two establishments.
These encounters are not meant to negotiate serious differences. They are used very rarely
to sort out a pressing diplomatic issue or two.
With India and China participating in many annual summits the BRICS, East Asia
Summit, and the G-20 the frequency of contact between the leaders of the two countries
has dramatically increased in the last few years.
Dr. Singh has met the Chinese leaders (the recently retired President Hu Jintao and premier
Wen Jiabao) more than twenty times in the last few years. This is more than all the
meetings between Singh's predecessors in Delhi and the Chinese leadership.
The short but routine meetings between the two leaderships have removed some of the
needless mystery surrounding India's relationship with China, which rose out of insufficient
contact between the two elites in the past.
Looking ahead, Delhi has its task cut out in maintaining the momentum of bilateral
relations with Beijing while mitigating tensions and seizing new opportunities.
But Delhi will be taken seriously by a self-assured Xi, only if Dr. Singh demonstrates
political purpose at home and the will to take some big decisions.
Otherwise, like the rest of the world leaders, Xi Jinping too will wait for regime change in
Delhi.
Contributing Editor of The Indian Express)

Doha round
C. Raja Mohan : Thu Apr 04 2013, 00:10 hrs
Doha round
Doha, the capital of the Persian Gulf emirate Qatar, which has lent its name to the world
trade talks, has also become the theatre for international diplomacy on Afghanistan.
Punching way above its weight, Qatar has inserted itself into the Great Game over the last
two years by offering an address to the Taliban.
For the last two years, a handful of the Taliban leaders and their families have taken up
residence in Doha and conducted negotiations, stalled for now, with the United States and
other Western countries. Last week, it received Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai.
In the 1990s, only two countries other than Pakistan recognised the Taliban government in
Kabul Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This time it is Qatar that has taken the
lead in the name of promoting the Afghan peace process. Karzai has been deeply suspicious
of Doha's attempt at drawing the Taliban closer to the US and lending the movement an
international personality. Karzai preferred mediation by Saudi Arabia or Turkey, rather
than Qatar.
Karzai was angry that Qatar was trying to promote reconciliation between the Taliban and
the West behind Kabul's back. To be sure, Karzai is all for a negotiated peace settlement
with the Taliban. His problem is with the terms of engagement. Karzai rightly insists that
the negotiations with the Taliban must be led by Kabul. Independent international
negotiations with the Taliban, he rightly argues, will undermine the legitimacy of the elected
government in Kabul.
The Taliban dismisses Karzai as a puppet of America, refuses to engage with him and insists
on direct negotiations with the US. Karzai's visit to Doha against this background suggested
possible movement in the negative dynamic between Kabul and Quetta, where the Taliban
leaders have taken shelter. The emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, met
Karzai and sought to dispel some of Kabul's concerns. But the Taliban has remained
inflexible. Its spokesman claimed that no Taliban leaders met Karzai in Doha.
Brief Romance
If hopes are receding for a direct dialogue between the Taliban and Kabul, a new chill has
descended on the ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the last few days. The surprising
warmth in the last few months between Kabul and Rawalpindi has turned out to be short-
lived.
Positive noises about peace from Rawalpindi were followed by the release of a few Taliban
leaders. There was much approbation in Washington and London for the seeming positive
change in the thinking of the Pakistan army GHQ in Rawalpindi. Trying to build on the
positive momentum, the British Prime Minister David Cameron hosted Karzai and the
Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari at his country home Chequers outside London in
February.
With senior military and intelligence officials from both sides of the Durand Line present at
the talks in Chequers, London talked up the prospects for a breakthrough in the Pak-Afghan
track of the peace process. What we have, instead, barely a few weeks later, is a near
breakdown. The Af-Pak romance, so fondly promoted by Anglo-American policymakers, has
turned out to be unsustainable. And the logic of the irreconcilable contradiction between the
interests of Kabul and Rawalpindi appears to be asserting itself.
Reality Check
Last week, the spokesman of the Afghan Foreign Office, Janan Mosazai, accused Pakistan of
"changing the goalposts" of the peace process and putting unacceptable "preconditions" for
Rawalpindi's support for reconciliation between Kabul and the Taliban. According to
Mosazai, these included severing Kabul's ties with India, sending Afghan army officers for
military training in Pakistan and the immediate signing of a strategic partnership
agreement.
Pakistani officials deny making any demands on Kabul and insist that Karzai is increasingly
an obstacle to the Afghan peace process. They also accuse Kabul of sheltering a section of
the militants belonging to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that fights the Pakistani
state.
Afghan officials say Pakistan has held back from sending a delegation of clerics to Kabul that
were to condemn suicide bombing and prevented some Taliban leaders from flying to Doha
for possible talks with Kabul.
Insofar as the recent hype about Rawalpindi's interest in the Afghan peace process is
concerned, Mosazai said, "when optimism was prevailing about Pakistani attitudes, our
human intelligence suggested that on the ground this optimism was not well-founded,
and unfortunately we were proved right".

Nonproliferation isn't all
C. Raja Mohan : Mon Apr 08 2013, 00:49 hrs
Why the US needs a more measured appoach to the nuclear question
The deepening crisis in the Korean Peninsula and the stalled nuclear talks with Iran
together are a powerful reminder to the United States that its nonproliferation policies are
not working in Asia. If George W. Bush attempted muscular approaches including
preventive war and regime change to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, his successor
Barack Obama has put greater emphasis on coercive diplomacy through international
sanctions.
Both approaches have failed. The American problem has less to do with the different
stratagems that Bush and Obama adopted the former emphasising unilateralism and the
later multilateralism. It has everything to do with rigid American political assumptions
about the meaning and implications of proliferation of nuclear weapons.
First, after the Cold War, the American strategic community has elevated the proliferation
of nuclear weapons to the highest possible level as an existential threat to international
peace and security. American liberals and conservatives alike whipped themselves into a
frenzy about the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
While the US managed to live with an expansive nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union
that saw both sides build thousands of nuclear weapons and deploy them around the world,
Washington convinced itself it just can't accept the spread of any nuclear weapon capability,
especially to regimes like Iran and North Korea. Paradoxically, the proliferation alarmism in
the US has turned into a powerful incentive for those regimes seeking to draw American
political attention. The argument here is not for minimising the dangers from the spread of
nuclear weapons. It is to suggest that a more measured approach to the nuclear question
will make it much easier for the US to pursue its larger interests in different parts of Asia.
Second, America's obsession with nonproliferation has been made worse by the relentless
demonisation of the regimes in Iran and North Korea. Calling them "rogue states" and
projecting the rulers in Tehran as "crazy" has prevented the US from taking a political view
of the proliferation challenge and building a pragmatic domestic consensus on how to deal
with it. Seen from a comparative perspective, though, neither Tehran nor Pyongyang have
been more deviant or threatening than the Pakistan army that has actively promoted
proliferation and constantly used nuclear blackmail vis-a-vis India and the US.
Iran and North Korea have not always been opposed to engagement and reconciliation with
the US. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and American intervention in Afghanistan,
Tehran had cooperated with the US. North Korea, too, has been willing to negotiate its
nuclear option at different times in the last two decades with the US. While the popular
narrative is that North Korea is an unreliable interlocutor, Washington has also backed
away from some of the commitments it made to Pyongyang. Fear of looking weak and
"giving away too much", and the ideology of nonproliferation, have prevented Washington
from fully exploring the prospects for reconciliation with North Korea.
Third is the near fundamentalist political canon in Washington today that America can't and
shouldn't accept Iran and North Korea acquiring any nuclear weapon capability.
Suggestions that Washington could productively focus on "containing" rather than "rolling
back" the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes draws fierce bipartisan outrage in
the US establishment. This refusal to accept containment is rooted in the proposition that
the "non-Western" regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang will not abide by the rules of
deterrence. History should help put things in a better perspective. If America deterred
Stalin's Russia and Mao's China regimes that once threatened to overthrow the
international order why won't deterrence work with Tehran and Pyongyang?
Fourth, the Obama Administration has convinced itself wrongly that international sanctions
would bring the regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran to their knees. While the sanctions have
imposed pain on North Korea and Iran, they have also helped unify the targeted regimes
that mobilise nuclear nationalism. The emphasis on multilateral sanctions had also made
the US increasingly dependent on China and Russia, which demand a price every time
Washington moves a fresh sanctions resolution in the United Nations Security Council. But
it is by no means clear that Chinese and Russian interests are in complete alignment with
those of the US in the Korean Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.
Fifth, the US has tended to make the discourse on Iran and North Korea focused exclusively
on the nuclear question. By elevating nonproliferation above all other regional objectives,
Washington has significantly limited its own room for manoeuvre in Asia and the Middle
East. To get itself out of the current no-win situations with North Korea and Iran, Obama
needs to discard the self-defeating nonproliferation myths that have transfixed the US in the
last two decades. The manic obsession with proliferation in Iraq wrecked the presidency of
George W. Bush and imposed extraordinary costs on the US.
Obama has every reason to avoid a needless war with either North Korea or Iran at a time
when the US has so much work to do in getting its own house in order. He can turn the
current crisis in North Korea into an opportunity by calling for a direct unconditional
bilateral American dialogue with North Korea. If he takes a broader view of America's
interests in Asia and the Middle East, and is willing to make the nuclear question one
element of the broader search for a stable balance of power in these two critical regions,
Obama may find many interesting options to experiment with North Korea and Iran.

Seoul's nukes
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Apr 10 2013, 03:25 hrs
SEOUL'S NUKES
As the United States struggles to cope with the North Korean atomic challenge, there is a
growing sentiment in South Korea in favour of building nuclear weapons. In a public
opinion poll conducted after the third North Korean nuclear test in February, nearly two-
thirds of South Koreans supported the development of a national nuclear arsenal.
Debating the nuclear weapon option has long been taboo in South Korea. That taboo is
breaking down amidst Pyongyang's adventurism and the growing pessimism in Seoul about
the US's ability to rollback North Korea's nuclear weapons programme.
As one of the world's leading economies with an advanced industrial base, South Korea has
long had the wherewithal to quickly mount a significant nuclear weapons programme. What
held it back until now is a political decision to forego the nuclear weapon option.
Seoul did pursue the nuclear weapon option in the 1970s, but the US persuaded South
Korea to abandon the programme. South Korea was encouraged instead to rely on the US
nuclear shield.
Faith in the US nuclear umbrella allowed South Korea to take a stoic view of the North
Korean nuclear and missile programmes, until recently. But Seoul's patience has begun to
snap in the last two years amidst the intolerable provocations from the North.
Making matters worse was the growing South Korean perception that a weakening America
may no longer have the ability to either rein in North Korea or defend Seoul against
Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal.
Some in Seoul call for strengthening the American nuclear umbrella by the redeployment of
US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. The US had withdrawn the tactical weapons
from South Korea after the end of the Cold War in 1991 in a gesture of reconciliation
towards North Korea. Others insist South Korea has no alternative but to acquire nuclear
parity with the North.
US DILEMMA
In Washington, of course, there is little
political appetite for a prospective South Korean nuclear weapons programme. American
policy is committed to keeping the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.
The problem, however, is that the US finds itself unable to compel North Korea to give up its
nuclear weapons while continuing to restrain its longstanding ally South Korea from
matching the atomic arsenal of the North.
While South Korea may be some distance away from exercising its nuclear weapon option,
Seoul is demanding that the US allow it to beef up its civilian nuclear infrastructure.
Washington is squirming at that too.
South Korea wants to produce enriched uranium and plutonium to fuel its expansive civil
nuclear programme and make it more efficient. The current US policy bars countries that
don't have these facilities from acquiring them, on the grounds that these technologies make
it easier to build nuclear weapons.
When South Korean President Park Geun-hye visits Washington next month, she is
expected to press Barack Obama to let Seoul strengthen its nuclear prowess. The non-
proliferation community in Washington is dead set against the liberalisation of the policy in
favour of South Korea.
MISSILE RULES
While Washington wrings its hands on the nuclear question, it has made one important
concession to Seoul last year that lets South Korea match the North Korean missile
programme.
In an agreement with Washington in 2001, Seoul agreed not to develop or deploy ballistic
missiles with a range of more than 300 km and a payload of more than 500 kg. These
restrictions were in line with the rules of the Missile Technology Control Regime and meant
to reduce the dangers of missile proliferation in the Korean Peninsula.
South Korea's self-restraint made no difference to the North, which has steadily advanced
towards developing longer range missiles. Under a new agreement announced last October,
Washington has agreed that South Korea can build missiles with ranges up to 800 km.
Seoul will also be free to develop missiles with ranges shorter than 800 km that can carry
heavier warheads than 500 kg.
Once Seoul develops the new ballistic missiles in the coming years, it will have the capacity
to target all of North Korea. The US justified the decision by saying that allowing South
Korea to develop longer range missiles was a "proportionate" response to the threats.
As Pyongyang rattles the nuclear sabre, the tension between the deepening political crisis in
the Korean Peninsula and the non-proliferation regime has become increasingly difficult to
manage.

Do nothing Delhi
C. Raja Mohan : Tue Apr 16 2013, 00:31 hrs
Finding reasons for inaction will reduce India's relevance for Washington and Beijing
As the United States seeks reconciliation with China in the second term of the Obama
administration, New Delhi must end its current policy paralysis, dressed up as non-
alignment between the world's two most important powers. China's warm reception to US
Secretary of State John Kerry in Beijing over the weekend and the new emphasis on jointly
addressing the current crisis in the Korean peninsula could help reduce some of the recent
tensions in the Sino-US relationship.
On the face of it, President Barack Obama's "pivot to Asia", unveiled two years ago, raised
the geopolitical significance of India in the construction of a new Asian balance of power. If
Washington underlined the importance of India in its strategy of rebalancing to Asia,
Beijing signalled greater interest in strengthening ties with Delhi amidst fears that the US
planned to contain China. What seemed a rare strategic opportunity for India, however,
froze the UPA government into an awful immobility. Delhi slowed its engagement with the
US and remained too timid to widen cooperation with Beijing.
"Beijing will not like it" has become the standard excuse in Delhi for not pursuing India's
interests with the US and other Asian neighbours like Japan and Vietnam. Delhi, of course,
finds many more reasons for not moving forward with China. Delhi's "do-nothing" drift is
probably the worst of all options India has in coping with the current dynamism in the
relationship between Washington and Beijing.
If the professional worriers in South Block have been concerned in the last two years about
the impact of Sino-US rivalry on India's freedom of action, they also lose sleep over the
prospect of political collaboration between Washington and Beijing in Asia. Recall that in
the first year of the Obama administration, Delhi went into a tizzy over the prospects of a G-
2 that many in the US were advocating. Kerry's just concluded visit to Beijing is bound to
raise those concerns again.
In the last few weeks, the Chinese media have revelled in trashing Kerry's predecessor,
Hillary Clinton, for promoting an assertive American policy in Asia. Kerry's publicly
expressed reservations about the wisdom of the US pivot to Asia have raised Beijing's
expectations that the Obama administration might now step back a bit and show greater
deference to Chinese concerns.
Kerry did not disappoint Beijing. After his meetings with the Chinese leaders, including the
new president, Xi Jinping, Kerry affirmed the American commitment to building a "strong
and special" relationship with China.
For more than a year, Beijing has been calling for a "new type of great power relationship"
between China and the US. Under Kerry, the Obama administration appears to have
accepted Beijing's call to avoid conflict and respect each other's core interests. Kerry
declared that the US "welcomes a stable and prosperous China, a China that is a great power
already, and that has the ability to be able to play a major role in world affairs. We have a
stake in China's success, and frankly, China has a stake in the success of the United States.
That became clear in all of our conversations here today."
No one is betting that the contradictions between the interests of the US and China will be
resolved overnight. But the two sides are now committed to responsibly addressing bilateral
differences.
India needs to recognise that the Sino-US relationship will see elements of competition as
well as cooperation in the decades to come. That in turn begs the question, how should
Delhi secure its own interests as Washington and Beijing struggle to manage their profound
economic interdependence, even as they strive for national primacy in Asia?
In crafting an effective response to the unstable dynamic between China and the US,
neutrality between Washington and Beijing is not an option for Delhi. A much weaker India,
under Jawaharlal Nehru, affirmed an independent position on the issues of the day while
actively seeking cooperation with both America and Russia during the Cold War. Nehru did
not stop cooperation with one superpower to avoid offending the other. Equidistance
between Washington and Beijing is also not an option for Delhi. India's relations with the
US and China are never going to be symmetrical. The US is a geographically distant power
that will shape world politics for a long time to come. China is not only a large neighbour,
with whom India has many unresolved issues, but it is also a rising power that will
increasingly define India's strategic environment in ever more powerful ways.
For Delhi has a much heavier inherited baggage to carry in its relations with Beijing than
the US. The problems of dealing with the US are more ideological and are not rooted in a
direct conflict of national interests. The engagement with China, in contrast, is constrained
by weightier bilateral issues. These include the unresolved boundary dispute, Beijing's all-
weather partnership with Pakistan, and its opposition to India's international aspirations,
such as membership of the export control groupings and the permanent membership of the
UN Security Council. The bilateral relationship has also been hobbled by new frictions
generated by China's growing influence across the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean
littoral.
Instead of precluding beneficial bilateral engagement with one in the name of avoiding
conflict with the other, Delhi must focus on realising the full potential of bilateral
cooperation with both the US and China. As it copes with the twists and turns in the Sino-
US relationship, India has two pathways before it. The current policy of "doing nothing" and
finding reasons for inaction will steadily reduce India's relevance for both Washington and
Beijing. A strategy of bold and intensive engagement with both America and China that
breaks many of the current taboos in Delhi will rapidly elevate India's weight in Asian
geopolitics.
contributing editor for 'The Indian Express '

Afghan attack
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Apr 17 2013, 02:06 hrs
AFGHAN ATTACK
The war of words between Kabul and Rawalpindi that began a few weeks ago has escalated
into a shooting match on the ground. After the Taliban overran an Afghan border post by
killing 13 soldiers over the weekend, Kabul charged that Pakistan has facilitated the bold
attack.
General Zahir Azimi, spokesman for the ministry of defence in Kabul, said the Taliban
fighters used artillery and other heavy weapons not seen during previous attacks in the
region. He added the attackers were heard speaking Urdu, rather than the Pashto normally
spoken by Taliban militants.
The Afghan allegation has not been confirmed by the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which is yet to evaluate the evidence from the incident. But
those familiar with the Taliban's military victory over it rivals during 1996-97 will not be
surprised. They would recall the active support of Pakistani military advisers in helping the
Taliban win that war.
The Afghan unit that was wiped out in the daring assault by the Taliban is part of the Third
Battalion of the Second Brigade, "one of only a handful of Afghan army battalions rated by
the United States military as independent and able to operate on its own without foreign
advisers," The New York Times reports.
The attack comes as the fighting season begins in Afghanistan and the international forces
hand over the security responsibility to the Afghan National Army. Just days before the
attack last Friday, the US media was reporting how confident the Third Battalion is about
coping with the insurgency based on Pakistani soil.
In targeting this particular battalion, the Taliban aim is to demoralise the Afghan troops as
the international forces begin to withdraw. It also signals the determination of the Taliban,
backed by Pakistan, to step up the military offensive in Afghanistan.
DURAND LINE
The disputed Durand Line that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan is back in view this
week, when Karzai on Sunday ordered his security forces to dismantle what he called an
illegal construction of a border gate and other military installations inside Afghan territory
by Pakistan.
Pakistan views the Durand Line drawn in 1893 by the British Raj as the legitimate
international boundary with Afghanistan. But no government in Kabul since the partition of
the subcontinent has been willing to recognise the legitimacy of this line drawn arbitrarily
through the Pashtun heartland.
Karzai's angry statement followed a meeting of the Afghan National Security Council on
Sunday. Karzai also sought clarification from the ISAF on whether it assisted Pakistan in
building the facilities. Karzai's accusation was followed by protests in Jalalabad by
university students against Pakistan. By late Monday, however, Pakistan put out the word
that the dispute has been resolved "amicably". An official statement from Rawalpindi said
an Afghan delegation led by Director General Military Operations Major General Afzal
Aman had discussed and amicably resolved the issues with his Pakistani counterpart.
The rapid build-up of the crisis and its apparently quick resolution underline the complex
dynamic shaping the relationship between Kabul and Rawalpindi at a time when the
Pashtun regions across the Durand Line are aflame.
WESTERN HYPE
The latest developments underline the incredulity of the recent Western hype about
Pakistan's change of heart towards Afghanistan and Rawalpindi's commitment to facilitate a
political reconciliation with the Taliban.
Earlier this year, British Prime Minister David Cameron organised a meeting between
Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari at his country home outside London. Under
British nudging, the two sides declared that a framework for peace settlement will be
negotiated within six months. That statement was never credible given the fundamental
contradiction between the interests of the Pakistan army and those of Karzai.
That Pakistan wants to undermine the Karzai regime and restore the Taliban to power is not
surprising. After all, the Pakistan army helped create the Taliban, protected it during the
dark days that followed 9/11, and launched it again as a credible force a few years ago.
If Pakistan's approach to the Taliban has been consistent, what is tragic is the West's
willingness to suspend disbelief and bet that the Pakistan army will be a force for good in
Afghanistan.

Beijing at sea
C. Raja Mohan : Fri Apr 26 2013, 16:43 hrs
Why Delhi cannot ignore the implications of China's maritime rise
As China's lone aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, gets ready to sail in blue waters this year, Asia
and the world must come to terms with Beijing's emerging capabilities to project military
power far beyond its shores.
Delhi is having enough trouble dealing with the impact of China's rapid military
modernisation on its Himalayan borders, as seen in the reported incident in which a unit of
the People's Liberation Army set up a post 10 kilometres inside territory claimed by India.
But Delhi can't afford to ignore the longer term implications of China's maritime rise.
The Liaoning's first blue-water voyage, after many sea trials in the near seas, was announced
in Beijing last week to coincide with the 64th anniversary of the Chinese navy's founding,
which was on Tuesday. The Liaoning marks the transformation of the navy from an
inconsequential force six decades ago to one that promises to decisively alter the balance of
power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
The Chinese navy is leading the dramatic shift in the political goals of China's armed forces.
Until now, the PLA has focused on internal security and territorial defence. Now, the
Chinese armed forces also aim to protect Beijing's expanding interests beyond borders,
influence regional security politics and contribute to international peace.
Nothing represents the political will in Beijing to pursue these new objectives better than
the Liaoning. China's first aircraft carrier is also the pride of the Chinese people. It has
become a powerful rallying point for Chinese patriotism and a catalyst for self-awareness of
the nation's importance on the global stage. While Western analysts have scoffed at the
Liaoning as a showpiece that is a long way from becoming a combat platform, every advance
made on it has been lustily cheered by the Chinese people.
Chinese naval officials, in turn, have acted with considerable deliberation and self-assurance
in building the first aircraft carrier. The Liaoning's first officer, Liu Zhigang, told the
Chinese media last week that the carrier will be combat-ready much quicker than the
current international assessments.
Besides the Liaoning, the Chinese navy is said to be building two carriers based on
indigenous designs. China also has plans to build a fourth, nuclear-powered carrier. China
might be late in acquiring carriers, but will have them in impressive numbers fairly soon.
For the Chinese leadership, the Liaoning, formally commissioned into service last year after
many sea trials, is not about prestige. It is meant to fulfil "the historic missions" for the
Chinese armed forces in the modern era, which were identified by the communist leadership
nearly a decade ago.
The 18th congress of the Communist Party of China last year declared that the defence of
the nation's "maritime rights and interests" was one of China's highest strategic priorities.
The new political directive is, in part, about defending China's expansive territorial claims in
the East and South China seas. It also underlines the centrality of maritime security for
China's economic progress and national well being.
China's latest white paper on defence, issued last week, explained Beijing's new focus on
maritime issues. The navy, the white paper said, naturally has the lead role in the "strategy
to exploit, utilise and protect the seas and oceans, and build China into a maritime power".
Linked to this is a section in the white paper, appearing for the first time, on the role of the
Chinese military in "protecting overseas interests". "With the gradual integration of China's
economy into the world economic system, overseas interests have become an integral
component of China's national interests. Security issues are increasingly prominent,
involving overseas energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and
Chinese nationals overseas, and emergency rescue have become important ways and means
for the PLA to safeguard national interests and fulfil international obligations."
The focus on overseas interests has already been reflected in some of the Chinese military's
recent operations. The Chinese navy has conducted anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of
Aden since the end of 2008. In the Libyan crisis in early 2011, the navy and air force
organised the largest overseas evacuation of its civilians since the founding of the republic,
taking home 35,860 Chinese nationals.
Building capabilities to operate in distant waters has become a major priority for the
Chinese armed forces. Besides the aircraft carrier, the Chinese navy is acquiring large
landing platforms that can move troops to foreign shores and carry helicopters for mission
support. Each of the three Chinese naval fleets has an aviation division and marine brigades
that are training for amphibious operations. The white paper identifies "strategic
projection" as an important objective for the air force, which is acquiring long-range
transport aircraft, practising rapid inter-theatre mobility, and modernising its airborne
divisions. The Chinese army, the white paper says, is gearing up for "air-ground integrated
operations, long-distance manoeuvres, rapid assaults and special operations".
China's development of expeditionary forces is an integral part of the new political intent to
"effectively conduct military operations other than war" in distant lands and seas. China's
growing participation in international peacekeeping operations, disaster relief and
humanitarian missions helps Beijing boost its claim as a responsible global power.
The white paper also points to the PLA's growing engagement with other armed forces
through joint exercises and training. China's defence diplomacy also includes military
assistance to partners, the cultivation of special political relationships, and building dual-
use infrastructure at locations that are critical for the distant operations of the Chinese
armed forces.
Beijing's unfolding outward military orientation is an inevitable consequence of the
globalisation of the Chinese economy. As China's interests extend way beyond its borders, it
is naturally looking to project military power. This predictable evolution, however, will have
significant consequences that China's neighbours and other powers must prepare to cope
with.

No-First-Use
C. Raja Mohan : Fri Apr 26 2013, 00:33 hrs
No-First-Use
The absence of a standard formulation on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons in the latest
Chinese defence white paper issued last week has raised questions about a likely evolution
in Beijing's nuclear doctrine. The previous white paper, issued in 2011, had reaffirmed
Beijing's well known position that China adheres to a policy of "no-first-use of nuclear
weapons at any time and in any circumstances". It also underlined Beijing's unequivocal
commitment that "under no circumstances will it use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear states or nuclear-weapon-free-zones".
China watchers picked up the disappearance of this phraseology that has remained
essentially unchanged ever since Beijing declared itself a nuclear weapon state in 1964.
Given its centrality to China's declared nuclear canon, its absence is considered significant
by many. To be fair, in its few references to the nuclear doctrine, the latest edition of the
white paper emphasises deterrence and nuclear counterattacks. There is no hint of an
explicit shift to a strategy of nuclear first-use. It is also important to note that the 2013
paper is not a comprehensive summary of China's defence strategy, conventional or nuclear.
It focuses on a specific theme the diverse roles envisaged for China's armed forces.
Some analysts, however, insist that potential changes in China's its no-first-use pledge
might be linked to growing doubts, at home and abroad, about the credibility of Beijing's
current nuclear doctrine. They point to the fact that at the heart of any no-first-use pledge is
a robust nuclear force capable of absorbing the attack by an adversary and responding with
a retaliatory strike. Given the relatively small size of its strategic nuclear forces, these
analysts say, Beijing can't bet that they will survive a first strike and be available for a
riposte. China must either significantly expand its nuclear arsenal or switch to a posture
that calls for first use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances.
Missile Defence
The one big impulse for a possible change in China's nuclear doctrine is Beijing's growing
concern about US missile defences deployed close to China in the Asian theatre. The US
insists that its missile defence deployments are directed at the threat from North Korea and
are meant to reassure its treaty allies South Korea and Japan. Beijing is not convinced and
points to the danger of US missile defences degrading the deterrent capability of China's
strategic nuclear forces.
At an international conference on nuclear issues in Washington earlier this month, a
Chinese delegate Gen. Yao Yunzhu vigorously articulated China's objections. American
deployment of missile defences in East Asia is a "very, very disturbing factor having
implications for the calculation of China's nuclear and strategic arsenal".
The Chinese general blamed the US missile defence collaboration with Japan and South
Korea for North Korea's determined pursuit of a nuclear weapon programme. Yao also
dismissed speculation in the Western and Russian media that China has a large undeclared
arsenal of nearly 3,000 nuclear weapons. While emphasising China's commitment to
"minimum deterrence", Yao said, "A certain amount of opaqueness is an integral part of
China's no-first-use policy".
Precision Strikes
Accurate missiles armed with powerful conventional weapons add another layer of
complexity to China's nuclear doctrine and its dynamic interaction with the US forces
forward deployed in Asia. The Second Artillery Force, the white paper says, is at the core of
China's strategic deterrence and is "mainly composed of nuclear and conventional missile
forces". "It is primarily responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear
weapons against China and carrying nuclear counterattacks and precision strikes with
conventional missiles".
The US, too, is developing advanced conventional missiles to counter the China's growing
capacity to target American forward military bases and aircraft carriers. The difficulties of
differentiating between conventionally armed and nuclear-tipped missiles mean a rapid
lowering of the nuclear threshold in a crisis involving the US, its Asian allies and China.
Given the new emerging instability in the US-China nuclear equation and its profound
interconnection with the shifting conventional military balance in Asia, many American
think tanks are calling for a substantive arms control dialogue between Washington and
Beijing. Beijing has resisted those calls, at least until now. If and when those talks occur,
they are likely to be on Chinese terms given the American eagerness for such an
engagement.

Abe the Bold
C. Raja Mohan : Wed May 01 2013, 01:02 hrs
Abe the Bold
After breaking many taboos on domestic economic policy, Japan's prime minister, Shinzo
Abe, is now in diplomatic overdrive this week in very unlikely places Russia, Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey.
In the first few months since his surprising return to power in Japan, Abe has taken bold
steps to revive the long-standing economy easing monetary supply, spending big and
promoting growth in a long stagnant economy. Abe's economic moves, which many consider
risky, have helped the yen lose value, boost Japanese exports and raise the approval ratings
for the prime minister. He has now turned to diplomatic adventures.
Over the weekend, Abe landed in Russia the first visit by a Japanese PM to Moscow in 10
years to impart some political momentum to one of Tokyo's weakest bilateral
relationships in the world. After World War II, Russia and Japan did not sign a peace treaty
and have long quarreled over four islands, called the Kuriles by Moscow and Northern
Territories by Tokyo.
As Japan's relations with China continue to deteriorate and Washington struggles to cope
with Beijing's assertiveness, Abe is seeking some room for political manoeuvre for Tokyo by
reaching out to Moscow. Moscow has strong ties with Beijing, but is nevertheless is
concerned about the implications of China's rapid rise on the regional balance. Russian
President Vladimir Putin is happy to test out the possibilities with Abe. Putin is playing
hardball on territorial issues and Abe is teasing him with the prospect of Japanese
collaboration to revive Russia's manufacturing sector and modernise its energy sector.
At the end of Abe's meeting with Putin on Monday, no breakthroughs were announced. But
Abe and Putin declared that "it is abnormal that we don't have a peace treaty 67 years after
the end of the World War II". The leaders also instructed their foreign ministers to
accelerate the negotiations on drafting a peace treaty and find ways to resolve the dispute
over the island territories.
Abe and Putin also want to build on the massive complementarity that has long demanded
strong economic cooperation the massive but underdeveloped hydrocarbon resources in
Russia's Far East, and Japan's huge demand for energy imports. While the two sides have
agreed to explore cooperation in the energy sector, big commercial deals will have to wait
until mutually satisfactory terms are worked out. But Abe and Putin appeared to have
broken the ice.
Energy Security
Energy security is at the top of Abe's mind as he travelled from Moscow to Riyadh. It's not
been a destination that has drawn Japanese prime ministers in recent years, despite the fact
that Saudi Arabia is the biggest source of Japanese oil imports.
The Japanese dependence on Saudi Arabia has intensified in recent years, as the US and
Europe squeeze the oil sector of Iran, for long a major supplier of oil to Japan. Reaching out
to Saudi Arabia has become an important political objective for Tokyo.
Abe and his advisors are concerned that Japan has kept too low a profile in the Middle East
in recent years and ceded too much ground to Chinese companies in the expanding regional
market. Abe wants to correct that.
Nuke Sale
One of Abe's biggest political challenges is to revive the Japanese nuclear energy sector that
faces huge popular and political resistance after the 2011 disaster at Fukushima atomic
power station. While progress at home is hard, Abe is promoting nuclear exports.
In Abu Dhabi, Abe is expected to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with the UAE. In
Ankara, Abe will lobby hard for a joint bid by Japanese and French companies (Mitsubishi
and Areva) for a contract to build a nuclear power station at Sinop on Turkey's Black Sea
coast. The only remaining competition for the contract, said to be worth more than $20
billion, is China's Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding.
As Delhi watches Tokyo's outreach to Russia and the Middle East, one can only hope some
of Abe's audacity will rub off on Manmohan Singh, who plans to visit Tokyo at the end of
this month. With Abe pushing Japan into a rare moment of creative diplomacy, Delhi must
match Tokyo's new strategic imagination.
The writer is a distinguished fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a
Three to tango
C. Raja Mohan : Tue May 07 2013, 00:28 hrs
Prachanda's trilateralism signals a turn to realism by Nepal's Maoists
The proposal for trilateral cooperation between Nepal, India and China from the Maoist
leader, Pushpa Kumar Dahal, also known as Prachanda, may have been aired at an
inopportune moment last week, when Delhi was desperately trying to de-escalate the
military stand-off with China in eastern Ladakh.
The prolonged incursion by the People's Liberation Army and the highest political
intervention that was needed to resolve it have certainly renewed doubts in Delhi's mind
about Beijing's peaceful intentions in the Great Himalayas. But it is important that
Prachanda's initiative towards Delhi and Beijing is debated on its merits. While Prachanda
has been musing about the proposal for some time, his Maoist colleague, Baburam
Bhattarai, had begun to articulate the idea during his recently concluded tenure as the
prime minister of Nepal.
Media reports from Nepal say Prachanda had discussed the idea of trilateral cooperation
during his visit to Beijing barely days before his just concluded trip to India. Prachanda was
received at the highest levels in Beijing, including by Chinese President Xi Jinping. In recent
months, Chinese scholars, in track two interactions, have been suggesting that Delhi
consider cooperation with Beijing in Nepal and think of joint developmental projects there.
Put simply, Prachanda was not shooting the breeze when he suggested triangular
cooperation.
Whether or not the proposal takes off, it represents a significant political evolution of the
Maoist worldview in Nepal. Maoists had long viewed with great suspicion Nepal's
traditional relationship with India. They denounced the 1950 bilateral treaty of friendship as
"hegemonic" and demanded that it be scrapped. The Maoists made no secret of their
preference for an ideological and political partnership with China. It is against such a
background that Prachanda's argument that Nepal must have good relations with both India
and China must be assessed.
In an interview to an Indian newspaper last month, on the eve of his visit to Delhi,
Prachanda had said, "our geography, dictates that Nepal can make progress and protect its
independence only by cooperating with our large neighbours. Looking at this historical truth
dictated by our geography, and the political developments, I saw that the tripartite
agreement benefits all three countries. But it benefits Nepal more than India or China".
This marks the geopolitical education of a leader reared in the awful nihilism spawned by
the Chinese Cultural Revolution. It also marks the transition of the Maoist ideologues in
Nepal from an ideological worldview to one informed by Nepal's national interest.
In his address to the Indian Council of World Affairs in Delhi last week, Prachanda said it
"would be unfathomable for Nepal to remain underdeveloped, poor and backward", when it
sits between two of the world's fast-growing economies. Repeated visits to China in recent
years seem to have convinced Prachanda that Nepal must embark on the path of radical
economic reform. A strategy of globalisation for Nepal, Prachanda is now willing to concede,
would necessarily mean deeper economic integration with both India and China.
For its part, Delhi should welcome this turn to realism among Nepal's Maoists. For too long,
the Kathmandu elite shot itself in the foot by politicising economic cooperation with India
and opposing all developmental projects in the name of asserting Nepalese sovereignty. The
political classes in Kathmandu were more interested in playing the two giant neighbours
against each other for narrow political ends rather than leverage their proximity to India
and China to promote Nepal's national interest. Prachanda's proposal is the most
impressive articulation so far of an alternative strategy for Kathmandu.
Many in Delhi will be concerned about the implications of the proposed trilateral
cooperation for India's special relationship with Nepal and reluctant to accept any
suggestion of symmetry in Kathmandu's ties with India and China. It will certainly take a
while to convince the sceptics in Delhi of the virtues of Prachanda's trilateralism. In the
interim, Delhi could consider four practical ways forward on trilateral economic cooperation
with Kathmandu and Beijing.
One is to encourage Indian and Chinese companies to jointly bid for the development of
Nepal's massive hydropower resources, which hold the key to the republic's rapid economic
growth. Such cooperation could help depoliticise these projects, have them benefit from
massive Chinese financial and engineering resources, and serve the power-hungry markets
in Nepal and India.
Second, let Indian and Chinese companies build east-west as well as north-south
transportation corridors in Nepal that will help integrate the country and connect it to the
markets of western China and northern India.
Third, Nepal can consider opening up its territory for a two-way transit trade between India
and China. Delhi and Beijing, in turn, could offer duty free access to goods produced in
Nepal with appropriate agreements on rules of origin and local content.
Four, Indian companies could seek a substantive stake in the Chinese consortium that wants
to build world-class facilities at Lord Buddha's birthplace, Lumbini, in Nepal. The
development of Lumbini is a project that could transform not just Nepal but also the entire
Buddhist circuit in India and contribute to the economic growth of some of the world's
poorest regions.
The four proposals could certainly help boost Nepal's economic prospects and promote
trans-Himalayan cooperation between Delhi and Beijing. They could be discussed when
External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid visits Beijing this week and Chinese Premier Li
Keqiang comes to Delhi later this month.
On the face of it, Prachanda has a big idea; but his geopolitical epiphany could soon be a
forgotten footnote if India and China can't find ways to ensure peace and tranquility on their
long and contested boundary. Major trans-border projects, including those involving third
countries like Nepal, however, could transform the Great Himalayas over time from a zone
of military contestation into a frontier of economic cooperation.
The writer, a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, is a contributing

Army of Wa
Army of Wa
As calm returns to eastern Ladakh after three weeks of military standoff between Delhi and
Beijing, a complex dynamic is unfolding on China's frontiers with Myanmar. Unlike the
disputed India-China border that has no agreed delineation of the line of actual control,
Beijing and Yangon have a settled boundary.
The problems are of a different nature on the 2200 km long Sino-Myanmarese border of
restive ethnic minorities that spread across the boundaries, cross-border crime, and a
history of Chinese intervention across the border in Myanmar. In the past, this included
Chinese fraternal support to the Communist Party of Burma that sought a violent overthrow
of the national government. Beijing also sought chase across the border the remnants of the
Guomindang that took shelter in Myanmar after the civil war in China.
Over the last quarter of a century, China reached out to the Myanmar military, also called
the Tatmadaw, extended military assistance to it, and deepened economic cooperation with
Myanmar, which was seen as a valuable source of raw materials and a bridge to the Indian
Ocean. As Myanmar ended its political isolation a couple of years ago, China's privileged
position in the country appeared to be under threat. China's renewed support to ethnic
militias in northern Myanmar appears to have risen in tandem.
In focus are reports that Beijing has begun supply of weapons to the United Wa State Army
in northern Myanmar. The USWA was formed out of the detritus of the Communist Party of
Burma (CPB) in the late 1980s. At the end of last month, Jane's Intelligence Review
reported that China has sent Mi-17 helicopters armed with TY-90 air-to-air missiles. The
helicopters apparently reached Myanmar from Laos rather than from across the Chinese
border.
Denying the reports, the Chinese embassy in Yangon said, "As a good neighbour and true
friend of Myanmar, China would never seek to establish any kind of illegal relations with
any parties or organisations in Myanmar". Despite the denials, Chinese support to the Wa is
being interpreted as a warning to Yangon not to trample upon its vital interests in
Myanmar.
Reports last year suggested that Beijing had supplied surface-to-air missiles and armoured
vehicles also known as "tank-killers" to the Wa. Equipped with these new capabilities, the
Wa army will be in a better position to stand up against a reported offensive being planned
by the Tatmadaw.
Kachin Talks
On another front, China has actively sought to mediate between Yangon and the Kachin
Independence Organisation, which have been at odds since the breakdown of the ceasefire a
couple of years ago. China hosted two rounds of talks this year on its territory in Yunnan,
provided security to participants from both sides, and actively shaped the agenda and the
negotiations. Beijing's intervention in the peace process has unsurprisingly irked Yangon.
But a third round of talks was postponed last month amidst reports that China leaned on the
Kachins not to attend the meeting, which was to take place in Myanmar. China was
apparently concerned about potential involvement of the United Nations and the Western
powers in the peace process.
Soft Power
While pointing to the negative leverages it has in Myanmar, Beijing is also trying to improve
its image in the country, where it is increasingly perceived as a ruthless exploiter. Beijing is
asking its corporations to reach out to communities around the project areas and undertake
visible social welfare activities. Beijing is inviting leaders of the ethnic minorities as well as
mainstream parties to visit neighbouring Yunnan and Beijing.
A delegation of leaders form National League of Democracy is visiting China this week. The
delegation does not include its leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has expressed her interest to
visit China at some point. But China's effort to sustain its primacy in Myanmar is being
tested by other powers. After a prolonged absence from Myanmar, Japan is intensifying the
strategic engagement with Myanmar under the activist reign of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Last month, Abe received Suu Kyi in Tokyo and plans to arrive on a state visit in Myanmar
later this month. Meanwhile, President Thein Sein is preparing to visit Washington. It will
be first such visit in nearly five decades.
editor of 'The Indian Express'

On Punjabiyat
ON PUNJABIYAT
The weekend telephone talk between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Nawaz Sharif,
who will soon be sworn in as premier of Pakistan, was presumably in Punjabi. There is
nothing like the comfort of one's mother-tongue in breaking the political ice between
nations.
The origins of the current on-again and off-again peace process between India and Pakistan
dates back to the determination of two Punjabi-speaking leaders, Sharif and Inder Kumar
Gujral. After Sharif's landslide victory in early 1997, Gujral negotiated the framework for the
composite dialogue that still provides the basis for India-Pakistan negotiations.
It is quite easy for cynics to scoff at New Delhi's "Lahore brigade" and the Punjabi peaceniks
who light candles at the Wagah border. But no political realist can forget that the shortest
road between the two capitals runs through the divided Punjab.
Nawaz Sharif, who invited Manmohan Singh to attend his swearing-in ceremony next week,
understands that the Indian PM has tied himself into knots over visiting Pakistan and will
not make it.
Sharif is also aware that Singh's clock is running down, and that the UPA government
headed by him has little political steam left. There is a danger then that the subcontinent's
traditional curse the misalignment of the political cycles in India and Pakistan might
once again compel Delhi to lose yet another moment of opportunity with Islamabad.
SENDING BADAL
As Delhi debates the government's options towards Sharif within the UPA's self-imposed
constraints, there is one way out through the Punjab. It could consider, for example,
sending an Indian political delegation headed by Punjab Chief Minister Parkash Singh
Badal to attend Sharif's swearing-in next week.
To be sure, many in Delhi are gnashing their teeth over the UPA losing control over foreign
policy, thanks to the pressures from such difficult CMs as Mamata Banerjee.
But Bengal and Punjab are two very different stories. Unlike Kolkata, which has seen little
political passion for the normalisation of relations with Dhaka, there is a strong bipartisan
demand in Amritsar and Chandigarh for a rapid normalisation of ties with Lahore and
Islamabad.
If Banerjee has undercut Delhi's ambitious plans towards Dhaka, Badal could help India
move forward with Pakistan. The role strong CMs can play in foreign policy must be viewed
from a political perspective rather than the legalist prism of Centre-state relations.
The PM can turn his current political weakness on its head by getting Badal to create
diplomatic space with Pakistan. That should also help reduce the foreign policy friction with
the BJP in an election year.
After all, the Akali Dal is a political ally of the BJP.
VAJPAYEE'S LEGACY
The BJP has its share of "stupid hawks" who oppose every foreign policy initiative of the
UPA. The Congress should remind them of the BJP's foreign policy under Atal Bihari
Vajpayee, who still remains a political mascot for the party.
When Vajpayee travelled to Lahore in February 1999, defying the hawks in his party, he had
the wisdom to ask Parkash Singh Badal, the then CM of Punjab, to join his delegation.
Vajpayee also encouraged Badal's successor, Amarinder Singh of the Congress, to sustain
contacts with the Lahore Takht and expand the areas of cooperation between the two
Punjabs.
Badal, who returned to power, picked up the threads again. His son and Deputy CM Sukhbir
Singh Badal travelled to Lahore last November and articulated with great vigour the shared
aspirations for deeper cooperation between the two provinces.
Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz's brother and the CM of Pakistan's Punjab, was to make a return
visit to Amritsar soon after to maintain the momentum in the ties between the two Punjabs.
But renewed military tensions on the Indo-Pak border at the end of the year and the UPA's
panicked response, saw the postponement of the visit.
The elections in Pakistan provide a new political basis for re-imagining India-Pakistan
relations. Nawaz Sharif's victory is rooted in a comprehensive political sweep in Punjab
Pakistan's largest province.
On this side of the Radcliffe Line, there is a strong government, whose leaders are deeply
committed to normalisation of relations between the two Punjabs, and between Delhi and
Islamabad. The stars in Punjab are in rare alignment for a big political push on the people's
agenda in Indo-Pak relations. The only missing element is a bit of political courage in the
Congress party.
The writer is a distinguished fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a

Sino-Pak Alliance: Naval and Nuclear
Cooperation
C. Raja Mohan : New Delhi, Fri May 17 2013, 11:17 hrs
The unrealistic expectations in India from Li Keqiang's visit to Delhi and Mumbai next week
are likely to be tempered when weighed against the Chinese premier's agenda in Pakistan. Li
flies from India to Pakistan and from there to Switzerland and Germany.
Sections of India's foreign policy establishment have long cultivated the illusion that
improved relations with China might result in a more balanced approach in Beijing towards
Delhi and Islamabad.
News reports from Pakistan say Li is likely to sign an accord on further development of the
Gwadar port on the Balochistan coast. Li's talks are also likely to focus on civilian nuclear
cooperation, the reports say.
Official media reports from Beijing do not mention either agreement, but simply reaffirm
China's commitment to deepen the strategic partnership with Pakistan. Naval and nuclear
cooperation between the two countries has a long history and Delhi must expect them to
advance in the coming years.
Together the two areas underline the enduring tension that China's alliance with Pakistan
generates for Sino-Indian relations. This can't be papered over by the usual rhetoric in Delhi
and Beijing about their shared global interests.
Pakistan has recently transferred the operational control over the Gwadar port, which was
constructed with Beijing's assistance, from Singaporean firm to a Chinese one. While the
Gwadar port can't serve as a naval base at this moment, Delhi's military planners must
necessarily assume such an option exists for Beijing in the future.
That premise is realistic, since China's stakes in the Indian Ocean are growing rapidly.
Meanwhile Chinese naval arms transfers to Pakistan have acquired a new intensity and are
creating a basis for interoperability between the two navies.
More immediately, India is faced with a nuclear problem that it cannot really ignore. It is
about Beijing's opposition to India's integration with the global nuclear order and China's
determination to ensure Pakistan's nuclear parity with India.
History reminds us that without China's support, Pakistan could not have easily become a
nuclear weapon power. Even as Delhi reconciled to that fact, it had to confront Chinese
resistance to the historic U.S. initiative to end India's nuclear isolation during 2005-08.
Since then, Beijing, in violation of international rules, has agreed to supply civilian nuclear
reactors to Pakistan. Islamabad is now pressing Beijing to convert the one time sale into a
formal agreement for civil nuclear cooperation.
If this is not bad enough, Beijing has been opposing the U.S. effort to promote India's
membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an international forum that sets the rules for
global nuclear commerce.
In his public remarks during his recent visit to China, the external affairs minister Salman
Khurshid ducked the questions on Beijing's nuclear tilt against India. In his talks with Li on
Monday, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh needs to make it clear that China's current
nuclear policy towards India is hostile and unacceptable.
contributing editor of The Indian Express)

Facing China threat, Vietnam seeks
American balance
C. Raja Mohan : New Delhi, Sat J un 01 2013, 15:46 hrs
As India struggles to make sense of the recent military tensions on the border with China,
Vietnam, at the receiving end of Beijing's muscular approach to maritime territorial
disputes in the South China Sea, is embracing the United States.
Although Vietnam and China share an ideologythey are the last of the communist
governments in AsiaHanoi wants to preserve its strategic autonomy by moving closer to
Washington.
Outlining Hanoi's strategy at the prestigious annual gathering of Asian defence
establishments in Singapore Friday night, the prime minister of Vietnam Nguyen Tan Dung,
underlined the current trust deficit between a rising China and its neighbours.
In a not so veiled reference to China, Dung said, "Somewhere in the region, there have
emerged preferences for unilateral might, groundless claims and actions that run counter to
international law and stem from imposition and power politics".
He also emphasized the importance of the United States in providing security to China's
neighbours. While Beijing describes Washington as an interloper in Asia, Dung insisted that
the United States is a 'Pacific power'.
"No regional country would oppose the strategic engagement of extra-regional powers if
such engagement aims to enhance cooperation for peace, stability and development," Dung
said.
Organised by the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, the annual
Shangri La dialogue has become a major vehicle for defence diplomacy in Asia. In inviting
the Vietnamese premier to deliver the key-note address to this year's Shangri La dialogue,
the IISS was highlighting the growing strategic importance of Hanoi in Asian geopolitics.
As Dung dined at the high table with the U.S. Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel, the irony of
Asia's new strategic realignments were too stark to miss. Four decades ago, Hagel was a U.S.
Army Sergeant fighting the war against Vietnam; Dung was on the other side of the combat
line trying to defeat the American occupation. Today, U.S. and Vietnam have shared
interests in promoting a new balance of power system that cope with China's rise.
In his speech, Dung also called for Southeast Asian unity in negotiating the region's
territorial disputes with China. He urged Beijing to respect the UN Convention on the Law
of the Seas (UNCLOS) in resolving its territorial disputes in the Asian waters.
As the inheritors of a strong realist political tradition, the Vietnamese leaders know that the
unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is shaky and recognise Beijing's ability
to divide the region without much effort.
Dung and his colleagues in Hanoi are also acutely conscious of the fact that the smaller
countries of the region can't compel China to accept international legal norms. The only
alternative to secure Vietnam's interest, they know, lies in cultivating a strategic partnership
with the United States and other Asian powers.
While seeking a deeper engagement with the United States, Vietnam has no intention of
giving up independent foreign policy. "Vietnam will not be a military ally to any country and
will not allow any country to set up military bases on Vietnamese territory. Vietnam will not
ally itself with any country to counter another."
Vietnam's self-assured pursuit of a complex balance of power strategy could be a model for
other medium powers in Asia who are deeply concerned about the rise of China, want
Washington to balance Beijing, but are reluctant to become formal military allies of the
United States.

Singh and friends
C. Raja Mohan : Mon J un 03 2013, 00:20 hrs
What the PM must get right with Nawaz Sharif and Sheikh Hasina
During his visit to Japan last week, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh underscored two
golden rules of diplomacy. One is to seize the moment when there is an opportunity to
advance. The other is to stand by friends through thick and thin. In the coming weeks, Singh
will have to demonstrate a vigorous commitment to these principles in India's engagement
with two of its most important neighbours, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
The swearing in of Nawaz Sharif as the prime minister this week opens the door for a fresh
start with Pakistan. As the current tenure of Sheikh Hasina comes to an end (elections are
due any time from October 2013) in Bangladesh, the window for a historic consolidation of
bilateral relations between Delhi and Dhaka might soon close.
Overruling fears in Delhi about annoying Beijing, Singh outlined an ambitious agenda for a
strategic partnership with Japan. Delhi would have had little diplomatic credibility, least of
all with Beijing, if Singh had chosen to abandon the special relationship with Japan's
premier, Shinzo Abe, in the elusive search for an accommodation with China's new leaders.
He must now show equal resolve in reaching out to Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and keeping
his word to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh. Some of the PM's boldest
diplomatic moves during the last nine years of his premiership have been towards Pakistan
and Bangladesh. He must now pick up the threads of the peace process with Islamabad, and
finish what he started with Dhaka.
In the UPA's first term, Singh built on his predecessor, Atal Bihari Vajpayee's bold agenda
towards Pakistan. He came close to clinching agreements on such difficult issues as Siachen
and Sir Creek, and exploring a framework of settlement on Jammu & Kashmir.
Two factors, however, undermined Singh's effort at normalising bilateral relations with
Pakistan. One was internal: the PM's timid colleagues in the Congress party had no stomach
for bold moves towards Pakistan (or towards any other country, for that matter). The other
was external: while cross-border terrorism cast a shadow over the peace process with
Pakistan, the outrageous attack on Mumbai at the end of November 2008 took away the
political oxygen by the end of the UPA's first term. In his second tenure as PM, Singh sought
to renew the peace process; but it never acquired the necessary momentum despite support
from Pakistan's civilian leadership led by Asif Ali Zardari.
If advance on the Pakistan front remained difficult, Bangladesh presented a historic
opportunity in the UPA's second term after Sheikh Hasina's return to power on a sweeping
mandate at the end of 2009. Singh and Hasina outlined an ambitious bilateral agenda and
ordered their senior officials to resolve all outstanding bilateral issues.
In the case of Pakistan, state support to terrorism prevented the possibilities for big
advances on the rest of the relationship. In contrast, Hasina's crackdown on the sources of
anti-India terrorism enabled advances on many fronts. Dhaka's unilateral actions on
terrorism saw Delhi respond with expansive market access to goods from Bangladesh. Singh
and Hasina negotiated agreements to address long-standing mutual concerns Dhaka's on
sharing the waters of the Teesta river and Delhi's on an overland transit to the Northeast.
The two sides also negotiated a land boundary agreement that sorted out a range of vexing
of issues that rose out of Bengal's partition in 1947.
When the stage was set in September 2011 for a transformation of India-Bangladesh
relations, the chief minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, opposed the signing of the
Teesta waters agreement and refused to join Singh in Dhaka at the very last moment.
Instead of ignoring Banerjee's tantrums, Manmohan Singh held himself back. With Teesta
off the table, so was the agreement on transit that would have brought immense benefit to
the land-locked northeastern states of India. To make matters worse, the UPA is yet to table
the land boundary agreement in Parliament.
In the last lap of his second term as prime minister, Singh must try and redeem his
diplomatic investment of the last nine years to transform India's relations with Pakistan and
Bangladesh and set a new course for the international relations of the post-Partition
subcontinent. Delhi finds itself in a rare moment when it has friends at the helm in
Islamabad and Dhaka. But the conditions and tasks for India's diplomacy are different in
the east and west. In Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif will have a hard time overcoming the
challenges of violent religious extremism; Sheikh Hasina, in contrast, is battling to preserve
the idea of Bangladesh as a secular democracy.
In the west, Singh must necessarily wait for Nawaz Sharif to determine the pace at which he
might be comfortable moving forward with India. In the east, the burden is entirely on Delhi
to implement the historic agreements that it had negotiated with Dhaka. In Bangladesh,
India's political credibility as an interlocutor is at stake. Manmohan Singh must sign the
Teesta waters agreement with Hasina and the Congress party must recognise the national
interest in an immediate ratification of the land boundary agreement with Bangladesh.
Moving forward with Hasina will indeed help Singh to reinforce Sharif's forward-looking
agenda in Pakistan. India's Bangla initiative, after all, is not very different from what Delhi
seeks with Islamabad. It is about creating a violence-free atmosphere for the resolution of
political disputes, delineating boundaries, opening the region's frontiers for easier flow of
goods and people, and sharing the region's valuable natural resources on an equitable basis.

Missing Shangri-La
C. Raja Mohan : Wed J un 05 2013, 00:40 hrs
MISSING SHANGRI-LA
"Eighty per cent of success," Woody Allen famously said, is just "showing up". India's
longest serving defence minister, A.K. Antony, however, was a "no-show" at Asia's leading
annual defence forum, the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last week.
As Asia becomes the cockpit of great power rivalry and regional conflict, the SLD, organised
by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, has become the vehicle for formal and
informal consultations between the region's top defence policymakers. Running for more
than a decade, with the support of the Singapore government, the SLD attracts defence
ministers from all major countries in the region; China, which was initially opposed to the
forum, now sends a very impressive delegation.
The MoD's approach to the SLD has been unprofessional, to say the least. Personal whims
rather than a careful consideration of India's interests seem to define New Delhi's decisions.
Consider the fact that Antony headed out to Singapore en route to Australia and Thailand
on Monday. But he could not schedule participation in the SLD on the weekend that
preceded it.
While the SLD has become a regular fixture on the calendar of all Asian defence ministries
it takes place on the last weekend of May the MoD never makes up its mind until the
very last minute on who might represent the country. In a very lucky year Antony might
agree, with great reluctance, to fetch up in Singapore. More often than not, it is the junior
minister in the MoD who is dispatched; sometimes it is the National Security Adviser,
Shivshankar Menon. This year, Admiral D.K. Joshi, the Chief of Naval Staff, was the top
Indian delegate to the SLD.
Representation at less than the cabinet level, however, is a protocol handicap when it comes
to speaking slots and meetings on the margins of the conference. At this year's SLD, there
was no Indian speaker in the prestigious plenary sessions.
DEFENCE DIPLOMACY
Antony, the minister, might be excused for not seeing the salience of India's defence
diplomacy. But shouldn't the MoD bureaucrats be tendering professional advice rather than
pandering to the minister's predilections? Why is it so hard for the MoD to decide on
sending a substantive delegation led by the defence minister every year to the Shangri-La
Dialogue, and touch base with all the Asian security establishments that are so eagerly
seeking engagement with India?
Our foreign office can get the prime minister to sign up high-sounding declarations on the
Look East policy and proclaim "strategic partnerships" with ASEAN nations. But when our
southeast Asian interlocutors turn to the MoD for follow-up, they run into a brick wall.
In track-two interactions, ASEAN policymakers vent their frustration in dealing with the
MoD at the bilateral as well as the multilateral level. Many bilateral agreements with
ASEAN countries on defence cooperation are languishing because of the MoD's inability to
implement them.
Worse still, the MoD is also very suspicious that our armed forces are keen to develop
deeper interaction with Asian militaries and the MEA, which recognises defence diplomacy
as a new quiver in its armoury.
At a time when China and the United States have dramatically stepped up their defence
diplomacy in Asia, the MoD seems out for lunch and a siesta. At the SLD last week, US
Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel invited all the ASEAN defence ministers for an interaction
in Hawaii next year. China's People's Liberation Army has been engaging the ASEAN
defence establishments, collectively, for many years.
No one expects the MoD's current leadership both political and bureaucratic to take
bold new initiatives towards ASEAN. What surprises southeast Asia is the passive
incoherence of the MoD's participation in the various defence forums of ASEAN neither
ready to lead nor willing to respond.
SECURITY PROVIDER
Some tend to dress-up the MoD's feckless defence diplomacy as a deeply felt assertion of
India's "strategic autonomy". Nice try. The real problem is the lack of political will in Delhi
to take defence diplomacy in Asia seriously.
To be fair, Antony has occasionally referred to India's role as a "net security provider" in the
Indian Ocean and beyond. What Antony needs is a strong institutional base in the MoD that
can effectively collaborate with the armed forces and the foreign office and facilitate India's
emergence as a valuable security partner for friendly Asian nations.
contributing editor for

Political Iran
C. Raja Mohan : Sat J un 15 2013, 01:57 hrs
Political Iran
It is easy to be cynical about yesterday's elections in Iran to choose a new president. After
all, the elected president does not dominate Iran's complex political system. That privilege
belongs to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This does necessarily mean the
current elections are inconsequential.
The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran replaced the monarchy with a system called velayet-e-
faqih, or rule by the clerics. Khamenei, sitting on top this structure, is only the second
supreme leader since the republic was founded by Ayatollah Khomeini. While the
president's powers are limited, not everyone is allowed to run for the job. Women are barred
and the men are carefully vetted by the Guardian Council, the powerful 12-member body
that has the mandate to interpret the constitution and approve candidates for the
presidency and the parliament, called the Majlis.
This year, more than 600 men registered as candidates. The Guardian Council approved
only eight. Those rejected included Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president, and
Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, a close confidant of the outgoing president, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. The exclusion of Rafsanjani and Mashaei, who were at odds with Khamenei,
has resulted in the widespread dismissal of the current elections as a sham. But politics has
a way of asserting itself even within the highly controlled Iranian electoral process.
Mohammad Khatami surprised the world with his victory in the presidential elections of
1997 and 2001. Although he failed to change the system from within, the reformist current
gained ground again in 2009 in the electoral battle between incumbent president
Ahmadinejad and the challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi.
When Ahmadinejad was declared winner by Khamenei, supporters of reformist Mousavi
demonstrated for weeks, accusing the Supreme Leader of rigging the result. While Mousavi
has been under detention since 2009, Ahmadinejad soon fell out with Khamenei and
tensions between the two have dominated Iran's political landscape in the last few years.
Purple Rouhani
With two of the eight candidates dropping out last week, the election has acquired a political
edge that was missing until now. Moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani has gained some ground
after the only reformist candidate on the slate, Mohammad Reza Aref withdrew this week.
Two former presidents, Rafsanjani and Khatami, have backed the candidacy of Rouhani,
who had earlier served as Iran's national security advisor. In the last few days, Rouhani has
promised women that he will end gender inequality in Iran and told students he will end
their harassment by the ubiquitous moral police. Sceptics say Rouhani, once dubbed a
radical, is hardly a reformer. Rouhani's supporters are wearing purple wristbands, much in
the manner that Mousavi's backers wore green during the last elections and the protests
that followed.
All the other candidates including the popular mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Baqer
Qalibaf, top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati
are said to enjoy the blessings of Khamenei.
A lot will depend on the turnout; more than 50 million are eligible to vote. If the supporters
of change, demoralised since the last elections, turn up in large numbers, there could be a
close contest. If no candidate wins 50 per cent of the vote on Friday, there will be a runoff
between the top two candidates. If Rouhani is one of the two, the next round of the election
on June 21 could turn out to be exciting. Many observers, however, say Rouhani's prospects
are slim despite the inability of the conservatives to unite behind one candidate.
Talking Nuclear
Although all candidates are opposed to Western sanctions and support Iran's right to
develop a peaceful nuclear programme, a recent television debate among the presidential
candidates revealed considerable variation.
In the heated debate, Velayati, the former foreign minister accused Jalili, the current
nuclear negotiator of being inflexible. "The art of diplomacy", Velayati said, is about
"preserving our rights" and not "inviting sanctions". Rouhani said, "it is nice to have the
centrifuges running, provided people's lives are also running". In his campaign rallies,
Rouhani has promised to end the nuclear dispute with the international community and
help remove economic sanctions.
The lack of flexibility is also a problem in the West, which has demonised Iran and treated it
as a black box. Despite their limitations, the elections in Iran may offer a brief window for
the US to pursue an unconditional dialogue with Tehran on all issues of mutual concern.

Snowden Effect
C. Raja Mohan : Wed J un 19 2013, 05:36 hrs
SNOWDEN EFFECT
It is not often that China defends the rights of whistleblowers against the state and America
finds itself defensive about internet freedom. That precisely is what Edward Snowden, the
young American who has exposed the expansive cyber espionage activities of the National
Security Agency in the United States against its own citizens and the rest of the world, has
achieved.
Americans are calling Snowden a "traitor" and the Chinese media is heralding him as a
"hero". Whether he is a Chinese spy or simply a "useful idiot" in Beijing's cyber war with
Washington, Snowden has sharpened the terms of the debate on cyber issues within major
nations and between them.
The ever expanding flows of information in cyberspace and the determination of states to
collect, process and exploit them has raised new questions about the traditional tension
between liberty and security within nations. While finding a balance between the two
imperatives in the information age is quite a challenge even in robust democracies, the
Snowden affair has equal salience for great power relations, especially between Washington
and Beijing. That in turn has a host of implications for lesser powers like India.
For quite some time now, the US has made a big deal out of Chinese spying in the cyber
domain. The charges included stealing secrets of the large American corporations and
hacking into the US and Western defence establishments. Major US media outlets like The
New York Times and The Washington Post have had frontpage exclusives on Chinese cyber
attacks on US entities. Beijing, in response, has been saying that it is not alone and that the
US has an even larger cyber espionage programme against China. Snowden has now made
the point for Beijing.
"Internet freedom" has been a major slogan for the US as it charged China and Russia of
using cyber control to pursue internal repression and limit personal freedoms. Beijing is
now relishing the opportunity to accuse America of double standards, and underline the
moral equivalence between the two powers.
POWER PLAY
While the Snowden affair is unlikely to end the ideological arguments on freedom and
democracy between Washington and Beijing, it brings into focus a consequential power play
in cyberspace between China and America. Washington and Beijing are investing massively
in building their cyber capabilities, both defensive and offensive. Both recognise the
centrality of cyberspace for future warfare economic, political and military. For the
moment at least, it is a no-holds-barred contestation.
At the informal California summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping earlier
this month, there was much focus on cyber security issues. Reports on the summit said
Obama pressed hard on the issue, but Xi was not defensive at all and pushed back. While
they circle each other in cyberspace, Washington and Beijing might sit down, sooner than
later, to work out an agreed set of rules for managing their conflict in the new domain. This
process will be similar to the nuclear arms control negotiations in the Cold War between the
US and the erstwhile Soviet Union that defined the terms of mutual deterrence and
circumscribed the options for the rest of the world, including India.
INDIA'S TASK
Delhi's response to the Snowden affair has been low-key; rightly so. For moral posturing on
cyber espionage is not going to get India too far. Spying is central to statecraft, since the
earliest times. Nor was it ever limited to targeting adversaries; spying never excluded
friends. Only the technological environment has changed.
There will be much that the Indian security establishment will have to do in coping with the
new challenges arising from Sino-American confrontation and possible collaboration in
cyberspace. India's ability to influence the new geopolitics of cyberspace will depend entirely
on the capabilities it builds. While Delhi has apparently been getting its act together on
cyber security in recent years, few are willing to wager that India is up to speed with
America and China.
The UPA government needs to take Parliament and the public into confidence on how it
plans to stay abreast of the global developments in cyber warfare. Mere statements that
Delhi is doing what it needs to are not reassuring enough.

ASEAN Theatre
C. Raja Mohan : Wed J ul 03 2013, 05:59 hrs
ASEAN Theatre
The annual gatherings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations at the ministerial
level in July and summit level in November at the East Asia Summit have become good
indicators of Asia's volatile geopolitical temperature. It was at the ASEAN Regional Forum
in Hanoi, Vietnam, three years ago that the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
injected America into the growing tensions between Beijing and its Southeast Asian
neighbours in the South China Sea. Clinton's diplomacy in Hanoi heralded America's much-
debated pivot to Asia a year later.
Since 2010, the US has stepped up its economic engagement in the region and outlined
plans to shift forces from the Atlantic and the Middle East to the Pacific waters facing China.
The US has also tightened its military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the
Philippines. Its newly vigorous Asian diplomacy included the rapid normalisation of
relations with Myanmar, expanded security cooperation with Vietnam, and stronger
engagement with Indonesia. The US has also been urging India to beef up its Look East
policy.
For years, Washington dismissed the ASEAN meetings as talk shops that did not aim for
specific outcomes. After the Clinton intervention in 2010, the ASEAN forums have not been
the same. The US secretary of state and the president have made annual diplomatic
pilgrimages to the ASEAN and the East Asia Summit, and have actively shaped the results.
Meanwhile, the arguments between the US and China, and between Beijing and its
Southeast neighbours and Tokyo, have become sharper in annual ASEAN meetings. In 2011,
China found itself isolated by US activism on the South China Sea issue. In 2012, China hit
back. Working with Cambodia, China's strong ally that chaired the meetings during 2012-13,
Beijing successfully divided the ASEAN members.
For the first time in its history, the ASEAN ended without an agreed statement, revealing
the deepening differences within the forum on how to deal with China's rising power and
assertiveness in the South China Sea. This year, though, the ASEAN is determined to put
across a show of unity in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei.
Kerry's Pivot
As the ASEAN copes with its internal fissures and the changing external power balance
between the US and China, all eyes in Brunei this week are on US Secretary of State John
Kerry. In the Chinese media, Kerry has been projected as a vast improvement over Clinton,
who was seen as confrontational and is accused of mobilising the ASEAN against China.
Many others in the region are worried for the same reason. They suspect that the new
secretary of state might be soft on China and less interested in the pivot to Asia than his
predecessor. In his address to the ASEAN this week, Kerry said much the same things as
Clinton did three years ago on the South China Sea and reaffirmed the American role in the
region.
But not all in the ASEAN are reassured about the depth of American security commitment
to the region. For, Kerry seems focused on the Middle East, and the recent US defence
budget cuts have raised questions about the sustainability of the pivot to Asia. The region is
also wary of Kerry's efforts to cultivate a special relationship with China.
Wang's Debut
Like Kerry, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made his debut at the ASEAN this week.
Wang, however, had an easier task than Kerry. Representing the new political leadership in
Beijing, Wang removed some of the rough edges that had crept up into China's diplomacy
towards the ASEAN in the last three years. Wang called for a formal dialogue with the
ASEAN states on drafting a code of conduct for the South China Sea. He also proposed
stronger trade ties between China and the ASEAN. Wang's softer tone made it more difficult
for the ASEAN to quibble with China.
However, the Philippines, which is locked in an escalating maritime territorial dispute with
China, was not impressed. At Brunei, it accused Beijing of militarising the South China Sea
and violating the earlier agreements between China and the ASEAN. "The overwhelming
presence of Chinese ships, including military and paramilitary ships, and the issuance of
threats, pose serious challenges for the region as a whole", the Philippines declared.

Pakistan's Taliban Proxy and Afghan
Power Sharing
C. Raja Mohan : Thu J ul 04 2013, 15:49 hrs
As tensions between Kabul and Islamabad threaten the fragile peace process in Afghanistan,
the Taliban's role as a proxy for Pakistan's interests has come back into sharp focus this
week.
Gen. Sher Mohammad Karimi, the head of the Afghan armed forces told the BBC in an
interview that the prolonged war in his country can come to an end "within a week" if
Pakistan stops supporting the Taliban.
On the face of it, Gen. Karimi's statement is not a shocking revelation. Despite repeated
Pakistani that it controls the Taliban, few in the world question the reality of the Pakistan
army's extraordinary influence on the militancy in Afghanistan.
The doubts, if any, have disappeared as Pakistan in recent months orchestrated the process
of political reconciliation, by selectively releasing some Taliban leaders from detention,
promoted the opening of their office in Qatar, and managed their communication and
contact with the United States.
Karimi's decision to reaffirm the well-known truth about Pakistan's control over the Taliban
comes amidst the reports that Islamabad is pushing for a power sharing arrangement in
which the Taliban will control the eastern and southern provinces in Afghanistan.
Although Islamabad has denied these allegations, Kabul says that Sartaj Aziz, foreign policy
adviser to the Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, put across the proposal to the Afghan
ambassador in Islamabad, Umer Daudzai in a meeting last week.
The Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Ershad Ahmadi pointed to "the elements within the
Pakistan government who have a grand design for using the peace process as a means to
undermine the Afghan state and establish little fiefdoms around the country in which the
Taliban--its most important strategic asset in Afghanistan--play an influential role".
Ahmadi expressed his deep disappointment that the newly elected Nawaz Sharif
government might be buying into the attempts by the ISI to weaken the Afghan state. He
said federalising Afghanistan is part of an effort to win at the peace table what the ISI could
not achieve on the battlefield with its proxy, the Taliban.
Interestingly, the Afghan Taliban too expressed its opposition to any form of federalism in
Afghanistan. Cynics would say this is mere posturing. They argue that the Taliban in any
case has no incentive to abide by any arrangement to share power once the international
forces withdraw from Afghanistan and will seek to establish an Islamic Emirate in the
nation.
C. Raja Mohan is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a
contributing editor for The Indian Express

Make a bold move
C. Raja Mohan : Tue J ul 09 2013, 04:31 hrs
UPA has been far too timid on Pakistan. PM must plan a trip, set a date
Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's special envoy, Shaharyar Mohammad Khan, was in
Delhi last Friday conveying the new premier's determination to transform bilateral relations
with India. Sharif was reciprocating Manmohan Singh's gesture of sending his special
envoy, Satinder Lambah, to Pakistan a few weeks ago.
Lambah and Khan now form a credible channel of communication between Singh and
Sharif, thanks to their long experience in India-Pakistan negotiations. Lambah has been PM
Singh's back channel negotiator with General Pervez Musharraf and President Asif Ali
Zardari since 2005. He was high commissioner to Pakistan and has known the Sharifs for
more than a quarter of a century. Khan was foreign secretary of Pakistan in the early 1990s
and helped initiate a dialogue with India under rather difficult circumstances when
Kashmir and Punjab were burning and military crises on the border were frequent. The heir
to the royal throne of Bhopal and a former chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Board,
Shaharyar Khan is the cousin of late Indian cricketer Mansur Ali Khan Pataudi. Few can
match Khan's deep appreciation of the intimacies and intricacies of India-Pakistan
relations.
Lambah and Khan are also fully conscious of the fragility of the bilateral relations and the
difficulty of turning good intentions towards each other into practical results. The two
envoys know better than anyone that India-Pakistan relations are accident-prone. They
have seen minor incidents acquire gigantic political proportions and undercut carefully
crafted agreements. What is worse, the political calendars in the two countries are rarely in
sync.
With their deep knowledge of India-Pakistan diplomatic history, Lambah and Khan must
convince the two prime ministers to act quickly and decisively on five important imperatives
confronting them.
For one, they must remind Manmohan Singh and Sharif that time is of the essence. The
current window of opportunity in India-Pakistan relations will not be open for too long. The
extraordinary problems that confront Sharif will ensure his political honeymoon in Pakistan
is short. Meanwhile, the approaching general elections in India will make it difficult to take
new policy initiatives after the end of this year. Put simply, Singh and Sharif have just a few
months to make some bold moves.
Two, the two leaders should personally drive the process rather than let their respective
bureaucracies set the pace and direction of the renewed engagement. Nawaz Sharif's
political capital is at its peak right now and he is in a position to take some risks. As he
completes 10 years at the helm, Manmohan Singh needs to make at least one big effort to
get some results from a political project in which he has invested so much.
Three, Singh and Sharif must recast the structure of the current bilateral process, called the
"composite and integrated dialogue". The process today is as ponderous as its name. The
two leaders should not be tied down by this framework. They must focus on a few priorities
and low-hanging fruit that can be plucked. Both sides also know some issues like Siachen,
Sir Creek and the normalisation of trade relations now need political intervention.
Further talks at the bureaucratic level will not be consequential.
Four, the two leaders should draw new stakeholders into the India-Pakistan peace process,
especially the chief ministers of the border states. The interaction between the chief
ministers of the two Punjabs over the last decade has only reinforced the peace process.
Encouraging an early visit to India by Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz's brother, who is chief
minister of West Punjab, should generate good momentum for the dialogue between the two
prime ministers. That the Akali Dal, an ally of the BJP, is demanding deeper cooperation
between the two Punjabs should help create some political space for Manmohan Singh and
the UPA government. Delhi should also encourage the chief minister of Rajasthan, for
instance, to reach out to his counterpart across the border in the Sindh province.
Five, Manmohan Singh and Sharif need to be sensitive to the political constraints on the
other. In Pakistan, there has not been adequate appreciation of what the 26/11 attacks on
Mumbai meant for India and why it is important to make steady progress in bringing the
perpetrators to justice.
In its relentless emphasis on 26/11, India tends to forget the limitations of the civilian
leaders in Pakistan and to give a veto to opponents of Pakistan's normalisation of relations
with India. The lack of sufficient public warmth in the UPA government and among
Congress leaders for renewed engagement makes Delhi look arrogant and unresponsive to
the widespread desire in Pakistan for friendly relations with India.
Beyond 26/11, India and Pakistan badly need communication and consultation between the
two intelligence establishments. A mechanism between the RAW and the ISI had operated
in the past. Its revival will be an important confidence-building measure. There is also much
room for expanding CBMs across the Line of Control in Kashmir and implementing
effectively those already in place.
Finally, its time Manmohan Singh travelled to Pakistan. Over the last decade, Musharraf has
made two visits to India and Zardari one. Rather than wait for agreements to be finalised,
the PM should set the dates for an early visit. That would indeed galvanise the two systems
to produce consequential outcomes.
From a political perspective, too, the UPA government needs to inject some boldness into its
Pakistan policy. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, representing the "communal" BJP, visited Pakistan
twice during his six-year tenure as PM. Manmohan Singh representing the "secular"
Congress has been too timid to go across the border. Surely that is not the legacy that
Manmohan Singh and the Congress want to leave for the
next government.

The great Game Folio
KASHGAR CORRIDOR
Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's just concluded visit to China has brought together
two separate issues that have long bothered India. One is China's growing presence in
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, and the other is Beijing's construction of a port at Gwadar on
Balochistan's Makran coast.
India's objections to Chinese activity in PoK go back to the 1970s, when the People's
Liberation Army built the Karakoram Highway that connected China's farwestern province
of Xinjiang with northern Pakistan. More recently, China has begun to undertake an
expansive range of development projects in PoK. Further south, New Delhi watched warily
as China financed and built a Greenfield port in Gwadar over the last decade. For many in
India, Chinese interest in Gwadar, located close to the Persian Gulf, is part of a larger
strategy to build up Beijing's strategic presence in the Indian Ocean.
There was some relief, however, when a Singapore firm won the bid to run the port. Earlier
this year, Pakistan terminated the contract with Singapore and handed over operational
control to a Chinese company called China Overseas Port Holding Co.
Nawaz Sharif's visit to China this week saw the formalisation of a plan to connect Kashgar in
Xinjiang to Gwadar. The construction of this economic corridor is expected to cost around
$18 billion, and will be fast-tracked for completion within five years. China has already
begun to modernise the Karakoram Highway. Under the corridor project, Beijing is
expected to add a railway line, optic fibre link and a petroleum pipeline across the mighty
Karakorams. It would also involve the development of industrial projects all along the
corridor and the construction of a massive special economic zone in Gwadar.
GAME CHANGER
For Sharif, who loves big commercial projects, the new corridor is akin to the Lahore-
Islamabad motorway he built in the 1990s. He called it a "game changer" for the whole
region. Indeed, for Pakistan as a whole, it involves a second commercial artery running
parallel to the current one between Karachi port in the Sindh province and the heartland of
Punjab.
For China, the project offers a reliable link between its landlocked western regions and the
Indian Ocean. The Gwadar project, along with Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Kyaukphyu in
Myanmar, will raise China's strategic profile in the Indian Ocean. On the flip side, what
about the security situation in Balochistan and northern areas of Pakistan, where Chinese
personnel have been victims of terror attacks?
Sharif is reaching out to the nationalist elements in Balochistan and trying to draw the
militants into a dialogue elsewhere. Like the Chinese, Sharif believes economic activism can
transform the ground situation over a period of time.
DELHI'S CHOICE
India has three choices in responding to the Gwadar-Kashgar corridor. One, Delhi can
continue to object to the Chinese projects in PoK and Balochistan. But Indian protests are
not going to stop or slow the construction of
the corridor.
Two, India can try and match China's transformative infrastructure projects on its
periphery. India's own rail link to Kashmir has finally begun to advance. It is talking to the
Iranians about developing the Chabahar port further west of Gwadar on the Makran coast.
But India's pace of implementing such projects is painfully slow.
Three, in parallel to the second option, India can reach out to Pakistan and China and
propose trilateral collaboration on mega infrastructure projects. For its part, Beijing has
been eager to involve India in developing overland connectivity between China and the
subcontinent. It has also offered to invest in the Chabahar project in Iran.
Through his visit to China, Sharif was careful to project the Gwadar-Kashgar corridor as an
economic project that would benefit the entire region, including India. Delhi must test the
intentions of both China and Pakistan by offering to join them in the development of the
corridor.
Delhi must also show interest in investing in the Gwadar Special Economic Zone. India can
also propose new connectivity projects across the current lines of control in J&K with
Pakistan and China. Instead of treating trans-border infrastructure projects as competitive,
Delhi can see them as part of a wider regional economic cooperation. The joint projects in
J&K can be undertaken without a reference to the competing territorial claims of Delhi,
Islamabad and Beijing.

Obama and Afghanistan: the zero
option
C. Raja Mohan : New Delhi, Fri J ul 12 2013, 11:20 hrs
The US threat to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014the so called
'zero option'is most probably a pressure tactic in the increasingly difficult negotiations
with President Hamid Karzai on the terms of future security cooperation between
Washington and Kabul.
But 'bargaining chips' often turn into real negotiating positions when mutual trust between
two sides begins to rapidly disappear.
As the ground situation becomes murky in Afghanistan, the Taliban gains ground with the
support of the Pakistan army, and the American public support for the war in Afghanistan
evaporates, it is certainly possible that Washington and Kabul might part ways and not so
amicably.
It is no secret that Karzai and the US President Barack Obama have not been able to build
much mutual trust since the latter took charge of the White House in January 2009.
Obama and his foreign policy advisers believed Karzai was part of the problem in
Afghanistan. Karzai, in turn, was concerned at Obama's 'surge and exit' policy in
Afghanistan and Washington's reluctance to confront the sources of regional instability
across the Durand Line in Pakistan.
The Afghan President was angered by Washington's recent attempts to cut a deal with the
Taliban with the help of the Pakistan army. Washington's denials that it is not negotiating
with the Taliban behind Karzai's back have not reassured Kabul.
Karzai has also been under considerable pressure to present himself as an Afghan
nationalist and counter the campaign of the Taliban that he is a 'mere puppet' of the
American occupation army.
As a result the negotiations between Washington and Kabul on the nature and terms of U.S.
military presence in Afghanistan after 2014 have been deadlocked for quite some
time. Obama had plans to leave a residual force of eight to ten thousand American troops in
Afghanistan.
If Karzai might be over-estimating the U.S. interest in such a residual presence after 2014,
Obama might be under-estimating the damage he has done to Kabul in his search for
political reconciliation with the Taliban.
Attempts to bridge the differences between Karzai and Obama through a direct video
conference have failed, according to a report in the 'New York Times' this week.
Military retreats are never pretty. Long-standing friends and partners tend to blame each
other for things gone wrong and in the process increase the probability of failure despite the
shared interests.
Contributing Editor for The Indian Express).

The faraway neighbour
Fracas with Bhutan underlines why Delhi must recast its neighbourhood policy
The "crisis" in India's relations with Bhutan did not begin with New Delhi's bungled
withdrawal of petroleum subsidies in the middle of the recent elections. Nor has it ended
with the claim that the next government in Bhutan will be "pro-India". Recent
developments in Bhutan reflect India's growing foreign policy challenges in the
neighbourhood. They are a reminder that many of the traditional assumptions of India's
regional policy are no longer sustainable.
For one, Delhi must come to terms with the reality that paternalism, however benign it
might appear from India's perspective, is no longer a sensible approach towards its smaller
neighbours. For paternalism breeds resentment. Put simply, India can no longer afford to
treat Bhutan as a protectorate, in the manner that the British Raj and independent India
dealt with it for more than a century and a half.
The British Raj had propped up a ring of weak states around the subcontinent as buffers
against intrusion by other powers. The rulers of these small states traded the freedom to
conduct their own foreign policy for political support and economic subsidies from the Raj.
India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, did not abandon this framework when he
signed a series of friendship treaties with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal during 1949-50 that
preserved the essence of the special relationship structured under the Raj.
But India's protectorate system quickly broke down amidst a number of factors. As the
Kathmandu elite learnt to play the China card against Delhi, it undermined much of the
1950 treaty. The games that Sikkim's Chogyal played with Delhi forced Indira Gandhi to
integrate the kingdom into India. Bhutan has been a lot slower in asserting its national
identity and creating an independent international personality. Until recently, it
scrupulously avoided the balancing game between India and China. But the pressures to do
so are clearly mounting.
The democratisation of the Kingdom and the new competitive politics within the nation are
bound to make Bhutan's relations with India a lot more complicated. To be sure, India did
recognise this problem and sought to put relations with Bhutan on a more equitable basis by
renegotiating the 1949 treaty of friendship in 2007. The latest turn of events underlines the
fact that India will have to go beyond formalism and change the operational basis of its
Bhutan policy.
Second, India can no longer delude itself that the subcontinent is its exclusive sphere of
influence, as in the days of the Raj. In a globalising world, Delhi can't keep other powers out
of the subcontinent. As China's power rises, its influence in the subcontinent has rapidly
grown over the last decade, from Bhutan and Nepal in the Himalayas to Sri Lanka and
Maldives in the Indian Ocean.
It was outgoing Bhutan PM Jigme Thinley's flirting with China that is said to have triggered
the mutual distrust between Delhi and Thimphu over the last year or more. India, however,
can't build a great wall around the subcontinent and keep China out of the region. At a time
when India itself is expanding its economic and political relations with China, it can't order
its neighbours to limit their ties to Beijing.
A smart China policy, then, involves giving our neighbours greater access to our markets,
improving connectivity, modernising trade facilitation, letting them benefit from India's
economic growth, and resolving longstanding bilateral problems. At the same time, the new
approach must also lay down clear red lines on security cooperation between India's smaller
neighbours and China. Making sure these red lines are respected will not be easy, but must
be part of India's strategy of continuous tending to the neighbourhood.
Third, India needs to expand the interface of its engagement with the neighbours. At the
moment, Delhi's neighbourhood policy is run by a handful of overworked officials in the
ministry of external affairs and our "viceroys" in the neighbourhood capitals. What India
now needs is a more intensive formal and informal political interaction between the
leaderships of the subcontinent. The lead must necessarily come from Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, who has been remiss in avoiding frequent travel to the neighbouring
capitals.
Fourth, while the Union government has sole responsibility of foreign policy, India's current
political conditions demand a more active involvement of the opposition parties in engaging
the elites across the borders. But our opposition leaders have not been able to resist the
temptation of playing politics with foreign policy towards the neighbours. Consider, for
example, the BJP's reluctance to support the historic agreements that the UPA government
has negotiated with Bangladesh in 2011 and the deafening silence of the CPM, which should
be so interested in transforming relations between Kolkata and Dhaka. Worse still, some
regional leaders have become spoilers in India's neighbourhood policy. If Mamata Banerjee
undercut India's engagement with Bangladesh, political dynamics in Tamil Nadu have
severely circumscribed Delhi's diplomatic room in Colombo. Delhi, then, needs to reassert
its primacy in foreign policy while making all efforts to bring the regional parties on board
the national consensus on foreign policy.
Finally, Delhi needs to discard the tradition of offering economic subsidies and negotiating
project proposals with neighbouring capitals. It should focus instead on enabling
agreements and let market forces leverage the existing economic and geographic
complementarities.
For its part, most of the Indian private sector has gone haring around the world but has
devoted little attention to markets nextdoor. On the other hand, the GMR group, which had
invested in the Male airport, has been burnt by the capricious domestic politics of Maldives
and lack of sufficient support from Delhi. Structuring greater synergy between Delhi and the
private sector must be an important part of a comprehensive mobilisation of the nation's
resources in recasting India's neighbourhood policy.
The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research
Foundation, Delhi and a contributing editor for 'The Indian Express'

Korea rising
C. Raja Mohan : Fri J ul 19 2013, 00:20 hrs
KOREA RISING
Korea has long been known as a "shrimp among the whales", boxed as it is among China,
Japan, Russia and the United States in northeast Asia. While the divided Korean Peninsula's
geopolitics continues to be shaped by the great powers, South Korea is rapidly emerging as a
middle power to reckon with in Asia and beyond. South Korea has long been an economic
powerhouse. What we are seeing today is Seoul's conscious search for a political and
diplomatic role in Asia and beyond. Sustained high growth rates since the 1960s had
transformed South Korea from a backward country at the end of World War II into the
world's 12th largest economy (PPP terms) and 15th largest (nominal GDP) by 2012.
As the world's seventh largest exporter and eighth largest importer, South Korea is one of
the world's important trading nations. Its companies have steadily moved to the export of
sophisticated products, including nuclear reactors. Samsung, for example, is giving Apple a
run for its money in the global markets for smartphones and tablets.
South Korea has free trade agreements with many countries, including the US, Europe, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India. It actively participates in the
building of an Asian economic community within a framework led by the ASEAN.
South Korean President Park Geun-hye is now building on her predecessor Lee Myung-
bak's efforts to convert Seoul's growing economic power into political influence. Despite
being hobbled by an unending conflict with North Korea, Seoul has begun to look beyond
the Peninsula to establish a solid global strategic footprint. While holding on to its
longstanding alliance with the US, Seoul has deepened ties with China and Russia, the
major benefactors of North Korea. It has strategic partnership agreements with a number of
countries, including Australia and Vietnam.
Korea now has active multilateral diplomacy. A Korean diplomat, Ban Ki-moon, is the
secretary general of the United Nations. It became the first non-G-8 country to host a
meeting of the G-20 and the first Asian power to host the Nuclear Security Summit. Korea
has become a major donor of foreign aid and is promoting the "Korean model" of economic
growth in Africa and Asia. South Korean troops now participate in UN peacekeeping
operations. Meanwhile, Korean culture has begun to make a big impact on the world.
Korean pop is here to stay after the huge success of "Gangnam Style". Korean movies have
penetrated global entertainment markets, including India's Northeast.
INDIA NEXUS
Although South Korea has been a major economic partner of India for nearly two decades,
the bilateral political relationship has remained an underdeveloped one. That, however, has
begun to change in recent years. The two sides have declared the intent to build a strategic
partnership. Korea was quick to negotiate an agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with
India after the India-US nuclear deal.
The visit of Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony in 2010 had laid the basis for deeper
defence cooperation. The recent visit of Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne to South Korea
has opened the door for productive engagement between the armed forces of the two
countries. South Korea is also quite close to clinching a deal on the supply of minesweepers
for the Indian navy. Beyond the buyer-seller relationship, the two sides are exploring the
prospects for defence industrial collaboration. There is growing recognition in both capitals
that promoting maritime security in the Indo-Pacific and the structuring of a stable Asian
balance of power demand stronger security cooperation between India and South Korea.
MENON IN SEOUL
Earlier this month, National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon was in Seoul to tie all
these strands together and inject some real content into the proclaimed strategic
partnership between the two countries. If Menon was the first Indian NSA to visit Seoul, his
grandfather K.P.S. Menon, independent India's first foreign secretary, was the chairman of
the nine-member UN Commission set up in 1947 to conduct elections in the Korean
Peninsula.
As New Delhi and Seoul reconnect politically, the planned visit of President Park to India in
the next few months provides an occasion to think boldly about the future of the bilateral
partnership. If Delhi can look beyond China in its policies towards northeast Asia, it will
find that South Korea can help develop very interesting strategic options for India.

New Middle East
New Middle East
As the old order crumbles in the Middle East, the imperative of recalibrating India's
regional policy has been staring at Delhi for some time. The deepening political turmoil,
regime instability and sectarian strife across the Middle East are all testing the established
policies of major powers. India is no exception.
Delhi's approach to the Middle East has been shaped by intimate historic links, the
profound impact of the region on India's domestic politics, its multiple internal conflicts
and its relations with great powers. India's economic interaction with the region has
significantly expanded over the last two decades. But the challenge of adapting to the
structural changes in the region is likely to endure. While the prospects for near-term
stability in the Middle East look bleak, India needs to step up its engagement with key
regional powers. There are interesting openings unfolding right now with three of them
Ankara, Cairo and Tehran. All three, along with Saudi Arabia, have long shaped the region's
destiny.
External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid's visit to Ankara this week ends the UPA
government's prolonged neglect of Turkey. That this is the first trip by an Indian foreign
minister in a decade precisely the period when Ankara's regional and international
standing has rapidly risen under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan underlines this
unfortunate fact. Khurshid's visit should set the tone for President Pranab Mukherjee's visit
to Ankara later this year and lay the basis for sustainable political engagement with Turkey.
Neither Erdogan's new troubles at home nor Ankara's close ties to Pakistan should be
allowed to come in the way of building strong institutional ties to Turkey.
If there ever was a moment for India to stick by the principle of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of other nations, this is it in the Middle East. The region is in the throes of a
difficult political transition and Delhi must deal with the governments of the day,
irrespective of their internal orientation. If India has managed to expand ties with
Islamabad's major partners, like China, the US and Saudi Arabia over the last decade, there
is no reason to let Pakistan define India's relations with Turkey.
Iran Opening
Like Turkey, Iran has long been a major non-Arab regional power in the Middle East.
Ankara and Tehran are not just at the two geographic extremities of the region. They are
also widely perceived as contributing to the new sectarian dynamic between the Sunni and
the Shia in the Middle East. As a neighbour, an important source of energy and a gateway to
Afghanistan and Central Asia, Iran has re-emerged at the centre of India's strategic calculus.
But India's ability to build strong partnership with Iran has been constrained by Tehran's
ongoing confrontation with the US on the nuclear issue.
As Hassan Rowhani takes charge as Iran's president next month, hopes have risen for a
productive dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Bringing an end to more than three
decades of conflict between Iran and the US will not be easy. But Delhi must extend full
support to the efforts to ease Iran-US tensions and reach out to the new Iranian leadership
at the earliest.
Cairo Calling
If Turkey and Iran have seen themselves as different models of political Islam in the Middle
East, recent developments in Egypt have put moderate secular forces back in control of
Cairo and expand the possibilities for the region's future. India has no reason to agonise
about whether the Egypt army's decision to end the brief rule of the Muslim Brotherhood is
a political coup or not. The fact is that the army has laid out a bold plan for drafting a new
constitution and holding parliamentary and presidential elections within six months.
Egypt's internal situation is bound to remain murky for a while, but the luxury of debating
Egypt's internal developments should be left to the West and those regional powers that
have partisan interests. Delhi, instead,must emphasise the principle of non-intervention
and back Cairo's current efforts at political reconciliation and the construction of an
inclusive constitutional order. Delhi also can't afford to miss the opportunities to engage the
new leaders of Egypt who are so well disposed towards India.
editor for

Japans Marines
C. Raja Mohan : Fri Aug 02 2013, 05:54 hrs

Mention the term "marines" and the images of colonialism, gunboat diplomacy and great-power
military interventions at once come to mind. It seems odd, then, that pacifist J apan wants to
develop a marine force. Facing China's growing military power and Beijing's increasingly
assertive regional policy, J apan may have no option but to make marines a critical element of its
new defence strategy.
Tokyo once had a formidable marine force. The dreaded Imperial J apanese Navy had deployed
its Special Naval Landing Forces extensively, before and during World War II. Unlike in the past
when marines were integral to J apan's imperial expansion, Tokyo today sees the marines as vital
for securing its territorial claims against Beijing over the disputed islands called Senkaku in
Tokyo and Diaoyu in Beijing.
Shinzo Abe, who returned to power in a landslide victory last December, had pledged to boost
J apan's defence expenditure and stand up against Beijing in the intensifying territorial disputes in
the East China Sea. He is now taking the first steps to transform J apan's military posture from
passive to active defence.
Abe had ordered a modest but immediate increase in J apan's defence budget and a longer-term
review of J apan's defence guidelines. An interim report issued last Friday in Tokyo unveiled
some of the elements of J apan's changing defence strategy. Responding to the increasingly
muscular tactics of the People's Liberation Army in the East China Sea, the J apanese defence
ministry wants more amphibious capabilities, expanded use of drone surveillance and above all,
the creation of a marine force. "To deploy units quickly in response to a situation, it is
important... to have an amphibious capability" that is capable of conducting landing operations
on remote islands, the report said.
Strike Corps
Tokyo is increasingly concerned that a quick Chinese seizure of a disputed island might leave it
with no options at all. J apan's long-standing ally, the United States, is reluctant to defend
J apanese territorial claims against China and unwilling to be drawn into a conflict with Beijing
over the small islands in the East China Sea.
Tokyo does not want to confront a fait accompli of the kind that the Philippines is grappling with
today. Beijing recently won control over Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Both
Manila and Beijing claim ownership of Scarborough Shoal, but it was administered until recently
by the Philippines.
J apan's military dilemma vis a vis China is not unlike that of India in the Himalayas. It is about
finding ways to cope with the rapidly altering military balance in favour of China, and Beijing's
ability to alter the territorial status quo with quick and decisive military action. It is to avoid this
horrible, Kargil-like possibility of losing control over a small piece of territory that India has
decided to raise a strike corps on the Himalayan frontier with China. Delhi hopes that the new
military capability will deter China. If deterrence fails, the strike corps will provide options for
Delhi to mount a riposte across into Tibet.
For J apan, a marine corps will serve a similar purpose. It will improve J apan's ability to defend
its far-flung island territories and act swiftly in response to any Chinese attempt to gain access to
them.
Amphibious Asia
With the waters of Asia increasingly contested, amphibious and expeditionary capabilities are
becoming part of the regional military landscape. As J apan debates the creation of a credible
marine force, China is well on its way to building up its amphibious capabilities. Way back in
the 1950s, China sought to develop a marine corps in the PLA, but the effort got grounded in the
following decades. As China turned to the seas over the last decade, Beijing has begun to build
powerful marine brigades.
A PLA commander recently told China Daily that "The marine corps represents the essence of
our armed forces, and I call our marines the 'steel of steel'". India, meanwhile, is nowhere near
catching up. The Indian navy's proposal for raising a marine brigade has long been collecting
dust in the ministry of defence.
Unlike Tokyo, which can focus on the maritime contestation with Beijing, Delhi can't afford to
choose between land and sea power in dealing with China's new military clout. India's defence
strategy must learn to walk on both legs.

Unquiet on the front
C. Raja Mohan : Sun Aug 11 2013, 00:11 hrs
Delhi must move towards more responsible management of the LoC and LAC
India's contested borders with China and Pakistan are seeing more frequent military
tension. The UPA government's failure to effectively manage these borders has pushed India
into crises of the kind that followed the recent Chinese intrusion in Ladakh and the violent
incidents on the Pakistan frontier.
The military character of India's borders with China and Pakistan has significantly changed
in the last couple of decades. Yet, the political instruments to maintain peace on these
borders have not evolved. While that gap is generating repeated military confrontations, the
domestic and international political costs of these crises have risen. Delhi, then, must find
ways to prevent these incidents from occurring and better manage the political fallout when
they do.
While both borders demand more effective management, the problems are somewhat
different on either front. It is for good reason that India has separate names for the
contested frontiers with Pakistan (Line of Control) and China (Line of Actual Control). The
776 km LoC with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir is demarcated and the two armies signed
off on its precise alignment after the 1971 war. Delhi and Beijing, however, have not been
able to delineate the LAC. They don't even agree on its length. The divergent perceptions of
the LAC lead to regular military friction in many parts of the disputed frontier with China.
Over the decades, the LoC has become intensely militarised. It is the lighting rod for
unending conflict, as the Pakistan army pushes militants across the LoC to destabilise
Kashmir and the Indian army counters the infiltration. In contrast, the Indian and Chinese
armies have not fired a shot in anger across the LAC for many decades. That happy situation
may be coming to an end thanks to the rapid modernisation of the Chinese armed forces
and Beijing's greater assertiveness on territorial disputes.
India's effort to restore the military balance on the border has run into Chinese opposition.
As the two armies draw close to the once neglected border and aggressively patrol the
disputed areas, there are more "intrusions" across the LAC, followed by political tension.
During Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China at the end of 1988, the two sides agreed to maintain
peace and tranquility on the long and disputed boundary. Since then, there have been many
agreements on this theme.
The Ladakh intrusion has underlined the importance of moving beyond general statements
on maintaining peace and tranquility to specific procedures and practices to prevent
military confrontation and its escalation. That is the focus of Delhi's current efforts to
finalise a border defence cooperation agreement with Beijing. In negotiating a new military
regimen with Beijing, Delhi needs more active army inputs on border management strategy
to redress one important imbalance. In China, it is the PLA that drives the border policy. On
the Indian side, it is dominated by the foreign office.
Unlike on the LAC with China, there is little political effort to manage the military dynamic
on the LoC with Pakistan. The UPA government ducks for cover and the opposition BJP
plays to domestic galleries; together they turn even routine incidents into major political
crises. In the end, though, it is the responsibility of the government to lead. But the ministry
of defence (MoD) has little intellectual heft or administrative capacity to define and
supervise policies for LoC management. The PMO and the MoD have, in recent years,
abandoned the civilian responsibility for policy leadership of the military domain. That
largely leaves the Indian army to handle the LoC dynamic as it sees fit, with no input or
support from the political and bureaucratic side. This is not good for the army or the nation
as a whole.
It is now time for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to inject some coherence into the
management of the LoC. Three propositions present themselves. First, the PM should
publicly underline the value of the LoC ceasefire that was negotiated by the BJP government
in 2003. The current passionate responses to the killings on the border should not blind us
to the fact that the ceasefire has brought significant reductions in LoC violence.
Second, the PM must order a comprehensive review of the current military policy on the
LoC, including the rules of engagement and standard operating procedures. He should set
up an apex body, with all relevant civilian and military officials as members, to continually
monitor and respond to the volatile dynamic on the LoC.
Third, India must seek more details on Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's offer to
jointly find ways to reduce the LoC violence. If Sharif, who is also in charge of Pakistan's
defence ministry at the moment, is serious, Delhi must propose specific steps to strengthen
the implementation of the ceasefire and call for early talks between the two armies for
additional confidence building measures on the LoC.
A decade and a half ago, Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif unveiled
the Lahore Declaration to deal with some of the post-nuclear security challenges facing
India and Pakistan. Talks on military security and border management are not a reward
from India for Pakistan's good behaviour. They are an integral part of managing a very
complex relationship and reducing the risks of a war that neither side wants.
After the Ladakh intrusion, Delhi has sensibly stepped up the conversation on LAC
management with Beijing. The recent violence on the LoC demands the same with
Islamabad. When he meets Sharif in New York next month, Manmohan Singh must seek
Pakistan's renewed political support for the LoC ceasefire and an agreement to translate
that commitment into a military reality. If he does not move towards responsible
management of India's borders, the country will be sucked, sooner rather than later, into a
costly military conflict that it neither wants nor is prepared to cope with.

What Delhi must say, what Dhaka
needs to hear
C. Raja Mohan : Mon Aug 19 2013, 03:13 hrs
Early parliamentary approval of the land boundary agreement with Bangladesh is in
India's interest. If the BJP sees itself as a champion of national security, it must support
the bill.
As UPA 2 enters the last lap of its tenure, it is not just the Indian economy that is
unravelling. New Delhi's loss of purpose and direction in the last few years has had an
equally damaging impact on the diplomatic front.
Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's bold effort to transform bilateral relations
with the US, pursued with equal vigour by his successor Manmohan Singh during UPA 1, is
now under a cloud. Vajpayee's attempt to normalise relations with Pakistan, pushed further
by Singh over the last decade, appears to be disintegrating. A more successful outreach to
Bangladesh, begun by the NDA, and finalised by UPA 2, is now in danger of being
undermined, thanks to Delhi's dysfunctional politics.
While the levers for economic regeneration are largely in the hands of the government,
Delhi needs support from the opposition to bring some of its historic foreign policy moves to
a closure. The breakdown of national unity during the nuclear debate in the UPA's first term
had complicated what was in essence a simple and mutually beneficial nuclear
accommodation between Delhi and Washington. If the BJP leadership's tactical temptations
and the CPM's ideological blinkers messed up UPA 1's historic civil nuclear initiative, UPA 2
has faced unprecedented challenges from state governments in the pursuit of its regional
goals. Competitive populism in Tamil Nadu has seen Delhi meekly surrender its
responsibility to craft a coherent policy towards Sri Lanka. West Bengal Chief Minister
Mamata Banerjee's tantrums, in turn, have nearly wrecked India's historic outreach to
Bangladesh. While regional parties have the luxury of irresponsibility on foreign policy
issues, national parties can't abandon their duty to protect India's security interests. This
week in Parliament will show if they are up to it, or if they simply play politics.
After a prolonged delay, the government hopes to table in Parliament this week the bill on a
comprehensive land boundary settlement with Bangladesh. In the last session, External
Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid stepped back as members of the AGP, opposed to the
settlement, disrupted the proceedings. One hopes Khurshid will be a little bolder this time
and the PM will articulate the strong political case for Parliament to approve the bill. It is
even more important for the BJP, which has been playing political hide-and-seek on the bill,
to come out explicitly in favour of the legislation, since India's collective stakes in the
agreement are so high.
For one, it resolves a major set of boundary issues that have been hanging fire since the
partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The British lawyer, Cyril Radcliffe, drew a line through
Bengal in a great hurry and saddled India with a messy boundary, first with East Pakistan
and, later, with Bangladesh. The Protocol to the Land Boundary Agreement signed by Prime
Ministers Singh and Sheikh Hasina completed the negotiations for a comprehensive
boundary settlement with Dhaka that began after the liberation of Bangladesh. Delhi and
Dhaka found it hard, until recently, to finish what Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and
Mujibur Rahman initiated more than four decades ago thanks to the volatility in bilateral
relations.
In fully demarcating the boundary, exchanging territorial enclaves and populations stuck
deep in each other's territory, and cleaning up the adverse possession of territories on the
border, the agreement has resolved an important item on the unfinished agenda of
Partition. Second, clear separation of territorial sovereignties is critical for better boundary
management and good relations between neighbours. At a time when India's disputed
boundary with China is witness to renewed tensions, and the ceasefire with Pakistan on the
Line of Control in Kashmir is breaking down, you don't have to be a rocket scientist to figure
that a comprehensive boundary settlement with Bangladesh significantly improves India's
national security condition.
Third, the resolution of the boundary dispute with Dhaka could not have been possible
without strong commitment from Hasina to a sweeping transformation of the bilateral
relationship in a sustained and comprehensive negotiation after she came to power in 2009.
When India's relations with all its neighbours entered a turbulent phase, Hasina spelt out a
vision for a very different approach to Delhi. If India fails to ratify the agreements on
sharing the Teesta waters and the land boundary settlement negotiated in good faith with
Dhaka, Delhi's credibility as an interlocutor will take a terrible beating. For her part, Hasina
has gone all out to address India's concerns on terrorism. If the goodwill and political risk
taken by leaders next door find no resonance in Delhi, there is little reason for India's
smaller neighbours to seek cooperative partnerships.
Finally, as the leader of one of the world's largest Islamic nations, Hasina has stood for the
separation of religion from state affairs, political moderation and regional economic
integration values that are under great stress across our western frontier. If it lets down
Sheikh Hasina, India would have actively contributed to the resurgence of extremism in
Bangladesh. At a time when jihadi politics is gaining ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it
will be suicidal for India to facilitate its rise in the east.
Viewed from any perspective then, early parliamentary approval of the land boundary
agreement is in India's supreme national security interest. Critical to the passage of the bill
in Parliament is political support from the BJP. If the BJP sees itself as an unflinching
champion of India's national security, it must end its ambiguity on the land boundary bill.
There are times when tactical play on foreign policy might make sense. This can't be one of
those moments. The BJP can't let its units in Bengal and Assam define a national position
that will so harm India's interests.
contributing editor for `The Indian Express'

Power relation
C. Raja Mohan : Wed Aug 21 2013, 03:23 hrs
The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have a long tradition of framing political
challenges at home and abroad through simple and catchy slogans. Every recent general
secretary has invented a phrase of his own that summarised the main political task of the
era. Recall Deng Xiaoping's "four modernisations" that set the stage for the rise of China. Xi
Jinping, who took charge of the CCP last year, has quickly proclaimed the "Chinese Dream"

or the great renewal of the nation
as the main mission for his
decade-long rule.
The realisation of the Chinese Dream, Xi says, demands a conducive external environment.
This in turn demands the construction of a "new pattern of major power relationship", Xi
has argued. Although the idea was first unveiled in the final years of Hu Jintao, Xi has made
it his own. The army of American analysts who track China have made the phrase an object
of intense scrutiny. For, it has become the dominant way of thinking in Beijing about
China's complex relationship with the United States.
Model transition
Although the Chinese phrase sounds mysterious, it addresses a familiar problem in the
history of international relations. It is about the rise and fall of great powers. But the decline
of the old and the rise of the new has rarely been peaceful. The rising powers demand a
greater say in the management of the international system, expand their territorial control
and widen their spheres of influence. The dominant power of the moment is threatened by
the rising one and uses all means, including war, to constrain it.
Historians of international relations, therefore, say big changes in the distribution of power
among the major nations often generate war and conflict. Many compare the rise of China
today to that of Germany in Europe in the 19th century. Europe had to fight two great wars
in the first part of the 20th century to limit Germany's ambitions. Many argue that China's
rise today is bound to destabilise the Asian and global orders and a confrontation between
Beijing, the rising power, and Washington, the current hegemon, is inevitable.
It is in response to the "theory of China threat" that Xi's predecessor Hu argued that China's
rise will be different from other great powers in the past. He sought to assure that China's
rise will be peaceful and that Beijing has no intention to dominate Asia and the world. Hu's
theory of China's peaceful rise was accompanied by a deep study of great power relations in
the past. Amidst the growing concern in Asia and the West about China's rise, the CCP
ideologues now suggest Beijing must actively seek to break from the old patterns of
international relations.
In his recent speeches, Xi has proposed a threefold framework for building a new type of
relationship among major powers, especially between China and the US. The first is to avoid
confrontation by correct handling of disputes. Second is mutual respect that respects each
other's choices for political and economic development. It also involves deference to each
other's core interests. Third is the conscious search for win-win solutions for regional and
global challenges.
While they are not wholly comfortable with Xi's concept, senior officials of the Obama
administration agree with the proposition that the two sides must seek a stable and
cooperative partnership.
Delhi's view
Although India has not focused on China's new diplomatic slogan, some in New Delhi are
wary. They fear that the US and China might cut a deal on regional and global issues that
will leave India out in the cold. Chinese leaders, meanwhile, are extending the concept of a
new type of great power relationship beyond the US to cover Russia, the European Union,
India and others.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will have an opportunity to discuss the notion of a new
type of major power relations with the Chinese leaders when he travels to Beijing in
October. Delhi has no reason to delude itself that Beijing will treat it on par with
Washington. But it is entirely worthwhile for Delhi to explore how the new concept might be
applied to better manage conflicts between India and China and expand the sphere of
cooperation.

India and Iraq: Restoring the Old Warmth
C. Raja Mohan : Fri Aug 23 2013, 10:22 hrs

The visit of the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri-al-Maliki to India this week marks the rapid
acceleration of bilateral ties after Delhi's prolonged neglect of Baghdad. The resurgence
of Iraq will not only contribute to India's energy security but also widen the basis of
India's engagement with the volatile Gulf region.
Until the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime by the American invasion in early 2003,
Iraq used to be India's closest partner in the Middle East. Iraq was a major source of oil
imports and Baghdad gave very favourable financial terms.
The India-Iraq partnership was not limited to energy security. Indian public sector
companies participated in a big way in Iraq's national construction in the oil boom of the
1970s.
The Indian armed forces had close contacts with their Iraqi counterparts. Saddam
Hussein's Iraq also among the few countries in the OIC that stood up for India when
Pakistan pushed hostile resolutions on J ammu & Kashmir. Above all India enjoyed
extraordinary good will among the Iraqi people.
Delhi's well-rounded partnership with Baghdad began to fray amidst the Iran-Iraq war of
the 1980s and Baghdad's international isolation after the first American Gulf war to
liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1990.
After America's Second Gulf War in 2003 transformed the Iraq's political structure by
empowering the nation's Shia majority, the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government briefly
considered the U.S. request to send a division of Indian troops to stabilise Iraq. While
Vajpayee finally ruled against the proposal, the UPA government's neglect of Iraq that
followed has been rather unfortunate.
Since 2003, Iraq slowly but certainly emerged out of a difficult period. As the new rulers
of Baghdad opened Iraqi oil fields and economy for international investments, China and
other major energy importers rushed in. But India seemed utterly distinterested.
Fortunately that has begun to change in the last couple of years.
With India's energy relationship with Iran under the stress of international sanctions, Iraq
has once again become an attractive source of oil for Delhi. Iraq's exports to India, mostly
oil jumped from US$ 11 billion in 2011 to more than US$ 20 billion in 2012.
The external affairs minister, Salman Khurshid traveled to Baghdad in J une and the Iraq's
Deputy Premier in charge of the energy sector, Ibrahim Shahristani was in India earlier
this month pitching for Indian investments.
As the Indian leaders meet Maliki this week, they need to appreciate the return of Iraq as
a major shaper of regional balance of power in the Middle East along with Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and Turkey.
To be sure, Iraq has been hit by fresh sectarian violence between the Shia and the Sunni.
Tension tension between the Arabs and Kurds remains a source of instability. Iraq's close
relations with Shia Iran worry some of the Sunni Arab states.
Yet there is no denying that Baghdad's relative weight in the Middle East can only grow
in the coming years. This, in turn, provides Delhi yet another pillar for the conduct of an
effective policy towards the Middle East.
(The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a
contributing editor for The Indian Express)

Manila Matters
When India looks east, the Philippines hardly figures on its radar for there is little
awareness in Delhi of Manila's growing strategic significance for Asia. Long viewed as the
"sick man of Asia", the Philippines is now roaring like a tiger and set to influence the
region's strategic evolution. Thanks to a series of purposeful reforms over the last few years,
the Philippines is now the fastest growing economy in Asia after China. Goldman Sachs,
which invented the concept of BRICS, has identified the Philippines as one of the 11
emerging economies to watch out for. With a population of nearly 100 million, a hard-
working labour force and a diaspora of 12 million, Manila is likely to become the world's
15th largest economy by the middle of this century.
Geography and location make the Philippines a critical factor in Asian geopolitics. As an
archipelagic nation with more than 7,100 islands, the Philippines straddles the waterways of
East Asia that connect the old continent to itself, the Indian Ocean and the Americas. More
than three centuries of Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines was overturned by the then
rising power, the United States, at the turn of the 20th century. Japan briefly occupied the
Philippines during World War II, but the US returned and granted full independence to the
Philippines.
Amidst the rise of China, the American pivot to Asia and the new Japanese assertiveness,
the Philippines has emerged at the heart of the new maritime contestation in the South
China Sea. Unlike many Asian capitals that are paralysed by the new great power rivalry,
Manila is making bold choices.
Maritime Pivot
If you think of "pivot" as a noun rather than a verb as in the current American discourse, the
Philippines is it in the Indo-Pacific. During the Cold War, the Philippines hosted one of the
biggest American naval bases in the world at the Subic Bay. Along with the Clark air base,
the Philippines provided the military pivot from which US armed forces could dominate
Asia's waters.
After the Filipinos overthrew the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, the democratic
dispensation in Manila withdrew the base faculties for America in 1991. Two decades later,
confronted with aggressive territorial push around the islands claimed by the Philippines in
the South China Sea, Manila is renewing its military partnership with the US.
Manila's rapidly changing relationship with Beijing and Washington was underscored last
week in two separate events. In the first, the president of the Philippines, Benigno Aquino,
cancelled a planned visit to China. Aquino was to attend an ASEAN-China trade expo this
week in Nanjing, but called it off at the last minute citing unreasonable Chinese political
demands. Senior officials in Manila told the press that Beijing wanted the Philippines to
withdraw an arbitration case it had filed last January at the UN on the disputed islands in
the South China Sea.
In the second, Manila hosted US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel to finalise arrangements
for a more effective American military presence in the Philippines to counter what it sees as
provocative patrolling by the Chinese navy. Manila is not offering permanent bases to
Washington but negotiating the terms for a credible but "rotational presence" of US forces
in the Philippines. A new agreement is expected to be signed by the time US President
Barack Obama visits the region for the annual East Asia Summit later this year.
New Partners
As it seeks to rebuild defence ties with the US, the Philippines doesn't want to rely on the US
alone. Manila wants multiple security partnerships with its Asian friends. Overcoming bitter
colonial memories, the Philippines is reaching out to Japan. Tokyo has agreed to beef up the
coast guard of the Philippines. Manila, in turn, is likely to offer Japan access to its naval
facilities. Last week, Manila received the Vietnamese defence minister, Phung Qang Thanh,
as part of a new effort to strengthen security cooperation with Hanoi, which also faces the
brunt of Chinese naval might in the South China Sea.
The Philippines is also eager for an intensive defence cooperation with India, but the
current military exchanges between the two countries are rather limited. If Delhi is serious
about gaining strategic influence in Asia, it should be paying a lot more political attention to
Manila.

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Iran Transit

C. Raja Mohan : Wed Aug 29 2012, 03:56 hrs

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