This document discusses the rights of the accused in a criminal proceeding under Philippine law. It covers 14 topics: 1) criminal due process, 2) self-incrimination, 3) custodial investigation, 4) bail, 5) presumption of innocence, 6) right to be heard, 7) assistance of counsel, 8) nature and cause of accusation, 9) the trial, 10) trial in absentia, 11) right of confrontation, 12) compulsory process, 13) prohibited punishments, and 14) double jeopardy. For each topic, it outlines the constitutional basis and scope of the right, limitations, requirements for a valid waiver of the right, and instances where denial of the right would violate due process
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Constitutional law, Bill of rights, rights of accused,
This document discusses the rights of the accused in a criminal proceeding under Philippine law. It covers 14 topics: 1) criminal due process, 2) self-incrimination, 3) custodial investigation, 4) bail, 5) presumption of innocence, 6) right to be heard, 7) assistance of counsel, 8) nature and cause of accusation, 9) the trial, 10) trial in absentia, 11) right of confrontation, 12) compulsory process, 13) prohibited punishments, and 14) double jeopardy. For each topic, it outlines the constitutional basis and scope of the right, limitations, requirements for a valid waiver of the right, and instances where denial of the right would violate due process
This document discusses the rights of the accused in a criminal proceeding under Philippine law. It covers 14 topics: 1) criminal due process, 2) self-incrimination, 3) custodial investigation, 4) bail, 5) presumption of innocence, 6) right to be heard, 7) assistance of counsel, 8) nature and cause of accusation, 9) the trial, 10) trial in absentia, 11) right of confrontation, 12) compulsory process, 13) prohibited punishments, and 14) double jeopardy. For each topic, it outlines the constitutional basis and scope of the right, limitations, requirements for a valid waiver of the right, and instances where denial of the right would violate due process
Rights of the accused...........................................................................................................1 1. Criminal due process ....................................................................................................2 2. Self incrimination..........................................................................................................5 3. Custodial Investigation...............................................................................................10 4. Bail ..............................................................................................................................20 5. Presumption of innocence .........................................................................................27 6. Right to be heard........................................................................................................33 7. Assistance of counsel .................................................................................................33 8. Nature and cause of accusation.................................................................................37 9. The Trial ......................................................................................................................41 10. Trial in absentia.......................................................................................................44 11. Right of confrontation ............................................................................................46 12. Compulsory process................................................................................................47 13. Prohibited punishments .........................................................................................50 14. Double jeopardy .....................................................................................................53 2 1. Criminal due process 1.1. No person shall be held to answer for an offense without due process of law (Sec. 14(1), Art III) 1.2. limitations 3 1.2.1. limited only to criminal proceedings 1.2.2. limited purely to procedural requirements 1.3. requisites of criminal due process 1.3.1. accused be tried by impartial and competent court 1.3.2. in accordance to procedure prescribed by law and 1.3.3. with proper observance of all the rights accorded him under the constitution and applicable statutes 1.4. Instances of denial of due process 4 1.4.1. Denial of right to preliminary investigation (Patanao vs Enage 121 SCRA 228) 1.4.1.1. Preliminary investigation is only a statutory right 1.4.1.2. Not among the rights prescribed under the Constitution 5 1.4.1.3. Denial without valid waiver constitutes denial of due process 1.4.2. Denial of motion to dismiss where evidence against accused is extremely tenuous (very weak) to sustain a prima facie case (no probable cause exists) - Salonga v. Panes 1.4.3. When the trial was not conducted in accordance with the rudiments of fair play, such as when the judge has an pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case 1.4.4. When there is a mistrial because of mob rule or interference or pressure from a high ranking official preventing the defense or rigging the decision 1.4.5. When there is prejudicial trial by publicity on the duty of government 1.4.6. When the charge was based on an unpublished law, order, regulation, or ordinance. The law expressly provides for publication of enacted laws, ordinances, or regulations in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or in the OG, before it can have force and effect upon the people governed by it. 1.4.7. Denial of appeal where it is permitted by statute or the constitution 2. Self incrimination 2.1. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself (Art III, Sec 17) 2.2. Based on humanitarian ang practical considerations 6 2.2.1. Humanitariian because it prevents the State from exacting testimony that might convict accused. 2.2.2. Practical because such compulsion perjures the accused for his own protection 2.3. Availability 2.3.1. In all criminal prosecutions 2.3.2. all other government proceedings 2.3.3. civil actions 2.3.4. administrative or legislative investigations 7 2.4. Who can claim 2.4.1. accused 2.4.2. a witness to whom incriminating questions are addressed 2.5. Scope 2.5.1. Covers 2.5.1.1. it covers against incriminating questions 2.5.1.2. Held against testimonial compulsiion only 2.5.1.3. The prohibition covers compulsion for the production of documents, papers and effects in evidence against the accused, except when the State has 8 the right to examine the same, such as books of accounts of corporations under the police power. 2.5.1.4. Where accused was compelled to furnish a specimen of his hand writing in evidence against him for falsification charge, the SC held this is covered by the prohibition, writing is not merely a mechanical act but requires application of intelligence and attention. (Beltran vs. Samson) 2.5.2. Does not cover 2.5.2.1. Does not cover compulsion to submit to physical examination to determine involvement in a crime charged. 2.5.2.2. An accused charged with rape was examined for gonorrhea, the SC held the examination was no different from fingerprint examination for identification purposes. (US vs. Tan Teng) 2.5.2.3. It was held that the prohibition applies only to the use of physical or moral compulsiion to extort testimony from accused, it does not exclude body of accused as evidence when it may be material (Holt vs US) 2.5.2.4. Does not cover all other questions that are relevant and otherwise allowed 2.5.2.5. It does not cover questions that may relate to past criminality whether prescribed, acquitted or convicted 9 2.5.2.6. Does not cover questions where previous immunity has been granted under a statute 2.6. When available 2.6.1. Only when the incriminating question is asked of ordinary witness 2.6.1.1. An ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand (Chavez, vs CA) 2.6.2. in case of the accused, he can refuse at the outset and to take the stand as a witness for the prosecution, on the reasonable presumption that his interrogation will be for the purpose to incriminate him (Chavez vs. CA) 2.7. Waiver 10 2.7.1. The right may be waived 2.7.2. waived directly or failure to invoke it 2.7.3. Provided waiver is intelligently, unequivocal, certain, willingly made 2.7.4. An accused who voluntarily submits an incriminating documents is deemed to have waived the privilege. 2.7.5. An accused who takes the stand and offers testimony on direct, he may be asked on cross examination incriminating questions on matters he testified to on direct 3. Custodial Investigation 11 3.1. Art III, Sec 12 3.1.1. Sec 12 stresses the right of the person under investigation to ""competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice"" 12 3.1.2. to be provided free if he cannot afford counsel de parte 3.1.3. These rights may be waived subject to the condition that it must be in writing and in the presence of counsel, who has presumably advised him, including the waiver of counsel's services (People vs. Galit) 3.2. It means any questioning intiated by law enforcement officers after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way (Miranda vs. Arizona) 3.3. In RA 7438, custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person suspected with an offense without prejudice to any liability of the inviting officer for violation of the law 3.4. admissability of extra judicial confession 3.4.1. it must be voluntary 3.4.2. assisted by competent and independent counsel 3.4.3. must be in writing 3.4.4. it must be express 3.5. Miranda doctrine (Miranda vs. Arizona) 13 3.5.1. a) Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent 3.5.2. b) that any statement he does make may be used in evidence against him 3.5.3. c) that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed 3.5.4. d) the defendant may waive his rights but waiver must be done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently 3.5.5. e) However, if he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the investigation that he wishes to consult with an attorney before further speaking, there can be no questioning. 3.5.6. f) If he is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated the police may not question him 3.5.7. g) The mere fact that he answered some questions on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further questions until he has consulted with his attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. 3.6. Confession inadmissible in violation of right against self incrimination (People vs Buscato) 14 3.6.1. Their conviction was reversed on grounds that the physical, mental,, and moral coercion exerted upon their persons rendered the confessions inadmissible as contrary to the right against self incrimination (People vs. Buscato) 3.7. A desirable end must not be accomplished by unconstitutional means (People vs Bagasala) 3.7.1. The imperative requirements of truth and humanity condemn the use of force and violence to extract information from unwilling victims. Crimes must be punished and the guilty must not escape. A desirable end cannot, however, be attained by unconstitutional means. (People vs Bagasala) 3.8. The interrogating officer must exercise patience in explaining the custodial rights (People vs. Ramos) 15 3.8.1. As mandated, it is not enough that the police merely inform the accused of his constitutional right to silence and to counsel... the interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him (the court observed the appellant has only finished Grade 6, which indicates he is not fully educated enough to understand fully and fairly the significance of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel). Conviction was reversed (People vs Ramos) 3.9. The manner of informing the accused must satisfy the requirements of the law (People vs Galit, Morales vs. Enrile) 3.9.1. The manner of informing the accused through a lengthy statement of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel followed by the question of whether he was ready to make his statement, to which the accused replied in a monosyllabic answer, ""Opo"", does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights (People vs Galit, citing Morales vs. Enrile) 16 3.10. Confession by a person whose sanity is dubious and where intelligence is not only limited but impaired must be disapproved (People vs. Capitin) 3.10.1. A reading of the supposed confession shows there was the mechanical advise of the suspect's rights including assistance of counsel, followed by the sacramental query as to whether or not she was waiving her rights to such assistance and followed by a stereotype answer in statements of this nature. The question was unacceptable, the answer thereto, is likewise unacceptable, as it could not have been possibly composed by accused appellant in her state of mind at the time (assuming she was sane) and given her limited knowledge of Tagalog (a 22 year old housemaid with her deficiencies in Tagalog, has killed her own child and was under strong emotional stress). If confessions written in advance by police officers for persons of limited intelligence or educational attainment is outlawed, the same disapprobation applies where a confession was signed by a person whose sanity is dubious, where the intelligence was not only limited but impaired. (People vs Capitin) 3.11. The swearing officers should have the confessant physically examined by independent doctors before administering the oath, to discourage attempts to secure confessions through violence (People vs. Barros) 3.12. When does right to counsel attach? (Gamboa vs. Cruz) 17 3.12.1. The right to counsel attached upon the start of an investigation, i.e., the investigation officer begins to ask questions to elicit information or confession from the accused (Gamboa vs. Cruz) 3.13. A police line up is not part of the custodial investigation 3.13.1. A police line up is not part of the custodial investigation and the right to counsel is not required. However, after the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an accused without the presence of counsel made in a police line up is inadmissible. (Gamboa vs. Cruz) 3.14. The right to counsel began when the interrogation started in Quezon (People vs Compil) 3.14.1. Where the accused was arrested in Quezon, subjected by the police to informal inculparoty interrogation that continued during their trip back to Manila, where his formal investigation was conducted at the police station and was without assistance of counsel until the following day, the SC held that his right to counsel began when the interrogation started in Quezon (People vs. Compil) 18 3.15. The operative act of custodial investigation (People vs Compil) 3.15.1. The operative act is when the question is no longer a general inquiry but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements (People vs Compil) 3.16. The constitution requires an effective and vigilant counsel (People vs Lucero) 3.16.1. In People vs Lucero, the SC held that the Constitution requires not just any kind of counsel, but an effective and vigilant counsel. In the case, the counsel merely signed a confession to authenticate regularity when in fact such confession was made under duress during interrogation by military escorts. The lawyer failed to perform his duty when he merely asks if such confession was freely made and did not ascertain the matter if such was the case before signing the same. 3.17. A re-enactment of the cirme in the absence of counsel is inadmissible evidence against accused. (People vs. Suarez) 19 3.18. The waiver of the suspect's custodial rights without assistance of counsel is invalid (People vs Bonola) 3.19. The taking of confession before advising the suspect of his custodial rights is inadmissible in evidence against him (People vs Andan) 3.20. The right to counsel is not unlimited where the accused repeatedly asked for postponement of his trial on grounds he was still looking for a lawyer de parte. The court should appoint counsel de officio for him. (People vs Serzo) 3.21. The right to counsel is absolute subject only to the limitation that it be exercised within a reasonable time 3.21.1. During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial, and even appeal, the accused has the option to be represented by counsel of his choice. In the event that accused refuses or neglects to exercise this right during arraignment and trial, the court should appoint one for him. While the right to counsel is absolute, the accused's option to exercise it is limited and cannot be sanctioned to trifle with the Rules or prejudice the right of the State to prosecute and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice. (People vs. Serzo) 3.22. Under RA 7399, victims of unjust imprisonment, arbitrary or illegal detention or of violent crimes may file a claim for damages with the Board of Claims under the DOJ. For victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, the award shall be not more than P1,000.oo per month of detention/imprisonment. In all other cases, the award shall not exceed 10,000.oo or the expenses incurred for hospitalization, medical 20 treatment, loss of wage, loss of support, or other expenses directly related to the injury, whichever is lower, without prejudice to the right of claimants to seek other remedies under existing laws. 4. Bail 21 22 4.1. All persons except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Art III, Sec. 13) 4.2. Definition 4.2.1. Bail is the security given for the provisional release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsmand conditioned upon his appearance before any court as may be required. 4.3. Bail as a matter of right 23 4.3.1. Rule 114 of the Rules provide that all persons in custody shall be entitled to bail as a matter of right except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong. 4.3.2. Even if the crime imputed is punishable by reclusion perpetua, th]e accused is still entitled to bail if the evidence of guilt is NOT strong. It is for the prosecution to prove the contrary although it is not necessary at this point to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (Pareja vs Gomez) 4.4. Exception to right to bail 4.4.1. The exception to bail applies to any offense which under prevailing laws at the time of its commission and at the time of application for bail, may be punished by reclusion perpetua or death, even if a lesser penalty may be imposed upon conviction owing to mitigating circumstances that may be disclosed later (People vs. Marcos) 4.4.2. However, an accused is entitled to bail if for example, he is charged with murder (capital offense) and evidence adduced by the prosecution at the hearing for bail indicates only a case of homicide (Bernardez vs. Valera) 24 4.5. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution has reversed the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile where it provides the right to bail is preserved even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. 4.6. When bail is cancelled and accused placed in confinement 4.6.1. Where the accused is convicted of a capital offense or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, his bail shall be cancelled, and shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal (People vs. Cortez) 4.7. Hearing for petition for bail is required to satisfy due process (Gerardo vs. CFI) 4.7.1. May be done summarily or held in the course of the trial itself. A separate hearing is not necessary (Gerardo vs. CFI) 4.8. Probability of escape is not ground for denial of bail (Zafra vs. City Warden) 25 4.8.1. The remedy is to increase the bail subject to the prohibition that it must not be excessive. (Zafra vs. City Warden) 4.8.2. After conviction, denial of bail is proper on grounds of risk of absconding (Zafra vs. City warden) 4.9. On humanitarian grounds, bail may be granted even when the evidence of guilt of the offense was strong in view of the illness of the accused which required his hospitalization (Dela Rama vs. People's Court) 4.10. Primary considerations in fixing the amount of bail (not exclusive) - Rule 114 4.10.1. Financial capability of accused 4.10.2. The nature and circumstances of the offense 4.10.3. The penalty for the offense charged 4.10.4. The character and reputation of the accused 26 4.10.5. his age and health 4.10.6. The weight of the evidence against him 4.10.7. The probability of his appearing in trial 4.10.8. The forfeiture of other bonds by him 4.10.9. The fact of his being a fugitive from justice when arrested 4.10.10. The pendency of other cases in which he is under bond 4.11. Bail not intended as punishment (Yap vs. CA) 4.11.1. The respondent court fixed the bail for appellant in the sum of P5,500,000. equivalent to his civil liability as found by the trial court. The SC reduced the bail to P200k, saying that bail is not intended as punishment nor as satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court. (Yap vs. CA) 4.12. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines 27 4.12.1. A person granted bail while facing estafa charges wanted to leave for abroad to attend to certain business matters. He was denied permission, on appeal to the SC the denial was sustained on the ground that if he were allowed to leave without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts (Manotoc vs. CA) 5. Presumption of innocence 5.1. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved (Art. III, Sec. 14(a)) 5.2. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt (People vs. Dramayo) 28 5.2.1. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 5.2.2. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 5.2.3. otherwise, he is entitled to acquittal 5.2.4. Conviction will depend not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. 5.3. Even up the odds in the interest of justice 5.3.1. The presumption of innocence to be fully adhered to requires that there be evidence sufficient to remove every vestige of reasonable doubt (US vs. Reyes) 5.3.2. Moral certainty not absolute certainty is required by the law to convict of any criminal charge and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense (US vs. Lasada) 5.3.3. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies, not even called upon to offer evidence on their behalf. (People vs Dramayo) 29 5.3.4. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence (People vs Malilay, also citing above cases) 5.4. The evidence of the defendant was weak, but the evidence of prosecution was weaker (People vs. Sunga) 5.4.1. In People vs Sunga, a prosecution for rape, the SC held that although the defense of appellant was weak, he nevertheless could not be convicted because of the constitutional presumption of innocence. The evidence of the prosecution is weaker. 5.5. The constitutional provision is expilcit 30 5.5.1. Explicit is the constitutional provision that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso (of a statute) contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. (Dumlao case) 5.6. An ambiguous evidence cannot justify condemnation of appellant (People vs Tempongko) 5.6.1. The guilt of appellant has not been established beyond reasonable doubt... The defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of the SolGen and the private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the appellant raped the complainant. The appellant may have been lying and there is evidence to this, but we are not prepared to accept, to the point of moral certainty, that the complainant is telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution cannot justify our condemning the appellant to prison where there are whispers of doubt that he is guilty. (People vs. Tempongko) 31 5.7. It may be overcome by contrary presumptions based on the experience of human conduct (People vs. Labara) 5.7.1. Unexplained flight may lead to an inference of guilt 5.7.2. Failure of accused to explain his possession of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable presumption that it was he himself who stole it (US vs Espia) 5.7.3. Under the RPC, failure of an accountable officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him constitutes prima facie evidence of misappropriation to personal uses (Art 217) 5.8. How about the presumption of regularity of official functions? 5.8.1. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by itself affect the constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by an accused, particularly when the prosecution's evidence is weak. xxx the onus 32 probandi on the prosecution is not discharged by casting doubts upon the innocence of the accused, but by eliminating all reasonable doubts as to his guilt (People vs Mirantes) 5.9. After the prosecution has adduced evidence, the constitutional presumption of innocence must yeild to what has been so amply and persuasively demonstrated (People vs. Villaluz) 5.9.1. It is incumbent on the accused who admitted the killing to establish his case of self defense instead of relying merely on the weakness of the prosecution (People vs. Regulacion) 5.10. On the right to remain silent 5.10.1. No inference of guilt may be drawn against an accused for his failure to make a statement of any sort. The neglect or refusal of the accused shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. (People vs. Arciaga) 5.10.2. While accused have a right to remain silent, they run the risk of an inference from the non-production of evidence (People vs Solis) 33 5.10.3. Failure of accused to testify may prejudice him if the prosecution has already established a prima facie case against him (People vs Resano) 5.10.4. The duty to apprise the accused of the right to be silent rests with the defense counsel, not with the court (People vs Tampus) 6. Right to be heard 6.1. ... and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel... 6.2. Such a right is indispensable in any criminal prosecution where the stakes are the liberty or even the life of the accused who must for this reason be given the chance to defend himself. 6.3. The SC set aside the conviction of three co-accused after finding they were denied due process because they were not given a chance to testify and to present additional evidence on their behalf. (People v. Lumague) 7. Assistance of counsel 34 7.1. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime (People vs. Lino) 7.2. The reason why the accused is entitled to be heard by himself and counsel. 7.2.1. An ordinary layman, let alone one who is ignorant or unlettered, is without knowledge of the intricacies of courtroom procedures. That is why the accused is entitled to be heard in his defense not only by himself but also with the assistance of counsel. He shall be appointed a counsel de officio if he cannot afford the services of a retained lawyer. 35 7.2.2. A counsel de officio should still, despite objection of accused, be appointed by the court to represent him. 7.3. The right to counsel is essential in criminal proceedings 7.3.1. In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel... Even the most intelligent man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. It is for this reason that the right to counsel is deemed important that it has become a constitutional right and is so implemented that under our rules of procedure, it is not enough for the court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de officio for him if he is poor or if he so desires, grant him reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own (People vs. Holgado) 7.4. The duty of the court is not ended with such appointment, as it should also see to it that counsel de oficio is doing his duty by the defendant. 36 7.4.1. Counsel de oficio should not merely make the motions of defending the accused but exert his utmost efforts as if he were representing a paying client. 7.4.2. The SC has reversed convictions based on pleas of guilty made on advice of counsel de oficio presumably seeking to avoid the inconveniences of unremunerated services. (People vs. Hondolero) 7.4.3. Thus, the judge should take extra care in informing the accused of his rights and the consequences of his plea of guilty, and in ascertaining the presence of different circumstances taken into account in imposing the proper penalty (People vs. Alde) 7.4.3.1. Justice Makasiar scolded the trial court for its pro forma appointment of a counsel de ofico, who in turn did not exert his best efforts for the protection of his non-paying client, and its own failure to explain to defendant the consequences of his plea of guilty. The judgment was set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings (People vs. Magsi) 37 7.4.4. In People vs. Malunsing, a defendant in a murder case had lost confidence in his former counsel and made manifest his intention to retain counsel de parte. Nevertheless the court appointed the same lawyer as his counsel de oficio. As the case proceeded, no evidence was adduced in behalf of the defendant. On appeal of his conviction, the SC remanded the case for new trial in view of the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. 7.5. Note that the right to be silent and to the assistance of counsel may be waived during custodial investigation under Art III, Sec. 12 (1). The right to counsel does not cease after trial but continues even when the case is appealed (People vs Rio) 8. Nature and cause of accusation 8.1. to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him... 8.2. The defendant is entitled to know the nature and cause of accusation against him so he can adequately prepare for his defense. He cannot defend if he has to guess at the charge leveled against him because of the ambiguous language of the complaint or information. 8.3. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person 38 of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Rule 110 Sec. 8, Rules of Court) 8.4. The description and not the designation of the offense is controlling. Hence even if there be an erroneous designation, the accused may still be validly convicted of the crime described in the information. 8.4.1. In Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan, a prosecutor entrapped by the NBI was charged with and convicted of violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The SC agreed with him that the said law was inapplicable but rejected his submission that he could not also be convicted of bribery under the RPC because this would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. ""Wrong,"" said justice Abad Santos. ""A reading of the information... clearly makes out a case of bribery."" 8.4.2. A person charged with rape, of which he was later absolved, could not be convicted of qualified seduction which was not included in the information. A separate charge should be filed alleging all the elements of qualified seduction. (People vs. Ramirez; People vs. Quintal) 8.4.3. The conviction was rape by intimidation, whereas the information charge the accused with raping his daughter while she was asleep and unconscious, 39 violates his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. (People vs. Abino) 8.4.4. The conviction was for having indirectly caused the death of the complainant, (who took her own life two days after the alleged incident of rape), whereas the information alleges rape. The SC held: The judgment indicates the accused was convicted of homicide. If this is so, the lower court is in grave error for he was never charged with said offense; he was accused of and tried for rape. (People vs Montes) 8.4.5. A person charged with homicide by drowning could not be convicted with homicide by stabbing which was not the crime alleged in the information (People v. Ortega) 8.5. Void for vagueness rule 8.5.1. Where the statute itself is couched in such indefinite language, such that it is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and hence, should be avoided. 8.5.2. To charge an accused for penalties under a statute couched in vague language constitutes denial of the right to be informed of the charge against him, and to due process as well. 8.5.3. Reasonable degree of certainty and not absolute precision for a statute to be upheld. 40 8.5.3.1. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. The vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld-not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude... Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity is permissible, as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan) 8.6. The purpose of arraignment is to inform the accused why he is being prosecuted. 8.6.1. An arraignment assures [the defendant] that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is not useless formality, much less an idle ceremony. (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan) 41 8.7. The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. (People vs Crisologo) 9. The Trial 9.1. to have a speedy, impartial and public trial... (Sec 14 (2)) 9.2. impartial trial 9.2.1. requires the cold neutrality of an impartial judge to ensure that justice is done to the defendant. (Gutierrez vs Santos) 9.2.2. It was held as part of the rule that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial (Fernandez vs. Presbitero) 9.2.3. It is beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just (Mateo vs Villaluz) 9.2.4. Convictions are based not on mere appearance of the accused (tadtad ng tattoo), but on his actual commission of the offense, to be ascertained with the 42 pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law for all without favor or malice and always with justice (People vs. Opida) 9.3. public trial 9.3.1. Publicity is necessary to avoid abuses that may be committed by the court to the prejudice of the defendant. 9.3.2. The people have the right to attend the proceedings to see whether or not the constitutional safeguards for the benefit of the accused are being observed. 9.3.2.1. This rule is not absolute. The court can bar the public in certain cases, like rape trials. 9.4. speedy trial 43 9.4.1. Defined as one free from vexatious, capricious, and oppresive delays (Flores vs People, 61 SCRA 331) 9.4.2. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi judicial, or administrative bodies. (Art III, Sec. 16, Bill of Rights) 9.4.3. We lay down the legal proposition that where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus, to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom (Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650) 9.4.4. The respondent court's delay of more than one year in resolving petitioner's motion to dismiss the charges against him violated the right to speedy trial, considering all pertinent pleadings required by the Sandiganbayan had already been submitted (Cojuanco vs. Sandiganbayan) 9.4.5. It was held, since the prosecution, by repeated motions for postponement caused the delay of the proceedings from the time the information was filed in Feb 1996, from which time the test of violation of the right to speedy trial is to be counted, the dismissal of the case, on motion of the accused, amounts to acquittal. (Padilla vs. Apas, 487 SCRA 29) 44 9.4.6. Speed is not the chief objective of a trial... more than the mere convenience of the courts or the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby are more important than a race to end the trial. (Amberti v. CA) 9.4.7. The right to speedy trial, which begins from the filing of the information, cannot be quantified in a specified number of days... but must be examined in light of surrounding circumstances such as the unavailability of witnesses.(Martin vs. Ver, 123 SCRA 745) 9.5. The right to be present at trial is personal and can be waived. 9.5.1. However, the rule is subject to qualification, for purposes of identification, the accused may be required to be present at the hearing where the prosecution intends to introduce witnesses who will identify him. (People vs. Presiding Judge, People vs. Macaraeg, 141 SCRA 37) 9.5.2. She had by repeated failure to attend the hearings waived her right to the trial, adding that speedy justice is as much a prerogative of an accused as of complainant (People vs. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957) 10. Trial in absentia 45 10.1. Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights provide ""after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. 10.2. Requisites 10.2.1. a) the accused has already been arraigned 10.2.2. b) he has been duly notified of the trial 10.2.3. c) his failure to appear is unjustified 10.3. In the old case of People vs Avacena, the case of the defendant was suspended on grounds that his presence is required at certain stages of the trial. Thus, his escape operate to his advantage. Now, the doctrine has been qualified by Sec. 14, which allows trial in absentia. Thus, escape will operate as a waiver of his right to be present and not interrupt his trial. Also the requirement of due notice will be deemed received by him on the fact of his escape. The fact of his escape will 46 make his failure to appear unjustified because he has by escaping placed himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law (People vs. Salas) 10.4. A judgment of conviction will be set aside if it appears the accused was tried and convicted in his absence before he had been formally arraigned. (Borja vs Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422) 10.5. Arraignment is an indispensable pre-requisite to trial in absentia, to accord an accused due process. (Borja vs Mendoza) 10.6. The court has the power to forfeit the bail bond if the accused fails to appear at his trial (Rule 114, Sec 18) 10.7. The trial court committed a grave error in reconsidering its original order and deferred confiscation of bail bond of accused, who had already gone abroad and could not attend his trial, as being premature until judgment is rendered. (People vs. Prieto) 11. Right of confrontation 11.1. to meet the witnesses face to face... 11.2. To give the accused an opportunity of cross examination (US vs Javier) 11.3. To prevent convictions based on depositions or ex parte affidavits which are regarded as hearsay and excluded by the Rules of Court. 47 11.4. An affidavit implicating the accused as a drug pusher was rejected as mere hearsay by the SC because the affiant had not been presented in court and so could not be cross examined by the defense. (People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312) 11.5. A conviction based on mere affidavits and denying the defense the right to.. cross examine the affiants was annulled by the SC. (Combate vs. San Jose 135 SCRA 693) 11.6. the witness must be presented in court 11.6.1. to enable the accused to confront him on cross examination 11.6.2. to enable the court to observe his demeanor and guage the credibility of his testimony 11.7. Depositions and ex parte affidavits are inadmissible unless the person making them are presented in court for examination on their statements by the judge and the accused. Evidence of this nature is hearsay and excluded by the rules. 11.8. if a prosecution witness dies before his cross examination can be completed, his direct testimony cannot be stricken off the record, provided the material points of his direct testimony had been covered on cross.(People vs. Seneres) 12. Compulsory process 48 12.1. and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf... 12.2. Accused is entitled to issuance of 12.2.1. subpoena 12.2.1.1. for the purpose of securing the attentance of witnesses 12.2.2. subpoena duces tecum 49 12.2.2.1. for the purpose of production of evidence in his behalf 12.2.3. Failure to comply consitutes contempt and a witness may be arrested so he can give the needed evidence. 12.3. There is denial of the right to compulsory process where the court, instead of taking steps to compel the attendance of a witness, held the defense responsible for bringing her to trial and that her testimony will be dispensed with if she fails to appear in the proceeding. (People vs Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388) 12.4. Where medical evidence can be adduced through other witnesses and hospital records, the refusal of the trial court to grant leave to serve written interrogatories on a doctor who already left for abroad can be sustained (Fajardo vs. Garcia, 99 SCRA 514) 12.5. Exceptional circumstances on conditional examination (Rule 119) 12.5.1. Where the testimony is material and the witness is so sick as to afford reasonable ground to believe that he will not be able to attend the trial 50 12.5.2. Where the witness resides more than 100 kilometers from the place of trial and has no means to attend the same 12.5.3. Other similar circumstances exists that would prevent him from attending the trial 12.6. The right to compulsary processes must be invoked during trial. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver that cannot be undone on appeal. (US vs. Garcia, 10 Phil. 384) 13. Prohibited punishments 13.1. Sec 19(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.... 13.2. To be violative, the penalty must be inhuman and barbarous and shocking to the conscience (People vs. Dionisio) 13.3. Torture is a cruel punishment because it involves a deliberate design to increase the suffering of a prisoner in a manner so flagrant and oppressive as to revolt the moral sense of the community. 13.4. When is punishment degrading and inhuman 51 13.4.1. A prostitute required to go naked in public in expiation of her crime 13.4.2. A thief to wear a stigmatizing emblem of his calling in public 13.5. The death penalty 13.5.1. is not allowed except as penalty for heinous crimes as provided in RA 7659. 13.6. Cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment 13.6.1. The punishment must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive, wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community, not merely harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution (People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil 674) 13.6.2. A punishment cruel, degrading and inhuman also violates the due process clause which requires the equivalence between the degree of the offense and the degree of the penalty. 52 13.6.3. There are penalties not normally proportionate to the offense in some instances are imposed without violating the fundamental law, such as where the offense has become rampant as to require the adoption of a more effective deterrent. 13.7. Excessive fines 13.7.1. this prohibition is addressed to the legislature and to the courts 13.7.2. In determination of the fine to be imposed, 13.7.2.1. take into account the financial condition of the convict. to prevent the fine from becoming excessive and discriminatory. 13.7.3. A fine is imposed as a penalty and not as payment for a specific loss or injury, and since its lightness or severity depends upon the culprit's wealth or means, it is only just and proper that the latter be taken into account in fixing the amount (People vs Ching Kuan, 74 Phil. 23) 13.7.4. Obviously, to impose the same amount of fine for the same offense upon two persons thus differently circumstanced would be to mete out to them a 53 penalty of unequal severity and hence, unjustly discriminatory (People vs. Ching Kuan) 14. Double jeopardy 14.1. Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. 14.2. Definition 54 14.2.1. The right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution again of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. 14.2.2. The object is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be put to the dangers and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. 14.3. Requisites of 14.3.1. a) a valid coomplaint or information 14.3.2. b) filed before competent court 14.3.3. c) to which the defendant had pleaded 14.3.4. d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 14.4. Complaint or information (not defective) 55 14.4.1. An invalid complaint or information cannot lead to a valid judgment and hence will not place the accused under jeopardy 14.4.2. Where the original information is defective and on motion of accused the case is dismissed, the correct information may be validly refiled without the accused placed in jeopardy. 14.4.3. However, if, without the express consent of the accused, the information is dismissed on the ground that it is defective, when in fact it is not so, another prosecution based on the same allegation will constitute double jeopardy. 14.5. Competent court (Jurisdiction) 56 14.5.1. A court devoid of jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment 14.5.2. Thus a person charged in a court without jurisdiction cannot plead double jeopardy when tried anew for the same offense by a competent court as the first prosecution never placed him in jeopardy. 14.5.3. Where a charge for estafa was dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction and subsequently a charge for the same offense was commenced in a court with 57 competent jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not attach because the defendant had not been in danger of conviction in the original prosecution. (People vs. Galano) 14.5.4. Where the defendant was convicted in the first proceedings which was not recorded and on appeal the defendant was convicted anew in a court with concurrent original jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not attach because the first proceeding was void for lack of record. Double jeopardy requires a valid previous proceedings. (People vs. Brecinio) 14.5.5. Where a court martial and a civil court have concurrent jurisdiction, a decision by one court will bar another prosecution for the same offense in the other court. (Crisologo vs People) 14.5.6. Where an information is motu proprio dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by a court which is actually competent to hear it, the dismissal will inure to the benefit of the accused, who is entitled to plead double jeopardy. (US v. Regala, 28 Phil. 57) 14.5.7. Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144, (Olaguer doctrine) - held that military courts have no jurisdiction to try cases of civilians which fell under the competence of ordinary civil courts even during the period of martial law. No jeopardy in retrial in competent civil courts because of absence of jurisdiction of courts martial to try and convict prisoners. There is jeopardy if there is a valid previous proceeding. Absent a valid previous proceeding, retrial in competent civil courts will not result in double jeopardy. 14.5.8. Tan vs. Barrios, 160 SCRA 702 - The Olaguer doctrine applies prospectively only to future cases and cases still pending when that decision was promulgated. No retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of Olaguer decision. 14.6. Valid plea (after arraignment) 58 14.6.1. A defendant is never place in jeopardy until after he shall have pleaded to the charge against him during arraignment. 14.6.2. Where a defective complaint was dismissed before arraignment of defendant and an amended complaint was later filed, double jeopardy does not attach because there was no valid previous indictment. (US vs. Solis, 6 Phil 676) 14.6.3. The accused pleaded guilty during arraignment. Thereafter, defendant testified to prove mitigating circumstances. The trial court acquitted the defendant. The government appealed. The defendant interposed the defense of double jeopardy. The SC held there had been no standing plea at the time the trial court rendered its judgment of acquittal because the testimony of accused had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty. Thus double jeopardy did not attach with respect to the appeal. (People vs. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 119) 14.7. Termination of case 59 14.7.1. General rule: a dismissal with the express consent of the defendant will not bar another prosecution for the same offense because said consent amounts to waiver of his right against double jeopardy. 14.7.2. To be effective, the consent must be expressly given. Mere silence or failure to object to the dismissal are excluded. (People vs Ylagan) 14.7.3. In the morning, the prosecutor moved for dismissal of the case for frustrated murder on ground of lack of jurisdiction because intent to kill was not alleged in the information. Counsel for the defense manifested he had no objection to the dismissal. The court granted the motion. In the afternoon of the same day, accused filed a manifestation making of record his opposition to the dismissal of the case. The motion was denied. The prosecutor later filed a new information for the same offense. The accused moved to quash on double jeopardy. The motion was granted holding the dismissal was erroneous, and not made with the express consent of defendant. The SC held that the oral manifestation of counsel of accused that he had no objection to dismissal of the case was equivalent to a declaration of conformity to its dismissal or to an express consent to its termination within the meaning of Section 9 Rule 117. 60 14.7.4. Where the motion to dismiss by accused was granted on grounds of insufficient information, he cannot invoke double jeopardy on grounds that the original information was sufficient when the case is refiled on a corrected information (People vs. Reyes, 98 Phil. 646) 14.7.5. Neither can he, upon dismissal on motion for lack of jurisdiction, question his prosecution on same offense before another court, on grounds that the first court had jurisdiction after all. The SC will not permit him to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions (People vs Acierto, 92 Phil. 534) 14.7.6. The question to be resolved is whether the state can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense? We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge, he can no longer be detained or re- arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basiic and elementary that it needs no elaboration (Toyoto vs. Ramos, 139 SCRA 316) 14.7.7. Appeal of prosecution 14.7.7.1. The prosecution can appeal where the accused is deemed to have waived or estopped from invoking his right against double jeopardy. 61 14.7.7.2. Exception: double jeopardy is available to the accused where dismissal of prosecution against him, even with his express consent, was based on insufficiency of evidence(Pp vs. City Court of Silay) or denial of his right to speedy trial (Pp vs. Anano 97 phil 28) 14.7.7.3. The order of dismissal of the charge for falsification was based on the merits (on the ground that guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt) and, although erroneous (the dismissal) amounted to an acquittal which therefore could not be appealed by the government (People vs. City Court of Silay) 14.7.7.4. The prosecutor was not ready because his witness was absent. The accused insisted on their right to speedy trial. The judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case without the defendant's express consent. The SC held the case could not be reviewed (on appeal) because double jeopardy had attached. (Esmena vs. Pogoy, 100 SCRA 861) 14.7.7.5. A motion to quash was filed before defendant makes his plea, can be appealed as he has not yet been placed in jeopardy (Rule 117) 14.7.7.6. The accused was acquitted without giving the prosecution its day in court, amount to denial of due process may be validly appealed (Pp vs. Navarro 63 SCRA 264) 14.7.7.7. An order of dismissal or an acquittal made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction may be appealed (People vs Pablo, 98 SCRA 289) 14.7.7.8. Where a person tried for theft was acquitted of the separate charge of grave coercion may be appealed (Pp v. Consulta, 70 SCRA 277) 14.8. Crimes covered 62 14.8.1. If the four elements of double jeopardy are present the accused may not be prosecuted anew for the original offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information or complaint. 14.8.1.1. A person acquitted of murder cannot be prosecuted again for the same murder, or for homicide, as this is embraced in the first offense. 14.8.1.2. If the original prosecution for homicide fails, he cannot again be indicted, this time for murder, as this embraces the original charge. 14.8.1.3. The effect of prosecuting first the lesser offense where a larger offense has been committed and could be prosecuted would be to split the larger offense into its lesser parts, thus bringing the man into jeopardy for each of such parts. This is unthinkable. The State in electing to prosecute the first one waives, in legal effect, all the others. (People vs. Besa, 74 Phil 57) 14.9. Doctrine of supervening event 63 14.9.1. Under the doctrine of supervening event, the accused may be prosecuted for another offense if a subsequent development changes the character of the first indictment under which he may have already been charged or convicted. 14.9.1.1. A person convicted of physical injuries may still be prosecuted for homicide, if the victim dies later (Diaz v. US) 14.9.1.2. The accused was charged with slight physical injuries. He pleaded not guilty. The charge was later changed to serious physical injuries when it appeared that the wounds inflicted, after healing, had left permanent scars on 64 the face of the victim. The SC held that there was no double jeopardy as the deformity did not exist and could not have been apprehended at the time the first information was filed. (People vs. Adil, 76 SCRA 462) 14.9.2. Instances in Rule 117 where the conviction of accused shall not bar another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the first complaint or information: 14.9.2.1. a) a graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge. 14.9.2.2. b) the facts constituting the graver offense became known or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information or 14.9.2.3. c) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in Sec. 1(f) of Rule 116. 14.10. Inseparable offenses 65 14.10.1. Where one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from the same act, they cannot be the subject of separate prosecutions. 14.10.1.1.A person indicted for smoking opium cannot be charged also with possessing opium (US vs. Pho Chi, 20 Phil. 140) 66 14.10.1.2.One convicted of less physical injuries cannot be later charged with assault on a person in authority committed on the same occasion and against the same victim (Tacas vs. Cariaso, 72 SCRA 528) 14.10.2. However, it is possible for one act to give rise to several crimes, in which case separate prosecutions for each crime may be filed, provided the elements of the several crimes are not identical. 14.10.2.1.Example; a person while driving without a license involved in an accident may be prosecuted both for damage to property and violation of the Motor Vehicles Law (People vs. Guanco, 47 OG 4179) 14.10.2.2.A pardonee who commits the crime of falsification and thus violates the condition of his pardon can be prosecuted for both offenses without denial of the right against double jeopardy.(Culanag vs Director of Prisons, 20 SCRA 1123) 14.10.2.3.The carrying of an unlicensed firearm during election period constitutes two offenses arising from the same act that can be separately prosecuted (Tapales vs CA, 120 SCRA 471) 67 14.10.2.4.Conviction of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code does not bar prosecution for estafa (People vs. Saley, 291 SCRA 715) 14.10.2.5.When the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case, it appears clear to us, the first offense charged is that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penailzed under a special statute, while the second offense charged was that of murder punished under the RPC. These two offenses in themselves are different one from the other, such that in principle the subsequent filing of the second charged is not to be regarded as having place appellant in prohibited second jeopardy. (People vs. Tac-an) 14.10.2.6.A plea of double jeopardy cannot be accorded merit where two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law however closely they may appear to be connected in fact. Protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offense. Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same technical offense.(same facts), if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.(Perez vs CA 168 SCRA 236) 14.10.2.7.Common elements between consented abduction and qualified seduction; (1) the offended party is a virgin, and (2) she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age. However, two elements differentiate the two crimes. In consented abduction; (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent and (2) the taking away must be with lewd design. In qualified abduction (1) the crime was committed by abuse of authority, confidence, or relationship (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman. (Perez vs. CA) 14.11. An act violating a law or ordinance 68 14.11.1. Two kinds of double jeopardy (Yap vs. Luterom[1959]) 14.11.1.1.The first sentence provide, no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense 14.11.1.1.1. This prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense 14.11.1.1.2. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided he is charged with different offenses or 69 the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include the crime charged in the other case. 14.11.1.2.The second sentence provide, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. 14.11.1.2.1. This prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same act 14.11.1.2.2. The second sentence applies even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense,even if there has been neither conviction or acquittal in either case.