VICTORIA S. JARILLO v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164435, Septembe !", !##".
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of one's marriage to another cannot be
considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment the former contracted a
second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the
crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage, the first marriage has not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction, and is thus still deemed valid and subsisting.
FLORENCIA G. $IA% v. REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1(15#!, Feb)*+ !, !#1#
In registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land ct for the judicial
confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for
registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not
only against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.
n amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a contract and
must necessarily comply with the provisions of rticle !"!# of the $ew %ivil %ode which
provides that there is no contract unless the following requisites concur& '!( %onsent of the
contracting parties) '*( +bject certain which is the subject matter of the contract) '"( %ause
of the obligation which is established.
RA,-&N$O S. $E LEON v. 'ENITA T. ONG
G.R. No. 1.#4#5, Feb)*+ !, !#1#.
In a contract of sale, the seller conveys ownership of the property to the buyer upon
the perfection of the contract. ,hould the buyer default in the payment of the purchase price,
the seller may either sue for the collection thereof or have the contract judicially resolved
and set aside. The non-payment of the price is therefore a negative resolutory condition. +n
the other hand, a contract to sell is subject to a positive suspensive condition. The buyer does
not acquire ownership of the property until he fully pays the purchase price. .or this reason,
if the buyer defaults in the payment thereof, the seller can only sue for damages.
There is a double sale where a property was sold validly on two separate occasions
by the same seller to the two different buyers in good faith. /nder rticle !011 of the %ivil
%ode, when neither buyer registered the sale of the properties with the registrar of deeds, the
one who too2 prior possession of the properties shall be the lawful owner thereof.
THE CIT, -A,OR OF 'AG&IO */0 THE HEA$ OF THE $E-OLITION TEA- 1
ENGR. NA%ITA 'A2E% v. ATT,. 'RAIN -AS3ENG, Re45o/*6 He*5/4 O7758e,
NCIP9CAR, THE HEIRS OF J&$ITH CARI2O, JAC:&ELINE CARI2O */0 t;e
HEIRS OF -ATEO CARI2O */0 'A,OSA ORTEGA
G.R. No. 165##3, Feb)*+ !, !#1#
3here one's ancestral land claims are still pending before the $ational %ommission
on Indigenous People '$%IP( for the validation, his rights over said ancestral land, if any,
are mere e4pectations. They are not the present and unmista2able right required for the grant
of the provisional remedy of injunction.
$ORIS &. S&N'AN&N v. A&RORA '. GO
G.R. No. 163!(#, Feb)*+ !, !#1#.
/nder rticle !501 of the %ivil %ode, the lessor is obliged to maintain the lessee in
the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the duration of the contract. 6ence,
where the lessor ejected the lodgers of the lessee without just cause and prior to the
e4piration of contract of lease, the former is liable for breach of contract. ,ince said act was
also done in bad faith, moral and e4emplary damages may be awarded.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. v. CA */0 NATIVI$A$ */0 ENRI:&E AGANA
G.R. No. 1!6!"., Feb)*+ !, !#1#
3here an employment relationship e4ists, the hospital may be held vicariously liable
under rticle *!75 in relation to rticle *!#8 of the %ivil %ode or the principle of respondeat
superior. 9ven when no employment relationship e4ists but it is shown that the hospital holds
out to the patient that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under
rticle *!75 in relation to rticle !1"! and rticle !#5: of the %ivil %ode or the principle of
apparent authority. ;oreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital may
be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or failure to follow established
standard of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation.
SPO&SES -ORRIS CARPO */0 SOCORRO CARPO v. A,ALA LAN$,
INCORPORATE$
G.R. No. 1665.., Feb)*+ 3, !#1#.
Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an
impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit.

NORTH3EST AIRLINES, INC. v. SPO&SES E$3AR$ J. HESHAN AN$ NELIA L.
HESHAN AN$ $ARA GANESSA L. HESHAN, REPRESENTE$ ', HER PARENTS
E$3AR$ AN$ NELIA HESHAN
G.R. No. 1."11., Feb)*+ 3, !#1#.
;oral damages are neither intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer nor to
enrich the claimant. 3hile courts are given discretion to determine the amount of damages
to be awarded, it is limited by the principle that the amount awarded should not be palpably
and scandalously e4cessive.
SPO&SES E&LOGIO N. ANTA%O */0 NELIA C. ANTA%O v. LEONI$ES $O'LA$A,
$IOS$A$O CELESTRA, LEOPOL$O CELESTRA, FER$INAN$ CELESTRA, */0
RO'ERTO $O'LA$A
G.R. No. 1.("#(, Feb)*+ 4, !#1#
Prior physical possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case.
party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself. 3hatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a
person with a better right lawfully ejects him. The party in peaceable quiet possession shall
not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
FLOR -ARTINE%, epe<e/te0 b+ -ACARIO -ARTINE%, *)t;o5=e0 epe<e/t*t5ve
*/0 Atto/e+95/9F*8t v. ERNESTO G. GARCIA */0 E$IL'ERTO -. 'R&A
G.R. No. 166536, Feb)*+ 4, !#1#
purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a
full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the
claims or interest of some other person in the property. 6ence, where a judgment creditor, in
registering a notice of attachment in her favor over the properties of his judgment debtor and
noticed that a third party has already annotated an adverse claim over the same, he cannot
be said to be a buyer in good faith when he later buys the property at a public auction. The
previous inscription must prevail over the former.
G.G. SPORTS3EAR -AN&FACT&RING CORP. */0 NARESH >. GI$3ANI v.
'ANCO $E ORO &NI'AN>, INC., et *6.
G.R. No. 1(4434. Feb)*+ (, !#1#
<The test for issuing a T=+ or an injunction is whether the facts show a need for
equity to intervene in order to protect perceived rights in equity. In general, a higher court
will not set aside the trial court>s grant or denial of an application for preliminary injunction
unless it gravely abused its discretion as when it lac2s jurisdiction over the action, ignores
relevant considerations that stic2 out of the parties> pleadings, sees the facts with a blurred
lens, ignores what is relevant, draws illogical conclusions, or simply acts in random
fashion.?
HEIRS OF ESTELITA '&RGOS9LIPAT v. HEIRS OF E&GENIO $. TRINI$A$
G.R. No. 1(5644. -*8; !, !#1#
<The one-year redemption period applied by the % is the rule that generally applies
to foreclosure of mortgage by a ban2. The period of redemption is not tolled by the filing of a
complaint or petition for annulment of the mortgage and the foreclosure sale conducted
pursuant to the said mortgage. 6owever, considering the e4ceptional circumstances
surrounding this case, we will not apply the rule in this instance pro hac vice.?
HEIRS OF JOSE LI-, epe<e/te0 b+ ELENITO LI- v. J&LIET VILLA LI-
G.R. No. 1.!6"#, -*8; 3, !#1#.
partnership e4ists when two or more persons agree to place their money, effects,
labor, and s2ill in lawful commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be a
proportionate sharing of the profits and losses among them. contract of partnership is
defined by the %ivil %ode as one where two or more persons bind themselves to contribute
money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits
among themselves.
CAR-EN $EL PRA$O v.
SPO&SES ANTONIO L. CA'ALLERO */0 LEONAR$A CA'ALLERO
G.R. No. 14(!!5, -*8; 3, !#1#.
In the case where the area of an immovable is stated in the contract based on an
estimate, the actual area delivered may not measure up e4actly with the area stated in the
contract. ccording to rticle !01* of the %ivil %ode, in the sale of real estate, made for a
lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be
no increase or decrease of the price, although there be a greater or less areas or number
than that stated in the contract.
3here both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared, the area
covered within the boundaries of the immovable prevails over the stated area. In cases of
conflict between areas and boundaries, it is the latter which should prevail. 3hat really
defines a piece of ground is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in
its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its
limits.
-ARIA VIRGINIA V. RE-O v. THE HONORA'LE SECRETAR, OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, G.R. No. 16"!#!, -*8; 5, !#1#.
,ection 0'd( of = #*": <limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed
to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport.? These instances are death of
husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage.
SPO&SES NOR-AN >. CERTE%A, JR. */0 -A. ROSANILA V. CERTE%A, A-A$A
P. VILLA-A,OR */0 HER-INIO VILLA-A,OR, JR. v. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS
'AN>
G.R. No. 1"##.(, -*8; 5, !#1#.
The requirement for at least two participating bidders provided in the original version of
paragraph 0 of .;. $o. ::-!8-80-8 is not found in ct $o. "!"0. The two-bidder rule is provided
under P.@. $o. !0:1 and its implementing rules with respect to contracts for government
infrastructure projects because of the public interest involved. lthough there is a public interest in
the regularity of e4trajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, the private interest is predominant.
LEIGHTON CONTRACTORS PHILIPPINES, INC. v. CNP IN$&STRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 16#".!, -*8; ", !#1#.
In a contract for a piece of wor2, a claim for the cost of additional wor2 arising from
changes in the scope of wor2 can only be allowed upon the& '!( written authority from the
developer or project owner ordering or allowing the written changes in wor2 and '*( written
agreement of parties with regard to the increase in price or cost due to the change in wor2 or
design modification. The absence of one or the other condition bars the recovery of
additional costs.
TEOFISTO O2O, PREC, O. NA-'ATAC, VICTORIA O. -AN&GAS */0 POLOR O.
CONSOLACION v. VICENTE N. LI-
G.R. No. 154!.#, -*8; ", !#1#.
Auieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or
uncertainty affecting title to real property. 3henever there is a cloud on title to real property
or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other real
rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
JOCEL,N -. S&A%O v. ANGELITO S&A%O */0 REP&'LIC OF THEPHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1644"3, -*8; 1#, !#1#.
6abitual drun2enness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. ll these
simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the
cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity
in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.
TITAN CONSTR&CTION CORP. v. -AN&EL A. $AVI$, SR. */0 -ARTHA S. $AVI$
G.R. No. 16"54(, -*8; 15, !#1#.
ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains e4clusively to the husband or to the wife. +ne is not
required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. =ather, the
presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not
appear. .ailure to overturn such presumption, the property is deemed to be part of the
conjugal partnership. 6ence, in conveying the same, the consent of both spouses is required.
bsent the consent of one spouse would render the sale null and void.
'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAN$S v. RE,NAL$ R. S&ARE%
G.R. No. 16..5#, -*8; 15, !#1#.
$egligence is defined as <the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent man and reasonable man could not
do.?
The following are the conditions for the award of moral damages& '!( there is an
injury B 369T69= += $+T physical, mental or psychological B clearly sustained by the
claimant) '*( the culpable act or omission is factually established) '"( the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the pro4imate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant) and
'1( the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in article **!: of the civil
code.
L,$IA L. ROA v. HEIRS OF SANTIAGO E'ORA, et *6
G.R. No. 16113., -*8; 15, !#1#.
The claim of indefeasibility of the petitioner>s title under the Torrens land title system
would be correct if a previous valid title to the same parcel of land did not e4ist. If the first
registered owner had a valid title and never parted with it nor handed or delivered to anyone
its owner>s duplicate of the transfer certificate of title, he should not be faulted for any act
which, without his 2nowledge, brought about the issuance of another certificate upon which a
purchaser in good faith and for value could rely. If the title of purchaser in good faith and for
value will be upheld, then registered owners without the least fault on their part could be
divested of their title and deprived of their property. ,uch disastrous results which would
sha2e and destroy the stability of land titles had not been foreseen by those who had endowed
with indefeasibility land titles issued under the Torrens system.
S&LPICIO LINES, INC. v. $O-INGO E. C&RSO, L&CIA E. C&RSO, -ELECIO E.
C&RSO, SEG&N$O E. C&RSO, VIRGILIO E. C&RSO, $IOS$A$A E. C&RSO, */0
CECILIA E. C&RSO
G.R. No. 15.##", -*8; 1., !#1#.
s a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract, unless there is fraud or bad faith. s an e4ception, moral
damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract of carriage that results in the death of
a passenger, in accordance with rticle !751, in relation to rticle **85 '"(, of the %ivil
%ode. The foregoing legal provisions set forth the persons entitled to moral damages. The
omission from rticle **85 '"( of the brothers and sisters of the deceased passenger reveals
the legislative intent to e4clude them from the recovery of moral damages for mental anguish
by reason of the death of the deceased. Inclusio unius est e4clusio alterius.
PAN PACIFIC SERVICE CONTRACTORS, INC. */0 RICAR$O F. $EL ROSARIO v.
E:&ITA'LE PCI 'AN> ?7ome6+ THE PHILIPPINE CO--ERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL 'AN>@ G.R. No. 16"".5, -*8; 1(, !#1#.
rticle !:05 of the %ivil %ode, which refers to monetary interest, specifically
mandates that no interest shall be due unless it has been e4pressly stipulated in
writing. Therefore, payment of monetary interest is allowed only if& '!( there was an e4press
stipulation for the payment of interest) and '*( the agreement for the payment of interest was
reduced in writing. The concurrence of the two conditions is required for the payment of
monetary interest.
SPO&SES -ELCHOR */0 SAT&RNINA AL$E v. RONAL$ '. 'ERNAL, OL,-PIA '.
ERNAL, J&ANITO '. 'ERNAL, */0 -,RNA $. 'ERNAL
G.R. No. 16"336, -*8; 1(, !#1#.
=egistration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title
as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. -ARCELO '&STA-ANTE, NEIL 'AL&,OT,
RICHAR$ $ELOS TRINO, HER-INIO JOSE, E$3IN SORIANO */0 EL-ER
SALVA$OR ?*ppe66ee<@
G.R. No. 1.!35., -*8; 1", !#1#.
/nder rticle **"8 of the %ivil %ode, e4emplary damages may be awarded in
criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances,
'in this case, abuse of superior strength(. This is intended to serve as deterrent to serious
wrongdoings and as vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. The imposition of
e4emplary damages is also justified under rticle ***: of the %ivil %ode in order to set an
e4ample for the public good.
THE -&NICIPALIT, OF HAGONO,, '&LACAN, epe<e/te0 b+ t;e HON. FELIA V.
OPLE, -)/585p*6 -*+o, */0 FELIA V. OPLE, 5/ ;5< pe<o/*6 8*p*85t+ v. HON.
SI-EON P. $&-$&-, JR., 5/ ;5< 8*p*85t+ *< t;e Pe<505/4 J)04e o7 t;e REGIONAL
TRIAL CO&RT, 'RANCH ., CE'& CIT,B HON. CLER> OF CO&RT C EA9OFFICIO
SHERIFF o7 t;e REGIONAL TRIAL CO&RT o7 CE'& CIT,B HON. CLER> OF
CO&RT C EA9OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL CO&RT o7 '&LACAN
*/0 ;5< $EP&TIESB */0 E-IL, ROSE GO >O LI- CHAO, $OING '&SINESS
&N$ER THE NA-E AN$ ST,LE >$ S&RPL&< G.R. No. 16(!(", -*8; !!, !#1#.
The ,tatute of .rauds found in paragraph '*(, rticle !18" of the %ivil %ode,
requires for enforceability certain contracts enumerated therein to be evidenced by some note
or memorandum. The effect of noncompliance with this requirement is simply that no action
can be enforced under the given contracts. If an action is nevertheless filed in court, it shall
warrant a dismissal, unless there has been, among others, total or partial performance of the
obligation on the part of either party. In the latter case, the case is e4cluded from the
coverage of the rule on dismissals based on unenforceability under the statute of frauds, and
either party may then enforce its claims against the other.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTHON, RANTE , RE,ES
G.R. No. 1(4(#", -*8; !", !#1#.
There are two legal bases for awarding e4emplary damages& rticles **"8 and ***:
of the %ivil %ode. lso 2nown as Cpunitive> or Cvindictive> damages, e4emplary or corrective
damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of
undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those
guilty of outrageous conduct.

L&CITA A. CANTOJA v. HARR, S. LI-
G.R. No. 16(3(6, -*8; !", !#1#.
The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered
with water bordering upon shores or ban2s of navigable la2es or rivers, shall be given
preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public
service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature. The reason for
that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian
owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his
land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. ,o, in the case of littoral lands,
he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.
FLOR$ELI%A E-ILIO v. 'IL-A RAPAL
G.R. No. 1(1(55, -*8; 3#, !#1#.
.or an action for reformation of instrument to prosper, the following requisites must
concur& '!( there must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract) '*(
the instrument does not e4press the true intention of the parties) and '"( the failure of
the instrument to e4press the true intention of the parties is due to mista2e, fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident.
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES v. $ANTE JA$AP
G.R. No. 1.."(3, -*8; 3#, !#1#.
%ivil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. In cases of murder and homicide, moral
damages may be awarded without need of allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of
the heirs, other than the death of the victim, since the emotional wounds from the vicious
2illing of the victim cannot be denied. rticle **"8 of the %ivil %ode states that e4emplary
damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. s to actual damages, the rule is that only receipted e4penses can be the basis
of actual damages arising from medical and funeral e4penditures.
s a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity. Dy way of e4ception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when '!( the
deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws,
in which case judicial notice may be ta2en of the fact that in the deceased's line of wor2 no
documentary evidence is available) or '*( the deceased is employed as a daily wage wor2er
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES v. $O-INGO PANITERCE
G.R. No. 1(63(!, Ap56 5, !#1#.
@eath of the accused pending appeal of his conviction e4tinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. %orollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. rticle !!07 of the %ivil %ode enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act
or omission& law) contracts) quasi-contracts) and quasi-delicts.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JONJIE ESO,
G.R. No. 1(5(4", Ap56 ., !#1#.
/nder rticle *!:: of the %ivil %ode, e4cept as provided by law or by stipulation,
one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
he has duly proved. ,uch compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
6ence, where it was stipulated during the trial that actual damages was incurred, the
stipulated amount may be rewarded without documentary proof. ,uch may be dispensed with.
$ANIEL T. SO v. FOO$ FEST LAN$, INC.
G.R. No. 1(36!(, G.R. No. 1(36.#, Ap56 ., !#1#.
The cause or essential purpose in a contract of lease is the use or enjoyment of a
thing. party>s motive or particular purpose in entering into a contract does not affect the
validity or e4istence of the contract) an e4ception is when the realiEation of such motive or
particular purpose has been made a condition upon which the contract is made to depend.
SPO&SES 'ASILIO */0 NOR-A HILAGA v. R&RAL 'AN> OF IS&LAN
?Cot*b*to, I/8., *< epe<e/te0 b+ 5t< -*/*4e@
G.R. No. 1.".(1. Ap56 ., !#1#
3hen the property was mortgaged, only the ta4 declaration was presented. lthough
a free patent title was subsequently issued in their favor, petitioners failed to inform the
creditor rural ban2 of such issuance. s a result, the certificate of sale was not registered or
annotated on the free patent title. Petitioners are estopped from redeeming the property
based on the free patent title which was not presented during the foreclosure sale nor
delivered to the =egister of @eeds for annotation of the certificate of sale as required under
,ection 0 of =epublic ct $o. 7*8, as amended. 9stoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts,
representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to spea2 out,
intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to e4ist
and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the
former is permitted to deny the e4istence of such facts.
SILVINO A. LIGERAL$E v. -A, ASCENSION A. PATALINGH&G */0 t;e
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 16(."6, Ap56 15, !#1#.
,ome of the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage
are the following& '!( The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff) '*( the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by e4perts and clearly e4plained in the
decision) '"( the incapacity must be proven to be e4isting at the Ftime of the celebrationF of
the marriage) '1( such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable) and '0( such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
SPO&SES JOSELINA ALCANTARA */0 ANTONIO ALCANTARA, */0 SPO&SES
JOSEFINO R&'I */0 ANNIE $ISTOR9 R&'I v. 'RIGI$A L. NI$O, *< *tto/e+95/97*8t
o7 REVELEN N. SRIVASTAVA
G.R. No. 165133, Ap56 1", !#1#.
rticle !#71 of the %ivil %ode e4plicitly requires a written authority before an agent
can sell an immovable property. 6ence, where no such written authority e4ists, the sale
conducted by the supposed agent covering the property of his principal is void. void
contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone and cannot be ratified.
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS 'AN> v. SPO&SES $IONISIO GERONI-O */0
CARI$A$ GERONI-O
G.R. No. 1.#!41. APRIL 1", !#1#
The questioned e4trajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage and sale are void
for failure to comply faithfully with the statutory requirements of foreclosure. Petitioner
failed to establish its compliance with the publication requirement under ,ection " of ct $o.
"!"0. ng Pinoy is a newspaper of general circulation printed and published in ;anila, not
in %aloocan %ity where the mortgaged property is located. This is contrary to the
requirement under ,ection " of ct $o. "!"0 pertaining to the publication of the notice of
sale in a newspaper of general circulation in the city where the property is situated. lso, the
invocation of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of
the sheriff is misplaced. 3hile posting the notice of sale is part of a sheriff>s official
functions, the actual publication of the notice of sale cannot be considered as such, since this
concerns the publisher>s business. ,imply put, the sheriff is incompetent to prove that the
notice of sale was actually published in a newspaper of general circulation.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ -ERCE$ES V. ALONSO, TO-AS V. ALONSO
*/0 AS&NCION V. ALONSO v. CE'& CO&NTR, CL&', INC. */0 REP&'LIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, epe<e/te0 b+ t;e OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 1((4.1, Ap56 !#, !#1#.
To benefit from =.. $o. :11", therefore, a person must hold as a condition
precedent a duly issued Transfer %ertificate of Title or a =econstituted %ertificate of Title.
HACIEN$A 'IGAA, INC. v. EPIFANIO V. CHAVE% ?0e8e*<e0@,
<)b<t5t)te0 b+ SANTIAGO V. CHAVE%
G.R. No. 1.416#, Ap56 !#, !#1#.
s a general rule in forcible entry cases, ownership or title is inconsequential) the
primordial issue is possession de facto and not possession de jure. The court, however, may
tac2le the issue of ownership or title, if raised, if this issue is indispensable in resolving the
issue of possession.
ll lands of the public domain are owned by the ,tate G the =epublic. Thus,
all attributes of ownership, including the right to possess and use these lands, accrue
to the =epublic. The registration of lands of the public domain under
the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.
NISSAN NORTH E$SA ope*t5/4 )/0e t;e /*me -OTOR CARRIAGE, INC. v.
&NITE$ PHILIPPINE SCO&T VETERANS $ETECTIVE AN$ PROTECTIVE
AGENC,
G.R. No. 1."4.#, Ap56 !#, !#1#.
The unilateral act of terminating a contract constitutes a breach thereof and entitles
the other party to collect damages.
-AN&EL O. F&ENTES */0 LETICIA L. F&ENTES v. CONRA$O G. ROCA,
ANNA'ELLE R. JOSON, ROSE -ARIE R. CRISTO'AL */0 PILAR -ALCA-PO
G.R. No. 1.("#!, Ap56 !1, !#1#.
rticle !*1 of the .amily %ode, where one spouse sold a conjugal property without
the consent of the other spouse, does not provide for a period within which the latter may
assail the sale. It simply provides that without the other spouse>s written consent or a court
order allowing the sale, the same would be void. /nder the provisions of the %ivil %ode
governing contracts, a void or ine4istent contract has no force and effect from the very
beginning. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. Dut, although a void
contract has no legal effects even if no action is ta2en to set it aside, when any of its terms
have been performed, an action to declare its ine4istence is necessary to allow restitution of
what has been given under it. This action, according to rticle !1!8 of the %ivil %ode does
not prescribe.
SPO&SES FA&STINO AN$ JOSEFINA GARCIA, SPO&SES -ELITON GALVE% AN$
HELEN GALVE%, */0 CONSTANCIA ARCAIRA epe<e/te0 b+ t;e5 Atto/e+95/9F*8t
J&LIANA O. -OTAS v. CO&RT OF APPEALS, E-ERLITA $E LA CR&%, */0
$IOGENES G. 'ARTOLO-E
G.R. No. 1.!#36, Ap56 !3, !#1#.
The ;aceda Law applies to contracts of sale of real estate on installment payments,
including residential condominium apartments but e4cluding industrial lots, commercial
buildings and sales to tenants.
In contracts to sell, where ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full
payment. Payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a
breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming
effective. ,trictly spea2ing, there can be no rescission or resolution of an obligation that is
still non-e4istent due to the non-happening of the suspensive condition.
ATT,. PE$RO -. FERRER v. SPO&SES ALFRE$O $IA% */0 I-EL$A $IA%,
REINA CO-AN$ANTE */0 SPO&SES 'IENVENI$O PANGAN */0 ELI%A'ETH
PANGAN
G.R. No. 1653##, Ap56 !3, !#1#.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of rticle !"17 of the %ivil %ode, no
contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance e4cept in cases e4pressly
authoriEed by law. .or the inheritance to be considered <future?, the succession
must not have been opened at the time of the contract. contract may be classified
as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of
rticle !"17, where the following requisites concur& '!( That the succession has not
yet been opened) '*( That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance) and
'"( That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an e4pectancy of a right which
is purely hereditary in nature.
A'S9C'N 'o*08*<t5/4 Copo*t5o/, E)4e/5o Lope= J., A)4)<to A6me0*9Lope= */0
O<8* -. Lope= v. O7758e o7 t;e Omb)0<m*/, Robeto S. 'e/e058to, EDeE)5e6 '. G*85*,
-54)e6 V. Go/=*6e< */0 S*6v*0o T*/
G.R. No. 13334., Ap56 !3, !#1#
@eath of an accused pending appeal of his conviction e4tinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. %orollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on
a source of obligation other than delict. rticle !!07 of the %ivil %ode enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act
or omission.
>OREAN AIR CO., LT$. */0 S&> >,OO >I- v. A$ELINA A.S. ,&SON
G.R. No. 1.#36", J)/e 16, !#1#.
n offer is a unilateral proposition made by one party to another for the celebration
of a contract. .or an offer to be certain, a contract must come into e4istence by the mere
acceptance of the offeree without any further act on the offeror>s part. The offer must be
definite, complete and intentional. There is an Coffer> in the conte4t of rticle !"!: only if the
contract can come into e4istence by the mere acceptance of the offeree, without any further
act on the part of the offeror. 6ence, the Coffer> must be definite, complete and intentional.
FELICI$A$ T. -ARTIN, -ELISSA -. ISI$RO, GRACE -. $AVI$, CAROLINE -.
GARCIA, VICTORIA -. ROL$AN, */0 'ENJA-IN T. -ARTIN, JR. v. $'S 'AN>
PHILIPPINES, INC. ?Fome6+ F/oG/ *< '*/F o7 So)t;e*<t A<5*@ /oG me4e0 G5t; */0 5/to 'PI
FA-IL, 'AN>
G.R. No. 1.463!, G.R. No. 1.4(#4, J)/e 16, !#1#.
It is not the filing of the action for rescission that mar2s the violation of the lease
agreement but the failure of the ;artins to repair and rehabilitate the property despite
demand.
SPO&SES 'ENE$ICT */0 -ARICEL $, TEC>LO v. R&RAL 'AN> OF PA-PLONA, INC.
epe<e/te0 b+ 5t< Pe<50e/tH-*/*4e, J&AN LAS
G.R. No. 1.1!#1, J)/e 1(, !#1#.
If a mortgage contract, which contains a blan2et clause whereby the mortgaged property
would also serve as a security for future loans, is duly annotated on the T%T of the mortgaged
property, such constitutes sufficient notice to the world that the mortgage secures not only the first loan
but also future loans the mortgagor may obtain. The second loan need not be separately annotated on
the said T%T in order to bind third parties.
OFFICE OF THE CIT, -A,OR OF PARA2A:&E CIT,, OFFICE OF THE CIT,
A$-INISTRATOR OF PARA2A:&E CIT,, OFFICE OF THE CIT, ENGINEER OF
PARA2A:&E CIT,, OFFICE OF THE CIT, PLANNING AN$ $EVELOP-ENT
COOR$INATOR, OFFICE OF THE 'ARANGA, CAPTAIN AN$ SANGG&NIANG
PA-'ARANGA, OF 'ARANGA, VITALE%, PARA2A:&E CIT,, TERESITA A.
GATCHALIAN, et. *6 v. -ARIO $. E'IO AN$ HIS CHIL$RENHHEIRS
G.R. No. 1.(411, J)/e !3, !#1#.
lluvial deposits along the ban2s of a cree2 do not form part of the public domain as the
alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added.
The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the
same under the Torrens system) otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
ST. JOSEPHIS COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI A-'ATALI, SFIC, */0 ROSALIN$A TA'&GO
v. JA,SON -IRAN$A, epe<e/te0 b+ ;5< 7*t;e, RO$OLFO S. -IRAN$A
G.R. No. 1(!353, J)/e !", !#1#.
3here persons bestowed with special parental authority under rticle *!# of the .amily
%ode failed to e4ercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight, which could have prevented a
mishap from happening, are liable for damages. +rdinarily, the liability of teachers does not e4tend to
the school or university itself, although an educational institution may be held liable under the
principle of =espondeat ,uperior. It has also been held that the liability of the employer for the
tortuous acts or negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not
conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee.
-ARS-AN $R,S$ALE LAN$ v. PHILIPPINE GEOANAL,TICS, INC. AN$
GOTESCO PROPERTIES, INC. G.R. No. 1(33.4
GOTESCO PROPERTIES, INC. v. -ARS-AN $R,S$ALE LAN$, INC. AN$ PHILIPPINE
GEOANAL,TICS, INC. G.R. No. 1(33.6, J)/e !", !#1#.
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same
obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the
latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when
the obligation e4pressly so states, or when the law or nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
ASIAN CONSTR&CTION */0 $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION v.
CATHA, PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION ?CAPASCO@
G.R. No. 16."4!, J)/e !", !#1#.
%ontracts of adhesion are as binding as ordinary contracts. Those who adhere to the
contract are in reality free to reject it entirely and if they adhere, they give their consent.
The law allows a party to recover attorney's fees under a written agreement. The attorney's
fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly called a penal
clause. It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public
order, it is strictly binding upon defendant.
ANTHON, OR$&2A, $ENNIS OR$&2A, */0 ANTONITA OR$&2A v. E$&AR$O J.
F&ENTE'ELLA, -ARCOS S. CI$, 'ENJA-IN F. CI$, 'ERNAR$ G. 'ANTA, */0
AR-AN$O GA'RIEL, JR.
G.R. No. 1.6(41, J)/e !", !#1#.
The ,tatute of .rauds e4pressed in rticle !18", par. '*(, of the %ivil %ode applies
only to e4ecutory contracts, i.e., those where no performance has yet been made. ,tated a bit
differently, the legal consequence of non-compliance with the ,tatute does not come into play
where the contract in question is completed, e4ecuted, or partially consummated.
The general rule is that one dealing with a parcel of land registered under the Torrens ,ystem
may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is not obliged to go
beyond the certificate. 3here, in other words, the certificate of title is in the name of the seller, the
innocent purchaser for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate, as he is charged
with notice only of burdens or claims on the res as noted in the certificate. 6owever, a buyer of a piece
of land which is in the actual possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those in possession. +therwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be
regarded as a buyer in good faith.
rt. !011 of the %ivil %ode prescribed the rules on preference in case of double sales of
immovable property& '!( 2nowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer>s
rights e4cept when the second buyer first register in good faith the second sale) and '*( 2nowledge
gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such
2nowledge taints his registration with bad faith.
SEL3,N F. LAO AN$ E$GAR -ANANSALA v. SPECIAL PLANS, INC.
G.R. No. 164."1, J)/e !", !#1#.
In order for compensation to be proper, it is necessary that& !. 9ach one of the obligors be
bound principally and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other) *. Doth debts
consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same 2ind, and also of
the same quality if the latter has been stated) ". The two debts are due) 1. The debts are liquidated and
demandable) 0. +ver neither of them be any retention or controversy, commenced by third parties and
communicated in due time to the debtor.
HEIRS OF PE$RO $E G&%-AN v. ANGELINA PERONA */0
HEIRS OF ROSA&RO $E G&%-AN, et *6
G.R. No. 15!!66, J)6+ !, !#1#
=espondent D@ ban2, through its appraiser +scar ;. =onquillo, conducted an
inspection and appraisal of the property covered by T%T $o. 7#!#!, together with the
e4isting improvements thereon. fter the said inspection and appraisal of the property,
respondent D@ Dan2 approved the loan in favor of the spouses =osauro and ngelina and,
thereafter, e4ecuted a =eal 9state ;ortgage with the said spouses. %learly, respondent ban2
was able to present sufficient evidence that the mortgage contract emanated from a valid and
regular transaction. =espondent ban2, before it accepted the collateral, e4ercised due
diligence in verifying the ownership and status of the land and the improvements e4isting in
the property mortgaged.
O-C CARRIERS, INC. */0 JERR, A2AL&CAS + PITALINO v.
SPO&SES RO'ERTO C. NA'&A */0 ROSARIO T. NA'&A
G.R. No. 14(".4, J)6+ !, !#1#
3hen an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. 6owever, the
presumption may be overcome by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has
e4ercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of his employee.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
HANOVER 3ORL3I$E TRA$ING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1.!1#!, J)6+ !, !#1#
pplicants for registration of title must prove& '!( that the subject land forms part of
the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and '*( that they have been in open,
continuous, e4clusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide
claim of ownership since Hune !*, !:10, or earlier.
,ettled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the
applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged
possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law.
/nfortunately, as petitioner contends, the pieces of evidence presented by respondent do not
constitute the Fwell-nigh incontrovertibleF proof necessary in cases of this nature.
-ETROPOLITAN 'AN> AN$ TR&ST CO-PAN, v. R&RAL 'AN> OF GERONA,
INC.
G.R. No. 15"#"., J)6+ 5, !#1#
rticle !"8* '*( of the %ivil %ode provides that it is presumed that there is legal
subrogation when a third person, not interested in the obligation, pays with the e4press or
tacit approval of the debtor. rticle !"8" of the %ivil %ode further states that subrogation
transfers to the person subrogated the credit with all the rights thereto appertaining, either
against the debtor or against third persons. s the entity against which the collection was
enforced, ;etroban2 was subrogated to the rights of %entral Dan2 and has a cause of action
to recover from =DI the amounts it paid to the %entral Dan2, plus !1J per annum interest.
HEIRS OF SPO&SES CRISP&LO FERRER */0 ENGRACIA P&HA3AN v.
HONORA'LE CO&RT OF APPEALS, et *6
G.R. NO. 1"#3(4, J)6+ 5, !#1#
It is not the mere lapse of time that vests title over the land to the claimant) it is also
necessary that the land be an alienable and disposable land of the public domain and that the
claimant be in open, continuous, e4clusive, and notorious possession of the land. Listed
down, the acquisition through adverse possession of public lands requires the following& '!(
the land applied for must be an alienable and disposable public land) and '*( the claimants,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
e4clusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since Hune !*, !:10 or
earlier.
VICENTE A$RIANO v. ALICE TANCO, et *6
G.R. No. 16(164, J)6+ 5, !#1#
The e4istence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one
is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. .or tenancy relationship to
e4ist, the following essential requisites must be present& '!( the parties are the landowner and
the tenant) '*( the subject matter is agricultural land) '"( there is consent between the
parties) '1( the purpose is agricultural production) '0( there is personal cultivation by the
tenant) and, '5( there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. ll the requisites must
concur in order to establish the e4istence of tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or
more requisites is fatal. In the instant case, the essential requisites of consent and sharing are
lac2ing. The essential element of consent is sorely missing because there is no proof that the
landowners recogniEed Kicente, or that they hired him, as their legitimate tenant. Li2ewise,
the essential requisite of sharing of harvests is lac2ing. Independent evidence, such as
receipts, must be presented to show that there was sharing of the harvest between the
landowner and the tenant. ,elf-serving statements are not sufficient.
ASIAN CATHA, FINANCE AN$ LEASING CORPORATION ?ACFLC@ v. SPO&SES
CESARIO GRAVA$OR */0 NOR-A $E VERA */0 SPO&SES E--A CONCEPCION
G. $&-IGPI */0 FE$ERICO L. $&-IGPI
G.R. No. 1(655#, J)6+ 5, !#1#
,tipulations authoriEing the imposition of iniquitous or unconscionable interest are
contrary to morals, if not against the law. /nder rticle !18: of the %ivil %ode, these
contracts are ine4istent and void from the beginning. They cannot be ratified nor the right to
set up their illegality as a defense be waived. The nullity of the stipulation on the usurious
interest does not, however, affect the lender>s right to recover the principal of the loan. $or
would it affect the terms of the real estate mortgage. legal interest of !*J per annum will
be added in place of the e4cessive interest formerly imposed.
,ettled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and effective, it must, in the first place,
be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which will leave no doubt as to the intention of a
party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. dditionally, the intention to
waive a right or an advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly.
PENTACAPITAL INVEST-ENT CORPORATION v. -A>ILITO '. -AHINA,
G.R. No. 1.1.36, J)6+ 5, !#1#
/nder rticle !"01 of the %ivil %ode, it is presumed that consideration e4ists and is
lawful unless the debtor proves the contrary. The presumption that a contract has sufficient
consideration cannot be overthrown by the bare, uncorroborated and self-serving assertion
of respondent that it has no consideration. The alleged lac2 of consideration must be shown
by preponderance of evidence.
penalty clause Is an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal
obligation for the purpose of ensuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a
special prestation 'generally consisting of the payment of a sum of money( in case the
obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled. 6owever, a penalty
charge of "J per month is unconscionable) hence, it should be reduced to !J per month or
!*J per annum, pursuant to rticle !**: of the %ivil %ode
A-ELIA '. HE'RON v. FRANCO L. LO,OLA, et *6
G.R. No. 16("6#, J)6+ 5, !#1#
Laches is the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable and une4plained length of
time to do that which by e4ercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or
to assert a right within reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. 6ence, where the parties are closely
related to each other and considering also that the parties are many different heirs, some of
whom reside outside the Philippines, the passage of si4 years before the respondents as2ed
for partition through the court is not unreasonable. The respondents, then, are not guilty of
laches.
SARGASSO CONSTR&CTION C $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATIONHPIC> C SHOVEL,
INC.,HATLANTIC ERECTORS, INC. ?JOINT VENT&RE@ v.
PHILIPPINE PORTS A&THORIT,
G.R. NO. 1.#53#, J)6+ 5, !#1#
/nder rticle !##! of the %ivil %ode, the agent must act within the scope of his
authority to bind his principal. ,o long as the agent has authority, e4press or implied, the
principal is bound by the acts of the agent on his behalf, 369T69= += $+T or not the third
person dealing with the agent believes that the agent has actual authority. Thus, all
signatories in a contract should be clothed with authority to bind the parties they represent.
In relation, the authority of government officials to represent the government in any contract
must proceed from an e4press provision of law or valid delegation of authority. 6ence, where
the petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that the respondent>s general
manager possessed such actual authority delegated either by the Doard of @irectors, or by
statutory provision, there could be no real consent, much less a perfected contract, to spea2
of.
THE HEIRS OF RE$ENTOR CO-PLETO */0 ELPI$IO A'IA$ v.
SGT. A-AN$O C. AL'A,$A, JR.
G.R. No. 1.!!##, J)6+ 6, !#1#
/nder rticle *!#8 of the %ivil %ode, the obligation imposed by rticle *!75 is
demandable not only for one>s own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom
one is responsible. 9mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees, but
the employers> responsibility shall cease upon proof that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to e4amine them as
to their qualifications, e4perience, and service records. +n the other hand, with respect to the
supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To
establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROSILA ROCHE
G.R. No. 1.5(46, J)6+ 6, !#1#
n application for registration of title must, under ,ection !1'!(, P.@. !0*:, meet
three requirements& a( that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain) b( that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, e4clusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land) and
c( that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since Hune !*, !:10 or
earlier.
In the instant case, =oche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has
been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. Thus, it cannot be said
that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under ,ection !1'!( of P.@. !0*:.
,ince =oche was unable to overcome the presumption that the land she applied for is
inalienable land that belongs to the ,tate, the Iovernment did not have to adduce evidence to
prove it.
ELPI$IO S. &,, 0o5/4 b)<5/e<< )/0e t;e /*me */0 <t+6e o7 E$ISON $EVELOP-ENT
C CONSTR&CTION V. P&'LIC ESTATES A&THORIT,
G.R. No<. 14."!59!6, J)6+ ., !#1#
The principle of unjust enrichment cannot be validly invo2ed by a party who, through
his own act or omission, too2 the ris2 of being denied payment for additional costs by not
giving the other party prior notice of such costs andLor by not securing their written consent
thereto, as required by law and their contract.
THE LEARNING CHIL$, INC. */0 SPS. FELIPE AN$ -AR, ANNE ALFONSO v.
A,ALA ALA'ANG VILLAGEASSOCIATION, et *6
G.R. No. 134!6", J)6+ ., !#1#
9stoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the
other party and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the
truth of any material facts asserted in it.
NIEVES ESTARES 'AL$OS, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ FRANCISCO 'AL$OS */0 -ARTIN
'AL$OS v. CO&RT OF APPEALS */0 RE,NAL$O PILLA%AR *.F.*. RE,NAL$O
ESTARES 'AL$OS
G.R. No. 1.#645, J)6+ ", !#1#
s a general law, ct $o. "70" applies to the registration of all births, not otherwise
covered by P.@. $o. 50!, as amended, occurring from *7 .ebruary !:"! onwards. 6ence,
where the individual was born on "8 +ctober !:1# but registration of his birth too2 place in
!:#0, said registration is outside of the coverage of P.@. $o. 50!, as amended. The late
registration of =eynaldo>s birth falls under ct $o. "70", otherwise 2nown as the %ivil
=egistry Law, which too2 effect on *7 .ebruary !:"! and is implemented by $ational %ensus
,tatistics +ffice '$%,+( dministrative +rder $o. !, ,eries of !:#"!" governs the
implementation of ct $o. "70" in this case.
SPS. FE$ERICO VALEN%&ELA */0 L&% '&ENA9VALEN%&ELA v.
SPS. JOSE -ANO, JR. */0 ROSANNA RE,ES9-ANO
G.R. No. 1.!611, J)6+ ", !#1#
,ettled is the rule that a person, whose certificate of title included by mista2e or
oversight the land owned by another, does not become the owner of such land by virtue of the
certificate alone. The Torrens ,ystem is intended to guarantee the integrity and
conclusiveness of the certificate of registration but is not intended to perpetrate fraud against
the real owner of the land. The certificate of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from the
true owner.
VIOLETA T&$T&$ 'ANATE, -AR, -ELGRI$ -. CORTEL, 'ONIFACIO CORTEL,
ROSEN$O -AGLASANG, */0 PATROCINIA -ONILAR v. PHILIPPINE
CO&NTR,SI$E R&RAL 'AN> ?LILOAN, CE'&@, INC. */0 TEOFILO SOON, JR.
G.R. No. 163(!5, J)6+ 13, !#1#
s a general rule, a mortgage liability is usually limited to the amount mentioned in
the contract. 6owever, the amounts named as consideration in a contract of mortgage do not
limit the amount for which the mortgage may stand as security if, from the four corners of the
instrument, the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered. This
stipulation is valid and binding between the parties and is 2nown as the <blan2et
mortgage clause? 'also 2nown as the <dragnet clause(.? In the present case, the mortgage
contract indisputably provides that the subject properties serve as security, not only for the
payment of the subject loan, but also for <such other loans or advances already obtained, or
still to be obtained.? The cross-collateral stipulation in the mortgage contract between the
parties is thus simply a variety of a dragnet clause. fter agreeing to such stipulation, the
petitioners cannot insist that the subject properties be released from mortgage since the
security covers not only the subject loan but the two other loans as well.
SPO&SES $IVINIA C. P&'LICO AN$ JOSE T. P&'LICO v. TERESA 'A&TISTA
G.R. No. 1.4#"6, J)6+ !#, !#1#
The Pagpapatunay was not a new obligation which could have e4tinguished the
Masulatan since the condition of payment that was set out in the Pagpapatunay was never
fulfilled. Petitioners> invocation of rticle !*"5 of the %ivil %ode does not help them. They
cannot deny their indebtedness to respondent on the basis of said rticle since the payment
advanced by respondent on petitioners> behalf redounded to their benefit and @ivinia never
objected to it when she came to learn of it. It is thus immaterial that @ivinia was unaware of
respondent>s action for the law ultimately allows recovery to the e4tent that the debtors-
petitioners were benefited.
'ENN, ,. H&NG v. 'PI CAR$ FINANCE CORP
G.R. No. 1(!3"(, J)6+ !#, !#1#
3hen an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at
the rate of 5J per annum. 3hen the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes
final and e4ecutory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph ! or
paragraph *, shall be !*J per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim
period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
J&ANITA TRINI$A$ RA-OS, et *6 v. $ANILO PANGILINAN, et *6
G.R. No. 1(5"!#, J)6+ !#, !#1#
The general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on
which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties,
which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seiEed by
creditors e4cept in certain special cases. 3hether under the %ivil %ode or the .amily %ode, it
is not sufficient that the person claiming e4emption merely alleges that such property is a
family home. This claim for e4emption must be set up and proved. In the present case, since
petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to ugust ", !:##, or as early as
!:11, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the %ivil %ode. There being
absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or e4trajudicially constituted
as the =amos> family home, the law>s protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners.
ALI$A -ORES v. SHIRLE, -. ,&9GO, et *6
G.R. No. 1.!!"!, J)6+ !3, !#1#
If the lessee ma2es, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use
for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased,
the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the
improvements at that time. ,hould the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. 6e
shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
3ith regard to the ornamental e4penses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any
reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to
the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the
time the lease is e4tinguished.
SOLI$'AN> CORPORATION v. ER-ANENT HO-ES, INCORPORATE$
G.R. No. 1.1"!5, J)6+ !3, !#1#
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law between
the parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality.
contract containing a condition which ma2es its fulfillment dependent e4clusively upon the
uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties is void. In the instant case, there was no
showing that either ,olidban2 or Permanent coerced each other to enter into the loan
agreements. The terms of the +mnibus Line greement and the promissory notes were
mutually and freely agreed upon by the parties. The stipulations on interest rate repricing are
valid because '!( the parties mutually agreed on said stipulations) '*( repricing ta2es effect
only upon ,olidban2>s written notice to Permanent of the new interest rate) and '"(
Permanent has the option to prepay its loan if Permanent and ,olidban2 do not agree on the
new interest rate.
SPO&SES E$-&N$O */0 LO&R$ES SARROSA v. 3ILL, O. $I%ON
G.R. No. 1(3#!., J)6+ !6, !#1#
The right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes
absolute upon the e4piration of the redemption period. The basis of this right to possession is
the purchaser's ownership of the property. fter the consolidation of title in the buyer's name
for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and
its issuance to a purchaser in an e4trajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.
SOLAR HARVEST, INC. v. $AVAO CORR&GATE$ CARTON CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1.6(6(, J)6+ !6, !#1#
rticle !!:! of the $ew %ivil %ode provides that <the power to rescind obligations is
implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is
incumbent upon him.? In reciprocal obligations, as in a contract of sale, the general rule is
that the fulfillment of the parties> respective obligations should be simultaneous. 6ence, no
demand is generally necessary because, once a party fulfills his obligation and the other
party does not fulfill his, the latter automatically incurs in delay. Dut when different dates for
performance of the obligations are fi4ed, the default for each obligation must be determined
by the rules given in the first paragraph of the present article, that is, the other party would
incur in delay only from the moment the other party demands fulfillment of the former>s
obligation. In the instant case, without a previous demand for the fulfillment of the obligation,
petitioner would not have a cause of action for rescission against respondent as the latter
would not yet be considered in breach of its contractual obligation.
A$RIAN 3ILSON INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATES, INC. v. T-A PHILIPPINES,
INC.,
G.R. No. 16!6#(, J)6+ !6, !#1#
ctual damages puts the claimant in the position in which he had been before he was
injured. The award thereof must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal
2nowledge of the court) and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and nonsubstantial
proof. /nder the %ivil %ode, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. 3hile T;N failed to prove the e4act
amount of the salaries it had paid, as a matter of equity, the court accorded T;N a relief in
the form of temperate damages.
LA%ARO PASCO */0 LA&RO PASCO v. HEIRS OF FILO-ENA $E G&%-AN,
epe<e/te0 b+ CRESENCIA $E G&%-AN9PRINCIPE
G.R. No. 165554, J)6+ !6, !#1#
0J monthly interest is iniquitous and unconscionable. ccordingly, the legal interest
of !*J per annum must be imposed in lieu of the e4cessive interest stipulated in the
agreement.
&NS3ORTH TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL ?PHILS.@, INC. v. CO&RT OF
APPEALS */0 PIONEER INS&RANCE AN$ S&RET, CORPORATION
G.R. No. 166!5#, J)6+ !6, !#1#
%ommon carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or negligent
if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove
that they e4ercised e4traordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In order to avoid
responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they
observed such diligence.
GOL$EN APPLE REALT, AN$ $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION AN$ ROSVI'ON
REALT, CORPORATION v. SIERRA GRAN$E REALT, CORPORATION, et *6
G.R. No. 11"(5., J)6+ !(, !#1#
close reading of the % @ecision would reveal that the said court used the phrase
badges of fraud to refer to certain fraudulent acts that attended the e4ecution of the %ontract
to ,ell and the @eeds of bsolute ,ale which would eventually tend to prove that the same
transactions were indeed suspicious as the said contracts were antedated, simulated and
fraudulent. ,uch phrase did not refer to any particular provision of a law, hence, the general
and ordinary meaning of the phrase prevails.
ATI-A GAG&IL -AGO,AG, HA$JI HASAN -A$LA3I -AGO,AG v.
HA$JI A'&'ACAR -AR&HO-
G.R. No. 1.".43, A)4)<t !, !#1#
The most fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts is that, if the terms are
clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
the contract provisions shall control. Its meaning should be determined without reference to
e4trinsic facts or aids. %rystal clear in the @eed of ssignment are unambiguous provisions
that respondent assigned, sold, transferred, and conveyed the subject mar2et stall to
petitioners. $owhere in the @eed does it say that respondent obtained a loan of P*8,888.88,
and mortgaged the subject stall as security. =espondent, as a mere grantee of the subject
stall, was prohibited from selling, donating, or otherwise alienating the same without the
consent of the %ity Iovernment) violation of the condition shall automatically render the
sale, donation, or alienation null and void. 6ence, the contract of sale is void.
LAN$ 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RA-ON P. JACINTO
G.R. No. 1546!!, A)4)<t 3, !#1#
There was no e4press stipulation in the =estructuring greement that respondent is
released from his liability on the issued chec2s and in fact the letter-agreements between
.3%% and Land Dan2 e4pressly provide that respondent>s H,, 'Hoint and ,everal
,ignatures( continue to secure the loan obligation and the postdated chec2s issued continue
to guaranty the obligation.
L&CIANO 'RIONES */0 NELL, 'RIONES v. JOSE -ACA'AG$AL, FE $.
-ACA'AG$AL */0 VERGON REALT, INVEST-ENTS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 15#666, A)4)<t 3, !#1#
rticle *7!1 of the %ivil %ode presumes good faith, and since no proof e4ists to show
that the mista2e was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have
built the house in good faith. %onsidering that petitioners acted in good faith in building their
house on the subject property of the respondent-spouses, there is no basis for the award of
moral damages to respondent-spouses. Li2ewise, the %ourt deletes the award to Kergon of
compensatory damages and attorney>s fees for the litigation e4penses Kergon had incurred
as such amounts were not specifically prayed for in its nswer to petitioners> third-party
complaint.
ROSARIO P. TAN v. ARTE-IO G. RA-IRE%, et *6
G.R. No. 15("!", A)4)<t 3, !#1#
The main purpose of a compromise agreement is to put an end to litigation because
of the uncertainty that may arise from it. =eciprocal concessions are the very heart and life of
every compromise agreement. Dy the nature of a compromise agreement, it brings the parties
to agree to something that neither of them may actually want, but for the peace it will bring
them without a protracted litigation. In the instant case, no right can arise from the
compromise agreement because the parties e4ecuted the same only to buy peace and to write
finis to the controversy) it did not create or transmit ownership rights over the subject
property.
=oberto cannot claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect or dispute in the title of the vendor, Delacho. $ot being a possessor in good faith and
with just title, the ten-year period required for ordinary acquisitive prescription cannot apply
in =oberto>s favor. 9ven the thirty-year period under e4traordinary acquisitive prescription
has not been met because of the respondents> claim to have been in possession, in the concept
of owner, of the subject property for only twenty-four years, from the time the subject
property was ta4 declared in !:71 to the time of the filing of the complaint in !::#.
RICAR$O P. TORING v. TERESITA -. TORING */0 REP&'LIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1653!1, A)4)<t 3, !#1#
Psychological incapacity under rticle "5 of the .amily %ode must be characteriEed
by 'a( gravity, 'b( juridical antecedence, and 'c( incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a
marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to Fno less than a mental 'not physical(
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.F
rticle "5 of the .amily %ode requires that the psychological incapacity must e4ist at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemniEation. In the absence of this element, a marriage cannot be annulled under
rticle "5.
-AN&EL P. NE, */0 RO-&LO P. NE, v.
SPO&SES CELSO P. :&IJANO */0 -INA N. :&IJANO
G.R. No. 1.(6#", A)4)<t 4, !#1#
n action for reconveyance is one that see2s to transfer property, wrongfully
registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. Indeed, reconveyance is an action
distinct from an action for quieting of title, which is filed whenever there is a cloud on title to
real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title for purposes of
removing such cloud or to quiet title. 6owever, we find nothing erroneous in the %>s ruling
treating respondents> action for reconveyance as an action to quiet title.
JA, HI$ALGO &,, epe<e/te0 b+ ;5< 7*t;e, ANTONIO J. &, v. Spo)<e< FRANCISCO
-E$INA */0 NATIVI$A$ -E$INA, et *6
G.R. No. 1.!541, A)4)<t (, !#1#
9ven though the sale of the land to petitioner too2 place before the judgment of the
trial court in favor of ,wift and the issuance of the writ of e4ecution over the property in
question, failure to register it with the =egister of @eeds negated any priority which he may
have acquired by virtue of the earlier sale. 9lementary is the rule that it is the act of
registration which gives validity to transfer or liens created upon land registered under the
Torrens ,ystem.
GA&$ENCIO LA'RA$OR, epe<e/te0 b+ L&L& LA'RA$OR &SON, *< Atto/e+95/9
F*8t v. SPS. IL$EFONSO PERLAS */0 PACENCIA PERLAS, et *6
G.R. No. 1.3"##, A)4)<t (, !#1#
/nder the Torrens ,ystem of registration, an +riginal %ertificate of Title '+%T(
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible one year after its final decree. It is a fundamental
principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to a property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTE$ ', THE $EPART-ENT OF
E$&CATION $IVISION OF LIPA CIT, v. PRI-O -EN$O%A */0 -ARIA L&CERO
G.R. No. 1(5#"1, A)4)<t (, !#1#
decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Iovernment of
the =epublic and all its branches, 369T69= += $+T or not mentioned by name in the
application for registration or its notice. Indeed, title to the land, once registered, is
imprescriptible. $o one may acquire it from the registered owner by adverse, open, and
notorious possession. Thus, to a registered owner under the Torrens system, the right to
recover possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible since possession is a
mere consequence of ownership.
3here the owner agrees voluntarily to the ta2ing of his property by the government
for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal e4propriation
proceeding covering such property. Therefore, in the instant case, the ;endoEas> remedy is
an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment.
ST. JA-ES COLLEGE OF PARA2A:&EB JAI-E T. TORRES, et *6 v.
E:&ITA'LE PCI 'AN>
G.R. No. 1."441, A)4)<t ", !#1#.
.or novation, as a mode of e4tinguishing or modifying an obligation, to apply, the
following requisites must concur& !( There must be a previous valid obligation) *( The
parties concerned must agree to a new contract) "( The old contract must be e4tinguished)
and 1( There must be a valid new contract. .urther, it is a well-settled principle that $ovatio
non praesumitur or novation is never presumed. %onsequently, that which arises from a
purported modification in the terms and conditions of the obligation must be clear and
e4press.
SPO&SES 'RA&LIO NAVARRO AN$ CESARIA SIN$AO v. PERLA RICO GO
G.R. No. 1(.!((, A)4)<t ", !#1#
person is considered an innocent purchaser in good faith when he buys the
property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or an interest in such
property, and pays a full price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. In the instant case,
petitioners live in the vicinity of the land which was fenced and planted to fruit bearing trees.
s such, they were put on notice that the land was possessed by someone. 3here the land
subject of sale is in possession of a person other than the vendor, prudence dictates that the
vendee should go beyond the certificate of title. bsent such investigation, good faith cannot
be presumed.
'ONIFACIO SAN% -ACE$A, JR. v.
$EVELOP-ENT 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1.4"."
$EVELOP-ENT 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES v. 'ONIFACIO SAN% -ACE$A, JR.
G.R. No. 1.5#1#, A)4)<t 11, !#1#
/nder rticle !!:! of the %ivil %ode, the aggrieved party has a choice between
specific performance and rescission with damages in either case. 6owever, if specific
performance becomes impractical or impossible, the court may order rescission with
damages to the injured party. 6ence, where after the lapse of more than "8 years, it has
become impossible to implement the loan agreement as it was written, considering the
absence of evidence as to the rising costs of construction, as well as the obvious changes in
mar2et conditions on the viability of the operations of the hotel, it is deemed equitable and
practicable to rescind the obligation of @DP to deliver the balance of the loan proceeds to
;aceda.
ALC IN$&STRIES, INC. v. $EPART-ENT OF P&'LIC 3OR>S AN$ HIGH3A,S
G.R. No<. 1.3!1"9!#, A)4)<t 11, !#1#
%learly, the @P36 gave two reasons for the rescission& !( L%>s failure to comply
with %lause !8 of the =I,) and *( its continuing commission of acts amounting to breaches
of contract, resulting in negative slippage in its performance. Thus, the @P36 was entitled
to terminate the project and e4pel L% from it
ISI$RO A'LA%A v. REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 15(!"(, A)4)<t 11, !#1#
3here the marriage was contracted on @ecember *5, !:1:, the applicable law was
the old %ivil %ode, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 6ence, the
rule on the e4clusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action
for declaration of nullity of the marriage under .;. $o. 8*-!!-!8-,% had absolutely no
application. 6ence, a brother of one of the contracting parties, under the old law, can initiate
such action for he, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to
succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in rticle !88! and
rticle !88" of the %ivil %ode.
GER'ERT R. CORP&% v. $AIS,L,N TIROL STO. TO-AS */0
T;e SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 1(65.1, A)4)<t 11, !#1#
The second paragraph of rticle *5 of the .amily %ode was included in the law Fto
avoid the absurd situation where the .ilipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the .ilipino spouse.F The legislative
intent is for the benefit of the .ilipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree. 6ence, only the .ilipino spouse can invo2e the
second paragraph of rticle *5 of the .amily %ode) the alien spouse can claim no right
under this provision.
HEIRS OF PA&LINO ATIEN%A v. $O-INGO P. ESPI$OL
G.R. No. 1(#665, A)4)<t 11, !#1#
=egarding the right to cancel the contract for non-payment of an installment, there is
need to initially determine if what the parties had was a contract of sale or a contract to sell.
In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the
thing sold. In a contract to sell, on the other hand, the ownership is, by agreement, retained
by the seller and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. In the
contract of sale, the buyer>s non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition) in
the contract to sell, the buyer>s full payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition to
the coming into effect of the agreement. In the first case, the seller has lost and cannot
recover the ownership of the property unless he ta2es action to set aside the contract of
sale. In the second case, the title simply remains in the seller if the buyer does not comply
with the condition precedent of ma2ing payment at the time specified in the contract.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. %ENAI$A G&INTO9AL$ANA
G.R. No. 1.55.(, A)4)<t 11, !#1#
3hile the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the
original tracing cloth plan issued by the Dureau of Lands 'now the Lands ;anagement
,ervices of the @epartment of 9nvironment and $atural =esources O@9$=P(, blueprint
copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification.
In an original registration of title under ,ection !1'!( P.@. $o. !0*:, the applicant
for registration must be able to establish by evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest
have e4ercised acts of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since Hune
!*, !:10 or earlier. 6e must prove that for at least "8 years, he and his predecessor have
been in open, continuous, e4clusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land.
ctual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally e4ercise over his own property.
SPO&SES NICANOR T&-'O>ON ?0e8e*<e0@, <)b<t5t)te0 b+J ROSARIO SESPE2E, et
*6 v. APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, */0 PA&LINA S. $E -AGTAN&-
G.R. No. 153.36, A)4)<t 1!, !#1#
The petitioners adduced no competent evidence to establish that Kictor ;iralles, the
transferor of the land to %resenciana Inog 'the petitioners> immediate predecessor in
interest( had any legal right in the first place to transfer ownership. 6e was not himself an
heir of lejandra, being only her son-in-law 'as the husband of %iriaca, one of lejandra>s
two daughters(.
.or res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur& '!( the former judgment must be final) '*( it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties) '"( it must be a judgment on the
merits) and '1( there must be between the first and second actions 'a( identity of parties, 'b(
identity of the subject matter, and 'c( identity of cause of action. The doctrine of res judicata
has two aspects& the first, 2nown as bar by prior judgment, or estoppel by verdict, is the effect
of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or
cause of action) the second, 2nown as conclusiveness of judgment, also 2nown as the rule of
auter action pendant, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different
cause of action and has the effect of preclusion of issues only.
HEIRS OF JOSE RE,ES, JR.v. A-AN$A S. RE,ES, et *6
G.R. No. 15(3.., A)4)<t 13, !#1#
The acceptance of the payments even beyond the !8-year period of redemption
estopped the mortgagees' heirs from insisting that the period to redeem the property had
already e4pired. Their actions impliedly recogniEed the continued e4istence of the equitable
mortgage. The conduct of the original parties as well as of their successors-in-interest
manifested that the parties to the Masulatan ng Diling ;abibiling ;uli really intended their
transaction to be an equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale.
-A. SOCORRO CA-ACHO9RE,ES v. RA-ON RE,ES
G.R. No. 1(5!(6, A)4)<t 1(, !#1#
The factors characteriEing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations are& '!( gravity, '*( juridical antecedence, and '"( incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage) it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage) and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
PACIENCIA A. $ALEON */0 CLARO E$&AR$O $. JAVIER, JR., et *6 v. -A.
CATALINA P. TAN, FI$EL P. TAN */0 -AN&EL P. TAN
G.R. No. 1(6#"4, A)4)<t !3, !#1#
contract is the law between the parties. Thus, from the moment the contract is
perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been e4pressly
stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in 2eeping
with good faith, usage and law. lso, the stipulations of the contract being the law between
the parties, courts have no alternative but to enforce them as they were agreed upon and
written, there being no law or public policy against the stipulated forfeiture of payments
already made.
forfeiture clause in a contract of sale, which in a sense is punitive and confiscatory,
is to be construed strictissimi juris and, in resolving a controversy involving it, the principles
of equity must apply to the end that e4act justice is achieved.
CE'& A&TO-ATIC -OTORS, INC. */0 TIRSO &,TENGS& III v.
GENERAL -ILLING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 15116(, A)4)<t !5, !#1#
lessor may judicially eject 'and thereby li2ewise rescind the contract of lease( the
lessee if the latter violates any of the conditions agreed upon in the lease contract. The lessor
is not required to first bring an action for rescission, but may as2 the court to do so and
simultaneously see2 the ejecment of the lessee in a single action for unlawful detainer.
FRANCISCO -&2O%, JR. v. ERLIN$A RA-IRE% */0 ELISEO CARLOS
G.R. No. 1561!5, A)4)<t !5, !#1#
/nder rticle !*8 of the .amily %ode, which supersedes rticle !0# of the %ivil
%ode, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than
the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the
spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement) otherwise, said property shall
be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, li2ewise subject to reimbursement of the cost
of the improvement.
rticle !58* of the %ivil %ode enumerates the instances when a contract, regardless
of its nomenclature, may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage& 'a( when the price of a
sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate) 'b( when the vendor remains in
possession as lessee or otherwise) 'c( when upon or after the e4piration of the right to
repurchase another instrument e4tending the period of redemption or granting a new period
is e4ecuted) 'd( when the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price) 'e( when
the vendor binds himself to pay the ta4es on the thing sold) and, 'f( in any other case where it
may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure
the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. These instances apply to a
contract purporting to be an absolute sale.
SPO&SES ERNESTO LI- */0 %ENAI$A LI- v. R&', SHELTER '&IL$ERS AN$
REALT, $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1(!.#., Septembe 1, !#1#
,ection ! of Presidential @ecree !"111 vests in the $ational 6ousing uthority 'now
6L/=D( e4clusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases& 'a( unsound real
estate business practices) 'b( claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
bro2er or salesman) and 'c( cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the
owner, developer, dealer, bro2er or salesman.
HEIRS */0Ho ESTATE OF ATT,. ROLAN$O P. SIAPIAN, epe<e/te0 b+ S&SAN S.
-EN$O%A, v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE E&FROCINA G. -AC>A, *<
epe<e/te0 b+ $R. RO$ERIC> -AC>A, */0 ENGR. ELVIN -AC>A,
G.R. No. 1(4."", Septembe 1, !#1#
It is settled that a claim for attorney>s fees may be asserted either in the very action
in which a lawyer rendered his services or in a separate action. Dut enforcing it in the main
case bodes well as it forestalls multiplicity of suits. The intestate court in this case, therefore,
correctly allowed tty. ,iapian to interject his claim for attorney>s fees in the estate
proceedings against some of the heirs and, after hearing, adjudicate the same on pril ",
!::7 with an order for rturo, et. al to pay tty. ,iapian the fees of P" million due him. lso,
since the award of P" million in attorney>s fees in favor of tty. ,iapian had already become
final and e4ecutory, the intestate court was within its powers to order the =egister of @eeds
to annotate his lien on the 9state>s titles to its properties. The 9state has no cause for
complaint since the lien was neither a claim nor a burden against the 9state itself. It was not
enforceable against the 9state but only against rturo, et. al, who constituted the majority of
the heirs.
E&GENIO FELICIANO, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ ;5< G57e CEFERINA $E PAL-A9 FELICIANO,
et. *6 v. PE$RO CANO%A, et *6
G.R. No. 161.46, Septembe 1, !#1#
deed of e4trajudicial partition e4ecuted without including some of the heirs, who
had no 2nowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. 6ence, an action to
set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted. ,uch action for the annulment of the
said partition, however, must be brought within four '1( years from the discovery of the
fraud.
SPO&SES REA AN$ CONCEPCION AGGA'AO v.
$IONISIO %. PAR&LAN, JR. */0 -A. ELENA PAR&LAN
G.R. No. 165(#3, Septembe 1, !#1#
The standard to determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who had
title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the
consent of the other spouse was required before the conveyance, is that the buyers must show
that they inquired not only into the title of the seller but also into the seller>s capacity to sell.
Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two 2inds of requisite diligence, namely&
'a( the diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the property) and 'b( the
diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in
behalf of the other spouse.
&NIVERSIT, PH,SICIANSK SERVICES, INCORPORATE$ v. -ARIAN CLINICS,
INC. */0 $R. LO&R$ES -A'ANTA
G.R. No. 15!3#3, Septembe 1, !#1#
rticle !550 of the %ivil %ode provides that Fthe lessee shall return the thing leased,
upon the termination of the lease, just as he received it, save what has been lost or impaired
by the lapse of time, or by ordinary wear and tear, or from an inevitable cause.F rticle !557
li2ewise states that Fthe lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased,
unless he proves that it too2 place without his fault.F In other words, by law, a lessee is
obliged to return the thing's( leased and be responsible for any deterioration or loss of the
properties, e4cept for those that were not his fault.
JOSELITO R. PI-ENTEL v. -ARIA CHR,SANTINE L. PI-ENTEL */0
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1.!#6#, Septembe 13, !#1#
t the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in %ivil %ase $o.
81-7":* is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of
the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
HEIRS OF J&ANITA PA$ILLA, epe<e/te0 b+ CLA&$IO PA$ILLA v.
$O-INA$OR -AG$&A
G.R. No. 1.6(5(, Septembe 15, !#1#
%o-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the
other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. ,ince possession
of co-owners is li2e that of a trustee, in order that a co-owner>s possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur& '!(
that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui
que trust or other co-owners, '*( that such positive acts of repudiation have been made
2nown to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and '"( that the evidence thereon must be
clear and convincing.
In the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 0 Hune !::#, the
date petitioners received notice of =icardo>s repudiation of their claims to the land. ,ince
petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages
with the =T% on *5 +ctober *88!, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-year period
falls short of the !8-year or "8-year acquisitive prescription period required by law in order
to be entitled to claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, @ominador cannot invo2e
acquisitive prescription.
CELESTINO SANTIAGO <)b<t5t)te0 b+ LA&RO SANTIAGO */0 ISI$RO G&TIERRE%
<)b<t5t)te0 b+ ROGELIO G&TIERRE% v.
A-A$A R. ORTI%9L&IS <)b<t5t)te0 b+ J&AN ORTI%9L&IS, JR
G.R. No<. 1(61(4 C 1(6"((1, Septembe !#, !#1#
94cept as otherwise provided in =epublic ct $o. 5507, no person may own, or
retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the siEe of which shall
vary according to factors governing a viable family-siEe, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential grarian =eform
%ouncil 'P=%( created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner e4ceed
five '0( hectares. Three '"( hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject
to the following qualifications& '!( that he is at least fifteen '!0( years of age) and '*( that he
is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm) Provided, That landowners whose
land have been covered by Presidential @ecree $o. *7 shall be allowed to 2eep the area
originally retained by them thereunder, Provided further, That the original homestead
grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this ct shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous,
shall pertain to the landowner.Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention
by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose 369T69= += $+T
to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be
considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this ct. In case
the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a
lease-holder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must e4ercise this option
within a period of one '!( year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area
for retention.
SPS. ANTONIO C LETICIA VEGA v. SOCIAL SEC&RIT, S,STE- ?SSS@ C PILAR
$EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1(16.!, Septembe !#, !#1#
rticle !5*0 of the %ivil %ode provides that an assignment of a credit, right or action
shall produce no effect as against third persons, unless it appears in a public instrument, or
the instrument is recorded in the =egistry of Property in case the assignment involves real
property. ,aid provision merely applies to assignment of credits and other incorporeal rights
and not to conveyances of, for instance, a house and lot.
JARA'INI G. $EL ROSARIO v. AS&NCION G. FERRER, <)b<t5t)te0
b+ ;e ;e5<, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIA'ERTO, JR., *66 <)/*me0 G.
FERRER, */0 -IG&ELA FERRER ALTE%A.
G.R. No. 1(.#56 Septembe !#, !#1#
The e4press <irrevocability? of the donation is the <distinctive standard that
identifies the document as a donation inter vivos.?
PR&$ENTIAL 'AN> AN$ TR&ST CO-PAN, ?/oG 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLAN$S v. LI3A,3A, A'ASOLO
G.R. No. 1(6.3( Septembe !., !#1#
/nder rt. !"!! contracts ta2e effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, e4cept in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable
beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.

If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may
demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its
revocation. mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting
parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.

HEIRS OF ENRI:&E TORING, epe<e/te0 ;ee5/ b+ -ORIE TORING v. HEIRS OF
TEO$OSIA 'O:&ILAGA, epe<e/te0 ;ee5/ b+ PA&LINO CA$LA3ON, CRISPIN
AL'&RO, VIVENCIO GO-E%, E$&AR$O CONC&ERA */0 PONCIANO NAILON
G.R. No. 16361# Septembe !., !#1#
The nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings is the restoration of an instrument
or the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title which is supposed to have been lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition. Its purpose is to have the title reproduced after
proper proceedings in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred and not
to pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
SPS. FELIPE */0 JOSEFA PARINGIT v. -ARCIANA PARINGIT 'AJIT, A$OLIO
PARINGIT */0 ROSARIO PARINGIT OR$O2O
G.R. No. 1(1(44 Septembe !", !#1#
Implied trust under rticle !108 presupposes a situation where a person, using his
own funds, buys property on behalf of another, who in the meantime may not have the funds
to purchase it. Title to the property is for the time being placed in the name of the trustee, the
person who pays for it, until he is reimbursed by the beneficiary, the person for whom the
trustee bought the land. It is only after the beneficiary reimburses the trustee of the purchase
price that the former can compel conveyance of the property from the latter.
n implied trust prescribes within !8 years from the time the right of action accrues.
right of action implies the e4istence of a cause of action and a cause of action has three
elements& a( the e4istence of a right in plaintiff>s favor) b( defendant>s obligation to respect
such right) and c( defendant>s act or omission that violates the plaintiff>s right. +nly when
the last element occurs or ta2es place can it be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.
FINANCIAL '&IL$ING CORPORATION v. R&$LIN INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION, 'LOO-FIEL$ E$&CATIONAL FO&N$ATION, INC., RO$OLFO J.
LAGERA, -A. ERLIN$A J. LAGERA AN$ JOSAPHAT R. 'RAVANTE
G.R. No. 1641(6, O8tobe #4, !#1#
R&$LIN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, 'LOO-FIEL$ E$&CATIONAL
FO&N$ATION, INC., RO$OLFO J. LAGERA, -A. ERLIN$A J. LAGERA AN$
JOSAPHAT R. 'RAVANTE v. FINANCIAL '&IL$ING CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 16434.
The award of attorney's fees is the e4ception rather than the rule, as they are not
always awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate.
FILO-ENA R. 'ENE$ICTO v. ANTONIO VILLAFLORES
G.R. No. 1(5#!#, O8tobe #6, !#1#
/nder rticle 11#, a landowner is given the option to either appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity, or sell the land to
the possessor in good faith. =elatedly, rticle 015 provides that a builder in good faith is
entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful e4penses incurred) it also gives
him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.
It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the e4ception rather than the general
rule) counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy
that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
COCA9COLA 'OTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. v. RO$RIGO -ERCA$O, et *6.
G.R. No. 1"#3(1, O8tobe #6, !#1#
/nder the %ivil %ode of the Philippines, contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions, as they deem convenient, so long as they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. compromise
agreement is a contract whereby the parties underta2e reciprocal obligations to resolve their
differences in order to avoid litigation or put an end to one already instituted. It is a judicial
covenant having the force and effect of a judgment, subject to e4ecution in accordance with
the =ules of %ourt, and having the effect and authority of res judicata upon its approval by
the court where the litigation is pending.
THE HEIRS OF RO-ANA SAVES v. THE HEIRS OF ESCOLASTICO SAVES,
NA-EL,J RE-E$IOS SAVES9A$A-OS, L&% SAVES9HERNAN$E% AN$ $O$ONG
SAVES, AN$ ENRI:&ETA CHAVES9A'ELLA
G.R. No. 15!(66, O8tobe #6, !#1#
It is a well-settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered under the
Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the certificates of title.
6e is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the
certificates.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and une4plained
length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it.
ER-ELIN$A C. -ANALOTO, A&RORA J. CIFRA, FLOR$ELI%A J. ARCILLA,
LO&R$ES J. CATALAN, ETHELIN$A J. HOLT, 'IENVENI$O R. JONGCO,
ARTE-IO R. JONGCO, JR. AN$ JOEL JONGCO v. IS-AEL VELOSO III
G.R. No. 1.1365, O8tobe #6, !#1#
s rticle !: of the %ivil %ode requires, Fevery person must, in the e4ercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.F violation of such principle constitutes an abuse of rights,
a tortuous conduct.
CA-PER REALT, CORP. v. -ARIA NENA PAJO9RE,ES REPRESENTE$ ', HER
ATTORNE,9IN9FACT ELISEO '. 'ALLAO, A&G&STO P. 'AJA$O, RO$OLFO PAJO
AN$ GO$OFRE$O PAJO, JR.
G.R. No. 1."543, O8tobe #6, !#1#
In sales involving real property or any interest therein, a written authority in favor of
the agent is necessary, otherwise the sale is void. ,ince the property was subjected to ensuing
transfers, it is necessary to establish the rights, if any, of the transferees vis-Q-vis that of
$ena's.
RI%AL CO--ERCIAL 'AN>ING CORPORATION v. PE$RO P. '&ENAVENT&RA
G.R. No. 1.64.", O8tobe #6, !#1#
.oreclosure is valid only when the debtor is in default in the payment of his
obligation. It is a necessary consequence of non-payment of mortgage indebtedness. s a
rule, the mortgage can be foreclosed only when the debt remains unpaid at the time it is due.
In a real estate mortgage, when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee
has the right to foreclose on the mortgage, to have the property seiEed and sold, and to apply
the proceeds to the obligation.
SPO&SES VICTORIANO CH&NG AN$ $E''IE CH&NG v.
&LAN$A, CONSTR&CTION, INC.
G.R. No. 156#3(, O8tobe 11, !#1#
In contractual relations, the law allows the parties leeway and considers their
agreement as the law between them. %ontract stipulations that are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy shall be binding and should be complied
with in good faith. $o party is permitted to change his mind or disavow and go bac2 upon his
own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto, to the prejudice of the other party.
It is a requisite in the grant of e4emplary damages that the act of the offender must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent manner. +n the
other hand, attorney's fees may be awarded only when a party is compelled to litigate or to
incur e4penses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party, as
when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim.
-IN$ANAO SAVINGS AN$ LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTE$ ', ITS
LI:&I$ATOR, THE PHILIPPINE $EPOSIT INS&RANCE CORPORATION v.
E$3AR$ 3ILL>O-B GIL$A GOB RE-E$IOS &,B -ALA,O 'ANT&AS, IN HIS
CAPACIT, AS THE $EP&T, SHERIFF OF REGIONAL TRIAL CO&RT, 'RANCH 3,
ILIGAN CIT,B AN$ THE REGISTER OF $EE$S OF CAGA,AN $E ORO CIT,
G.R. No. 1.(61(, O8tobe 11, !#1#
There being no merger between .I,LI and @,LI 'now ;,LI(, for third parties
such as respondents, the two corporations shall not be considered as one but two separate
corporations. corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law. It possesses
the right of succession and such powers, attributes, and properties e4pressly authoriEed by
law or incident to its e4istence. It has a personality separate and distinct from the persons
composing it, as well as from any other legal entity to which it may be related. Deing
separate entities, the property of one cannot be considered the property of the other.
It is a rule that novation by substitution of debtor must always be made with the
consent of the creditor. rticle !*:" of the %ivil %ode is e4plicit, thus& novation which
consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one, may be made even
without the 2nowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the consent of the
creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives him the rights mentioned in rticles !*"5 and
!*"7.
-AN&EL A. ECHAVE% v. $O%EN CONSTR&CTION AN$ $EVELOP-ENT
CORPORATION AN$ THE REGISTER OF $EE$S OF CE'& CIT,
G.R. No. 1"!"16, O8tobe 11, !#1#
donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the
validity of wills, Fotherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect.F rticles #80
and #85 of the %ivil %ode should have been applied.
CALI'RE TRA$ERS, INC., -ARIO SISON SE'ASTIAN, AN$ -IN$A 'LANCO
SE'ASTIAN v. 'A,ER PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 161431, O8tobe 13, !#1#
To justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, the amount of loss must be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, based upon competent proof and the best
evidence obtainable by the injured party.
PACIFIC REHO&SE CORPORATION, PACIFIC CONCOR$E CORPORATION,
-I%PAH HOL$INGS, INC., FOR&- HOL$INGS CORPORATION, AN$ EAST ASIA
OIL CO-PAN,, INC. v. EI' SEC&RITIES, INC.
G.R. No. 1(4#36, O8tobe 13, !#1#
rticle !##! of the %ivil %ode provides that Fthe agent must act within the scope of
his authority.F Pursuant to the authority given by the principal, the agent is granted the right
Fto affect the legal relations of his principal by the performance of acts effectuated in
accordance with the principal's manifestation of consent.F
ANICETO G. SAL&$O, JR. v. SEC&RIT, 'AN> CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1(4#41, O8tobe 13, !#1#
%omprehensive or continuing surety agreements are, in fact, quite commonplace in
present day financial and commercial practice. ban2 or financing company which
anticipates entering into a series of credit transactions with a particular company, normally
requires the projected principal debtor to e4ecute a continuing surety agreement along with
its sureties. Dy e4ecuting such an agreement, the principal places itself in a position to enter
into the projected series of transactions with its creditor) with such suretyship agreement,
there would be no need to e4ecute a separate surety contract or bond for each financing or
credit accommodation e4tended to the principal debtor.
'.E. SAN $IEGO, INC. v. CO&RT OF APPEALS AN$ JOVITA -ATIAS
G.R. No. 15"!3#, O8tobe 1(, !#1#
The settled doctrine in property law is that no title to register land in derogation of
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
SPO&SES RA-, AN$ %ENAI$A P&$A$ERA v. IRENEO -AGALLANES AN$ THE
LATE $AIS, TERESA CORTEL -AGALLANES S&'STIT&TE$ ', HER
CHIL$REN, NELL, -. -AR:&E%, ELISEO -AGALLANES AN$ ANGEL
-AGALLANES
G.R. No. 1.##.3, O8tobe 1(, !#1#
+ne is considered a buyer in bad faith not only when he purchases real estate with
2nowledge of a defect or lac2 of title in his seller but also when he has 2nowledge of facts
which should have alerted him to conduct further inquiry or investigation.
PIO -O$ESTO AN$ CIRILA RIVERA9-O$ESTO v. CARLOS &R'INA,
S&'STIT&TE$ ', THE HEIRS OF OL,-PIA -IG&EL V$A. $E &R'INA
?S&RVIVING SPO&SE@ AN$ CHIL$REN, NA-EL,J ESCOLASTICA -. &R'INA, ET.
AL
G.R. No. 1("(5", O8tobe 1(, !#1#
/nless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually
alienated by the ,tate to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public
domain, and its occupation in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights. It is only after the property has been declared alienable and
disposable that private persons can legally claim possessory rights over it.
ASSET '&IL$ERS CORPORATION, v. STRONGHOL$ INS&RANCE CO-PAN,,
INCORPORATE$
G.R. No. 1(.116, O8tobe 1(, !#1#
s provided in rticle *817, the surety underta2es to be bound solidarily with the
principal obligor. That underta2ing ma2es a surety agreement an ancillary contract as it
presupposes the e4istence of a principal contract. lthough the contract of a surety is in
essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the surety becomes liable for the debt
or duty of another although it possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations
nor does it receive any benefit therefrom. Let it be stressed that notwithstanding the fact that
the surety contract is secondary to the principal obligation, the surety assumes liability as a
regular party to the underta2ing.
CAR-ELA 'RO'IO -ANGAHAS v. E&FROCINA A. 'RO'IO
G.R. No. 1(3(5!, O8tobe !#, !#1#
%ontracts are voidable where consent thereto is given through mista2e, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. In determining 369T69= += $+T consent is
vitiated by any of these circumstances, courts are given a wide latitude in weighing the facts
or circumstances in a given case and in deciding in favor of what they believe actually
occurred, considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence, relationship, and conduct of
the parties at the time of the e4ecution of the contract and subsequent thereto, irrespective of
369T69= += $+T the contract is in a public or private writing.
SHINR,O ?PHILIPPINES@ CO-PAN,, INC. v. RRN INCORPORATE$
G.R. No. 1.!5!5, O8tobe !#, !#1#
/njust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the
efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly
enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
$ELFIN LA-SIS, -A,NAR$ -ON$IG&ING, JOSE VAL$E%, JR. AN$ HEIRS OF
AG&STIN >IT-A, REPRESENTE$ ', E&GENE >IT-A v. -ARGARITA SE-ON
$ONG9E
G.R. No. 1.3#!1, O8tobe !#, !#1#
There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the proceedings, of
a possible jurisdictional objection, and has every opportunity to raise said objection, but fails
to do so, even on appeal.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE T. CHING REPRESENTE$ ', HIS
ATTORNE,9IN9FACT, ANTONIO V. CHING
G.R. No. 1(6166, O8tobe !#, !#1#
pplicants for registration of title under ,ection !1'!( must sufficiently establish& '!(
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain)
'*( that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
e4clusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same) and '"( that it is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since Hune !*, !:10, or earlier.
-AN&EL AL-AGRO JOINE$ ', HIS SPO&SE, ELI%A'ETH AL-AGRO v.
SALVACION C. >3AN, 3ILLIA- C. >3AN, VICTORIA C. >3AN, ASSISTE$ ',
HER H&S'AN$, JOSE A. AR'AS, AN$ CECILIA C. >3AN
G.R. No<. 1.5(#6 */0 1.5(1#, O8tobe !#, !#1#
-ARGARITA PACHORO, $RONICA ORLINA, PIO T&'AT, JR., AN$RES T&'AT,
E$&VIGIS >IS>IS, ELSA 'I2AL'ER, NOELA T&'AT, ELSA T&'AT, AN$
ROGELIO $&RAN v. 3ILLIA- C. >3AN, SALVACION C. >3AN, VICTORIA C.
>3AN, ASSISTE$ ', HER H&S'AN$, JOSE A. AR'AS, AN$ CECILIA C. >3AN
G.R. No. 1.5(4"
To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and
low water mar2s and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The land's
pro4imity to the waters alone does not automatically ma2e it a foreshore land.
CENT&R, SAVINGS 'AN>, PETITIONER v. SPO&SES $ANILO T. SA-ONTE AN$
ROSALIN$A -. SA-ONTE
G.R. No. 1.6!1!, O8tobe !#, !#1#
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the
property to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. $otices are given for the
purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects are
attained, immaterial errors and mista2es will not affect the sufficiency of the notice) but if
mista2es or omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or mislead
bidders, to depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price,
such mista2es or omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, and also to the sale made
pursuant thereto.
JOSE PONCE $E LEON v. SANTIAGO S,J&CO, INC., $EFEN$ANT AN$
APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 'AN>
G. R. No. 33169P**<, O8tobe !6, !#1#
;ortgagor has the right to pay the indebtedness at any time within three years
provided that, as in this case, he pays the interest for the whole term of the mortgage.
SPO&SES ALFRE$O */0 ENCARNACION CHING v. FA-IL, SAVINGS 'AN>, */0
SHERIFF OF -ANILA
G.R. No. 16.(35
ALFRE$O CHING v. FA-IL, SAVINGS 'AN> */0 THE SHERIFF OF -ANILA
G.R. No. 1((4(# Novembe 15, !#1#
Title and ownership to the property is consolidated upon the lapse of the period of
redemption. It is automatic upon the failure of the judgment obligor to e4ercise his right of
redemption within the period allowed by law. Title may be consolidated in the name of the
purchaser even without a new title issued in his name. The term <title? as used in
consolidation does not pertain to the certificate of title, or piece of paper, issued by the
=egister of @eeds, which is a mere evidence of ownership. It is synonymous with ownership.
VITARICH CORPORATION v. CHONA LOSIN
G.R. No. 1(156# Novembe 15, !#1#

rticle !*1:, paragraph * of the %ivil %ode provides& he delivery of promissory notes
payable to order, or bills of e4change or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect
of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they
have been impaired.
CONSTANCIA G. TA-A,O, JOCEL,N G. TA-A,O, */0 ARA-IS G. TA-A,O,
8o66e8t5ve6+ F/oG/ *< HEIRS OF CIRILO TA-A,O v. ROSALIA A'A$ SE2ORA,
ROAN A'A$ SE2ORA, */0 JANETE A'A$ SE2ORA
G.R. No. 1.6"46 Novembe 15, !#1#
The award of damages for loss of earning capacity is concerned with the
determination of losses or damages sustained by respondents, as dependents and intestate
heirs of the deceased. This consists not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support
which they received or would have received from him had he not died as a consequence of the
negligent act. Thus, the amount recoverable is not the loss of the victim>s entire earnings, but
rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AVELINO R. $ELA PA%, ARSENIO R. $ELA
PA%, JOSE R. $ELA PA%, */0 GLICERIO R. $ELA PA%, epe<e/te0 b+ JOSE R.
$ELA PA%
G.R. No. 1.1631 Novembe 15, !#1#
/nder ,ection !1 '!( of P@ !0*:, otherwise 2nown as the Property =egistration
@ecree provides persons that my file an application for registration 369T69= += $+T
personally or through their duly authoriEed representatives, one of which are those who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, e4clusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since Hune !*, !:10, or earlier.
SPO&SES -ARIANO ?*.F.*. :&A>,@ */0 E--A 'OLA2OS v. ROSCEF %&2IGA
'ERNARTE, CLARO %&2IGA, PERFECTO %&2IGA, */0 CEFERINA %&2IGA9
GARCIA
G.R. No. 1(#"". Novembe 1., !#1#

/nder rt. :7:. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and
other ascendants, without distinction as to se4 or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.

/nder rt. :#8. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their
own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
FILINVEST $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION v. GOL$EN HAVEN -E-ORIAL
PAR>, INC. G.R. No. 1(.(!4
GOL$EN HAVEN -E-ORIAL PAR>, INC. v. FILINVEST $EVELOP-ENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1((!65 Novembe 1., !#1#
To prove good faith, the rule is that the buyer of registered land needs only show that
he relied on the title that covers the property. Dut this is true only when, at the time of the
sale, the buyer was unaware of any adverse claim to the property. +therwise, the law
requires the buyer to e4ercise a higher degree of diligence before proceeding with his
purchase. 6e must e4amine not only the certificate of title, but also the seller>s right and
capacity to transfer any interest in the property. In such a situation, the buyer must show that
he e4ercised reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the four corners of the title. .ailing
in these, he may be deemed a buyer in bad faith.
HONG>ONG AN$ SHANGHAI 'AN>ING CORP., LT$. STAFF RETIRE-ENT
PLAN, Ret5eme/t T)<t F)/0, I/8.@ v. SPO&SES 'IENVENI$O AN$ E$ITHA
'RO:&E%A,
G.R. No. 1.(61#, Novembe 1., !#1#
<The enforcement of a loan agreement involves Fdebtor-creditor relations founded
on contract and does not in any way concern employee relations. s such it should be
enforced through a separate civil action in the regular courts and not before the Labor
rbiter.F
CE'& 'IONIC '&IL$ERS S&PPL,, INC. */0 L,$IA SIA v. $EVELOP-ENT 'AN>
OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE TO CHIP, PATRICIO ,AP */0 ROGER 'ALILA
G.R. No. 154366, Novembe 1., !#1#
In respect of the lease on the foreclosed property, the buyer at the foreclosure sale merely
succeeds to the rights and obligations of the pledgor-mortgagor subject to the provisions of
rticle !575 of the %ivil %ode on its possible termination. This article provides that Cthe
purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not recorded in the =egistry of
Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipulation to the contrary in the
contract of sale, or when the purchaser 2nows of the e4istence of the lease.> In short, the
buyer at the foreclosure sale, as a rule, may terminate an unregistered lease e4cept when it
2nows of the e4istence of the lease.
ASIA &NITE$ 'AN> v. GOO$LAN$ CO-PAN,, INC.
G.R. No. 1((#51, Novembe !!, !#1#
fter the consolidation of titles in the buyer's name, for failure of the mortgagor to
redeem, entitlement to a writ of possession becomes a matter of right. s the confirmed
owner, the purchaser>s right to possession becomes absolute. There is even no need for him
to post a bond, and it is the ministerial duty of the courts to issue the same upon proper
application and proof of title. To accentuate the writ>s ministerial character, the %ourt has
consistently disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance despite a pending action for
annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.
CITI'AN>, N.A. v. ATT,. ERNESTO S. $INOPOL
G.R. No. 1((41! Novembe !!, !#1#
The award of moral damages should be granted in reasonable amounts depending on the
facts and circumstances of the case. ;oral damages are meant to compensate the claimant
for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious an4iety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shoc2, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused.

s to the award of e4emplary damages, the law allows it by way of e4ample for the public
good. The business of ban2ing is impressed with public interest and great reliance is made on
the ban2>s sworn profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable
service.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. 3ENCESLAO $ERI + 'ENITE%
G.R. No. 166566 Novembe !3, !#1#
If the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying circumstances that
require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be
P70,888.88.? In the same vein, the award of moral damages should be increased from
P08,888.88 to P70,888.88 because the cases remain to be heinous.
LE$ESCO $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION v. 3ORL$3I$E STAN$AR$
INTERNATIONAL REALT,, INC.
G.R. No. 1.333" Novembe !4, !#1#
ccording to the contract e4ecuted between the parties, commission becomes due
upon the occurrence of three events& first, the buyer signs the reservation agreement) second,
the buyer pays Ledesco the amount representing the downpayment) third, the buyer delivers
to Ledesco si4 '5( postdated chec2s. To be entitled to the *J incentive, there are two
additional qualifying circumstances, to wit& '!( that all three required acts must be completed
within a specific rec2oning period 'within si4 '5( months from the signing of the Project and
;ar2eting greement() and '*( that the contract price of such sales totals at least
Php"8,888,888.88.
LAN$ 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFRE$O ONG
G.R. No. 1"#.55 Novembe !4, !#1#
rt. !*"5 provides& the creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a
third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary. 3hoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he
has paid, e4cept that if he paid without the 2nowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can
recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor.
$ovation, in its broad concept, may either be e4tinctive or modificatory. It is
e4tinctive when an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that ta2es
the place of the former) it is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the
e4tent it remains compatible with the amendatory agreement. n e4tinctive novation results
either by changing the object or principal conditions 'objective or real(, or by substituting the
person of the debtor or subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor 'subjective or
personal(. /nder this mode, novation would have dual functions R one to e4tinguish an
e4isting obligation, the other to substitute a new one in its place R requiring a conflu4 of four
essential requisites& '!( a previous valid obligation) '*( an agreement of all parties
concerned to a new contract) '"( the e4tinguishment of the old obligation) and '1( the birth of
a valid new obligation.
rt. !*:" of the %ivil %ode states& $ovation which consists in substituting a new
debtor in the place of the original one, may be made even without the 2nowledge or against
the will of the latter, but not without the consent of the creditor. Payment by the new debtor
gives him rights mentioned in articles !*"5 and !*"7.
/njust enrichment e4ists <when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.? There is unjust enrichment under rt. **
of the %ivil %ode when '!( a person is unjustly benefited, and '*( such benefit is derived at
the e4pense of or with damages to another. dditionally, unjust enrichment has been applied
to actions called accion in rem verso. In order that the accion in rem verso may prosper, the
following conditions must concur& '!( that the defendant has been enriched) '*( that the
plaintiff has suffered a loss) '"( that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal
ground) and '1( that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract,
crime, or quasi-delict. The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment
when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive
it.
The term <forbearance,? within the conte4t of usury law, has been described as a
contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of time, from
requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due and payable.
H,ATT ELEVATORS */0 ESCALATORS CORPORATION v. CATHE$RAL HEIGHTS
'&IL$ING CO-PLEA ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 1.3((1 $e8embe 1, !#1#
Dy the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in
money or its equivalent. The absence of any of the essential elements will negate the e4istence
of a perfected contract of sale.
FE$ERICO JARANTILLA, JR. v. ANTONIETA JARANTILLA, '&ENAVENT&RA
RE-OTIG&E, S&'STIT&TE$ ', C,NTHIA RE-OTIG&E, $OROTEO JARANTILLA
*/0 TO-AS JARANTILLA
G.R. No. 1544(6 $e8embe 1, !#1#
There is a co-ownership when an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. It is a partnership when two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money,
property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among
themselves.
rticle !75: of the new %ivil %ode lays down the rule for determining when a
transaction should be deemed a partnership or a co-ownership. ,aid article paragraphs *
and ", provides) '*( %o-ownership or co-possession does not itself establish a partnership,
369T69= += $+T such co-owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits made
by the use of the property) '"( The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a
partnership, 369T69= += $+T or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common
right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived.
/nder rticle !757 of the %ivil %ode, there are two essential elements in a contract
of partnership& 'a( an agreement to contribute money, property or industry to a common
fund) and 'b( intent to divide the profits among the contracting parties.
rticle !7:7 of the %ivil %ode provides& The losses and profits shall be distributed in
conformity with the agreement. If only the share of each partner in the profits has been
agreed upon, the share of each in the losses shall be in the same proportion. In the absence of
stipulation, the share of each partner in the profits and losses shall be in proportion to what
he may have contributed, but the industrial partner shall not be liable for the losses. s for
the profits, the industrial partner shall receive such share as may be just and equitable under
the circumstances. If besides his services he has contributed capital, he shall also receive a
share in the profits in proportion to his capital.
94press trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while
implied trusts come into being by operation of law, either through implication of an intention
to create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the trust irrespective of, and
even contrary to, any such intention. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or
constructive trusts. =esulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable
consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed
always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or
circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby
becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit
of another.
NOEL '. 'ACCA, v. -ARI'EL C. 'ACCA, */0 REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1.313( $e8embe 1, !#1#
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a <difficulty,? a <refusal,? or a
<neglect? in the performance of some marital obligations. n unsatisfactory marriage is not
a null and void marriage.
TRA$ERS RO,AL 'AN> v. NOR'ERTO CASTA2ARES */0 -ILAGROS
CASTA2ARES
G.R. No. 1.!#!#, $e8embe 6, !#1#
Fdragnet clauseF or Fblan2et mortgage clauseF in merican jurisprudence that
would subsume all debts of past and future origins. It has been held as a valid and legal
underta2ing, the amounts specified as consideration in the contracts do not limit the amount
for which the pledge or mortgage stands as security, if from the four corners of the
instrument, the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered. pledge or
mortgage given to secure future advancements is a continuing security and is not discharged
by the repayment of the amount named in the mortgage until the full amount of all
advancements shall have been paid. It operates as a convenience and accommodation to the
borrowers as it ma2es available additional funds without their having to e4ecute additional
security documents, thereby saving time, travel, loan closing costs, costs of e4tra legal
services, recording fees, et cetera. 3hile a real estate mortgage may e4ceptionally secure
future loans or advancements, these future debts must be sufficiently described in the
mortgage contract. n obligation is not secured by a mortgage unless it comes fairly within
the terms of the mortgage contract.
TRANSCEPT CONSTR&CTION AN$ -ANAGE-ENT PROFESSIONALS, INC. v.
TERESA C. AG&ILAR
G.R. No. 1..556 $e8embe (, !#1#
rticle !*"1 of the %ivil %ode provides that <if the obligation had been substantially
performed in good faith, the obligor may recover as though there had been a strict and
complete fulfillment, less damages suffered by the obligee.?
'AN> OF CO--ERCE */0 STEPHEN %. TAALA v.
SPO&SES AN$RES */0 ELI%A FLORES
G.R. No. 1.4##6 $e8embe (, !#1#
continuing guaranty is a recogniEed e4ception to the rule that an action to
foreclose a mortgage must be limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage contract.
/nder rticle *80" of the %ivil %ode, a guaranty may be given to secure even future debts,
the amount of which may not be 2nown at the time the guaranty is e4ecuted. This is the basis
for contracts denominated as a continuing guaranty or suretyship. continuing guaranty is
not limited to a single transaction, but contemplates a future course of dealing, covering a
series of transactions, generally for an indefinite time or until revo2ed. It is prospective in its
operation and is generally intended to provide security with respect to future transactions
within certain limits, and contemplates a succession of liabilities, for which, as they accrue,
the guarantor becomes liable. In other words, a continuing guaranty is one that covers all
transactions, including those arising in the future, which are within the description or
contemplation of the contract of guaranty, until the e4piration or termination thereof.
JOCEL,N -. TOLE$O v. -ARILO& -. H,$EN
G.R. No. 1.!13" $e8embe (, !#1#
It is true that the imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt is
immoral and unjust and the court may come to the aid of the aggrieved party to that contract.
6owever, before doing so, courts have to consider the settled principle that the law will not
relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish or disastrous contract if such party had
full awareness of what she was doing.
ENRI:&E AGRAVIA$OR + AL&NAN v. ERLIN$A A-PARO9AGRAVIA$OR */0
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1.#.!" $e8embe (, !#1#
rticle "5 of the .amily %ode contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
RO'ERTO $. T&A%ON v. LO&R$ES :. $EL ROSARIO9S&ARE%, CATALINA R.
S&ARE%9$E LEON, 3ILFRE$O $E LEON, -IG&EL L&IS S. $E LEON, RO--EL
LEE S. $E LEON, */0 G&ILLER-A L. SAN$ICO9SILVA, *< *tto/e+95/97*8t o7 t;e
0e7e/0*/t<, eD8ept Lo)0e< :. $e6 Ro<*5o9S)*e=
G.R. No. 16(3!5 $e8embe (, !#1#
In a situation where the lessor ma2es an offer to sell to the lessee a certain property
at a fi4ed price within a certain period, and the lessee fails to accept the offer or to purchase
on time, then the lessee loses his right to buy the property and the owner can validly offer it
to another.
FRANCISCO TA,CO, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ L&CRESIA TA,CO */0 NOEL TA,CO v. HEIRS
OF CONCEPCION TA,CO9FLORES, /*me6+J L&CELI F. $IA%, RONELE F. 'ESA,
-ONELE FLORES, PERLA FLORES, R&PERTO FLORES, 3ENCESLAO FLORES,
P&RISI-A FLORES, */0 FELIPE FLORES
G.R. No. 16(6"! $e8embe 13, !#1#
$otariEation of the deed of e4trajudicial settlement has the effect of ma2ing it a
public document that can bind third parties. 6owever, this formal requirement appears to be
superseded by the substantive provision of the %ivil %ode that states& 9very act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be
a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an e4change, a compromise, or any other
transaction.

ROAAS C CO-PAN,, INC. v.
$A-'A9NFS3 */0 t;e $EPART-ENT OF AGRARIAN REFOR-
G.R. No. 14"54(
$A-A,AN NG -GA -ANGGAGA3ANG '&>I$ SA AS,EN$A ROAAS9NATIONAL
FE$ERATION OF S&GAR 3OR>ERS ?$A-'A9NFS3@ v. SECRETAR, OF THE
$EPT. OF AGRARIAN REFOR-, ROAAS C Co., INC. AN$HOR ATT,. -ARIANO
A-PIL
G.R. No. 16.5#5
>ATIP&NAN NG -GA -AG'&'&>I$ SA HACIEN$A ROAAS, INC. ?>A-AHARI@,
ET. AL v. SECRETAR, OF THE $EPT. OF AGRARIAN REFOR-, ROAAS C Co.,
INC.
G.R. No. 16.54#
$EPART-ENT OF LAN$ REFOR-, FOR-ERL, $EPART-ENT OF AGRARIAN
REFOR- ?$AR@ v. ROAAS C CO, INC.
G.R. No. 16.543
ROAAS C CO., INC. v. $A-'A9NFS3
G.R. No. 16.(45
$A-'A9NFS3 REPRESENTE$ ', LA&RO V. -ARTIN v. ROAAS C CO., INC.
G.R. No. 16"163
$A-'A9NFS3 v. ROAAS C CO., INC.
G.R. No. 1."65# $e8embe 14, !#1#
There is no need for the publication and filing of the said @= ;emorandum
%ircular with the +$= as it is merely an administrative interpretation. Interpretative rule is
promulgated by the administrative agency to interpret, clarify or e4plain statutory
regulations under which the administrative body operates. The purpose or objective of an
interpretative rule is merely to construe the statute being administered. It purports to do no
more than interpret the statute.

RENATO RE,ES, epe<e/te0 b+ RA-ON RE,ES v.
LEOPOL$O 'ARRIOS, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ L&CIA -ANAL&S9'ARRIOS
G.R. No. 1.!(41 $e8embe 15, !#1#
It was improper for the @=D to order the issuance of the 9mancipation Patent in
favor of respondent without the required supporting documents and without following the
requisite procedure before an 9mancipation Patent may be validly issued.
PCI LEASING AN$ FINANCE, INC. v. TROJAN -ETAL IN$&STRIES
INCORPORATE$, 3ALFRI$O $I%ON, ELI%A'ETH $I%ON, */0 JOHN $OE
G.R. No. 1.63(1 $e8embe 15, !#1#
In a true financial leasing, a finance company purchases on behalf of a cash-
strapped lessee the equipment the latter wants to buy but, due to financial limitations, is
incapable of doing so. The finance company then leases the equipment to the lessee in
e4change for the latter>s periodic payment of a fi4ed amount of rental.
HEIRS OF $O-INGO VALIENTES v. HON. REINERIO ?A'RAHA-@ '. RA-AS,
A8t5/4 Pe<505/4 J)04e, RTC, '*/8; !", "t; J)0585*6 Re45o/, S*/ -54)e6, %*mbo*/4*
0e6 S) */0 VIL-A V. -INOR
G.R. No. 15.(5! $e8embe 15, !#1#
=econveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another>s name, which must be filed within ten years
from the issuance of the title since such issuance operates as a constructive notice. 3here a
party has neglected to assert his rights over a property in question for an unreasonably long
period, he is estopped from questioning the validity of another person>s title to the property.
Long inaction and passivity in asserting one>s rights over a disputed property precludes him
from recovering said property.
SEALOA$ER SHIPPING CORPORATION v. GRAN$ CE-ENT -AN&FACT&RING
CORPORATION, JO,CE LA&NCH C T&G CO., INC., RO-&LO $IANTAN C
JOHNN, PONCE
G.R. No. 16.363
TAIHEI,O CE-ENT PHILIPPINES, INC. ?Fome6+ G*/0 Ceme/t -*/)7*8t)5/4
Copo*t5o/@ v. SEALOA$ER SHIPPING CORPORATION, JO,CE LA&NCH C T&G
CO., INC., RO-&LO $IANTAN C JOHNN, PONCE
G.R. No. 1..466 $e8embe 15, !#1#
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. ,tated
differently, the antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering
damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by the e4ercise of due diligence.

$egligence is defined as <the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
%ontributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection.
AIR FRANCE v. 'ONIFACIO H. GILLEGO, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ ;5< <)v5v5/4 ;e5<
epe<e/te0 b+ $o6oe< P. G566e4o
G.R. No. 165!66 $e8embe 15, !#1#
business intended to serve the travelling public primarily, a contract of carriage is
imbued with public interest. The law governing common carriers consequently imposes an
e4acting standard. rticle !7"0 of the %ivil %ode provides that in case of lost or damaged
goods, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed e4traordinary diligence as required by rticle !7"".
Thus, in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not
have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. ll that he has to prove
is the e4istence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier.
A-ELIA P. ARELLANO, epe<e/te0 b+ ;e 0)6+ *ppo5/te0 4)*05*/<, AGNES P.
ARELLANO */0 NONA P. ARELLANO v. FRANCISCO PASC&AL */0 -IG&EL
PASC&AL
G.R. No. 1("..6 $e8embe 15, !#1#
The term collation has two distinct concepts& first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value
of the hereditary estate) and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of
property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime. The purposes
of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is
possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that
inofficious donations may be reduced.
PCI LEASING AN$ FINANCE, INC. v. TROJAN -ETAL IN$&STRIES
INCORPORATE$, 3ALFRI$O $I%ON, ELI%A'ETH $I%ON, */0 JOHN $OE
G.R. No. 1.63(1 , $e8embe 15, !#1#
<In a true financial leasing, whether under = 0:#8 or = #005, a finance company
purchases on behalf of a cash-strapped lessee the equipment the latter wants to buy but, due
to financial limitations, is incapable of doing so. The finance company then leases the
equipment to the lessee in e4change for the latter>s periodic payment of a fi4ed amount of
rental. In this case, however, T;I already owned the subject equipment before it transacted
with P%IL.. Therefore, the transaction between the parties in this case cannot be deemed to
be in the nature of a financial leasing as defined by law but a simple loan secured by the
various equipment owned by T;I.?
JOSE -AR:&ES, ET AL. v. FAR EAST 'AN> AN$ TR&ST CO-PAN,, ET AL. H FAR
EAST 'AN> AN$ TR&ST CO-PAN,, ET AL. v. JOSE -AR:&ES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 1.13."HG.R. No. 1.141", J*/)*+ 1#, !#11
C9stoppel by silence> arises where a person, who by force of circumstances is obliged to
another to spea2, refrains from doing so and thereby induces the other to believe in the
e4istence of a state of facts in reliance on which he acts to his prejudice. ,ilence may support
an estoppel whether the failure to spea2 is intentional or negligent.
LOA$-ASTERS C&STO-S SERVICES, INC. v. GLO$EL 'RO>ERAGE
CORPORATION */0 RC' INS&RANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1."446, J*/)*+ 1#, !#11.
Dy the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do
something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the
latter.? The elements of a contract of agency are& '!( consent, e4press or implied, of the
parties to establish the relationship) '*( the object is the e4ecution of a juridical act in
relation to a third person) '"( the agent acts as a representative and not for himself) '1( the
agent acts within the scope of his authority.
/nder rticle *!#8 of the %ivil %ode, whenever an employee>s negligence causes
damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to
e4ercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of its employees. To
avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he e4ercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
$&R'AN APART-ENTS CORPORATION, 0o5/4 b)<5/e<< )/0e t;e /*me */0 <t+6e o7
C5t+ G*0e/ Hote6 v. PIONEER INS&RANCE AN$ S&RET, CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1."41", J*/)*+ 1!, !#11.
deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to
another, with the obligation of safely 2eeping it and returning the same. If the safe2eeping of
the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some
other contract.
ttorney>s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur
e4penses to protect its interest,P or when the court deems it just and equitable.
HEIRS OF SANTIAGO C. $IVINAGRACIA v. HON. J. CE$RIC> O. R&I%, Pe<505/4
J)04e, '*/8; 3", Re45o/*6 T5*6 Co)t, I6o56o C5t+B GERR, $. S&-AC&L&', *< C6eF
o7 Co)t o7 t;e Re45o/*6 T5*6 Co)tB 'O-'O RA$,O HOL$INGS, INC., */0
ROGELIO -. FLORETE, SR.
G.R. No. 1.!5#(, J*/)*+ 1!, !#11
The e4ecution of any award for moral and e4emplary damages is dependent on the
outcome of the main case. /nli2e actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly be
held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of which are fi4ed and certain,
liabilities with respect to moral and e4emplary damages, as well as the e4act amounts,
remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate ppellate %ourt and
eventually the ,upreme %ourt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGELIO $OLORI$O + ESTRA$A
G.R. No. 1"1.!1, J*/)*+ 1!, !#11.
3hen death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded& '!( civil
indemnity e4 delicto for the death of the victim) '*( actual or compensatory damages) '"(
moral damages) '1( e4emplary damages) and '0( temperate damages.
LETICIA TAN, -,RNA -E$INA, -ARILO& SPOONER, ROSALIN$A TAN, */0
-AR, JANE TAN, -AR, L,N TAN, CELE$ONIO TAN, JR., -AR, JO, TAN, */0
-AR> ALLAN TAN, epe<e/te0 ;ee5/ b+ t;e5 mot;e v. LETICIA TAN
G.R. No. 1"#5!1, J*/)*+ 1!, !#11.
ctual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. To justify an award of actual
damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given
only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.
s a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
loss of earning capacity. Dy way of e4ception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when& '!( the deceased is self-
employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case,
judicial notice may be ta2en of the fact that in the deceased's line of wor2, no documentary
evidence is available) or '*( the deceased is employed as a daily wage wor2er earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
94emplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of e4ample or correction for
the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In
quasi-delicts, e4emplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
L&%ON $EVELOP-ENT 'AN> ?'AN>@ v. ANGELES CATHERINE ENRI:&E%
G.R. No. 16(646, J*/)*+ 1!, !#11
$ELTA $EVELOP-ENT */0 -ANAGE-ENT SERVICES, INC. v. ANGELES
CATHERINE ENRI:&E% */0 L&%ON $EVELOP-ENT 'AN>
G.R. No. 16(666
contract to sell is one where the prospective seller reserves the transfer of title to
the prospective buyer until the happening of an event, such as full payment of the purchase
price. 3hat the seller obliges himself to do is to sell the subject property only when the entire
amount of the purchase price has already been delivered to him.
dacion en pago is governed by the law of sales. %ontracts of sale come with
warranties, either e4press or implied under rticle !017 et seq. of the %ivil %ode.
'PI FA-IL, SAVINGS 'AN>, INC. v. GOL$EN PO3ER $IESEL SALES CENTREN,
INC., ET AL.
G.R. No. 1.6#1". J*/)*+ 1!, !#11
< purchaser in a public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of
possession and, upon an e4 parte petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon the trial
court to issue the writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. 6owever, when the foreclosed
property is in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the judgment
obligor, the issuance by the trial court of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of
said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be done e4 parte. The
procedure is for the trial court to order a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse
possession. .or the e4ception to apply, however, the property need not only be possessed by a
third party, but also held by the third party adversely to the judgment obligor.?
< pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale does not stay the
issuance of the writ of possession. The trial court, where the application for a writ of
possession is filed, does not need to loo2 into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure. The purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession without prejudice to the outcome
of the pending annulment case.?
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLOS R. VEGA, -ARCOS R. VEGA,
ROGELIO R. VEGA, L&'IN R. VEGA, HEIRS OF GLORIA R. VEGA, NA-EL,J
FRACISCO L. ,AP, -A. 3INONA ,. RO$RIG&E%, -A. 3EN$EL,N V. ,AP */0
FRANCISCO V. ,AP, JR.
G. R. No. 1..."#, J*/)*+ 1., !#11.
pplicants for registration of title must prove the following& '!( that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain) and '*( that they have
been in open, continuous, e4clusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since !* Hune !:10 or earlier. Presently, aside from a
%9$=+ certification, an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land
must also be accompanied by a copy of the original classification approved by the @9$=
,ecretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to
establish that the land indeed is alienable and disposable. The %ourt, however, has
nonetheless recogniEed and affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial
and convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from the L= or the @9$=
on the ground of substantial compliance.
ROSALINO L. -ARA'LE v. -,RNA F. -ARA'L
G.R. No. 1.(.41, J*/)*+ 1., !#11
In cases of annulment of marriage, the psychological illness and its root cause must
be proven to e4ist from the inception of the marriage. The root cause of said psychological
incapacity must be sufficiently established and supported by factual bases lin2ed to said
illness. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a Fdifficulty,F
FrefusalF or FneglectF in the performance of some marital obligations. =ather, it is essential
that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
e4isting at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
SOLE$A$ $ALTON v. FGR REALT, */0 $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION, FELIA
NG, NENITA NG, */0 FLORA R. $A,RIT o FLORA REGNER
G.R. No. 1.!5.., J*/)*+ 1", !#11
%onsignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial
authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and generally
requires a prior tender of payment. In consignation, the giving of notice to the persons
interested in the performance of the obligation is mandatory. .ailure to notify the persons
interested in the performance of the obligation will render the consignation void.
ALAIN -. $I2O v. -A. CARI$A$ L. $I2O
G.R. No. 1.(#44, J*/)*+ 1", !#11
The Property =elations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed by either rticle !17 or rticle !1# of the .amily %ode. The rules
on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the %ivil %ode provisions on co-ownership and not the =ule on @eclaration of bsolute
$ullity of $ull ;arriages and nnulment of Koidable ;arriages.
-ETROPOLITAN 'AN> C TR&ST CO-PAN, v. SPO&SES E$-&N$ -IRAN$A */0
J&LIE -IRAN$A
G.R. No. 1(."1.. J*/)*+ 1", !#11
<It has been our consistent ruling that the question of compliance or non-compliance
with notice and publication requirements of an e4trajudicial foreclosure sale is a factual
issue, and the resolution thereof by the trial court is generally binding on this %ourt. The
matter of sufficiency of posting and publication of a notice of foreclosure sale need not be
resolved by this %ourt, especially when the findings of the =T% were sustained by the %.
3ell-established is the rule that factual findings of the % are conclusive on the parties and
carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court.?
GON%ALO VILLAN&EVA, epe<e/te0 b+ ;5< ;e5< v.
SPO&SES FROILAN */0 LEONILA 'RANOCO
G.R. No. 1.!(#4, J*/)*+ !4, !#11.
property already irrevocably donated cannot be made subject of a subsequent sale
by the same donor. ccordingly, the buyer in the later transaction acquired no right over the
property.

The !8 year ordinary prescriptive period to acquire title through possession of real
property in the concept of an owner requires uninterrupted possession coupled with just
title and good faith. There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recogniEed by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Iood
faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the
possessor received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.
Lac2ing good faith possession, one>s only other recourse to maintain his claim of ownership
by prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the Property for "8
years.
C,NTHIA E. ,A-'AO v.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES */0 PATRICIO E. ,A-'AO
G.R. No. 1(4#63, J*/)*+ !4, !#11
rticle "5 of the .amily %ode contemplates incapacity or inability to ta2e cogniEance
of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following& 'a( a
true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage) 'b( this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage& the conjugal act, the community of
life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring) and
'c( the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person) it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
IN REJ IN THE -ATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE 3ILL OF
R&PERTA PALAGANAS 3ITH PRA,ER FOR THE APPOINT-ENT OF SPECIAL
A$-INISTRATOR, -AN&EL -IG&EL PALAGANAS */0 'ENJA-IN GREGORIO
PALAGANAS v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 16"144, J*/)*+ !6, !#11
rticle #!5 of the %ivil %ode states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of
the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HE-IANO $E JES&S */0 RO$ELO -ORALES
G.R. No. 1(65!(, J*/)*+ !6, !#11.
;oral damages must be awarded in cases of murder and homicide, without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. Temperate or moderate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty. 94emplary damages as a part of the civil
liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. ,uch damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the
offended party.
A:&INAS SCHOOL v. SPS. JOSE INTON */0 -A. VICTORIA S. INTON, o/ t;e5
be;*67 */0 o/ be;*67 o7 t;e5 m5/o 8;560, JOSE L&IS S. INTON, */0 SR. -ARGARITA
,A-,A-IN, OP
G.R. No. 1(4!#!, J*/)*+ !6, !#11
.or an employer to be held liable under rticle *!#8 of the %ivil %ode for the
liability of its supposed employee, the employer-employee relationship between them should
first be established.
JOSE RE,NAL$O '. OCHOSA v. 'ONA J. ALANO */0 REP&'LIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 16.45", J*/)*+ !6, !#11.
Psychological incapacity must be characteriEed by 'a( gravity, 'b( juridical
antecedence, and 'c( incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage) it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after marriage) and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
INTERNATIONAL FREEPORT TRA$ERS, INC. ?IFTI@ v.
$AN%AS INTERCONTINENTAL, INC.
G.R. No. 1(1(33, J*/)*+ !6, !#11.
9very contract has the elements of '!( consent of the contracting parties) '*( object
certain which is the subject matter of the contract) and '"( cause of the obligation which is
established. contract is perfected by mere consent, which is manifested by the meeting of
the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract.
Ienerally, contracts undergo three distinct stages& '!( preparation or negotiation)
'*( perfection) and '"( consummation. $egotiation begins from the time the prospective
contracting parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the moment of
agreement of the parties. The perfection or birth of the contract ta2es place when the parties
agree upon the essential elements of the contract. The last stage is the consummation of the
contract where the parties fulfill or perform the terms they agreed on, culminating in its
e4tinguishment.
HEIRS OF RA-ON C. GAITE, C,NTHIA GOROSTI%A GAITE */0 RHOGEN
'&IL$ERS v. THE PLA%A, INC. */0 FG& INS&RANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1..6(5, J*/)*+ !6, !#11
=eciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and in which each
party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent
upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the
performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other.
/nder the principle of quantum meruit, a contractor is allowed to recover the
reasonable value of the thing or services rendered despite the lac2 of a written contract, in
order to avoid unjust enrichment.
SPS. IRENEO T. FERNAN$O ?<)b<t5t)te0 b+ t;e5 ;e5<, Ro/*60o -. Fe/*/0o,
Co/8o05* Fe/*/0o9J*+me, E<me*60* -. Fe/*/0o, A/to/ette -. Fe/*/0o9
Re4o/0o6*, Fe05/*/0 -. Fe/*/0o, */0 Je*/ -*5e Fe/*/0o9C*/<*/*+@, AN$
-ONSERRAT -AGSALIN FERNAN$O v. -ARCELINO T. FERNAN$O
G.R. No. 1"1((", J*/)*+ 31, !#11
3here a deed is declared null and void by reason of the forgery of the signature of
one of the parties, it conveys no title) and under rticle !1!8 of the %ivil %ode, said deed is
subject to attac2 anytime. The property registered by virtue of said deed is deemed to be
simply held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered.
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES v. AVELINO FELAN
G.R. No. 1.6631, Feb)*+ !, !#11.
3hen either one of the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is
omitted or lac2ing, that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence may
be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, conformably with rticle **"8 of the
%ivil %ode, which provides that <in criminal offenses, e4emplary damages as a part of the
civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstance, e4emplary damages should be awarded.
-ARGARITA F. CASTRO v. NAPOLEON A. -ONSO$
G.R. No. 1(3.1", Feb)*+ !, !#11.
rticle 5#1 of the %ivil %ode provides that no proprietor shall ma2e such e4cavations
upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support. n owner, by virtue of his surface right, may ma2e e4cavations on his land, but his
right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Detween two adjacent landowners, each has an
absolute property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if
either, in e4cavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbor>s
land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or
slide from its position, the one so e4cavating is liable.
I--AC&LATE CONCEPTION ACA$E-, ?ICA@ */0 t;e 6*te $R. PA&LO C. CA-POS
<)b<t5t)te0 b+ ;5< ;e5<, $R. JOSE PA&LO E. CA-POS, ATT,. PA&LO E. CA-POS, JR.
*/0 $R. ENRI:&E E. CA-POS v. A-A CO-P&TER COLLEGE, INC. ?A-A@
G.R. No. 1.35.5, Feb)*+ !, !#11.
rticle !558 of the %ivil %ode provides that FIf a dwelling place or any other
building intended for human habitation is in such a condition that its use brings imminent
and serious danger to life or health, the lessee may terminate the lease at once by notifying
the lessor, even if at the time the contract was perfected the former 2new of the dangerous
condition or waived the right to rescind the lease on account of this condition.F ,aid
provision is evidently intended to protect human lives. 6owever, it assumes that the defects
were irremediable and that the parties had no agreement for rectifying them.
-AN&EL CATIN$IG, epe<e/te0 b+ ;5< 6e4*6 epe<e/t*t5ve E-ILIANO CATIN$IG9
RO$RIGO v. A&RORA IRENE V$A. $E -ENESES
SILVINO ROAAS, SR., epe<e/te0 b+ FELICISI-A VILLAF&ERTE ROAAS v. CO&RT
OF APPEALS */0 -EN$O%A, JJ. A&RORA IRENE V$A. $E -ENESES
G.R. No. 165(51, G.R. No. 16((.5, Feb)*+ !, !#11
3here the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has
never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lac2 of consideration. /nder
rticle !17! of the %ivil %ode, if the price is simulated, the sale is void.
s against the registered owners and the holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is
the former who has a better right to possess. The certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
therein.
SPO&SES L&IGI -. G&ANIO */0 ANNA HERNAN$E%9G&ANIO v. -A>ATI
SHANGRI9LA HOTEL */0 RESORT, INC.
G.R. No. 1"#6#1, Feb)*+ ., !#11.
The doctrine of pro4imate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another party.
Dreach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the
terms of a contract. It is also defined as the failure, without legal e4cuse, to perform any
promise which forms the whole or part of the contract.
$EVELOP-ENT 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES v. 'EN P. -E$RANO */0
PRIVATI%ATION -ANAGE-ENT OFFICE LP-OM
G.R. No. 16.##4, Feb)*+ ., !#11.
/nder rticle !170 of the %ivil %ode, a contract of sale is perfected the moment
there is a meeting of the minds on the thing which is the object of the contract and on the
price. s a rule, a contract is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the two parties, from
the moment that there is a meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause that constitute the contract. The law requires that the offer must be certain
and the acceptance absolute and unqualified.
rticle **8# of the %ivil %ode allows attorney's fees to be awarded by a court when
its claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur e4penses to protect his
interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is
sought.
$OLORITA C. 'EATINGO v. LILIA '& GASIS
G.R. No. 1."641, Feb)*+ ", !#11.
In a double sale, where the two sales concerning a property were not duly registered
with the =egistry of Property, whoever was in possession of said property had the better
right.
In a sale of a property, the e4ecution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima
facie presumption of delivery. It is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to ta2e actual
possession of the land sold.
E-ILIANA G. PENA, A-ELIA C. -AR, */0 CAR-EN RE,ES v. SPO&SES
AR-AN$O TOLENTINO AN$ LETICIA TOLENTINO
G.R. No. 155!!.9!(, Feb)*+ ", !#11.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CAN$I$O, $E-ETILA, JES&S, ANGELITO,
*/0 TERESITA, *66 <)/*me0 VERGEL $E $IOS
G.R. No. 1.#45", Feb)*+ ", !#11.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and
condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in e4actly the same way it has been when the loss or
destruction occurred.
SA-&EL &. LEE */0 PA&LINE LEE */0 ASIATR&ST $EVELOP-ENT 'AN>, INC.
v. 'ANG>O> 'AN> P&'LIC CO-PAN,, LI-ITE$
G.R. No. 1.334", Feb)*+ ", !#11
/nder rticle !"#7 of the %ivil %ode, alienations by onerous title are also presumed
fraudulent when made by persons against whom some judgment has been rendered in any
instance or some writ of attachment has been issued. 6owever, the presumption of fraud does
not apply to registered lands if the judgment or attachment made is not also registered.
lienation, connotes transfer of the property and possession of lands, tenements, or
other things, from one person to another. This term is applied to absolute conveyances of real
property and must involve a complete transfer from one person to another. mortgage does
not contemplate a transfer or an absolute conveyance of a real property. It is merely a lien
that neither creates a title nor an estate.
The rights of the first mortgage creditor or mortgagee over the mortgaged properties are
superior to those of a subsequent attaching creditor and other junior mortgagees.
OCEANEERING CONTRACTORS ?PHILS@, INC. v. NESTOR N. 'ARRETTO, 0o5/4
b)<5/e<< *< N.N.'. LIGHTERAGE
G.R. No. 1(4!15. Feb)*+ ", !#11
The rule is long and well settled that there must be pleading and proof of actual
damages suffered for the same to be recovered. In addition to the fact that the amount of loss
must be capable of proof, it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.
CAROLINA HERNAN$E% NIEVERA, ET AL. v. 3ILFRE$O HERNAN$E%,
ET AL.
G.R. No. 1.1165, Feb)*+ 14, !#11
Thus, it becomes clear that @emetrio>s special power of attorney to sell is sufficient
to enable him to ma2e a binding commitment under the @% in behalf of %arolina and
;argarita. In particular, it does include the authority to e4tinguish P;=@%>s obligation
under the ;+ to deliver option money and agree to a more fle4ible term by agreeing
instead to receive shares of stoc2 in lieu thereof and in consideration of the assignment and
conveyance of the properties to the sset Pool. Indeed, the terms of his special power of
attorney allow much leeway to accommodate not only the terms of the ;+ but also those of
the subsequent agreement in the @% which, in this case, necessarily and consequently has
resulted in a novation of P;=@%>s integral obligations.
INS&RANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAN$S CORPORATION v. SPO&SES VI$AL S.
GREGORIO */0 J&LITA GREGORIO
G.R. No. 1.41#4, Feb)*+ 14, !#11
/nder the provisions of rticle !!15 of the %ivil %ode, actions upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff or upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years from the time
the cause of action accrued. In the instant case, the %ourt agrees with petitioner that the
rec2oning period for prescription of petitioner's action should be from the time of actual
discovery of the fraud in !::0. 6ence, petitioner's suit for damages, filed on .ebruary *8,
!::5, is well within the four-year prescriptive period.
$either may the principle of laches apply in the present case. The essence of laches
or <stale demands? is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and une4plained length of
time to do that which, by e4ercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,
thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it. It would be the height of injustice if respondents would be allowed to go
scot-free simply because petitioner relied in good faith on the former's false representations.
REVELINA LI-SON v. 3AC> 3AC> CON$O-INI&- CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1(((#!. Feb)*+ 14, !#11
CAROLINA HERNAN$E%9NIEVERA, $E-ETRIO P. HERNAN$E%, JR., */0
-ARGARITA H. -ALVAR v. 3ILFRE$O HERNAN$E%, HO-E INS&RANCE */0
G&ARANT, CORPORATION ?6II%@, PROJECT -OVERS REALT, */0
$EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION ?P;=@%@, -ARIO P. VILLA-OR */0 LAN$ 'AN>
OF THE PHILIPPINES ?LDP@
G.R. No. 1.1165, Feb)*+ 14, !#11
There are two ways which could indicate the presence of novation and
thereby produce the effect of e4tinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the
same. The first is when novation has been e4plicitly stated and declared in unequivocal
terms. The second is when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every
point. The test of incompatibility is 369T69= += $+T the two obligations can stand
together, each one having its independent e4istence. If they cannot, they are incompatible,
and the latter obligation novates the first. %orollarily, changes that breed incompatibility
must be essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must ta2e place in
any of the essential elements of the obligation such as its object, cause or principal
conditions thereof) otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and
insufficient to e4tinguish the original obligation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RO'ERTO LOPE% + CA'AL
G.R. No. 1(("#!, Feb)*+ 16, !#11
The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss
of earning capacity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PORFERIO -ASAGCA, JR. + PA$ILLA
G.R. No. 1(4"!!, Feb)*+ !3, !#11
The %ourt affirms the award of civil indemnity made by the trial court for each count
of rape. %ivil indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to have been committed. Dased on
prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of P70,888.88 to the rape victim as civil
indemnity for each count. ;oral damages are awarded to rape victims without need of proof
other than the fact of rape, on the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the
e4perience she underwent.
SPS. -OISES */0 CLE-ENCIA AN$RA$A v. PILHINO SALES CORPORATION,
epe<e/te0 b+ 5t< '*/8; -*/*4e, JOJO S. SAET
G.R. No. 15644(, Feb)*+ !3, !#11
rticle *! of the %ivil %ode, in conjunction with rticle !: of the %ivil %ode, is part
of the cause of action 2nown in this jurisdiction as <abuse of rights.? The elements of abuse
of rights are& 'a( there is a legal right or duty) 'b( e4ercised in bad faith) and 'c( for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.In the instant case, Pilhino had acted in good faith
in bringing %ivil %ase $o. *!,#:#-:" to annul the deed of sale involving the 6ino truc2
e4ecuted by Hose ndrada, Hr. in favor of ;oises ndrada, considering that Pilhino had
<believed that the sale in favor of defendants-appellants had been resorted to so that Hose
ndrada might evade his obligations.? Kerily, the petitioners did not prove the concurrence
of the elements of abuse of rights.
It is well accepted in this jurisdiction that no premium should be placed on the right
to litigate and that not every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of attorney>s
fees. 6erein, the element of bad faith on the part of Pilhino in commencing and prosecuting
%ivil %ase $o. *!,#:#-:", which was necessary to predicate the lawful grant of attorney>s
fees based on rticle **8# '1( of the %ivil %ode, was not established. 6ence, petitioners are
not entitled to attorney>s fees.
VICENTE ,& CHANG AN$ SOLE$A$ ,& CHANG v. REP&'LIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1.1.!6, Feb)*+ !3, !#11.
In order that an application for registration of title may be granted, they must first
establish the following& '!( that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain and '*( that they have been in open, continuous, e4clusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership, since
Hune !*, !:10, or earlier. pplicants must overcome the presumption that the land they are
applying for is part of the public domain and that they have an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in their names arising from an imperfect title.
S&PRE-E TRANSLINER, INC., -OISES C. ALVARE% v. 'PI FA-IL, SAVINGS
'AN>, INC. H 'PI FA-IL, SAVINGS 'AN>, INC. v. S&PRE-E TRANSLINER INC.,
-OISES C. ALVARE% AN$ PA&LITA S. ALVARES
G.R. No. 16561.HG.R. No. 165(3.. Feb)*+ !5, !#11
If mortgagors e4ercised their right of redemption before the e4piration of the
statutory one-year period, the mortgagee is not liable to pay the capital gains ta4 due on the
e4trajudicial foreclosure sale.
SPS. VICENTE $IONISIO */0 ANITA $IONISIO v. 3ILFRE$O LINSANGAN
G.R. No. 1.(15", -*8; !, !#11
n action is for unlawful detainer if the complaint sufficiently alleges the following&
'!( initially, the defendant has possession of property by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff) '*( eventually, however, such possession became illegal upon plaintiff>s notice to
defendant, terminating the latter>s right of possession) '"( still, the defendant remains in
possession, depriving the plaintiff of the enjoyment of his property) and '1( within a year
from plaintiff>s last demand that defendant vacate the property, the plaintiff files a complaint
for defendant>s ejectment. If the defendant had possession of the land upon mere tolerance of
the owner, such tolerance must be present at the beginning of defendant>s possession.

REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TEO$ORO P. RI%ALVO, JR.
G.R. No. 1.!#11, -*8; ., !#11
/nder ,ection !1 '!(, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish
first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain) second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, e4clusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same) and third, that it
is under a bona fide claim of ownership since Hune !*, !:10, or earlier.
It is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty '"8(-year period of prescription for
purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under ,ection !1 '*( of P.@.
$o. !0*: only begins from the moment the ,tate e4pressly declares that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
SPO&SES FERNAN$O */0 ANGELINA E$RALIN v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS 'AN>
G.R. No. 16(5!3, -*8; ", !#11
@uring the period of redemption, the mortgagee is entitled to a writ of possession
upon depositing the approved bond. 3hen the redemption period e4pires without the
mortgagor e4ercising his right of redemption, the mortgagor is deemed to have lost all
interest over the foreclosed property, and the purchaser acquires absolute ownership of the
property. The issuance by the =T% of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this
case is proper. 3e have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of
possession in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not e4ercise discretion or
judgment. Thus, Fthe remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of OthisP
ministerial duty.F
The elements of pactum commissorium, which enable the mortgagee to acquire
ownership of the mortgaged property without the need of any foreclosure proceedings, are&
'!( there should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal
obligation, and '*( there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor
of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the
stipulated period. In the instant case, the second element is missing to characteriEe the @eed
of ,ale as a form of pactum commissorium. Keterans Dan2 did not, upon the petitioners>
default, automatically acquire or appropriate the mortgaged property for itself. That
Keterans Dan2 went through all the stages of e4trajudicial foreclosure indicates that there
was no pactum commissorium.
The %ourt has held before that the purchaser>s right Fto request for the issuance of
the writ of possession of the land never prescribes.F FThe right to possess a property merely
follows the right of ownership,F and it would be illogical to hold that a person having
ownership of a parcel of land is barred from see2ing possession thereof.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS 'AN> v. RA-ON VALEN%&ELA
G.R. No. 16353#, -*8; ", !#11
3hile ,ection !8# of P@ $o. !0*: authoriEes a person in interest to as2 the court for
any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title or of any memorandum
appearing therein, the prevailing rule is that proceedings thereunder are summary in nature,
contemplating corrections or insertions of mista2es which are only clerical but certainly not
controversial issues. =elief under the said legal provision can only be granted if there is
unanimity among the parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the
part of any party in interest.
In the present case, there is no question that there is a serious objection and an adverse claim
on the part of an interested party as shown by respondent's opposition and motion to dismiss
the petition for correction of entry filed by petitioner. Thus, petitioner may not avail of the
remedy provided for under ,ection !8# of P.@. $o. !0*:.
CORNELIA -. HERNAN$E% v. CECILIO F. HERNAN$E%
G.R. No. 15(5.6, -*8; ", !#11
Auitclaims are also contracts and can be voided if there was fraud or intimidation
that leads to lac2 of consent. The preparation by %ecilio of the receipt and quitclaim
document which he as2ed %ornelia to sign, indicate that even %ecilio doubted that he could
validly claim #".87J of the price of %ornelia>s land. Dased on the attending circumstances,
the receipt and quitclaim document is an act of fraud perpetuated by %ecilio. Kery clearly,
both the service contract and the later receipt and quitclaim document, the first vitiated by
mista2e and the second being fraudulent, are void.
%ecilio breached an obligation that is neither a loan nor forbearance of money. The
decision of the lower court ordering %ecilio to pay the amount of P5,!#:,1!7.58 to %ornelia
at !*J per annum until fully paid should be modified to 5J per annum from the time of the
filing of the complaint up to the date of the decision, and at !*J per annum from finality until
fully paid
FILIPINAS S,NTHETIC FI'ER CORPORATION v. 3ILFRE$O $E LOS SANTOS, et
*6
G.R. No. 15!#33, -*8; 16, !#11
/nder the $ew %ivil %ode, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. pparently, in the present case, ;ejia's violation of the
traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the
collision. The allowed rate of speed for ;ejia's vehicle was 08 2ilometers per hour, while the
records show that he was driving at the speed of 78 2ilometers per hour. The %ourt is then
convinced that defendant ;ejia was running real fast along 9@, when he saw a vehicle on
the opposite side suddenly turn left towards 3hite Plains.
/nder rticle *!#8 of the $ew %ivil %ode, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under rticle *!#8 is direct and immediate) it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. In view of
the absence of sufficient proof of its e4ercise of due diligence, .ilsyn cannot escape its
solidary liability as the owner of the wayward bus and the employer of the negligent driver of
the wayward bus.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. J&ANITO -ANI-TI-, et *6.
G.R. No. 16"5"", -*8; 16, !#11
Dased on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under ,ection
!1'!( must sufficiently establish& '!( that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain) '*( that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, e4clusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same) and '"( that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since Hune !*, !:10, or earlier.
In the case at bench, the respondents failed to establish that the subject lots were disposable
and alienable lands. Li2ewise, the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, e4clusive, continuous, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lands, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since Hune !*, !:10 or earlier.
3ell settled is the rule that ta4 declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The
fact that the disputed property may have been declared for ta4ation purposes in the names of
the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
VENANCIO GIVERO, et. *6v. -AAI-O GIVERO */0 LORETO GIVERO
G.R. No. 15.4.6, -*8; 16, !#11
The fact that it was ,everina who actually conveyed the properties to the said heirs of
=ufino does not in anyway contradict the fact that the partition was actually made by
Teodorico prior to his demise. The basis of their ownership to the property is indubitably the
right vested on their said predecessor-in-interest at the time of Teodorico>s death. The
e4istence of the @eed of @onation is evidently a mere surplusage which does not affect the
right of =ufino>s heirs to the property.
&NION LEAF TO'ACCO CORPORATION, REPRESENTE$ ', ITS PRESI$ENT -R.
HILARION P. &, v. REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1(56(3, -*8; 16, !#11
dvance Plans and %onsolidated Plans are hardly the competent pieces of evidence
that the law requires. The notation by a geodetic engineer on the survey plans that properties
are alienable and disposable does not suffice to prove these lands> classification. The
applicant for registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
@9$= ,ecretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
-ETROPOLITAN 'AN> AN$ TR&ST CO-PAN, v. -ARINA '. C&STO$IO
G.R. No. 1.3.(#, -*8; !1, !#11
The %ourt is not sufficiently convinced that petitioner ;etroban2 has introduced a
preponderance of circumstantial evidence to show that respondent %ustodio was liable for
the missing bundles of cash worth PhP588,888. There is nothing on record that will show
that there were any missing bundles of one-thousand-peso and five-hundred-peso bills when
respondent %ustodio turned over the funds to the cash custodian, ;s. ;arinel %astro.
.urther, considering the failure of the cash custodian and the security guard to abide by the
procedural safeguards, petitioner ban2 is now left to find other evidence to determine the
person liable for the cash shortage.
'ETT, '. LAC'A,AN v. 'A,ANI S. SA-O,, JR.
G.R. No. 1654!., -*8; !1, !#11
The determination as to the e4istence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution
of an action for partition. s the %ourt held in the case of ;unicipality of DiSan v. Iarcia,
the first phase of a partition andLor accounting suit is ta2en up with the determination of
369T69= += $+T or not a co-ownership in fact e4ists, and a partition is proper 'i.e., not
otherwise legally proscribed( and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attac2ed,
but that rule is not material to the case at bar. 3hat cannot be collaterally attac2ed is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used. ;oreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens
system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. +wnership is
different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over
a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.
R&RAL 'AN> OF TO'OSO, INC. ?/oG &CP' S*v5/4< '*/F@ v. JEAN VENIEGAS
AGTOTO
G.R. No. 1.56"., -*8; !3, !#11
JEAN VENIEGAS AGTOTO v. R&RAL 'AN> OF TO'OSO, INC. */0 ANTONIO
AR'IS
G.R. No. 1.61#3
The foreclosure sale covering the land was valid, notwithstanding the chattel
mortgage that covered the P5:,1"*.88 portion of the loan of P!"8,088.88. The chattel
mortgage was a contract distinct from the real estate mortgage, which latter mortgage
covered the separate amount of P5!,85#.88. Thus, the Dan2 had no right to include in the
foreclosure of the land the portion of the loan separately secured by the chattel mortgage.
.orbearance of money refers to the obligation of the creditor to desist for a fi4ed
period from requiring the debtor to repay the debt then due and for which !*J per annum is
imposed as interest rate. ,uch interest should, however, be computed only from the time the
% rendered its decision on +ctober *7, *880 when it determined with reasonable certainty
the amount of the surplus proceeds the Dan2 has to return to gtoto.
STAR T3O ?SPV9A-C@, INC. v. HO3AR$ >O, -IN -IN SEE >O, JI--, ONG, */0
GRACE NG ONG
G.R. No. 1(5454, -*8; !3, !#11
=espondents acted as sureties under the %omprehensive ,urety greement to secure
the obligations of Hianshe to =%D%. contract of suretyship is an agreement whereby a
party, called the surety, guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or
obligor, of an obligation or underta2ing in favor of another party, called the obligee.
Pursuant to rticle *801 of the %ivil %ode that Fa guarantor or surety may bind himself for
less, but not for more than the principal debtor, both as regards the amount and the onerous
nature of the conditions,F respondents limited their liability to P08 ;, which is less than
Hianshe>s liability to =%D%. 6oward Mo then complied with his obligations and made
payments to =%D% through the different modes.
JOSEFA S. A'ALOS
O
AN$ THE $EVELOP-ENT 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
SPS. LO-ANTONG $ARAPA */0 S5/*b $5m*F)t*
G.R. No. 1646"3, -*8; !3, !#11
The land covered by T%T $o. T-!,::7 was not among the properties, the spouses
mortgaged with the @DP in !:5*. s such, the foreclosure made by @DP over the subject
land was null and void.
The @DP>s annotation that the property originally covered by Ta4 @eclaration $o.
-!1# is now covered by T%T $o. T-!,::7 is neither the deed nor the instrument referred to
by ,ections 58 and 5! of the above quoted law and such annotation will in no way change the
fact that the two documents refer to different lands& one, which was indeed a subject of the
mortgage contract) and two, which @ima2uta had delivered to @DP in !:78 supposedly for
another loan, but, which was, however, disapproved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. R&EL VELAR$E *65*< $OLO, 'ELAR$E
G.R. No. 1(!55#, -*8; !3, !#11
%ivil indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to have been committed. ;oral
damages are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape, on the
assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the e4perience she underwent. The
award of e4emplary damages is justified under rticle ***: of the %ivil %ode to set a public
e4ample and serve as a deterrent against elders who abuse and corrupt the youth.
ANITA -ONASTERIO9PE */0 t;e SPO&SES RO-&LO TAN */0 E$ITHA PE9TAN v.
JOSE J&AN TONG, ;ee5/ epe<e/te0 b+ ;5< Atto/e+95/9F*8t, JOSE ,. ONG,
G.R. No. 15136", -*8; !3, !#11
rticle !1:# of the %ivil %ode provides that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the e4ecution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred. In the instant case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that they had
no intention of delivering the subject lots to respondent when they e4ecuted the said deed of
sale. 6ence, petitioners' e4ecution of the deed of sale is tantamount to a delivery of the
subject lots to respondent.
ROSA $ELOS RE,ES v. SPO&SES FRANCISCO O$ONES */0
AR3ENIA O$ONES, et *6
G.R. No. 1.(#"6, -*8; !3, !#11
In forcible entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of
defendants> actual entry into the property) whereas, in unlawful detainer cases, it is counted
from the date of the last demand to vacate. 6ence, to determine 369T69= += $+T the
case was filed on time, there is a necessity to ascertain 369T69= += $+T the complaint is
one for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer) and since the main distinction between the
two actions is when and how defendant entered the property, the determinative facts should
be alleged in the complaint.
ROLAN$O T. CAT&NGAL, et *6 v. ANGEL S. RO$RIG&E%
G.R. No. 146(3", -*8; !3, !#11
rt. !!#* of the %ivil %ode provides& 3hen the fulfilment of the condition depends
upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends upon
chance or upon the will of a third person, the obligation shall ta2e effect in conformity with
the provisions of this %ode.
This %ourt has distinguished between a condition imposed on the perfection of a
contract and a condition imposed merely on the performance of an obligation. 3hile failure
to comply with the first condition results in the failure of a contract, failure to comply with
the second merely gives the other party the option to either refuse to proceed with the sale or
to waive the condition.
rticle !010 of the %ivil %ode on sales provides& 3here the obligation of either party
to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party may refuse
to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition 4 4 4.
rticle !"71 of the %ivil %ode provides that FOtPhe various stipulations of a contract
shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result
from all of them ta2en jointly.F The same %ode further sets down the rule that FOiPf some
stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as
bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual.F
GRAN$TE: IN$&STRIAL STEEL PRO$&CTS, INC., et *6 v. ANNALI%A -.
ESTRELLA
G.R. No. 1"!416, -*8; !3, !#11
corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers
and employees. +bligations incurred by them, acting as such corporate agents, are not theirs
but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. True, solidary liabilities may
at times be incurred but only when e4ceptional circumstances warrant such as, generally, in
the following cases& '!( 3hen directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a
corporation T 'a( vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation) 'b( act in
bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs.
In the instant case, there is no indication that 9strella>s dismissal was effected with
malice or bad faith on the part of Irandteq>s officers. Their liability for 9strella>s illegal
dismissal, the consequential monetary award arising from such dismissal and the other
money claims awarded in the L>s decision, as correctly affirmed by the %, could thus only
be joint, not solidary.
SPO&SES HER-ES P. OCHOA */0 ARACELI $. OCHOA v. CHINA 'AN>ING
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1"!(... -*8; !3, !#11
The e4clusive venue of ;a2ati %ity, as stipulated by the parties and sanctioned by
,ection 1, =ule 1 of the =ules of %ourt, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for
94trajudicial .oreclosure filed by respondent ban2 because the provisions of =ule 1 pertain
to venue of actions, which an e4trajudicial foreclosure is not.
ESTRELLITA J&LIANO9LLAVE v. REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA P&TRI
%ORA,$A A. TA-ANO */0 A$I' AH-A$ A. TA-ANO
G.R. No. 16".66, -*8; 3#, !#11
The marriage between the late ,en. Tamano and Uorayda was celebrated in !:0#,
solemniEed under civil and ;uslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between ;uslims and non-;uslims ali2e was the %ivil %ode of !:08, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can e4ist at any given time. ,en. Tamano>s prior
marriage to Uorayda has been severed by way of divorce under P@ !8#", the law that
codified ;uslim personal laws. 6owever, P@ !8#" cannot benefit 9strellita. In view of ,en.
Tamano>s prior marriage which subsisted at the time 9strellita married him, their subsequent
marriage is correctly adjudged by the % as void ab initio.
Uorayda and dib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage. .;. $o. 8*-!!-!8-,%, which limits to only the husband or
the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out
the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
LOTTO RESTA&RANT CORPORATION v. 'PI FA-IL, SAVINGS 'AN>, INC.
G.R. No. 1..!6#, -*8; 3#, !#11
The %ourt has previously upheld as valid the proviso in loans that the interest rate
would be made to depend on the prevailing mar2et rate. ,uch provision does not signify an
automatic increase in the interest. It simply means that the ban2 may adjust the interest
according to the prevailing mar2et rate. This may result to either an increase or a decrease
in the interest.
The %ourt held in 9quitable P%I Dan2, Inc. v. +H-;ar2 Trading, Inc. that
foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of mortgage indebtedness. The
creditor-mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property, and apply the
proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the unpaid loan. The records show that Lotto
defaulted in its obligation when it unjustifiably stopped paying its amortiEations after the first
year. %onsequently, there is no question that DPI 'which succeeded @D,( had a clear right to
foreclose on Lotto>s collateral.
RICHAR$ J&AN v. GA'RIEL ,AP, SR.
G.R. No. 1(!1.., -*8; 3#, !#11
/nder the general principles on trust, equity converts the holder of property right as
trustee for the benefit of another if the circumstances of its acquisition ma2es the holder
ineligible <in 4 4 4 good conscience to hold and enjoy it.? This %ourt recogniEed
unconventional implied trusts in contracts involving the purchase of housing units by officers
of tenants> associations in breach of their obligations, the partitioning of realty contrary to
the terms of a compromise agreement, and the e4ecution of a sales contract indicating a
buyer distinct from the provider of the purchase money. In all these cases, the formal holders
of title were deemed trustees obliged to transfer title to the beneficiaries in whose favor the
trusts were deemed created. 3e see no reason to bar the recognition of the same obligation
in a mortgage contract meeting the standards for the creation of an implied trust.
-ARIA LO&R$ES TA-ANI, CONCEPCION TA-ANI, ESTRELLA TA-ANI,
TERESITA TA-ANI, A%&CENA SOLE$A$, $OLORES G&ERRERO, CRISTINA
T&GA$E $A-IETA -ANSAANG, -AN&EL TA-ANI, VALERIANA CASTRO,
A&RORA SANTIAGO */0 ROSARIO CASTILLO v. RO-AN SALVA$OR */0
FILO-ENA 'RAVO
G.R. No. 1.14". Ap56 4, !#11
purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair
price for it at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
some other persons in the property. 6e buys the property with the belief that the person from
whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. 6e cannot
close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted
in good faith.
LAN$ 'AN> OF THEPHILIPPINES v. $EPART-ENT OF AGRARIAN REFOR- */0
-ETRACO TELE9H,GIENIC SERVICES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1.1(4# Ap56 4, !#11
3e must stress, at this juncture, that the ta2ing of private lands under the agrarian
reform program parta2es of the nature of an e4propriation proceeding. In a number of cases,
we have stated that just compensation in e4propriation proceedings represents the full and
fair equivalent of the property ta2en from its owner by the e4propriator. The measure is not
the ta2er>s gain, but the owner>s loss. To compensate is to render something which is equal
in value to that ta2en or received.
$O-INGO CARA'EO <. SPO&SES NOR'ERTO */0 S&SAN $INGCO
G.R. No. 1"#(!3 Ap56 4, !#11
The requirement that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing is satisfied as
long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being
made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties.
RICAR$O '. 'ANGA,AN v.
RI%AL CO--ERCIAL 'AN>ING CORPORATION AN$ PHILIP SARIA
G.R. No. 14"1"3 Ap56 4, !#11
The mere absence of notariEation does not necessarily render the ,urety greement
invalid. $otariEation of a private document converts the document into a public one, renders
it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity, and is entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. 6owever, the irregular notariEation B or, for that matter, the lac2 of
notariEation B does not necessarily affect the validity of the contract reflected in the
document.
/nder rticles *!:: and **88 of the %ivil %ode, actual or compensatory damages
are those awarded in satisfaction of or in recompense for loss or injury sustained. They
proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been
done.

RO$OLFO N. REGALA v. FE$ERICO P. CARIN
G.R. No. 1((.15 Ap56 6, !#11
In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an e4ception rather than
the rule. ;oral damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and
alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious an4iety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shoc2, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly
caused to a person. To be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove
that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases
listed in rticles **!: and ***8 of the %ivil %ode. ;oreover, the damages must be shown to
be the pro4imate result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the
factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.
JOE A. ROS */0 ESTRELLA AG&ETE v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 'AN> 9 LAOAG
'RANCH
G.R. No. 1.#166 Ap56 6, !#11
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, e4press or implied, of the wife. ,hould the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession,
that contract falls within the term <obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.?
6ere, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent
at the signing of the contract. .rom the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed. ,imply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
ENRICO SANTOS v. NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
G.R. No. 1.11!" Ap56 6, !#11
The rule on estoppel against tenants is subject to a qualification. It does not apply if
the landlord>s title has e4pired, or has been conveyed to another, or has been defeated by a
title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee relationship. In other
words, if there was a change in the nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of
the lease, then the presumption does not apply. +therwise, if the nature of the landlord>s title
remains as it was during the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant, then
estoppel lies against the tenant.
ELENITA -. $E3ARA, epe<e/te0 b+ ;e Atto/e+95/9F*8t, FER$INAN$
-AGALLANES v. SPO&SES RONNIE AN$ GINA LA-ELA */0 STENILE ALVERO
G.R. No. 1."#1# Ap56 11, !#11
ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains e4clusively to the husband or to the wife. =egistration in
the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The separation-
in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the
conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. ;oreover, the presumption of
conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does
not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption
to arise.
Iross inadequacy of the price does not affect a contract of sale, e4cept as it may
indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other
act or contract.
/nder rt. !5", the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership. $either shall the fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. 6owever, the
payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, and that of fines
and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in rticle !5! have been covered, if the spouse who is bound
should have no e4clusive property or if it should be insufficient) but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned.
SERVILLANO E. A'A$ v. OSCAR C. FARRALES AN$ $AIS, C. FARRALES9
VILLA-A,OR
G.R. No. 1.(635, Ap56 11, !#11
Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical possession or
possession de facto, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. +nly prior
physical possession, not title, is the issue.
JOSE -IG&EL ANTON v. SPO&SES ERNESTO OLIVA AN$ CORA%ON OLIVA AS
S&'STIT&TE$ ', HER LEGAL HEIRS, NA-EL,J GRA%IELA -ARIE
COLLANTES, GRETEL ELAINE $ING, GLA$,S -IRIA- OLIVA, GEOFFRE,
JOSEPH OLIVA AN$ GL,NNIS CAR-EN CALPOT&RA
G.R. No. 1(!563, Ap56 11, !#11
,ince the +livas were mere creditors, not partners, they had no right to demand that
the ntons ma2e an accounting of the money loaned out to them. ,till, the +livas were
entitled to 2now from the ntons how much net profits the three stores were ma2ing annually
since the +livas were entitled to certain percentages of those profits.
CRISPIN $ICHOSO, JR., EVEL,N $ICHOSO VAL$E%, AN$ ROSE-ARIE
$ICHOSO PE 'ENITO v. PATROCINIO L. -ARCOS
G.R. No. 1(#!(!, Ap56 11, !#11
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met&
'!( The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway) '*( There is payment of proper indemnity) '"( The isolation is not due to the
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate) and '1(The right of way claimed is at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate) and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
ART&RO SARTE FLORES v. SPO&SES ENRICO L. LIN$O, JR. */0 E$NA C. LIN$O
G.R. No. 1(3"(4, Ap56 13, !#11
< mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that
is, to recover the debt. The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action
for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security. n election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be
multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending
on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.?
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 'AN> v. -ERELO '. A%NARB -ATIAS '. A%NAR IIIB
JOSE L. A%NAR ?0e8e*<e0@, epe<e/te0 b+ ;5< ;e5<B RA-ON A. 'ARCENILLAB
ROSARIO T. 'ARCENILLAB JOSE '. ENA$ ?0e8e*<e0@, epe<e/te0 b+ ;5< ;e5<B */0
RICAR$O GA'&,A ?0e8e*<e0@, epe<e/te0 b+ ;5< ;e5<.
G.R. No. 1.1(#5
-ERELO '. A%NAR */0 -ATIAS '. A%NAR III v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 'AN>
G.R. No. 1.!#!1 -*+ 3#, !#11
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is
vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the
property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be
e4press or implied. n e4press trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties.
n implied trust comes into being by operation of law. 94press trusts, sometimes referred to
as direct trusts, are intentionally created by the direct and positive acts of the settlor or the
trustor - by some writing, deed, or will or oral declaration. It is created not necessarily by
some written words, but by the direct and positive acts of the parties. This is in consonance
with rticle !111 of the %ivil %ode, which states that <no particular words are required for
the creation of an e4press trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.? In other
words, the creation of an e4press trust must be manifested with reasonable certainty and
cannot be inferred from loose and vague declarations or from ambiguous circumstances
susceptible of other interpretations.
ESTATE OF PASTOR -. SA-SON, epe<e/te0 b+ ;5< ;e5 ROLAN$O '. SA-SON v.
-ERCE$ES R. S&SANO */0 NOR'ERTO R. S&SANO
G.R. No. 1."#!4
J&LIAN C. CHAN v. -ERCE$ES R. S&SANO */0 NOR'ERTO R. S&SANO
G.R. No. 1."#(6 -*+ 3#, !#11
.or a tenancy relationship to e4ist between the parties, the following essential
elements must be shown& '!( the parties are the landowner and the tenant) '*( the subject
matter is agricultural land) '"( there is consent between the parties) '1( the purpose is
agricultural production) '0( there is personal cultivation by the tenant) and '5( there is
sharing of the harvests between the parties. The presence of all of these elements must be
proved by substantial evidence.
VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC. v. JOCEL,N CAT&'IG
G.R. No. 1.551! -*+ 3#, !#11
The presumption that employers are negligent under rticle *!#8 of the %ivil %ode
flows from the negligence of their employees. 6aving adjudged that the immediate and
pro4imate cause of the collision resulting in %atubig>s death was his own negligence, and
there was no fault or negligence on %abanilla>s part, then such presumption of fault or
negligence on the part of petitioner, as %abanilla>s employer, does not even arise. Thus, it is
not even necessary to delve into the defense of petitioner that it e4ercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of %abanilla as its employee driver.
HEIRS OF FELICI$A$ V$A. $E $ELA CR&% v. HEIRS OF PE$RO T. FAJAR$O
G.R. No. 1(4"66 -*+ 3#, !#11
compromise agreement is final and e4ecutory. ,uch a final and e4ecutory judgment
cannot be modified or amended. If an amendment is to be made, it may consist only of
supplying an omission, or stri2ing out a superfluity or interpreting an ambiguous phrase
therein in relation to the body of the decision which gives it life.
ROSALIA N. ESPINO v. SPO&SES SHARON SA-PANI '&L&T */0 CELE'I '&L&T
G.R. No. 1(3(11 -*+ 3#, !#11
The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership) it is merely an evidence of
title over a particular property.
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of
moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the li2e. 3hile respondents alleged sleepless
nights and mental anguish in their petition for relief, they failed to prove them during the
trial. ;ere allegations do not suffice. They must be substantiated.
n award of attorney>s fees is an e4ception and there must be some compelling legal
reason to bring the case within the e4ception and justify the award.
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS 'AN> v. SPO&SES ALFRE$O -. CASTILLO AN$
ELI%A'ETH C. CASTILLO, */0 SPO&SES RO-EO '. CAPATI */0 A:&ILINA -.
LO'O
G.R. No. 1"31.( -*+ 3#, !#11
The unilateral determination and imposition of the increased rates is violative of the
principle of mutuality of contracts under rticle !"8# of the %ivil %ode, which provides that
<the contract must bind both contracting parties) its validity or compliance cannot be left to
the will of one of them.? perusal of the Promissory $ote will readily show that the increase
or decrease of interest rates hinges solely on the discretion of petitioner. It does not require
the conformity of the ma2er before a new interest rate could be enforced. ny contract which
appears to be heavily weighed in favor of one of the parties so as to lead to an
unconscionable result, thus parta2ing of the nature of a contract of adhesion, is void. ny
stipulation regarding the validity or compliance of the contract left solely to the will of one of
the parties is li2ewise invalid.
;oral damages are not recoverable simply because a contract has been breached.
They are recoverable only if the party from whom it is claimed acted fraudulently or in bad
faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton,
rec2less, malicious or in bad faith, and oppressive or abusive. Li2ewise, a breach of contract
may give rise to e4emplary damages only if the guilty party acted in a fraudulent or
malevolent manner.
-ILA A. RE,ES v. VICTORIA T. T&PARAN
G.R. No. 1((#64 J)/e 1, !#11
%ontract to ,ell may not be considered as a %ontract of ,ale because the first
essential element is lac2ing. In a contract to sell, the prospective seller e4plicitly reserves the
transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree
or consent to transfer ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell until the
happening of an event, which for present purposes we shall ta2e as the full payment of the
purchase price. 3hat the seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell
the subject property when the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him. In
other words, the full payment of the purchase price parta2es of a suspensive condition, the
non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and, thus, ownership is
retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer.
A&RORA L. TECSON, SPO&SES JOSE L. TECSON */0 LEONILA TECSON v.
-INERVA, -ARIA, FRANCISCO, AG&STINA, JOSE, RO-&AL$O, ELI%A'ETH */0
VICTOR, *66 <)/*me0 FA&STO, */0 ISA'EL V$A. $E FA&STO
G.R. No. 1(#6(3 J)/e 1, !#11
/nder rticle 1#0, the portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall
be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.
$ANILO A. A&RELIO v. VI$A -A. CORA%ON P. A&RELIO
G.R. No. 1.536. J)/e 6, !#11
9ach case involving the application of rticle "5 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generaliEations but
according to its own attendant facts. %ourts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by e4perience, the findings of e4perts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NESTOR GALANG
G.R. No. 16(335 J)/e 6, !#11
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a Fdifficulty,F FrefusalF or FneglectF
in the performance of some marital obligations. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person) it is essential that he or she
must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical,
illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person G an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage G had
to be shown. cause has to be shown and lin2ed with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity.
JAPRL $EVELOP-ENT CORP., PETER RAFAEL C. LI-SON AN$ JOSE &,
AROLLA$O v. SEC&RIT, 'AN> CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 1"#1#. J&NE 6, !#11
creditor can demand payment from the surety solidarily liable with the corporation
see2ing rehabilitation, it being not included in the list of stayed claims.
$R. R&'I LI v. SPO&SES RE,NAL$O */0 LINA SOLI-AN, *< p*e/t<H;e5< o7
0e8e*<e0 A/4e658* So65m*/
G.R. No. 165!." J)/e ., !#11
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based
upon the doctrine of informed consent& <'!( the physician had a duty to disclose material
ris2s) '*( he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those ris2s) '"( as a direct and
pro4imate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise
would not have consented to) and '1( plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.? The
gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to <point to significant
undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to
undergo it.
NATIVI$A$ STA. ANA VICTORIA v. REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 1."6.3 J&NE (, !#11
,ection !1'!( of the Property =egistration @ecree has three requisites for
registration of title& 'a( that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain) 'b( that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, e4clusive and notorious possession and occupation) and 'c(
that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since Hune !*, !:10 or earlier.
SPO&SES J&ANITO -AH&SA, */0 FRANCISCA -AH&SA, v. '.E. SAN $IEGO,
INC.
G.R. No. 1."6.5 J)/e (, !#11
The instant case is a sale of real property where the purchase price is not paid in full.
The unpaid seller>s remedy is either an action to collect the balance or to rescind the
contract within the time allowed by law. ,ince rescission is no longer an option considering
that petitioners have been in possession of the properties for a considerable period of time,
substantial justice dictates that respondent be entitled to receive the unpaid balance of the
purchase price, plus legal interest thereon.
FELICIANO GAITERO */0 NELIA GAITERO v.
GENEROSO AL-ERIA */0 TERESITA AL-ERIA
G.R. No. 1(1(1! J)/e (, !#11
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. $ecessarily, whoever owns the
property has the right to possess it. 6ere, between the lmerias> registered title of ownership
and Iaitero>s verbal claim to the same, the former>s title is far superior.
SI-E $AR', PILIPINAS, INC. v. GOO$,EAR PHILIPPINES, INC. */0
-ACGRAPHICS CARRAN% INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1(!14(
GOO$,EAR PHILIPPINES, INC. v. SI-E $AR', PILIPINAS, INC. */0
-ACGRAPHICS CARRAN% INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1(3!1# J)/e (, !#11
In an assignment of a lease, there is a novation by the substitution of the person of
one of the parties G the lessee. The personality of the lessee, who dissociates from the lease,
disappears. Thereafter, a new juridical relation arises between the two persons who remain G
the lessor and the assignee who is converted into the new lessee. The objective of the law in
prohibiting the assignment of the lease without the lessor>s consent is to protect the owner or
lessor of the leased property.
The award of attorney's fees is the e4ception rather than the rule, and it must have
some factual, legal and equitable bases. $evertheless, rt. **8# of the %ivil %ode authoriEes
an award of attorney's fees and e4penses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in
this case the plaintiff's act or omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur
e4penses of litigation to protect her interest, and where the %ourt deems it just and equitable
that attorney's fees and e4penses of litigation should be recovered.
PHIL9VILLE $EVELOP-ENT AN$ HO&SING CORPORATION v. -AAI-O
'ONIFACIO, CEFERINO R. 'ONIFACIO, APOLONIO '. TAN, 'ENITA '. CAINA,
CRISPINA '.PASC&AL, ROSALIA '. $E GRACIA, TERESITA S. $ORONIA,
CHRISTINA GOCO AN$ ARSENIO C. 'ONIFACIO, 5/ t;e5 8*p*85t+ *< t;e <)v5v5/4
;e5< o7 t;e 6*te ELE&TERIA RIVERA V$A. $E 'ONIFACIO
G.R. No. 16.3"1 J)/e (, !#11
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur&
'!( the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property
subject of the action) and '*( the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
PHILIPPINE REALT, AN$ HOL$INGS CORPORATION v. LE, CONSTR&CTION
AN$ $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION
G. R. No. 16554(
LE, CONSTR&CTION AN$ $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION v. PHILIPPINE
REALT, AN$ HOL$INGS CORPORATION
G. R. No. 16.(." J)/e 13, !#11
In order for novation to ta2e place, the concurrence of the following requisites is
indispensable& !. there must be a previous valid obligation) *. the parties concerned must
agree to a new contract) ". the old contract must be e4tinguished) 1) there must be a valid
new contract.
/nder rticle !!71 of the %ivil %ode, to e4empt the obligor from liability for a
breach of an obligation due to an <act of Iod? or force majeure, the following must concur&
'a( the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor) 'b(
the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable) 'c( the event must be such as to render
it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner) and 'd( the debtor
must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor
AR-AN$O V. ALANO L$e8e*<e0M, S)b<t5t)te0 b+ E6e/* A6*/o9Toe< v.
PLANTERIS $EVELOP-ENT 'AN>, *< S)88e<<o95/9I/tee<t o7 -A&NLA$ SAVINGS
*/0 LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 1.16!( J)/e 13, !#11
The general rule that a mortgagee need not loo2 beyond the title does not apply to
ban2s and other financial institutions as greater care and due diligence is required of them.
Imbued with public interest, they <are e4pected to be more cautious than ordinary
individuals.? Thus, before approving a loan, the standard practice for ban2s and other
financial institutions is to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered to be
mortgaged and verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or owners
thereof. .ailure to do so ma2es them mortgagees in bad faith.
STA. L&CIA REALT, C $EVELOP-ENT, INC. v. CIT, OF PASIG, Re<po/0e/t,
-&NICIPALIT, OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RI%AL
G.R. No. 166(3( J)/e 15, !#11
Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case,
until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the
proposed barangays would only be an e4ercise in futility. $ot only that, we would be paving
the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, epe<e/te0 b+ t;eCHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE v. THI TH& TH&, T. $E G&%-AN
G.R. No. 1.5#!1 J)/e 15, !#11
Payment made by the debtor to the person of the creditor or to one authoriEed by him
or by the law to receive it e4tinguishes the obligation. 3hen payment is made to the wrong
party, however, the obligation is not e4tinguished as to the creditor who is without fault or
negligence even if the debtor acted in utmost good faith and by mista2e as to the person of the
creditor or through error induced by fraud of a third person.
CO&NTR, 'AN>ERS INS&RANCE CORPORATION v. ANTONIO LAG-AN
G.R. No. 1654(. J)6+ 13, !#11
$ovation is the e4tinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the
obligation by a subsequent one which e4tinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing
the object or principal conditions, or by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by
subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. .or novation to ta2e place, the
following requisites must concur& !( There must be a previous valid obligation) *( The
parties concerned must agree to a new contract) "( The old contract must be e4tinguished)
and 1( There must be a valid new contract.
VICELET LALICON */0 VICELEN LALICON v. NATIONAL HO&SING A&THORIT,
G.R. No. 1(544# J)6+ 13, !#11
n action for rescission can proceed from either rticle !!:! or rticle !"#!. It has
been held that rticle !!:! spea2s of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the conte4t
of rticle !!*1 of the +ld %ivil %ode which uses the term <resolution.? =esolution applies
only to reciprocal obligations such that a breach on the part of one party constitutes an
implied resolutory condition which entitles the other party to rescission. =esolution grants
the injured party the option to pursue, as principal actions, either a rescission or specific
performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case. =escission under
rticle !"#!, on the other hand, was ta2en from rticle !*:! of the +ld %ivil %ode, which is
a subsidiary action, not based on a party>s breach of obligation. The four-year prescriptive
period provided in rticle !"#: applies to rescissions under rticle !"#!.
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE R&'EN REINOSO, SR., epe<e/te0 b+ R)be/ Re5/o<o J.
v. CO&RT OF APPEALS, PONCIANO TAPALES, JOSE G&'ALLA, */0 FIL3RITERS
G&ARANT, ASS&RANCE CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 1161!1, J)6+ 1(, !#11
<L5*b565t+ o7 emp6o+eB ED5<te/8e o7 emp6o+ee /e4654e/8e 8e*te< pe<)mpt5o/ o7
/e4654e/8e 5/ t;e <e6e8t5o/ o7 t;e emp6o+ee b+ t;e emp6o+e - 3henever an employee>s
negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to e4ercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection or
supervision of his employee.?
$AT& >IRA- SA-PACO, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ HA$JI SORA,A S. -ACA'AN$O v. HA$JI
SERA$ -INGCA LANT&$
G.R. No. 163551, J)6+ 1(, !#11
<A8t5o/ to e8ove oG/e<;5pB eE)5<5te< - /nder rticle 1"1 of the %ivil %ode, to
successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who
claims a better right to it must prove two '*( things& first, the identity of the land claimed) and
second, his title thereto.?
GENERAL -ILLING CORPORATION v. SPS. LI'RA$O RA-OS */0 RE-E$IOS
RA-OS
G.R. No. 1"3.!3, J)6+ !#, !#11
<$e7*)6tB eE)5<5te< - There are three requisites necessary for a finding of default.
.irst, the obligation is demandable and liquidated) second, the debtor delays performance)
and third, the creditor judicially or e4trajudicially requires the debtor>s performance.?
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 'AN> v. F.F. CR&% */0 CO., INC.
G.R. No. 1.3!5", J)6+ !5, !#11
PNe4654e/8eB popot5o/*6 65*b565t+ o7 b*/F */0 0epo<5to - s between a ban2 and
its depositor, where the ban2>s negligence is the pro4imate cause of the loss and the
depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, the greater proportion of the loss shall be
borne by the ban2.?
SPO&SES FRANCISCO $. ,AP */0 3HEL-A S. ,AP v. SPO&SES %OSI-O $,, SR.
*/0 NATIVI$A$ CHI& $,, SPO&SES -ARCELINO -AAINO */0 RE-E$IOS L.
-AAINO, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS ORIENTAL */0 $&-AG&ETE
R&RAL 'AN>, INC. L $&-AG&ETE R&RAL 'AN>, INC. ?$R'I@ ;ee5/ epe<e/te0 b+
-. 35665*m $.S. $58;o<o v. SPO&SES %OSI-O $,, SR. */0 NATIVI$A$ CHI& $,,
SPO&SES -ARCELINO -AAINO */0 RE-E$IOS -AAINO, */0 SPO&SES
FRANCISCO $. ,AP */0 3HEL-A S. ,AP
G.R. No. 1.1(6( H G.R. No. 1.1""1, J)6+ !., !#11
<Re0empt5o/B ve/0ee ;*< t;e 54;t to e0eem - The right of P36, to redeem the
subject properties finds support in ,ection 5 of ct "!"0 itself which gives not only the
mortgagor-debtor the right to redeem, but also his successors-in-interest. s vendee of the
subject properties, P36, qualifies as such a successor-in-interest of the spouses Litonjua.
Re0empt5o/B p5e8eme*6 e0empt5o/ 5< v*650 - $othing in the law prohibits the
piecemeal redemption of properties sold at one foreclosure proceeding. In fact, in several
early cases decided by this %ourt, the right of the mortgagor or redemptioner to redeem one
or some of the foreclosed properties was recogniEed.?
<L*/0 T5t6e< */0 $ee0<B P)8;*<e I/ Goo0 F*5t;J purchaser in good faith is one
who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the claim of another person. It is a well-settled rule that a
purchaser cannot close his eyes to .acts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard,
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor.
At586e 1544, NeG C5v56 Co0eB Pe<)mpt5o/ o7 Goo0 F*5t;J ,ince the petitioners
never alleged that the $ational irports %orporation acted with bad faith when it registered
the lots in its name, the presumption of good faith prevails. %onsequently, the $ational
irports %orporation, being a registrant in good faith, is recogniEed as the rightful owner of
the lots in question, and the registration of the properties in its name cut off any and all prior
liens, interests and encumbrances, including the alleged prior sale to %obarde, that were not
recorded on the titles.?
JES&S -. -ONTE-A,OR v. VICENTE $. -ILLORA
G.R. No. 16(!51 J)6+ !., !#11
debt is liquidated when its e4istence and amount are determined. It is not
necessary that it be admitted by the debtor. $or is it necessary that the credit appear in a
final judgment in order that it can be considered as liquidated) it is enough that its e4act
amount is 2nown. nd a debt is considered liquidated, not only when it is e4pressed already
in definite figures which do not require verification, but also when the determination of the
e4act amount depends only on a simple arithmetical operation.

3hen the defendant, who has an unliquidated claim, sets it up by way of
counterclaim, and a judgment is rendered liquidating such claim, it can be
compensated against the plaintiff>s claim from the moment it is liquidated by
judgment. %ompensation ta2es place only if both obligations are liquidated.
RCJ '&S LINES, INCORPORATE$ v. STAN$AR$ INS&RANCE CO-PAN,,
INCORPORATE$
G.R. No. 1"36!", A)4)<t 1., !#11
<L5*b565t+ o7 Re45<tee0 OG/e o7 * Ve;586eJ The registered owner of a vehicle
should be primarily responsible to the public for injuries caused while the vehicle is in
use. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fi4ed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
Ne4654e/8eJ rticle *!#8 of the %ivil %ode, in relation to rticle *!75, ma2es the
employer vicariously liable for the acts of its employees. 3hen the employee causes damage
due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises
the juristantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.?
-A. ANA -. TA-ONTE */0 E$IL'ERTO A. TA-ONTE v. HONG>ONG */0
SHANGHAI 'AN>ING CORPORATION LT$., et *6.
G.R. No. 166".#, A)4)<t 1., !#11
<Foe86o<)e o7 -ot4*4e< Pe/05/4 I66e4*6 $5<m5<<*6 C*<eJPetitioners were
already in default in the payment of their loan obligations) thus, foreclosure of the mortgage
property was resorted to by respondents. =espondents were only enforcing the civil
obligation of petitioners under their mortgage contract. There is no labor aspect involved in
the enforcement of petitioners' obligation.
fter petitioners failed to pay upon demand, the civil obligation of the petitioners
under the mortgage contract must be enforced to protect 6,D% ,=P's interest in the housing
loan. The dismissal of petitioners' complaint for the annulment of the foreclosure proceedings
is, therefore, valid and proper.?
SPO&SES NELSON R. VILLAN&EVA */0 -,RA P. VILLAN&EVA v. THE CO&RT OF
APPEALS, et *6.
G.R. No. 163433, A)4)<t !!, !#11
<Co/t*8t)*6 St5p)6*t5o/<B !4Q Pe A//)m I/tee<t R*teB Le4*65t+J The question
now is whether the *1J per annum interest rate is unreasonable under the circumstances
obtaining in the present case. The ,% ruled in the negative. In ,pouses Uacarias Dacolor and
%atherine Dacolor v. Danco .ilipino ,avings and ;ortgage Dan2, @agupan %ity Dranch, the
,% held that the interest rate of *1J per annum on a loan of P*11,888.88, agreed upon by
the parties, may not be considered as unconscionable and e4cessive.
6Q Pe A//)m Pe/*6t+ C;*4eB Le4*65t+J The ,% also upheld the validity of the 5J
per annum penalty charge. In @evelopment Dan2 of the Philippines v. .amily .oods
;anufacturing %o., Ltd., the ,%, sustained the validity of an #J per annum penalty charge
on separate loans of P088,888.88 and P118,888.88, In a similar manner, herein petitioners
bound themselves to pay the stipulated penalty charge of 5J per annum Fof the principal
amount of loan as penalty for ine4cusable neglect to pay any amount of tOheP loan when
due.F ,ince petitioners failed to present evidence that their failure to perform their obligation
was due to either force majeure or the acts of respondent Dan2 or to any justifiable or
e4cusable cause, they are obliged to pay the penalty charge as agreed upon.?
NATIONAL PO3ER CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF -ACA'ANG>IT SANG>A,
G.R. No. 165(!(, A)4)<t !4, !#11
<A8t5o/ 7o J)<t Compe/<*t5o/ v5<9R9v5< A8t5o/ 7o $*m*4e<J The two actions are
radically different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based
on the %onstitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments.
Indeed, the former arises from the e4ercise by the ,tate of its power of eminent domain
against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a
right. The fact that the owner rather than the e4propriator brings the former does not change
the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort,
but on the constitutional prohibition against the ta2ing of property without just compensation.
A8E)5<5t5o/ o7 E*<eme/t<J The manner in which the easement was created by
petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice
and indemnity to them and did not go through proper e4propriation proceedings. Petitioner
could have, at any time, validly e4ercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the
easement over respondents> property as this power encompasses not only the ta2ing or
appropriation of title to and possession of the e4propriated property but li2ewise covers even
the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned property.
PoGe o7 Em5/e/t $om*5/B 3;*t Co/<t5t)te< T*F5/4 o7 P5v*te Popet+ 7o
P)b658 &<eJ It is settled that the ta2ing of private property for public use, to be compensable,
need not be an actual physical ta2ing or appropriation. Indeed, the e4propriator>s action may
be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a
ta2ing.%ompensable ta2ing includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of
the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in
a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.It is neither necessary that the owner be
wholly deprived of the use of his property,nor material whether the property is removed from
the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.?
RA-ON ARAN$A v. REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1.!331, A)4)<t !4, !#11
<To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the e4istence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an e4ecutive order) an administrative action) investigation
reports of Dureau of Lands investigators) and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the Iovernment that the lands applied for are alienable
and disposable.
person who see2s the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of
possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and
convincing evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or
wea2ness of the evidence of the oppositors.?
AL'ERT TISON */0 CLA&$IO L. JA'ON v. SPS. GREGORIO PO-ASIN */0
CONSORCIA PONCE PO-ASIN, $IANNE PO-ASIN PAG&NSAN, C,NTHIA
PO-ASIN, SONIA PEROL, ANTONIO SESISTA, GINA SESISTA, */0 RE,NAL$O
SESISTA
G.R. No. 1.31(#, A)4)<t !4, !#11
<To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur& 'a(
damage suffered by the plaintiff) 'b( fault or negligence of defendant) and 'c( connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff.?
RENE ANTONIO v. GREGORIO -ANAHAN
G.R. No. 1.6#"1, A)4)<t !4, !#11
<The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate
in order to be considered as ground for dispossession of an agricultural tenant.?
3ILFRIE$ ER$EN'ERGER v. JOHN V. A:&INO, CLER> OF CO&RT RTC, OFFICE
OF THE CLER> OF CO&RT, OLONGAPO CIT,
A.-. No.P91#9!.3". A)4)<t !4, !#11
The time-honored precept is that after the consolidation of titles in the buyer>s name,
for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its
issuance to a purchaser in an e4trajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function which
cannot be enjoined or stayed, even by an action for annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure sale itself.
PO3ER SECTOR ASSETS AN$ LIA'ILITIES -ANAGE-ENT CORPORATION v.
PO%%OLANIC PHILIPPINESINCORPORATE$
G.R. No. 1(3.(", A)4)<t !4, !#11
<Public bidding is the established procedure in the grant of government contracts.
The award of public contracts through public bidding is a matter of public policy. The right
of first refusal of respondent being invalid, it follows that it has no binding effect. It does not
create an obligation on the part of petitioner to ac2nowledge the same?
$C$ CONSTR&CTION, INC. v. REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1."".(, A)4)<t 31, !#11
<Ope/ */0 8o/t5/)o)< po<<e<<5o/B 0e75/5t5o/ - Ta2en together with the words open,
continuous, e4clusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for
an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. ctual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally e4ercise over his own property.?
ANTONIO FRANCISCO, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ ;5< ;e5<J NELIA E.S. FRANCISCO, E-ILIA F.
'ERTI%, RE'ECCA E.S. FRANCISCO, ANTONIO E.S. FRANCISCO, JR., SOCORRO
F. FONTANILLA, */0 JOVITO E.S. FRANCISCO v. CHE-ICAL '&L> CARRIERS,
INCORPORATE$
G.R. No. 1"35.., Septembe ., !#11
<$)e 05654e/8eB 05654e/8e eE)5e0 o7 * b65/0 pe<o/ - 6owever, one who is
physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a reasonably careful
person who has the same physical disability would use. Physical handicaps and infirmities,
such as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances under which a
reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for a blind person becomes that of
a reasonable person who is blind.?
<E<toppe6B eD8ept5o/ to mee <tepp5/4 5/to t;e <;oe< o7 t;e t*/<7eo - The general
principle is that a seller without title cannot transfer a better title than he has. +nly the
owner of the goods or one authoriEed by the owner to sell can transfer title to the buyer.
Therefore, a person can sell only what he owns or is authoriEed to sell and the buyer can, as
a consequence, acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer. The e4ception from
the general principle is the doctrine of estoppel where the owner of the goods is precluded
from denying the seller>s authority to sell. Dut in order that there may be estoppel, the owner
must, by word or conduct, have caused or allowed it to appear that title or authority to sell is
with the seller and the buyer must have been misled to his damage.?
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. */0 -ARTA 'AROLA, /*me6+J LEONOR,
SI-PLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, 'EVERL, ANN LORRAINNE, TITA,
CONSOLACION, LEONORA */0 AS&NCION, *66 <)/*me0 GO, epe<e/te0 b+
LEONORA '. GO v. ESTER L. SERVACIO */0 RITO '. GO
G.R. No. 15.53., Septembe ., !#11
<Co/S)4*6 popet+B -*5*4e< p5o to t;e e77e8t5v5t+ o7 t;e 7*m56+ 8o0e eE)5e<
65E)50*t5o/ - The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving
spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by rticle !"8 of the .amily %ode is not
necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or e4trajudicial
partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. t any rate, the requirement of prior
liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.?
&NION 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO&SES RO$OLFO T. TI& AN$
VICTORIA N. TI&
G.R. No<. 1.3#"#9"1, Septembe ., !#11
<F50)85*+ 0)t+ o7 b*/F<B <)00e/ e<t)8t)5/4 e/t*56< b*0 7*5t; - The ban2s have a
fiduciary duty to their clients and to the .ilipino people to be transparent in their dealings
and to ma2e sure that the latter>s interest are not prejudiced by the former>s interest. rticle
!"": of the $ew %ivil %ode provides that the failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to
reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud.
/ndoubtedly, the ban2s and their clients are bound by confidential relations. The almost
perfect timing of the ban2s in convincing their clients to shift to dollar loans just when the
sian financial crisis struc2 indicates that the ban2s not only failed to disclose facts to their
clients of the looming crisis, but also suggests of the insidious design to ta2e advantage of
these undisclosed facts.?
ELENA JANE $&ARTE v. -IG&EL SA-&EL A.E. $&RAN
G.R. No. 1.3#3(, Septembe 14, !#11
<Pepo/0e*/8e o7 ev50e/8eB 0e75/5t5o/ - Preponderance of evidence only requires
that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence.?
<Pe7e8t5o/ o7 * 8o/t*8t o7 <*6eB G;e/ 9 contract of sale is perfected the moment
the parties agree upon the object of the sale, the price, and the terms of payment. +nce
perfected, the parties are bound by it whether the contract is verbal or in writing because no
form is required.?
<,tatute of .rauds applies only to e4ecutory, and not to completed, e4ecuted or
partially e4ecuted contracts.?
JOSE FERNAN$O, JR., ET AL. v. LEON AC&2A, ET AL.
G.R. No. 161#3#, Septembe 14, !#11
<Toe/< S+<temB P5/85p6e< o7 I/0e7e*<5b565t+ */0 Impe<85pt5b565t+ o7 T5t6e<B
ED8ept5o/J The ,% had recogniEed the jurisprudential thread regarding the e4ception to the
foregoing doctrine that while it is true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible,
the registered landowner may lose his right to recover possession of his registered property
by reason of laches. In view of respondents> decades long possession andLor ownership of
their respective lots by virtue of a court judgment and the erstwhile registered owners>
inaction and neglect for an unreasonable and une4plained length of time in pursuing the
recovery of the land, assuming they retained any right to recover the same, it is clear that
respondents> possession may no longer be disturbed. The right of the registered owners as
well as their successors-in-interest to recover possession of the property is already a stale
demand and, thus, is barred by laches.?
<S*meB A8t5o/ 7o Re8o/ve+*/8eB Pe<85pt5ve Pe5o0<J The ,% did not subscribe to
petitioners> argument that whatever rights or claims respondents may have under the
$ovember *:, !:*: @ecision has prescribed for their purported failure to fully e4ecute the
same. n action for reconveyance of registered land based on implied trust prescribes in ten
'!8( years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property. 6owever, the ,% has ruled that the ten-
year prescriptive period applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession
of the property. If a person claiming to be its owner is in actual possession of the property,
the right to see2 reconveyance, which in effect see2s to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.?
<S*meB Re4*65*/ $o8t5/eB R5ve< */0 T;e5 N*t)*6 'e0< *< Popet5e< o7 P)b658
$om5/5o/J .rom the transcripts of the proceedings, the parties could not agree how ,apang
Dayan came about. 3hether it was a gradual deposit received from the river current or a
dried-up cree2 bed connected to the main river could not be ascertained. 9ven assuming that
,apang Dayan was a dried-up cree2 bed, under rticle 1*8, paragraph !and rticle 08*,
paragraph ! of the %ivil %ode, rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion.
In the absence of any provision of law vesting ownership of the dried-up river bed in some
other person, it must continue to belong to the ,tate.?
FCE $E CASTRO CORPORATION, ET AL. v. ERNESTO G. OLASO */0 A-PARO -.
OLASO
G.R. No. 1(334", Septembe 14, !#11
<PeS)0585*6 :)e<t5o/J stay in the proceedings in %ivil %ase $o. ,PL-8::! in
order to give way to the proceedings in %ivil %ase $o. ,PL-8"05 is not judicious as there is
no prejudicial question.?
<S*meJ .irst, the subject matter or res involved in %ivil %ase $o. ,PL-8::! is
different from those in %ivil %ase $o. ,PL-8"05. .V9 %orporation see2s to recover
subdivision lots located in Phase ! and !- of .orfom>s subdivision while the +lasos see2 to
recover their fully paid lot in Phase KI of the same subdivision. ,econd, the parties in both
cases are different. The litigation in %ivil %ase $o. ,PL-8"05 is between the developer, .V9
%orporation, and the subdivision owner, .orfom, while the parties in the proceedings in %ivil
%ase $o. ,PL-8::! are .V9 %orporation, as annotator of the $otice of LisPendens and the
+lasos, as fully paid lot buyers. Third, the prayers are different. In %ivil %ase $o. ,PL-8::!,
the +lasos want to cancel the annotation of the $otice of LisPendens stamped on their
certificate of title over the piece of property described as Lot !8, Dloc2 "8, Phase KI of the
Killa +lympia ,ubdivision, which they bought from .orfom. In %ivil %ase $o. ,PL-8"05, the
prayer was for the delivery of the certificates of title over "7 lots situated in Phase ! and !-
of the same subdivision and the payment of a sum of money and damages. .or said reasons,
the proceedings in %ivil %ase $o. ,PL-8::! can continue independently of %ivil %ase $o.
,PL-8"05.?
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO -. &RETA, SR., ET AL. v. HEIRS OF LI'ERATO -.
&RETA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 165.4(, Septembe 14, !#11B
*/0
HEIRS OF LI'ERATO -. &RETA, ET AL. v. HEIRS OF POLICRONIO -. &RETA,
SR, ET AL.
G.R. No. 165"3#, Septembe 14, !#11B
<Co/t*8t<B $ee0 o7 S*6eB Ab<o6)te S5m)6*t5o/J Lac2ing, therefore, in an absolutely
simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and enforceable contract. Thus,
where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a
transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of
the property) hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. ,imilarly, in this case, lfonso
simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for ta4ation purposes, without intending to transfer
ownership over the subject lands.
<S*meB S*meB Ab<e/8e o7 o L*8F o7 A0eE)*te Co/<50e*t5o/B E77e8t o7J It is well-
settled in a long line of cases that where a deed of sale states that the purchase price has
been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lac2 of
consideration. Thus, although the contract states that the purchase price of *,888.88 was
paid by Policronio to lfonso for the subject properties, it has been proven that such was
never in fact paid as there was no money involved. It must, therefore, follow that the @eed of
,ale is void for lac2 of consideration. Iiven that the @eed of ,ale is void, it is unnecessary to
discuss the issue on the inadequacy of consideration.
<S*meB N)66 */0 Vo50 Co/t*8t<B Pe<o/< 35t; t;e R54;t to Set &p N)665t+J The
right to set up the nullity of a void or non-e4istent contract is not limited to the parties, as in
the case of annullable or voidable contracts) it is e4tended to third persons who are directly
affected by the contract. Thus, where a contract is absolutely simulated, even third persons
who may be prejudiced thereby may set up its ine4istence.
<S*meB $ee0 o7 EDt*9J)0585*6 P*t5t5o/B E<toppe6J The ,% concluded that the
allegation of %onrado>s vitiated consent and lac2 of authority to sign in behalf of his co-heirs
was a mere afterthought on the part of the 6eirs of Policronio. It appears that the 6eirs of
Policronio were not only aware of the e4istence of the @eed of 94tra-Hudicial Partition but
had, in fact, given %onrado authority to sign in their behalf. They are now estopped from
questioning its legality, and the @eed of 94tra-Hudicial Partition is valid, binding, and
enforceable against them.
VALERIO E. >ALA3 v. -A. ELENA FERNAN$E%
G.R. No. 16635., Septembe 1", !#11
FThe burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must
prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious
psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be
grave, must have e4isted at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.F
PE$RO ANGELES , Repe<e/te0 b+ A$ELINA T. ANGELES, Atto/e+95/ F*8t v.
ESTELITA '. PASC&AL, -ARIA THERESA PASC&AL, NERISSA PASC&AL,
I-EL$A PASC&AL, -A. LAARNI PASC&AL */0 E$3IN PASC&AL
G.R. No. 15.15#, Septembe !1, !#11
FThe land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to
Pascual as the owner of the land to ma2e the choice as between appropriating the building or
obliging ngeles as the builder to pay the value of the land.F
JOSEFINA P. REAL&'IT v. PROSENCIO $. JASO */0 E$ENG. JASO
G.R. No. 1.(.(!. Septembe !1, !#11
<Ienerally understood to mean an organiEation formed for some temporary purpose,
a joint venture is li2ened to a particular partnership or one which <has for its object
determinate things, their use or fruits, or a specific underta2ing, or the e4ercise of a
profession or vocation.? The rule is settled that joint ventures are governed by the law on
partnerships which are, in turn, based on mutual agency or delectus personae.?
PHILIPPINE EAPORT AN$ FOREIGN LOAN G&ARANTEE CORPORATION ?/oG
TRA$E AN$ INVEST-ENT $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES@ v. A-ALGA-ATE$ -ANAGE-ENT AN$ $EVELOP-ENT
CORPORATION, FELI-ON R. C&EVAS, AN$ JOSE A. SA$$&L, JR.
G.R. No. 1...!", Septembe !(, !#11
FIn contracts, the law empowers the courts to reduce interest rates and penalty
charges that are iniquitous, unconscionable and e4orbitant. 3hether an interest rate or
penalty charge is reasonable or e4cessive is addressed to the sound discretion of the courts.
In determining what is iniquitous and unconscionable, courts must consider the
circumstances of the case.F
FThe !8-year prescriptive period to recover a deficiency claim starts to run upon the
foreclosure of the property mortgaged.F
THE LA3 FIR- OF RA,-&N$O A. AR-OVIT, v. CO&RT OF APPEALS AN$
'ENGSON CO--ERCIAL '&IL$ING, INC.
G.R. No. 15455", O8tobe 5, !#11
<It is clear that the statement in the body of our !::! @ecision 'that Fwe do not find
tty. rmovit's claim for Wtwenty percent of all recoveries' to be unreasonableF( is not
an order which can be the subject of e4ecution. $either can the %ourt ascertain from
the body of the @ecision an inevitable conclusion clearly showing a mista2e in the
dispositive portion.?
HEIRS OF ANTONIO FERAREN, REPRESENTE$ ', ANTONIO FERAREN, JR., et
*6. v. CO&RT OF APPEALS ?FOR-ER 1!TH $IVISION@ AN$ CECILIA
TA$IAR,
G.R. No. 15"3!(, O8tobe 5, !#11
</nder rticle !57#, the lessor has the option of paying one-half of the value of the
improvements that the lessee made in good faith, which are suitable to the use for which the
lease is intended, and which have not altered the form and substance of the land. +n the
other hand, the lessee may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.?
$EVELOP-ENT 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TRAVERSE $EVELOP-ENT
CORPORATION AN$ CENTRAL S&RET, AN$ INS&RANCE CO-PAN,
G.R. No. 16"!"3, O8tobe 5, !#11
<The award of attorney's fees is the e4ception rather than the rule and the court must
state e4plicitly the legal reason for such award. They are not to be awarded every time a
party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under rticle **8#
demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. 9ven when a claimant is compelled to
litigate with third persons or to incur e4penses to protect his rights, still, attorney's fees may
not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's
persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.?
ALCATEL PHILIPPINES, INC., v I.-. 'ONGAR C CO., INC. AN$ STRONGHOL$
INS&RANCE CO., INC.,
G.R. No. 1(!"46, O8tobe 5, !#11
<lthough attorney>s fees are not allowed in the absence of stipulation, the court can
award the same when the defendant>s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur
e4penses to protect his interest or where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff>s plainly valid, just, and demandable claim.?
CONTINENTAL CE-ENT CORPORATION, v. ASEA 'RO3N 'OVERI, INC., ''C
'RO3N 'OVERI, CORP., AN$ TOR$ '. ERI>SON
G.R. No. 1.166#, O8tobe 1., !#11
<94cept as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. ,uch
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.?
&R'AN 'AN>, INC v. -AG$ALENO -. PE2A
G.R. No. 145(1., O8tobe 1", !#11
$ELFIN C. GON%ALE%, JR., 'ENJA-IN L. $E LEON, */0 ERIC L. LEE v.
-AG$ALENO -. PE2A
G.R. No. 145(!!, O8tobe 1", !#11
-AG$ALENO -. PE2A v. &R'AN 'AN>, INC., TEO$ORO 'ORLONGAN, $ELFIN
C. GON%ALE%, JR., 'ENJA-IN L. $E LEON, P. SIERVO H. $I%ON, ERIC L. LEE,
'EN T. LI-, JR., CORA%ON 'EJASA, C ART&RO -AN&EL, JR.
G.R. No. 16!56!, O8tobe 1", !#11
<In a contract of agency, agents bind themselves to render some service or to do
something in representation or on behalf of the principal, with the consent or authority of the
latter. The basis of the civil law relationship of agency is representation, the elements of
which include the following& 'a( the relationship is established by the parties> consent,
e4press or implied) 'b( the object is the e4ecution of a juridical act in relation to a third
person) 'c( agents act as representatives and not for themselves) and 'd( agents act within the
scope of their authority.?
REP&'LIC FLO&R -ILLS CORPORATION v. FOR'ES FACTORS, INC.
G.R. No. 15!313, O8tobe 1", !#11
<,ubrogation is either FlegalF or Fconventional.F Legal subrogation is an equitable
doctrine and arises by operation of the law, without any agreement to that effect e4ecuted
between the parties) conventional subrogation rests on a contract, arising where Fan
agreement is made that the person paying the debt shall be subrogated to the rights and
remedies of the original creditor.?
ESTRELLA TIONGCO ,ARE$ ?$e8e*<e0@ <)b<t5t)te0 b+ CAR-EN -. TIONGCO *.F.*.
CAR-EN -ATIL$E '. TIONGCO v. JOSE '. TIONGCO */0 ANTONIO G.
$ORONILA, JR.
G.R. No. 16136#, O8tobe 1", !#11
<+ne who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof
may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attac2ed before ta2ing steps to
vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to see2 the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of
the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed
only by one who has possession. 6ence, prescription cannot be invo2ed in an action for
reconveyance when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.?
E-ERITA -. $E G&%-AN v. ANTONIO -. T&-OLVA
G.R. No. 1((#.!, O8tobe 1", !#11
<In determining actual damages, one cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations,
conjectures or guesswor2, but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable regarding specific facts that could afford some basis for measuring compensatory
or actual damages.?
<3hen pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proven with certainty, temperate damages may be recovered. Temperate
damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party
suffered some pecuniary loss.?
LINA CALILAP9AS-ERON v. $EVELOP-ENT 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PA'LO CR&%, TRINI$A$ CA'ANTOG, ENI S.P. ATIEN%A */0 E-ERENCIANA
CA'ANTOG,
G.R. No. 15.33#, Novembe !3, !#11
<The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for automatic rescission
upon non-payment cannot be doubted.?
JOSE TEOFILO -ERCA$O v. VALLE, -O&NTAIN -INES EAPLORATION, INC.
G.R. No. 141#1", Novembe !3, !#11
< %9$=+ certification, an application for original registration of title over a
parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original classification approved by the
@9$= ,ecretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in
order to establish that the land indeed is alienable and disposable.?
VICENTE -AN%ANO, JR., v. -ARCELINO GARCIA
G.R. No. 1."3!3, Novembe !(, !#11
<The absence of the essential OrequisitesP of consent and cause or consideration
renders the contract ine4istent.?
PACIFICO -. VALIAO, 7o ;5m<e67 */0 5/ be;*67 o7 ;5< 8o9;e5< LO$OVICO,
RICAR$O, 'IENVENI$O, *66 S)/*me0 VALIAO */0 NE-ESIO -. GRAN$EA v.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, -ACARIO %AFRA, */0 -AN&EL ,&SA,
G.R. No. 1.#.5., Novembe !(, !#11
</nder the =egalian doctrine, which is embodied in our %onstitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the ,tate. ll lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the ,tate. ccordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the ,tate remain part of the inalienable public domain. /nless public land is shown to
have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the ,tate, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.?
<There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable.?
SPO&SES RICAR$O HIPOLITO, JR. */0 LI%A HIPOLITO v. CARLOTA 'AL$E
CINCO */0 ATT,. CARLOS CINCO
G.R. No. 1.4143, Novembe !(, !#11
<3hen any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the
Duilding +fficial shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of
danger to life, health, or safety.?
RA-ON S. CHING AN$ PO 3ING PROPERTIES, INC., v. HON. JANSEN R.
RO$RIG&E%, 5/ ;5< 8*p*85t+ *< Pe<505/4 J)04e o7 t;e Re45o/*6 T5*6 Co)t o7 -*/56*,
'*/8; 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAI-E CHENG, -ERCE$ES IGNE AN$ L&CINA
SANTOS, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ ;e <o/, E$&AR$O S. 'ALAJA$IA
G.R. No. 1"!(!(, Novembe !(, !#11
<3hen there is no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of a
decedent>s estate, there is no disinheritance which will call for the probate court's e4ercise of
its limited jurisdiction.?
'PI F*m56+ S*v5/4< '*/F, I/8. v. -*.A6+/ T. Ave/50oCP*85758o A. Ave/50o,
G.R. No. 1.5(16. $e8embe #., !#11
3hile ct $o. "!"0, as amended, does not discuss the mortgagee>s right to recover
the deficiency, neither does it contain any provision e4pressly or impliedly prohibiting
recovery.
SPO&SES FERNAN$O */0 LO&R$ES VILORIA v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 1((!((, J*/)*+ 16, !#1!
The essential elements of agency are& '!( there is consent, e4press or implied of the
parties to establish the relationship) '*( the object is the e4ecution of a juridical act in
relation to a third person) '"( the agent acts as a representative and not for himself, and '1(
the agent acts within the scope of his authority. ll the elements of an agency e4ist in this
case. The first and second elements are present as %I does not deny that it concluded an
agreement with 6oliday Travel, whereby 6oliday Travel would enter into contracts of
carriage with third persons on %I>s behalf. The third element is also present as it is
undisputed that 6oliday Travel merely acted in a representative capacity and it is %I and
not 6oliday Travel who is bound by the contracts of carriage entered into by 6oliday Travel
on its behalf. The fourth element is also present considering that %I has not made any
allegation that 6oliday Travel e4ceeded the authority that was granted to it.
/nder rticle !""# of the %ivil %ode, there is fraud when, through insidious words
or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract
which, without them, he would not have agreed to. In order that fraud may vitiate consent, it
must be the causal 'dolo causante(, not merely the incidental 'dolo incidente(, inducement to
the ma2ing of the contract. In this case, the %ourt finds that the fraud alleged by ,pouses
Kiloria has not been satisfactorily established as causal in nature to warrant the annulment
of the subject contracts. In fact, ,pouses Kiloria failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that ;ager>s statement was fraudulent.
SPO&SES ARACELI OLIVA9$E -ESA */0 ERNESTO S. $E -ESA v. SPO&SES
CLA&$IO $. ACERO, JR. */0 -A. R&FINA $. ACERO, et *6
G.R. No. 1(5#64, J*/)*+ 16, !#1!
@espite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have
been e4empt from e4ecution, we nevertheless rule that the % did not err in dismissing the
petitioners> complaint for nullification of T%T $o. T-**!700 ';(. 3e agree with the % that
the petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being
e4empted from e4ecution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.
6aving failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed e4emption of the subject
property before the sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising
the same. ,ince the e4emption under rticle !0" of the .amily %ode is a personal right, it is
incumbent upon the petitioners to invo2e and prove the same within the prescribed period
and it is not the sheriff>s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a
family home.
PETRON CORPORATION v. SPO&SES CESAR JOVERO */0 ER-A F. C&$ILLA, et
*6
G.R. No. 151#3(, J*/)*+ 1(, !#1!
There are four '1( persons who are liable to pay damages to respondents. The latter
may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously,
pursuant to rticle !*!5 of the %ivil %ode. These solidary debtors are petitioner Petron, the
hauler KillaruE, the operator @ortina /y and the dealer =ubin /y. To determine the liability
of each defendant to one another, the amount of damages shall be divided by four,
representing the share of each defendant.
STAR'RIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PHILIPPINE REALT,
CORPORATION,
-SGR. $O-INGO A. CIRILOS, et *6
G.R. No. 1.."36, J*/)*+ 1(, !#1!
subjective novation results through substitution of the person of the debtor or
through subrogation of a third person to the rights of the creditor. To accomplish a subjective
novation through change in the person of the debtor, the old debtor needs to be e4pressly
released from the obligation and the third person or new debtor needs to assume his place in
the relation.
The proposed substitution of Licup by ,,9 opened the negotiation stage for a new
contract of sale as between ,,9 and the owners. The succeeding e4change of letters between
;r. ,tephen %u, ,,9>s representative, and ;sgr. %irilos attests to an unfinished negotiation.
;sgr. %irilos referred to his discussion with ,,9 regarding the purchase as a <pending
transaction.? %u, on the other hand, regarded ,,9>s first letter to ;sgr. %irilos as an
<updated proposal.? This proposal too2 up two issues& which party would underta2e to evict
the occupants on the property and how much must the consideration be for the property.
These are clear indications that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties. s it
turned out, the parties reached no consensus regarding these issues, thus producing no
perfected sale between them. The P!88,888.88 that was given to ;sgr. %irilos as <deposit?
cannot be considered as earnest money. 3here the parties merely e4changed offers and
counter-offers, no contract is perfected since they did not yet give their consent to such offers.
9arnest money applies to a perfected sale.
R&'EN C. CORP&%, epe<e/te0 b+ Atto/e+95/9F*8t 3e/57e0* C. A4)66*/* v. Sp<.
HILARION AG&STIN */0 J&STA AG&STIN
G.R. No. 1(3(!!, J*/)*+ 1(, !#1!
+ne of the three 2inds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is
accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry
'detentacion( or unlawful detainer 'desahucio(. In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve
the basic question of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession
referring to possession de facto, and not possession de jure. 3here the parties to an
ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine
who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. 6owever, where the
issue of ownership is inseparably lin2ed to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership
issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession.
The lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of the
disputed properties by respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance
of the elder %orpuE. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of
the property for more than "8 years up to this day. The petitioner has not established when
respondents> possession of the properties became unlawful G a requisite for a valid cause of
action in an unlawful detainer case.
VIRGINIA A. %A-ORA v. JOSE AR-AN$O L. E$&:&E, et *6
G.R. No. 1.4##5, J*/)*+ !5, !#1!
9ast sia had a fiduciary obligation to Kirginia Uamora., both as middleman or
dealer of commercial papers and custodian of the same for the latter>s account. .or
simultaneously acting as middleman or dealer and custodian, 9ast sia was obliged to turn
over to its client the proceeds of the matured commercial papers and deliver the outstanding
ones to it together with accrued interests.
ORIA -ETRO LEASING AN$ FINANCE CORPORATION v. -INORSJ $ENNIS,
-,LENE, -ELANIE */0 -ARI>RIS, *66 <)/*me0 -ANGALINAO + $I%ON, et *6
G.R. No. 1.4#("
SONN, LI */0 ANTONIO $E LOS SANTOS v. -INORSJ $ENNIS, -,LENE,
-ELANIE */0 -ARI>RIS, *66 <)/*me0 -ANGALINAO + $I%ON, et *6
G.R. No. 1.4!66, J*/)*+ !5, !#1!
3ith regard to actual damages, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Temperate damages, under rticle ***105 of the %ivil %ode, is given in the absence
of competent proof on the actual damages suffered. <In the past, we awarded temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity where earning capacity is
plainly established but no evidence was presented to support the allegation of the injured
party>s actual income.?
;oral damages, it must be stressed, are not intended to enrich plaintiff at the
e4pense of the defendant. They are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering heLshe had
undergone due to the other party>s culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the
suffering inflicted.
In quasi-delicts, e4emplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.? It is given by way of e4ample or correction for the public good. Defore the
court may consider such award, the plaintiff must show his entitlement first to moral,
temperate, or compensatory damages, which the respondents have.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, epe<e/te0 b+ t;e NATIONAL IRRIGATION
A$-INISTRATION ?NIA@ v. R&RAL 'AN> OF >A'ACAN, INC., et *6
G. R. No. 1(51!4, J*/)*+ !5, !#1!
In e4propriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property ta2en from its owner by the e4propriator. The measure is not the
ta2er's gain, but the owner's loss. The word <just? is used to intensify the meaning of the
word <compensation? and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be ta2en shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional
limitation of <just compensation? is considered to be a sum equivalent to the mar2et value of
the property, broadly defined as the price fi4ed by the seller in open mar2et in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition) or the fair value of the property) as between
one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fi4ed at the time of the actual ta2ing by the
government. In the conte4t of e4propriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from
that of the e4propriated land. Hust compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to
compensate for what the owner actually loses. ,uch value could only be that which prevailed
at the time of the ta2ing.
It should be noted that eminent domain cases involve the e4penditure of public funds.
In this 2ind of proceeding, we require trial courts to be more circumspect in their evaluation
of the just compensation to be awarded to the owner of the e4propriated property. The law
imposes certain legal requirements in order for a conveyance of real property to be valid. In
order for the reconveyance of real property to be valid, the conveyance must be embodied in
a public document and registered in the office of the =egister of @eeds where the property is
situated.
CRISANTA ALCARA% -IG&EL v. JERR, $. -ONTANE%
G.R. No. 1"1336, J*/)*+ !5, !#1!
In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions of
the Masunduang Pag-aayos. ,uch non-compliance may be construed as repudiation because
it denotes that the respondent did not intend to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby
negating the very purpose for which it was e4ecuted. Perforce, the petitioner has the option
either to enforce the Masunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand, in accordance with the provision of rticle *81! of the %ivil %ode. 6aving
instituted an action for collection of sum of money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind
the Masunduang Pag-aayos.
CRESENCIO C. -ILLA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES */0 -AR>ET P&RS&ITS,
INC. epe<e/te0 b+ CARLO V. LOPE%
G.R. No. 1((.!6, J*/)*+ !5, !#1!
9ven in %ivil Law the acceptance of partial payments, without further change in the
original relation between the complainant and the accused, cannot produce novation. .or the
latter to e4ist, there must be proof of intent to e4tinguish the original relationship, and such
intent cannot be inferred from the mere acceptance of payments on account of what is totally
due. ;uch less can it be said that the acceptance of partial satisfaction can effect the
nullification of a criminal liability that is fully matured, and already in the process of
enforcement.
In the case at bar, the acceptance by ;PI of the 9quitable P%I chec2s tendered by
;illa could not have novated the original transaction, as the chec2s were only intended to
secure the return of the P* million the former had already given him.
$&RA3OO$ CONSTR&CTION AN$ L&-'ER S&PPL,, INC. v. CAN$ICE S. 'ONA
G.R. No. 1."((4, J*/)*+ !5, !#1!
The entry of instruments in the Primary 9ntry Doo2 is equivalent to registration
despite the failure to annotate said instruments in the corresponding certificates of title.
6owever, for the entry of instruments in the Primary 9ntry Doo2 to be equivalent to
registration, certain requirements have to be met. There is still a need to comply with all that
is required for entry and registration, including the payment of prescribed fees. In this case,
since there was still no compliance of <all that is required 4 4 4 for purposes of entry and
annotation? of the @eed of ,ale as of Hune *0, *881, we are constrained to rule that the
registration of the $otice of Levy on ttachment on Hune !7, *881 should ta2e precedence
over the former. %onsidering that the $otice of Levy on ttachment was deemed registered
earlier than the @eed of ,ale, the T%T issued pursuant to the latter should contain the
annotation of the ttachment.
FONTANA RESORT AN$ CO&NTR, CL&', INC. AN$ RN $EVELOP-ENT CORP. v.
SPO&SES RO, S. TAN AN$ S&SAN C. TAN
G.R. No. 1546.#, J*/)*+ 3#, !#1!
/nder rticle !""8, fraud refers to dolo causante or causal fraud, in which, prior to
or simultaneous with the e4ecution of a contract, one party secures the consent of the other
by using deception, without which such consent would not have been given. ,imply stated, the
fraud must be the determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to be
given.

The general rule is that he who alleges fraud or mista2e in a transaction must
substantiate his allegation as the presumption is that a person ta2es ordinary care for his
concerns and that private dealings have been entered into fairly and regularly. +ne who
alleges defect or lac2 of valid consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue influence
must establish by full, clear and convincing evidence such specific acts that vitiated a party>s
consent, otherwise, the latter>s presumed consent to the contract prevails.
J&AN GALOPE v. CRESENCIA '&GARIN, REPRESENTE$ ', CELSO RA'ANG
G.R. No. 1(566", Feb)*+ #1, !#1!
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are& '!( the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee) '*( the subject matter of the relationship
is agricultural land) '"( there is consent between the parties to the relationship) '1( the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production) '0( there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee) and '5( the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
n agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the e4plicit provisions of a
written contract alone. ,ection 0 of =epublic ct $o. "#11, otherwise 2nown as the
gricultural Land =eform %ode, recogniEes that an agricultural leasehold relation may e4ist
upon an oral agreement.
'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAN$S ?'PI@, AS S&CCESSOR9IN9INTEREST OF
FAR EAST 'AN> C TR&ST CO-PAN, v. C,NTHIA L. RE,ES
G.R. No. 1(!.6", Feb)*+ #1, !#1!
creditor is not precluded from recovering any unpaid balance on the principal
obligation if the e4trajudicial foreclosure sale of the property subject of the real estate
mortgage results in a deficiency and regardless if the mortgaged property was bought at a
lower price than its mar2et value. 6ence, where the foreclosed property was sold to the
creditor at a public auction, the highest bidding price of which was only !:J of the mar2et
value, the creditor may still recover the deficiency from the debtor.
CELERINO E. -ERCA$O v. 'ELEN ESPINOCILLA */0 FER$INAN$
ESPINOCILLA
G.R. No. 1(41#", Feb)*+ #1, !#1!
Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable
property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by
law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted, and adverse. cquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or
e4traordinary. +rdinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with
just title for !8 years. In e4traordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for "8 years
without need of title or of good faith.
In a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to spea2
of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the
beneficiary. The relation of trustee and cestui que trust does not in fact e4ist, and the holding
of a constructive trust is for the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse.
Prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship.
LEONCIO C. OLIVEROS, epe<e/te0 b+ ;5< ;e5<, -OISES $E LA CR&%, AN$ THE
HEIRS OF L&CIO $ELA CR&%, epe<e/te0 b+ Fe65D $e6* C)= v. 'ERSA-IN, SAN
-IG&EL CORPORATION, THE REGISTER OF $EE$S OF CALOOCAN CIT,, */0
THE REGISTER OF $EE$S OF VALEN%&ELA, -ETRO -ANILA
G.R. No. 1.3531, Feb)*+ #1, !#1!
The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one applies when there
are two apparently valid titles over a single property. The e4istence of the earlier valid title
renders the subsequent title void because a single property cannot be registered twice.
certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already
been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in e4istence. %learly, a mere
allegation of an earlier title will not suffice.
n action or proceeding is deemed an attac2 on a title when the object of the action
is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed.
The attac2 is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or to
enjoin its enforcement. +n the other hand, it is indirect or collateral when, in an action or
proceeding to obtain a different relief, an attac2 on the judgment is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof.
NANC, T. LOR%ANO v. J&AN TA'A,AG, JR.
G.R. No. 1("64., Feb)*+ #6, !#1!
;oral damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the e4pense of the
defendant. =ather, these are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain <means,
diversions or amusements? that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering that resulted by
reason of the defendant>s culpable action. The purpose of such damages is essentially
indemnity or reparation, not punishment or correction. In other words, the award thereof is
aimed at a restoration within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante)
therefore, it must always reasonably appro4imate the e4tent of injury and be proportional to
the wrong committed.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 'AN> v. SPO&SES ROGELIO AN$ EVEL,N RO:&E
G.R. No. 1"3346, Feb)*+ #6, !#1!
The grounds for the proper annulment of the foreclosure sale are& '!( that there was
fraud, collusion, accident, mutual mista2e, breach of trust or misconduct by the purchaser)
'*( that the sale had not been fairly and regularly conducted) or '"( that the price was
inadequate and the inadequacy was so great as to shoc2 the conscience of the court. 6ence,
where the case does not fall into any of the grounds, the validity of the foreclosure must be
upheld.
-EROPE ENRI:&E% V$A. $E CATALAN v. LO&ELLA A. CATALAN9LEE
G. R. No. 1(36!!, Feb)*+ #(, !#1!
+wing to the nationality principle embodied in rticle !0 of the %ivil %ode, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. 6owever, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recogniEed in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. $onetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven. The
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
ANTONIA R. $ELA PE2A AN$ ALVIN JOHN '. $ELA PE2A v. GE--A RE-IL,N
C. AVILA AN$ FAR EAST 'AN> C TR&ST CO.
G.R. No. 1(.4"#, Feb)*+ #(, !#1!
Pursuant to rticle !58 of the %ivil %ode of the Philippines, all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains e4clusively to the husband or to the wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is
an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. 6ence, where it was not sufficiently proven that the subject property was
acquired during the marriage between ntonia and ntegono, the presumption of conjugality
does not operate. The fact that the property was registered in the name of Fntonia =. @ela
PeSa, of legal age, .ilipino, married to ntegono . @ela PeSaF does not mean it is a
conjugal property. the phrase Fmarried toF is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife
and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner.
$EPART-ENT OF P&'LIC 3OR>S AN$ HIGH3A,S v. RONAL$O E. :&I3A,
0o5/4 b)<5/e<< )/0e t;e /*me PR.E.:. CONSTR&CTION,T EFREN N. RIGOR, 0o5/4
b)<5/e<< )/0e t;e /*me PCHIARA CONSTR&CTION,T RO-EO R. $I-AT&LAC,
0o5/4 b)<5/e<< )/0e t;e /*me PAR$, CONSTR&CTION,T */0 FELICITAS C.
S&-ERA, 0o5/4 b)<5/e<<
)/0e t;e /*me PF.C.S. CONSTR&CTION,T
G.R. No. 1(3444, Feb)*+ #(, !#1!
The clean hands doctrine provides that <a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.? 6owever, fraud is never presumed but
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. 6ence, where the petitioner failed to
prove that omissions of respondents, such as their failure to comply with the legal
requirements concerning government contracts and in ascertaining the e4tent of authority of
the public official with whom they contracted, amounted to fraud, the doctrine cannot apply.
C.F. SHARP C CO. INC. */0 JOHN J. ROCHA v. PIONEER INS&RANCE C S&RET,
CORPORATION, 3ILFRE$O C. AG&STIN */0 HERNAN$O G. -INI-O
G.R. No. 1."46", Feb)*+ 15, !#1!
%ontracts undergo three distinct stages, to wit& negotiation) perfection or birth) and
consummation. $egotiation begins from the time the prospective contracting parties manifest
their interest in the contract and ends at the moment of agreement of the parties. Perfection
or birth of the contract ta2es place when the parties agree upon the essential elements of the
contract. %onsummation occurs when the parties fulfill or perform the terms agreed upon in
the contract, culminating in the e4tinguishment thereof.
The commencement of an employer-employee relationship must be treated separately
from the perfection of an employment contract. @espite the fact that the employer-employee
relationship has not commenced due to the failure to deploy respondents in this case,
respondents are entitled to rights arising from the perfected %ontract of 9mployment, such as
the right to demand performance by %... ,harp of its obligation under the contract.
ROGELIO J. JA>OSALE- */0 GO$OFRE$O '. $&LFO v. RO'ERTO S.
'ARANGAN
G.R. No. 1.5#!5, Feb)*+ 15, !#1!
rticle 1"1 of the %ivil %ode provides that <OiPn an action to recover, the property
must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the
wea2ness of the defendant>s claim.? In other words, in order to recover possession, a person
must prove '!( the identity of the land claimed, and '*( his title.
Hurisprudence consistently holds that <prescription and laches can not apply to
registered land covered by the Torrens system? because <under the Property =egistration
@ecree, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.?
SPO&SES RO-AN A. PASC&AL */0 -ERCE$ITA R. PASC&AL, FRANCISCO A.
PASC&AL, et. *6 v. SPO&SES ANTONIO 'ALLESTEROS */0 LOREN%A -ELCHOR9
'ALLESTEROS
G.R. No. 1(6!6", Feb)*+ 15, !#1!
rticle !5*". The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be e4ercised
e4cept within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the =egistry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice
thereof to all possible redemptioners.
6ere, it is undisputed that the respondents did not receive a written notice of the sale
in favor of the petitioners. ccordingly, the "8-day period stated under rticle !5*" of the
%ivil %ode within which to e4ercise their right of redemption has not begun to run.
%onsequently, the respondents may still redeem from the petitioners the portion of the subject
property that was sold to the latter.
$R. E--AN&EL JARCIA, JR. AN$ $R. -ARILO& 'ASTAN v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1(."!6, Feb)*+ 15, !#1!
The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are& '!( the
accident was of a 2ind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent) '*( the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the e4clusive control of the
person in charge) and '"( the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution of the person injured. 6ence, where the circumstances that caused a patient>s
injury and the series of tests that were supposed to be undergone by him to determine the
e4tent of the injury suffered were /ot under the e4clusive control of the physicians in
question, the latter cannot be made liable under the aforementioned doctrine.
;oral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and
alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious an4iety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shoc2, social humiliation, and similar injury
unjustly inflicted on a person. Intended for the restoration of the psychological or emotional
status quo ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate emotional injury
suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. 94emplary damages, on the other hand,
may be imposed by way of e4ample or correction for the public good.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAIL3A,S CORPORATION, JAPHET ESTRANAS AN$
'EN SAGA v. P&RIFICACION VI%CARA, -ARIVIC VI%CARA, CRESENCIA A.
NATIVI$A$, HECTOR VI%CARA, JOEL VI%CARA AN$ $O-INA$OR ANTONIO
G.R. No. 1"##!!, Feb)*+ 15, !#1!
3hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. ,uch fault or negligence, if there was no
pre-e4isting contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this chapter. 6ence, where a common carrier fell short of the diligence
e4pected of it, ta2ing into consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward
incident, it should be held liable for negligence.
%ontributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required
to conform for his own protection. 6owever, where one had no reason to anticipate the
impending danger while crossing the railroad trac2s precisely because of the lac2 of installed
reliable and adequate safety devices along the crossing, contributory negligence cannot be
attributed to said driver.
The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it
is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. 6ence, where between the
parties involved, only one was negligence, said doctrine should not be made to apply.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EAST SILVERLANE REALT,
$EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1(6"61, Feb)*+ !#, !#1!
The respondent cannot register the subject property in its name on the basis of either
,ection !1 '!( or ,ection !1 '*( of P.@. $o. !0*:. It was not established by the required
quantum of evidence that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, e4clusive and notorious possession of the subject property for the prescribed
statutory period. ,ection !1 '!( and ,ection !1 '*( of P.@. $o. !0*: are clearly different.
,ection !1 '!( covers <alienable and disposable land? while ,ection !1 '*( covers <private
property?. The distinction between the two provisions lies with the inapplicability of
prescription to alienable and disposable lands.
SPO&SES JOSE */0 -ILAGROS VILLACERAN */0 FAR EAST 'AN> C TR&ST
CO-PAN, v. JOSEPHINE $E G&%-AN
G.R. No. 16"#55, Feb)*+ !!, !#1!
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the
intention of the parties. If the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention
of the parties, the latter shall prevail. ,uch intention is determined not only from the e4press
terms of their agreement, but also from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the
parties. In the case at bar, there is a relative simulation of contract as the @eed of bsolute
,ale dated Hune !:, !::5 e4ecuted by @e IuEman in favor of petitioners did not reflect the
true intention of the parties.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. L&CIA -. GO-E%
G. R. No. 1("#!1, Feb)*+ !!, !#1!
Public Land ct requires that the applicant must prove 'a( that the land is alienable
public land) and 'b( that the open, continuous, e4clusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land must have been either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land ct.
The %ertification was inadequate to prove that the land was alienable and
disposable. .urther, it is not enough for the P9$=+ or %9$=+ to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the @9$=
,ecretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by the P9$=+ or %9$=+.
TEE>A, SHIPPING PHILS., INC. */0Ho TEE>A, SHIPPING CANA$A v.
RA-IER C. CONCHA
G.R. No. 1(5463, Feb)*+ !!, !#1!
It is a principle in merican jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recogniEed in
this jurisdiction that one>s employment, profession, trade or calling is a <property right,?
and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be
property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. %learly
then, when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the
action instituted to contest the legality of one>s dismissal from employment constitutes, in
essence, an action predicated <upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff,? as contemplated
under rt. !!15 of the $ew %ivil %ode, which must be brought within four '1( years.
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INS&RANCE CORPORATION v. CENTRAL COLLEGES OF
THE PHILIPPINES */0 $,NA-IC PLANNERS AN$ CONSTR&CTION
CORPORATION
G.R. No<. 1(#631933, Feb)*+ !!, !#1!
The civil law concept of delay or default commences from the time the obligor
demands, judicially or e4trajudicially, the fulfillment of the obligation from the obligee.
6ence, @P%% incurred delay from the time %%P called its attention that it had breached the
contract and e4trajudicially demanded the fulfillment of its commitment against the bonds.
/pon notice of default of obligor @P%%, P%I%>s liability, as surety, was already
attached. surety under rticle *817 of the $ew %ivil %ode solidarily binds itself with the
principal debtor to assure the fulfillment of the obligation. If a person binds himself solidarily
with the principal debtor, the provisions of ,ection 1, %hapter ", Title I of this Doo2 shall be
observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship. 6aving acted as a surety, P%I% is
duty bound to perform what it has guaranteed on its surety and performance bonds, all of
which are callable on demand, occasioned by its principal>s default.
PHILA- INS&RANCE CO-PAN,, INC. */0 A-ERICAN HO-E INS&RANCE CO. v.
CO&RT OF APPEALS, */0 $.-. CONS&NJI INC.
G.R. No. 165413, Feb)*+ !!, !#1!
$egligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a conduct that
involves an unreasonably great ris2 of causing damage) or, more fully, a conduct that falls
below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonably great
ris2 of harm. In the instant case, since Philam failed to convince us of actions that would lay
the blame on @;%I, this %ourt agrees with the % that @;%I e4ercised the necessary care
and precaution in lifting the genset.
In this case, res ipsa loquitur is not applicable, since there is direct evidence on the
issue of diligence or lac2 thereof pertaining to the lifting of the genset. The doctrine is not a
rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. In any
event, res ipsa loquitur merely provides a rebuttable presumption of negligence. +n this, we
have already pointed out that the evidence does not prove negligence on the part of @;%I,
and that due diligence on its part has been established.
CHINA 'AN>ING CORP. v. :'RO FISHING ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. NO. 1(4556, FE'R&AR, !!, !#1!
It has been held that third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation
may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property.
-ANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT A&THORIT, v. AVIA FILIPINAS
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
G.R. No. 1(#16(, Feb)*+ !., !#1!
rticle !"71 of the %ivil %ode clearly provides that <OtPhe various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may
result from all of them ta2en jointly.? Indeed, in construing a contract, the provisions thereof
should not be read in isolation, but in relation to each other and in their entirety so as to
render them effective, having in mind the intention of the parties and the purpose to be
achieved. In other words, the stipulations in a contract and other contract documents should
be interpreted together with the end in view of giving effect to all.
In the instant case, there is no showing that respondent gave his acquiescence to the
said amendment or modification of the contract. The fact that respondent subsequently settled
the said bill proves that he acceded to the increase in rental fee. 6owever, the same may not
be said with respect to the questioned rental fees sought to be recovered by petitioner
between ,eptember !::! and ,eptember !::1 because no bill was made and forwarded to
respondent on the basis of which it could have given or withheld its conformity thereto.
T&NA PROCESSING, INC. v. PHILIPPINE >INGFOR$, INC.
G.R. No. 1(55(!, Feb)*+ !", !#1!
Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforecement of a foreign
arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign
corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our
courts. 3hen a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and,
as in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by
the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the other
party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of
the result.
CRESENCIO 'A2O AN$ HEIRS OF THE $ECEASE$ A-ANCIO AS&-'RA$O v.
'ACHELOR EAPRESS, INC.H CERES LINER, INC. AN$ 3ENIFRE$O SALVANA
G.R. No. 1"1.#3, -*8; 1!, !#1!
Iross negligence is one that is characteriEed by the want of even slight care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may
be affected.
PA&LITA PE$ITHT SERRA v. NELFA T. -&-AR
G.R. No. 1"3(61, -*8; 14, !#1!
/nder rticle *!#8 of the %ivil %ode, employers are liable for the damages caused
by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tas2s. 3henever an employee>s
negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the
employer failed to e4ercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or
supervision of its employees. The liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee.
@amages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which as a
rule must be duly proven,

by documentary evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony
of the widow. Dy way of e4ception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when '!( the deceased is self-employed earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be ta2en of the
fact that in the deceased>s line of wor2 no documentary evidence is available) or '*( the
deceased is employed as a daily wage wor2er earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.
-CA9-'F CO&NT$O3N CAR$S PHILIPPINES INC., AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V,
AMABLE C. AGUILUZ IX, CIELO C. AGUILUZ, ALBERTO L. BUENVIAJE,
VICENTE ACSAY AND MCA HOLDINGS AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
v. -'F CAR$ INTERNATIONAL LI-ITE$ AN$ -'F $ISCO&NT CAR$ LI-ITE$
G.R. No. 1.35(6, -*8; 14, !#1!
3hile the absence of a written agreement does not necessarily negate the perfection
of a contract, nevertheless, this very lac2 of a written contract constitutes convincing
circumstantial proof that said parties were indeed in the process of negotiating the contract's
terms. 3hen there is as of yet no meeting of the minds as to the subject matter or the cause or
consideration of the contract being negotiated, the same cannot be considered to have been
perfected.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF9APPELLEE v. ERLAN$ SA'A$LA' ,
'A,:&EL, ACC&SE$9APPELLANT
G.R. No. 1.5"!4, -*8; 14, !#1!
The ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction
that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the
offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
369T69= += $+T ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
e4emplary damages within the unbridled meaning of rticle **"8 of the %ivil %ode.
F.F. CR&% C CO., INC. ?FFCCI@ v. HR CONSTR&CTION CORP. ?HRCC@
G.R. No. 1(.5!1, -*8; 14, !#1!
3aiver is defined as a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
2nown e4isting legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which e4cept for such
waiver the party would have enjoyed.
/nder rticle !!:! of the %ivil %ode, the power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon
him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. 6e may also see2 rescission, even
after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
-ARITER -EN$O%A v. A$RIANO CAS&-PANG, JENNIFER A$RIANE AN$ JOHN
AN$RE, ALL S&RNA-E$ CAS&-PANG
G.R. No. 1"."(., -*8; 1", !#1!
n operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the
sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign
substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence
by the operating surgeon. .or this reason, e4emplary damages under rticle ***: of the
%ivil %ode should be awarded.
SPO&SES JESSE CACHOPERO AN$ 'E-A CACHOPERO v. RACHEL CELESTIAL
G.R. No. 146.54, -*8; !1, !#1!
compromise once approved by final orders of the court has the force of res judicata
between the parties and should not be disturbed e4cept for vices of consent or forgery. 6ence,
'a decision on a compromise agreement is final and e4ecutory.' ,uch agreement has the force
of law and is conclusive on the parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding
only upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to e4ecution in
accordance with the =ules. Hudges therefore have the ministerial and mandatory duty to
implement and enforce it.
R.S. TO-AS, INC. v. RI%AL CE-ENT CO-PAN,, INC.
G.R. No. 1.3155, -*8; !1, !#1!
Dreach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the
terms of a contract. It is also defined as the failure, without legal e4cuse, to perform any
promise which forms the whole or part of the contract. 6ence, where there was not only
delay but non-completion of the projects underta2en by petitioner without justifiable ground,
undoubtedly, petitioner is guilty of breach of contract. This gives respondent the right to
terminate the contract by serving petitioner a written notice.
THE RO-AN CATHOLIC CH&RCH, epe<e/te0 b+ t;e A8;b5<;op o7 C*8ee<, v.
REGINO PANTE
G.R. No. 1.411( Ap56 11, !#1!
$ot every mista2e renders a contract voidable. /nder rticle !""! in order that
mista2e may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing which is the
object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both
parties to enter into the contract. ;ista2e as to the identity or qualifications of one of the
parties will vitiate consent only when such identity or qualifications have been the principal
cause of the contract. simple mista2e of account shall give rise to its correction.
/nder rticle !011. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first ta2en possession thereof in
good faith, if it should be movable property. ,hould it be immovable property, the ownership
shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the =egistry of
Property. ,hould there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession) and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
ANTONIO '. 'ALTA%AR, SE'ASTIAN -. 'ALTA%AR, ANTONIO L.
-ANGALIN$AN,
ROSIE -. -ATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., */0 RAFAEL
TITCO v. LOREN%O LAAA
G.R. No. 1.44(", Ap56 11, !#1!
@ue e4ecution of the will or its e4trinsic validity pertains to 369T69= += $+T the testator,
being of sound mind, freely e4ecuted the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of ma2ing his dispositions is on
the person who opposes the probate of the will) but if the testator, one month, or less, before ma2ing
his will was publicly 2nown to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove
that the testator made it during a lucid interval. In connection to this, the state of being forgetful does
not necessarily ma2e a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to e4ecute a 3ill.
.orgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
HEIRS OF 'IENVENI$O AN$ ARACELI TAN,AG v. SALO-E E. GA'RIEL,
NESTOR R. GA'RIEL, L&% GA'RIEL9ARNE$O m*5e0 to ART&RO ARNE$O,
NORA GA'RIEL9CALINGO m*5e0 to FELIA CALINGO, PILAR -. -EN$IOLA,
-INERVA GA'RIEL9NATIVI$A$ m*5e0 to E&STA:&IO NATIVI$A$, */0
ERLIN$A VELAS:&E% m*5e0 to HER-INIO VELAS:&E%
G.R. No. 1.5.63, Ap56 11, !#1!
n action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible
where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts. 6owever, for such an
action to prosper, this %ourt has held that the party see2ing reconveyance must prove by clear
and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.
cquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the
requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of
an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. The party who asserts ownership by adverse
possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
/nder rticle 1"1 of the %ivil %ode, to successfully maintain an action to recover the
ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove * things&
first, the identity of the land claimed) and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first
requisite, the person must first fi4 the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the
location, area and boundaries thereof.
ESTELITA VILLA-AR v. 'AL'INO -ANGAOIL
G.R. No. 1((661, Ap56 11, !#1!
rticle !!:! of the $%% is clear that <the power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon
him.? This remains true notwithstanding the absence of e4press stipulations in the agreement
indicating the consequences of breaches which the parties may commit. To hold otherwise
would render rticle !!:! of the $%% as useless.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SAN$IGAN'A,AN
G.R. No. 166(5", Ap56 1!, !#11
The thrust of the =epublic that the funds were borrowed or lent might even preclude
any consequent trust implication. In a contract of loan, one of the parties 'creditor( delivers
money or other consumable thing to another 'debtor( on the condition that the same amount
of the same 2ind and quality shall be paid. +wing to the consumable nature of the thing
loaned, the resulting duty of the borrower in a contract of loan is to pay, not to return, to the
creditor or lender the very thing loaned. This e4plains why the ownership of the thing loaned
is transferred to the debtor upon perfection of the contract. +wnership of the thing loaned
having transferred, the debtor enjoys all the rights conferred to an owner of property,
including the right to use and enjoy 'jus utendi(, to consume the thing by its use 'jus
abutendi(, and to dispose 'jus disponendi(, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. 9vidently, the resulting relationship between a creditor and debtor in a contract of loan
cannot be characteriEed as fiduciary.

REJ CO-PLAINT OF CONCERNE$ -E-'ERS OF CHINESE GROCERS
ASSOCIATION AGAINST J&STICE SOCORRO '. INTING OF THE CO&RT OF
APPEALS
A.-. OCA IPI No. 1#91..9CA9J, Ap56 1!, !#11
,ec. !8: of P.@. !0*: allows a person who is not the owner of the property to file the
petition for a new duplicate certificate, provided the person has interest in the property. In
the instant case, dela %ruE is a person in interest to the subject property given the fact that he
had what appeared to be a validly notariEed @eed of bsolute ,ale over the subject property
in his favor. s a public document, the subject @eed of bsolute ,ale has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. To contradict it, one must present evidence that is clear and
convincing) otherwise, the document should be upheld. 6owever, no one from %I appeared
during the proceedings to oppose dela %ruE>s petition or to bring to Hustice Inting>s attention
the fact that ng Dio was already dead at the time the deed of sale was allegedly e4ecuted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AI$A -AR:&E%
G. R. No. 1(144#, Ap56 13, !#11
The crime of 2idnapping and failure to return a minor under rticle *78 of the
=evised Penal %ode is clearly analogous to illegal and arbitrary detention or arrest, thereby
justifying the award of moral damages.
rticle ***!. $ominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recogniEed, and
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

JEAN TAN, ROSELLER C. ANACINTO, CARLO LOILO ESPINE$A */0 $AIS,
ALIA$O -ANAOIS, epe<e/te0 5/ t;5< *8t b+ t;e5 Atto/e+95/9F*8t, -A.
3ILHEL-INA E. TO'IAS v. REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1"3443 Ap56 16, !#1!
,ection !1 of Presidential @ecree $o. !0*: 'P.@. $o. !0*:( specifies those who are
qualified to register their incomplete title over an alienable and disposable public land under
the Torrens system. ,ection !1 states& The following persons may file in the proper %ourt of
.irst Instance an application for registration of title to land, 369T69= += $+T personally
or through their authoriEed representatives& '!( Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, e4clusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since Hune !*, !:10, or earlier) '*( Those who have acquired ownership
of private lands by prescription under the provision of e4isting laws) '"( Those who have
acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the e4isting laws) and '1( Those who have acquired ownership of land in any
other manner provided for by law.
,ection !1'!( covers Falienable and disposable landsF while ,ection !1'*( covers
Fprivate propertyF. Thus, for one>s possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable
public land to give rise to an imperfect title, the same should have commenced on Hune !*,
!:10 or earlier. +n the other, for one to claim that his possession and occupation of private
property has ripened to imperfect title, the same should have been for the prescriptive period
provided under the %ivil %ode. 3ithout need for an e4tensive e4trapolation, the private
property contemplated in ,ection !1'*( is patrimonial property as defined in rticle 1*! in
relation to rticles 1*8 and 1** of the %ivil %ode.
Possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods
provided under the %ivil %ode will not convert it to patrimonial or private property. There
must be an e4press declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of national wealth. In the absence thereof, the property remains to be
alienable and disposable and may not be acquired by prescription under ,ection !1'*( of
P.@. $o. !0*:. $onetheless, rticle 1** of the %ivil %ode states that Fproperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the ,tate.F It is this provision that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. fter all, rticle 1*8 '*( ma2es clear that those property Fwhich belong to the
,tate, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealthF are public dominion property. .or as long as the
property belongs to the ,tate, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is Fintended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealthF.
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INS&RANCE CORPORATION v. PETROLE&-
$ISTRI'&TORS C SERVICE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1(#("( Ap56 1(, !#1!
rticle ***5 of the %ivil %ode allows the parties to a contract to stipulate on
liquidated damages to be paid in case of breach. It is attached to an obligation in order to
insure performance and has a double function& '!( to provide for liquidated damages, and '*(
to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the threat of greater responsibility in the
event of breach. s a general rule, contracts constitute the law between the parties, and they
are bound by its stipulations. .or as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy, the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient.
contract of suretyship is an agreement whereby a party, called the surety,
guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an
obligation or underta2ing in favor of another party, called the obligee. lthough the contract
of a surety is secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the surety becomes liable for the
debt or duty of another although it possesses no direct or personal interest over the
obligations nor does it receive any benefit therefrom.
surety agreement has two types of relationship& '!( the principal relationship
between the obligee and the obligor) and '*( the accessory surety relationship between the
principal and the surety. The obligee accepts the surety>s solidary underta2ing to pay if the
obligor does not pay. ,uch acceptance, however, does not change in any material way the
obligee>s relationship with the principal obligor. $either does it ma2e the surety an active
party in the principal obligor-obligee relationship. It follows, therefore, that the acceptance
does not give the surety the right to intervene in the principal contract. The surety>s role
arises only upon the obligor>s default, at which time, it can be directly held liable by the
obligee for payment as a solidary obligor.

.urthermore, in order that an obligation may be e4tinguished by another which
substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the
old and new obligation be in every point incompatible with each other. $ovation of a
contract is never presumed. In the absence of an e4press agreement, novation ta2es place
only when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point.
HER-OJINA ESTORES v. SPO&SES ART&RO */0 LA&RA S&PANGAN
G.R. No. 1.513" Ap56 1(, !#1!
rticle **!8 of the %ivil %ode e4pressly provides that <interest may, in the discretion
of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.?
JOSE A'ELGAS, JR. */0 LETECIA J&SA,AN $E A'ELGAS v. SERVILLANO
CO-IA, R&RAL 'AN> OF SOCORRO INC. A/0 R&RAL 'AN> OF PINA-ALA,AN,
INC.
G. R. No. 1631!5 Ap56 1(, !#1!
,ection !!# of % !1! requires that before the five year prohibition applies, there
should be an alienation or encumbrance of the land acquired under free patent or homestead.
OSCAR $EL CAR-EN, JR. v. GERONI-O 'ACO,, G)*05*/ */0 epe<e/t5/4 t;e
8;560e/, /*me6+J -AR, -ARJORIE '. -ONSAL&$, ERIC '. -ONSAL&$, -ET%IE
ANN '. -ONSAL&$, >AREEN '. -ONSAL&$, LEONAR$O '. -ONSAL&$, JR.,
*/0 CRISTINA '. -ONSAL&$
G.R. No. 1.3(.# Ap56 !5, !#1!
/nder the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, <where the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants) and the
accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or
control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence G in the absence of a sufficient,
reasonable and logical e4planation by defendant G that the accident arose from or was
caused by the defendant>s want of care.?
INS&LAR INVEST-ENT AN$ TR&ST CORPORATION v. CAPITAL ONE E:&ITIES
CORP. ?/oG F/oG/ *< CAPITAL ONE HOL$INGS CORP.@ */0 PLANTERS
$EVELOP-ENT 'AN>
G.R. No. 1(33#( Ap56 !5, !#1!
Decause the words of the documents in question are clear and readily
understandable by any ordinary reader, there is no need for the interpretation or
construction thereof. ,uch is the mandate of the %ivil %ode of the Philippines which provides
that& <rt. !"78. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall controlX?

/nder rt. !*7#& %ompensation shall ta2e place when two persons, in their own
right, are creditors and debtors of each other. .urthermore, in order that compensation may
be proper, it is necessary& '!( That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that
he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other) '*( That both debts consist in a sum
of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same 2ind, and also of the same
quality if the latter has been stated) '"( That the two debts be due) '1( That they be liquidated
and demandable) '0( That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,
commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor. Lastly, when all
the requisites mentioned in rticle !*7: are present, compensation ta2es effect by operation
of law, and e4tinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the creditors and
debtors are not aware of the compensation.
SPO&SES NICANOR -AGNO */0 CARI$A$ -AGNO v. HEIRS OF PA'LO
PAR&LAN, epe<e/te0 b+ E-ILIANO PAR&LAN, $EPART-ENT OF AGRARIAN
REFOR-, 'ALI&AG, '&LACAN, OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF $EE$S OF
G&IG&INTO, '&LACAN
G. R. No. 1(3"16 Ap56 !5, !#1!
/nder @= dministrative +rder $o. 8*, ,eries of !::1, emancipation patents may
be cancelled by the P=@ or the @=D for violations of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations. The same administrative order further states that <administrative corrections
may include non-identification of spouse, correction of civil status, corrections of technical
descriptions and other matters related to agrarian reform)? and that the @=D>s decision
<may include cancellation of registered 9PL%L+, reimbursement of lease rental as
amortiEation to =Ds, reallocation of the land to qualified beneficiary, perpetual
disqualification to become an =D, and other ancillary matters related to the cancellation of
the 9P or %L+.?
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. v. FELIA PARAS AN$ INLAN$
TRAIL3A,S, INC., AN$ HON. CO&RT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 161"#" Ap56 !5, !#1!
In an action for breach of contract of carriage commenced by a passenger against
his common carrier, the plaintiff can recover damages from a third-party defendant brought
into the suit by the common carrier upon a claim based on tort or quasi-delict. The liability of
the third-party defendant is independent from the liability of the common carrier to the
passenger.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 'AN> v. SPO&SES CHEAH CHEE CHONG */0 OFELIA
CA-ACHO CHEAH
G.R. No. 1.#(65
SPO&SES CHEAH CHEE CHONG */0 OFELIA CA-ACHO CHEAH v. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL 'AN>
G.R. No. 1.#("! Ap56 !5, !#1!
/nder rt. *!01& If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it
was unduly delivered through mista2e, the obligation to return it arises. The indispensable
requisites of the juridical relation 2nown as solutio indebiti, are, 'a( that he who paid was not
under obligation to do so) and 'b( that the payment was made by reason of an essential
mista2e of fact.
AR-AN$O ALILING v. JOSE '. FELICIANO, et *6
G.R. No. 1(5(!", Ap56 !5, !#1!
;oral damages are awarded if the following elements e4ist in the case& '!( an injury
clearly sustained by the claimant) '*( a culpable act or omission factually established) '"( a
wrongful act or omission by the defendant as the pro4imate cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant) and '1( the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated rticle
**!: of the %ivil %ode. In addition, the person claiming moral damages must prove the
e4istence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good
faith.
liling has failed to overcome such burden to prove bad faith on the part of
3339%. liling has not presented any clear and convincing evidence to show bad faith. The
fact that he was illegally dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith. 6ence, he is not entitled
to moral and e4emplary damages.
PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO :. LI-, ET AL. V.$ISTINCTION PROPERTIES
$EVELOP-ENT AN$ CONSTR&CTION, INC.,
G.R. No. 1"4#!4, Ap56 !5, !#1!.
The 6L/=D is given awide latitude in characteriEing or categoriEing acts which may
constitute unsound business practice or breach of contractual obligations in the real estate
trade. This grant of e4pansive jurisdiction to the 6L/=D does not mean, however, that all
cases involving subdivision lots or condominium units automatically fall under its
jurisdiction. n intra-corporate controversy may e4ist between a condominium corporation
and its members-unit owners
ANICETO 'ANGIS <)b<t5t)te0 b+ ;5< ;e5< v. HEIRS OF SERAFIN AN$ SAL&$
A$OLFO
G.R. No. 1"#(.5 J)/e 13, !#1!
.or the contract of antichresis to be valid, rticle *!"1 of the %ivil %ode requires
that Fthe amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing) otherwise
the contract of antichresis shall be void.F
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF $OROTEO -ONTO,A, epe<e/te0
b+ '&ENAVENT&RA -ONTO,A,
G.R. No. 1"513. J)/e 13, !#1!
/nder ,ection !1'!( of P.@. $o. !0*:& +ne of those persons that may file in the
proper %ourt of .irst Instance an application for registration of title to land, 369T69= +=
$+T personally or through their duly authoriEed representatives are those who by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, e4clusive
and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain since Hune
!*, !:10, or earlier.
LO-ISES AL&$OS, 0e8e*<e0, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ FLORA AL&$OS v. JOHNN, -. S&ERTE
G.R. No. 165!(5 J)/e 1(, !#1!
s contemplated in rticle !58*, in relation with rticle !581, of the %ivil
%ode. <n equitable mortgage has been defined Cas one which although lac2ing in some
formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless
reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, there being
no impossibility nor anything contrary to law in this intent.>?
-ARCOS V. PRIETO v. THE HON. CO&RT OF APPEALS ?Fome N5/t; $5v5<5o/@,
HON. ROSE -AR, R. -OLINA9ALI-, I/ He C*p*85t+ *< P*55/4 J)04e o7 '*/8; 6.
o7 t;e RTC, F5<t J)0585*6 Re45o/, '*)*/4, L* &/5o/, FAR EAST 'AN> C TR&ST
CO-PAN,, /oG t;e 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAN$S, t;o)4; ATT,.
E$IL'ERTO '. TENEFRANCIA, */0 SPO&SES ANTONIO */0 -ONETTE PRIETO
G.R. No. 15(5". J)/e 1(, !#1!
=atification or confirmation may validate an act done in behalf of another without
authority from the latter. The effect is as if the latter did the act himself.
In agency, ratification is the adoption or confirmation by one person of an act
performed on his behalf by another without authority. The substance of ratification is the
confirmation after the act, amounting to a substitute for a prior authority.

CO&NTR, 'AN>ERS INS&RANCE CORPORATION v. >EPPEL CE'& SHIP,AR$,
&NI-ARINE SHIPPING LINES, INC., PA&L RO$RIG&E%, PETER RO$RIG&E%,
AL'ERT HONTANOSAS, */0 'ETHOVEN :&INAIN
G.R. No. 166#44 J)/e 1(, !#1!
In a contract of agency, a person, the agent, binds himself to represent another, the
principal, with the latter>s consent or authority. Thus, agency is based on representation,
where the agent acts for and in behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of the
authority conferred upon him. ,uch <acts have the same legal effect as if they were
personally done by the principal. Dy this legal fiction of representation, the actual or legal
absence of the principal is converted into his legal or juridical presence.?
FRANCISCO RA'AT, ET AL. v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 'AN>
G.R. No. 15(.55. J)/e 1(, !#1!
Inadequacy of the bid price at a forced sale, unli2e that in an ordinary sale, is
immaterial and does not nullify the sale.
FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES v. JOSE A. ESPINAS
G.R. No. 1.4156 J)/e !#, !#1!
s a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a person
will generally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. This
general rule is laid down in rticle *!75 of the %ivil %ode, which provides to wit& 3hoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. ,uch fault or negligence, if there is no pre-e4isting contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
%hapter.
+ne e4ception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed
by his employee. rticle *!#8 of the %ivil %ode states& The obligation imposed by rticle
*!75 is demandable not only for one>s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible. 9mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tas2s, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. /nder rticle *!75, in relation with
rticle *!#8, of the %ivil %ode, an action predicated on an employee>s act or omission may
be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission
committed by his employee.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. E$&AR$O -. COJ&ANGCO, JR., J&AN
PONCE ENRILE, -ARIA CLARA LO'REGAT, JOSE ELEA%AR, JR., JOSE
CONCEPCION, ROLAN$O P. $ELA C&ESTA, E--AN&EL -. AL-E$A,
HER-ENEGIL$O C. %A,CO, NARCISO -. PINE$A, I2A>I R. -EN$E%ONA,
$ANILO S. &RS&A, TEO$ORO $. REGALA, VICTOR P. LA%ATIN, ELEA%AR '.
RE,ES, E$&AR$O &. ESC&ETA, LEO J. PAL-A, $O&GLAS L& ,-, SIGFRE$O
VELOSO */0 JAI-E GAN$IAGA
G.R. No. 13""3# J)/e !6, !#1!
=.. "8!: being a special law, the !8-year prescriptive period should be computed in
accordance with ,ection * of ct ""*5, which provides& Prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not 2nown at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.

RG- IN$&STRIES, INC. v. &NITE$ PACIFIC CAPITAL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1"4.(1 J)/e !., !#1!
,tipulated interest rates are illegal if they are unconscionable and courts are allowed
to temper interest rates when necessary. In e4ercising this vested power to determine what is
iniquitous and unconscionable, the %ourt must consider the circumstances of each
case. 3hat may be iniquitous and unconscionable in one case, may be just in another.
NANC, L. T, v. 'ANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS */0 -ORTGAGE 'AN>
G.R. No. 1((3#! J)/e !., !#1!
3here the purchase is made in violation of an e4isting statute and in evasion of its
e4press provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud

PA'LO P. GARCIA v. ,OLAN$A VAL$E% VILLAR
G.R. No. 15(("1 J)/e !., !#1!
/nder rticle *!"8 of the %ivil %ode, a stipulation forbidding the owner from
alienating the immovable mortgaged shall be void.
/nder rticle *8## of the %ivil %ode, the creditor cannot appropriate the things
given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. ny stipulation to the contrary is
null and void.

/nder rticle *8#7 of the %ivil %ode, it is also of the essence of these contracts that
when the principal obligation becomes due, the things in which the pledge or mortgage
consists may be alienated for the payment to the creditor.

mortgage is a real right, which follows the property, even after subsequent
transfers by the mortgagor. < registered mortgage lien is considered inseparable from the
property inasmuch as it is a right in rem.? The sale or transfer of the mortgaged property
cannot affect or release the mortgage) thus the purchaser or transferee is necessarily bound
to ac2nowledge and respect the encumbrance. In fact, under rticle *!*: of the %ivil %ode,
the mortgage on the property may still be foreclosed despite the transfer, /nder rt.
*!*:& The creditor may claim from a third person in possession of the mortgaged property,
the payment of the part of the credit secured by the property which said third person
possesses, in terms and with the formalities which the law establishes.
$ovation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one,
may be made even without the 2nowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the
consent of the creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives him the rights mentioned in articles
!*"5 and !*"7.
SPS. A-'ROSIO $ECALENG ?<)b<t5t)te0 b+ ;5< ;e5<@ */0 J&LIA P3ANA,T
$ECALENG v. 'ISHOP OF THE -ISSIONAR, $ISTRICT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLAN$S OF PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CH&RCH IN THE &NITE$ STATES OF
A-ERICA, et *6.
PATRICIO O'ONAN 'ANIAGA, et *6. v. PHILIPPINE EPISCOPAL CH&RCH,
epe<e/te0 b+ RT. REV. RO'ERT O. LONGI$
G.R. No. 1.1!#" J)/e !., !#1!
n accion reinvindicatoria is an action to recover ownership over real
property. rticle 1"1 of the $ew %ivil %ode provides that to successfully maintain an action
to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must
prove two things& first, the identity of the land claimed by describing the location, area, and
boundaries thereof) and second, his title thereto.
HEIRS OF SERVAN$O FRANCO v. SPO&SES VERONICA AN$ $ANILO
GON%ALES
G.R. No. 15".#" J)/e !., !#1!

There is novation when there is an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and
the new obligations. There is no novation in case of only slight modifications) hence, the old
obligation prevails.
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. -ETRO IN$EA REALT, AN$
$EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1"(5(5, J&L, !, !#1!
<It is not the notorious, e4clusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of an
alienable and disposable public land for the mandated periods that converts it to patrimonial.
The indispensability of an official declaration that the property is now held by the ,tate in its
private capacity or placed within the commerce of man for prescription to have any effect
against the ,tate cannot be overemphasiEed.
It must be underscored that the law spea2s of Fpossession and occupation.F ,ince
these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to
ma2e one synonymous with the other. 3hen, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
see2s to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession.?
S&'IC 'A, -ETROPOLITAN A&THORIT, v. CO&RT OF APPEALS */0 S&'IC
INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 1"!((5, J&L, 4, !#1!
<9ven logic dictates that before anyone is entitled to collect service fees, one must
have actually rendered a service. In the instant case, petitioner ,D;, not having provided
the services that would require the payment of service fees as stipulated in the Lease
@evelopment greement, is not entitled to collect the same.?
'RIGI$O '. :&IAO v. RITA C. :&IAO, et *6.
G.R. NO. 1.6556, J&L, 4, !#1!
< vested right is one whose e4istence, effectivity and e4tent do not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the e4ercise of which no obstacle e4ists, and
which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. 3hile one
may not be deprived of his <vested right,? he may lose the same if there is due process and
such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. 6ere, petitioner's claim of a vested
right has no basis considering that under rticle !75 of the %ivil %ode, his share of the
conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation
case.?
E-ETERIA LI3AG v. HAPP, GLEN LOOP HO-EO3NERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
G. R. NO. 1(".55, J&L, 4, !#1!
<9asements or servitudes are encumbrances imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner, for the benefit of a community,
or for the benefit of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
The law provides that easements may be continuous or discontinuous and apparent or non-
apparent. The water facility is an encumbrance on Lot !!, Dloc2 0 of the subdivision for the
benefit of the community. It is continuous and apparent, because it is used incessantly without
human intervention, and because it is continually 2ept in view by the overhead water tan2,
which reveals its use to the public.?
ENGR. E-EL,NE P. CA,ETANO9A'ANO, et *6. v. COLEGIO $E SAN J&AN $E
LETRAN9CALA-'A
G.R. No. 1."545, J)6+ 11, !#1!.
<Ienerally, the punch list includes those items that restrict the final completion of
the project. %learly, by its very nature, unless and until the items in a punch list are
completed andLor corrected, accomplishment on a project can never be considered !88J.
Iiven the many defects and unfinished wor2s on the building subject of this case, the items in
the punch list submitted are definitely not in the nature of mere Cfinishing touches.>?
NATIONAL SPIRIT&AL ASSE-'L, OF THE 'AHAKIS OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
ALFRE$O S. PASC&AL
G.R. No. 16"!.!, J)6+ 11, !#1!
<The decisions and orders of administrative agencies, such as the Dureau of Lands,
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, upon finality, have the force and binding
effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The petitioner>s
status as possessor and owner of the lots had been decided upon in the final and e4ecutory
@ecember 1, !:#0 decision of the Dureau of Lands, which the @9$= ,ecretary and the +P
affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of the
lots.?
VIRGILIO S. $AVI$ v. -ISA-IS OCCI$ENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
G.R. No. 1"4.(5, J&L, 11, !#1!
<The elements of a contract of sale are& a( %onsent or meeting of the minds, that is,
consent to transfer ownership in e4change for the price) b( @eterminate subject matter) and
c( Price certain in money or its equivalent. It is the absence of the first element which
distinguishes a contract of sale from that of a contract to sell. The delivery made by @avid to
3illiam Lines, Inc., as evidenced by the Dill of Lading, was deemed to be a delivery to
;+9L%I. @avid was authoriEed to send the power transformer to the buyer pursuant to their
agreement. 3hen @avid sent the item through the carrier, it amounted to a delivery to
;+9L%I.?
NATIONAL PO3ER CORPORATION v. SPS. FLORI-ON V. ILETO et *6.
G.R. No. 16""5., J&L, 11, !#1!
$ANILO 'RILLO et *6. v. NATIONAL PO3ER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1.155(, J&L, 11, !#1!
<3hen a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a
contract binding upon the parties. 6aving been sanctioned by the court, it is a determination
of the controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately e4ecutory and
not appealable, e4cept for vices of consent, forgery, fraud, misrepresentation and coercion.
n easement of a right of way transmits no rights e4cept the easement itself, and
respondent retains full ownership of the property. 6owever, considering the nature and the
effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite
period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. .or this reason, the latter is
entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the
monetary equivalent of the land.?
PHILIPPINE CHARIT, S3EEPSTA>ES OFFICE ?PCSO@ v. NE3 $AG&PAN -ETRO
GAS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1.31.1, J&L, 11, !#1!
<The stipulation e4tending the coverage of a mortgage to advances or loans other
than those already obtained or specified in the contract is valid and has been commonly
referred to as a Fblan2et mortgageF or FdragnetF clause. mortgage that provides for a
dragnet clause is in the nature of a continuing guaranty and constitutes an e4ception to the
rule than an action to foreclose a mortgage must be limited to the amount mentioned in the
mortgage contract. Its validity is anchored on rticle *80" of the %ivil %ode and is not
limited to a single transaction, but contemplates a future course of dealing, covering a series
of transactions, generally for an indefinite time or until revo2ed. It is prospective in its
operation and is generally intended to provide security with respect to future transactions
within certain limits, and contemplates a succession of liabilities, for which, as they accrue,
the guarantor becomes liable. 6ence, where the subject mortgage is not in the nature of a
continuing guaranty and given the automatic termination thereof, P%,+ cannot claim that
Ialang>s tic2et purchases in !::* are also secured. .rom the time the amount of
P108,888.88 was fully settled, the subject mortgage had already been cancelled such that
Ialang>s subsequent tic2et purchases are unsecured. ,imply put, P%,+ had nothing to
register, much less, foreclose.?
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. $O-INGO ESPINOSA
G.R. No. 1.1514, J&L, 1(, !#1!
<.or one to invo2e ,ection 1#'b( and claim an imperfect title over an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain on the basis of a thirty '"8(-year possession and
occupation, it must be demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on
Hanuary *1, !:17 and the thirty '"8(-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of
P.@. $o. !87".?
SANTIAGO V. SO:&ILLO v. JORGE P. TORTOLA
G.R. No. 1"!45#, J&L, !3, !#1!
<s a general rule, a purchaser may rely on what appears on the face of a certificate
of title. n e4ception to this rule is when there e4ist important facts that would create
suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man and spur him to go beyond the present title and to
investigate those that preceded it. +ne who falls within the e4ception can neither be
denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith) hence, does not
merit the protection of the law. In this case, petitioner ,oquillo was not a purchaser in good
faith. 6e and the heirs of %oloso, Hr. who were his predecessors-in-interest, 2new about the
sale made to Tortola and the possession of the disputed property by Killaflores. Desides,
Tortola registered the sale, albeit with much delay, in *88*. s of the time Tortola's
complaint was filed, no registration was effected by ,oquillo.?
A<5* T)<t $eve6opme/t '*/F v. C*me6o H. T)b6e
G.R. No 1(3"(., J)6+ !5, !#1!
The right of redemption of foreclosed properties was a statutory privilege.
=edemption is by force of law, and the purchaser at public auction is bound to accept it.
Thus, it is the law that provides the terms of the right) the mortgagee cannot dictate them.
GOL$LOOP PROPERTIES INC. v. GOVERN-ENT SERVICE INS&RANCE S,STE-
G.R. No. 1.1#.6, A&G&ST 1, !#1!
<Parties may validly stipulate the unilateral rescission of a contract. 6ence, where
pursuant to the ;emorandum of greement e4ecuted by the parties, one of the grounds under
which I,I, may validly rescind the ;+ is if at any given time, Ioldloop commits any
breach of its obligations and commitments thereunder, and Ioldloop still failed to pay the
installments due from it, I,I, may unilaterally rescind the contract.?
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. -ARLON -E$I$A
G.R. No. 1"5#".. A)4)<t 13, !#1!
<ll lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the ,tate. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
presented to establish that the land subject of the application for registration of title is
alienable or disposable. The applicant must prove that there was a positive act of the
government ma2ing such land alienable and disposable. 6ence, where the evidence presented
are mere survey plans prepared by a geodetic engineer, although approved by the @9$=-
Land ;anagement Dureau, such is inadequate proof as to the alienable and disposable
character of the lands and are hardly incontrovertible. The survey plans refer only to the
technical correctness of the survey plotted and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature
and character of the property surveyed.?
LILIA '. A$A, L&% '. A$AN%A, FLORA C. 'A,LON, RE-O 'A,LON, JOSE
'A,LON, ERIC 'A,LON, FLORENTINO 'A,LON, */0 -A. R&', 'A,LON v.
FLORANTE 'A,LON
G.R. No. 1(!435. A)4)<t 13, !#1!
</nder rticle !"#!'1( of the %ivil %ode, contracts which are rescissible due to
fraud or bad faith include those which involve things under litigation, if they have been
entered into by the defendant without the 2nowledge and approval of the litigants or of
competent judicial authority. ,uch 2ind of disposition tends to render inutile the court>s
impending disposition in such case and is unmista2ably and irrefutably indicative of bad
faith. 6ence, where the two parcels of land subject of a complaint for partition were donated
inter vivos by the alleged owner without the 2nowledge of the court or of the other litigants,
the conveyance may be rescinded and such right to as2 for the rescission of the contract
under rticle !"#!'1( is generally not contingent upon the final determination of the
ownership of the thing subject of litigation.?
CHARLES GOTAR$O v. $IVINA '&LING
G.R. No. 165166, A)4)<t 15, !#1!
<In an action for filiation, a prima facie case e4ists if a woman declares B supported by
corroborative proof B that she had se4ual relations with the putative father. The burden of
evidence then shifts to the putative father. The two affirmative defenses available to the
putative father are& '!( incapability of se4ual relations with the mother due to physical
absence or impotency) or '*( that the mother had se4ual relations with other men at the time
of conception. .ailure to allege and prove such defenses, as in this case where the putative
father failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity
against the mother, the prima facie case should be maintained. s such, filiation is beyond
question, and support follows as a matter of obligation) a parent is obliged to support his
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.?
-AN&EL $. ,NGSON, JR., 5/ ;5< 8*p*85t+ *< t;e L5E)50*to o7 ARCA- C CO-PAN,,
INC. v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 'AN>
G.R. No. 1.113!. A)4)<t 15, !#1!
The court has already settled and upheld the right of the secured creditor to foreclose
the mortgages in its favor during the liquidation of a debtor corporation.
N&-ERIANO P. A'O'ON v. FELICITAS A'ATA A'O'ON */0 GELI-A A'ATA
A'O'ON
G.R. No. 155(3#, A)4)<t 15, !#1!
< certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title
to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. This reliance on the
certificate of title rests on the doctrine of indefeasibility of the land title. It is only when the
acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine of indefeasibility
finds no application. 6ence, where there is an issue as to who has the better right of
possession over a parcel of land between one who has no title and one who has such, the
latter has the preferential right to the possession of the land in question. lso, it should be
noted that in order for one to properly assail the validity of a T%T, he must himself bring an
action for that purpose.?
&NION 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES v. -A&NLA$ HO-ES, INC., */0 *66 ot;e
pe<o/< o e/t5t5e< 86*5m5/4 54;t< )/0e 5t.
G.R. No. 1"##.1, A)4)<t 15, !#1!
<In a contract to sell, the full payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition whose non-fulfillment is not a breach of contract, but merely an event that prevents
the seller from conveying title to the purchaser. The non-payment of the purchase price
renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. 6ence, where a buyer in
a contract to sell withholds the installment payments, such rendered the contract ineffective
and without force and effect, and ultimately deprived itself of the right to continue possessing
;aunlad ,hopping ;all. lso, as in any unlawful detainer case, ;aunlad 6omes> claim of
ownership of the property does not divest ;eT% of its jurisdiction over the action. ;eT% may
preliminarily resolve the issue of ownership to determine the issue of possession, although
such preliminary resolution is merely provisional and is binding only with respect to the issue
of possession.?
SPO&SES TEO$ORO */0 NANETTE PERENA v. SPO&SES TERESITA PHILIPPINE
NICOLAS */0 L. %ARATE, NATIONAL RAIL3A,S, */0 t;e CO&RT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 15."1., A)4)<t !", !#1!
<@efendants may be held jointly and severally liable for damages in favor of the
plaintiff despite the fact that the basis of the latter>s right to relief against the former is
distinct in each case. 6ence, in an action for damages against a school service on the ground
of breach of contract of carriage and against the P$= based on quasi-delict, they could be
held jointly and severally liable by virtue of their respective negligence combining to cause
the death of a student.
Loss of earning capacity is a compensation awarded not for loss of time or earnings
but for loss of the deceased>s power or ability to earn money. 6ence, where a student with no
history of earnings died because of a vehicular accident, his heirs may still be awarded an
amount corresponding to loss of earning capacity.?
-A>ATI SHANGRI9LA HOTEL AN$ RESORT, INC. v. ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER,
JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, */0 RIGO'ERTO GILLERA
G.R. No. 1("""(, A)4)<t !", !#1!
<$egligence is defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The test in
determining whether there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation is& @id
defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situationY If not, the person is guilty
of negligence. 6ence, where a five-star hotel continued with its practice of providing only
one security guard per three to four floors despite the recommendation of it chief security
officer that the ideal-set up for an effective security should be one guard for every floor
considering that the hotel is L-shaped and the ends of the hallways cannot be seen, and as a
result of which failed to prevent the foreseeable crime of murder of one of its guests, it is
guilty of negligence under rt. *!75 of the %ivil %ode.?
JOSE I. -E$INA v. CO&RT OF APPEALS */0 HEIRS OF THE LATE A'&N$IO
CASTA2ARES, Repe<e/te0 b+ AN$RES CASTA2ARES
G.R. No. 13.5(!, A)4)<t !", !#1!
?3here a property is part of the estate that has not been fully settled and partitioned,
the heirs> right of ownership over said property is merely inchoate. This means that the
impending heir has yet no absolute dominion over any specific property in the decedent>s
estate that could be specifically levied upon and sold at public auction. ny encumbrance of
attachment over the heir>s interests in the estate, therefore, remains a mere probability, and
cannot summarily be satisfied without the final distribution of the properties in the estate.
6ence, where a portion of a parcel of land was sold at a public auction to satisfy the writ of
e4ecution issued by the court but such land was later on found to be part of the estate that has
not been partitioned, said sale is void. The highest bidder in the public auction does not
become the absolute owner of the property notwithstanding his possession of a ta4
declaration over said property. ta4 declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove
ownership.?
-ETROPOLITAN 'AN> C TR&ST CO-PAN, v. SERVAN$O ARG&ELLES
?$e8e*<e0@ C CLA&$IO ARG&ELLES, et *6.
G.R. No. 1.6"(4, A)4)<t !", !#1!
<bsence of receipts of is not conclusive of as to the non-payment of installments in a
contract of sale as long as other pieces of circumstantial evidence are presented to show that
such installments were indeed fact made. 6ence, where the buyers of a parcel of land were
not able to present receipts covering their installments, the ,upreme %ourt found that such
payment may be assumed to have been made from the fact that said buyers were subsequently
found in possession of a deed of sale that the sellers e4ecuted in their favor. In addition, the
sellers gave up possession of their owner>s duplicate copy of the title and this subsequently
found its way into the hands of the buyers. They were even successful in registering the title
to the land in their names, whose presumed validity was not overcome by the sellers.?
J&AN '. 'ANE%, JR. v. HON. CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION AS PRESI$ING J&$GE
OF THE RTC9'&LACAN, -ALOLOS CIT,, AN$ THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
RO$RIGO GO-E%, REPRESENTE$ ', ITS A$-INISTRATRIA, TS&I ,&> ,ING
G.R. No. 15"5#(, A)4)<t !", !#1!
<rticle !!11 of the %ivil %ode requires that an action to revive a judgment must be
brought before it is barred by prescription, which was ten years from the accrual of the right
of action. n allegation of prescription, can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only
when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed,
otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full
blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss. 6ence,
where the defense of prescription could not be determined in the hearing of the petitioner>s
motion to dismiss considering that the complaint did not show on its face that the period to
bring the action to revive had already lapsed, the issue of prescription became one involving
evidentiary matters requiring a full blown trial on the merits.?
LEONAR$O NOTARTE, G&ILLER-O NOTARTE, REGALA$O NOTARTE AN$
HEIRS OF FELIPE NOTARTE v. GO$OFRE$O NOTARTE
G.R. No. 1(#614, A)4)<t !", !#1!
</nder rticle !8#* of the %ivil %ode, every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition even though it should purport to be a
sale, an e4change, or any other transaction. Partition may thus be inferred from
circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. 6ence, where the original
registered owners had either mortgaged or sold their respective shares, in whole or in part,
and the said owners> successors-in-interest eventually too2 possession of the respective
portions acquired by them beginning !:0! or thereabouts, introducing improvements and
e4ercising acts of ownership thereon, property is deemed partitioned. That their respective
shares of the original registered owners were merely designated orally is immaterial.?
JES&S VIRT&CIO, epe<e/te0 b+ A'$ON VIRT&CIO v. JOSE ALEGAR'ES
G.R. No. 1(.451, !" A)4)<t !#1!
<Law and jurisprudence dictate that only a judicial summons can effectively toll the
period for acquisitive prescription. 3hen no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue
a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription continues
to run. 6ence, where what was filed by the party in possession of the property was merely a
protest against the homestead application of the adverse party, such protest did not interrupt
the "8-year period of acquisitive prescription. 9ven the decision resulting from such protest
cannot effectively toll the running of the period of acquisitive prescription. In such an
instance, no civil interruption can ta2e place.?
PACIFIC OCEAN -ANNING, INC. */0 CELTIC PACIFIC SHIP -ANAGE-ENT CO.,
LT$. v. 'ENJA-IN $. PENALES
G.R. No. 16!(#", Septembe 5, !#1!
</nder rticle **8# of the %ivil %ode, attorney>s fees can be recovered Fwhen the
defendant>s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur e4penses to protect his interest.F 6ence, where a party did not give the adverse party
ample time to assess and evaluate his monetary claims before filing the case, the former is
not entitled to attorney>s fees.?
-AG$I3ANG REALT, CORPORATION, RENATO P. $RAGON AN$ ESPERAN%A
TOLENTINO v. THE -ANILA 'AN>ING CORPORATION, S&'STIT&TE$ ', FIRST
SOVEREIGN ASSET -ANAGE-ENT ?SPV9A-C@, INC.
G.R. NO. 1"55"!, SEPTE-'ER 5, !#1!
</nder rticle !!00 of the $ew %ivil %ode '$%%( which provides that the
prescription of actions is interrupted when& '!( they are filed before the court) '*( there is a
written e4trajudicial demand by the creditors) and '"( there is any written ac2nowledgment of
the debt by the debtor. 6ence, where several letters were e4changed between the parties, the
ten '!8(-year prescriptive period to file an action based on the subject promissory notes was
interrupted.
rticle **8#'*( of the $%% allows the grant of attorney>s fees when the defendants>
act or omission compelled the plaintiff to litigate or to incur e4penses to protect its interest.
%onsidering the circumstances that led to the filing of the complaint in court, and the clear
refusal of the petitioners to satisfy their e4isting debt to the ban2 despite the long period of
time and the accommodations granted to it by the respondent to enable them to satisfy their
obligations, the respondent was clearly compelled by the petitioners' acts to litigate for the
protection of the ban2's interests, ma2ing the award of attorney's fees proper.?
PLANTERS $EVELOP-ENT 'AN> v. J&LIE CHAN$&-AL
G.R. NO. 1"561", SEPTE-'ER 5, !#1!
<=.. $o. 500* recogniEes the right of the seller to cancel the contract but any such
cancellation must be done in conformity with the requirements therein prescribed. In addition
to the notarial act of rescission, the seller is required to refund to the buyer the cash
surrender value of the payments on the property. The actual cancellation of the contract can
only be deemed to ta2e place upon the e4piry of a thirty '"8(-day period following the receipt
by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by a notarial act and the
full payment of the cash surrender value.?
PAR> HOTEL, JK< PLA,HO&SE '&RGOS CORP., INC., AN$HOR GREGG HAR'&TT,
GENERAL -ANAGER, ATT,. RO'ERTO ENRI:&E%, PRESI$ENT, AN$ 'ILL
PERC,, v. -ANOLO SORIANO, LESTER GON%ALES, AN$ ,OLAN$A 'A$ILLA,
G.R. NO. 1.111( SEPTE-'ER 1#, !#1!
<;oral damages may be recovered where the dismissal of the employee was tainted
by bad faith or fraud, or where it constituted an act oppressive to labor, and done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, while e4emplary damages are
recoverable only if the dismissal was done in a wanton, oppressive, or malevolent manner.?
GOVERN-ENT SERVICE INS&RANCE S,STE- ?GSIS@, et *6. v. CO--ISSION ON
A&$IT ?COA@, et *6.
G.R. No. 16!3.!. Septembe 11, !#1!
<Dased on rticle ** of the %ivil %ode, there is unjust enrichment when '!( person
is unjustly benefited) and '*( such benefit is derived at the e4pense of or with damages to
another. There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to
such benefit. 6ence, where the payees of retirement benefits granted pursuant to a retirement
plan that is contrary to law and thus void and of no effect, the enrichment of the payees is
without just or legal ground. They received the disallowed benefits with the mista2en belief
that they were entitled to the same under the retirement plan. s such, under rticle !105 of
the %ivil %ode, the payees are considered as trustees of the disallowed amounts and are
required to account for and return the same.?
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 'AN> v. SPO&SES ALEJAN$RO AN$ -,RNA
RE'LAN$O
G.R. NO. 1"4#14, SEPTE-'ER 1!, !#1!
<rticle *8#0 of the %ivil %ode provides that a mortgage contract, to be valid, must
have the following requisites& 'a( that it be constituted to secure the fulfilment of a principal
obligation) 'b( that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged) and 'c( that
the persons constituting the mortgage have free disposal of their property, and in the absence
of free disposal, that they be legally authoriEed for the purpose.?
<The practice of obtaining loans, defaulting in payment, and thereafter contesting the
validity of the mortgage after the collateral has been foreclosed without any meritorious
ground should be deterred. ctions of this 2ind, bearing a hint of fraud on the part of
mortgagors, should not be tolerated, for they go against the basic principle that no person
shall unjustly enrich himself or herself at the e4pense of another and that parties in a
juridical relation must act with justice, honesty, and good faith in dealing with one another.
%OSI-A IN CORPORATE$ v. LILIA SALI-'AGAT AN$ ALL PERSONS CLAI-ING
RIGHTS &N$ER HER
G.R. NO. 1.43.6, SEPTE-'ER 1!, !#1!
<In an unlawful detainer, the defendant>s possession of the plaintiff>s property is
based on the plaintiff>s permission e4pressed through an e4press or implied contract between
them. The defendant>s possession becomes illegal only when the plaintiff demands the return
of the property, either because of the e4piration of the right to possess it or the termination of
their contract and the defendant refuses to heed the demand.?
<n implied new lease will set in if it is shown that& 'a( the term of the original
contract of lease has e4pired) 'b( the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate) and
'c( the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for !0 days with the acquiescence of the
lessor. This acquiescence may be inferred from the failure of the lessor to serve notice to
vacate upon the lessee.?
>EPPEL CE'& SHIP,AR$, INC.v. PIONEER INS&RANCE AN$ S&RET,
CORPORATION, AN$ PIONEER INS&RANCE AN$ S&RET, CORPORATION,
PETITIONER, V. >EPPEL CE'& SHIP,AR$, INC.
G.R. NO. 1(#((#9(1HG.R. NO. 1(#("69".. SEPTE-'ER 1(, !#1!
<3here the parties being mutually at fault, the degree of causation may be
impossible of rational assessment as there is no scale to determine how much of the damage
is attributable to either party. Therefore, it is but fair that both should equally shoulder the
burden for their negligence.?
<Dasic is the rule that parties to a contract may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms, or conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, and public policy. 3hile greater vigilance is required in determining
the validity of clauses arising from contracts of adhesion, this does not mean that contracts of
adhesion are not invalid per se?.
<3hile contracts of adhesion may be struc2 down as void and unenforceable for
being subversive of public policy, the same can only be done when, under the circumstances,
the wea2er party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is
reduced to the alternative of ta2ing it or leaving it, completely depriving the former of the
opportunity to bargain on equal footing.?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. E$GAR$O L&PAC + FLORES
G.R. NO. 1(!!3#, SEPTE-'ER 1", !#1!
</nder the %ivil %ode, e4emplary damages are imposed in a criminal case as part of
the civil liability Fwhen the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. ,uch damages are awarded Fby way of e4ample or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.F
<The term Faggravating circumstancesF used by the %ivil %ode, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense
has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon
the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the e4acerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. /nli2e the criminal liability which is
basically a ,tate concern, the award of damages, however, is li2ewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would ma2e little sense for an award of
e4emplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance
is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. 3ithal, the ordinary or qualifying nature
of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of
the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the
offended party to an award of e4emplary damages within the unbridled meaning of rticle
**"8 of the %ivil %ode.?
$ARE A$VENT&RE FAR- CORPORATION v. CO&RT OF APPEALS, HON.
A&G&STINE VESTIL, *< Pe<505/4 J)04e o7 RTC9CE'&, '. 56, -AN$A&E CIT,,
SPS. FELIA NG AN$ NENITA NG, */0 SPS. -ARTIN T. NG AN$ A%&CENA S. NG
AN$
AGRIPINA R. GOC9ONG
G.R. No. 1611!!, Septembe !4, !#1!
< party may vindicate its rights in the property through an action for quieting of
title, a common law remedy designed for the removal of any cloud upon, or doubt, or
uncertainty affecting title to real property. The action for quieting of title may be brought
whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason
of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or
effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may
be prejudicial to said title. The other proper remedy is an action for reconveyance of
property. The remedy belongs to the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person>s name, and such landowner demands the
reconveyance of the property in the proper court of justice.?
-ILAGROS $E 'ELEN V$A. $E CA'AL&, -ELITON CA'AL&, SPS. ANGELA
CA'AL& AN$ RO$OLFO TALAVERA, AN$ PATRICIO A'&S v. SPS. RENATO
$OLORES TA'& AN$ LAAA-ANA, -&NICIPAL TRIAL CO&RT IN CITIES,
TARLAC CIT,, 'RANCH II
G.R. NO. 1((41. SEPTE-'ER !4, !#1!
/nder rticle !"17 of the %ivil %ode, F$o contract may be entered into upon future
inheritance e4cept in cases e4pressly authoriEed by law.F Paragraph * of rticle !"17,
characteriEes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies when
the following requisites concur& '!( the succession has not yet been opened) '*( the object of
the contract forms part of the inheritance) and '"( the promissor has, with respect to the
object, an e4pectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.
%ontracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of the consummation of the
contract. ,tated otherwise, to form a valid and legal agreement it is necessary that there be a
party capable of contracting and a party capable of being contracted with. 6ence, if any one
party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of its e4ecution, such contract is
undoubtedly simulated and false and, therefore, null and void by reason of its having been
made after the death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. The
death of a person terminates contractual capacity.
TO-AS T. TEO$ORO, FRANCISCO J. TEO$ORO ?S&'STIT&TE$ &PON HIS
$EATH ', TO-AS T. TEO$ORO, SALVA$ORILANO AN$ TEO$ORO
EAPLORATION AN$ -INERAL $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION v.
CONTINENTAL CE-ENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 165355 SEPTE-'ER !6, !#1!
<The settled rule is that Fa resort to judicial processes is not, per se, evidence of ill
will upon which a claim for damages may be based,F for the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate. F.ree resort to %ourts for redress of wrongs is a
matter of public policy. The law recogniEes the right of everyone to sue for that which he
honestly believes to be his right without fear of standing trial for damages.F
$R. PE$RO $ENNIS CERENO, AN$ $R. SANTOS %AFE v. CO&RT OF APPEALS,
SPO&SES $IOGENES S. OLAVERE AN$ FE R. SERRANO
G.R. NO. 16.366 SEPTE-'ER !6, !#1!
<In medical negligence cases, it is settled that the complainant has the burden of establishing
breach of duty on the part of the doctors or surgeons. It must be proven that such breach of
duty has a causal connection to the resulting death of the patient. verdict in malpractice
action cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. %ausation must be proven within a
reasonable medical probability based upon competent e4pert testimony.?
LIVING U SENSE, INC. v. -ALA,AN INS&RANCE CO-PAN,, INC.
G.R. NO. 1"3.53 SEPTE-'ER !6, !#1!
<The term Fjointly and severallyF e4presses a solidary obligation granting petitioner,
as creditor, the right to proceed against its debtors.
<The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not ma2e one an indispensable
party. n indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs or defendants.
The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, thus,
without their presence to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real
finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present.?
R.V. SANTOS CO-PAN,, INC. v. 'ELLE CORPORATION
G.R. No<. 15"56196!, OCTO'ER 3, !#1!
<3hile there was no provision in the %onstruction %ontract e4pressly authoriEing Delle to
secure the services of a third party auditor to determine the value of the wor2 accomplished
by petitioner =K,%I, there is li2ewise no provision prohibiting the same. %ertainly, =K,%I
failed to point to any contractual stipulation preventing =K,%I to see2 e4pert opinion
regarding the value of =K,%I>s accomplishment or the accuracy of the Progress Dilling,
whether prior or subsequent to the approval of such billing.?
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 'AN> v. LILIAN S. SORIANO
G.R. No. 164#51, OCTO'ER 3, !#1!
<$ovation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially,
must appear by e4press agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and
unmista2able. The contracting parties must incontrovertibly disclose that their object in
e4ecuting the new contract is to e4tinguish the old one. /pon the other hand, no specific form
is required for an implied novation, and all that is prescribed by law would be an
incompatibility between the two contracts. $onetheless, both 2inds of novation must still be
clearly proven. 6ence, the respondent>s bare assertion that the restructuring was approved
by petitoner cannot equate to a finding of an implied novation which e4tinguished former>s
obligation as entrustee under the trust receipts.?
LAN$ 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES v. E-ILIANO R. SANTIAGO, JR
G.R. No. 1(!!#", OCTO'ER 3, !#1!
<The interest imposed in case of delay in payments in agrarian cases is !*J per
annum and not 5J as the imposition is in the nature of damages for delay in payment which
in effect ma2es the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance.?
ASSOCIATE$ -ARINE OFFICERS AN$ SEA-ENKS &NION OF THE PHILIPPINES
PTG3O9ITF v. NORIEL $ECENA
G.R. No. 1.(5(4, OCTO'ER (, !#1!
<It is basic that a contract is what the law defines it to be, and not what it is called by the
contracting parties. The ,helter %ontract ward granted to respondent e4pressly stipulates
that Fupon completion of payment of the amount of /,Z*#,05" representing the full value of
the 6ouse and Lot subject of the %ontract ward, the /$I+$ shall e4ecute a @eed of
Transfer and shall cause the issuance of the corresponding Transfer %ertificate of Title in
favor of and in the name of the 3=@99.F It cannot be denied, therefore, that the parties
herein entered into a contract to sell in the guise of a reimbursement scheme requiring
respondent to ma2e monthly reimbursement payments which are, in actuality, installment
payments for the value of the subject house and lot.?
SPO&SES GO$FRE, */0 GERAR$INA SERFINO v. FAR EAST 'AN> AN$ TR&ST
CO-PAN,, INC., /oG 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAN$S
G.R. No. 1.1(45, OCTO'ER 1#, !#1!
<n assignment of credit is an agreement by virtue of which the owner of a credit,
2nown as the assignor, by a legal cause, such as sale, dation in payment, e4change or
donation, and without the consent of the debtor, transfers his credit and accessory rights to
another, 2nown as the assignee, who acquires the power to enforce it to the same e4tent as
the assignor could enforce it against the debtor. It may be in the form of sale, but at times it
may constitute a dation in payment, such as when a debtor, in order to obtain a release from
his debt, assigns to his creditor a credit he has against a third person.F s a dation in
payment, the assignment of credit operates as a mode of e4tinguishing the obligation) the
delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing 'in this case, the credit due from a third
person( by the debtor to the creditor is accepted as the equivalent of the performance of the
obligation. 6ence, where the terms of a compromise judgment did not convey an intent to
equate the assignment of ;agdalena>s retirement benefits 'the credit( as the equivalent of the
payment of the debt due the spouses ,erfino 'the obligation(. There was actually no
assignment of credit) if at all, the compromise judgment merely identified the fund from
which payment for the judgment debt would be sourced.?
<s current laws provide, the ban2>s contractual relations are with its depositor, not
with the third party) a ban2 is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care and always to have in mind the fiduciary nature of its relationship with
them.?
-ARIETTA N. PORTILLO v. R&$OLF LIET%, INC., R&$OLF LIET% */0 CO&RT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 1"653", OCTO'ER 1#, !#1!
<The e4istence of a difference in the nature of the credits that one has against the
other, conversely, the nature of the debt one owes another, which difference in turn results in
the difference of the forum where the different credits can be enforced, prevents the
application of compensation. To illustrate, the labor tribunal in an employee>s claim for
unpaid wages is without authority to allow the compensation of such claims against the post
employment claim of the former employer for breach of a post employment condition. The
labor tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the civil case of breach of contract.?
NAPOLEON $. NERI, et *6 v. HEIRS OF HA$JI ,&SOP &, AN$ J&LPHA I'RAHI-
&,
G.R. No. 1"4366, OCTO'ER 1#, !#1!
</nder =T. :7:, Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents
and other ascendants, without distinction as to se4 or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages. /nder =T. :#8, The children of the deceased shall always inherit from
him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. 6ence, where the petitioners
were found to be indisputably legitimate children of the deceased from her first and second
marriages with IonEalo and 9nrique, respectively, consequently, they are entitled to inherit
from her in equal shares, pursuant to rticles :7: and :#8 of the %ivil %ode.?
<%onsidering, thus, that the e4trajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not
binding on 9utropia, Kictoria and @ouglas, only the shares of 9nrique, $apoleon, licia,
Kisminda and =osa in the homestead properties have effectively been disposed in favor of
spouses /y. F person can only sell what he owns, or is authoriEed to sell and the buyer can
as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer.F
RCJ '&S LINES, INCORPORATE$ v. -ASTER TO&RS AN$ TRAVEL
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1..!3!, OCTO'ER 11, !#1!
<=%H failed to present any clear proof that it agreed with ;aster Tours to abandon the lease
of the buses and in its place constitute =%H as depositary of the same, providing storage
service to ;aster Tours for a fee. .urther, it did not ma2e sense for ;aster Tours to pre-
terminate its lease of the jun2ed buses to =%H, which would earn ;aster Tours P 588,888.88,
in e4change for having to pay =%H storage fees for 2eeping those buses just the same. s
already pointed out, the lease already implied an obligation on =%H>s part to safe2eep the
buses while they were being rented.?
NGEI -&LTI9P&RPOSE COOPERATIVE INC. AN$ HERNANCITO RON:&ILLO v.
FILIPINAS PAL-OIL PLANTATION INC. AN$ $ENNIS VILLAREAL
G.R. No. 1(4"5#, OCTO'ER 11, !#1!
<It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties. +bligations arising from contracts
have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith. /nless the stipulations in a contract are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy, the same are binding as between the parties. 6ence, the petitioners,
having freely and willingly entered into the ddendum with .PPI, cannot and should not now
be permitted to renege on their compliance under it, based on the supposition that its terms
are unconscionable. The contract must bind both contracting parties) its validity or
compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.?
ATLANTIC ERECTORS, INC. v. CO&RT OF APPEALS */0 HER'AL COVE REALT,
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1.#.3!, OCTO'ER 11, !#1!
<The parties to a contract are allowed to stipulate on liquidated damages to be paid
in case of breach. It is attached to an obligation in order to ensure performance and has a
double function& '!( to provide for liquidated damages, and '*( to strengthen the coercive
force of the obligation by the threat of greater responsibility in the event of breach. The
amount agreed upon answers for damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the
completion of the project. s a pre-condition to such award, however, there must be proof of
the fact of delay in the performance of the obligation.?
<s long as the contractor fails to finish the wor2s within the period agreed upon by
the parties without justifiable reason and after the owner ma2es a demand, then liability for
damages as a consequence of such default arises.?
SPO&SES -INIANO '. $ELA CR&% */0 LETA L. $ELA CR&% v. ANA -ARIE
CONCEPCION
G.R. No. 1.!(!5, OCTO'ER 11, !#1!
<In order to e4tinguish an obligation that consists of payment of a sum of money,
payment should be made to the proper person as set forth in rticle !*18 of the %ivil %ode.
6owever, where payment of the remaining balance of P*88,888.88 was not made to the
creditors themselves, but to one who was e4press authoriEed to receive payment, payment
made to the latter is deemed payment to the creditors.?
HEIRS OF $R. -ARIO S. INTAC */0 ANGELINA -EN$O%A9INTAC v. CO&RT OF
APPEALS, et *6
G.R. No. 1.3!11, OCTO'ER 11, !#1!
<The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the
intention of the parties. If the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention
of the parties, the latter shall prevail. ,uch intention is determined not only from the e4press
terms of their agreement, but also from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the
parties. s heretofore shown, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of both parties in
this case, point to the fact that the intention of Ireneo was just to lend the title to the ,pouses
Intac to enable them to borrow money and put up a hospital in ,ta. %ruE, Laguna. %learly,
the subject contract was absolutely simulated and, therefore, void.?
FILINVEST LAN$, INC., et *6. v. A'$&L 'AC>,, et *6.
G.R. No. 1.4.15, OCTO'ER 11, !#1!
<The conveyance of a homestead before the e4piration of the five-year prohibitory
period following the issuance of the homestead patent is null and void and cannot be
enforced, for it is not within the competence of any citiEen to barter away what public policy
by law see2s to preserve.?
FILINVEST LAN$, INC., et *6. v. A'$&L 'AC>,, et *6.
G.R. No. 1.4.15, OCTO'ER 11, !#1!
<It bears stressing that the law was enacted to give the homesteader or patentee
every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the ,tate had gratuitously
given to him as a reward for his labour in cleaning and cultivating it. Its basic objective, as
the %ourt had occasion to stress, is to promote public policy that is to provide home and
decent living for destitute, aimed at providing a class of independent small landholders which
is the bulwar2 of peace and order. 6ence, any act which would have the effect of removing
the property subject of the patent from the hands of a grantee will be struc2 down for being
violative of the law.?
<The conveyance of a homestead before the e4piration of the five-year prohibitory
period following the issuance of the homestead patent is null and void and cannot be
enforced, for it is not within the competence of any citiEen to barter away what public policy
by law see2s to preserve.?
HEIRS OF AL'INA G. A-PIL epe<e/te0 b+ EAE:&IEL G. A-PIL v. TERESA
-ANAHAN */0 -ARIO -ANAHAN
G.R. No. 1.5""#, OCTO'ER 11, !#1!
<3ell established is the rule that ownership over the land cannot be acquired by
mere occupation. 3hile it is true that ta4 declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they, nevertheless, constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property. It strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.?
<The bare allegation that one had been in peaceful and continuous possession of the
lot in question because his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession thereof in the
concept of an owner from time immemorial, cannot prevail over the ta4 declarations and
other documentary evidence.?
ARTH&R F. -ENCHAVE% v. -ARL,N -. 'ER-&$E%
G.R. No. 1(536(, OCTO'ER 11, !#1!
<There is unjust enrichment under rticle ** of the %ivil %ode when '!( a person is
unjustly benefited) and '*( such benefit is derived at the e4pense of or with damages to
another. 6ence, where the respondent only entered into the compromise agreement to commit
to payment of the original loan, petitioner cannot separate the two and see2 payment of both,
especially as he has already recovered the amount of the original loan.?
RO'ERT PASC&A, 0o5/4 b)<5/e<< )/0e t;e /*me */0 <t+6e TRI93E'
CONSTR&CTION v. G C G REAL TV CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1"63(3, OCTO'ER 15, !#1!
There is unjust enrichment under rticle ** of the %ivil %ode when '!( a person is
unjustly benefited) and '*( such benefit is derived at the e4pense of or with damages to
another. 6ence, where the petitioner already completed the construction of the project but
the respondent refuses to pay the contract price due to the delay in terms of completion of the
same, such would constitute unjest enrichment in favor of the respondent. This is more true
where it appears that the respondent>s additional wor2s and change order wor2s caused the
delay in the construction of the subject project.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. FRANCISCO LAO LI-, et *6
G.R. No. 16("(., OCTO'ER 1., !#1!
<3here several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all
or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. $o actor's
negligence ceases to be a pro4imate cause merely because it does not e4ceed the negligence
of other actors. 9ach wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his
acts were the sole cause of the injury. 6ence, since both PL and =ainbow Tours and Travel,
Inc. acted together in creating the confusion leading to the erroneous cancellation of
aforementioned respondents' confirmed boo2ings and the failure to inform respondents of
such fact. s such, they have become joint tortfeasors who are liable jointly and solidarily for
damages awarded to respondents Lao Lim and Io.?
<The findings of the lower courts that respondents .rancisco Lao Lim and 6enry Io
were holding confirmed plane tic2ets and yet were not transported by petitioner, are binding
on this %ourt. 6aving proven the e4istence of a contract of carriage between respondents Lao
Lim and Io, and the fact of non-performance by petitioner of its obligation as a common
carrier, it is clear that petitioner breached its contract of carriage with respondents Lao Lim
and Io.?
JOHN C. ARRO,O, JAS-IN ALIPATO, PRI-ITIVO 'ELAN$RES, et *6 v. ROSAL
HO-EO3NERS ASSOCIATION, INC
G.R. No. 1.5155, OCTO'ER !!, !#1!
<The =6I was purposely formed to enable the dwellers, including petitioners, to
purchase the lots they were occupying, being the ultimate beneficiaries of the %;P of the
$6;.%. Deneficiaries, however, must comply with certain requirements and obligations to
qualify as beneficiaries and be entitled to the benefits under the program. 6ence, where the
petitioners unreasonably refused to join =6I and their negative response to comply with
their obligations, such gives =6I the power to either e4pel them or declare them as non-
members of the association. Petitioners cannot now claim that they were denied the right to
own the portions of land they were occupying for their homes under the %;P.?
ARCH'ISHOP FERNAN$O R. CAPALLA, et *6 v. THE HONORA'LE CO--ISSION
ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. !#111!, O8tobe !3, !#1!
SOLI$ARIT, FOR SOVEREIGNIT, ?S4S@ epe<e/te0 b+ -*. L5/0* O6*4)e, et *6 v.
CO--ISSION ON ELECTIONS epe<e/te0 b+ 5t< C;*5m*/, Comm5<<5o/e SIATO S.
'RILLANTES, JR.
G.R. No. !#11!1
TEOFISTO T. G&INGONA, et *6 v. CO--ISSION ON ELECTIONS */0
S-ART-ATIC TI- CORPORATION
G.R. No. !#11!.
TANGG&LANG $E-O>RAS,A ?TAN $E-@, INC., et *6. v. CO--ISSION ON
ELECTIONS */0 S-ART-ATIC9TI- CORPORATION
G.R. No. !#1413
<Dased on the 9, %ontract, the %ourt sustained the parties> right to amend the
same by e4tending the option period. %onsidering that the performance security had not been
released to ,martmatic-TI;, the contract was still effective which can still be amended by the
mutual agreement of the parties, such amendment being reduced in writing. To be sure, the
option contract is embodied in the 9, %ontract whereby the %omelec was given the right to
decide whether or not to buy the subject goods listed therein under the terms and conditions
also agreed upon by the parties.?
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA JARALVE <)b<t5t)te0 b+ ALAN JESS
JARALVE $OC&-ENTO, JR., E$GAR$O JARALVE, et *6
G.R. No. 1.51.., OCTO'ER !4, !#1!
< %9$=+ or P9$=+ %ertification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable. .urther, the subject property is beyond the authority of the %9$=+ to certify
as alienable and disposable pursuant to @+ $o. "#, series of !::8. 6ence, the respondents
in this case failed to prove in accordance with law that the subject property is within the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain by merely presenting a %9$=+
%ertificate as evidence.?
3EST-ONT 'AN>, 7ome6+ ASSOCIATE$ 'AN> /oG &NITE$ OVERSEAS 'AN>
PHILIPPINES v. -,RNA $ELA ROSA9RA-OS, $O-INGO TAN */0 3ILLIA- CO
G.R. No. 16#!6#, OCTO'ER !4, !#1!
<The Dan2, given the fiduciary nature of its relationship with its depositors, should
have e4erted every effort to safeguard and protect the latter>s money which was deposited
and entrusted with it. 6ence, where respondent was defrauded and lost her money because of
the negligence attributable to the Dan2 and its employees, the latter must be made liable.
6owever, while the Dan2 reneged on its responsibility to @ela =osa-=amos, she is
nevertheless equally guilty of contributory negligence. It has been held that where the ban2
and a depositor are equally negligent, they should equally suffer the loss. The two must both
bear the consequences of their mista2es. Thus, the Dan2 should only pay 08J of the actual
damages awarded while @ela =osa-=amos should have to shoulder the remaining 08J.?
TO- TAN, ANNIE &. TAN */0 NATHANIEL TAN v. HEIRS OF ANTONIO F.
,A-SON
G.R. No. 1631(!, OCTO'ER !4, !#1!
< plain reading of the uthority to Loo2 for DuyerLDuyers reveals that nowhere in
the said document is it indicated that the sale of all seven lots was a prerequisite to the
payment by petitioners of [amson>s commission. ,ince no such stipulation appears, then it
would be fair to conclude that the petitioners had no such intention. 6ence, [amson is
entitled to his commission for the sale of the two lots.?
VS$ REALT, C $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION v. &NI3I$E SALES, INC. */0
$OLORES 'AELLO TEJA$A
G.R. No. 1.#6.., OCTO'ER !4, !#1!
<The rights of a builder in good faith under rticle 11# of the %ivil %ode, in relation
to rticle 015 of the same %ode, which provides for full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a
possessor in good faith who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does
not apply where one>s only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract.?
ANITA A. LE$$A v. 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAN$S
G.R. No. !##(6(. Novembe 1!, !#1!
%learly, DPI failed to prove Ledda>s conformity and acceptance of the stipulations
contained in the Terms and %onditions. Therefore, as the %ourt held in lcaraE, the Terms
and %onditions do not bind Ledda without a clear showing that Ledda was aware of and
consented to the provisions of such document.
IN THE -ATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PRO'ATE OF THE LAST 3ILL
AN$ TESTA-ENT OF ENRI:&E S. LOPE% RICHAR$ '. LOPE% v. $IANA JEANNE
LOPE%, -AR,'ETH $E LEON */0 VICTORIA L. T&A%ON
G.R. No. 1(""(4, Novembe 1!, !#1!
<The attestation clause must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of
one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. 6ence, where the
attestation clause states that last will and testament consists of 7 pages including the page on
which the ratification and ac2nowledgment are written, but actually, the will consists of #
pages including its ac2nowledgment, such discrepancy cannot be e4plained by mere
e4amination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde. Therefore, the
discrepancy cannot be deemed substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. .or
this reason, the will must be disallowed.?
A&RELIA G&A9AN AN$ SONIA G&A9AN -A-ON v. GERTR&$ES :&IRINO,
epe<e/te0 b+ EL-ER :&IRINO
G.R. No. 1"(..#, Novembe 1!, !#1!
<3here the deed of conditional sale revealed that the supposed vendor was given the
right to repurchase the subject property even beyond the !*-year 'original and e4tended(
period, allowing in the meantime the continued possession of the vendee pending payment of
the consideration, the real intention of the parties was not to enter into a contract of sale but
merely to secure the payment of the loan 'consideration( of the vendor. /nder these
conditions and in accordance with rticle !58* of the %ivil %ode, the pacto de retro sale is in
reality an equitable mortgage.?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. -ARCIAL -ALIC$E- + -OLINA
G.R. No. 1(46#1, Novembe 1!, !#1!
<nent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered& '!( civil indemnity e4 delicto for the death of the victim) '*( actual or
compensatory damages) '"( moral damages) '1( e4emplary damages) '0( attorney>s fees and
e4penses of litigation) and '5( interest, in proper cases. %ivil indemnity in the amount of
P70,888.88 is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the commission
of the crime. ;oral damages in the sum of P08,888.88 should be awarded despite the
absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim>s heirs. s borne out by
human nature and e4perience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim>s family. n aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of e4emplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of rticle **"8 of the %ivil %ode.?
ARA'ELLE J. -EN$O%A v. REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES */0 $O-INIC C.
-EN$O%A
G.R. No. 15.64", Novembe 1!, !#1!
<94pert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. t best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical or psychological e4amination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. 6owever, where the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a
finding of his psychological incapacity, the actual medical e4amination of the spouse
concerned cannot be dispensed with.?
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HON. CO&RT OF APPEALS ?NINTH
$IVISION@, AN$ E$&AR$O C. $E :&INTOS, .JR.
G.R. No. 15"5"4, Novembe 1!, !#1!
<Immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. To rule that such
immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts
were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her
youth or immaturity. It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to
perform these obligations. ;ere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness) irreconcilable differences, se4ual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the li2e, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under rticle "5, as the same may only be due
to a person>s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.?
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARCA$IO IVAN A. SANTOS III, */0 ARCA$IO
C. SANTOS, JR.
G.R. No. 16#453, Novembe 1!, !#1!
<Dy law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the
current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the ban2s of rivers where it
forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. 6ence, the dried-up river bed belongs to
the ,tate as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the
ownership in some other person.?
PHILPPINE 'AN>ING CORPORATION v. ART&RO $,, et *6.
G.R. No. 1(3..4. Novembe 14, !#1!
The diligence with which the law requires the individual or a corporation at all times to
govern a particular conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which one is placed,
and the importance of the act which is to be performed.
CO--&NITIES CAGA,AN, INC. v. SPO&SES ARSENIO ?$e8e*<e0@ */0 ANGELES
NANOL AN$ AN,'O$, CLAI-ING RIGHTS &N$ER THE-
G.R. No. 1.6."1, Novembe 14, !#1!
</nder the ;aceda Law, before a contract to sell involving a property can be validly
and effectively cancelled, the seller has '!( to send a notariEed notice of cancellation to the
buyer $@ '*( to refund the cash surrender value. Thus, the buyer has the right to continue
occupying the property subject of the contract to sell, and may still reinstate the contract by
updating the account during the grace period and before the actual cancellation of the
contract. 6ence, where a party complied only with the first condition but failed to refund the
cash surrender value to the adverse party, the %ontract to ,ell remains valid and subsisting
and the latter has the right to continue occupying the subject property.?
NESTOR N. PA$ALHIN */0 ANNIE PA$ALHIN v. NELSON $. LAVINA, Re<po/0e/t.
G.R. No. 1(3#!6, Novembe 14, !#1!
<There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is e4ercised for the only purpose of
prejudicing or injuring another. 3hen the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act
cannot be concealed under the guise of e4ercising a right. The principle does not permit acts
which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they violate
the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. 6ence, where the
petitioner>s surreptitious acts caused the ta2ing of the pictures of the respondent's residence
without the latter's 2nowledge and consent, the former violated the $ew %ivil %ode
concerning the privacy of one's residence and is therefore liable for damages.?
$IONISIO -ANAN:&IL, LA&$ENCIA -ANAN:&IL9VILLA-OR, ESTANISLAO
-ANAN:&IL, */0 $IANITA -ANAN:&IL9RA'INO, epe<e/te0 b+ OTILLO RA'INO
v. RO'ERTO -OICO
G.R. No. 1(##.6, Novembe !1, !#1!
<.or an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely& '!( the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action) and '*( the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 6ence, where the petitioners
have failed to show any title, award, grant, document or certification from the $6 or proper
government agency concerning the property allegedly awarded to their predecessor in
interest, they cannot maintain an action for quieting of title involving said property. Proof of
heirship alone does not suffice. The petitioners must prove to the satisfaction of the courts
that they have a right to succeed their predecessor in interest under the law or terms of the
$6 project, and are not disqualified by non-payment, prohibition, lac2 of qualifications, or
otherwise.?
R&PERTA CANO V$A. $E VIRA, */0 JES&S CARLO GERAR$ VIRA, v. SPO&SES
JOSE &SI */0 A-ELITA &SI
G.R. No. 1"!4(6, Novembe !1, !#1!
< double sale situation, which would call, if necessary, the application of rt. !011
of the %ivil %ode, arises when the following requisites concur& 'a( The two 'or more( sales
transactions must constitute valid sales) 'b( The two 'or more( sales transactions must
pertain to e4actly the same subject matter) 'c( The two 'or more( buyers at odds over the
rightful ownership of the subject matter must each represent conflicting interests) and 'd( The
two 'or more( buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each
have bought from the very same seller. 6owever, where the second sale is not valid due to
non-e4istent prestations pursuant to rticle !"80, rt. !011 need not be applied and the first
sale must be upheld.?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. E$3IN ISLA , ROSSELL
G.R. No. 1""(.5, Novembe !1, !#1!
<In order for one to be entitled to actual damages, the claim must not only be
capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. 6ence,
where the complainant failed to provide receipts to substantiate her claim for actual
damages, the same cannot be awarded. 6owever, in lieu of such, temperate damages may be
allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary
loss. In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape, e4emplary damages are
awarded in order to set a public e4ample and to protect hapless individuals from se4ual
molestation.?
SPO&SES SOCRATES S, AN$ CEL, S, v. AN$O>KS LITSON CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1"!1#(, Novembe !1, !#1!
<In case of breach of a contract of lease, the aggrieved party is given the option to
as2 for& '!( the rescission of the contract) '*( rescission and indemnification for damages) or
'"( only indemnification for damages, allowing the contract to remain in force. 6ence, where
the lessee had complied with all its obligations under the contract but the lessor failed to
render the premises fit for the use intended and to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and
adequate enjoyment of the lease, the former is entitled to the remedy of rescission.?
JOA:&IN G. CH&NG, JR., PA% RO,ERA%9SOLER, */0 -ANS&ETO -ACE$A v.
JAC> $ANIEL -ON$RAGON, ?0e8e*<e0@, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ ;5< <5<te< /*me6+J TEOTI-A
-. 'O&R'ON, E--A -. -ILLAN, E&GENIA -. RA-A */0 ROSARIO -.
CA'ALLESB CLARIN$A REGIS9SCH-IT% */0 -ARIA LINA -AL-ISA
G.R. No. 1.".54, Novembe !1, !#1!
<In a case for quieting of title, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least
an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding
beclouds its validity or efficacy. 6ence, where the plaintiff is not even named in the +riginal
%ertificate of Title as the registered owner of the subject property, he cannot maintain said
aforementioned action and the same should be dismissed.?
SPO&SES EROSTO SANTIAGO */0 NELSIE SANTIAGO v. -ANCER VILLA-OR,
CARLOS VILLA-OR, JOHN VILLA-OR */0 $O-INGO VILLA-OR, JR.
G.R. No. 16(4"", Novembe !6, !#1!
<Auieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt or uncertainty
affecting title to real property. The plaintiffs must show not only that there is a cloud or
contrary interest over the subject real property, but that they have a valid title to it. 6ence,
where the plaintiff bought a property from the vendor, who was not in possession of the
property at the time of the transaction, the former should have been wary and should have
investigated the rights of the actual possessor. .or failure to do such, the buyer cannot be
said to be in good faith and cannot have any right over the property. Therefore, he cannot
maintain an action for quieting of title.?
FIORELLO R. JOSE v. RO'ERTO ALF&ERTO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 16"3(#, Novembe !6, !#1!
</nlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real
property. In unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his
possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an e4press or implied contract
between them. 6owever, the defendant>s possession became illegal when the plaintiff
demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the e4piration or termination
of the right to possess under the contract, and the defendant refused to heed such demand.
Tolerance or permission must have been present at the beginning of possession) if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not be the
proper remedy and should be dismissed. 6ence, where the petitioner alleged in his complaint
that the respondents> occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or
legal basis, an action for unlawful detainer against the latter cannot be maintained.?
SA'INIANO $&-A,AG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1.!..(, Novembe !6, !#1!
<Pro4imate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbro2en by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. 6ence, where the evidence indubitably shows that
before the collision, a passenger bus was cruising along its rightful lane when a tricycle
coming from the opposite direction suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane, the acts of
the driver of the passenger bus, although found to be negligent, is not the pro4imate cause of
the accident resulting thereto. Dut even if not found to be criminally liable, the bus driver>s
contributory negligence renders him civilly liable.?
PA% $EL ROSARIO v. FELIA H. LI-CAOCO, %. ROJAS AN$ 'ROS., REP&'LIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, */0 REGISTER OF $EE$S OF TAGA,TA, CIT,.
G.R. No. 1..3"!, Novembe !6, !#1!
<3here the land registration court rendered a decision declaring the registration of
the parcel of land in favor of a party and appellate court thereafter affirmed the registration,
and from there, no more appeal was ever made, such proves the party>s ownership of the
land. The fact that no decree has as yet been issued cannot divest him of his title to and
ownership of the land in question. There is nothing in the law that limits the period within
which the court may issue a decree. The reason is that the judgment is merely declaratory in
character and does not need to be enforced against the adverse party.?
E$&AR$O -. COJ&ANGCO, JR. v. REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1(#.#5, Novembe !., !#1!
</nder the law, it is presumed that consideration e4ists and is lawful unless the
debtor proves the contrary. The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration
cannot be overthrown by the bare uncorroborated and self-serving assertion that it has no
consideration. To overcome the presumption of consideration, the alleged lac2 of
consideration must be shown by preponderance of evidence. 6ence, where the evidence
presented to prove that there was no sufficient consideration in a contract entered into
between the government and a private individual concerning the sale of share is inconclusive,
the contract must be upheld as valid.?
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ?Repe<e/te0 b+ t;e So85*6 Se8)5t+ S+<tem@ v.
-ARA3I9-ARANTAO GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC. */0 ATT,. -ACAPANTON >.
-ANGON$ATO
G.R. No. 15("!#, Novembe !(, !#1!
<The right of legal redemption must be e4ercised within specified time limits. 6owever, the
statutory period of redemption can be e4tended by agreement of the parties. 6ence, where the
petitioner approved the proposal of respondent to <redeemLrepurchase? the property despite
the fact that the redemption period has already lapsed, the former is deemed to have waived,
or even agreed to e4tend, the original limited period of redemption.?
$ELIA T. S&TTON v. RO-ANITO P. LI-, EFREN C. LI- AN$ ALLAN C. LI-,
-&NICIPAL AGRARIAN REFRO- OFFICER OF ARORO,, -AS'ATE,
PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFOR- OFFICER OF -AS'ATE, AN$ THE REGISTER
OF $EE$S FOR THE PROVINCE OF -AS'ATE
G.R. No. 1"166#, $e8embe 3, !#1!
</nder ,ection !, =ule II of the !::1 @epartment of grarian =eform djudication
Doard '@=D( =ules of Procedure, @=D may entertain petitions for cancellation of
%ertificates of Land +wnership ward. Its jurisdiction is, however, confined only to agrarian
disputes. n agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over
lands devoted to agriculture. Tenurial arrangements pertain to agreements which set out the
rights between a landowner and a tenant, lessee, farm wor2er or other agrarian reform
beneficiary involving agricultural land. 6ence, where the petitioner has not alleged any
tenurial arrangement between the parties, such negatwe the e4istence of any agrarian dispute
and consequently, the jurisdiction of the @=D. $ote that as of Huly !, *88:, under =.. $o.
:788, all cases involving the cancellation of %L+s and other titles issued under any
agrarian reform program are now within the e4clusive and original jurisdiction of the @=
,ecretary.?
LORETO 'OTE v. SPO&SES RO'ERT VELOSO */0 GLORIA VELOSO
G.R. No. 1"4!.#, $ECE-'ER 3, !#1!
</nder rticle 0*7 of the %ivil %ode, good faith is even always presumed and upon
him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.F Thus, in order
to refute the spouses Keloso>s contention that they are builders in good faith, it is necessary
that Dote present evidence that they acted in bad faith.?
3ILLE- 'E&-ER v. AVELINA A-ORES
G.R. No. 1"56.#, $ECE-'ER 3, !#1!
<Petitioner openly admitted that he Fis well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibitionF and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent
registered the subject properties in the latter>s name. %learly, petitioner>s actuations showed
his palpable intent to s2irt the constitutional prohibition. +n the basis of such admission, the
%ourt finds no reason why it should not apply the ;uller decision and accordingly, deny
petitioner>s claim for reimbursement.?
LAGRI-AS $E JES&S %A-ORA v. SPO&SES 'EATRI% %A-ORA HI$ALGO
-IRAN$A */0 ART&RO -IRAN$A, et *6
G.R. No. 16!"3#, $ECE-'ER 5, !#1!
<rticle !"0# of the %ivil %ode, which requires the embodiment of certain contracts
in a public instrument, is only for convenience, and registration of the instrument only
adversely affects third parties. .ormal requirements are, therefore, for the benefit of third
parties. $on-compliance therewith does not adversely affect the validity of the contract nor
the contractual rights and obligations of the parties thereunder.?
<In the instant case, the trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground
that the receipt presented is a worthless piece of paper, which cannot be made the basis of
petitioner>s claim of ownership over the property as ;r. rcadio =amos, an $DI handwriting
e4pert, established that the signature appearing on the said receipt is not the signature of
respondent DeatriE ;iranda.?
LAN$ 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO&SES ROSA */0 PE$RO COSTO
G.R. No. 1.464., $ECE-'ER 5, !#1!
<The %ourt has consistently ruled that the ascertainment of just compensation by the
=T% as ,% on the basis of the landholding>s nature, location, mar2et value, assessor>s
value, and the volume and value of the produce is valid and accords with ,ection !7 of =..
$o. 5507. The %ourt has li2ewise ruled that in appraising just compensation, the courts must
consider, in addition, all the .acts regarding the condition of the landholding and its
surroundings, as well as the improvements and the capabilities of the landholding.?
AL'ERT -. CHING */0 RO-EO J. 'A&TISTA v. FELIA -. 'ANTOLO, et *6
G.R. No. 1..#(6, $ECE-'ER 5, !#1!
<rticle ***: of the %ivil %ode provides that e4emplary damages may be imposed Fby way of
e4ample or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.F They are, however, not recoverable as a matter of right. They are
awarded only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, rec2less, oppressive or
malevolent manner. 6ence, where revocation of a contract was done by the respondents in
bad faith but not in a wanton, fraudulent, rec2less, oppressive or malevolent manner,
petitioners are not entitled to e4emplary damages.?
$R. GENEVIEVE L. H&ANG v. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., $&SIT THANI
P&'LIC CO., LT$. A/0 FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO INS&RANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 1(#44#, $e8embe 5, !#1!
<The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, '!( the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened e4cept for the
defendant>s negligence) '*( the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the e4clusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of) and '"( the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 6ence, where the accident would not
have happened had the petitioner not lifted the folding wooden counter top that subsequently
fell on top of her head, the doctrine cannot apply. The folding wooden counter top did not fall
on petitioner>s head without any human intervention.
ALEJAN$RO $INA,&G */0 ANA $INA ,&G v. E&GENIO &GA$$AN, NOR'ERTO
&GA$$AN, PE$RO &GA$$AN, ANGELINA &GA$$AN, TERESO &GA$$AN,
$O-INGA &GA$$AN, GERONI-A &GA$$AN, */0 'ASILIA LACA-'RA
G.R. No. 1(16!3, $e8embe 5, !#1!
<,ection !!# of the Public Land Law provides that $o alienation, transfer, or
conveyance of any homestead after five and before twenty-five years after issuance of title
shall be valid without the approval of the ,ecretary of griculture and $atural =esources,
which approval shall be denied e4cept on constitutional and legal grounds. This provision is
mandatory. 6ence, where the homestead patent grantee sold the subject property within the
five-year period, such contract of sale is void for being contrary to law. s a void contract,
the bsolute @eed of ,ale produces no legal effect whatsoever in accordance with the
principle Fquod nullum est nullum producit effectum.F void contract is also not susceptible
of ratification, and the action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of such a contract is
imprescriptible.?
EAPRESS INVEST-ENTS III PRIVATE LT$. AN$ EAPORT $EVELOP-ENT
CANA$A v. $A,AN TELECO--&NICATIONS, INC., THE 'AN> OF NE3 ,OR>,
AN$ ATT,. RE-IGIO A. NOVAL
G.R. NOS. 1.445.95", $e8embe 5, !#1!
<,% ruled that the non-impairment clause is a limitation on the e4ercise of legislative
power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The prohibition embraces enactments of a
governmental law-ma2ing body pertaining to its legislative functions. 6ence, where a
decision of a rehabilitation court is being assailed, the non-impairment clause cannot be
made to apply.?
FI$ELI%A J. AGLI'OT v. INGERSOL L. SANTIA
G.R. No. 1(5"45, $e8embe #5, !#1!
<It is settled that the liability of the guarantor is only subsidiary, and all the
properties of the principal debtor must first be e4hausted 'benefit of e4cussion( before the
guarantor may be held answerable for the debt. 6owever, where the supposed guarantor
could not present proof of the contract of guaranty as required under rticle !181 '*( 'b( of
the %ivil %ode, he cannot invo2e the benefit of e4cussion.?
SPO&SES CRISANTO ALCA%AR AN$ S&SANA VILLA-A,OR v. EVEL,N ARANTE
G.R. No. 1..#4! $ECE-'ER 1#, !#1!
<The rule is that in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be
pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the li2e.?
<94emplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of e4ample or correction for
the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 3hile
the amount of the e4emplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not e4emplary damages should be awarded.?
EFREN PANA v. HEIRS OF JOSE J&ANITE, SR. AN$ JOSE J&ANITE, JR.
G.R. NO. 164!#1 $ECE-'ER 1#, !#1!
<The civil indemnity provided in the decision of the murder case may be enforced
against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in rticle !*! of the
.amily %ode have been covered. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
liabilities under rticle !*!, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties.?
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. CONCEPCION LOREN%O, ORLAN$O
FONTANILLA, SA-&EL FONTANILLA, J&LIET FONTANILLA, ELI%A'ETH
FONTANILLA, ROSELA FONTANILLA, RENATO FONTANILLA AN$ EVEL,N
FONTANILLA
G.R. NO. 1.!33( $ECE-'ER 1#, !#1!
<The relevant law that governs the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed Torrens
certificate of title is =epublic ct $o. *5. ,ection * of said statute enumerates the following
as valid sources for judicial reconstitution of title& 'a( The owner>s duplicate of the certificate
of title) 'b( The co-owner>s, mortgagee>s, or lessee>s duplicate of the certificate of title) 'c(
certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal
custodian thereof) 'd( n authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the
case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued) 'e( document, on
file in the =egistry of @eeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document
showing that its original had been registered) and 'f( ny other document which, in the
judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title. s borne out by the records of this case, respondents were unable to
present any of the documents mentioned.?
<The term Fany other documentF in paragraph 'f( refers to reliable documents of the
2ind described in the preceding enumerations and that the documents referred to in ,ection
*'f( may be resorted to only in the absence of the preceding documents in the list. Therefore,
the party praying for the reconstitution of a title must show that he had, in fact, sought to
secure such documents and failed to find them before presentation of Fother documentsF as
evidence in substitution is allowed.?
GA&$ENCIO PACETE v. INOCENCIO ASOTIG&E
G.R. NO. 1((5.5 $ECE-'ER 1#, !#1!
< =econveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the
person with a better right than the person under whose name said property was erroneously
registered.?
<n action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose
property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another>s name.
lthough the decree is recogniEed as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the
registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. s a remedy, an action for
reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the
land registration court. =econveyance is always available as long as the property has not
passed to an innocent third person for value. notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated
on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice of
lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of
the real owner.?
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CESAR ENCELAN
G.R. NO. 1.##!!, J*/)*+ ", !#13
<rticle "5 of the .amily %ode governs psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that Fa marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall li2ewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemniEation.F In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly
stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates Fdownright incapacity or inability to ta2e
cogniEance of and to assume the basic marital obligationsF) not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the juridical antecedence 'i.e., the e4istence at the time of the celebration of
marriage(, gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.?
<In any event, se4ual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if
true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity) these are simply grounds for
legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.?
-ETROPOLITAN 'AN> C TR&ST CO-PAN, v. A'SOL&TE -ANAGE-ENT
CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 1.#4"( JAN&AR, ", !#13
< quasi-contract involves a juridical relation that the law creates on the basis of
certain voluntary, unilateral and lawful acts of a person, to avoid unjust enrichment.?
<rticle *!01 embodies the concept Fsolutio indebitiF which arises when something
is delivered through mista2e to a person who has no right to demand it. It obligates the latter
to return what has been received through mista2e. ,olutio indebiti, as defined in rticle *!01
of the %ivil %ode, has two indispensable requisites& first, that something has been unduly
delivered through mista2e) and second, that something was received when there was no right
to demand it.?
SPO&SES 'ENJA-IN C. -A-ARIL AN$ SONIA P. -A-ARIL v. THE 'O, SCO&T
OF THE PHILIPPINES, AI' SEC&RIT, AGENC,, INC., CESARIO PE2A,O AN$
VICENTE GA$$I
G.R. NO. 1."3(! JAN&AR, 14, !#13
<rticle *8 of the %ivil %ode provides that every person, who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
,imilarly, rticle *!75 of the %ivil %ode states that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
,uch fault or negligence, if there is no pree4isting contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this %ode.?
</nder rticle !"!! of the %ivil %ode contracts ta2e effect only between the parties,
their assigns and heirs, e4cept in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The
heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. If a contract
should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment
provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. mere
incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have
clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person. Thus, in order that a third
person benefited by the second paragraph of rticle !"!!, referred to as a stipulation pour
autrui, may demand its fulfillment, the following requisites must concur& '!( There is a
stipulation in favor of a third person) '*( The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the
contract) '"( The contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third
person - the favor is not merely incidental) '1( The favor is unconditional and
uncompensated) '0( The third person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor before
its revocation) and '5( The contracting parties do not represent, or are not authoriEed, by the
third party.?
<It has been held that the act of par2ing a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a
fi4ed amount, is a lease.?
<It is a4iomatic that actual damages must be proved with reasonable degree of
certainty and a party is entitled only to such compensation for the pecuniary loss that was
duly proven.?
-ANILA ELECTRIC CO-PAN, ?-ERALCO@ v. ATT,. PA'LITO -. CASTILLO,
$OING '&SINESS &N$ER THE TRA$E NA-E AN$ ST,LE OF PER-ANENT
LIGHT -AN&FACT&RING ENTERPRISES AN$ G&IA S. CASTILLO,
G.R. NO. 1(!".6 JAN&AR, 14, !#13
<;oral damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious an4iety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shoc2, social humiliation and similar injury. Hurisprudence has established the following
requisites for the award of moral damages& '!( there is an injury whether physical, mental or
psychological, which was clearly sustained by the claimant) '*( there is a culpable act or
omission factually established) '"( the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
pro4imate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant) and '1( the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases stated in rticle **!: of the %ivil %ode.?
<94emplary damages are imposed by way of e4ample or correction for the public
good. In this case, to serve as an e4ample - that before disconnection of electric supply can
be effected by a public utility, the requisites of law must be complied with - we sustain the
award of e4emplary damages to respondents.?
<ctual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the
position where it was before the injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are
actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. 94cept as provided by law or by
stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as is
duly proven. Dasic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of
loss be capable of proof) it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.?
<In the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual damages suffered, a
party is entitled to temperate damages. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case,
be proved with certainty. The amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of the courts but
the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than
nominal but less than compensatory.?
<n award of attorney>s fees has always been the e4ception rather than the
rule.ttorney>s fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit. The policy of the
%ourt is that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. The trial court must ma2e
e4press findings of fact and law that bring the suit within the e4ception. 3hat this demands is
that factual, legal or equitable justifications for the award must be set forth not only in the
fallo but also in the te4t of the decision, or else, the award should be thrown out for being
speculative and conjectural.?
A$VOCATES FOR TR&TH IN LEN$ING, INC. */0 E$&AR$O '. OLAG&ER v.
'ANG>O SENTRAL -ONETAR, 'OAR$
G.R. No. 1"!"(6, J*/)*+ 15, !#13
The power of the %D to effectively suspend the /sury Law pursuant to P.@. $o. !5#1
has long been recogniEed and upheld in many cases. %D %ircular $o. :80 Fdid not repeal nor
in anyway amend the /sury Law but simply suspended the latter>s effectivity.
,tipulations authoriEing iniquitous or unconscionable interests have been invariably
struc2 down for being contrary to morals, if not against the law. Indeed, under rticle !18:
of the %ivil %ode, these contracts are deemed ine4istent and void ab initio, and therefore
cannot be ratified, nor may the right to set up their illegality as a defense be waived.
$onetheless, the nullity of the stipulation of usurious interest does not affect the lender>s right
to recover the principal of a loan, nor affect the other terms thereof.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RA-IL RAR&GAL ALIAS VA-A, 'ISA,A,V
G.R. NO. 1((6#3 JAN&AR, 16, !#13
<3hen death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered& '!( civil
indemnity e4 delicto for the death of the victim) '*( actual or compensatory damages) '"(
moral damages) '1( e4emplary damages) '0( attorney's fees and e4penses of litigation) and
'5( interest, in proper cases.?
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AFP RETIRE-ENT AN$ SEPARATION
'ENEFITS S,STE-, HEIRS OF CA'ALO >&SOP AN$ ATT,. NILO J. FLAVIANO
G.R. NO. 1(#463 JAN&AR, 16, !#13
<ny title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged
innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled.?
THE -ANILA INS&RANCE CO-PAN,, INC. v. SPO&SES RO'ERTO AN$ AI$A
A-&RAO
G.R. NO. 1."6!( JAN&AR, 16, !#13
F contract of suretyship is defined as Fan agreement whereby a party, called the
surety, guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an
obligation or underta2ing in favor of a third party, called the obligee. It includes official
recogniEances, stipulations, bonds or underta2ings issued by any company by virtue of and
under the provisions of ct $o. 0"5, as amended by ct $o. **85.F 3e have consistently held
that a surety>s liability is joint and several, limited to the amount of the bond, and determined
strictly by the terms of contract of suretyship in relation to the principal contract between the
obligor and the obligee. It bears stressing, however, that although the contract of suretyship
is secondary to the principal contract, the surety>s liability to the obligee is nevertheless
direct, primary, and absolute.?
SPO&SES AL'ERTO AN$ S&SAN CASTRO v. A-PARO PALEN%&ELA, FOR
HERSELF AN$ AS A&THORI%E$ REPRESENTATIVE OF VIRGINIA A'ELLO,
GERAR$O ANTONIO A'ELLO, AL'ERTO $EL ROSARIO, INGE'ORG REGINA
$EL ROSARIO, HANS $EL ROSARIO, -ARGARET $EL ROSARIO ISLETA,
ENRI:&E PALEN%&ELA AN$ CARLOS -IG&EL PALEN%&ELA,
G.R. NO. 1(46"(, JAN&AR, !1, !#13
<Dad faith <means breach of a 2nown duty through some motive or interest or ill
will.? Dy refusing to honor their solemn obligations under the lease, and instead unduly
profiting from these violations, petitioners are guilty of bad faith. ;oral damages may be
awarded when the breach of contract is attended with bad faith. <94emplary damages may
also be awarded when a wrongful act is accompanied by bad faith or when the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, rec2less, oppressive, or malevolent manner. nd since the
award of e4emplary damages is proper in this case, attorney>s fees and costs of the suit may
also be recovered, as stipulated in the lease agreement.?
SPO&SES AL'ERTO AN$ S&SAN CASTRO v. A-PARO PALEN%&ELA, FOR
HERSELF AN$ AS A&THORI%E$ REPRESENTATIVE OF VIRGINIA A'ELLO,
GERAR$O ANTONIO A'ELLO, AL'ERTO $EL ROSARIO, INGE'ORG REGINA
$EL ROSARIO, HANS $EL ROSARIO, -ARGARET $EL ROSARIO ISLETA,
ENRI:&E PALEN%&ELA AN$ CARLOS -IG&EL PALEN%&ELA,
G.R. NO. 1(46"(, JAN&AR, !1, !#13
<Dad faith <means breach of a 2nown duty through some motive or interest or ill
will.? Dy refusing to honor their solemn obligations under the lease, and instead unduly
profiting from these violations, petitioners are guilty of bad faith. ;oral damages may be
awarded when the breach of contract is attended with bad faith. <94emplary damages may
also be awarded when a wrongful act is accompanied by bad faith or when the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, rec2less, oppressive, or malevolent manner. nd since the
award of e4emplary damages is proper in this case, attorney>s fees and costs of the suit may
also be recovered, as stipulated in the lease agreement.?
<Dac2 rentals are equivalent to a loan or forbearance of money, and the amount of
interest is !*J per annum counted from the time of e4trajudicial demand.?
-ON$RAGON PERSONAL SALES, INC. v. VICTORIANO S. SOLA, JR.
G.R. NO. 1.4((! JAN&AR, !1, !#13
<%ompensation is a mode of e4tinguishing to the concurrent amount the obligations
of persons who in their own right and as principals are reciprocally debtors and creditors of
each other. Legal compensation ta2es place by operation of law when all the requisites are
present, as opposed to conventional compensation which ta2es place when the parties agree
to compensate their mutual obligations even in the absence of some requisites. Legal
compensation requires the concurrence of the following conditions& '!( That each one of the
obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the
other) '*( That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable,
they be of the same 2ind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated) '"( That
the two debts be due) '1( That they be liquidated and demandable) '0( That over neither of
them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated
in due time to the debtor.?
J&ANITA ER-ITA2O v. LAILANIE -. PAGLAS
G.R. No. 1.4436 , J*/)*+ !3, !#13
It is settled that during the period of redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor
is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property, since the rule up to now is that the right of
a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has
e4pired without the right being e4ercised. The title to land sold under mortgage foreclosure
remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the e4piration of the redemption period and
conveyance by the master's deed. Indeed, the rule has always been that it is only upon the
e4piration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his
right of redemption, that the ownership of the land sold becomes consolidated in the
purchaser.
ct. $o. "!"0, as amended, allows the purchaser at the foreclosure sale to ta2e
possession of the property only upon the filing of a bond, in an amount equivalent to the use
of the property for a period of twelve '!*( months, to indemnify the mortgagor in case it be
shown that the sale was made in violation of the mortgage or without complying with the
requirements of the law.
The mortgagor as owner is entitled not only to the possession of the disputed house
and lot but also to the rents, earnings and income derived therefrom.
HEIRS OF FA&STO C. IGNACIO, /*me6+ -ARFEL $. IGNACIO9-ANALO, -ILFA
$. IGNACIO9-ANALO AN$ FA&STINO $. IGNACIO v. HO-E 'AN>ERS SAVINGS
AN$ TR&ST CO-PAN,, SPO&SES PHILLIP AN$ THEL-A RO$RIG&E%,
CATHERINE, RE,NOL$ C JEANETTE, ALL S&RNA-E$ %&NIGA,
G.R. NO. 1...(3 JAN&AR, !3, !#13
< contract of sale is consensual in nature and is perfected upon mere meeting of the
minds. 3hen there is merely an offer by one party without acceptance of the other, there is no
contract. 3hen the contract of sale is not perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of
obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation between the parties.?
<%onsent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing
and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the
acceptance absolute. qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer. If the acceptance of
the offer was not absolute, such acceptance is insufficient to generate consent that would
perfect a contract. The acceptance must be identical in all respects with that of the offer so as
to produce consent or meeting of the minds. 3here a party sets a different purchase price
than the amount of the offer, such acceptance was qualified which can be at most considered
as a counter-offer) a perfected contract would have arisen only if the other party had
accepted this counter-offer.?
S,E$ A%HAR A''AS v. GLORIA GOO A''AS
G.R. NO. 1(3("6 JAN&AR, 3#, !#13
<The certification of the Local %ivil =egistrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The presumed
validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of
the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the
required marriage license had been secured.?
JOSEPH GO,AN>O, JR., AS A$-INISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH
GO,AN>O, SR. v. &NITE$ COCON&T PLANTERS 'AN>, -ANGO AVEN&E
'RANCH
G.R. NO. 1."#"6, FE'R&AR, #6, !#13
< trust, either e4press or implied, is the fiduciary relationship between one person
having an equitable ownership of property and another person owning the legal title to such
property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain
duties and the e4ercise of certain powers by the latter. 94press or direct trusts are created by
the direct and positive acts of the trustor or of the parties. $o written words are required to
create an e4press trust. This is clear from rticle !111 of the %ivil %ode, but, the creation of
an e4press trust must be firmly shown) it cannot be assumed from loose and vague
declarations or circumstances capable of other interpretations.?
<The requirements before an e4press trust will be recogniEed are as follows& a
competent trustor and trustee, an ascertainable trust, and sufficiently certain beneficiaries.
each of the above elements is required to be established, and, if any one of them is missing, it
is fatal to the trusts. .urthermore, there must be a present and complete disposition of the
trust property, notwithstanding that the enjoyment in the beneficiary will ta2e place in the
future. It is essential, too, that the purpose be an active one to prevent trust from being
e4ecuted into a legal estate or interest, and one that is not in contravention of some
prohibition of statute or rule of public policy. There must also be some power of
administration other than a mere duty to perform a contract although the contract is for a
third-party beneficiary. declaration of terms is essential, and these must be stated with
reasonable certainty in order that the trustee may administer, and that the court, if called
upon so to do, may enforce, the trust.?
SPO&SES :&IRINO V. $ELA CR&% AN$ GLORIA $ELA CR&% v. PLANTERS
PRO$&CTS, INC.
G.R. NO. 15(64", FE'R&AR, 1(, !#13
<If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. In determining their
intention, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.?
LICO-CEN, INC. v. ENGR. SALVA$OR A'AIN%A, $OING '&SINESS &N$ER THE
NA-E AN$ ST,LE VA$S IN$&STRIAL E:&IP-ENTV
G.R. NO. 1"".(1 FE'R&AR, 1(, !#13
<rt. !7*1. The contractor who underta2es to build a structure or any other wor2 for
a stipulated price, in conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon with the
landowner, can neither withdraw from the contract nor demand an increase in the price on
account of the higher cost of labor or materials, save when there has been a change in the
plans and specifications, provided& '!( ,uch change has been authoriEed by the proprietor in
writing) and '*( The additional price to be paid to the contractor has been determined in
writing by both parties.?
TEO$ORO A. RE,ES v. ETTORE ROSSI
G.R. No. 15"(!3, Feb)*+ 1(, !#13
< prejudicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cogniEance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court
but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it
to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves .acts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there e4ists in the former an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.?
NICOLAS P. $IEGO v. RO$OLFO P. $IEGO */0 E$&AR$O P. $IEGO
G.R. No. 1.""65, Feb)*+ !#, !#13
< contract to sell is one where the prospective seller reserves the transfer of title to
the prospective buyer until the happening of an event, such as full payment of the purchase
price. 3hat the seller obliges himself to do is to sell the subject property only when the entire
amount of the purchase price has already been delivered to him. CIn other words, the full
payment of the purchase price parta2es of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of
which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is retained by the
prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer.> It does not, by itself,
transfer ownership to the buyer.?
PA$ILLA -ERCA$O, %&L&ETA -ERCA$O, 'ONIFACIA -ERCA$O, $A-IAN
-ERCA$O AN$ E--AN&EL -ERCA$O 'ASC&G v. SPO&SES AG&E$O ESPINA
AN$ LO&R$ES ESPINA
G.R. No. 1.3"(., Feb)*+ !5, !#13
<+ne who deals with property registered under the Torrens ,ystem need not go
beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title.?
LAN$ 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINES v. 'AR'ARA SA-PAGA PO'LETE
G.R. No. 1"65.., Feb)*+ !5, !#13
3here the mortgagee acted with haste in granting the mortgage loan and did not
ascertain the ownership of the land being mortgaged, as well as the authority of the supposed
agent e4ecuting the mortgage, it cannot be considered an innocent mortgagee.
SPO&SES NILO RA-OS AN$ ELIA$ORA RA-OS v. RA&L O'ISPO AN$ FAR EAST
'AN> AN$ TR&ST CO.
G.R. No. 1"3(#4, Feb)*+ !., !#13
The accommodation mortgagor, ordinarily, is not himself a recipient of the loan,
otherwise that would be contrary to his designation as such. 3e have held that it is not
always necessary that the accommodation mortgagor be apprised beforehand of the entire
amount of the loan nor should it first be determined before the e4ecution of the ,pecial Power
of ttorney in favor of the debtor. This is especially true when the words used by the parties
indicate that the mortgage serves as a continuing security for credit obtained as well as
future loan availments.
SPO&SES ALFONSO AN$ -ARIA ANGELES C&SI v. LILIA V. $O-INGO
G.R. NO. 1"5(!5, Feb)*+ !., !#13
RA-ONA LI%A L. $E VERA v. LILIA V. $O-INGO
*/0 SPO&SES RA$ELIA AN$ ALFRE$ S,
G.R. NO. 1"5(.1, Feb)*+ !., !#13
<Iood faith is the honest intention to abstain from ta2ing unconscientious advantage
of another. It means the <freedom from 2nowledge and circumstances which ought to put a
person on inquiry.? Iiven this notion of good faith, therefore, a purchaser in good faith is
one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or
interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same.?
</nder the Torrens system of land registration, the registered owner of realty cannot
be deprived of her property through fraud, unless a transferee acquires the property as an
innocent purchaser for value. transferee who acquires the property covered by a reissued
owner>s copy of the certificate of title without ta2ing the ordinary precautions of honest
persons in doing business and e4amining the records of the proper =egistry of @eeds, or who
fails to pay the full mar2et value of the property is not considered an innocent purchaser for
value.?
ALLIE$ 'AN>ING CORPORATION v. 'AN> OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAN$S
G.R. No. 1((363, Feb)*+ !., !#13
< collecting ban2 is guilty of contributory negligence when it accepted for deposit a
post-dated chec2 notwithstanding that said chec2 had been cleared by the drawee ban2,
which failed to return the chec2 within the *1-hour reglementary period.?
-ERC, V$A. $E ROAAS, epe<e/te0 b+ ARLENE C. ROAAS9CR&%, 5/ ;e 8*p*85t+ *<
<)b<t5t)te *ppe66*/t9pet5t5o/e v. O&R LA$,IS FO&N$ATION, INC.
G.R. No. 1(!3.(. -*8; 6, !#13
lthough the provisions of the %ivil %ode do not e4plicitly state the rec2oning period
for valuing the property, Dallatan v. %ourt of ppeals already specifies that in the event that
the seller elects to sell the lot, Fthe price must be fi4ed at the prevailing mar2et value at the
time of payment.F
REP&'LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. -ARTIN T. NG
G.R. NO. 1(!44", -*8; 6, !#13
<In a judicial confirmation of title under original registration proceedings,
applicants may obtain the registration of title to land upon a showing that they or their
predecessors-in-interest have been in '!( open, continuous, e4clusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of '*( agricultural lands of the public domain, '"( under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, '1( for at least "8 years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, e4cept when prevented by war or force
majeure. The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on applicants who must show
clear, positive and convincing evidence that their alleged possession and occupation were of
the nature and duration required by law.?
<Possession is acquired in any of the following ways& '!( by the material occupation
of the thing) '*( by the e4ercise of a right) '"( by the fact that the property is subject to the
action of our will) and '1( by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
the right.?
<Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbro2en and not intermittent or
occasional) e4clusive when the adverse possessor can show e4clusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit) and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally 2nown and tal2ed of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.?
<3hile ta4 declarations and realty ta4 payments on property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they are nevertheless good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner, for no one in the right frame of mind would be paying ta4es for a property that is not
in one>s actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for ta4ation purposes is an announcement of one>s claim against the ,tate and all
other interested parties. In fact, these documents already constitute prima facie evidence of
possession. ;oreover, if the holders of the land present a deed of conveyance in their favor
from its former owner to support their claim of ownership, the declaration of ownership and
ta4 receipts relative to the property may be used to prove their good faith in occupying and
possessing it. dditionally, when considered with actual possession of the property, ta4
receipts constitute evidence of great value in support of the claim of title of ownership by
prescription.?
RO'ERN $EVELOP-ENT CORPORATION */0 RO$OLFO -. 'ERNAR$O, JR. v.
PEOPLEIS LAN$LESS ASSOCIATION REPRESENTE$ ', FLORI$A RA-OS */0
NAR$O LA'ORA
G.R. NO. 1.36!!, -*8; 11, !#13
< contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. Thus, for a contract of sale to be
valid, all of the following essential elements must concur& <a( consent or meeting of the
minds) b( determinate subject matter) and c( price certain in money or its equivalent.?
<%ontracts undergo three stages& a( negotiation which begins from the time the
prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract and ends at the moment of
their agreement) b( perfection or birth, which ta2es place when the parties agree upon all the
essential elements of the contract) and c( consummation, which occurs when the parties fulfill
or perform the terms agreed upon, culminating in the e4tinguishment thereof.?
RO$OLFO G. CR&% */0 ESPERAN%A I'IAS v. ATT,. $ELFIN GR&SPE
G.R. No. 1"1431, -*8; 13, !#13
<%ontracts are obligatory no matter what their forms may be, whenever the essential
requisites for their validity are present. In determining whether a document is an affidavit or
a contract, the %ourt loo2s beyond the title of the document, since the denomination or title
given by the parties in their document is not conclusive of the nature of its contents. In the
construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and
is to be pursued. If the terms of the document are clear and leave no doubt on the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. If the words
appear to be contrary to the parties> evident intention, the latter shall prevail over the
former.?
ROGELIO $ANTIS v. J&LIO -AGHINANG, JR.
G.R. No. 1"16"6 Ap56 1#, !#13
Dy the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of, and to deliver, a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price
certain in money or its equivalent. contract of sale is a consensual contract and, thus, is
perfected by mere consent which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance
upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. /ntil the contract of sale is
perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical
relation between the parties. The essential elements of a contract of sale are& a( consent or
meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in e4change for the price) b(
determinate subject matter) and c( price certain in money or its equivalent. The absence of
any of the essential elements shall negate the e4istence of a perfected contract of sale.
INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CORPORATION v. FRANCISCO '. JOA:&IN, JR. */0
RAFAEL S&ARE%
G.R. No. 15(361 Ap56 1#, !#13
To avoid unjust enrichment to a party from resulting out of a substantially performed
contract, the principle of quantum meruit may be used to determine his compensation in the
absence of a written agreement for that purpose. The principle of quantum meruit justifies the
payment of the reasonable value of the services rendered by him.
SPO&SES OSCAR */0 THEL-A CACA,ORIN v. AR-E$ FORCES AN$ POLICE
-&T&AL 'ENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 1.1!"( Ap56 15, !#13
%onsignation is necessarily judicial. rticle !*0# of the %ivil %ode specifically
provides that consignation shall be made by depositing the thing or things due at the disposal
of judicial authority. The said provision clearly precludes consignation in venues other than
the courts.
RE, CASTIGA$OR CATE$RILLA v. -ARIO */0 -ARGIE1 LA&RON
G.R. No. 1."#11 Ap56 15, !#13
rt. *81! of the %ivil %ode, provides& If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by
the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded
and insist upon his original demand.
SPS. ES-ERAL$O $. V ALLI$O */0 ARSENIA -. V ALLI$O, ep. b+ ATT,. SERGIO
C. S&-A,O$ v. SPS. EL-ER PONO */0 J&LIET PONO, */0 P&RIFICACION
CERNAPONG */0 SPS. -ARIANITO PONO */0 ESPERAN%A -EROPONO
G.R. No. !##1.3 Ap56 15, !#13
The purpose of the registration is to give notice to third persons. nd, privies are not
third persons. The vendor's heirs are his privies. gainst them, failure to register will not
vitiate or annul the vendee's right of ownership conferred by such unregistered deed of sale.
EVANGELINE RIVERA9CALINGASAN */0 E. RICAL ENTERPRISES v. 3ILFRE$O
RIVERA, <)b<t5t)te0 b+ -A. L,$IA S. R6VERA, FREI$A LEAH S. RIVERA */0
3ILFRE$O S. RIVERA, .JR.
G.R. No.1.1555 Ap56 1., !#13
Possession in ejectment cases Fmeans nothing more than actual physical possession,
not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.F In a forcible entry case, Fprior
physical possession is the primary consideration.F F party who can prove prior possession
can recover such possession even against the owner himself. 3hatever may be the character
of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.F
FThe party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence,
or terror.F