Asia Pacific 25, 2007

ASI A PACI FI C
A RESEARCH JOURNAL OF FAR EAST & SOUTH EAST ASI A

Volume 25, 2007
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EDITORIAL PANEL
PatroninChief
Mr Mazharul Haq Siddiqi
Vice Chancellor, University of Sindh and
Chairman, Board of Governors
Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia,
Sindh Pakistan
EDITOR
Dr Lutfullah Mangi
Director, Area Study Centre,
Far East & South East Asia,
Sindh - Pakistan
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Professor Dr Zhang Li
Director
Centre South AsiaWest China
Cooperation and Development
Studies, Sichuan University,
Chengdu, 610064,
People s Republic of China
Dr Hariyadi Wirawan
Head,
Department of International
Relations,
University of Indonesia,
Jakarta, Indonesia
Dr Toshihiko Suda
Associate Professor
Faculty of International Relations
Daito Bunka University,
HigashimatsuyamaCity, Saitama,
Japan
Dr Guihong Zhang
Deputy Director
Institute of International Studies
Zhejiang University, Zhejiang
Dr Shang Quanyu
Professor, Department of Politics and
History Studies,
Zhejiang University, Guangdong,
Dr Mohammed Aslam
Faculty of Economics and
Administration,
University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed Choudhry
Dean,
Faculty of Social Sciences,
Sargodha University,
University Road, Sargodha
Pakistan
Dr Deedar Hussain Shah
Professor,
Area Study Centre,
Pakistan
Ms Firdous Nilofer
Associate Professor
Area Study Centre
Pakistan
Dr Abdul Latif Tunio
Associate Professor,
Department of International
Relations,
Pakistan
Mr Altaf Hussain Ansari
Assistant Professor,
Area Study Centre,
Pakistan
ASIA PACIFIC Volume 25, 2007
A RESEARCH JOURNAL OF FAR EAST & SOUTH EAST ASIA
Contents
Economic Perspectives of Forestry in Myanmar
Deedar Hussain Shah............................................................. 01
Japan s Traditional Security Concerns
Naghma Mangrio ................................................................... 11
Pakistan Vietnam Political, Economic and Trade Relations
Altaf Hussain Ansari .............................................................. 29
An Overview of Education and Training Model of Japan
Jamila Jarwar ........................................................................ 43
Sino-U.S Relations in the Post-9/11 Era: Cooperation Or Conflict?
Ghulam Murtaza Khoso ......................................................... 58
Involvement of Military in Indonesian Politics
Naureen Nazar ....................................................................... 75
China s One Child Policy: A Violation of Human Rights and
Social Consequences
Mukesh Kumar Khatwani....................................................... 90
China s South Asian Curiosities and Strategies
Ishrat Afshan Abbasi ............................................................ 105
Pakistan-Laos Economic and Trade Relations
Muhammad Ayoob Shaikh & Altaf Hussain Ansari............. 133
The Evolution of Japan s Security Policy
Naghma Mangrio ................................................................. 148
Pakistan - Malaysia Bilateral Trade and Investments
Noreen Hassan ..................................................................... 164
New Directions of China s Nuclear Posture: Capabilities
and Limitations
Abdul Latif Tunio ................................................................. 179
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES OF
FORESTRY IN MYANMAR
Dr Deedar Hussain Shah
*
Abstract
he economy of Myanmar is basically an agricultural
economy and Forestry is one of the main organs of
agriculture in Myanmar and a third big source of
earning foreign exchange. It also serves as a source of
livelihood for the teeming millions of rural population in
Myanmar and renders the profitable position to contribute
towards poverty alleviation. The study of forestry in Myanmar
may help to understand the methodology of curbing poverty
and poorness from the rural areas of developing economies in
Asia, through the provision of employment to the unemployed
working population.
*
Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia, University of
Sindh, Jamshoro.
Asia Pacific, Volume 25, 2007 (2)
Agriculture alongwith its natural components and related
interdependent sectors like livestock, fisheries and forestry, has
been the main source of economic achievements in Myanmar.
Because, its economy is basically agricultural, therefore more
than two-third of its people derive their livelihood directly
from agriculture and its allied sources. Forestry is an abundant
natural resource of the economy of Myanmar. It occupies
52.8% of the total area (676577 sq. kilometers) of Myanmar. The
forestry earns sufficient amount through its diverse valuable
wood, timber and bamboo resources, including, internationally
known teak wood which specifically earns more than 25% of
foreign exchange through world wide exports.
In 1988-89, reserved and protected public forests accounted for
24.8 million acres and protected area system totaled to 135
million acres, which increased to 35.5 million acres as reserved
and protected public forest area, whereas the only protected
acreage assessed to 3.36 million acres, in 2002-2003. In addition
to this, during this period more than 1.1 million acres have
been brought under forest plantations, with special emphasis
on teak plantations.
The following table reflects the picture more clearly

.
S.No. 1988 2004 Million Acres
1. Reserved Area 15.367 30.01 do
2. Protected Forest Area 07.23 do
3. Teak Logs 07.23 (acre lakhs)
4. Forest Plantation 01.93 (million acres)
5. Green Hill and Parks 14.00 do
6. Sanctuaries and Parks 32.00 do
Ministry of Information, Govt. of Myanmar, 2004

Bio-diversity (Species / Families)
i. Trees 3700 do
ii. Flora 285 do
iii. Orchids 800 do
iv. Birds 1000 do
v. Reptiles 400 do
vi. Fishes 587 do
The above table shows that Myanmar may be termed as forest
clad mountainous country. It has more than 7000 species of
plant life, reflecting its considerable potential of plant species.
The above table also indicates that the Ministry of forestry is
striving hard and making strenuous efforts to execute the
different projects of forestry to gain the positive results of
economic and social objectives meant for massive benevolence
and state profiteering. This will not only earn the foreign
exchange through cutting logs, but will enhance new sowing
meant for reforestation. It may improve the responsibilities of
nurturing, conserving and exploiting the forestry resources,
systematically. It may promote the financial earning of the state
and improve the cohesion between different sectors of the
economy. Hectic measures are being taken for extension,
protection and conservation of forests, continuously.
Besides the forest Department, another institution known as
Myama Timber Enterprise, is also working under the Ministry
of Forestry for exploitation of forestry resources, production of
sawn timber and wood based finished products, meant for
local and foreign consumption. Its teak log production
attained the ceiling of 318870 tons in 1987 and 297979 tons in
2003, against 381530 and 1072734 tons of hardwood in the
corresponding period.
Both the classification (1.Major 2.Moinor) of forest produce is
promoted accordingly. Major forest produce is comprised of
teak and hardwood like Pyinkadoe, Padauk, Pyinma, In-
Kanyin, Thitya-Ingyin, Thingan, Tamalau and others along
with minor products like firewood, charcoal, Kanyin Resin,
Turpentine, honey, bees-wax, orchids, edible birds nests, laac
etc, are developed, environmentally.
The Ministry of Forestry has also established the Arid Zones
Greening Department for environmental conservation and
greening. The main objectives of this department are aimed at
making arid zones green, to conserve environment, to fulfill
wood based finished products required by rural populace, to
constantly raise socio-economic condition with the values and
benefits of forests and vegetation, to ensure active additional
participation of masses for the promotion of environmental
conservation and development, to stimulate the agricultural
sector for ensuring moderate climate and to prevent
desertification, etc.
In order to achieve the implementation of the above mentioned
objectives, the department has so far sown the plantations on
20.1 million acres for environmental conservation and greening
of arid zones. It is further classified into 3.8 million acres for
forest reserves and 8.2 million acres for protected forests. Such
development of greening has so far covered 57 townships of 13
districts of Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway Divisions in
central Myanmar. The 13 districts viz: Sagaing, Monywa,
Shewbo, Kyaukse, Meiktila, Yamethin, Myinhgyan, Nyaungu,
Magway, Gangaw, Pakokku, Minbu and Thayat, are covered
and cultured with greening meant for conservation. This has
made the forests and vegetatin greener, which has resulted in
moderate climate. Local labour has been provided with jobs for
earning their livelihood, in a facilitating way. The variety and
status of forestry production is reflected in the following table.
Table Statement of Forestry Production

Year
Exploitation
of round
logs (m)
Export of
round logs
(m)
Exploitation
and
processing
(m)
Exploitation
of Non-
wood
products in
(Tons)
Plantation for
Reforestation
hectares
million
1980 238 0 0 0 -----
1985 96530 0 0 0 27
1989 224827 0 0 0 51
1993 200909 80835 0 0 46
1995 829006 459085 64414 201 29
1997 525935 0 248920 1371 25
2000 187488 0 74309 749 55
2003 0 0 1641 337 132
The above table reflects the variation of different products.
Relevant statistical figures show that the total forestry
production went up from 100000(m) cubic meters in 1981 to
900000 (m) cubic meters in 2000. It also reflects the quantum of
exploitation, exportation and processing. The total area under
reforestation went up from 200 million hectares in 1981 to 1400
million hectares in 2000. In Myanmar National Day for
plantation is also ceremonized for enhancing choice of
Ministry of Information, Government of Myanmar, Magnificent

Myanmar (1988-2003), 2004, p.104.
common man for reforestation.
Forest plantation is being established and strengthened to

promote commercial Plantation (Teak Hardwood, Pyinkadoe,
padauk, Pinus species), local supply plantation (Fuel wood,
Mangrove), Industrial Plantation (Eucalyptus species, Bamboo,
Tung oil tree), water shed Plantation, wood lot etc.
Development of forestry has tremendously promoted the
enhancement of livestock, fisheries, cattle farming, poultry
farming, beehiving, timbering, shrimping, egg production,
horti-culture etc.
Efforts are on the way to establish a single ASEAN Market,
where production and movement of goods, services,
investment and free flow of capital integration may be pushed
up vigorously. This may help to improve the agricultural
sector including forestry. Such resource mobilization may
reform the economic status of teeming millions of rural
population. Implementation of strategic co-operation in Food,
Agriculture and Forestry (1999-2004), has helped to strengthen
food security with self sufficiency, to manage the conservation
of forestry, to promote inter-intra-extra foreign trade, to
increase productivity and efficiency of forest labor and to
empower the building and development of human resources,
to seek co-operation and co-ordination of private sector for
joint ventures in forestry, to consolidate the efforts for creating
competitiveness about forestry production and mobilization of
resources on this count.
Internet & Website information.

Finally, it may be mentioned that Union of Myanmar is
member of GATT and signatory to WTO. Apart from the
membership of instructional organizations, Myanmar is also
member of Regional Groups, such as ASEAN, (Association of
South East Asian Nations), GMS (Greater Mekong Sub-region),
BIMSTEC (Multi sectoral Technology and Economic Co-
operation, ACMECS (Ayarwaddy-Chao Phaya-Mekong
Economic Co-operation strategy, etc. Because of such-
cooperation, Myanmar Forestry Products are being exported
under the principles of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA),
activities.
Such enactments of initial implementation of trade facilitation,
has moulded Myanmar to change its economic course from a
centrally planned economy into a market-oriented system,
since 1988. Since then structural reforms have been introduced,
such as decentralization of central control, encouragement of
private sector development, allowing of foreign direct
investment, initiating of institutional changes and financial
management systems, streamlining of taxes and duties,
promotion of external trade by facilitating export and import
products and improvement of infrastructural supports, have
been implemented. The role of Chamber of Commerce and
industry has been reactivated for promotion of private sector
participation for international trade activities.
Myanmar is a agro-based developing country and its main
exporting items are agriculture, marine and forest products
against imports of capital goods, construction materials and
equipment, machines and pharmaceuticals. Myanmar is also
maintaining more than 34 sanctuaries for the protection of wild
life species, comprised of Elephants, Gaur, Bomteng, Samber,
Tiger, Leopard, Bear, Hogdeer, Barking deer, wild boar, wild
dog, Himaleyam, Peacock, Pheasant, Jungle Fowl, Quail,
Potritch, Musked deer, Butterfly, Black barking deer, monkey,
Rhinoeros, Serow, Wild Birds, Migratory birds, Hill birds,
hand tortoises, Avifauna, Bear, Crocodiles, etc. These species
are maintained in various states, such as Kachin, Kayin, Chin
Mon, Shan, Rakhine, and divisions like Sagaing, Taniuthary,
Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Yangoo, Ajeyarwaday etc.
Conclusion
While concluding it may be observed that 50% land area of
Myanmar is covered by forestry. The country is blessed with
abundant forest resources. Myanmar owned more than 8570
plant species, including 2300 trees species, 850 kinds of orchard
species, 97 varieties of bamboo species and 32 types of cane
species. The ministry of Forestry has been synchronizing the
adoption of the policies of UN decision on environment and its
development Protection of the soils, water catchment areas, the
bio-diversity of plant and animal resources, as well as, eco-
systems are being developed on priority basis. The exploitation
of the forest-based resources is being maintained at a
sustainable level, just to ensure the tangible and intangible
benefits in the current and future periods.
The world wide famous hard wood Burma Teak, necessarily
required for building ships, bridges, wharvas, railway
Carriages, Wagons, houses, furniture, Carvings etc, is being
developed constantly. Girdling of teak, teak and hard wood
extraction, production of forest produce, teak and hard wood
milling etc are attended to properly in a accurate way.
Presently, teak forests are covered with an area of 15 million
acres, which is being further widened and expanded on annual
basis. Teak items like veneer, plywood, furniture, carvings,
joinery, flooring products and moulding are exported for
earning foreign exchange. The following table reflects the
Types of Forests in Myanmar.
No. Types of Forest Area Hectares
Million
Percentage
1. Tidal, beach and dune
Swamp Forests
1.4 04
2. Tropical evergreen forests 5.5 16
3. Mixed deciuduous forests 14 39
4. Dry forests 3.4 10
5. Deciduous dipterocarp
forests
1.7 05
6. Hill and temperate
evergreen forest
9.0 26
Total Million hectares
approximately: 35
Source: Kyaw-(1995) in APFSOS/WP/08 through web cites
The above table mentions that, species of commercially valued
hard wood like Padauk, Pyinkado, Kanyin, Taungthayet and
pine etc. are produced in these forests, abundantly. In addition
to this Bamboo trees are also exploited for the benefits of the
economy. The annual yield of bamboo and its pulp is more
than 0.6 million tons.
Myanmar is also naturally gifted with abundant cane
production, alongwith its 23 varieties. After meeting local
demand, surplus is exported.
Forestry also yields products like cutch (used for tanning and
dyeing of fish nets), Canvas, tarpaulins- leather laac etc (used
for making varnish, polish and sealing wax) for profitability of
the economy of Myanmar.
References and Notes
1
Dr Arvind Dayal, The Making of Modern Burma, Cambridge University Press,
2001
2
Helen James, Security and sustainable Development in Myanmar, Routledg,
London, 2006.
3
Ministry of information, Chronicle of National Development, comparison Between
period preceding 1988 and after, Yangoon, 2005.
4
Ministry of information, Magnificent Myanmar, (1988-2003), Yangoon, 2004
5
Thames & Hudson, Angkor, And the Khmer Civilization, Singapore 2003
6
Web cites and internet, variety of services and information.
7
Various sources of information, issued by the Forest Department, Cooperative
Department and Myanmar Agriculture services.
JAPANS TRADITIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
Dr Naghma Mangrio
**
Abstract
n the post-Cold War period, while most of the world
worries about new and non-traditional threats to their
national security, many countries in the world are still
facing the same old traditional threats. In the Asia-Pacific
region, even after the end of the Cold War, many countries are
trying to modernize their national defense capabilities. The
tension on Korean Peninsula, Chinas military buildup and
other unsettled issues constitute uncertain factors. Taking these
factors into account, this paper examines whether, despite the
end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet threat,
traditional security issues for Japan are still alive today.
**
Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of
Sindh, Jamshoro.
Security Threats to Japan
China
Before dwelling in detail over the Japanese perception of China
as a threat, a brief look at the historical overview of their
relations would be in order. The neighbouring countries of
North East and South East Asia have always ranked high in the
eyes of Japanese policy makers, who considered them to be
extremely important for Japanese security and prosperity. The
1930s witnessed an upsurge in Japanese militarism
1
. With the
trumpeted ideal of elimination of Western influence in the
region, along with spreading its antennae in different
directions, Japan consolidated its position in Manchuria in
1932, creating a puppet state there. Going a step further Japan
initiated a full fledged war against China in 1937. This war
prompted the unification of communist and nationalist forces
against the Japanese invasion, which finally defeated Japan, in
the war of resistance.
Following the period of its occupation (1945-1952) various
Japanese governments adopted the policy of semi isolation,
followed by a period of passive diplomacy, during which
economic relations remained the focal point of the national
policy. Japan finally ended its self imposed isolation in 1969
through the Nixon doctrine and started playing an affirmative
role in promoting trade relations with the neighbouring
countries, as well as establishing diplomatic relations with the
countries in the region. The U.S.-China rapprochement of 1971
also instigated Japan to take interest in East Asian affairs and
the establishment of diplomatic relations with China was also
one of its manifestations.
In June 1989, Japan imposed economic sanctions against China
in the wake of events of Tienamen Square, where the pro
democracy demonstrators were oppressed by the Chinese
army and linked its resumption with the domestic political
changes in China. But the fact remained that Japanese policy-
makers did not want to offend China on one hand, nor did
they want to see it isolated in the international community. For
the same reason Japan wanted the other members of G-7
meeting held in July 1990, to understand Japans special
relations with China
2
.
Ideological differences between Japan and China have been
overshadowed by economic considerations. Japan is Chinas
biggest trading partner and a big source of foreign investment.
The general review of the Japanese comparative soft attitude
towards China seems aimed at increasing bilateral trade and
cooperation, to ensure that China remains an important source
of Japans energy supplies, and also an important market for
Japanese goods. It also aims at to avoid Chinese isolation and
preserve and maintain peace in North East Asia
3
.
Although Japan harboured some concerns about the increasing
military buildup in China, the relations between the two
countries continued growing but all that got a serious set back
when China, despite its assurances tested a nuclear device in
May 1995. Japan was naturally shocked, because China had
signed the extension agreement of non-proliferation treaty.
There was also an outrage from the survivors of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki to stop loans to China. This was taken by China
as an intervention in its internal affairs
4
. August 1995 saw an
imposition of ban of Japanese grant to China. Finally in July
1996, China declared moratorium on nuclear testing and
signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Japanese aid to
China was thus restored in September, the same year.
The approval of the new defense guidelines by Japan in 1997,
further soared the relations between Japan and China, because
this allowed Japan to project power beyond its shores. It
further indicated that Japan and the United States will
cooperate, even if a military confrontation occurs, that does not
involve Japan directly. China took these assertions as the
policy of containment. In April 2005 Beijing and Tokyo sparred
over Japans approval of little used nationalist history text
books, which Beijing said gloss over wartime atrocities.
Chinese Activities in Waters Around Japan
The activities of Chinese marine research vessels in Japans
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) without prior approval by the
Japanese government and intelligence collecting activities by
Chinese naval vessels have become more frequent in recent
years
5
. In July 2000, the four tank landing ships and two patrol
crafts conducted activities in waters, 470km North West of the
main island of Okinawa
6
. It was the first time that activities by
Chinese tank landing ships in this area of sea were confirmed.
China is thought to have conducted training activities for
marine transport to remote areas. The deployment of tank
landing ships in the high seas may also be regarded as an
activity aimed at power projection to the main island of
Taiwan and Spartly Islands. By deploying tank landing ships
in the high sea in addition to warships, China can be said to be
repeatedly projecting its military capability vis--vis remote
places and sea areas.
According to a report published by Taiwans United Daily
News, more than 300 instances of sovereignty infringements
by China were observed in the Spartly Islands region in the
year 2000, including illegal fishing and oil exploration
7
. These
activities indicate Chinas strong interest in securing its
maritime interests.
The availability of secure sea-lanes in Asia-Pacific waters is
important for countries that are heavily depended on
international trade. Japan imports most of its crude oil from
Persian Gulf region through the Malacca strait and bulk of
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) consumed in Japan is produced
in the countries comprising Insular South East Asia. Therefore
the deterioration of sea lane security in and around the
Malacca Strait is a matter of grave concern for Japan.
According to a report published by the Washington Times,
China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes
from the Middle East to the South China sea in ways that
suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect Chinas
energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives
8
.
The string of pearls strategy, as the report calls Chinas move,
includes a new naval base under construction at the Pakistani
port of Gawadar, naval bases in Myanmar, a military
agreement with Cambodia, strengthening ties with Bangladesh
and an ambitious plan under consideration to build a 20
billion-dollars canal in Thailand to bypass the strait of
Malacca
9
. The report said, China by militarily controlling oil
shipping sea lanes, could threaten ships, thereby creating a
climate of uncertainty about the safety of all ships on the high
seas
10
. As regards the navy, China is believed to have signed a
contract with Russia to purchase two additional destroyers of
the same type, equipped with cutting edge weapon system
11
. It
is also reported that China has launched two destroys of a new
type that are equipped with a phased-array radar system
12
.
Chinas sovernnyy class destroyers are equipped with 9k-90
Uragan surface-to-air missile system (SAM-7) and two 130 mm
rapid-gun systems, in addition to eight 3m-80 Mosquito anti-
ship missiles (SS-N22) that fly at Mach 2 or over
13
.
During the past few years, Chinas air power has grown with
the rapid deployment of Su-27 and Su-30 mkk fighters. In
addition, China in September 2003, conducted test flight of a
fighter aircraft conamed Super 7/fc-1 This is an all weather,
single seater fighter aircraft capable not only of air-to-air
combat but also of air-to-ground mission
14
. It also appears that
a newer fighter aircraft J-10 is under developement
15
.
Chinese Missiles
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including
ballistic missiles, has become one of the main global issues of
the post-Cold War era. The strengthening of Chinas nuclear
and ballistic missile capability is continuing if at a slow pace.
China test launched in August 1999 an ICBM (Inter Continental
Ballistic Missile) Called Dong Feng-31 (DF-31) that has a
maximum range of about 8,000 Kilometers. It is a mobile ICBM
that uses solid fuel to enhance its rapid-launch capability.
China is developing another ICBM called the Deng Feng-41
(DF-41), which is believed to have a rang of about 12,000
kilometers
16
. China is alleged to have several types of short and
medium range ballistic missiles currently under development.
The dangers of Chinese ballistic missiles for Japan are closely
linked to Chinas seemingly expansionist tendencies.
Regardless of Chinas actual intensions, whenever Japan-China
territorial issues surrounding Senkaku Islands receive attention
or China-Taiwan relations become strained, the mere existence
of such missiles can exert significant psychological pressure on
Japan. Such capability is one of the factors on which China
makes high-profile assertions on territorial issues involving
Japan. Backed by growing military might, China has been
expanding its sphere of influence in the Ocean waters off its
shores. Chinas activities in the South China Sea and East
China Sea have grown increasingly bold, as evidenced by its
strengthened effective control over the Spartly islands and
expanded development of oil resources in the East China sea
17
.
While the world watches Chinas rapid rise towards super
power status with awe. Japan, Chinas old enemy, watches
with foreboding. Japans latest defense review for the first time
named China, along with North Korea, as a potential threat.
The defense review in form of a set of guidelines, approved by
the cabinet in December 2004, said China, which has a great
impact on security in this region, is pushing ahead with
enhancing its nuclear and missile capabilities in modernizing
its navy and air force while expanding marine activities
18
.
When asked whether China will translate its growing
economic power into political power and use it against
Japanese interests in the region, Professor Zhangli Lee of
Chinas Sichuan University said, The upward trend of
economic development in China would, no doubt, bolster its
defense capability and security arrangements, and in that
perspective it would be hard to really avoid an increasing
likelihood of a large-scale fierce conflict, if not a military one.
Moreover, an assured Japan-U.S. security relationship will
provoke the firm response from Beijing, he added
19
.
The fact is that Chinas rapid rise towards superpower status is
a matter of quite concern for Japan. While it is almost
inconceivable that Japan and China would ever fight again,
reason being their economic interdependence, but their
relations are deteriorating. Political tensions, territorial
rivalries, competition over energy resources and Chinas
military buildup provide the ingredients for a 21
st
century Cold
War.
Russia
According to Blair Ruble of Woodrow Wilson center,
Washington D.C. the post-Cold War Japan-Russia relations are
one of the most complex and least understood major issues
20
.
Actually the claims, counter claims and refutation of claims of
propriety by the two countries over the Northern Territories of
four islands off Hokkaido has not brought about any
improvement in relations between Russia and Japan in the
post-Cold War era.
The issue of Northern Territories has prevented the two
countries to sign a peace treaty for World War II, to end the
hostilities and has proved a small bone in the throat of Japan-
Russia relations
21.
The border between Japan and Russia was
established in 1855 with the signing of Shimoda treaty. Under
the treaty the issue of ownership of Sakhalin was left
undecided. Another treaty was signed between the two
countries in 1875 in St. Petersburg, by which Russia
surrendered to Japan the Russian part of Kuril Islands, in
exchange for Japan giving up its claim to Sakhalin
22
.
In September 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan
and occupied the Kuril Islands and Northern Territories. The
Northern Territories are actually part of Kuril Islands, which
stretch from the north of Hokkaido to the southern tip of
Kamehatka Peninsula. When negotiations were held in 1956 to
restore diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet-
Union the issue of Northern Territories was also raised
23
.
During the negotiations the Soviet Union promised to return
Shikotan and Habomai islands to Japan. Japan also agreed to
this two-island solution
24
. At that stage U.S. warned Japan that
if it did not persist its claim to two other islands i.e. Itorufa and
Kunashiri, the U.S. would not see any reason to return
Okinawa to Japan
25
. Thus the deadlock remained. The relations
between Japan and Russia further deteriorated when in 1960
Japan and the United States revised the Security Treaty of 1951.
During the Cold War period, attempting to discourage Tokyo
from closer trilateral alignment with Beijing and Washington,
the Soviet issued numerous threats to Japan and deployed
amphibious troops to the Kurile Islands. After Japan signed the
Friendship Treaty with China in 1978, the Soviets stepped up
pressure in a variety of ways
26
. They boosted amphibious troop
strength in the Kuriles, extending the buildup to another island
(Shikotan). The Soviets increased the number of SS-20 tactical
nuclear missile launchers deployed in Siberia
27
. They enhanced
the visibility of their fleet by doubling the number of transits
through Sea of Japan straits over the 1976-88 period. In 1985
the Soviets held an amphibious landing exercise that
stimulated an attack on Japans Hokkaido Island
28
.
The situation has changed significantly in the post-Cold War
period in which Russia does not have the military capabilities
to directly challenge the military power of U.S.-Japan alliance.
However, the issue of Northern Territories remains a major
problem between Japan and Russia, even in the post-Cold War
era. Although there have been quite a few efforts during this
period for normalization of relations between the two
countries, they have not been able to break the impasse on this
issue. In fact the domestic public concerns are a great hurdle in
its solution. In public circles the threat perception and
historical mistrust still dominate the debate in Japan towards
Russia. The mode of tactics adopted by the Russian President
Vladimir Putin has also not been encouraging towards the
solution of the problem
29
.
Compared to Russias relations with other North East Asian
countries like China and North Korea, no outstanding
development has recently taken place vis--vis Japan. This is
also due to the perception that as a U.S. allay, Japan is fully
behind the United States with regards to the missiles defense
issue. It was only recently that a Russian Defense Ministry
news paper, strongly criticized Japans participation in the U.S.
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) plan. It states that Japans
involvement in the TMD plan lends a hand to U.S. hegemony
and will trigger a global arms race
30
.
Strengthening economic ties with North East Asian countries,
especially Japan is crucial for Russian economy, particularly
the economic development of Siberia and Russian Far East. The
reality, however, is that the Northern Territories issue. Stands
in the way of negotiations and the prospect for expansion of
the economic relationship remains weak.
North Korea
North Koreas declaration of withdrawal from the Treaty on
the Non Proliferation Weapons (NPT) in January 2003,
reignited the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, posing a
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat to Japan. A
solution is being sought through multilateral, six party talks,
which is different from what happened during the crises of
1993-94, when a solution was sought through bilateral talks
between the United Stats and North Korea.
For North Korea, the current situation is different from that of
1993-94. There are two areas in which the situation has grown
more favorable to North Korea since 1994. First, it had made
progress in the development of nuclear weapons. Under
Agreed Framework, central components of its nuclear
program, the production, extraction, and accumulation of
plutonium were frozen. However, as the freeze did not cover
the development of a detonator, the miniaturization of war
heads (or nuclear devices), and the development of delivery
means, it is believed that North Korea has continued work on
these projects even after 1994
31
. Were North Korea to make
progress on the miniaturization of warheads, in particular, this
would have serious ramifications because it means these could
be mounted on ballistic missiles.
In addition to already undertaken Plutonium-based nuclear
development, North Korea is pressing ahead with
development of enriched uranium based nuclear weapons. If
North Korea proceeds with a Uranium enrichment program at
its current pace, the plant could become fully operational as
early as the middle of the decade, and it could produce two or
more nuclear weapons a year there after
32
.
Second, North Korea has made progress in developing long-
range ballistic missiles that can be used as a delivery vehicle. In
the second half of the 1990s, it began deploying No Dong
missiles with a range of 1,300 Kilometers. At present, it has
deployed about 175 to 200 No Dong missiles capable of
covering almost the entire territory of Japan
33
. It is believed that
No Dong missiles are designed to accommodate nuclear
warheads, conventional warheads, cluster bombs, and
chemical war heads
34
. North Korea is thought to have several
facilities capable of producing agents for chemical weapons
and to be in possession of a considerable amount of them. It
appears that there are also some production bases for
biological weapons
35
.
North Korea has also made and deployed ballistic missiles
such as scud-B and scud-C. In addition to this, research and
development is probably being conducted towards developing
missiles with longer ranges. The Taepo Dong-I, which is
considered to be the base of the ballistic missile launched in
August 1998, has a range of more than 1,500 kilometers. The
Taepo Dong-II reportedly has a range of between 3,500 and
6,000 kilometers
36
.
Japanese policy makers have long identified North Koreas
military capabilities as a potential cause of instability in North
East Asia, and the perceived threat from North Korea was
highlighted by its withdrawal from Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) in 1993. Despite their consensus over North Korea being
a potential threat to the security, the Japanese policy makers
have not reached a consensus amongst them over the exact
type of threat posed or the extent to which the threat is a
nuclear one.
The greatest fear of the Japanese defense planners is North
Korean acquisition of a credible nuclear strike force, by
combining its Taepodong-I missile with a nuclear warhead. As
it is difficult to spot No Dong missiles mounted on mobile
launchers before they are launched, a preemptive strike cannot
be effective. Because Japan and the United States are not
capable of defending against No Dong missiles deployed by
North Korea, Tokyo, like Seoul is being held hostage militarily,
heightening Japans vulnerability.
The Japanese policy makers also seriously evaluate the
possibility of North Korea attacking Japan with high-explosive
or chemically-armed missiles. As of November 9, 2003, 157
countries had signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) that aims to eliminate chemical weapons.
North Korea is the only country in East Asia that is not party to
the CWC. On the contrary, North Korea has developed and
possesses chemical weapons
37
.
The physical and psychological vulnerability of Japan to
chemical attacks, has been shown by the sarin gas attack
incidence in Tokyo subway in March 1995 and the threat of
launch of chemical and conventional warheads would be likely
to produce far greater panic amongst the population of
Japanese cities. Hence, Japans strongest perception of the
North Korean military threat is that of a chemical missile attack
and the subsequent domestic chaos that it would produce.
South Korea
The existence of acrimonious relations between Japan and its
immediate neighbour South Korea is a familiar theme in the
literature on mutual relations of both the countries. Kenneth
Pyle notes the lingering South Korean wariness of Japans
domination of the region
38
. William Nester, notes the history of
anti-Japanese feelings in South Korea, starting with the former
President Rhee Syng-man in the immediate aftermath of the
Second World War. Nester states that bilateral relations are
characterized by deep mutual antipathy where by Koreans
are intensely anti-Japanese and well remember Japans brutal
colonization efforts to destroy the national identity
39
.
This difficult relationship defined through lack of mutual
trust towards one another, took shape in 1965, when
diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea were
established. In the absence of diplomatic relations, trade ties
continued between Tokyo and Seoul between 1945 and 1965.
While economic relations between both countries continued to
flourish throughout the Cold War period, political relations
between them continued to remain strained most of the time.
Bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea became
strained in 2001. The South Korean people were critical about
the Japanese history textbook issue and the visit to Yasukuni
Shrine by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, claiming that they
indicated Japans lack of repentance about past militarism
40
.
In response to the history textbook issue, South Korea
suspended defense exchanges. Although President Kim and
Prime Minister Koizumi met in October and reaffirmed their
policy to address the issues in cooperative manner, a sense of
dissatisfaction remained among the South Korean people with
regard to Japan and a shift was seen from the friendly
atmosphere that had been built during the previous summit
meetings.
As far Takeshima/Dokdo, the disputed island is already under
defacto South Korean control, while Japan has consistently
held the position that, in light of the historical facts, as well as
the rules and principles of international law, Takeshima is an
integral part of Japan, and will take a course of continued and
persistent dialogue with South Korea on this issue
41
.
Though the mutual skepticism remains between Japan and
South Korea, one must not surrender the hopes for a better
relationship between them, nor are the bilateral relations as
solely acrimonious.
Conclusion
There are various unresolved issues, remnants of the Cold
War, that remain in the neighbouring areas of Japan, including
the issues of Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. North Korea and
china continue to increase the number of ballistic missiles, with
Japan within their ranges. Along with their possession of
weapons of mass destruction, these states are considerable
security threats for Japan. Russias military capabilities,
although waning, are still formidable and Japan has made no
substantial rapprochement with that country. The continuing
dispute over four small islands known in Japan as the
Northern Territories has been a stumbling block to closer
relations. All this suggest that in post Cold-War world, Japan
still faces serious threats from North-Korea and potentially
from China and at the same time an important threat, the risk
of attack of ballistic missiles possibly armed with weapons of
mass destruction has come to the fore.
1
William R. Nester, Japan and the Third World: Pattern, Power, and Prospect,
Macmillan, London, 1992, pp. 101-102.
2
Bert Edstorm, Japans Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to
Miyazawa, Macmillan Press, London, 1999, p.148.
3
Qingxin Ken Wang, Recent Japanese Economic Diplomacy in China: Political
Alignment in the Changing World Order, Asian Survey, Volume XXXIII, No. 6,
June 1993, p. 632.
4
Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook, Hong Kong, 1990, p.145.
5
East Asian Strategic Review 2002, The National Institute for Defense Studies,
Tokyo, p.213.
6
Ibid.
7
The United Daily News, Taiwan, 11.2.2001.
8
Quoted in Daily Japan Times, Tokyo, 4.12.2004.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
East Asian Strategic Review 2004, op.cit, p.118.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid, p.67.
17
East Asian Strategic Review, 1995, op.cit, p.36.
18
The Japan Times, Tokyo, 12.12.2004.
19
Interview with Professor Zhangli Lee, Director, Centre South Asia-West China
Co-operation, Sichuan University, Peoples Republic of China on 27.07.2005.
20
Quoted in Lutfullah Mangi, Northern Territories: The Unresolved Dispute
Between Japan and Russia, Pakistan Horizon, Volume 55, No. 3, The Pakistan
Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, July 2002, p.62.
21
Constain Sarkisov, quoted in Kimura Hiroshi, Positive Sum Solution to the
Territorial Dispute, Japan Echo, Tokyo, Volume XIX, No.4, Winter 1992, p.31.
22
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese
Relations: Between War and Peace 1667 1985, University of California, Berkley,
1998, p.8.
23
Wada Haruki, Rethinking the Russo Japanese Territorial Dispute, quoted in
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, op.cit, p.28.
24
Gregory Clark, The Long View on the Kuriles, The Japan Times, Tokyo, 24
March 2001.
25
Ibid.
26
Derek Da Chunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific, Lynne Rienner, Boulder,
1990, p.94.
27
Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka (eds.), The Soviet Military Buildup:
Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security, Auburn House, Dover, 1986, p.133.
28
Derek Da Chunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific, op.cit, p.96.
29
Kimura Hiroshi, Islands Apart, Look Japan, Volume 46, No 539, February
2001, p.7.
30
31
32
Ibid, p.16.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
36
Ibid.
37
East Asian Strategic Review 2004, op.cit, p. 232.
38
Quoted in, Taku Tamaki, Taking the taken for-granted ness seriously:
Problematizing Japans Perception of Japan-South Korea Relations, International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 4, 2004, Tokyo, p.151.
39
Ibid.
40
41
Diplomatic Blue Book 2000, op.cit, p.39.
PAKISTAN VIETNAM POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS
Altaf Hussain Ansari

Abstract
his research article entitled Pakistan
_
Vietnam
Political, Economic and Trade Relations is written
with the purpose to see the political, economic and
trade relations in between the two countries. Pakistan and
Vietnam have been relatively at low level and inconsistent,
with the result that sustainable trade has not been able to grow
over time. Pakistans trade was strongly western oriented;
while it did not have comparable market access vis--vis South
East Asian countries. In this regard, the data is collected from
various secondary and tertiary sources. This research article is
structured with eight sections. The first section is initiated with
the introduction, the second mentions the political relations,
the third section states economic relations, the fourth
elaborates the need for potentiality in Pak-Vietnam trade, the
fifth explores PakistanVietnam balance of trade, the sixth
describes import by Pakistan, the seventh shows overview of
Vietnam and Pakistan and the finally it ends with the eighth
section which demonstrates the conclusion and suggestions.

Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia,
University of Sindh, Jamshoro.
Introduction
Pakistans relations with Vietnam have continued to grow in
strength over the years. Both countries have agreed to boost
their political, economic and trade relations during a 3 day
official visit by the President of Vietnam Tran Duc Louong
President Lounong visited Pakistan from March 24 to 27, 2006
at the invitation of President General Pervaiz Musharaf.
During the talk, the two sides informed each other of their
respective countrys political and economic situation and
agreed to further promote the friendship and cooperation
between the government and peoples of the two countries.
1
Pakistan Vietnam also had in depth exchange of views on
measures to strengthen and enhance bilateral relations as well
as on other regional and international issues of mutual
concern. The talks took place in an atmosphere of cordiality
and mutual understanding.
2
Leaders of Pakistan congratulated
the important achievements made by the people of Vietnam in
the course of renovation and expansion of international
cooperation. President of Pakistan expressed his strong
confidence that the people of Vietnam would continue to reap
yet greater achievements in the cause of building and
developing a prosperous country actively contributing to
peace, stability, cooperation and development in the region
and the world.
3
The government of Pakistan welcomed the
decision of the Vietnamese government to reopen its Resident
Embassy in Islamabad. Pakistan desires to build mutually
beneficial links with the process of regional cooperation in
South East Asia.
4
According to the President of Vietnam the achievements made
by the people of Pakistan in the political, economic and social
spheres and expressed his high appreciation for Pakistans
active contribution to the process of peace, stability and
cooperation in South Asia. Vietnam government wished the
Pakistani people ever greater success in their cause of building
a peaceful and prosperous country that contributes to peace,
security, stability and prosperity in the region and the world at
large. The two sides highly valued the visits between the two
countries which lay a firm foundation for the enhancement of
friendship and bilateral cooperation in many areas. They
agreed that both sides should exchange more delegations at
various levels and promote existing mechanism for
cooperation to develop bilateral relations in the fields of
economy, investment and trade commensurate with the
potential of the two countries.
5
Political Relations
Pakistan is pursuing an "oriental-oriented" policy which gives
Vietnam an important position. Vietnam and Pakistan are
enjoying fine development of political relations, which was
marked with a recent exchange of high-level visits and the
signing of a number of key agreements. Pakistan strongly
supported Vietnam in its past struggle for national
independence and is continuing to do so for the Southeast
Asian nation in international forums and Vietnam also helped
to the Pakistan on various forums.
6
Economic Relations
The Vietnam government however pushed for bilateral
stronger economic ties, which remained modest despite a
growth of more than five times in two-way trade revenues
over the past five years to US$ 75 million currently in 2005-06.
However, even this trade is much below the real potential and
did not reflect the warmth in the diplomatic and economic
relations. The Vietnam government policy of openness and
industrialization had opened up new opportunities for
Vietnam to make full use of its comparative advantages.
7
Due
to pursuance of these policies, the total export volume surged
from $26 billion in 2004 to $32.2 billion of Vietnam in 2006 and
Pakistan surged US$14.391 billion in 2005. [Economic Survey,
2005-06. p.75] Pakistan and Vietnam were the two fastest
growing economies of Asia, underscores great potential for
imports from each other and there is great potential for
bilateral and economic cooperation in between the two
countries.
8
Need for Potentiality in Pak-Vietnam Trade
According to Pakistans statistics, the bilateral balance of trade
in 2002 was US$17.12 million, up by 0.25%, of which Pakistan
exported US$22.989 million and imported US$5.870 million. In
1997-98 the bilateral balance of trade was US$ 6.28 and total
exports of Pakistan were US$8627.663 and share in total export
was 0.14%. Similarly total imports of Pakistan were
US$10118.021 and share in total imports was 0.03%. Statistics
from Vietnam indicated that Pakistan was the small trading
partner, but its export was more and import was less with
Vietnam during the period from 1997-98 to 2001-2002.
9
The
evidence is given in the following table -1.
Table 1: Pak-Vietnam Balance of Trade
(Million US$)
Source: Government of Pakistan (2003) Export Promotion
Bureau, Karachi.
Exports from Pakistan to Vietnam
The items exported from Pakistan are: textile yarn and fabrics,
articles surgical of apparel and cloth accessories, raw cotton,
rice, lubricating petroleum oil, sugar- cane refined , leather and
leather manufactures, fertilizer manufactured cotton
(American staple) , fish and fish preparation and others.
Table-2: Exports from Pakistan to Vietnam
Pakistan Major Exports
Major Exporting Items 1999-00 2000-2002
Textile Yarn & fabrics 7.730 11.670
Cotton American (staple) 0.470 1.070
Fertilizer manufactured - 2.850
Leather & leather manufactures 0.220 3.030
Fish & fish preparation 0.090 2.220
Bureau, Karachi.
Year Export Import
Balance
Trade
Total
Exports of
Pakistan
% Share in
Total Export
Total
Imports of
Pakistan
%Share in
Total
Imports
1997-98 12.35 3.021 6.28 8627.663 0.14 10118.021 0.03
1998-99 3.497 4.378 088 7779.285 0.04 9431.656 0.05
1999-00 9.566 5.172 4.39 8568.599 0.11 10309.425 0.05
2000-01 20.06 7.820 12.24 9201.595 0.22 10728.918 0.07
2001-02 22.98 5.870 17.12 9202.218 0.25 10342.865 0.06
Figure 1: Exports from Pakistan to Vietnam
Major Export Items
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
T
e
x
t
i
l
e
Y
a
r
n
&
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e
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o
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Commodities
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
U
S
$
1999-00
2000-2002
Bureau, Karachi.
Imports by Pakistan
Pakistan wants to expand its imports from Vietnam like,
vegetables of pepper and dry anise flower and fruits, tea
pepper black, cork and wood, sodium sulphide, organic
chemical, crude rubber including synthetic and other. Pakistan
had imported Vietnam's green tea which has become popular
in the country.
Table-3: Imports from Vietnam to Pakistan
Pakistan Major Import items
Major Importing Items 1999-00 2000--2002
Tea 4.440 6.870
Organic Chemicals 0.500 0.270
Crude Rubber Including Synthetic 0.070 -
Source: Government of Pakistan (2003( Export Promotion
Bureau, Karachi.
Figure 2: Imports from Vietnam to Pakistan
Pakistan Major Import Items
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Tea Organic Chemicals Crude Rubber Including
Synthetic
Commodities
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
U
S
$
1999-00
2000--2002
Bureau, Karachi.
Overview of Vietnam and Pakistan
Vietnam got independence on September 2, 1945. Its area is
331,114 sq. km.; equivalent in size to Ohio, Kentucky, and
Tennessee combined. Its main cities are Capital--Hanoi 2.842
million, other cites --Ho Chi Minh, city formerly Saigon; 5.378
million, Hai Phong 1.711 million, Da Nang 715,000 and the
climate of Vietnams is tropical monsoon. The population was
83.1 million and its annual growth rate was 1.33% in 2005. The
ethnic groups of Vietnamese are 85% to 90%, Chinese 3%,
Hmong, Thai, Khmer, Cham, mountain groups. It is good thing
that there is good literacy rate which was 90.3% that was more
than Pakistan in 2004. The GDP of Vietnam was US$53.1 billion
and its real growth rate was 8.4% but its inflation rate was 8.4%
and external debt was also US$17.2 billion in 2005. The natural
resources are coal, crude oil, zinc, copper, silver, gold,
manganese and iron. The agriculture and forestry shares 20.9%
of GDP, and its principal products are rice, maize, sweet
potato, peanut, soya bean, cotton, coffee, cashews and its
cultivated land was 12.2 million hectares. Land use-21% arable;
28% forest and woodland; 51% other in the year 2005.
10
Industry and construction made share 41% of GDP and its
principal types are mining and quarrying, manufacturing,
electricity, gas, water supply, cement, phosphate, and steel in
2005. The service sector shares 38.1% of GDP and its principal
types are wholesale and retail repair of vehicles and personal
goods, hotel and restaurant, transport storage,
telecommunications, tourism, in 2005.
11
Vietnam is even smaller than Balochistan but its trade is more,
its exports are US$32.23 billion and principal exports are
garments/textiles, crude oil, footwear, rice just as second-
largest exporter in world, sea products, coffee, rubber,
handicrafts. Major export partners are U.S., EU, Japan, China,
Singapore, Australia, Taiwan, and Germany. Imports are
$36.88 billion. The principal imports are-machinery, oil and
gas, garment materials, iron and steel, transport-related
equipment. The major import partners are China, Japan,
Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Thailand.
Exports to U.S were U$6.5 billion and imports from U.S.
US$1.19 billion during the year 2005.
12
Pakistan appeared on the world map on 14
th
August 1947 and
its national day is celebrated every year on 23
rd
March from
1956 (Pakistan day). Its area is 796,096 sq.km and its climate
remains mostly hot, dry, and temperate in North West, Arctic
in north. Its natural resources are: gas reserves, limited
petroleum, five hundred billion worth coal reserves in Thar,
iron, copper, salt, and limestone. According to UN Pakistans
population was 154 million in 2005 and its population growth
rate is 2.0% per year. Pakistan comprises of four major ethnic
groups viz: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun, and Baloch. From
religious point of view Muslims are 97%; Christians, Hindus
and others are 3%. According to language point of view
Punjabis 48%, Sindhis 12%, Siraiki 10%, Pashtu 8%, Urdu 8%,
Balochi 3%, Hindko 2%, Brahvi 1%, English, Burushaski and
others are 8%. Pakistan is primarily an agriculture country and
its main exports are textile products, rice, cotton, leather goods.
Its GDP was US$ 78 billion, per capita income was near to
US$ 842, GDP growth rate remained 6.6% and foreign
exchange reserves were US$ 13 billion in the year 2006-07.
Pakistans exports are less as compared to imports. In 2004-05
its exports were US$ 14.391 million and its import was US$
20.598 million. Pakistan got a few markets among from them
are major markets, USA , EU, Middle East, Japan and its small
partner Vietnam.
13
In Pakistan inflation was 6.6% and
unemployment was 3,72 millions. Its foreign debt was US$
36.5 billion by end-March 2006 and it got economic aid from
donor countries near about US$ 2400 million. [Economic
Survey 2005-06]
Trade matters of Pakistan
Globally trade matters more than ever before in a highly
incorporated world today. Countries that have intensified
their links with the global economy through trade and
investment have usually grown more rapidly over a sustained
period and have consequently experienced larger reduction in
poverty. Pakistans foreign trade sector is being affected both
by structural and cyclical factors.
14
On the domestic side, four
years of strong economic growth strengthening domestic
demand and triggering a resulting pick up in investment
expenditure, has led to a massive flow in imports. On the
external side, the world economy continues its power and
broad -based expansion with growth reaching close to 5% in
2006 with similar expansion projected for the next year- which
will be the fifth successive year that the world economy has
grown by more than 4.0% per year.
15
A strong and
geographically broad -based growth has helped world trade to
expand strongly and at the same time the rapid expansion of
global trade has been a key driving force for growth in almost
every part of the world. Like many other developing countries,
Pakistan and Vietnam have also benefited from a strong and
sustained growth in world economy. Pakistans exports grew
at an average rate of 16.45% per annum over the last four
years.
16
Notwithstanding global economic expansion, the
sound macroeconomic policies that Pakistan pursued coupled
with wide - ranging structural reforms, particularly in the areas
of trade and tariff that it implemented over the last six or seven
years have helped Pakistan doubled its exports in seven years
and increased its trade-to-GDP ratio from close to 26 percent in
1999-2000 to estimated 34 percent in 2005-06.
17
The evidence is
given in the following Table-4
Table 4: Pakistans Export Trade-to-GDP
Year Ratio Percentage
1999-02 25.8
2000-01 28.0
2001-02 27.2
2002-03 28.4
2003-04 29.0
2004-5 31.6
2005-06 34.0
Source: Government of Pakistan (2005-06) Economic Survey,
Finance Division, Economic Advisors Wing,
Islamabad, pp.127
Pakistan Export Trade-to-GDP
0
10
20
30
40
1999-02
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03 2003-04
2004-5
2005-06
Source: Government of Pakistan (2005-06) Economic Survey,
Finance Division, Economic Advisors Wing,
Islamabad, pp.127
Conclusions / Suggestions
It is concluded that Pak-Vietnam government agreed to
promote the political, economic and trade relations and
government of Pakistan also welcomed the decision of the
Vietnam government to reopen its embassy in Islamabad. The
visits between Pak-Vietnam lay a firm foundation for the
enhancement of bilateral cooperation in various sectors. It is
also noted that Pakistan government strongly supported
Vietnam in its past struggle for national independence. The
trade between Vietnam and Pakistan has increased but still
there is a room for development because with an annual
growth rate of 25% to 30%, with the volume of bilateral trade
rising from $12.35 million in 1997-98 to US$ 22.98 million in
2001 and 75 million in 2005. US$32.2 million in 2006. Similarly
the bilateral balance of trade in 2002 was US$ 17.12 million and
it went up by 25%, of which Pakistan exported US$ 22.989
million and imported US$ 5.870 million. It is a good indication
that the balance was in favor of Pakistan as compared to
Vietnam. Pakistan mainly exports textile yarn and fabrics,
articles surgical of apparel, cloth, raw cotton, rice, lubricating
petroleum oil, sugar-cane refined, leather commodities,
fertilizer, fish etc. Pakistan mainly imports from Vietnam
vegetable of pepper and black cork wood, sodium sulphide,
organic chemical, crude rubber including synthetic and green
tea. The government of Pakistan must take efforts to increase
the export of value added commodities and motivate the
Vietnam government to invest in Pakistan through foreign
direct investment and portfolio.
1
Vietnam, US Business Fear may not get Vietnam WTO Benefits, Daily Times,
November 11, 2006.
2
Humayun Khan, Pakistan - Vietnam agree to enhance Trade and Economic
Cooperation with Pakistan Times Business & Commerce Desk, Trade and
Economic Cooperation, Islamabad. 2006, p.7
3
Government of Pakistan, Pakistan - Vietnam sign agreement for visa exemption
for diplomatic, official passport holders, Diplomatic and Official Passport holders,
Associated Press of Pakistan, 2006.
4
Vietnam Trade Promotion Agency, Seminar Fosters Vietnam-Pakistan Trade
Relations, (9/8) Wednesday 7/18/2007, HANOI A Seminar was held in Hanoi
On Tuesday To Promote Trade And Investment Co-Operation Between Vietnam &
Pakistan. Vietnam News, 2007.
5
Government of Pakistan, Pakistan, Vietnam to increase Political, Economic, and
Trade Cooperation, Seminar held in Islamabad, 2006.
6
Do Nhu Dinh, The Vietnam - Pakistan Business Seminar held on September 5
in Hanoi, Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Trade, Vietnam and Pakistan are
developing strongly with two-way trade 9/8/2006 10:19:44 AM
7
Pakistan Seeks Vietnam's Help in Relations with ASEAN, The News, July 18,
2007, pp.4-5
8
Habib Ur Rahman, Pakistan has anticipated Viet Nam's role in bringing it closer
to ASEAN, Ambassador of Pakistan, Oriental policy which gives Vietnam an
important position, 2005.
9
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, Vietnam Delegation visited
Ministry of Commerce News and Press Releases Complete Story Page Published,
February 11, 2006: PRO to CM
10
Government of Vietnam, Development and to Promoting External Relations
with Pakistan, Dawn, July 18, 2007
11
Government of Vietnam, Excerpt from Agriculture, Food and Nutrition in Four
South Pacific Archipelagos: New Caledonia, Vanuatu, French Polynesia. Wallis
and Futuna, CGPRT Centre, 2005.
12
Tran Duc Luong, Pakistans Relations with Vietnam have continued to grow in
strength over the years. Special Edition, Hand Book, 2004, pp. 2-5
13
Government of Pakistan, Sign Four Agreements by the President of Pakistan
and President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Hand Book of Joint statement,
24-27 March 2004.
14
Tran Duc Luong, Businessmen of Pakistan and Vietnam jointly established
Business Forum. The News, February 14, 2004, Islamabad.
15
Mr. Le Cong Phung, Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam visited Pakistan,
from 10-20 March 2004 to make preparations for the first ever visit of the President
of Vietnam to Pakistan, 2004.
16
Government of Pakistan, Balance of Trade, Finance Division, Economic
Advisors Wing, Islamabad. 2005, pp. 122- 23.
17
Government of Pakistan, Export and Import, Federal Bureau of Statistic,
Islamabad, Pakistan, 2006, p 34.
AN OVERVIEW OF EDUCATION AND
TRAINING MODEL OF JAPAN
Jamila Jarwar
Abstract:
apanese education and training from establishment to
maintenance is responsibility of local Government
Board. The Education and training system of Japan is
based upon the personality development with reference to
body and mind of the living souls, who are experiencing rapid
growth in science technology and economic development with
social changes. This paper is broadly covering the education
system, curriculum development, teachers education and
examinations and financing including issues and remedies.
Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia, University
of Sindh, Jamshoro
Japan consists of nearly 4,000 large and small islands,
stretching along the northeastern coast of the Asian continent,
the longest span being 3,000 kilometers. The total area is
378,000 square kilometres (145,945 square miles), only one-fifth
of which can be inhabited.
Administratively, Japan is divided into 47 Ken (prefectures)
and further subdivided into 3,256 Shi / Cho / Son
(municipalities). The 1947 Local Autonomy Law provides that
local-assembly members and heads of the prefectures and
municipalities should be elected directly by the people.
1
The establishment and maintenance of public schools and
other educational facilities is the responsibility of board of
education in each local government area, with members of the
boards appointed by the head of the local prefecture or
municipality with the consent of the local assembly.
2
Goals of Education
The goals of education in Japan are enunciated in the
Fundamental Law of Education (1947). Article one of the law
states:
Education shall aim at the full development of personality, at
rearing the people sound in mind and body, to love truth and
justice, esteem individual values, respect labour, have a deep
sense of responsibility, and are imbibed with an independent
spirit as the builders of a peaceful state and society.
3
Since the issue of this Fundamental Law of Education, the
general aims of education have periodically been cast in more
specific forms as laws and recommendations of various
councils, including the Central Council for Education, which
advise the minister of education. The most recent statement of
aims for Japanese education is the recommendations, made by
the central council for education in 1971 as the guide lines for
the reform fundamental law of education 1947 and identifies
goals suitable for Japanese youth who are citizens in a global
society that is experiencing rapid progress in science and
technology, rapid economic development, and radical social
changes.
4
The objective of education for the recommendation states the
development of personality should be to help people acquire
the abilities for building a satisfactory and spontaneous life, for
adapting to social reality, and for the creative solution of
difficulties. The Japanese people, showing tolerance for the
values of others, should realize their national identity and, on
the values of basis of the rules of democratic society and
national tradition, should contribute to the peace of the world
and to the welfare of mankind through the development of a
distinct but universal culture.
Schooling in Japan emphasizes the development of basic
abilities in young people rather than a set of specified
vocational skills, in the assumption that they should be
prepared to cope flexibly with rapid progress in science and
technology and with rapid changes in society.
Structure of the School System and Size of the Education
Effort
The educational system in prewar Japan was a multi-track
system, in which diversification of course started at the age of
12, when children left the six-year elementary school. This
system was completely changed in the postwar reform of
education.
Kindergarten
A Majority Of Children Attend Kindergarten or Nursery
School. Kindergarten is an Educational Institution under the
Jurisdiction of the ministry of education for children aged 3 to
5 years, while the nursery school is regarded as a social welfare
institution under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health and
Social Welfare for children up to 5 year old. Activities at
nursery schools for children of three years old and above are
more or less the same as those provided at kindergartens.
5
Elementary Education
At 6 years of age, children begin to attend elementary school,
which is compulsory for all. Elementary school lasts six years
and is an educational institution to provide children with basic
education relevant to their physical and mental development.
The standard number of periods for school programmes per
year is 1,015, varying from 850 periods in grade 1 to 1,015
periods in grades 4 to 6. Promotion from one grade to the next
is practically automatic. Almost all children of this age group
are enrolled and 99 percent are in public schools.
6
Secondary Education
Lower-secondary school is compulsory and lasts three years.
Promotion from elementary to lower-secondary-school is
automatic as far as public school is concerned. Only 3 percent
of children attend private school at this level. In addition to the
subject matters taught at the elementary school, prevocational
education subjects are provided at the lower-secondary school.
A foreign language is also one of the elective subjects but in
practice almost all lower-secondary schools teach English as a
foreign language. The total number of periods given at the
lower-secondary school is 1,050.
7
After compulsory schooling, three to four years of upper-
secondary school education is provided. An entrance
examination is taken and 94 percent of graduates from lower-
secondary schools enter upper-secondary school, how ever, 28
percent of upper-secondary school students are enrolled in
private institutions. Approximately 70 percent of students are
enrolled in the general education course; technical and
vocational to the general education is provided. Part-time as
well as correspondence three years for daytime courses.
8
Higher Education
After upper-secondary school, students proceed to Daigaku
(University) or Tanki-daigaku (junior college), which requires
passing an entrance examination. Students wishing to proceed
to the national and public universities take first the common
entrance examination, which is an achievement-type test, and
then the entrance examination, which comprises interviews,
essay test, and other examinations organized by each
individual university. A final decision on entrance is based on
the two tests and the upper-secondary-school report. Private
universities select their entrants by their own examination.
Daigaku or university course lasts four years except for
medical and dental courses. Tanki-daigaku or junior college
courses last two to three years. Some 75 percent of Daigaku
students and 90 percent of tanki-daigaku students are in
private establishments. In 2005, 53 percent of Daigaku students
were enrolled in social science and humanities courses and 27
percent in science and technology courses. Another type of
higher institution of learning is Kotosenmon-gakku, lasting
five years, which requires as a qualification for entry
graduation from lower-secondary school. This is mainly for
technical and vocational education.
9
Nonformal Education
In Japanese, Nonformal Education is known as social
education. Law as organized educational activities are not
provided by formal schooling. Learning courses for different
segments of society (adult schools, youth classes, womens
classes, courses for the aged, etc.) correspondence courses for
basic-skill development, courses for hobbies, and leisure-time
activities, extension courses conducted by upper-secondary
schools and universities are organized by local boards of
education. These social education programmes are under the
jurisdiction of the ministry of Education. The ministry is also in
charge of special training schools and miscellaneous schools
which are nonformal education institutions providing
technical/vocational train courses equivalent to those at the
upper-secondary and junior levels. The ministry of labour
establishes several types of institution for vocational training
and the ministry of agriculture, forestry, and fishery provides
various training opportunities in agriculture, fishermen, and
forestry, mainly for young farmers, fishermen, and forestry
workers.
There are many radio and television programmes for general
education and skill training purposes. Learning courses on
various subjects are also provided by non-governmental bodies
such as newspaper companies, broadcasting companies, and
departmental stores in large urban areas.
Opportunities for distance learning are supplied by institutions
at the upper-secondary level and the University of the Air, but
these programmes are all within the framework of formal
education.
10
Administration
At the national level, the Ministry of Education, Science, and
Culture is the principal agency, which shares responsibilities
with the cabinet and the diet for preparing budget estimates,
drafting educational legislation, and formulating educational
policies. The ministry allocates financial aids to prefectural and
municipal boards of education and assists such boards with
advice and technical guidelines for curriculum, and credit
requirements for kindergarten through higher education.
Curricular standards for elementary and secondary schools are
described in the form of courses of study issued by the
ministry. The ministry is also responsible for authorizing
textbooks in all elementary and secondary schools.
11
Each of the 47 prefectures has a board of education to
administer local education affairs. The five-member boards
administer prefectural institutions of education and social
education programmes established by the prefecture. In
addition, the prefectural boards supervise personnel matters
for public educational institutions, provide in-service training
for teachers, purchase and manage instructional materials,
promote special education activities, protect cultural assets,
and offer advice to municipal boards of education.
Each municipality maintains a three-to five-member board of
education whose major functions are to establish and manage
municipal educational institutions, administer personnel
matters in such institutions, adopt textbooks for municipal
elementary and lower-secondary schools and provide advice
and guidance to educational institutions.
12
Finance
The current system of educational administration provides for
national, prefectural, and municipal sharing in the financing of
educational activities, with funds obtained from taxes and
other revenue sources. In 1981, a total amount of 17.9 billion
yen (approximately us$77,800 million) was spent on education
reached 15 billion yen (approximately us$65,400 million),
which represents 19.6 percent of the total expenditure for
government services in Japan. A total of 15.9 billion yen (i.e.,
public and private funding) was spent on schooling, from
kindergarten to higher education, of which 28.7 percent was
from the national government, 53.7 percent from local
government, and the remaining 17.6 percent from the private
sector including parents. From this total of 15.9 billion yen, 54.1
percent was allocated to compulsory education, 18.1 percent to
upper-secondary schools, and 21.2 percent to higher
education.
13
Teacher Education
Teachers for elementary and secondary schools are trained in
higher education institutions, including university, graduate
schools, and junior colleges sanctioned by the ministry of
education. Teaching certificates prescribed by law are granted
for life by prefectural boards of education and are valid in all
prefectures. An elementary-school teaching certificate qualifies
a teacher to teach all subject matters in an elementary school,
whereas secondary-school teaching certificates authorize
teachers to teach specified subject fields only.
To obtain a post in a public elementary or secondary school, a
candidate must take a recruitment examination. The
appointment is made by the prefectural board of education on
the basis of the recommendation of the prefectural
superintendent, who usually takes into consideration the
results of the recruitment examination. The teachers in public
elementary or secondary schools are designated local public
officials. Promotion to administrative posts such as deputy
principal or principal in public schools usually requires a
candidate to pass a series of examinations for promotion and to
complete specified inservice training.
14
Curriculum Development
The school curriculum is based on the course of study
prescribed by the Ministry of Education, in which the basic
framework for curriculum at each grade level including
objectives, instructional content, and standard time allotments
are stated. The prefectural and municipal boards of education
prepare guidelines for curriculum development in the schools
and are required to organize their own detailed instructional
programmes on the basis of the courses of study and the
guidelines.
At the beginning of the 2000s, the educational programmes in
the elementary school comprised instruction in Japanese
language, social studies, arithmetic, general science, music, art
and handicrafts, physical education and home working (for
grades 5 and 6). In addition, moral education is compulsory for
one period a week in public schools and can be replaced by
religious education in private schools. Special activities are
another area of education in elementary schools, and such
programmes may contain home-room activities, childrens
assembly, club activities, sports meeting, school excursions, etc.
in the lower-secondary school, subjects are in two categories:
compulsory and elective. Japanese language, social studies,
mathematics, general science, music, fine arts, health and
physical education, prevocational /homemaking are
compulsory, and elective subjects include foreign languages,
music, fine arts, health and physical education, and
prevocational subjects and homemaking. Moral education and
special activities are also conducted in the lower-secondary
schools.
15
The school year begins in April and ends in March, and one
school year consists of three school terms. The first is from
April to July, the second from September to December, and the
third is from January to March.
The courses of study produced by the ministry of education are
formulated in the following way. The curriculum council, the
ministers advisory organ on matters of school curriculum,
prepares the basic guidelines, upon the request of the minister,
for revising a course of study. The guidelines prepared by the
council are utilized by the ministry subject matter. A course of
study is revised approximately every 10 years. Teachers
guidebooks for each grade level and subject are typically
prepared by curriculum specialists in the ministry with the
assistance of teachers who are involved in the deliberations of
the curriculum council.
The textbooks authorized by the ministry and adopted by the
local boards of education for use in schools serve as the main
instructional material in the classroom, the textbooks are
developed by commercial publishing companies and once
adopted then are distributed free of charge to children in
compulsory schooling, i.e., thorough lower-secondary school.
Examinations, Promotion, and Certification
At all levels of the school system, tests of various types and
several other sources of information are used to judge whether
students should be promoted to higher grade, should be
enrolled in a given school, or should be certified as having
completed a course, in elementary schools, the decision about
promoting pupils from one grade to the next and of graduating
them is based entirely on internally administered tests and
other measures. No external tests are given. Legally, pupils can
be required to repeat a grade if they have not attended more
than half the total number of school days in the year, if their
subject matter achievement is unsatisfactory, or if they have a
record of misbehavior. However, in practice, promotion is
automatic from grade to grade within compulsory education.
Public upper-secondary schools select their qualified entrants
on the basis of the results of the scholastic ability tests
administered by the relevant boards of education and the
reports for each applicant are submitted by the lower-
secondary schools. The system of submitted evaluation in
upper-secondary schools is almost the same as that for lower
schools. Since upper-secondary schooling is not compulsory,
students are required to repeat grades or are expelled for poor
achievement or misbehavior.
17
Entrants into universities and junior colleges are selected by
each receiving institution on the basis of a minimum of 12
years of formal schooling, of an acceptable entrance
examination score, and of a satisfactory upper-secondary
school record.
Major Issues Worth Solution
There are several problems facing Japanese education. The
population trend governing the size of the 18-year-old age
group (the age at which pupils graduate from secondary
school) is now the focus of particular concern. The range of the
increase and decrease in the size of the 18-year-old age group
will be about 300,000. Such a swing in the population causes
various problems, particularly for upper-secondary education
in urban areas and for higher education planning. At the
elementary level, however, the population has begun to decline
and this decline may be utilized for the improvement of
instructional conditions at that level. The population increase,
together with the continuing increase in technological
sophistication within the nations expand industrial complex,
will cause pressure for an expansion of higher education
enrolment. This pressure is backed by the wealth of society and
the enthusiasm of people for education. Currently the
enrolment ratio in higher education is around 38 to 39 percent,
and it is anticipated that the student population of the four-
year universities will be over 2 million by 2010 if this
enrolment ratio continues. But this figure is probably low, since
continuing pressure to raise the educational level of the
workforce to meet advanced technological requirements and
the overwhelming demand for higher education opportunities
among the population will require the proportion of an age
group in higher education institutions to increase.
Progress in science and technology and changes in the sectoral
distribution of the workforce will also require a change in
emphasis in school educational programmes. Instead of
knowledge-based instruction at school, emphasis will be on the
creativity and character development of individual children.
There appears to be a widespread belief within the Japanese
population that the present-day educational system is
producing youths exhibiting two serious short-comings.
People express astonishment at what they perceive to be young
peoples lack of basic knowledge and skills, and of a proper
attitude toward life. A variety of indicators suggests that
neither the school nor the home is teaching children a suitable
way of life. Such indicators are: less respect for elders,
increased self-centred and willful behavior, impoliteness,
capriciousness, a decline in physical strength and fitness, non-
participatory attitudes towards social affairs, and rising rates of
juvenile delinquency.
Thus, improving the quality of school education, expanding
and qualitatively developing higher education, and proving
diversified educational opportunities in and out of the formal
schooling systems are among the major tasks to be tackled by
Japanese society.
1
Japan, Ministry of Education, Basis Guidelines for the Reform of Education
Report of the Central Council for Education. Ministry of Education, Tokyo. 2002,
pp 28 35
2
Comber LC, Keeves J P., Science Education in Nineteen Countries: An Empirical
Study. Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, 1993, pp 3033
3
Teichler U., Das Dilemma der Modernen Bildungsgesellschaft: Japans
Hochschulen unter den Zwangen von Statuszuteilung. Klett, Stuttgart, 2006, pp 15
18
4
Husen T (ed.), International Study of Achievement in Mathematics: A
Comparison of Twelve Countries I-II. Wiley, New York, 1997, pp 212 - 217
5
Sato, M., The structure of teacher culture. In T. Inagaki and Y. Kudomi (Eds.),
Nihon no kyoshi bunka [The culture of teachers and teaching in Japan], (21-44)
Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. 2002, p 219
6
Shimizu, M., Kyoin yousei no saikento [Reexamination of teacher education].
Tokyo:Kyoiku Kaihatsu Kenkyujo, 2000, p 21
7
Monbusho, Waga Kuni no bunkyo shisaku [Cultural and Educational Policies of
our country]. Tokyo:Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 2000, p 14
8
Japan, Ministry of Education, Monbu Tokei Yoran {statistical report}. Monbu-
sho, Japan, 2005, p.151
9
Cummings W., Education and Equality in Japan. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1980, p.18
10
Japan, Nippon Kyoiku Nenkan {Japans Economic Development and
Education}. Monbu-sho, Tokyo, 2000, p.192
11
Shiimazu, A., Y. Okada, M. Sakamoto and M. Miura, Effects of Stress
Management Program for Teachers in Japan: A Pilot Study. Occup Health, 2003,
45 (4). p 45
12
Shimizu, k., Akao, K., Arai, A., Ito,M.,Sato,H., and Yaosaka, O., Kyoiku deeta
rando, 2002-2003: A databook of educational statistics [ Educational data land
2002-2003: A databook of educational statistics]. Tokyo:Jiji Tsushinsha, 2003,
p.226
13
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Reviews of
National Policies for Education: Japan. Oecd, Paris, 2001.
14
Teichler U. Geschichte und Struktur des Japanischen Hochschulwesens. Klett,
Stuttgar, 2005, p.201
15
Japan, Nippon khoiku Nenkan {Japans education yearbook}. Gyosei, Tokyo,
2001, p.17
SINO-U.S RELATIONS IN THE POST-9/11 ERA:
COOPERATION OR CONFLICT?
Ghulam Murtaza Khoso
Abstract
he U.S China relations experienced various phases
of confrontation, and cooperation, hostility and
partnership since the communists took over in
Peoples Republic of China. During the Cold War period when
the world was divided into two camps, China was seen upon
with enmity by the United States. Bogged down in the Vietnam
War, the tired looking U.S finally started to drift from its
hostile attitude towards China and recognized communist
regime in 1971. This American approach lasted only two
decades and immediately after the disappearance of the Soviet
Union, the U.S started to consider China, a threat to world
peace. However, the events of 9/11 brought China and U.S
close to each other but there are some conflicting signals in this
mega bilateral relationship which may bring two powers into a
direct military clash.
Lecturer, Area Study Centre, Far East & South East Asia, University of
Sindh, Jamshoro.
Introduction
The debate on relations between China and the United States
heated up yet once again when China tested Anti-Satellite
Medium Range Ballistic Missile on January 11, 2007. The test
not only was condemned by the United States officially but
received a big attention from U.S media. Pentagon presented a
report to the U.S congress on May 25, 2007 alleging Chinese
military build up moving beyond countering Taiwan to global
operations from the Middle East through Southeast Asia.
1
The
report also suggests that the test poses dangers to human space
flight and puts at risk the assets of all space faring nations.
2
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, Sino-U.S.
relations have developed by twists and turns. Tying up with
the changing postwar international situation, the development
passed through different stages each covering roughly a
decade. From the late 1940s to the late 1950s was a period of
confrontation between the two world camps. Throughout this
period, China was blockaded, besieged and looked upon with
enmity. For well-known reasons, China and the United States
met on the battlefield in Korea.
The United States did not change its policy for Peoples
Republic of China even in the next decade which experienced
significant changes in the two world camps. There was no any
fundamental change in the Sino-U.S confrontation.
Frustrated United States bogged down in the Vietnam War at
last softened its attitude towards China (Peoples Republic of)
and recognized communist regime in 1971. The relationship,
however, was made hostage by the syndromes of China
Threat, Revolutionary China and Imperial and Unilateralist
United States. It was only during the Clinton administration
when Washington called China Strategic Partner but that
term did not last for much and debates like how to contain
emerging China again started in the United States.
The dramatic events of September 11, 2001 changed these
syndromes for a while and the U.S perception of China Threat
changed or even overshadowed by the new motto of Islamic
fundamentalism. China joined international coalition against
terrorism led by the United States. The war on terror allowed
China to wage its own war on terror against separatist
movement in Xinjinag.
The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon tremendously highlighted the threat that
international terrorism poses to the United States and
President Bush declared war on terrorism.
China itself a victim of terrorism in Xinjinag where Uighur
separatists have mounted a series of bombing attacks
supported U.S war on terror. China generally shares U.S
concerns about terrorism. Chinas state centric approach to
international relations strongly opposes terrorism. When two
Chinese colonels noted that terrorism was a possible means of
asymmetric warfare against the United States, Chinese
military officers and analysts roundly condemned the
suggestion.
3
Though China-U.S relations improved appreciably but there
also have been some obstacles in this emerging cooperation.
This paper tries to discuss the opportunities as well as
challenges that the U.S-China relations are facing since the
terrorist attacks on the United States of America.
The paper also tries to briefly discuss conflicting signals, as
well as, signs of cooperation in U.S-China relations after the
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.
U.S-China Relations After 9/11
China clearly supported the United States war on terrorism
but U.S unilateral approach to get rid of terrorism made China
reluctant to support military operations without UN approval.
China did not support U.S military operation in Iraq due to the
lack of international will and courage for the war. Chinese
perspectives on the post-Cold War world revolve around
consistent themes of multi-polarity, a greater UN role in world
affairs, state sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic
affairs of other states. Following a September 21, 2001 meeting
with U.S. Secretary of State Powell, Chinese Foreign Minister
Tang stated that Sino-U.S. cooperation against terrorism had
already started and would continue in the future. This
cooperation will include sharing of intelligence information
about terrorist groups and activities. If the United Nations
authorizes military action, it is possible that China would
provide support for operations against terrorist targets.
4
The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001
brought China and the U.S comparatively closer. Though
China joined U.S war on terror but it opposed U.S invasion of
Iraq and also opposes U.S military presence in Central Asia for
very long. A majority of the American academic circles held
doubts over whether the events of September 11 might bring
favorable by products to U.S-China relations.
However, the optimistic scholars called September 11 an
opportunity for China and the United States to come closer. Dr
Mulvenon at the RAND Corporation in the fight against
terrorism gives the United States and China the chance to be
partners on a crucial issue.
5
Professor Lampton went a step
further by considering counter terrorism as the new strategic
foundation for U.S-China relations just like the common
enemy of the former Soviet Union in the Cold War.
6
There have been concerns on both sides over various issues.
Chinese concerns about Taiwan independence, American
military intervention, and U.S hegemony have been matched
by U.S worries about whether a rising China will eventually
challenge the United States. However, the two countries
despite these concerns share numerous important common
interests on trans-national security issues such as non-
proliferation, terrorism, and energy security.
Non-Proliferation
The United States of America and Chinas cooperation on the
non-proliferation issues is considerably better than that of on
some other issues. The non-proliferation issue has been on the
agenda of bilateral negotiations for almost last two decades
and achieved a considerable success. The U.S concerns over
Chinas non-proliferation policies narrowed while China joined
major arms control and non-proliferation treaties and
improved its export control laws. Both countries are key
members of international non-proliferation treaties including
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC). Both the United States and China cooperated on the
issues such as Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and
United Nations Security Councils response to the 1998 nuclear
tests in South Asia. This was the period when Clinton
administration used the term Strategic Partner for China.
China and the United States both oppose the introduction of
nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula which may lead
Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan to build nuclear
weapons. The United States considered Chinas role in Six
Party Talks dealing with North Koreas nuclear program, as
pivotal.
However, non-proliferation remains a contentious issue
despite a very important record of successful bilateral
cooperation. Since U.S concerns now mainly center on possible
Chinese exports of ballistic missile technology to Pakistan and
exports of dual-use technology to Iran that can be used for
chemical and biological weapons. The current trends of conflict
between Islamic radicals and the West, especially the United
States these weapons of mass destruction can directly be used
against American lives. The United States continuously
showed its concerns on Pakistani nuclear weapons falling to
terrorists and if it happens the United States will directly blame
China for assisting Pakistan in its nuclear program in the 1980s.
However, both China and Pakistan denied these allegations of
any nuclear cooperation between them. Since United States is
now considering the spread of weapons of mass destruction
from abstract proliferation issue to concrete threat to its
national security, it cannot afford to allow China to get away
with it.
Simultaneously, China argues that U.S arms sales to Taiwan
and proposals to provide Japan theatre missile defense system
(TMD) should be considered a form of proliferation. China
never allowed Taiwan to announce its independence and
rather passed an anti-secession law in 2005 which allows China
to use its force to merge Taiwan with mainland China in case
Taiwan announces its independence. In case of any cross-strait
conflict these U.S weapons can be used against China.
Energy Security
The United States being the largest economy in the world
depends on energy imports from the Middle East while China
is racing to develop natural resources to meet its rapidly
growing domestic demand for energy as the economy races
ahead. China will not only become dependent on imported oil
and gas for its future economic growth, modernization and
prosperity but its reliance on supplies from the Middle East
also seems set to increase.
Chinas strategy focused on maintaining good political
relations with oil producing states, including states such as
Iran that are on poor terms with the United States while the
United States has emphasized political and military alliances
with key oil-producing states such as Saudi Arabia to maintain
access to the Middle Eastern energy supplies. The United
States has also used naval power to ensure the flow of oil to the
United States and its allies. China worries about U.S ability to
use naval forces to cut off Chinese oil imports from the Middle
East, but alternative sources of energy are few and significantly
more expensive. A key question is whether China is willing to
rely on the United States to maintain world access to oil
supplies and to protect the shipping lanes from the Middle
East to Asia. Alternatively, China could decide to try to
develop political relationships and power projection
capabilities to secure its supply of energy independently of the
United States. This would require development of a much
stronger Chinese navy, an expensive and difficult undertaking
likely to promote conflict with the United States.
Taiwan
Taiwan is the only issue on which a war can be erupted
between the United States and China. The continuous U.S arms
sales to Taiwan and Anti-Secession Law passed by China in
2005 have complicated the issue more. No compromise is
expected in near future on this very crucial issue between the
two countries.
When in July 2004 the then U.S National Security adviser
Condoleeza Rice met with Chinese leaders in Beijing, China
once again underlined the important status of the Taiwan issue
in Sino-U.S relations.
7
Rice responded that the Taiwan issue
concerns Chinas sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to
handle Taiwan issue properly is a crucial issue related to the
sound and smooth development of Sino-U.S ties.
8
However,
U.S continued to sale weapons to Taiwan which not only
resulted in Chinese criticism of U.S One China Policy but it
also undermined other aspects of Sino-U.S cooperation.
American decision to approve an overnight stop over for
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian in San Francisco in early
January 2007 resulted in Chinas anger. China had hoped that
the U.S would only offer Chen refueling stops in Hawai or
Alaska. Chinese minister Yang Jeichi, who was dispatched to
Washington to attend President Fords funeral, had planned to
discuss the bilateral exchange program for the upcoming year
as well as substantive matters but was compelled to spend a
considerable amount of time delivering a demarche in meeting
with U.S officials.
China widely criticized Taiwan President Chen
administrations desire for de jure Taiwan independence and
also warned Americans to refrain from supporting Taiwan in
their bid for the declaration of independence. In January 2007
deputy director of the Chinese State Councils Taiwan Affairs
Office Sun Yafu traveled to the U.S to discuss developments in
Cross-Strait relations with the United States. The Chinese
attitude and policy was quite apparent from Chinese officials
speech at a forum. Sun said that the Chien Shui-bian
administrations adventure to strive for de jure Taiwan
independence through so-called constitutional
transformation is the greatest threat confronting cross strait
peace and stability at present.
9
Sun also argued greater joint
efforts by the United States and China to constrain Chen Shui-
bians pro-independence articles.
The United States has also been consistent in approving arms
sales to Taiwan and that always has been countered by Chinese
complaints and protests. This also remains one of the biggest
obstacles in Sino-U.S relations. In late February 2007 U.S
Defense Department notified congress of a possible sale to
Taiwan of advanced medium-range-air-to-air missiles,
Maverick air-to-ground missiles and other equipment in a deal
worth about 421 million U.S dollars. China lodged a formal
complaint with U.S over the matter.
10
Chinese foreign minister
Qin Gang said the proposed sale would seriously violate
previous commitments made by Washington to reduce arms
sales to Taiwan and would constitute a rude interference into
Chinas internal affairs .
11
China considered U.S arms sales to Taiwan very dangerous for
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait region. China made it
clear to the U.S when U.S Deputy Secretary of State John
Magroponte visited China in March 2007. During talks with
Negroponte Chinese officials expressed their objections to U.S
arms sales to Taiwan and expressed concerns about Chen Shui-
bians rhetoric that China considers provocative.
12
Chinese
State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan went further and told American
Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte that the activities of
Taiwan separatists pose a major threat to peace and stability in
the Taiwan Strait, and warned the U.S not to send wrong
signals.
13
The same message was conveyed to American
academia by Chinese ambassador to the U.S Zhou Zhong in
the same month. Chinese ambassador during his speeches at
the Brown University and Paul H. Nitze school of Advanced
International Studies said U.S should stop sending advanced
weapon to Taiwan and stop sending any wrong signals to the
Taiwan independence forces.
14
Chinas Military Modernization
The United States continuously voiced its unease on Chinas
military modernization and Beijings lack of transparency in
showing its defense economic data. The U.S also considers
Chinas military modernization as a threat to regional military
balance.
15
The number of official contacts even at the higher
level between China and the United States increased
dramatically in the post-September 11 period but the
relationship between the two countries continued to go down.
Chinas relations with the United States have, notwithstanding
the increase in official contacts at all levels, proved generally
troublesome and subject to many points of disagreement.
American traditional strategic alliances with Japan, South
Korea, Australia and now with India created the feelings of
uneasiness in Beijing. Whatever the other main objectives of
Indo-U.S nuclear deal are being estimated but its prime
purpose seems to be the containment of Asian giant China.
Meanwhile, Chinas military modernization is the subject of
discussion in Pentagon as well as in White House.
Indeed, American concerns about Chinas military
modernization were voiced with increasing force and
frequency in the last few years. Speaking at the 4
th
annual
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security
Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, in June 2005 U.S Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld berated the Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA) for the lack of transparency surrounding its
efforts to develop military capabilities, and for concealing the
full extent of its defense expenditure.
16
The themes were
developed more fully in the Pentagons 2005 Report to the
Congress on the Military Power of the Peoples Republic of
China.
17
Despite the end of the Cold War, the United States has
maintained its traditional Cold War era alliances that encircle
China. The United States has formal alliances with Japan,
South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia. The
United States massive support for Taiwan and its recent
commitment to help India through civilian nuclear power
justifies Chinas military modernization. India is the new
addition to the team that is trained for the game being played
against China. After the end of the Cold War the military threat
to East Asia decreased but the United States has strengthened
its strategic alliances with its Cold War allies in the region.
In comparison to the U.S military and other militaries of East
Asia, even with growing defense budget, Chinese military does
not pose any threat to the United States. Despite these
comparisons the United States sends conflicting signals to
China by calling its military a threat to international security.
Chinas military is large but a guerrilla-style Maoist peoples
army and it needs to be completely transformed into a modern
force that emphasizes projection of power on sea and in the air.
So the Chinese must spend much of their increases in official
defense funding to prop up their sagging. Given that the
United States, with a mega budget for the research,
development and procurement of weapons well over 500
billion US dollars per year
18
is leaving its East Asian foe
China in dust.
The United States instead of maintaining Cold War alliances
and a forward military presence in the region should gradually
withdraw its forces from East Asia and allow those nations to
be the first line of defense against China. Currently those
nations fail to spend enough on their security because the
United States spends huge amounts on its military and is
willing to subsidize their security for them.
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Missile Test
Meanwhile, when China test fired anti-satellite medium range
ballistic missile (MRBM) destroyed its own weather satellite,
the United States government sought an explanation from
Beijing, but it received none. The United States reaction was
clear from its National Security Council spokesman Gordon
Johndroes expressed concern about the ASAT test. The U.S
believes Chinas development and testing of such weapons is
inconsistent with the sprit of cooperation that both countries
aspire to in the civil space area. We and other countries have
expressed our concern regarding this action to the Chinese.
Johndroe stated.
19
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman
responded five days later and confirmed the test. According to
the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman the ASAT test was
not directed at any country and does not constitute a threat to
any country.
20
Foreign Ministry spokesman went further and
responded the question regarding the late confirmation of the
test by saying that China has nothing to hide. After various
parties expressed concern, we explained this test in outer space
to them.
21
The American allies in the Asia-Pacific, Australia, Japan,
Canada and South Korea also expressed their concerns on the
test. In these countries the incident raised questions about
civilian control over the Chinese military coordination in the
Chinese bureaucracy and Chinas crisis management
capability.
China over the years denied the authenticity of the pentagon
reports presented to the congress reading Chinese military
power but the anti-satellite test proved the reports quite correct
to some extent. The test was not a surprise to the Americans, it
was indicated in the Pentagons annual report to the Congress
on Chinese military power in 2006 that Beijing is continuing
pursuit of an offensive anti-satellite capability, including by
launching a ballistic missile and by using ground based-lasers
to damage or blind imaging satellites.
22
The U.S media think tanks, academia as well as official of the
White House explicitly expressed their concerns on the ASAT
test. U.S Vice-President Dick Cheney in his speech in Sydney
maintained that Chinas ASAT test along with its continued
fast paced military build up are less constructive and are not
consistent with Chinas stated goal of a peaceful rise.
23
Earlier U.S Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard lawless
told the U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission
on February 1, 2007 that Chinas test of an ASAT weapon
poses dangers to human space flight and puts at risk the
assets of all space faring nations
24
Conclusion
Following attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New
York and on the Pentagon in Washington narrowed the gap in
cooperation between the United States and China for a while
but as time progressed the conflicting signals expressed from
both sides. Both countries sought cooperation in the war on
terror but both countries differ with each other on the strategy
to tackle it.
The United States considers the September 11 attacks as an act
of war so it does not suppose UN authorization necessary for
retaliation. This theory like many European countries worries
China and this seems to be another obstacle that the
cooperation between the two countries is experiencing.
Chinese officials have already expressed concerns about U.S
military response based on clear evidence, only target the
guilty parties and minimize civilian causalities.
25
The U.S war
on terror will result in a long term military presence in Central
Asia is another concern that China shows.
Both countries position on Taiwan still is the same; however,
joint military exercises can lead to narrow the gap in military
cooperation between the two countries. Chinas military
modernization, space weapons test and U.S arms sales to
Taiwan are other obstacles that this cooperation may witness in
the near future.
1
Pentagon Report to the US Congress, Military Power of the Peoples Republic of
China 2007, May 25, 2007
2
Ibid.
3
Phillip C. Saunders, Can 9-11 Provide a Fresh Start for Sino-U.S. Relations?,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sino911.htm
4
Quoted in Jing-dong Yuan The War on Terrorism: China's Opportunities and
Dilemmas, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Washington DC, September 25,
2001, http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/china.htm
5
Quoted in Yuan Peng, September 11 Event vs. Sino-US Relations,
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/septe.pdf
6
Ibid.
7
www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/fyrth/fyrth/t143028.htm
8
Ibid.
9
Pacific Forum CSIS Comparative Connections: An East Asian Journal of
Bilateral Relations, op.cit. p.31.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Military Balance 2006, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Washington,
Routledge, p.247.
16
Strategic Survey 2006, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Washington,
Routledge, p. 274.
17
Quoted in Strategic Survey 2006, International Institute of Strategic Studies,
Washington, Routledge, p. 274.
18
Military Balance 2007, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Washington.
19
Pacific Forum CSIS Comparative Connections: An East Asian Journal of
Bilateral Relations, op.cit p.29.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid., p.30.
23
Ibid., p.30.
24
Ibid., p.30.
25
Phillip C. Saunders, Can 9-11 Provide a Fresh Start for Sino-U.S. Relations?,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sino911.htm
INVOLVEMENT OF MILITARY
IN INDONESIAN POLITICS
Naureen Nazar
***
Abstract
he Indonesian militarys involvement in socio-political
and economic sectors of the country is clearly
enshrined in countrys doctrine and ideology. Unlike
other nations of the world whose military is handed over the
only responsibility of guarding the borders, Indonesian
military is given additional responsibility of serving the nation
by guarding and managing socio-political affairs along with
the protection of borders. After some reforms the militarys
role in socio-political and economic sectors were made limited
but still Indonesian military plays a significant role of
maintaining the peace within the country and defending the
borders against any external threat. Although Indonesian
military is legally and ideologically bound to carry out political
responsibilities, many officers use their positions in
advancements of their political and economic interests. In
order to be true democratic, it is necessary for the military to
adopt professionalism and confine itself to the external defense
of the country.
***
Sindh, Jamshoro.
Introduction
Indonesia, the worlds most populous Muslim-majority
country, situated in Southeast Asia is the largest archipelago
state comprising more than 17,500 islands and islets of which
about 6,000 are inhabited. This archipelago connects two
oceans, the Pacific and Indian oceans, and two continents, Asia
and Australia. Divided in three divisions, the islands of Java,
Sumatra and Kalimantan, Indonesia have various ethnic
groups residing in those divisions. For example, Acehnese, the
Batak, Malays, Jambi, Palembang live in the island of Sumatra.
Betawi, Javanese, and Sundanese live in island of Java.
Whereas Dayak, Banjar, and Malays live in Kalimantan. The
Javanese are the politically dominant and largest ethnic group.
Islam is the major religion of Indonesia, whereas Hinduism
and Buddhism were propagated by the Indian merchants and
those who migrated and now these religions are very much
present in Indonesian islands.
1
Despite being worlds most populous Muslim-majority
country, officially Indonesia is not an Islamic state, its a
republic with an elected parliament and president. Indonesia
achieved its independence from Dutch after World War II
through armed struggle in 1945. Since then Indonesia has been
ruled most of the time by military rulers first by Sukarno
who was ousted by a communist coup in 1965, then by
Suharto, a General, for more than 30 years. His government,
was called the New Order, whereas, Sukarnos government
was called Guided Democracy. However, during the
governments of both the army rulers, there has remained the
close relationship between Indonesian government and
Indonesian military. This paper will illustrate the Indonesian
militarys role in socio-political, economic and security sectors
of the country.
Political Structure of Indonesia
Indonesia consists of 7 state organs according to amended 1945
constitution:
1. Peoples Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusywaratan
Rakyat-MPR),
2. The House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-
DPR),
3. The Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan
Daerah-DPD),
4. The State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Kellangan-BPK),
5. The Presidency,
6. The Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung-MA) and, 7. The
Constitutional Court (Mahkahamh Konstitusi-MK)
2
1. Peoples Consultative Assembly (Majelis
Permusywaratan Rakyat-MPR)
The Peoples Consultative Assembly is the highest
representative body at national level performing the functions
of supporting and amending the constitution, inaugurating the
president, and formalizing broad outlines of state policy. The
assembly has also authority to discharge the president and
vice-president during his/her term of office. The MPR
comprises of two houses, the House of Peoples Representative
(DPR) and the Regional Representatives Council (DPD).
2. The House of Peoples Representatives (Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat-DPR)
The House of Peoples Representatives (DPR) consists of 550
members. The DPR passes legislation and monitors the
executive branch. Its members are elected for five years term.
The House of Peoples Representative meets annually and is
led by a speaker elected from the membership.
3
3. The Regional Representative Council (Dewan
Perwakilan Daerah-DPD)
The Regional Representative Council (DPD) consists of 168
members, is aimed at enhancing the democratic life and
developing a mechanism of check-and-balance between
legislative and executive bodies. The DPD is summoned
annually, for discussing the bills concerning to the State Budget
and tax, education and religious affairs.
4. The State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Kellangan-
BPK)
The State Audit Board carries out the financial functions of the
government. The governments budget requests are approved
by the DPR on the reports made by the State Audit Board.
4
5. The Presidency
The President of Indonesia is the head of the state,
commander-in-chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and the
director of domestic governance, policy making and foreign
affairs and is assisted by a Vice-President. Both President and
Vice-President are elected directly by the people and hold
office for five year term, and shall be eligible for another term.
6. The Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung-MA) and 7.
The Constitutional Court (Mahkahamh Konstitusi-
MK)
The Judiciary of Indonesia consists of various courts working
under the supremacy of the Supreme Court that is countrys
highest court and that hears final cassation appeals and
conducts case reviews. These courts are: State Court for most
the civil disputes; High Court hears the appeals; Commercial
Court for handling the bankruptcy and insolvency; State
Administrative Court to hear administrative law cases against
the government; a Constitutional Court to hear disputes
concerning legality of law, general elections, dissolution of
political parties; and a Religious Court for specific religious
cases.
5
Military Structure of Indonesia
The military refers, generally to countrys armed forces or
sometimes, more specifically, senior officers running them.
Military of any country usually works for national defense and
security, whereas in Indonesia, military is assigned the duties
of maintaining the political and social integrity of the nation
along with national defense and security. Armed forces of the
Republic of Indonesia ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik
Indonesia) under the New Order and renamed TNI (Tentara
Nasional Indonesia- Indonesian National Military) in 1999
consist of three military services-the Army, Navy, and Air
Force- and the police (until its separation in April 1999).
6
The
GDP of Indonesia in 2006 was about 3,143 trillion Indonesian
Rupiah or US$346 billion. The defense budget was near 23.6
trillion Indonesian Rupiah or US$2.59 billion. The total number
of military personnel is 923,000 out of which 302,000 are active
personnel, who are divided in 233,000 Army, 45,000 Navy and
24,000 Air Force and along with this 280,000 are in
paramilitary.
7
Indonesian military arsenal possesses 613
Aircrafts, 969 Armor, 700 Artillery Systems, 91 Missile Defense
System, 1,790 Infantry Support Systems, 121 Naval Units, and
750 Merchant Marine Strength.
8
Involvement of Military in Indonesian Politics
Indonesian military plays a critical role in countrys socio-
political and economic life. It also played a vital role in history
by keeping country united at the time of revolutionary struggle
against the Dutch. Thus, the military structure of Indonesia
shows how it designed itself according to its most serious
concern that security and integrity of the nation. Therefore, the
countrys military structure is an inherently political one.
Military of Indonesia has since very beginning held the top
positions in political structure of the country and had
represented itself at various levels of state, provincial and local
administration. Many administrative positions have been held
by retired army generals and other officers. President Suharto
ruled the country for a very long period of more than 30 years.
He was an army general and supported strongly by the
military establishment. During his time most of the cabinet
membership was from military establishment. Military officers
held posts starting from village chief, sub-district head, regent,
mayor, governor, up to ministers. The military officers
possessed seats in the DPDs and DPRs without being elected
by the common people denying the fact that all legislative seats
must be won by elections.
During President Suharto era, the military was given a doctrine
called dual function or dwi fungsi in Indonesia. According to
this doctrine, the military of Indonesia has the double role, one
of internal and external security of the country, and other as an
active component of the social and political life of the state.
9
The Indonesian military considers dwi fungsi to be the heart,
soul and spirit of the military, as it believes that the security
and socio-political development is inseparable. This concept
was first developed in seminars at the Indonesian General Staff
and Command College in the early 1960s. It was tried to make
dwi fungsi an official policy when Suharto assumed power in
1966. But in 1982 dwi fungsi became official policy when the
Basic Provisions for the Defence and Security of the Republic
of Indonesia became law.
The Militarys Perceptions of Dwifungsi
First Function Second Function
is called the
1. Defense role 1. Socio-political role
2. Professional role 2. Patriotic role
3. Primary role 3. Secondary role
4. Security role 4. Functional role
5. Role as protector 5. Role as struggler
6. Role as security
apparatus
6. Role as social force
7. Role as instrument of
state
7. Instrument of revolution
8. Role as security force 8. Role as freedom fighter
is concerned with
9. Military affairs 9. Civilian affairs
10. Nation-defending 10. Nation-building
11. Preventing disintegration 11. Seeking integration
12. Security 12. Prosperity
13. Protection 13. Development
14. Discipline 14. Cooperation
can be described as
15. War-oriented 15. Peace-oriented
16. Authoritarian 16. Paternal
17. Stabilizing 17. Dynamizing
18. Oriented towards law
enforcement
18. Oriented toward law making
19. Government-oriented 19. Populace-oriented
20. Status quo-oriented 20. Modernization-oriented
21. Subordinate to
Parliament
21. Political leadership
22. Intermittent role 22. Continuous role
23. Singular role 23. Multi-faceted role
24. Fighting role 24. Conciliatory role
25. The will to resist 25. The will to grow
26. Universally accepted 26. Skeptically accepted
Source: Sukardi Rinakit, The Indonesian Military after the New
Order, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Denmark,
2005, p. 36.
The active role of military in political affairs of the country is
not mentioned in the constitution but as the country is mostly
ruled by the army generals, the military is assigned the role,
whatever those generals wished the military to play. And as
the constitution of Indonesia clearly states that all citizens are
equal before law and are obliged to respect the law and
government, and as every citizen has right to take active part
in defense of the country, the military can also freely
participate in government and business along with the other
citizens of Indonesia.
10
The military, and state and society of
Indonesia have very deep relationship with each other, which
is very much apparent from another doctrine that is basically
armys basic military strategy called Universal Peoples
Defence. According to this doctrine, the people and army will
fight together against any possible threat to the independence
and sovereignty of the nation.
Besides playing the two roles of a professional army and a
social force, Indonesian military also plays an active role in
economic sector of the country, by having control over state
owned companies and cooperatives. Alongwith the functions
of defense and security, according to the 1945 constitution, the
armed forces are supposed to contribute their efforts in fields
outside defense and security. In this regards, the armed forces
form a functional group to take part in the determination of
state policy. The main role of the armed forces being functional
group is thus to take active part in most of the state affairs that
is politics, economy, and social affairs.
11
Defense spending in the national budget is only 3 percent of
the GDP but is supplemented by revenue from many military-
run businesses and foundations, including those in the areas of
natural resources and agribusiness, finance, real estate,
manufacturing and construction. The armed forces of
Indonesia are even alleged to be involved in the black
marketing, smuggling, and illegal mining and logging. Though
this black marketing was used to finance the armed forces but
now it has become the source of personal enrichment of many
senior officers.
12
Hundreds of companies are run by the army,
navy and the air force of Indonesia in every field of life, such
as, holding companies, trading companies, forestry, food and
beverages, chemicals, metal products, construction, industrial
real estate, banking and finance, fisheries, air services,
plantation, wood, manufacturing, mining, textiles,
pharmaceutical, transportation, education, tourism/resorts,
property (offices / shopping centre).
13
As Indonesia faces more internal threats than external threats,
therefore, the military of Indonesia continues to play internal
role more than the external one as Indonesia has not faced any
external threat since its independence in 1949. Indonesian
military is assigned three types of operations according to the
Indonesian army doctrine for national defense: intelligence
operations, combat operations and territorial operations.
Intelligence operations are conducted by the TNI to seize an
area occupied by an enemy, the combat operations has the
purpose to destroy the enemy, whereas territorial operations
are to create or restore political, economic, social or cultural
order.
The territorial operation is further divided into two types:
Territorial operations (Constructions) that are directed to
improve the condition of a particular area considered being at
risk of political and social instability, and Territorial operations
(Opposition/Resistance) are those efforts and energies directed
to restore or impose political and social stability. Those
territorial operations are mostly used by Indonesia particularly
in the areas where separatism seems to be in process like East
Timor, Aceh, and Papua (Irian Jaya).
14
The power of military
can be seen in the existence of territorial commands. For the
purpose of carrying out territorial operations, the TNI has
established some territorial units following the bureaucracy
hierarchy: (i) Kodam (Komando Daerah Militer-Military
Command Areas) for social development and security role, for
which it performs intelligence and internal security functions
and maintains contacts with local officials, (ii) Kostrad
(Komando Cadangan Strategik Angkatan Darat-Army Strategic
Command), it is TNIs primary combat unit, by which the TNI
can engage in higher-level military actions, (iii) Kopassus, the
elite Special Forces Command, which performs the functions
related to human rights abuses and state terrorism. It is mostly
known for its counter-insurgency activities against separatist
movements in East Timor, Aceh and Irian Jaya.
15
Indonesia because of being so ethnically and religiously
diverse faces great threats of separatism most of the time. The
separatism does not only threaten the security of the particular
country but the region as a whole as it encourages other
separatist movements as well. In Indonesia, the independence
to East Timor encouraged Acehnese and Papuans to fight for
their cause more strongly. In this context the national integrity
becomes the major factor and major concern for policy makers.
The province of Aceh in Indonesia is rich in oil and gas
reserves, producing highest wealth whereas the share of
income and consumption per person is perhaps the lowest in
the national ranking.
16
Papua experienced an armed
independence movement due to exploitation of the islands
vast gold, copper and other mineral resources, and
insensitivity to local culture and land ownership practices. East
Timorese started resisting Indonesian government after it
invaded the former Portuguese colony in 1975. The strict
control over the resources of the East Timor resulted in famine
and disease in the province, which created strong criticism
among the international forum causing so many problems for
national integrity.
17
At the time of all these instances of strong
opposition against the government, Indonesian military played
a significant role in maintaining the integrity of the region,
failing only in one case of East Timor, which achieved its
independence due to huge international criticism and support.
One of the three defense operations of Indonesian army
doctrine--the territorial operations allows Indonesian army to
carry out operations against anti-government or separatist
movements. The creation and restoration of internal order has
become Indonesian militarys major responsibility because of
various separatist movements present in the archipelago.
18
This sense of separatism among various ethnic and religious
groups residing in Indonesia could have caused secession of
more provinces or regions if the military of Indonesia would
not have played its major internal role of maintaining peace
and order in the country and ensuring the national integrity.
Conclusion
The military of any country when gets so much involved in the
other sectors of the country other than the external defense,
brings positive as well as negative consequences to the nation.
The involvement of Indonesian military in politics often fosters
the militarys domination over the civil bureaucracy and
exposes its militaristic culture and behavior in various social
matters. The critics believe that the militarys involvement in
business and economic matters of the country is just to raise
profit for their companies functioning all over the country.
Despite its efforts in maintaining peace and law and order in
the areas where separatist movements are very much active,
the TNI or Indonesian military is often criticized on human
rights bases as it gives the monopoly over the use of arms. On
the other hand, the dwi fungsi doctrine of Indonesian military
according to which the TNI performs dual function, one of
internal and external security of the country, and other as an
active component of the social and political life of the state is
not only praised within the country but other multi-ethnic
countries of Southeast Asia are also planning to import such
doctrine in their respective countrys policies to handle
numerous ideological challenges to the government and to
keep the nation united.
However, like most of the democratic countries of the world,
the role of military in Indonesia should also be limited to the
external defense only, so that military could not exploit its
monopoly over the use of arms and human rights violations
should not take place. The armed forces should focus and
utilize its resources on external threats such as piracy, border
clashes, and possible encroachment on Indonesian maritime
resources. Besides this, the national police should be given full
authority and training to deal with the insurgencies and
internal security problems. The armed forces should come to
assistance to the national police if in any case the police are
unable to handle the situation. To some extent, the armed
forces are restricted to the external defense only but the TNI is
still involved in counterinsurgency operations in East Timor
and Irian Jaya, but still there is the need of change.
1
Indonesia 2004: An Official Handbook, National Information Agency, Republic
of Indonesia, Jakarta, 2004, pp. 9-16
2
Ibid.
3
The Structure of Government, http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/84.htm
4
Ibid.
5
Military of Indonesia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_military
6
ABRI: Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, http://www.globalsecurity.org
/military/world/indonesia/abri.htm
7
The Military Balance 2007, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),
London, 2007, p. 352.
8
Indonesia Military Strength, http://www.globalfirepower.com
/country_detail.asp?country_id=26
9
The Civil Supremacy Paradigm: A Blueprint for Reforming the Position and Role
of the Military on the Road to Democracy in Indonesia, http://www.resdal.org/
Archivo/d0000085.htm
10
Major Thomas E. Sidwell, The Indonesian Military: Dwi Fungsi and Territorial
Operations, U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS,
1995, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/indo-fmso.htm
11
David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (Eds.), Indonesian Politics and Society: A
Reader, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, pp. 35-37.
12
Damien Kingsbury, Power Politics and The Indonesian Military, Routledge
Curzon, London, 2003, pp.194-195.
13
Ibid., pp.214-220.
14
Ibid., p.69.
15
J. Danang Widoyoko, Questioning the Military-Business Restructuring,
http://www.antikorupsi.org/docs/militarybusiness.pdf
16
Naureen Memon, Southeast Asia: Impact of Separatist Movements, Asia
Pacific, Area Study Centre, Far East and Southeast Asia, University of Sindh,
Jamshoro, Vol. 23, 2005, p.66.
17
David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (eds.), op.cit., p.256.
18
Damien Kingsbury, op.cit., p.70
CHINAS ONE CHILD POLICY: A VIOLATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES
Mukesh Kumar Khatwani

Abstract
owadays the biggest social threats that are being faced
by the world are increasing population and global
warming (environment). China, being the largest
country regarding population in the world and contributing
about 22 per cent to the total world population is also facing
the both threats. In order to control Chinas government in
early 1950s took concrete steps and introduced population
planning throughout the country. In early 1970 late-long and
few policy of population controlling was initiated and no
doubt the policy remained very much successful. Despite its
success of this policy the government reviewed and introduced
one child policy in late 1970s. Later policy of population is
not uniform and optional but it varies from region to region,
from ethnic group to group and from urban to rural areas. In
the context of human rights and dignity the policy violates the
basic human rights which are entitled in Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and other international charters. Of course,
China has succeeded to control its increasing population, but
simultaneously Chinese society has fallen in many social
problems which is result of the forceful imposition of one child
policy. The paper attempts to highlight the social consequences
of one child policy such as imbalanced sex ratio, increasing
number of old aged, selective abortion, infant abandonment
and adoption, trafficking in women, female suicide, diffusion
of HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs).

Sindh, Jamshoro
Introduction
China is the most populous country in the world with 1,306
millions, about 22 per cent of world population. The 69.6 per
cent of Chinese total population lives in rural area and
depends on farming and agriculture. Chinese society has
greatly remained under the influence of Confucius, well
known philosopher (551-479 BC) and latter on with his name
Confucianism was developed as a religion and code of social
and political matter in China. Traditionally, the Confucius
ideology places a strong emphasis on filial responsibilities and
intergenerational connections
1
. The Chinese family system is
patriarchal, patrilocal, and patrilineal. Patriarchal means the
legal head of family should be oldest male and only he reserves
sole authority in all family matters; patrilocal means the family
should be centered in the husbands home and patrilineal
denotes that descent must be counted only through the male
line. Historically, the extended family was dominant family
form in China. Despite falling family size and increasing
proportions of nuclear families the tradition of patrilineal and
patrilocal extended families remain important in contemporary
China. According to 1990 census of China around 27 per cent
of households in China contained 3 or more generations and
about 73 per cent of the populations aged 65 and above live in
households made up of 2 or 3 or more generations
2
. Due to the
legacy of patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal in China, the
preference in family has always been given to son rather than
daughter; this is why it has become very much essential for a
family to have a male child for keeping the lineage. The
tradition of son preference in Chinese society traced in The
Book of Rites A woman is to obey her father before marriage,
her husband during married life and son in widowhood
3
.
Mencius, a Chinese philosopher has said There are three
things that are unfilial, and to have no children is the greatest
of these
4
. It obviously shows the wide range acceptance of
male dominancy in Chinese society and subordinate position
of females.
Background of Population Planning
In 1949 the first and most basic task that confronted China
Communist Party (CCP) was to provide basic subsistence for
more than 500 million people
5
. In 1953 communist government
urged the Ministry of Health to study the method of
population planning and to teach people how to practice
population planning. However, before it the great communist
leader Mao Tzu in his speeches always took pride in saying
over 600 million people are the countrys wealth
6
. In 1954
population planning took an official and national concept, and
it was considered very much essential to promote health for
women and children. The government strongly realized to take
concrete measures for controlling population as the economic
reforms can be ensured for the improvement of living
standard.
In 1970s family planning programme later- long- fewer was
initiated to control the birth rate and uplift the living
conditions of people. Under this policy of population control
the couples were encouraged to get married later; space at least
five years between first and second child, and have a limited
number of children. The policy discouraged the traditional
Chinese extended family system and encouraged nuclear
family; so that increasing population could be controlled as
well as economic reforms could also be ensured for improving
the living standard. This policy remained very much successful
in bringing down the birth rate from 5.8 children per married
woman in 1970 to 2.7 in 1979, before the introduction of one
child policy.
One Child Policy
In late 1979 the one child policy was introduced by setting a
target population 1.2 billion by the year 2000. The policy
consists of a set of regulations that vary from ethnic group to
group, urban to rural area and religion to religion. These
regulations include restrictions on family size, late marriage,
the space between first and second child (if second child is
permitted). Todays one child policy has undergone many
revisions and changes, the major revision in policy occurred in
1986, which allows couple to legally give birth to a second
child.
As the one child policy was introduced to achieve sole
objective of economic development rather than social
development and improvement of human rights. This is why
the formulators of the policy have either neglected the social
consequences or given less importance to them. Thus policy
itself has been bias one, for instance in terms of gender, urban-
rural, ethnic groups, and localities etc. Generally a couple is
allowed to have only one child but in case of first female they
may have a second one and even in case of rural and ethnic
groups a couple is allowed to have up to four or five children.
In urban area couples receive a monthly stipend of around 5%
of the average workers wage until the child reaches the age of
14, preferential treatment when applying for housing,
increased maternity leave, highest priority in education and
health for the child, and a supplementary pension because of
the problem of lack of support in old age. On the contrary in
rural areas a family receives a large allocation of farming plot.
In 1982, family planning was included in the Constitution as a
basic state policy. Since then, the marriage law has explicitly
required couples to practice family planning. Under marriage
law of 1980, women are required to submit proof of
contraceptive use (usually in form of IUD, the presence of
which was verified twice a year through mandatory medical
examination) and abortion became the mandatory form of
remediation for unplanned pregnancies
7
. In the late 1980s,
clear provincial rules were demanded and regulations focused
on preventing early-age marriage and childbirth, reducing the
high rate of induced abortions were implemented. One of the
incentives of one child policy since 1988 is the "one-child
certificate" which is a contract between a couple and the local
government. It gives a couple who agrees to have only one
child certain economic rewards, such as a monthly stipend,
free obstetric care, increased maternity leave, highest priority
in education and health care for the child, preferential
treatment when one is applying for housing, and a
supplementary pension.
The policy in context of urban has successfully reduced the
birth rate but in rural context it has not. According to Cooney
and Li in 1991 approximately 91 per cent of mothers with
worker registration had only one child, while only 59 per cent
of those with agricultural registration did so. Similarly 87 per
cent of mothers with worker registration accepted the one child
certificate as compared with 13 per cent of mothers with
agricultural registration
8
. The reasons of success of policy in
urban are strong monitoring and implementation system,
attractive incentives, and changing family structure and norms
(traditional to nuclear) due to increasing female education.
While one child policy could not attract rural women because
of strong traditional family structure, low female literacy rate,
more requirement of labour force to work on farming land,
preference to both one boy and one girl, especially former and
the lack of effective monitoring system. According to Milwetzs
survey of women in Beijing and Shenyang, while between 26
and 82 per cent of women said that they would prefer more
than one child, the majority also agreed that some sort of
population control measures were necessary in China
9
.
Social Consequences
No doubt the one child policy has left positive impact
particularly in enabling the government to face the challenges
of food shortage, ensure the economic reforms and improve
the living standard of people. But simultaneously, because of
traditional extended family structure, strong family bond,
agrarian family, preference to having more male children the
policy has also given birth to many social problems as well as
psychological consequences to children without siblings.
a) Imbalanced sex ratio
Chinese census figures show that in the 1950s and 1960s, boy-
girl birth ratios were relatively stable and normal. The forcibly
application of one child policy and traditionally preference to
son in family have given birth to many social problems and
imbalanced sex ratio is one of them particularly in rural area.
It is reported that 99 per cent of Chinese children adopted by
foreigners are girls. China's newborn sex ratio was 123 boys for
every 100 girls in 2005, compared with 110:100 reported in
200010. In the case of China, social scientists are talking about a
future when 15 per cent of men won't have wives. According to
Asia expert Nicholas Eberstadt, the trend, termed the
"marriage squeeze," is an anthropological phenomenon partly
due to China's "one child" policy
11
. For controlling the
imbalanced sex ration the Chinese government made
Ultrasound exams for non-medical purposes illegal in 1994, but
due to lack of its enforcement and proper monitoring system
the tests for selective abortions are performed frequently. In
many places outside urban areas in China, remaining
unmarried is a matter of shame and defame. It is also reported
that a great number of persons of married age involved in
crimes and anti social activities are without family.
Imbalanced sex ratio in rural China today is an obvious
evidence of frequent practice of female infanticide; again
female infanticide is because of rigid and imposed one child
policy. The article 35 of the law of the Peoples Republic of
China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women
forbids female infanticide by means of drowning,
abandonment, or cruel treatment.
b) Increasing in Aging Population
The drastically falling fertility rate in China has given birth to
an increased proportion of aging population (134 million); it is
increasing 3.2 per cent every year. The aging process in China
is increasing in unbalanced way and definitely it is not in
favour of economic development and reforms in China. About
two decades ago the aging population of years 60 to 65 was
only 7.6 per cent and above 65 was 4.9 per cent. Chinese census
2000 disclosed that number of aged persons of years 60 -65 rose
to 10.5 per cent while above 65 rose to 7.1 per cent from 4.9 in
early 1980s. The elderly people will be a big burden for China
by the year 2050, when that population will reach to 400
million, accounting for 25 per cent of the total
12
. Assuming
fertility rates stay at current level among urban Chinese, about
1.3 children per couple, 35 per cent of urban population will be
of aged 65 and above by 2050. They were 20.6 million in 2000,
and will increase to 34.1 million by 2015, 45.6 million by 2025
and 55.9 by 2050
13
c) Increasing Selective Abortion
Until 1953, induced abortion was available during first 10
weeks only in case of protecting a womans or her childs
health and for it physicians medical certificate was required.
But in 1957, all pregnant women are allowed to perform
abortion during their early 10 weeks. The 1979 abortion law
abolished most restrictions, and set 28 weeks of gestation as the
upper limit for legally performing abortions
14
. Since 1979,
abortion has been available on request, and the ratio of legal
abortions to birth increased in the 1980s.
Abortion is a major factor in keeping population growth under
control. Most of the Chinese couples try to confirm about their
coming offspring of having male or female and in case of later
they prefer immediately abortion, because son is regarded as
lineage of the family. Selective abortion is one form of violation
of basic humanitarian rights in China. It is very much
interesting to know that violators are product of governments
imposed one child policy. On one hand strong traditional
family patterns which give preference to male child,
requirement of more persons to work on farming; on other
hand imposed one child policy majority of people, particularly
in rural areas seeks selective abortion and abandonment.
d) Infant Abandonment and Adoption
Female Infant abandonment is one of the burning social
problems in todays China particularly in rural areas. There are
reports that many female children are born each year but never
recorded and most of them are known as missing girls. It is
very difficult to collect data on these missing girls, however;
Johnson estimates that 100,000 to 160,000 young children,
mostly girls, are abandoned each year
15
. According to 1994
figures, despite legal penalties, the number of children
abandoned in China annually approached 1.7 million
16
. Illegal
adoption and abandonment are considered as violation of
population policy not violation of adoption and abandonment
laws. If someone adopts or abandons a child means he is
violating the birth planning policy and must be punished.
Further more the requirements of legal adoption are very
strong i.e. adoptive parents must be above 35 years, and
childless, even adopted child must be orphan or disabled. This
is why the illegal adoption and abandonment are increasing
every year.
e) Increasing Trafficking in Women
Trafficking is defined as the recruitment, harboring, provision,
receipt, transportation and/or obtaining of individuals; using
force or threats of it, coercion, fraud and/or using systems of
indebtedness or debt bondage; for purposes of sexual or other
forms of economic exploitation
17
Trafficking in women is one
of the burning issues of todays China. China's Public Security
Department says that there were 12,281 prostitution-related
cases prosecuted in 1984. By 1995, in the five months from
January to May the figure had exploded to 113,000. Most of the
sociologists and social scientists believe that one of the major
causes of increasing in women trafficking and sell out is female
infanticide and shortage of wives in rural China. Because of
one child policy majority of people gives preference to son.
From sociological point of view it is a ground fact that
unmarried and single persons are more vulnerable to involve
in criminal and anti social activities. Increased trafficking in
women has been seen for purpose of marriage, prostitution
within and outside China. The kidnapping of women for
marriage by criminal gangs and middlemen has become a
growth industry in China. Women are also being trafficked for
sale as wives to husbands who often resell them
18
. Further
more, the increased commercialization of sex within and
outside China has made the situation worse. According to
1996 reports, police owned and operated brothels employing
70,000 prostitutes in the Shanxi province
19
. Article 36 of law on
the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women and Children
stipulates that trafficking or purchase of women shall be
prohibited and government agencies shall be timely measure
to rescue women and children from traffickers.
f) Increasing Female Suicide rate
Chinese society is more traditional wherein the family bond is
very much strong; family generally consists of 2 or 3
generations. The value and importance to life is clearly shown
in below Chinese saying we receive our body including hair
and skin from our parents and we dare not injure them if we
are filial ( shenti fafu shou zhi fuwu, bu gan huishbang, xiao zhi shi
ye)
20
. Suicide is not allowed socially, religiously, as well as
legally throughout world; however altruistic suicide (for a
national cause) is acceptable in every society and he is
honoured as national hero. International statistics on suicide
shows higher ratio of male suicide than those of female, but on
contrary in China the case is totally different. China has the
highest suicide rate in the world, with an over all suicide rate
of 230 per million people, while the world average is only one
hounded per million people
21
. According to study by Harvard
University, the World Bank and World Health Organization,
some 56 per cent of the worlds female suicides (about 500 per
day) occur in China. Most of the victims are young rural
women
22
. There are reports that about 287,000 persons commit
suicide and 2 million more attempt it every year in China, 75
per cent of them occur in rural areas and female suicide rate is
25 per cent higher than that of males. Suicide is currently
number one killer of people aged 15-34 in China, accounting 30
percent of deaths in this age range
23
. Why female suicide rate
in china is higher than that of males? Answer to this question
according to eminent French Sociologist Emile Durkheim lies
in complex social structure. He focused on social facts, social
structures, cultural norms, and values, all of which he argued
are external to the individual
24
. Keeping this in mind, now we
should have to look at the present position of women both
economically and socially in Chinese traditional society. They
have lower social, economic and educational status, they suffer
selective- abortion because of son preference and one child
policy, frequent domestic violence, trafficking and purchase,
and female infanticide. In this oppressive situation woman
suffers a lot socially, economically, and psychologically. There
are also reports that women failed to give birth to a male child
even after many selective abortions, are beaten, humiliated,
maltreated in family and even divorced in many cases, who
often prefer to commit suicide as an offensive protest against
the complex social structure in China.
g) Diffusion of HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted
Diseases
The Chinese government currently estimates up to one million
Chinese citizens may be infected with the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus HIV/AIDS. However,
World Heath experts believe the real figure lies between 1.5
and two million, and the United Nations Program on AIDS
(UNAIDS) projects China could have between 10 and 15
million HIV cases by the year 2010
25
. The number of people
living with HIV/AIDS in the Chinese capital has grown by an
average of 40.6 per cent each year since 1998. In 2002 alone, the
number of HIV cases rose 140 percent. Currently there are
more than 3 million sex workers in China. The increasing
number of sex workers has also given birth to a many sexually
transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS. In 1988, China
reported 56,090 STD cases, and by December 1989 the total
number of reported annual STD cases reached 204,077. In 2002
alone, more than 740,000 cases of STDs were reported. There
are five major modes of HIV/AIDS transmission; intravenous
drug users (IDUs), commercial blood donors, homosexual
transmission, heterosexual transmission and mother to Infant
transmission. The IDUs transmission ratio is decreasing while
heterosexual and mother to- infant transmission of HIV/AIDS
is increasing in China. It clearly shows the increasing unsafe
prostitution in China.
1
Dudely L. Postan, et. al., Fertility, Family Planning and Population Policy in
China, Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 54.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., p. 25.
4
Marting C. Yang, A Chinese Village, Routledge, London, 1998, p.102.
5
William A. Joseph (ed.) China Briefing 1991, Westview Press, Inc., Boulder,
1992, p. 89.
6
Zubair Sharif, Poverty Alleviation through Population Planning in China: A Role
Model for Pakistan, Dissertation for M.phil Degree, University of Sindh, Jamshoro,
2005, p.85.
7
Mary Synder, Governmental Control and Cultural Adaptation: A Comparison
between Rural and Urban Reactions to Chinas Fertility Control Policies, Luce
Foundation Grant for China Studies, Portland,2000, p. 3.
http://web.reed.edu/luce/documents/SnyderLuce Report.pdf
8
Ibid,. p. 9.
9
Ibid. , p. 13.
10
China Daily, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/17/content_760772.htm
11
The Christian Science Monitor, www.csmonitor.com/2004/0903/p01s03-
woap.html
12
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-09/21/content_694252.htm
13
Wang Feng, Can China Afford to Continue its One- Child Policy? Analysis from
East- West Center No. 17, 2005, http://easrwestcenter.org/scored/pdfs/apio77.pdf
14
Abortion Policies: A Global Review, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, New York: United Nations; 2001. pp. 9495.
15
Mary Synder, op. cit., p. 22
16
International Womens Rights Action Watch, http://iwraw.igc.org/publications/
countries/china.htm
17
Asian and Pacific Islander Institute on Domestic Violence, San Francisco
California, http://www.apiahf.org/apidvinstitute/CriticalIssues/trafficking.htm
18
Coalition against Trafficking in Women, http://www.catwinternational.org/
factbook /China%20and%20Hong%20Kong.php
19
International Women Rights Action Watch, http://iwraw.igc.org/publications
/countries/china.htm
20
China Human Rights Forum No.1. 2005, http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents
/article?revision%5fid=31865&item%5fid=21614
21
Association for Asian Research, New York, http://www.asianresearch.org/
articles /1697.html
22
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview
/mmwrhtml/,,5322a6.htm
23
Suicide Becomes Largest Killer of Young Adults in China, Voice of America,
April 20, 2004.
24
http://www.radford.edu/~junnever/theory/durkheim.htm
25
China AIDS Survey, Monetary, California, 2003, http://www.casy.org/
overview.htm
CHINAS SOUTH ASIAN CURIOSITIES
AND STRATEGIES
Ishrat Afshan Abbasi
Abstract
he aim of this article is to demonstrate the China's
strategic, economic and political interests in South
Asia linked to its global policies. The article first looks
at the swift emergence of China as a global power, besides it
highlights its current worldwide targets in various social
spheres. Then, it presents the political and economic scenario
of South Asia so as to ascertain the current state of order within
the region to account for the proper standing of China. The
core of this article is version of growing importance of South
Asian periphery for the accomplishment of Chinas security
objectives. Certain positive impacts of the inclusion of China in
the SAARC for furtherance of mutual cordiality have also been
revealed in this paper. In pursuance of the achievement of the
most crucial interests in South Asia, China has sought some
significant strategies, which are featured here. The article
concludes by noting that for peaceful co-existence with South
Asian states in order to achieve its world-reaching interests as
well as the united Asia as a world power, China needs
unconditional cooperation of India.
Lecturer, Department of International Relations, University of Sindh,

Jamshoro
Introduction
Chinas South Asian interests are security oriented. This region
is economically and strategically a source of wide-reaching
opportunities for China because it leads her to oil producing
region, Middle East and rich Central Asia, which is both geo-
politically and geo-economically paramount for her. In order to
cope with the Indian rivalry, for long time, Chinas
fundamental strategy, designed for the extension of interests,
was to build Pakistan as a competitor of India in order to
maintain balance of power in the region.
In the post cold war era under the changing international
scenario from bipolar to unilateralist, it had been impetus for
both India and China to transform their priorities and policies
for the promotion of their global interests; in this regard they
emphasized the change for the better relations with strong
regional powers. As a result, the two emerging-market
economies initiated to engage economically and became
awesome economic partners. Notwithstanding, varying Sino-
India interaction from estranged relations to economic-
engagement, Chinese interests in South Asian region are still
challenged. Certain major challenges, China is confronting
with in South Asia, are Indias emergence as a rising global
power and her hegemonic command over the region.
Moreover, emerging US hold and interference in South Asia
and US-India strategic partnership are creating hindrances in
the way of its peaceful co-existence with South Asia.
Despite all these challenges China aims to enlarge multi-
dimensional accommodating relations implying military as
well as political and economic relations to multiply her own
economic and political power in the region and to deter back
the influence of her potentially hostile powers (currently the
U.S.) to damage Chinas welfare. In this regard there are
arranged periodic visits between China and larger South Asian
countries leaderships to exchange views on mutual bilateral,
regional and international concerns. Cooperation in
transportation is currently particular and important form of
Chinas expanding ties to South Asian countries. Besides, she is
more concerned regarding the maintainance of existing balance
of power between India and Pakistan for the security of the
region as well as the extension of her own interests.
Emergence of China as a Global Power
In the literature of International Relations the term global
power is an added present-day term for great power, which
characterizes the impact of the various dynamics of
Globalization upon states activities and polices in all its
manifestations. In keeping with this phenomenon, at present,
the great power standing is a matter to encompass every
sphere of social life, concurrently. Admittedly, this situation
requires the states to keep more economic and diplomatic heft
in their bilateral, regional and international arena so as to spin
the international order in favor. Above and beyond, it
conditions for states the competent interaction with non-state
actors, regional associations, and the instruments and
institutions of global governance. Accordingly, the term global
power is above all assigned for the competent contemporary
great powers that are capable to uphold their rise and make the
most of their potential and resources to fortify or emasculate
the continuing worldwide configuration.
According to Hedley Bull's classic 1977 work, The Anarchical
Society International system belongs to such a social order of
states that preserve balance-of-power to prevent a global
dictatorship emerging through imperial conquest. Besides the
balancing-of-power for maintaining this socially constructed
system, great powers additionally slot in the order preserving
mechanisms of international law, diplomacy, and joint
management of the system. Accordingly, 21
st
century global
power retains inalienable strength for the promotion of its
interest hangs on to influential position in world market,
possesses formidable military capability, Information
technology skills as well as pursues effectively and
dynamically the projects and initiatives of international
instruments against regional and global security threats.
Being a member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council,
and a peer Competitor of United States, People's Republic of
China (PRC) belongs to the elite club of recognized great
powers and proc-active performer of global market. It is
involved in more than 1000 international governmental
organizations that deal with issues of Human security besides,
it is a staunch supporter of pacific settlement of disputes under
UN charter and areas under discussion of International Law.
1
In the appreciation of all these tremendous characters China is
globally titled as Giant Economic Power , Super Energy
Power and Global Power.
Previously, In the course of remarkable and triumphant
reformation period of Chinese history, the key goal and the
bedrock of its foreign policy were rigorous to revitalize the all-
embracing national strength via economic development. In
order to pull off the indomitable end Chinese leadership
persistently pushed for non-violent regional and global
environment. Sketching the key foreign policy principals of
China, the architect of the reformation policy Deng Xiaoping
superbly asserted the establishments claim. According to him
We observe developments soberly, maintain our position,
meet challenges calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time,
remain free of ambitions, never claim leadership.
Afterward, in 1993, this statement was amended by President
Jiang Zemin in order to magnetize US for unwavering relations
with China. He declared that enhancing cooperation,
reducing troubles, expanding cooperation, and avoiding
confrontation were main foreign Policy objectives of China.
2
However, the years ahead witnessed a prominent shift in
Chinas foreign policy and politics which was then focused on
its east coast of the Taiwan Straits even Asia as a whole ranked
relatively low in its security agenda but subsequently by virtue
of Chinas escalation via reformation policy and its self-assured
regional policies of the early to mid-1990s as regards to Taiwan
and the South China Sea had alarmed its neighbors and
intensified the probability of curtailing expanding china as a
high-flying part of United States Asian strategy. From then on,
the reserved and inert political move toward no argue for
leadership, holding back competence and spotlight just on
internal strength keeping aside the external regional and
international issues had been no more workable for its smooth
survival. Consequently, it was to demonstrate economic and
military clout assuring the world regarding peaceful rise up by
way of no menace to the world community. For the sake of
acting upon its new-fangled security concept by 1996, Beijing
went on a track to develop mutual trust and ties of common
interests with Asian multilateral security and economic
organizations first.
3
Bringing up the recent active policy approaches of China the
Information Office of the State Council published a white
paper titled Chinas National Defense in 2006 It describes:
China pursues a road of peaceful development,
and endeavors to build, together with others a
harmonious world of enduring peace and common
prosperity. Never before has China been so closely
bound up with the rest of the world as it is today.
The Chinese government works to advance both the
fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the
common interests of the peoples of the rest of the
world, and pursues a defense policy, which is
purely defensive in nature. Chinas national
defense, in keeping with and contributing to the
countrys development and security strategies, aims
at maintaining national security and unity, and
ensuring the realization of the goal of building a
moderately prosperous society in an all-round way.
China is determined to remain a staunch force for
global peace, security and stability. Chinas national
defense and military modernization, conducted on
the basis of steady economic development, is the
requirement of keeping up with new trends in the
global revolution and development in military
affairs, and of maintaining Chinas national security
and development.
4
Presently Chinas Security climax highlights the under
mentioned broad approaches:
Modernization of military potential
Endorsement of passive regional and international order
contributing economic security to regional actors
Vie with Americas escalating being there in its
contiguous areas, in coalition with regional actors
Access to world markets, advanced technology, capital
investment and managerial know how.
5
Political-Economic Scenario of South Asia
South Asia is one of such regions of the world, which
regardless of their fragile and backward situation hold on to a
frontline position in world politics on account of their un-
diminishing strategic significance. Even if it is a hub of
International politics nevertheless this region could havent
achieved the outstanding lead. In view of the fact that this
region has witnessed a more complex order wherein the forces
of conflict and cooperation are simultaneously at work. Briefly,
on the one hand, there is consensus for peace and
development, on the other; strife and conflict are disturbing the
regional balance.
The main inter-state problems, which have given South Asia an
intricate shape, are:
Porous borders (owing to it population of one country
influx another)
Cross border terrorism
Blame game on one an other
6
Being a sole well-built economic and conventional military
power of South Asia, India reigns not merely as a leader of the
region but alongside attempts to influence policy process of
almost all the countries of the region due to which all the
neighboring countries with exception to Maldives, blame India
for imposition of its will upon their external matters plus
impede and vitiate the internal political matters. Despite all
these facts, in recent times, the other states of the region have
committed them to economic reforms, restructuring and
national revitalization aligned with it they have made new
headway in these aspects.
Growing Significance of South Asia for China
Consistent with the series of archaeological discoveries and
manuscripts, China-South Asia interaction dates back to 2000
years when by 221 BC cultural and commerce interaction had
initiated to develop between China and the Indian
subcontinent that was known as Tian Zhu (the western
heaven) as a revered swath.
7
Buddhism exclusively provides
the strongest link between the two societies. Gautam Buddha,
who was born and had acquired knowledge about the ultimate
truth in South Asia, very many lives life-size everywhere in
China. The civilization of China and South Asia thus holds
common source of inspiration with a profound degree of
connectivity.
8
Beijings recent South Asia policy is guided by security
considerations these were historical legacies of disputed border
claims and mutual suspicions against the expansionist policies
of the British Empire and Chinas communist regime. This
correlation was further messed up by Cold War bipolarism.
9
Geographically, China and South Asia are linked by land,
water, mountains and rivers, which compose the two ends ties
more natural and comprehensive. Mountains pass through and
major rivers flow down to China and South Asia from the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR) of China, which has made this
linkage more stable.
Tibet in particular conditioned China in formulation of its
South Asia policy and to the stability in its frontier regions,
because the question of Tibetan separatism raised by external
forces had apprehended China regarding its national integrity
and domestic stability so in order to comprehend the internal
and external features of Tibetan question it was essential to
reform and appreciate linkages with all those states and
organizations which supported the national integrity of China
and voiced against external intervention in the sovereignty of
China. South Asian countries abreast of other friends of China
discouraged separating elements on Chinas soil; therefore the
immediate creed of Chinas South Asian policy was to
maintain peace at the South West border region and signing
border treaties with south Asian neighboring countries.
10
China's entre in South Asia gained impetus in 1980s after its
conversion into the market economy in the 1980s, which made
possible for China to risk investing capital in the strife torn
region of South Asia. China skillfully deployed economic
incentives to draw Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka
into its strategic orbit.
11
But, rather the main hindrance ahead
for China concerning its achievements in the region was inter-
state suspicions, imbalanced attitude in relations with each
other and exploitation and gains at the cost of other regional
states. As a strong power of the region and rising global power
India has never liked the furthering Chinese inclination
towards other countries of his domain. In the face of such
numerous objectionable inducements China continued to
cultivate independently bilateral ties with small South Asian
countries. It has ever voiced for the sovereign existence of these
countries. Especially, after 1962-border war with India become
more conscious about the strategic significance of small
neighboring countries of South Asia as regard to the peace and
stability of China's frontier regions.
12
Strategically China keeps deep affinity with Indias
neighboring countries, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri
Lanka and Pakistan. Bangladesh is a gateway into Indias state
of Arunachal Pradesh, which is bone of contention between the
two countries because of Chinas territorial claims over this
part. Bangladesh is abundant with natural gas reserves, which
is the main cause of Chinese tilt towards this poor country.
China accolades Bangladesh for its immense natural gas
reserves. Bangladesh's geographic proximity with Myanmar
makes this land accessible to China. The most interesting point
in case of the strategic position of Bangladesh is that so as to
get access to Myanmar for exploiting its gas reserves, India as
well spin around on Dhaka's readiness to let a passageway.
13
In case of cordial relations with Nepal it works like a shield for
Chinas well being in Tibet area. Holding back the influence of
India over Nepal she is trying to mount her hold through
infrastructure building projects. All the concerned indications
reveal the strategic importance of Nepal for China, which is not
energy based like Bangladesh but because of its natural
boundaries and frontiers, on the one hand Nepal's borders join
China's agitated western province of Tibet and on the other
hand it touches the Naxalite-dominated Indian states. This
cross way provides golden chance to Nepals Maoist
insurgents to infiltrate into Nexaliites influence districts of
India. As a result, both China and India vie for Katmandu's
favor. But China avoids interfering in the internal matters of
Nepal while India likes to keep influence upon its political
matters. For China Internal peace and stability of Nepal is
important to keep it away from foreign (Indian and US
influence) in order to save Tibet region from new troubles.
Sri Lanka too, occupies strategically important heft in the
Indian Ocean stretching from the Middle East to Southeast
Asia. Having an easy approach to South East Asia, it attaches
importance to Beijing. After 9/11, Sri Lanka has been
strategically important for the U.S too, which sought access to
the ports of Sri Lanka, airfields and air space for its armed
forces under the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement
(ACSA). This western approach to Sri Lanka is unendurable for
Both China and India, which jostle to see Sri Lanka out of
Western alliances to maintain their own influence in the region.
Indias reputation in front of Sri Lanka is already suspicious
because having a Tamil-majority state of its own treads she
cautiously mediates the conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils
of Sri Lanka. Conversely, China keeps no profound regard for
the separation movement of Tamils and vouches for the
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and supports it from all the
angles.
14
In the consideration of vital importance of all the South Asian
countries and a marvelous move towards the prosperous
escalation of relations it can be avowed that unwavering
environment in Chinas South Asian periphery is conducive to
Chinas smooth economic swap with the countries of the
region. Needless to mention, South Asia in many respects
offers economic opportunities, which according to China
laying the foundation, I-e, political understanding, peace and
stability. Prime Minister Zhu Rongji views that South Asia is
an important part of the world boasting a vast land area of five
million square kilometers and 1.3 billion diligent and talented
people.
In sum, a stable and peaceful South Asia free from military
confrontation and war is actual desire of China in
consideration of its geographical location, strategic position,
and geo-political significance.
15
South Asia in Chinas Energy Strategy
According to UNCTAD report:
Energy is one of the most important drivers of economic
development and is a
Key determinant for the quality of our daily lives, it is
probably the biggest
business in the world economy, with a turnover of at
least $1.72 trillion a year.
The future investment in the global energy sector is potentially
the most important sole issue of international economic
development other than the management of the world
economy itself. In the consequence of 9/11 events, current Iraqi
situation, and vitiating relations between Iran and US, the
volatility in the oil market can be widely esteemed which will
pose jeopardizing risks to economies. In view of these facts, the
worlds giant economic power and Energy Super Power
China has also been concerned about energy security.
16
China
is the worlds second largest consumer of energy after the US.
In 2006, China imported 47% of its oil demand from overseas.
It is the largest potential market for energy products, services
and technology. This increasing dependency on oil and gas
has urged her to frame its inter-state relations on bilateral,
regional and international level complying with the diplomatic
and pacific mechanism to ensure and guarantee the safety of
oil import routes through international shipping lanes and
pipelines. As a consequence, oil has been one of the chief
determinants of Chinas foreign policy and a big constraint for
future economic development.
17
Presently, like other energy seekers China as well intends to
apply the under mentioned polices:
It desires to come up with sustainable way out for energy
security,
It requires to overcome obstructions in the way of
exploration and quest,
It aims at step up the progress of cross-border power and
gas projects.
It needs boosting countrywide self-sufficiency because it
lacks the naval power and foreign maritime basis to
guarantee the safety of oil import routes.
18
With regard to aforementioned plans, China intends to take
advantage of South Asian sea-lanes of communication.
International shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf through the
Indian Ocean and some critical straits, such as the Strait of
Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca and Taiwan Strait, which have
exposed new importance for China as it still relies on oil
supply from Middle East.
19
China imports half of its oil from the Middle East plus North
and East Africa. Almost all of that oil shifts to China by tankers
crossways the Indian Ocean. China splendidly understands the
strategic importance of the Indian Ocean for its energy
security. Since, Chinas economic vivacity and energy depends
a great deal on sea-borne trade therefore this authenticity is of
mounting magnitude for China that the Indian Ocean takes
over the profit-making and economic links of the Asia-Pacific
region. China can confront several potential threats to its trans-
Indian ocean oil supply like:
Closure of the strategic choke points of the Persian Gulf,
South East Asia and the South China Sea Strait
A confrontation between Iran and the United States that
could be cause of economic sanctions or military actions
which probably restrict oil shipments through the Strait of
Hormuz
As a result of escalating India China conflict India might
severe Chinas very important oil imports
US-PRC conflict over Taiwan might be escalated into US
naval blockade of China.
These are just Contingencies which might not turned into
reality even so such attentiveness keeps the military
institutions on high alert to face the unforeseen events.
Advancement of robust overland transportation system
between Yunnan and the Bay of Bengal, and between Western
Xinjiang and Gawadar could substantially reinforce the
Peoples Liberation Armys aptitude to maintain powerful
military maneuver in the eastern and western Indian oceans.
Newly created transport lines via Myanmar and Pakistan could
also be useful to persist in Chinas oil commerce across the
India Ocean.
20
To keep the sea-lanes open and escort Chinese tankers transit
the strategic straits, China has found many new entrants in
South Asia to keep its sea-lanes open and safe. In this regard
the innovative participant is Maldives. According to Media
reports Abdul Gayoom government in 2001 during the Chinese
Prime Minister Zhu Rongjis visit to Maldives gave consent to
establish a base in Marao , to monitor its sea-lanes, which run
along the Indian coast. Besides, it would be able to monitor US
naval activity at Diego Garcia and also engage in electronic
surveillance in the area. For successful sea-lane security the
China has developed a strategy directed to assist Myanmar,
Maldives, Pakistan and Iran to assure naval facilities.
Importantly, much of the assistance is concentrated along the
sea-lane from Malacca to Hormuz. Myanmar too, provides
China the desired strategic surge into Indian Ocean via
Intelligence network. This electronic intelligence network in
Myanmar is masterpiece of Chinas strategic assistance.
Chinese initiatives for oil-security can be seen in Pakistan too.
In March 2002, the visiting Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo
laid the foundation stone of a deep-sea port at Gwadar, which
contains strategic significance for China and helps it to sit
astride the sea-lane originating from the strategic choke point
of Hormuz
21
.
Nurturing Close and Cordial Sino-India Relations: A Need of
Time
Although China and India for the largest part of History have
remained as adversary and competent allies, this antagonistic
approach witnessed a good change in the Post Cold war era
and both the rival countries were seen working together for the
third category of relations that maintains partnership potential.
Following this category the two developed powers retain a
comprehensive common illustration of the globe under
multipolar structure with capacity for diplomatic options and
sovereignty.
22
Since the early 1990s, India is moving rapidly in the fields of
economic privatization and marketing programme. Its growth
rate has remained steadily at 5 to 7 percent over the last
decade. The GDP has reached US$ 484.5 billion, and ranks 12
th
among world economies.
In economic frontage India have abundance of learned
professionals, IT personnel, and a 200-million middle-class
consumer market. With this excess skills India is Chinas main
competitor for foreign investment and leading power in
information Technology industry along with US.
Simultaneously, being in the rank of militarily developed
countries, its military expenses have amplified by up to 20
percent or more in a decade. Now it has been one of the
prevalent importers in the world arms market. Now, being a
manufacturer of high-tech military equipment and procurer of
aircraft carriers by manufacturing and procuring its naval
capability has augmented to project its power in the India
Ocean, South China Sea, and so forth. At ease with its
economic and military approaches India has set off to trail, A
look east policy, which entails her to extend its sphere of
influence and procure a larger contribution in political,
economic, and strategic benefits in South-East Asia.
23
In view of Indias prevailing range of influence in all spheres of
life, adopting conciliatory approach, China should try to shun
treating her as a geo-political rival since any extreme approach
against her could go ahead to a retaliatory policy that
emasculate Chinas interests in South Asia and slow down its
policy options to muddle through the new strategic backdrop
in this region.
24
There are a number of common issues between them, which
can adjoin the two to the dimension of cooperation, such as:
Both the countries share similar acuity for styling multi-
polar and balanced world order in which an impartial
correlation of forces will safeguard international
security and prop up fair and equitable course in
economic order in place of current unbalanced economic
structural design
They hold somewhat analogous viewpoint for the way
out of global issues such as, environment, nuclear Non-
proliferation, arms control and disarmament and the
need to narrow down the gap between the
industrialized North and the developing South
The two hold similar views on international terrorism,
they are splendidly aware of its effects on global
security. Consequently, they support counter terrorism
actions under the aegis of United Nations. Bilaterally,
they concur an exchange of information and intelligence
between them on a regular basis. Such actions would
lead them to greater understanding and cooperation
concerning other issues as well.
25
A very interesting and main dimension of the evolving Sino-
Indian relationship that on one hand contains competiton but
on the other side shows a degree of cooperation too, is based
on the energy requirements of their industrial expansion and
their big ventures with regard to investing in the oilfields
abroad - in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. They
dont affrord long confrontation on this issue as they are
already confronting with other major players of global oil
market.
26
In spite of evolving Sino-India relations the danger of
escalating new problems cannot be avoided which are likely to
come in the way of future Sino-China relations. The major one
could be China and Indias perception of each others position
and role in Asia and in the International community. It is not
only the result of Chinas rapid growth, but also of Indias fast
development. At Chinese end, it is indeed imperative to
acquire a better understanding of Indias growth, behavior,
and the techniques as India is going to use its increasing power
in the region and the world at large. In tandem, it is essential
for both sides to take it into serious account whether their
power would not lead to extra power politics
27
On Indian side
its her own responsibility to give first priority to its regional
security in collaboration with neighboring country China, in
this regard it should give cold-shoulder to any long term and
meaningful US alliance against her counterpart. A stronger
India should not jeopardize Chinas fundamental interests.
Facing a rising India, China as well must show smiling
expressions rather than bad blood. As Deng Xiaoping asserted
in 1980s, only after China and India became strong, the
century could be called as a century of the Asia-Pacific region .
Nurturing closer and better Sino-Indian relations are mutually
beneficial for them. Therefore, being geo-strategic and geo-
political partners, the two countries should take concrete steps
to compete for the betterment of South and East Asia.
28
Pakistans Un-diminishing Implications for China
Since the conclusion of a boundary agreement in 1963, in lieu
of several changes inside and outside the circumstances of
Pakistan, China has stood as her long-term time tested friend.
29
In the case of Pakistan, it was the security imperative arising
from the hostility of a bigger and stronger neighbor, which
carried her close to this neighboring great power. While, in
case of China, it was recognition of Pakistans importance as a
leader of the Muslim world and later the partnership with US
exclusively against rival India, which convinced her to
strengthen the stability of Pakistan for the security of its own
strategic interests in Asia.
30
Since then the two countries have
maintained very committed relationship.
It was only after 9/11 events that due to rising inclination of
USA to South Asia and in consequence, Chinas rising cordial
relations with India, some misgivings were learnt regarding
future Pak-China relations. Since then two issues continue to
worry the Chinese. One is the continuing ability of radical
Islamists to disturb the peace in Muslim areas of China and the
further one is its alarming scale of cooperation and
collaboration with United States and Nato. Though China does
not speak out publicly, yet it is keeping it on a side might be in
the wait of Pakistans future policy. While growing Sino-Indian
relations have cautioned and concerned Pakistan regarding
future Chinese policy towards Pakistan.
31
Even with the presence of concerns on both the ends regarding
each others shifting policies in the changing international
scenario there are available all mature incentives for the proper
growth of cordial relations.
32
In terms of Chinas economic
engagement, Pakistan still remains Chinas biggest market for
its capital investment in infrastructure project.
33
Meanwhile,
there are a multitude of cooperation sectors between two.
Pakistans leadership has offered the land of Pakistan
ascorridor for Chinas energy, trade and other regional
activism. It vows to provide a shortcut route and contributes to
all kinds of trade and energy cooperation to China to move on
Central Asia.
34
To quote Pan Zhiping, Director of the Center for
the Central Asian studies of the Xinjiang Academy of Social
Sciences: Pakistans Gawadar Port is capable of serving as
Chinas important energy transfer station. Oil from Africa and
Middle East will reach the port and go on to China via road,
rail, or pipelines. Ni Yanshuo in his article Corridor of
Cooperation , published in Beijing Review in March 2006,
writes To China, Pakistans role is far beyond the energy
corridor. It is also the sea channel between China and the
Indian Ocean and as the land channel connecting China and
Iran. Its unique geographical position connecting East Asia and
West Asia and joining the Indian Ocean and the surrounding
area of Asia thereby it supplies a new channel to China to come
within reach of world.
35
Chinas support for Pakistan, however, is unlikely to
completely diminish in the coming decade. The main reason
for this continuity resides ironically in the feeble economic
situation of Pakistan particularly as compared to India. With
out sufficient economic, political, and military support, a
further decline in its condition could introduce an element of
extreme instability in Pakistan. This, in turn, would have
implications for Chinese security on its western flanks. The
next incentive is relevant to Pakistans geog-strategic position,
which is situated on the eastern flank of Middle Eastern/Gulf
countries. Considering the US long-term presence in these
regions, China is unlikely to reduce its support for Pakistan to
a level where the latter is forced to align itself completely with
Washington without any reference to Beijings access to the
only state straddling both South Asia and the Middle East. For
the next decade, too, China and Pakistan will continue to
operate as partners.
36
Analyzing the future Sino-Pak relations Pakistans analyst
ought to consider the position of China in this shifting
scenario, which is not only regional power but a global power
too, which is dealing with other super power and great powers
rivalry. Our relation with this neighboring global power must
be based on economic and commercial links in the first place. .
In addition, being a good strategic partner of China we ought
to show concerns for the promotion of legitimate Chinese
interests which would be defensive for Pakistan in future. In
this respect, we should try to turn down the demands of USA
for transit facilities for imports and exports through Pakistani
territory via the ports of Gawadar and Karachi to reject any
role in the United States policy directed at the containment of
China. Pakistan should try to normalize its relations with India
so that the two countries could rely less on United States.
37
Harmonious Advancement of Sino-SAARC Association
Since long China has been endeavoring to promote equally and
liberally some common affiliations with South Asian countries
but devoid of multilateral platform, her march on South Asia
was short of an organized approach. This Chinese attempt was
materialized by means of its inclusion as an observer state in
South Asian Association along with United States, Japan,
European Union and North Korea. As an observer partner of
SAARC, China intends to facilitate contacts and interaction
among the major regional cooperation mechanisms therefore
China's involvement can be expected to further an Asian
consensus and cooperation, contributing to the realization of a
harmonious Asia.
38
The main proposals of China for harmonizing relations with
South Asia include:
Lessening poor quality of living in the region by means of
collaborative apparatus
Setting up standard conventions between China and
South Asia countries for the release and alleviation of
adversities
To make stronger the existing support with South Asia to
upward key transportation and energy sectors
Backing further ventures in SAARC countries
Spiraling support for human resource education
Introducing public exchange programmes
Academic exchange programmes with SAARC countries
are also one of the main proposals.
39
Chinas inclusion in SAARC as an observer has facilitated
SAARC nations to seek closer economic ties with this land-
linked giant neighbor. As an observer nation to SAARC, now
China can feasibly push for in-depth development of trade and
other economic engagements as well as political associations
with all the nation states of this region.
40
In order to create a deep linkage with this association China
needs to successfully enforce all its major proposals in this
region. At the first place, China will have to convince India to
join hands with her for the integrity and stability of region
because India was the sole adversary to the Chinese inclusion
in the seven-nation regional grouping (SAARC) as a dialogue
partner or observer. Even though India stood isolated on this
question, because no other member country was apathetic to
this proposal, rather Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal gave warm
welcome to Chinas entrance in the association. According to
South Asian Analysts and Observers India believes that
Chinas entry into SAARC would cast a shadow on Indias
influential standing in the region that means a big blow to her
economic interests and political status in the region .
Conversely, China's presence in SAARC means more
opportunities for India and other SAARC members.
Conceivably, SAARC serves China and India as a potential
platform for cooperation in a multilateral setting and a
precious opportunity for these two biggest developing
countries of Asia to have deeper understanding about each
other
41
.
Indeed, the pleasant advance of China-SAARC relations is
largely left to the well-coordinated joint efforts of parties both
within and exterior the region. There is a need for
institutionalized dialogue mechanism between the two.
42
Conclusion
The South Asian adjoins the Central Asia in the North, borders
the Middle East in the West, and has power over the Indian
Ocean to the South; in this manner it maintains an exceedingly
vital strategic position in Asia. This extraordinary crucial
footing has made it a gate way for China to the out side world
and a source of promoting worldwide interests. Chinas
foreign policy approach is shaped by three main deliberations:
swift economic enlargement, magnificent status as a major
power, and its functioning as a global player. Chinas South
Asian policy is also devised in line with these three realities
therefore it engulfs all the three tracks: strategic, economic and
political. In order to meet with challenges in concerned sphere
of activities to achieve determined interests in the region,
China is working on some imperative strategies such as;
Expanding friendly and multi- dimensional cooperation with
all South Asian countries, Supporting independence of these
countries and their independent decision-making, Minimizing
Indian Alignment with Washington, Diminishing American
influence in South Asia, Maintaining China and South Asia
Balance of Power. Safe guarding energy sea-lanes of
communication China helps sustaining a balance in India-
Pakistan relations.
For the realization of these policies China needs inevitably the
mutual aid of India, which can be possible escaping the traps
of USA and giving way to the wide-range deepening
relationships between two. In this respect, they need to adopt
common concerns and efforts in terms of the united Asia.
Chinas inclusion in SAARC is a segment of this chain.
1
http://www.international-relations.com/CM6-2WB/GlobalChinaWB.htm
2
Rosemary Foot, Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global Order:
Accommodating and Hedging, International Affairs, Volume 82, Issue 1, pp.84-
85.
3
Speech by Tang Jiaxuan, available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng
4
Chinas National Defense in 2006 (Xinhua), December 2006, Beijing, Available
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/29/content_771191.htm
5
K Santhanam and Srikanth Kondapalli (eds), Asian security and China 2000-210,
Shipra, New Delhi, 2004.p.302.
6
Syed Ali Mujtaba, Soundings on South Asia, New Dawn Press, 2005, New Delhi.
pp.2-3.
7
Swaran Singh, Sino-South Asian Ties: Problems & Prospects, Strategic
Analysis, April 2000, Volume XXIV No.1, see at http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/
sa_apr00sis01.ht
8
Dr Upendra Gautam, China-South Asia political relations: A view from Nepal,
13 January 2006, at http://nation.ittefaq.com/artman/publish/article_24622.shtml
9
Swaran Singh, Sino-South Asian Ties: Problems & Prospects, Strategic
Analysis, April 2000, Vol XXIV No.1, see at http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa
/sa_apr00sis01.ht
10
13 January 2006, at http://nation.ittefaq.com/artman/publish/article_24622.shtml
11
Tarique Niazi, Chinas March on South Asia, China Brief, April 26, 2005, also
see at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp? Parentid=23468
12
January 13, 2006, at http://nation.ittefaq.com/artman/publish/article_24622.shtml
13
Dutta, Sreeradha, Security of India's Northeast: External Linkage, Strategic
Analysis, vol. Xxiv , November8, 2000
14
Tarique Niazi, Chinas March on South Asia, China Brief, April 2005, also see
At http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=23468 and
http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2613.html
15
K Santhanam & Srikanth Kondapalli (ed), op.cit, p-29
16
Mehmet gt, Chinas Energy Security: Geopolitical Implications for Asia
and Beyond, Gas, Oil and Law Intelligence, Volume I, issue# 02,26-27, January
2003,New Delhi, India,see at http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles
/article_15.htm
17
Ibid
18
Mehmet gt, Chinas Energy Security: Geopolitical Implications for Asia
and Beyond, Gas, Oil and Law Intelligence, Volume I, issue# 02,28-29, January
2003,New Delhi, India,see at http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles
/article_15.htm
19
Fan He, Donghai Qin, Chinas Energy Strategy in the Twenty First Century,
China & World Economy, Volume 14, Issue 2: 93-104, March 2006, available at
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1749-124X.2006
20
John W. Garver, Chinas South Asian Interests and Policies, prepared for Panel
on Chinas Approaches to South Asia and the Former Soviet States by US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, 22 July 2005, available at
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/
garver_john_wrts.pdf
21
Sergei Troush, Chinas Changing Oil Strategy and its Foreign Policy
Implications, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Foreign Policy Studies,
Working Paper, fall 1999.
22
Tariq Fatemi, In the Wake of Hus Visit, Dawn, December 2, 2006
23
Santhanam & Srikanth Kondapalli (ed), op.cit, pp.293-294
24
Ibid
25
K Santhanam and Srikanth Kondapalli(eds), op.cit, p.288
26
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Indian_relations
27
A.G.Noorani, China and South Asia: A Review Article, see at
http://www.hinduonnet.com /fline/fl2303/stories/20060224000607600.htm
28
K Santhanam & Srikanth Kondapalli(ed), op.cit, p-298
29
Maqbool Ahmed Bhatty, Chinas Indispensable Partnership, Dawn, 12, 2006
30
Tarique Fatemi, In the Wake of Hus Visit Dawn, December2, 2006
31
K Santhanam & Srikanth Kondapalli(ed), op.cit, pp-310-311
32
Ishrat Afshan Abbasi, Pakistans Foreign Policy in the Changing International
Scenario, Proceedings of One Day International Seminar on New Directions of
Pakistans Foreign Policy: Geopolitics, Security and Development, organized by
Department of International relations and Area Study Centre, Far East and South
East Asia, University of Sindh, Jamshoro-Pakistan, p.181.
33
Dr Swaran Singh, China -South Asia: Changing Contours http://www.ndu.edu/
inss/symposia/pacific2006/singhpaper.pdf
34
Ni Yanshou, A Corridor of Cooperation, Beijing Review (Beijing), Vol.49,
No.13, 30 March 2006, p.16.
35
Ni Yanshou, A Corridor of Cooperation, Beijing Review (Beijing), Vol.49,
No.13, 30 March 2006, p.17.
36
K Santhanam & Srikanth Kondapalli(ed), op.cit, pp-317-318
37
Tayyab Siddique, Chinese Diplomacy in South Asia, Dawn, 28 November
2006
38
Fu Xiaoqiang, South Asia Moving Toward Closer China Relations, China
Daily, 3April, 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-04/03/
content_842196.htm
39
http://jmsc.hku.hk/blogs/inews/2007/04/11/as-an-observer-in-saarc-china-aims-
to-increase-its-cooperation-with-south-asia/
40
China Accorded SAARC Observer Status, Xinhua News Agency, November
14, 2005 http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/148692.htm
41
Su Qiang, China Makes First Visit to SAARC, China Daily, April 3, 2007.
See at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-04/03/content_842112.htm
42
Fu Xiaoqiang, South Asia Moving Toward Closer China Relations, China
Daily, April 3,2007 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-04/03/
content_842196.htm
PAKISTAN-LAOS ECONOMIC
AND TRADE RELATIONS
Dr Muhammad Ayoob Shaikh
Altaf Hussain Ansari

****
Abstract
his research article entitled Pakistan
_
Laos Economic
and Trade Relations is written with the purpose to
study and analyze economic and trade relations in
between the two countries. The trade between Pakistan and
Laos has been relatively at low level and inconsistent, with the
result that sustainable trade has not been able to grow over
time. Pakistans trade was strongly western oriented; while it
did not have a comparable market access vis--vis South East
Asian countries. In this regard the data is collected from
various secondary and tertiary sources. This research article is
structured with six sections. The first section is initiated with
the introduction, the second mentions the main macro-
economic indicators of Laos, the third section states inflation in
Laos, the fourth elaborates the Pakistan-Laos trade relations,
the fifth explores Pakistan and Laoss-services rendered to each
other, and finally it ends with the sixth section which
demonstrates the conclusions / suggestions.
Associate Professor, Institute of Commerce, University of Sindh,

Jamshoro.
****
Assistant Professor, Area Study Centre, Far East and South East Asia,
University of Sindh, Jamshoro.
Introduction
Pakistan and Laos have excellent bilateral, cordial, and friendly
relations. The two sides agreed to initiate a consultative process
for enhancing trade and investment promotion and facilitation
between them. Pakistan secured membership of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) and acceded to the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in South East Asia on 2 July 2004.
1
Laos became a
member of the ASEAN in 1997. Since then, its significance for
Pakistan has considerably increased. The two countries are now
cooperating for uplifting of social status and alleviation of
poverty in Asia-Pacific region. Pakistan and Laos signed
agreements for combating terrorism and other crimes, and an
agreement on promotion and protection of investments.
Pakistan spreads over an area of 796096 sq km whereas Laos,
over an area of 23700 sq km and with a population of 5.68
million. Pakistans population was 154 million in 2005-06. The
population grew at 1.9% per annum, with a literacy rate of
51.60% in 2005.
2
Laoss population was on half females and one
fifth lives in the urban areas; it has been growing at the rate of
2.8 percent per annum in the recent years, Laos is ranked as a
low income, economically fast growing, and is passing through
a critical phase of structural reform program. Laos is a
landlocked developing country. It is in the North East of
Thailand and West of Vietnam. As a result of the structural
reforms program, initiated in the decade of the nineties,
Pakistan has been able to achieve, stellar growth in most
sectors of the economy; real GDP has grown at 4.8%, 6.4% and
8.4% during the years 2002-2003, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005.
3
Per capital income in dollar terms has increased by an average
13.5 percent per annum during the last three years rising from
$ 579 in 2002-2003 to $848 in 2005-2006. As a part of its
initiative, the Government of Pakistan is seeking to foster new
economic relationships with South Eastern and Far Eastern
Asian countries. As a part of this strategy, the Prime Minister
of Pakistan paid a visit to Laos in April, 2003 and, amongst
others, announced that Pakistan would assist Laos in its
development effort by extending it a loan of US$ 10 million.
The modalities for the disbursement of the loan are being
worked out by the different agencies of the Pakistan
Government. These are expected to include the purposes and
the terms and conditions of the proposed loan.
Although Laos trades with 40 countries, its trade volume with
Pakistan has traditionally been insignificantly small. It was in
this background that Pakistan decided to explore various
possibilities to expand its trade with various countries
including Laos. Free Trade Agreements / Preferential Trade
Agreements provide a vehicle for creation of new trading
opportunities thereby accelerating the pace of their
development, increasing the incomes and welfare of and
alleviating poverty amongst the people of the contracting
states. The task of planning, negotiating and implementing a
bilateral preferential/free trade agreement will be interesting
and challenging for both Laos as well as for Pakistan.
4
Laos is also a member of the various international agencies,
such as ILO, ESCAP, IBRD, ADB, IMF, IDA, FAO, IFC,
UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNICEF and EALAF, and is
eagerly waiting to become a member of the WTO. Laos is
committed to the principles of the WTO and is shaping its
policies within the disciplines of the ASEAN FTA. The country
is largely agricultural with a predominant part of the
population residing in the rural areas. Laos has witnessed
impressive continuous growth in its economy; the industrial
sector registering spectacular growth, Laos appears to look at
its relatively more developed neighbors, Thailand and
Vietnam, and its other partners in the ASEAN for a helping
hand. With Thailand, which accounts for bulk of the trade with
it, Laos has embarked upon a plan for smooth flow of its
international trade through Thailand by building new bridges
over the Mekong River and laying down of rail track which
would also bring down costs associated with cross border
trade.
5
Main Macro-Economic Indicators of Laos
The organization of the economy over the last two decades is
heavily tilted in favor of agriculture which had a 53.9% share
in the GDP in 1985 and still had 48.6% share in 2003, 47.1%
share in 2004. The share of services has also declined from
28.4%, 25.5% to 24.2% over the same period. The share of
industry has, however, grown from 17.7% to 25.9% to 27.8%.
6
Laos has enormous hydropower. A major part of its
production of power is exported. Two mega hydropower
projects are in hand. However, domestic demand for
consumption is modest, despite the fact that only 38% of
Laotian households have electricity, which is relatively modest
compared to some other ASEAN members (Singapore 100%,
Thailand 99%, Malaysia 98%, Indonesia 86%, Vietnam 77%
only Cambodia has lower 16%. Financial close of one of the
hydropower projects being built with assistance from France,
Italy and Thailand has been delayed for want of sovereign
guarantee and finding Laotian equity contribution. The
following table-1, shows the Laos energy reserves.
7
Table 1: Laos: Energy Reserves
Million KWh
Year
Coal
(000M.T)
Production Exports Imports Consumption
1985 1 919 716 14 217
1990 3 844 607 26 263
1995 15 1044 705 43 n.a
1999 210 2849 n.a n.a n.a
2000 220 3678 n.a n.a n.a
2001 210 3590 n.a n.a n.a
2002 270 3602 n.a n.a n.a
Source: ASEAN Secretariat / IMF
It is clear from Table- 5 that Laos produced 1 thousand metric
tons in 1985, 3 thousand metric tons in 1990, 15 metric tons in
1995, 210 metric tons in 1999, 220 metric tons in 2000, 210
metric tons in 2001 and 270 metric tons in 2002.
Electricity was produced by 919 million KWh in 1985 and in
1990 it was produced by 844 million KWh. In the year 1995
electricity was produced by 1044 million KWh. Similarly it was
produced by 2849 million KWh in 1999; again in 2000 it was
produced by 3678 million KWh. In 2001 it was produced by
3590 million KWh and finally in the year 2002 it was produced
by 3602 million KWh. Laos exports were 716 million KWh,
imports were 14 million KWh and consumption was
217million KWh in 1985, again in the year 1990 exports were
607 million KWh imports were 26 million KWh and
consumption was 263 million KWh and in the year 1995
production was 1044 million KWh, exports were 705 KWh and
imports were 43 million KWh. In addition to hydropower, Laos
has reserves of natural gas (3.6 TCF) and wood (46000 KT).
8
Inflation in Laos
The data ascertained that Laos faced run away inflation in the
decade of the nineties as can be seen from the following table -
2 and figure -1.
Table 2: Laos Inflation
Year Rate of
Inflation%
1996 13.0
1997 33.0
1998 142.4
1999 86.2
2000 10.6
2001 7.5
2002 15.2
2004 7.5
2005 7.8
Rate of Inf lation
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
140.00%
160.00%
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
Source: ASEAN Secretariat / IMF
It is clear from above table 2 and figure-1 that the decade of
the 90s was marked by moderate growth of the economy, high
financial growth, rapid inflation and unstable exchange rate.
Laos seems to have recovered and inflation and exchange rate
are now comparatively stable.
9
Pak-Laos Trade Relations
Pak-Laos have comparative advantages in certain products
which show that they have achieved specialization in these
products in the global markets. Pakistan has a comparative
advantage in cotton, textile and clothing. Laos has a
comparative advantage in clothing, woods, wood products.
Laos global exports are concentrated in a few sectors, like
clothing and wood and Laos wants to stand to gain market
access in Pakistan in a number of sectors. The basket of Laoss
imports shows that its imports are concentrated in a few
commodities.
The potential for trade between Pakistan and Laos has
remained untapped. In the earlier years, because of the
political and ideological reasons but subsequently because
Pakistan did not have any investment in Laos, on Pakistans
trade policy and its specialization. Pakistans trade was
strongly western oriented, to EU and USA, where it benefited
from preferential market access (which for textile and clothing
disappeared on December 31, 2004). While it did not have
comparable market access vis--vis South East Asian countries.
The trade between Pakistan and Laos has been relatively low
level and inconsistent with the result that sustainable trade has
not been able to grow over time. Looking at the pattern of
import and export of Laos, it appears that export of electricity
has been and will continue to occupy the pivotal position in its
export effort. Wood and wood products and garments take
second place. Exports of manufacture remain low because of
the low industrial base in the country. Laos imports clothing
accessories and on the supply side also exports clothing
accessories.
10
Imports of Laos show that import of investment goods which
includes machinery take top slot. Consumption goods have
been estimated at 50% of total imports. The remaining
significant import is that of material for the garments industry,
which accounts for 10% of total imports or two-thirds of
garments exports. It means value addition in respect of the
exported garments was to the extent of one-thirds. Table -3
shows export and import from ASEAN member countries.
Table 3: Pakistan Exports and Imports
from the ASEAN Member Countries
(Rupees 000)
Year 2002-2003 2003-2004
Country Exports Imports Exports Imports
Total 21802937 88262222 21273967 101587282
Brunei 226016 78908 196340 12974
Cambodia 348495 24175 484099 69215
Indonesia 4305370 15084157 2563254 20592908
Laos 315 123 6582 19753
Malaysia 4583174 33144575 4804024 4696977
Myanmar 508852 608790 208800 767587
Philippines 1506420 460314 1520518 621396
Singapore 5058440 24935099 6738185 28291558
Thailand 3495739 133229226 3641878 15490640
Vietnam 1766257 584136 1985725 965763
Source: 1. Government of Pakistan (2004) Federal Bureau
of Statistics, Islamabad.
2. Riaz H. Khokhar (2003-04) Year Book of
Pakistans Foreign Relations and Foreign
Policy Foreword by the Foreign Secretary
Foundations, Islamabad, pp.2-15
It is clear from the above table-3 that Pakistan had exported to
ASEAN members in 2002-03 amounting to Rs. 21802937(000)
and imported amounting to Rs. 88262222(000) and in the year
2003-2004, Pakistan had exported to ASEAN amounting Rs.
21273967(000) and imported to Rs. 101587282. It is also noted
that Pakistan had exported 2.426% less in 2003-04 when
compared with 2002-03 and import increased 365.93% in the
above same period. Pakistans exports increased to Laos
1989.52% more in 2003-04 when compared with 2002-03 and
import also went up by 15959.3% in the above same period.
11
The following Figure -2 shows the evidence.
Figure -3: Pakistan Exports and Imports from the ASEAN.
(Rupees 000)
Pak-Imoport and Export From ASEANMember
0
5000000
10000000
15000000
20000000
25000000
30000000
B
r
u
n
e
i
C
a
m
b
o
d
i
a
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
L
a
o
s
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
M
y
a
n
m
a
r
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
S
i
n
g
a
p
o
r
e
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
V
i
e
t
n
a
m
v
a
l
u
e
i
n
Exports
Imports
Bulks of Pakistans exports have traditionally gone to
Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Bulks of the imports into
Pakistan have come from Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and
Thailand. Trade between Pakistan and Laos has been modest
amongst ASEAN countries, lower than with Brunei, Myanmar
and Vietnam.
12
Table-4: Pakistans Exports to ASEAN Countries
(US $ million)
Years
Sr.
No.
Country Fiscal
year 03
Country
Jul-Mar
05
1 Brunei 1.864 Brunei 0.299
2 Cambodia 2.388 Cambodia 6.734
3 Indonesia 50.096 Indonesia 48.634
4 Laos 0.338 Laos 0.228
5 Malaysia 60.666 Malaysia 49.593
6 Myanmar 8.161 Myanmar 2.397
7 Philippines 26.055 Philippines 20.125
8 Singapore 110.727 Singapore 65.827
9 Thailand 51.253 Thailand 43.235
10 Vietnam 29.918 15.957 25.053
Total Exports to
ASEAN
341.466 342.599 262.125
Pakistan's Export to ASEAN
Countries
0 50 100 150
Brunei
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
Sources: 1. Government of Pakistan (2004) Federal
Bureaus Statistics, Islamabad.
2. Riaz H. Khokhar (2003-04) Year Book of
Pakistans Foreign Relations and Foreign
Policy Foreword by the Foreign Secretary
Foundations, Islamabad, pp.2-15
Pakistan and LAOS Services
In any free trade arrangement with Laos, Pakistan may
consider to include services, besides trade in goods, as it is
likely to yield enormous gains to Pakistani service providers.
Pakistan textile sector is ranked highest in the world, followed
by clothing and leather products. In the case of Laos, it ranks 5
in the world in the clothing sector, followed by wood and
leather products. It would be worthwhile to explore for the
decision makers of Pakistan and Laos if they can aim at
achieving synergy in the excellent specialization that exists in
the two countries in the textile and clothing sectors.
13
Conclusion / Suggestions
Laos is a landlocked, low-income, predominantly agricultural
country with Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar and China etc. as
its neighbors. Imports into and exports out of Laos move
through road network via Thailand. Pakistan decided to
negotiate a FTA with Laos, a member of ASEAN. Pakistan and
Laos have good economies of complementary structures and
even within the industrialized sector complementarities are
noticeable. Both have comparative advantages in certain
products which show that they have achieved specialization in
these products in the global markets. Pakistan has a
comparative advantage in cotton, textile and clothing. Laos has
a comparative advantage in clothing, wood, wood products.
Pakistan and Laos have insignificant trade between them in the
past. However, both countries are on the look out to diversify
their trade, by products and by markets. Enormous potential
exists for trade creation and, in some areas, for trade diversion
in both countries. The global exports of Laos are concentrated
in a few sectors, like clothing and wood. We have seen that
Laos stands to gain market access in Pakistan in a number of
sectors. The basket of Laos imports shows that its imports are
concentrated in a few commodities. Both countries would
benefit substantially if a free trade arrangement may be
developed to cover not only trade in goods but also in services
and investments in joint ventures. Wood and its products are
major exports of Laos and are also imported by Pakistan in
large quantities from various sources other than Laos. Pakistan
has reduced custom duties to zero on rough wood and semi-
finished wood.
Thus it is finally suggested that both countries must set up
technical groups to identify measures, tariff or non-tariff which
may hinder growth of trade between Pakistan and Laos and
make recommendations for eliminating them. The ministry of
commerce must take this responsibility to monitor trade
facilitation to ensure free flow of trade in between the two
countries.
Wood and its products are major exports of Laos and are also
imported by Pakistan in large quantities from various sources
other than Laos. By SRO 567(I)/2005 dated 6.6.2005, Pakistan
has reduced custom duties to zero on rough wood (HS Code
4403) and semi-finished wood (HS Code 4407). Exports of
rough wood and semi-finished wood from Laos and their
import into Pakistan would not require a PTA or FTA as the
import duty on such types of wood stand reduced to zero.
However, under the law of Laos, export of rough wood is
prohibited. Since transportation is a substantial component of
the cost, import of finished wood products into Pakistan from
Laos may have to be for a selective market.
1
Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Foreign Relations, office of the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Islamabad. Pakistan, 2004-05, pp. 12-13
2
Government of Pakistan, South East Asia, Relations with Laos, Pakistan and
Laos Relations took a number of Confidence Building Measures November 2003,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 2005, pp.2-5
3
Government of Pakistan, Address by the President, General Pervez Musharraf to
the 10
th
OIC Summit: Putrajaya, Malaysia; Special Bulletin, 16 October, 2003,
pp.2-12
4
Government of Pakistan, Address by the President, General Pervez Musharraf to
the inaugural session of the 13th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM
XIII): Kuala Lumpur; 24 Special Bulletin, 2003.
5
Government of Pakistan, Pakistan secured membership of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East
Asia on 2 July 2004, A report published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004-05,
pp.3-8
6
Government of Pakistan, Pakistan - Laos are now cooperating for uplifting of
social status and alleviation of poverty in Asia-Pacific Region, Ministry of
Commerce, Islamabad, 2005, pp.9-14
7
Government of Pakistan, Bilateral trade issue and focused on continuing to
strengthen the growing trade ties between Pakistan and Laos, A short report
published by Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad, 2007, pp.4-8
8
Government of Pakistan, Pakistan and Laos Trade Relations, the visit of the top
Pakistani leaders to Laos, 2006.
9
Col. Rahul K. Bhonsle, China: Balancing Power Relations in South and South-
East Asia, 2006.
10
Chong Quan, Holding a Press Conference, on 11-17, 2006 at 08:08 Add: No.2
Dong Chang'an Avenue, Beijing China, 2006, pp. 3 - 10
11
Col. Rahul K. Bhonsle, China: Balancing Power Relations in South and South-
East Asia, 2007.
12
Government of Pakistan, Balance of Trade with Individual Countries, Pakistan
Statistical, Year Book, Islamabad, 2005-06, pp. 20 - 30
13
Louis R. Mortimer, Chief Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. 20540-5220, 1994, pp. 10- 15
14
Trade Regime of the Union of Laos 2001, Ministry Of Commerce, Laos Best
Viewed In 800x600 Screen Size.
15. Louis R. Mortimer, Chief Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. Data as of July, 1994,
16
Ftdwebmaster, Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C.
20233 Location: Main: Statistics: Country Data: Trade Balance Created: March 9,
2007.
17
Riaz H. Khokhar, Year Book, Pakistans Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy
Foreword by the Foreign Secretary Foundations, Islamabad, 2003-04, pp.2-15
THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANS
SECURITY POLICY
Dr Naghma Mangrio

Abstract
ecurity after the end of the Cold War not only remains
as the most vital issue for states, but it has also become
a complex phenomenon with the re-emergence of low-
intensity and non-specific threats. Many of these threats cannot
be adequately handled by means of military power alone and
instead require solutions involving the exercise of economic
power. These trends suggest that a fresh and innovative
approach is required to address the issue of security after the
end of the Cold War. Changes in the international security
environment in post-Cold War period have also brought new
developments to the security situation in East Asia. These
changes imply an expanding international peace keeping role
for a country like Japan, which is the second largest economy
of the world and now stands as a regional and global economic
superpower. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the
different phases of the development of Japans security policy.
A comparative study of Japanese security policy during and
after the end of the Cold War will help understand the changes
in security policy. The paper also aims to identify the factors
which have made the security policy change inevitable.
Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University

of Sindh, Jamshoro.
Basic Framework of Post-War Japanese Security Policy
Japanese security policy after the end of World War-II has been
influenced by national as well as international factors. The 1947
Constitution, strong public pacifism and domestic politics have
been responsible for shaping the Japanese security policy
during this period. Article 9 of the Constitution has set the
basic framework for Japanese security policy since the end of
World War-II. The first paragraph prohibits the possession of
armed forces.
1
Because of the existence of Article 9, the
Constitution is often called the Peace Constitution.
The present Constitution was written by the American
occupation authorities headed by General Doughlas Mac
Arthur. In the wake of the out- break of Korean War in 1950
and with the departure of American occupied forces to the
Korean Peninsula, General Mac Arthur, ordered the creation of
a seventy five thousand persons National Police Reserve to fill
the security vacuum. This police reserve comprising ground
and maritime forces was developed into the Japanese National
Safety Forces in August 1952, and eventually into the Ground,
Air and Maritime Self Defense Forces following the creation of
the Japanese Defense Agency in July 1954
2
.
Determined never to relieve the horror of war, Japan has made
every effort to build itself as a peace loving nation since World
War-II. Lasting peace is the most earnest wish of the Japanese
people and the idea of pacifism is enshrined in the
Constitution, Article 9 of which sets forth the renunciation of
war, non-possession of war potential and a denial of the right
of belligerence of the state. Nonetheless, as long as Japan
remains an independent nation, it is recognized beyond doubt
that these provisions do not deny the inherent right of self-
defense that Japan is entitled to maintain as a sovereign state.
Since the right of self-defense is thus not denied, the
government interprets this to mean that the Constitution
allows Japan to possess the minimum level of armed strength
needed to support the exercise of that right
3
. On the basis of
this understanding, the government has, as part of its
exclusively self defense oriented basic policy on national
defense under the terms of the Constitution, preserved the Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, continued to
equip them and sought to prepare them for operational use.
There are three criteria for exercise of the right of self-defense.
i) There is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression
against Japan.
ii) There is no appropriate means to deal with the act of
aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-
defense.
iii) The use of armed strength is confined to the minimum
necessary level
4
.
However, the use of minimum necessary force to defend Japan
is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of
Japanese territorial land, sea and air space
5
.
The government nevertheless believes that the Constitution
does not permit the dispatch of armed troops to foreign
territorial land, sea and airspace for the purpose of using force,
because such an oversea deployment of troops would
generally go beyond the limits of the minimum necessary level
of self-defense
6
. Until recently, the constitutionality of the Self
Defense Forces had been one of the most controversial political
issues in Japan. It was ironic that the left wing political forces
sympathetic to the communist bloc criticized the existence of
the SDF as unconstitutional in the light of Article 9 of the
Japans Constitution, where as the pro-Western bloc forces in
the government had to defend the SDF with great difficulty.
Several court battles, as a consequence, were waged over the
constitutionality of the SDF as well as the American military
presence in Japan. The Japanese judiciary, however, has so far
avoided making any legal judgement on the issue. The
Supreme Court has ruled out that it is a political matter
7
.
Mainichi Daily in its editorial titled Peace Creating wrote
that neither the SDF nor Security Treaty would be legal under
a strict interpretation of the Constitution
8
.
In Japans Parliament, the Diet, a common understanding has
evolved about the constitutionality of the SDF through a long
history of debates and deliberations. Thus it is understood
under Article 9 of the Constitution that Japan is entitled to
possess the minimum level of armed strength for self-
defense purposes, that Japan is not allowed to possess
offensive weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles,
long range bombers, and air craft carriers and that Japan
cannot exercise the right of collective self-defense
9
. In the light
of these interpretations, one can say that Japans stated security
policy after World War-II has been to maintain an exclusively
defense-oriented posture.
The basic strategy of Japans post-War defense policy was
formulated by twice sworn Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru
(1946-1947 and 1948-1954). It was the same strategy that was
adopted by the Meiji revolutionaries i.e. security could be
ensured only through economic power fukoku. Economic
power in turn depends upon industrial and technological
growth. Yoshida thought that Japan should rebuild its
industrial and technological strength to lay the solid
foundation of its total security. He took full advantage of
Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of
America signed in September, 1951 which guaranteed
Security of Japan against armed attack from within and
without
10
. He left the defense of Japan to the United States and
the Japanese government concentrated wholly on the economic
reconstruction of the country.
Economic Power and Japanese Security Policy
During the Cold War Period
The focus upon the importance of economic power as a
component of security policy is not a new phenomenon. The
globalisation of trade and investment especially financial
markets facilitated by advancements in information
technology, has meant that national wealth is manifested
increasingly in these intangible components of economic
power, which military power is unable to seize, destroy,
control, or augment. It is commonly believed today that the
security of states and their individual citizens is increasingly
determined more by economic vitality and the command of
market shares than by the acquisition of national territory and
command of raw materials
11
.
In Japan the tradition of seeing economic power as the
foundation of national power and as an instrument of security
policy is a relatively old one. The long held conception of Japan
as a resource-poor and economically vulnerable country meant
that in large part Japanese diplomacy and security policy from
the Meiji period until the contemporary era has been driven by
the search for economic and technological security
12
.
Immediately after the World WarII, Japanese policy makers
realized that in future Japanese power would have to be
expressed through economic rather than military means.
The intellectual and political debate over pacifism was one
cogent expression of doubts about the utility of military power
for security ends and the Socialist Democratic Party of Japans
(SDPJ) opposition to the existence of the SDF and U.S.-Japan
alliance during the Cold War meant that it advocated
alternative forms of security including pacifism, neutralism,
and economic co-operation
13
. The conservative politicians in
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) during this same period,
were supportive of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the gradual
expansion of Japans own military defense capabilities but also
did not lose sight of the possibilities of economic power in the
service of security policy. For instance Yoshida doctrine of
Yoshida Shigeru, which laid down the basic path of Japanese
diplomacy in the post-War period of maintaining the security
alliance with the U.S. whilst Japan concentrated upon
economic recovery, did not seek to deny the utility of military
power but merely to entrust the role of exercising military
power for security purposes to the U.S. But the Yoshida
doctrines emphasis upon rebuilding the Japanese economy
and economic growth set in a motion a train of thought
concerning the primacy of economic power that persisted into
the 1990s
14
.
Concept of Comprehensive Security
The non-military components of security continue to be
emphasized in Japan. In the early beginning of 1970s to kid of
the decade, the Japanese began to modify their policies. This
was partly a reaction to adverse international developments,
particularly the oil shocks of 1973, which drove home Japans
vulnerability to events in distant places. Nations continuing
dependence on foreign sources of raw materials is one of the
permanent strategic problems that Tokyo faces. The 1973-74 oil
crisis heightened Japanese fear of major disruptions of their oil
supplies and forced them to seek ways to reduce their
vulnerability
15
.
Japans search for economic security has included concerted
and continuing efforts to reduce tensions in regions vital to its
largely economic interests, namely, the Middle East and
Southeast Asia. The security and economics are inextricably
lined. It has been clear to Japanese officials since early in the
modernization process that given its geographical position and
resources, the success of Japans industrialization would
depend on access to overseas raw materials especially energy
and to overseas markets. As Tokyo gradually realized the
limits of its ability to translate its economic expertise into
political influence in its efforts to reduce its economic
vulnerability in the1970s, its interest in peacetime defense
measures to protect its maritime trade increased.
In part to reduce a feared major disruption of shipping to and
from its ports and in part in response to U.S. prodding for
greater defense burden sharing, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki
decided in 1981 that Japan should undertake to improve its
maritime defense capabilities to protect its sea lanes of
communication to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles from its
shores. At about the same time, defense policy makers in
Tokyo began talking about the possibility of closing Japans
strategic straits (Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima) against the
Soviet Union in times of crises
16
.
The search for economic security that had led to problematic
consideration of sea-lane and straits defense also generated
increasing enthusiasm about the concept of comprehensive
security. The concept of comprehensive security provides a
useful framework for examining Japans security policy.
Comprehensive security sought to broaden the traditional
military only focus of national security to include economic
and political issues as well as to address security at the
domestic, bilateral, regional and global levels
17
.
The concept first introduced by the end of the 1970s, looks at
Japans security needs in a multi-dimensional and multi-level
framework. Since then the concept of comprehensive security
became the foundation of official Japanese security policy
18
.
Official Development Assistance (ODA) As Economic
Instrument of Security Policy
Parallel to the development of the concepts of comprehensive
security was a growing recognition that Japans security and
prosperity contributed to regional and international peace and
security and vice versa. It was through development of this
awareness and through the discussion of the comprehensive
approach to national and international security during the
early 1980s that a national consensus emerged on the need to
expand Japans economic assistance as part of Japans broadly
conceived security policy. The consensus held that Japans
economic assistance including what one Western observer has
called strategic aid should be considered a part of its
contribution to international peace and security
19
.
Japans ODA policies in the 1980s and early 1990s clearly
indicated that economic power may be used for security
purposes. Ohira and Suzuki, were the first Japanese leaders to
link explicitly Japans economic aid to its security policy. By
stating in 1980 and 1981 respectively that in future Japanese
ODA would be provided to those countries bordering areas of
conflict, and which were important to the maintenance of
peace and stability in the world
20
. Successive Japanese
governments in the later stages of the Cold War followed these
guidelines for the use of strategic aid by directing ODA to
states such as Pakistan, Turkey, and Somalia, which were
considered by the U.S. and Japan to be vital to Western
security
21
.
By 1989 Japan had surpassed the U.S. to become the largest
ODA donor in the world and ODA Great Power
22
.
Furthermore, despite the economic down turn in Japan and the
fall in value of the Yen, Japan since the mid-1990s has
continued to disburse close to U.S. $10 billion annually in
bilateral ODA and U.S. $4 billion via multilateral institutions
including the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
23
. Japans
expanded ODA clearly indicates that Japanese policy makers
firmly believe that ODA constitutes a powerful economic
instrument of security policy.
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as a Corner Stone of Japanese
Security
The second most important pillar of the security system of
post-War Japan is the United States-Japan Security Treaty.
Following the defeat in the Second World War, a broad
national consensus emerged in Japan on the nations
immediate goals and priorities. Among Japans many national
objectives, two have been overarching throughout the post-
War period: promoting economic growth and prosperity, and
ensuring national security. These objectives, of course, hardly
make Japan unique. Almost all nations share these objectives.
What does make Japan some what unique is the broad strategy
its leaders adopted to achieve these objectives; to concentrate
national energies on expanding foreign markets for Japanese
exports while protecting Japanese industries against foreign
competition and gaining control over high-value added
technologies, critical to Japanese industrial competitiveness,
and to minimize military expenditures while relying on the
United States to provide Japans external security.
The United States and Japan signed the United States-Japan
Security Treaty on September 8, 1951, which came into effect
on April 28, 1952. Under the terms of the1951 defense pact, the
United States possessed the right to use American forces at the
request of Tokyo, to put down large scale internal riots and
disturbance in Japan caused through instigation or
intervention by an outside power or powers. The treaty
further states that Japan would not grant, without the prior
consent of Washington, military basis to any third power
24
.
United States Japan defense pact of 1951 was replaced with the
Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security in January 1960.
This treaty is often characterized as being asymmetrical, the
United States is obligated by this treaty to defend Japan while
Japan is not obligated to defend the United States, the United
States is granted the right to maintain its bases in Japan for the
purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and
maintenance of international peace and stability in the Far East,
while Japan is not granted similar rights
25
.
The former asymmetry has clearly resulted from Japans
constitutional limitations i.e. the Japanese government has
maintained that the Constitution does not allow Japan to
exercise the right of collective self-defense. The United States
was indeed able to establish and maintain a hegemonic system
of international relations in the postwar period. Japans
national interests were largely defined and persuaded within
the framework of the U.S. dominated Western capitalist
system. Despite the heated debate and sometimes violent
division in Japan over its political and ideological identity in
the 1950s and 1960s, the nations security needs and polices
during those decades were largely framed within the confines
of the system of U.S. alliances
26
.
Japans Security and Reliance on the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent
Since 1958, the development of Japans Self Defense Forces
(SDF) was guided by series of defense buildup plans. The third
Defense plan accepted nuclear dependence on the United
States as part of the basic structure of national defense. In 1976,
Japan adopted the National Defense Program Out line
(NDPO), which defined the nature of Japans defense
capability and prescribed specific goals for the equipment it
should posses. In view of the dramatic changes in the
International situation including the end of the Cold War
however, the former NDPO was reviewed and National
Defense Program outline in and after fiscal year 1996 was
approved and adopted by the Security Council of Japan and
the cabinet in 1995. The outline states that Japan will depend
on Americas nuclear deterrent against nuclear threats
27
.
In April 1996, the Japan-U.S. joint Declaration was announced
by the then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hasimoto and President
Bill Clinton. The two leaders reaffirmed in the joint Declaration
that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is
close cooperation on defense between Japan and the United
States, based on a combination of an appropriate defense
capability of SDF and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.
The U.S. deterrent under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
remains the foundation of Japans security
28
.
The question that has been frequently raised regarding the U.S.
deterrent especially in the post-Cold War is Is the U.S. nuclear
umbrella over Japan still credible ? It is not a new question,
since the Japanese and American experts have been debating
the answer for many years. The myth of these debates is that
the U.S. nuclear umbrella is sufficiently credible in the eyes of
Japans potential opponents to deter nuclear threats. The
deterrent will remain credible as long as Japan and the United
States maintain common interests and an alliance relationship.
Approach to Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Since the end of the Cold War, Japan and the United States
shared the recognition that the proliferation of ballistic missiles
is posing a threat to international security
29
. In December 1998,
the Japanese government decided to launch a Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) technology research project jointly with the
United States and in August 1999, the Defense Agency of Japan
and the U.S. Defense Department signed a memorandum of
understanding. The memorandum prescribed the two
countries to jointly conduct requirements analysis, design and
trail production of certain parts and components
30
.
At the June 2001 Japan-U.S. summit, the leaders of both
countries agreed that the two countries should continue to
consult closely on missile defense. The leaders also
reconfirmed the importance of co-operative research on
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) technologies that was initiated
in 1999. Judgment on transitioning the development and
implementation stages of the BMD system will be made after
sufficient examination of the feasibility of BMD and the ideal
way for Japans defense to develop in future
31
.
According to an annual Defense Agency report released on 5
th
August 2003, Japan must accelerate research and
consideration of ballistic missile defense
32
. The report calls on
the government to beef up national defense in readiness for
more unpredictable threats such as terrorism and ballistic
missile attacks. The report says missile defense systems,
particularly the Patriot PAC-3 and sea based systems to be
deployed on Aegis ships, are now technically feasible
33
.
According to the paper, many of the missiles defense system
tests conducted by the United States have been successful. It
also says that facing a perceived threat of missile attack from
North Korea, the government has shown increasing interest in
the Patriot PAC-3 and sea based missile defense systems
34
.
Conclusion
An overview of developments in Japanese security policy
suggests that the concept of Comprehensive Security Policy in
which diplomacy, military power and economic power were
ascribed equal roles in national security was the first conscious
attempt to attach a specific security function to economic
power during the Cold-War period. In the post-Cold War
period also policy makers have continued to view economics
as one of the central components of security policy. Japans
expanded Official Development Assistance (ODA) program
clearly indicates that Japanese policy makers believe in making
best use of the economic tools of security policy. The U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty remains crucial for Japans national
security but as threat perceptions become increasingly
divergent, it becomes necessary for Japan to make autonomous
efforts to defend its territory. A comprehensive national
security policy is basic to Japans national security and its
national security should be secured by means of integrated use
of its political, diplomatic, economic, defense and other
national resources.
1
Akeneya Tatsuo, Japan in Paul B. Stares (ed), The new Security Agenda: A
Global Survey, Japan Centre for International Economy, Tokyo, p.177.
2
Ibid.
3
The Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2000, The Japan Times, Tokyo, 2000,
p.63.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid
6
Ibid.
7
Akaneya Tatsuo, op.cit, p.179.
8
Quoted in Talukder Maniruzzaman, Japans Security Policy for the Twenty First
Century, The University Press Limited, Bangladesh, 2000, p.8.
9
Akaneya Tatsuo, op.cit, p.179.
10
Ibid.
11
Christopher W. Hughes, Japans Economic Power and Security: Japan and
North Korea, Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies / Routledge Series, London,
1999, p.9.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Tsuneo Akaha, Japans Security Policy After U.S. Hegemony, in Kathleen
Newland (ed), International Relations of Japan, MacMillan Academic and
Professional Ltd., London, 1990, p.158.
16
Ibid.
17
Graig A. Synder, Regional Security Structure, in Graig A. Synder, (ed),
Contemporary Security and Strategy, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.113.
18
Ibid.
19
Tsuneo Akaha, op.cit, p.161.
20
Christopher W. Hughes, op.cit, p.23.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Akeneya Tatsuo, op.cit, p.178.
25
Akihiko Tanaka, Japans Security Policy in 1990s, in Funabashi Yoichi (ed),
Japans International Agenda, New York University Press, 1994, p.32.
26
Tsuneo Akaha, op.cit, p.148.
27
Defense of Japan 2000, op.cit, p.70.
28
Ibid, p.67.
29
30
East Asian Strategic Review 2002, The National Institute for Defense Studies,
Tokyo, p.9.
31
32
The Japan Times, Tokyo, 6.8.2003.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
PAKISTAN - MALAYSIA BILATERAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENTS
Noreen Hassan
Abstract
his research article entitled Pakistan-Malaysia,
Bilateral Trade and Investments is written with the
purpose to see trade and investment relations in
between Pakistan-Malaysia. Both countries have involved in
enhancing their economic cooperation through a series of
important initiatives. Since the trade between the two countries
is very low there is need to strengthen the exports. For
favorable trade and economic growth both the countries are
adopting significant measures. In this regard the data is
collected from various secondary and tertiary sources. This
research paper is structured with six sections. The first section
is initiated with the introduction, the second describes
Pakistan-Malaysia joint ventures, the third section states
Pakistan-Malaysia trade and investment relations, the fourth
explores the balance of trade between Pakistan-Malaysia, the
fifth elaborates the bilateral trade and its impact on FDI and
the finally it ends with the sixth and last section which is
conclusion.
Lecturer, Department of Management Sciences, Isra University,

Hyderabad
Introduction
Pakistan-Malaysia have been enjoying cordial diplomatic
relations and strengthening understandings on important
regional and international affairs over the past several decades.
Both the countries have decided to enhance their economic
cooperation through a series of important initiatives. For
favorable trade and economic growth both the countries are
adopting significant measures.
1
The two countries signed a protocol on Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) which is another important facet of the Pakistan-
Malaysia growing cooperation. FTA would prove a milestone
in further enhancing the trade and bilateral ties between the
two countries. Moreover, both the countries have also agreed
to pursue an Early Harvest Program (EHP) which was
implemented with effect from January 1, 2006 and expired on
March 31, 2007. EHP aimed to deliver benefits to the private
sector of both the countries. Under the EHP, the two countries
had zero duty on the imports of selected items from each other,
which helped to boost trade.
2
Malaysia makes an effort to support Pakistan to become a full-
fledged dialogue partner of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN). Pakistan-Malaysia air flights will also be
resumed between Karachi and Kuala Lumpur. Both the
countries plan to set up branches of different banks in each
others country which will absolutely improve bilateral trade
relationship between the two countries.
3
Pakistan has a large surplus of skilled and relatively cheap
manpower which labour-short Malaysia has decided to import.
Both the countries have signed a contract for employment of
100,000 Pakistanis in Malaysia. Moreover, Malaysia can also
shift its labour-intensive industries to Pakistan. As a starting
point, around 1000 Pakistanis will be sent to Malaysia. Thus,
the two countries could learn from each other's experience in
science and technology, education, culture, insurance, Islamic
banking and other Islamic investment instruments.
4
Malaysia has also shown its interest to invest in Pakistan in the
areas of textile, petroleum, agro industry, real estate,
construction and tourism. Malaysia is also associated with the
construction of physical infrastructure in Pakistan. The
Malaysian traders may take advantage of vast opportunities
for investment in Pakistan. Both sides also agreed upon
exchange of technical groups related to trade. Malaysia has
attached a great importance to its relations with Pakistan and
would continue to strive for the expansion of relations in all the
fields. Both the countries have decided to set up a Joint
Development Committee to further develop bilateral co-
operation in various fields such as processing of vegetables
and fruits, fisheries, rubber industries, agriculture, textile,
information technology, telecom, finance, construction,
education, human resources, tourism, culture, housing and
other areas of life.
5
Pakistan-Malaysia Joint Ventures
Pakistan-Malaysia enjoys strong trade and diplomatic relations
and share common perceptions on national and international
issues. They can spread out the possibilities of expanding
economic and trade relations between the two Muslim
countries by establishing joint ventures. The businessmen of
both countries have decided to expedite their trade relations by
entering into joint ventures in various fields.
They can start joint ventures arrangements in the field of cotton
textiles together, to exploit the opportunities offered by the
textile quota-free world markets. Malaysia has already set up
the first phase of one power project named Liberty Power in
Pakistan and is interested in being offered the second phase as
well. They could also enter into joint ventures in palm oil. They
can also further enhance cooperation in the fields of power and
water.
6
Pakistan is well aware of the fact that without facilitating
greater people to people contact, the objective of closer
economic, trade and commercial relations with the countries of
East Asia cannot be realized. It is for this reason that every
agreement Pakistan has signed with countries like Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines contains
honest provisions for increasing people to people contacts
through cultural exchanges and diverse educational
programmes.
7
Memorandum of Understanding between Pakistan-Malaysia
Pakistan-Malaysias gracious relationship between becomes
further healthier with the signing of the Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) which was signed for the construction
of another section of the Motorway namely M-4 which is for
the development of the Faisalabad- Khanewal Motorway. This
M-4 will be a joint venture between the National High Way
Authority of Pakistan (NHA) and the Construction Industry
Development Board, Malaysia (CIDB). The signing of the MoU
signifies the devotion and dedication by the two sides to
maintain good relations and bilateral trade cooperation
between NHA and CIBD to jointly facilitate the construction of
184Km of motorway from Faisalabad to Khanewal. As a result,
it will open up the doors for prospective joint ventures
between Malaysian and Pakistani companies especially in the
field of construction such as highways, roads, bridges, housing,
ports and airports.
8
Pakistan-Malaysia Investment Relations
Malaysia has good investment relations with Pakistan. Pakistan
is enthusiastic to attract more Malaysian investment. A lot of
private companies from Malaysia are already investing in
Pakistan. Malaysian companies have made investments in
power generation, bulking storage facility for vegetable oils,
property development and oil and gas exploration. Since the
trade between the two countries is very low there is a need to
strengthen the exports urgently but with care so that any
growth in trade is not unbalanced in either partner's favor.
9
Moreover, another discouraging factor is that, both the
countries had remained largely importing countries
throughout the past 30 years. It is only in the last ten years that
Malaysia has become a significant exporter. On the other hand,
Pakistan is also making potential attempts to orient its foreign
trade towards exports rather than imports. At present Malaysia
is amongst top 20 trade partners of Pakistan. The country,
however, is sustaining a huge trade deficit every year in trade
with Malaysia. They can start with exploring the possibility of
entering into variety of agreements for preferential treatment
of their respective goods in each other's country. In order to
promote trade and investment, Pakistan offers attractive
investment opportunities to Malaysian entrepreneurs, through
identifying areas of housing, information technology and
telecommunication etc.
10
Pakistan-Malaysia Balance of Trade
Pakistan's imports from Malaysia are primary goods whereas
Pakistan's exports are merely secondary goods. There is no
substitute of huge edible oil imports from Malaysia in the
foreseeable future for Pakistan. Pakistan needs to diversify its
trade. Exports basket must be improved with the inclusion of
value-added products.
11
Malaysias major exports to Pakistan
are palm oil, margarine and telecommunication equipments;
whereas, Pakistans main exports to Malaysia are fresh, chilled
and frozen fish, rice, surgical apparatus, vegetables, tobacco,
textile yarn, fabrics and woven cotton fabrics.
In 2004, the export from Pakistan to Malaysia was US$ 83.4
million and it increased over the period to 195.74% when
compared with 1990. On the other side, Pakistans imports also
increased by 145.66% in 2004 when compared with 1990.
12
Evidence is given in Table -1.
Table- 1: Pakistan-Malaysia Balance of Trade 1990-2004
(Million US $)
Year Exports Imports
Balance
of Trade
Total
Exports
of Pak
% Share
in Total
Exports
Total
Imports
of Pak
% Share
in Total
Imports
1990 28.2 245.3 -217.1 6131 0.46 7619 3.22
1991 7.2 304.9 -297.7 6904 0.10 9252 3.30
1992 25.2 388.9 -363.7 6813 0.37 9941 3.91
1993 54.2 512.3 -458.1 6803 0.80 8564 5.98
1994 48.7 471 -422.3 8137 0.60 10394 4.53
1995 50.9 912.7 -861.8 8707 0.58 11805 7.73
1996 41.4 852.6 -811.2 8320 0.50 11894 7.17
1997 31.3 564.2 -532.9 8628 0.36 10118 5.58
1998 28.4 713.2 -684.8 7779 0.37 9432 7.56
1999 33.4 634.5 -601.1 8569 0.39 10309 6.15
2000 45.7 439.3 -393.6 9202 0.50 10729 4.09
2001 50.8 429.2 -378.4 9135 0.56 10340 4.15
2002 51.7 455.8 -404.1 11160 0.46 12220 3.73
2003 78.3 566.6 -488.3 12313 0.64 15592 3.63
2004 83.4 602.6 -519.2 14391 0.58 20592 2.93
Total 658.8 8093.1 -7434.3 132992 7.26 168801 73.67
Average 43.92 539.54 -495.62 8866.13 0.48 11253.40 4.91
% Share 7.53 92.47 - - - - -
(+) (-)
over the
period
195.74 145.66 - 134.73 26.09 170.27 (9.00)
Source: Government of Pakistan, Federal Bureau of Statistics
5-SLIC Building, F-6/4, Blue Area, Islamabad,
Pakistan, pp 449-453
It is also clear from the above table-1 that the balance of trade
always remains in deficit. The total exports of Pakistan
averagely were US $ 8866.13 million from the period of 1990 to
2004. The percentage increased in total exports was 134.72% in
the 2004 when compared with 1990. Similarly, the total imports
increased by 170.27% in 2004 when compared with 1990.
13
It is also obvious from the above table-1 that in the total trade
balance Pakistans share in percentage is 7.53% whereas
Malaysias share in percentage is 92.47%. The basket of
Pakistan's exports to Malaysia is quite low including items
such as rice, textiles, surgical instruments, leather, seafood, and
tobacco, etc. In order to improve the trade imbalance in favor
of Pakistan and for rapid expansion and growth, the items of
exports should be diversified.
14
Bilateral Trade and its impact on FDI
Malaysia is an important source of palm oil requirement for
Pakistan. Pakistan annually imported palm oil worth $800
million from Malaysia; In return, Pakistan's exports to
Malaysia are quite negligible. Malaysia is a potential market
for Pakistani rice, fruit and vegetables. Therefore, Pakistan
needs to take necessary steps to adjust this huge trade
imbalance in its favor.
15
Malaysian trade surplus may be converted into FDI activities
in several public and private sectors in Pakistan. FDI has
become an important source of private external finance for the
developing countries. It is different from the other major types
of external private capital flows in that it is motivated largely
by the investors long term prospects for making profit in
production activities in the host countries. While FDI
represents investment in production facilities, its significance
in the developing countries is greater. Not only can FDI add
resources and capital formation but it is also a means of
transferring production technology, skills, innovative capacity
and organizational and managerial practices between
locations, as well as of accessing international marketing
network. Given the eventual role FDI can play in the
accelerating growth and economic transformation, developing
countries are strongly interested in attracting it.
16
Its admirable that in July and August 2006, Pakistan had a
37.7% increase in FDI compared to the same months of last
year. FDI in the country rose up by 37.7% in July-August 2006-
07 to $407.3 million against $295.8 million last year. FDI stood
at $375.4 million.
17
Like many other emerging market economies Pakistan has also
taken a number of steps including wide-range reforms in
various sectors of economy and restoring macroeconomic
stability to attract FDI. More than ten leading Malaysian firms
are undertaking projects in Pakistan in oil and gas, power
generation, chemical, telecommunication, information
technology and palm oil refinement process.
18
Pakistan has emerged as the fourth largest FDI destination for
Malaysian investors after Singapore, Indonesia, and China.
This is indeed a very positive indication that an important
ASEAN member gives top priority to Pakistan in its FDI in
South Asia even at the preference of other East Asian countries
such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Malaysia has a considerable
number of ethnic Chinese communities which are the integral
part of its business, manufacturing and exports activities. The
Chinese community has a natural tilt toward Singapore, Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China. Knowing that Pakistan
has friendly ties with China, Malaysian investors can increase
their presence in Pakistan. To attract more Malaysian FDI to
Pakistan, our policy-makers further need to constantly take
advantage of this favorable situation. This also shows the
potential growth of investment activities between Pakistan and
the other ASEAN members.
19
Table-2 shows the total FDI into
Pakistan and the FDI share which comes from Malaysia:
Table 2: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
(In Million US $)
Source: Government of Pakistan (2006), Ministry of
Privatization and Investment, Board of Investment,
Islamabad, pp.5-6
F-year
Total FDI into
Pak
FDI from Malaysia
Percentage
share
2001-02 487.7 0.885 0.18
2002-03 798.0 2.285 0.29
2003-04 949.4 1.207 0.13
2004-05 1524.0 22.1 1.45
2005-06 3521.0 2.9 0.08
Total 7280.1 29.377 2.13
0.885
2.285
1.207
22.1
2.9
0
5
10
15
20
25
Million $
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
Year
Figure 1: FDI from Malaysia (Million US $)
Source: Government of Pakistan (2006) Ministry of
Privatization and Investment, Board of Investment,
Islamabad, pp. 5-6
It is also clear from the above table-2 and fig-1 that from 2001
to 2006 the total FDI into Pakistan was US $ 7280.1 million
where as FDI from Malaysia was US $ 29.377 million. The
percentage increase in FDI from Malaysia was US $ 227.68
million when compared with 2001-02. The study reveals that
from the period of 2001 to 2006 FDI from Malaysia remains US
$ 227.68 million. In 2005-06 the percentage share of FDI from
Malaysia was 0.08% when it is compared with 2001-02 when it
was 0.18%.
20
Conclusions
It is concluded that Pakistan-Malaysia attached a great
importance to their relations. For favorable trade and economic
growth both countries may adopt significant measures. As the
countries have signed a protocol on FTA and also agreed to
pursue an EHP, Malaysian private companies are already
investing in Pakistan. Malaysias major exports to Pakistan are
secondary, whereas Pakistans are primary. In 2004, the export
from Pakistan to Malaysia was 83.4 million US$ and the
increase over the period was 195.74% when compared with
1990. On the other side, Pakistans imports also increased by
145.66% in 2004 when compared with 1990. This study reveals
that the total exports of Pakistan averagely were 8866.13
million US dollars from the period 1990 to 2004. The
percentage increase in total exports was 134.72% in 2004 when
compared with 1990. Similarly, the total imports increase by
170.27% in 2004 when compared with 1990. This study also
shows that in the total trade balance, Pakistans share in
percentage is only 7.53% and Malaysia share in percentage is
92.47%. It also depicts that from the period 2001 to 2006 the
FDI from Malaysia was US$ 29.377 million; and the percentage
increase in FDI from the Malaysia was US$227.68 million when
compared with 2001-02.
Finally it is suggested that:
1. The Government of Pakistan must encourage the
Malaysian Investors to invest in various sectors of
Pakistan.
2. The Government of Pakistan must motivate the
Government of Malaysia to take Pakistans human
resources as both the countries have signed a contract in
2005 for employment of 100,000 Pakistanis in Malaysia.
3. The Government of Pakistan should focus on value
added products in the place of raw commodities.
4. The Government of Pakistan must have control on
corruption and political interferences. Law and order
situation should be improved to provide favorable
environment to the Malaysian investors.
5. The Government of Pakistan should identify various
investment areas for Malaysian investors such as Thar
coal power, Gwader sea port, Sandak etc.
6. The Government of Pakistan should not impose heavy
duties on manufacturing, imports and exports.
7. The Government of Pakistan and Malaysia should take
steps to learn from each other's experience in science
and technology, education, culture, insurance, Islamic
banking and other Islamic investment instruments.
8. The Government of Pakistan and Malaysia should start
joint ventures arrangements in the field of cotton textiles
together to exploit the opportunities offered by the
textile quota-free world markets.
1
Aziz Shaukat, Economic cooperation with Malaysia, Daily News, February 19,
2005, p.1
2
Asian Development Bank, Pakistan-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement, Regional
Cooperation and Integration Initiatives: Trade and Investment, Global Newspaper,
April 18, 2005, p.1
3
Khan Rashid Ahmad, Pakistan and East Asia, The Nation, October 13, 2005, pp.
4-7
4
Khan Rashid Ahmad, Look East policy, The Nation, May 26, 2005, pp. 2-6
5
Khan Humayun Akhtar, Pakistan Malaysia to work out modalities on FTA next
month, Pakistan News, June 5, 2006, pp.1-2
6
Badawi Abdullah Ahmed, Economic ties with Malaysia, Daily Dawn, February
19, 2005, pp.1-3
7
Khan Rashid Ahmad, Pakistan and East Asia, The Nation, October 13, 2005, pp.
3-8
8
Aziz Shaukat, Pakistan, Malaysia sign Memorandum of understanding for
building M-4 Motorway, Daily Pakistan Times, April 27, 2005, pp.1-3
9
Aziz Rafidah, Malaysia, Pakistan sign accord to reduce trade tariffs, The News
International, October 2, 2005, pp.2-4
10
Mahmood Javed, Malaysia seeks MFN, National Treatment for investment, Daily
Nawaiwaqt , August 26, 2005, pp. 1-3
11
Khan Rashid Ahmad, Pakistan looks East, The Nation, May 16, 2005, pp. 1-10
12
Government of Pakistan, Federal Bureau of Statistics, 5-SLIC Building, F-6/4,
Blue Area, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2005, pp. 449-453
13
Ibid., pp. 452-453
14
Ibid., pp. 452
15
Mustafa Khalid, Pakistan and Malaysia to sign protocol for PTA, Daily Times,
2005, pp.1-2
16
Malik Ahmad Rashid, Aziz's visit to Malaysia, Daily Nawaiwaqt, May 8, 2005,
pp.2-5
17
Ahmed Razib, Increasing Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan, South Asian
Business News, September 24, 2006, pp. 1-2
18
Government of Malaysia, Brief on Malaysia, Quarterly Report published by
ministry of finance Kuala Lumpur, 2003, pp. 10-22
19
Malik Ahmad Rashid, Aziz's visit to Malaysia, May 8, 2005, pp. 3-5
20
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Privatization & Investment, Board of
Investment, Islamabad, 2006, pp. 5-6
NEW DIRECTIONS OF CHINAS NUCLEAR
POSTURE: CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
Dr Abdul Latif Tunio
Abstract
The role of nuclear posture is important in the projection of
national power. It entails the ambitions of power in
determining the national goals. It also plays a crucial role in
maintaining a nuclear deterrence. Nuclear postures are mainly
expressed by nuclear doctrine, command and control system
and the targeting plans of a country. The nuclear doctrine of
China stands for credible minimum nuclear deterrence. China
developed nuclear weapons as a limited force to prevent
nuclear blackmail and to obtain greater international status
and prestige. Its relatively small nuclear forces are intended
for retaliation rather than first strike purpose. China has
always shown principled stand on nuclear problems and has
exercised nuclear restrain against other nuclear powers.
Owing to technological progress, Chinas strategic and
targeting plans are versatile. However, its current striking
capability is limited. China is poised to play an assertive role in
changing the status quo. It is striving hard for a more robust
nuclear posture against other nuclear powers. This paper is an
attempt to highlight the nuclear posture of China. How it is
changing from a symbolic stage to operational strike? And
what measures China is taking for raising capabilities to stand
up to its operational plans.
Associate Professor Department of international relations, University of

Sindh, Jamshoro
Nuclear Command and Control
In China, the political party and military command are often
mixed, but the principle of party commands the gun always
prevails
1
. China employs civilian-military mechanism on
control of its nuclear button. The Central Military Commission
[CMC] of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] exercises
ultimate authority for the use of nuclear weapons. The
chairman of the CMC is always the General Secretary of the
Politburo
2
. Thus, Chinese command and control system,
despite some technological insufficiencies, is matured and does
not follow the pre-delegated policy in its nuclear exchange and
keeps its nuclear weapons at a very low alert.
Targeting Plans
From the very beginning, China had decided not to enlarge its
nuclear stockpile and therefore its target list has never been
long. The nuclear arsenal is shaped according to targeting
plans. The nuclear doctrine of a country has different layers
ranging from the declaratory to development and employment
stage. The targeting plans of nuclear states are mainly gauged
through two postures- Counter force and Counter value .
The first concept is defined as employment of strategic forces
in destroying the enemys important installations and
capabilities including damaging its command and control
system. Counter value concept, by contrast, targets enemys
major cities including its industrial base.
Traditionally, China has followed a policy which is closer to
Counter force value in its nuclear activities. According to a
1964 draft plan, the Chinese assigned its future military
programs to four major targets. These targeting plans were
later modified as a result of technological progress and more
importantly, political changes in the 1970s and 1980s.For
example, the original design targets of the DF-3 were the US
Clark Air force base and Subic Bay level base in the Philippines
but it was modified to attack targets in the Central and Eastern
USSR. The DF-4 was at first aimed at striking the US Andersen
air base at Guam. Later, its range was increased to Moscow
3
.
In the post-cold war period, China has again revised its
strategic targeting. Now ,Chinas nuclear posture reflects the
Counter value option. Chinese intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) in the 54 base of the Second Artillery have
been reserved for Counter value missions against the US
homeland specially Alaska and Western US cities
4
.
China perceives India and Japan as a latent threat while US is
considered as a potential threat because US nuclear posture
lists China as one of the targets of its nuclear weapons and
takes Taiwan Strait crisis as one contingency for using nuclear
weapons .Moreover, China considers US control of space
specially over Chinese territory more threatening.
Nuclear Operational Plans
Chinas major strategic force-The Second Artillery maintains
control over its nuclear missile force and is responsible for the
conduct of Chinese nuclear operations. It has been assigned
with three basic tasks: deter, survive and retaliate. Based on
these assumptions, the second artillery adheres with three
levels of readiness in its operational plans. At the first stage, it
trains forces, does exercises and conducts normal maintenance
.In the case of nuclear threat, CMC directs these units to move
from protected positions like tunnels, silo, caves or garrisons to
firing positions. The third level is of high alert, in this situation,
missiles are fully deployed for combat purpose with support
elements, warheads and fuels, waiting for launch order.
The primary objective of Chinese nuclear policy is to convince
the potential enemies that enough of Chinese strategic
weapons would survive attack to inflict unacceptable damage
on the aggressor. In this context, China is developing assured
second strike nuclear capability in its defense plan. This
indicates that China lays more focus on retaliation rather than
attempting on launch on warning (LOW)
5
. China currently
doe not posses the requisite early warning capabilities needed
to move towards a LOW- type policy. However, China has
acquired high efficiency in handling the situation in launch
under attack (LUA) type contingency. It can ride any foreign
attack on national nuclear assets of China.
China has largely relied on its land based ballistic missiles to
ensure retaliation in post nuclear attack on strategic weapons.
According to General Zhang Zhen, the former vice chairman of
CMC: The combat of Chinese missiles is very high but they
must be used on enemys troop concentrations, important
bases, facilities or other command or control centers
6
In the beginning, the operational plans of the Second Artillery

were rudimentary and faced the technological deficit. For
decades, Chinas medium range bombers and medium range
ballistic missiles had only enough range to hit Japan, Korea,
Taiwan and US bases in Philippines or Russian Far Eastern
cities.
China has not released information concerning the number of
nuclear weapons it posses. It is generally believed that it has
always retained about 400 war heads .But, all the old
generation missiles were liquid fueled and carried single war
head. Most of these missiles were of medium range and were
more suitable for tactical combat. For strategic purposes, till
early 2000 China had acquired around 20 long range inter-
continental missiles (ICBMs) to cover the US
7
.
During the process of modernization of its nuclear forces,
China is striving to replace old generation of missiles with new
generation of missiles with multiple war heads. The liquid fuel
technology is being replaced with solid fueled missiles.
In recent years, the Second Artillery corps has replaced its
some 20 older DF-5 ICBM has already started and its extended
range version DF-31A is under development. Chinas solid
fueled 6500 nautical miles DF-4.The ageing liquid fueled DF-
3A is being replaced by the newer road-mobile, solid
propellant DF-21 MRBM. At the same time, China is
developing a nuclear powered missile submarines carrying 12
single war head from the DF-31 ICBM which is expected to be
deployed in the 094 xia class submarine by 2010
8
.Besides, the
Second Artillery crops is developing a new class of
maneuvering re-entry vehicles to acquire naval battle
capabilities.
China has made progress in its medium range ballistic missile
(MRBMs) and intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBMs) as
compared to ICBMs & submarine launch ballistic missiles
(SLBMs). The first pair of missiles MRBMs & IRBMs is chiefly
assigned to counterforce missions
9
, whereas the second pair of
missile ICBMs & SLBMs performs counter value targets more
effectively in case of present nuclear scenario aimed at
countering the hyper power.
Chinese aspirations for counter value action are modest for the
purpose of credible minimum deterrence against US especially
over the question of latters support to Taiwan. However, in
any crisis situation over Taiwan, China will keep its nuclear
options, even for counter value strike, open. By all practical
means, most of the Chinese nuclear arsenal and operations are
designed for counter force actions. In this respect, US security
experts have expressed that China is coming closer to
achieving a goal of being able to attack on deployed US aircraft
carrier battle group with conventional or nuclear ballistic
missiles
10
.
US primacy in space and global surveillance has limited
Chinese nuclear autonomy in carrying out counter value type
strategy in its nuclear equation. The introduction of anti-
ballistic missile defense system has further undermined the
deterrence value of China.
The second artillery corps has established four research
institutes to solve the problems associated with operations.
And find out the gap between its targeting plans and
operational capability. For that purpose, China has focused on
electro- magnetic technology to fill the lag between goals and
operations. In this context, on 11 January 2007, China
destroyed its own weather satellite with kinetic kill vehicle
launched on a Chinese missile. Earlier, in August 2006 a
Chinese ground-based laser blinded a US reconnaissance
satellite over China
11
. This anti- satellite weapon has
empowered China to follow an active defense over its horizon.
The Chinese space program has launched a number of military
or dual use satellites for imagery and radar reconnaissance,
telecommunication and regional navigation. It is also
developing a heavy- lift space launch vehicle (SLV) to place
various payloads into earth orbits
12
.
Indeed, Chinese rocket technology is the best in the world. The
United States drops satellites into the sea and then special
ships recover them, while China has succeeded in landing its
space craft on ground
13
. Recently, China has planned to
develop the new- generation carrier rockets. This will help
bolster significantly its capabilities to sharpen its competitive
edge in the international launch services.
Conclusion
The Chinese nuclear posture is still incompatible with its
operational capability which is more suitable for counter force
option. This lag is manifested in the precision and accuracy of
Chinese missiles. Moreover, China lacks command-control,
computer and communication, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance (C4ISR) skills. As a matter of fact, the gaps of
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities
between civilian and military sectors are actually expanding
rather than contracting, and the technicians are flowing to the
civilian sector for better returns
14
.
According to one account, the USA only needs 10-15
W76R5W88 warheads to wipe out Chinas 4 largest cities
15
. The
destruction of cities was perhaps acceptable during Mao
period. But, with rapid economic growth in the last four
decades, it appears suicidal.
New leadership in China is more pragmatic by embracing the
de-targeting agreements with Russia and USA in 1994 and 1998
respectively. Nevertheless, China is trying to improve its
strategic ballistic missiles with four high goals: high
survivability before launching; high anti-interception
capability; high precision and strike capability; and high
reliability
16
. These new priorities will definitely bolster Chinese
nuclear deterrence more credible and invincible.
1
Ta-Chen Cheng, Chinas Nuclear Command, Control and Operations,
International Relations of the Asia Pacific, VOL.7, 2007, pp.156
2
Ibid, pp.156
3
Ibid, pp.164-165
4
The Military Balance, 2004-2005, pp.170
5
Nuclear Files Organization, De-Alerting Nuclear Weapons, a project of the
nuclear age, peace foundation; http:www.nuclearfiles.org
6
Wang Zhong quan, Meiguo He liliang Yu He Zahunlue, American Nuclear
Strategy, Beging; National defense university press,1995,pp.125-126
7
Dr. Larry M. Wortzel, China's Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine,
Command, Control and Campaign Planning. May 2007, p-26,
www.basicint.org/update/WNU070814.htm
8
Nuclear Weapons and Space programme, Chinese Defense Today, December,
2007
9
Cheng[2007], Chinas Nuclear Command Asia Pacific, pp.167
10
Wortzel,[2007], Chinas Nuclear Planning, pp-32
11
Wendell Minnick. Chinas flexes Space Muscle; Satwellite Destruction
Highlights Beggings Focus, Defence News, January 22, 2007, p.7
12
Nuclear Weapons and Space programme, Chinese Defense Today, December,
2007
13
Syed Fazl-e-Haider, US Frustrated On Nuclear Deal, Express India, April 21,
2007
14
Cheng[2007], Chinas Nuclear Command, Asia Pacific, pp.173
15
Ibid, p.168
16
Ibid, p.161

Asia Pacific 25, 2007

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