Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 72

Article 3, Primacy of Human Rights

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS


RAMAS AND ELIZABETH DIMAANO
GR 104768, July 21, 2003

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Sandiganbayan resolution dismissing
petitioners amended complaint and ordering the return of the confiscated items of Elizabeth
Dimaano

Facts:
1. President Cory Aquino issued EO No. 1 after the EDSA revolution
EO 1 created the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) to recover all ill-
gotten wealth of Marcos and his cronies. The PCGG then created the AFP Anti-graft Boad to
investigate corrupt AFP Personnel.
2. The AFP Board investigated the unexplained wealth of Josephus Ramas
Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the time of former
President Ferdinand Marcos.
3. Pursuant to said investigation, the constabulary raiding team served a search and seizure warrant on
Dimaanos premises.
The search warrant was for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition but the team
confiscated firearms and ammunition, along with items not included in the warrant such as
monies of P2.8M and $50,000, jewelry and land titles.
4. The AFP Board then recommended that Ramas be prosecuted before the Sandiganbayan
The case was for violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and RA 1379, otherwise known as the Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property. Accordingly, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines filed a complaint against Ramas and Dimaano before the Sandiganbayan.
5. Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for lack of merit
The grounds for the dismissal were: (1) the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the private
respondents and (2) the search and seizure conducted was illegal.
6. Petitioner appealed before the SC arguing that the search was conducted during a revolutionary
government bound by no constitutional limitation.
During the interregnum, the exclusionary right from illegal seizure granted to the respondents
by the Bill of Rights was inoperative.

Issue:
W/N the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house were illegally seized and therefore inadmissible as
evidence.

Held:
No.
1. Although the Bill of Rights was inoperative during the interregnum, as the de jure government, the
Philippine revolutionary government was still bound by treaty obligations under the ICCPR
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The revolutionary government had the duty to insure that no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his property. Although it is not intend as a legally binding
document, the court has interpreted the Declaration as a part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State.
2. While conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, the sequestration orders
remained valid as they were expressly recognized upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution.
3. During the interregnum, the directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as
they did not exceed the authority granted by the revolutionary government and did not violate the
Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the
warrant since they did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application,
specifically stated the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the
items in the warrant. However, the constabulary seized items not in the warrant.
4. The warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the
raiding team confiscated. The raiding team thus had no legal basis for the seizure of the items. Such
actions amounted to warrantless search and seizure, exceeding its authority. The seizure was therefore
void and the items must be returned to Dimaano.
Article 3, Primacy of Human Rights and Enforcement

MIJARES vs. RANADA
G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005

This is a petition for certiorari to reinstate a dismissed civil case filed by the petitioners in the RTC
of Makati. The case was initially a prayer to enforce the awarded damages given by the US District
Court in Hawaii against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. The Respondent Judge moved to dismiss
the case because of a procedural flaw in the payment of filing fees.

Facts:
1. Petitioners are victims of human rights violations during the Marcos regime. They filed
a civil case against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos to claim for damages as a result of the
abuses (arbitrary detention, torture, rape in the hands of police or military forces) during his
presidency.
2. May 9, 1991 - A complaint was filed with the US District Court, District of Hawaii.
The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Courts jurisdiction over
the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international
law. It was an action for and on behalf of a class of individuals who between 1972
and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody
of military or paramilitary groups.
February 3, 1995 - The US District Court rendered a Final Judgment awarding the
petitioners a total of $1,964,005,859.90 against the estate of Marcos.
The Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
3. May 20, 1997 - Petitioners filed a Complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of the
Final Judgment. They argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for
certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed
the Final Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had become final and executory and
hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court then in force.
The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment
of the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid P410.00 as docket
and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary
amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars
(US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7,
pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees.
Respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the subject
Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined that the
subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation as it
involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite
sums of money. According to the Judge, the estimated proper amount of filing fees
was approximately P472,000,000 which obviously had not been paid.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Judge Ranada denied. From this
denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the civil case by the Respondent Judge was proper because of the
petitioners failure to pay the proper filing fees

Held:
NO. The petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Respondent Judge are NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. A new order REINSTATING the civil case is issued. No costs.

The relevant question related to the issue is whether the action filed with the lower court is a "money
claim against an estate not based on judgment" The Court ruled in the negative and said that:
Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a
judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The provision does not make any
distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not
distinguish, we shall not distinguish.
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is
computed on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or on the value of the property
in litigation. The filing fee for requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is based
on the amount of indebtedness or the mortgagee's claim. In special proceedings involving
properties such as for the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the value of
the property. The aforecited rules evidently have no application to petitioners' complaint.
Neither the complaint nor the award of damages adjudicated by the US District Court
involves any real property of the Marcos estate.
Relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right
recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds
of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. To
further answer the issue, the Court discussed the nature and effects of a foreign judgment in within our
jurisdiction:
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations in international law have
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries (Hilton v. Guyot, Ingenholl v. Walter E.
Olsen & Co.)
Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in
the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.
The applicability of Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was called
upon by the Court to emphasize on the effect of foreign judgment being enforced in our
land. However, it also asserts that the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled
to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that
there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in
this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.
There is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such
purpose. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a
vindication of a right prescinding either from a "conclusive judgment upon title" or the
"presumptive evidence of a right."

Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a
quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before the
regular courts.
The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at
the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of
Section 7(a) of Rule 141. It is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not
involving property." Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was
an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for "other actions
not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a
grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule
and dismissed the complaint.



OTHER THINGS DISCUSSED IN THE CASE
(Dean or Atty. Ingles might ask these other details to know if you really read the case)

Petitioners invokes Section 11, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty," a mandate which is essentially
defeated by the required exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived at by the RTC, was
characterized as indisputably unfair, inequitable, and unjust. Since the provision is among the guarantees ensured by the Bill of
Rights, it certainly gives rise to a demandable right. However, now is not the occasion to elaborate on the parameters of this
constitutional right. It is not necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic
that the constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy can be settled on other grounds or
unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case.

The Commission on Human Rights, as an intervenor, urged that the petition be granted and a judgment rendered, ordering the
enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment in accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign judgment as a new case,
in violation of the principle that once a case has been decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue with
finality, it can no longer be relitigated again in another country. The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity, and of vested
rights.

On what court has jurisdiction over the money claim - If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of (like the enforcement of a foreign judgment), the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

Article 3, Section 1

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORG VS PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS CO. INC.
G.R. No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations which dismissed the
motion for reconsideration for being late by 2 days as well as the decision of the lower court
deciding in favor of the company in accordance with Article 3 Section 1.

Facts
!
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) a union of workers held a
strike in front of Malacanang against the abuse of the Pasig police.
!
Before such strike, some of the petitioners, Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Pacientee, Bonifacio Vacuna Benjamin Pagcu
and Rodulfo Munsod, had meetings with Phil Blooming regarding the coming strike
!
The first meeting occurred where the company asked the representatives of PBMEO to
cancel the strike because it would interrupt the normal course of business of the company
where in the representatives contended that the strike was their constitutional right to
freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances and
stressed out that the strike is not against the company but rather against the Pasig police
!
A second meeting occurred where the company allowed such strike to ensue on the
condition that the first shift of employees would not continue with the strike and come to
work, without which such workers would be terminated by the company on the basis of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which provides a clause of No Strike, No
Lockout.
!
The Company terminated the heads of the PBMEO union.
!
The lower court decided in favor of the company where the petitioners were found guilty
of bargaining in bad faith and that their motion for reconsideration was late by 2 days
submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations.

Issue
1) Whether or not Phil Blooming validly terminated the petitioners on the basis of a violation of
the CBA of the company and 2) Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations dismissal of the
motion for reconsideration is to be reversed.

Held
No, the petitioners were not validly terminated and the Supreme Court may set considering the
circumstances involving the case at bar, the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration by the
Court of Industrial Relations on the basis of being late be set aside. The primacy of human rights
is above property rights and such human rights do not prescribe. Also the strike was not in
violation of the CBA of the company because it was not against the company. The company must
be the protectors of their employees but rather in the case at bar, it seemed like they were looking
for a chance to reduce such personnel. They are guilty of unfair labor practice. The dismissal of
the Court of Industrial Relations of the motion for reconsideration because of the prescription of 5
days upon the notice and 10 days to arguments that support such motion was the reason.
Considering the nature of the offense the Supreme Court allowed such negligence to prosper
hence the reversal of the decision and the reinstatement of the petitioners with the proper pay
from the moment they were dismissed minus the one day of strike as well as the earnings which
they might have earned during their separation from other sources.

WHEREFORE, the primacy of human rights over property rights may be considered in lieu with
the enforcement of the due process of the law, as seen in this case, with regard to the tardiness of
the submission of the motion for reconsideration.

DISSENTING by Barredo, J

Barredo argues that such negligence of the submission of the motion for reconsideration is right
to be dismissed. He says that the petitioner with the help of his counsel had the proper number of
days to submit such motion. Barredo argues with proof of previous jurisprudence. Added to this
argument is that the constitutional right is not what is being tackled in the case at bar, according
to Barredo. The errors is said to be in the interpretation, construction or application of a
constitutional precept and not a denial of due process. All of these must first comply with the
rules of procedure and overpowering a final and executory decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations devoids them of power and renders them useless hence the dissenting opinion of
Barredo.

SEPARATE by Teehankee, J

Teehankee restates the reasons of the decision of the majority of the court in the primacy of
human rights over property rights are to be considered and are considered imprescriptible.
Article 3 Section 1| Due Process: In General

TUPAS V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 89571. February 6, 1991


Facts:
1. October 12, 1989
a. court denied petition for certiorari for failure to show CA (respondent court) committed
reversible error in its resolution dated May 31, 1989.
2. November 23, 1989
a. petitioner filed motion for reconsideration to which SC required a Comment followed by
a Reply and a Rejoinder
3. After examining the issues and arguments, SC affirmed the decision of CA.
a. petitioners received copy of the Pasay RTC decision on April 3, 1989
b. motion for reconsideration was filed on April 17, 1989
c. such motion for reconsideration was denied by RTC on May 3, 1989 but only received by
the petitioners counsel on May 9, 1989
d. petition for review with CA was done only on May 23, 1989 which was clearly outside
the 15-day reglementary period

Issue:
W/N the petitioners were denied of procedural due process after they fail to comply with the 15-day
prescription for appealing

Held/Ratio

NO. Records showed that the petitioners counsel did not file petition for review within the
remaining period which he should have known was only one day.
The tardiness of the petitioners to file an extension for review has forfeited their right to
appeal. Therefore, they cannot claim that they have been denied of due process.
Observance of both procedural and substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process
and must be followed whatever the source of such rights.
Petition for certiorari cannot be a remedy if the reason behind the lost of the right to appeal is
due to the petitioners inexcusable negligence.
Lacsamana V. CA
! If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the
movant has only the remaining period within which to file a petition for review.
Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of
time to file such petition for review
Petitioners argument that they should not be prejudiced by the mistake of their counsel was
not acceptable especially that their counsel is equipped with impressive credentials.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with finality. It is so ordered.
Article III, Section 1

ASILO, JR. V. PEOPLE
G.R. Nos 159017-18, March 9. 2011

Quick Digest:
This is a case to petition for review of certiorari the decision of the Sandiganbayan re:
Finding petitioners Comendador and Asilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)
Dismissing the case against accused Alberto Angeles
Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs now respondents spouses Bombasi
Dismissing the cases against the spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza and Benita and
Isagani Coronado.

Facts (relevant to the due process issue):
1. MARCH 15, 1978: Private Respondent Visitacions late mother Marciana Vda. De
Coronado and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna entered into a lease contract
Municipality allowed Marciana Vda. De Coronado the use and enjoyment of
property of a lot and store for a period of 20 years beginning on March 15, 1978
Lease contract:
Respondent can build firewall
In case of modification of the public market, respondent or her heirs
would be given preferential rights
2. SOMETIME IN 1986: A fire razed the public market
Engineer Marcelino Gorospe inspected the store of Visitacion
Declared that the store remained intact and stood strong
The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until October 15, 1993
3. SEPTEMBER 1, 1993: Visitacion received Resolution No. 156 to from Mayor
Comandador; Visitacion wrote a reply letter
Resolution:
Demolish her store within 5 days of notice
File an Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses
incurred due to the delay in the completion of the project if the
Coronados continuously resists the order
Letter:
The lease contract was still existing and binding
She was willing to vacate provided that the same place and area be
given to her
If Mayor Comendador will not accept the proposal, he should file the
appropriate action to court
4. OCTOBER 11, 1993: The Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution
No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store occupied by Visitacion
5. OCTOBER 14, 1993: Municipal Administrator Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. sent a letter to
Visitacion about the demolition of her store the next day; Visitacion wrote a reply letter
Letter:
There is no legal right to demolish without a court order
The resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only
the filing of an unlawful detainer case against her
If the demolition will take place, administrative, criminal and civil
actions will be filed against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and all persons
who will take part in the demolition
6. OCTOBER 15, 1993: Mayor Comendador authorized the demolition of the store with
Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.

Issue:
W/N due process was accorded to spouses Bombasi when Mayor Comendador, Asilo and
Angeles demolished the store relying on the authority of the Sangguniang Baranggay resolution.
(In relation to the issue of the case of W/N the court should find Comendador and Asilo Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019)

Held:
No there was no due process.
Yes Comendador and Asilo, Jr. are guilty of RA 3019, Sec. 3(e).

There was no due process:
Abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is allowed if it is a nuisance per se
o In this case, the market stall cannot be considered a nuisance since it was not
affected by the 1986 fire
Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition. The Local
Government Code does not expressly provide for the abatement of nuisance.
Art III Section 1
EL BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO V. VICENTE PALANCA
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
Quick Digest PortionThis is a petition to set aside the judgment of the lower court (Court of First
Instance) involving the foreclosure of the mortgage due to a supposed irregularity made by the
clerk of the court of first instance.
Facts:
1. Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco (Engracio Palanca) mortgaged various parcels
of land in June 1906.
The real property is situated in Manila.
Estimated value at the time: P292,558
2. Engracio Palanca went back home to China.
He went to China, his native country, after he executed the mortgage.
He never went back to the Philippines.
He died in China at January 29, 1910.
3. Upon March 31, 1906 the debt amounted to P218,294.10
The parcels of land is about P75,000 pesos in excess of the debt.
Drawing interest at 8% per annum.
Payable at end of each quarter.
4. Upon March 31, 1908 El Banco Espanol-Filipino (Bank) instituted an action to foreclose the
mortgage upon the parcels of real property.
Engracio Palanca is not a resident of the Philippines when the action was instituted.
He was somewhere in China.
Engracio Palancas last known place of residence was in Amoy, China.
5. An order of publication was obtained by the court and was made in due form in a newspaper
of Manila.
Engracio Palanca was not a resident at the time of the institution of the action, the
plaintiff (Bank) has to give notice to the defendant BY PUBLICATION (Engracio
Palanca) in accordance with section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 399 says that in case of publication, if the non-resident/absent defendants
place of residence is KNOWN (in this case Amoy, China is the last known place of
residence) the judge must send a copy of the complaint and summons to be deposited
by the CLERK in the post-office.
It is not clear whether or not the clerk complied with this order. However, there is an
affidavit signed by Bernardo Chan, an employee of the attorneys of the bank,
showing that he had deposited such documents in the post-office.
6. Engracio Palanca did not appear and lost by default. A decision was made ordering Palanca
to pay on or before July 6, 1908 and in case of failure the mortgaged property will be
auctioned.
The property was bought by the bank for P110,200. (Note: the value of the property
at the time of the mortgage was P75,000 pesos in excess. So in a sense Palanca was
prejudiced.)
7. 7 years later, Vicente Palanca, the administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca filed a
motion to set aside the order. It was denied.
Issue:
W/N the failure of the clerk to mail the notice to Amoy, China amounts to a denial of due process of the
defendant.
Note: It is not clear whether or not the clerk complied. There is just a lack of proof that there is
compliance so the Court assumes here that it was not complied with for the sake of argument.
Ruling:
No, it does not amount to a denial of due process.
The law only requires the mailing of the notice if the defendants residence is known. The law generally
requires the publication and the mailing of the notice is simply an addition if his residence is known.
The owner of the mortgaged property must take the risk of a possible failure to deliver the notice for
various reasons. Moreover, the notice was published in the newspaper.
4 requisites of due process:
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which
is the subject of the proceeding;
(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
All of these were complied with. The irregularity is not fatal.
Article 3 Section 1
Mortel vs Kerr
G.R.No. 156296(Nov 12, 2012)

Quick Digest Portion The client seeks the reversal of a decision, where by the Court of Appeals denied
his petition for review on certiorari, the client should not be bound my the negligence and errors of his
previous counsels that deprived him the due process of law.

Facts:
On July 19, 2000, respondent Salvador E. Kerr (Kerr) instituted a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage,
docketed as Civil Case No. 279-0-2000, against Dennis Q. Mortel (Mortel) through Atty. Leonuel N.
Mas (Atty. Mas) of the Public Attorneys Office. The pre-trial was re-set four times for various reasons,
but on the fifth setting on December 7, 2000, Mortel and Atty. Mas were not around when the case was
called. On motion of Kerrs counsel, the RTC declared Mortel as in default and allowed Kerr to present
evidence ex parte.On December 28, 2000, Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak (Atty. Tumulak) filed a notice of
appearance in behalf of Mortel, but the RTC did not act on the notice of appearance On May 4, 2001,
Mortel, this time through Atty. Tumulak, filed a verified petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38
of the Rules of Court.

On August 20, 2001, the RTC denied the verified petition for relief from judgment on the ground
that the petition for relief had been filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days. On November 14,
2001, Mortel moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his petition for relief from judgment

On September 5, 2002, the CA issued a resolution dismissing Mortels petition for review for
failing to state the specific material dates showing that the petition had been filed within the reglementary
period, in violation of Section 6(d), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It observed that Mortel thereby
resorted to the wrong remedy considering that he was assailing the propriety of the RTCs order declaring
him in default, against which the proper remedy was a petition for certiorari. On November 18, 2002, the
CA denied Mortels motion for reconsideration for lack of merit because the defects of the petition for
review were not corrected, and for availing himself of the remedy of petition for review when he should
have filed a petition for certiorari instead.

On December 23, 2002, Mortel, by himself, sought an extension of time to file a petition for review on
certiorari. On January 27, 2003, the Court granted Mortels motion for extension with a warning that no
further extension would be given.

Issue:

W/N the negligence of Mortels counsels was so gross and palpable as to deprive him of his
property without due process of law.

Held:
Yes. As a rule, a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a case. To
allow a client to disown his counsels conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject
to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. But the rule admits of exceptions. The
negligence and mistakes committed by his several counsels were so gross and palpable that they denied
due process to Mortel and could have cost him his valuable asset. They thereby prevented him from
presenting his side, which was potentially highly unfair and unjust to him on account of his defense being
plausible and seemingly meritorious.Court litigation is primarily a search for truth, and a liberal
interpretation of the rules that gives to both parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way
to ferret out such truth.36 Thus, a court may suspend its own rules or except a case from them in order to
serve the ends of justice; or, it may altogether disregard the rules in a proper case.37 To cling to the
general rule of having the ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty of the counsel bind the client is
only to condone rather than to rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith
and entrust his cause to his counsel.
Webb v. de Leon
G.R. 121234, August 23, 1995

Quick Reference: Peititions are filed to annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued by respondent
Judge de Leon of the Paraaque RTC against petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, and Antonio
Lejano

Facts:
a. On June 19, 1994, the NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Webb,
Gatchalian, Lejano, and 6 others with the crime of Rape with Homicide of Carmela
Vizconde, her mother (Estrellita, 51y/o), and her sister (Anne Marie Jennifer, 9 y/o) in their
home at 80 Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paraaque in June 30, 1991. The DOJ formed a panel
of prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation.
During preliminary investigation, Webb claimed that he did not commit the crime at
bar as he went to the US (New York) on March 1, 1991 and returned to the
Philippines on October 27, 1992.
He submitted documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota
car while in the US, and was issued a State of California Drivers License. In
addition, he submitted a letter of Robert Heafner, Legal Attach of the US
Embassy to confirm his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as
a passenger of US Airlines Flight No. 808.
Other petitioners likewise have alibis stating that it was impossible for them to be at
the scene of the crime as they were engaged in something else.
b. On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution finding probable cause to
hold Webb and company for trial upon which, an information was filed with the Paraaque
RTC, and was raffled to Branch 258, as presided by respondent Judge Escano. It was,
however, respondent Judge Raul de Leon who issued the warrants of arrest. Judge
Escano inhibited himself from the case due to possible partiality as he was formerly engaged
with the NBI.
c. Webb and Co. voluntarily surrendered at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., after filing their
separate petitions, which primarily entail that the (1) DOJ Panel denied them of their
constitutional right to due process during preliminary investigation, (2) respondent
judges committed grave abuse of discretion due to the attendance of prejudicial
publicity and a hasty/malicious prosecution by the NBI and DOJ Panel.

Issue (in re. Due Process and Prejudicial Publicity):
W/N prejudicial publicity denied them of their right to due process. NO.

Held (in re. Due Process and Prejudicial Publicity):
Petitions are dismissed.
SC found no procedural impediment while undergoing preliminary investigation;
There must be a balance in the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the
press, the publics right to information, and an accused right to a fair and impartial trial.
While history has shown that commentators bombard the public with views not too many
of which are sober and sublime, in the case of Martelino, it was said that to warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be ALLEGATION AND PROOF that
the judges have been unduly influenced by the tone and content of such publicity.
o Petitioners cannot merely rely on the subconscious effects of publicity, as these
are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.
To the aspect of publicity = there was no petition from the petitioners to disqualify any member of the DOJ panel on the basis of bias
resulting from their bombardment with publicity.
Article III Section 1
PEOPLE vs TEEHANKEE
G. R. No. 111206-08 | October 6, 1995

Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr.: murder for
the killing of Roland John Chapman, frustrated murder for the shooting and wounding of Jussi Leino
and murder (initially frustrated murder but she died eventually) for the killing of Maureen Hultman.

Facts: 1. July 13, 1991 order of events:
after a night-out with their friends, Hultman asked Leino to take her to Campanilla Street,
Dasmarinas Village, Makati and Chapman tagged along.
Upon entering the village, Maureen asked them to stop a block away from her house, and walked
the rest of the way with Leino while Chapman waited in the car.
While walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car driven by the accused (Teehankee)
stopped them, asked for their IDs, and grabbed and pocketed Leinos without looking at it
Upon seeing the incident, Chapman stepped down and asked why the accused was bothering them.
Accused pulled out his gun and shot him.
The shooting shocked Maureen and she started screaming hysterically.
Accused asked them to sit at the sidewalk. Leino obeyed. After trying to run away from the
accused, Maureen obeyed as well.
Accused turned his back on them, and then faced them again then shot Leino, then Maureen, then
the accused left.
Leino struggled to ask for help and saw atleast 3 people who saw the incident: Florece (private
security guard) , Mangubat (driver) and Cadenas (private SG).
2. Leino and witnesses Cadenas and Mangubat identified Teehankee as the gunman. The
witnesses also confirmed that the accuseds car was the car they saw during the incident.
3. Separate criminal cases were filed against the accused. The trial court convicted him because
of the strength of the testimonies of the eyewitnesses through positive identification.
4. Accused interposed the present appeal and gave reasons why the trial judge erred in his ruling,
one of which is that the publicity given to the case impaired his right to an impartial trial:
that the trial judge was pressured because of high-ranking individuals (Estrada and Drilon) who
followed the developments of the case.
Trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity
He claims that placards were displayed in the courtroom, spectators clapped their hands, and
people gave him the finger sign.

Issue: Whether or not the publicity given the case against the accused-appellant was massive,
overwhelming, and prejudicial as to effectively deprive him of his right to impartial trial.

Held: NO
It is natural for media to give high profile and high stake criminal trials pervasive publicity.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact of
pervasive and overwhelming publicity does not in itself prove that the said publicity permeated
the mind of the judge and impaired his impartiality.
! It is impossible to seal the judges from publicity. News is everywhere
! Our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not one who is detached from the world
! Judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-cam
performances of parties to litigation.
There must be allegation and proof that the judges have unduly been influenced by the publicity
and not merely a possibility. The records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias
against appellant. Appellant himself relied heavily on selected portions of 7 newspaper reports for
his defense.

Article III Section 1 Publicity and TV Coverage
Perez v. Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001

Pres. E. Estrada was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan and petitioners have requested to
televise the hearing but were denied by the Sandiganbayan. Issue contemplates on the conflict
between the right to public information & freedom of press and the right of the accused for a fair
trial. The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to have an audio-visual recording and not live telecast
of the hearing.

Facts:
1. Former Pres. E. Estrada is charged with a plunder case in the Sandiganbayan
! Estrada was ousted and the press requested for a live telecast of the plunder case in the
Sandiganbayan
! KBP (Kabisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas), the organization of the press in the
Philippines, together with Cesar Sarino, Renato Cayetano, and Atty. Ricardo Romulo,
requested for a live telecast
2. The Sandiganbayan denied the request of the press for a live telecast of the case
3. Sec. of Justice Hernando Perez, one of the petitioners, filed a motion of reconsideration on
the denial for a live telecast of the plunder case
! They argue that:
There is no real conflict of right to public information & freedom of press and the
right of the accuse for a fair trial
If there was a clash, the right to public information and freedom of press would
be favored for they (the people) are the source of the sovereignty
4. Estrada restates that TV and Radio coverage would violate the sub judice rule or under
judicial consideration
! Sub judice rule: Courts role should not be usurped by others making public statements
about how these issues should be dealt with
! live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which
can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a
decision one way or the other.
Issues:
W/N the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the request
In denying the request, does this mean that the Sandiganbayan can disregard the right to public
information & freedom of press over the right to fair trial?
Ruling:
Court finds no reason to alter or modify the resolution of the Sandiganbayan
! 9:6 members of the Court voted
Not necessary
! In lieu of the TV or Radio coverage of the trial, 8 voted to order an audio-visual
recording of the case

Ratio:
Purposes for Audio-visual recording
! Historic Significance; the King is under no man, but he is under God
! Involves vital concern of the people on the fundamental right to know
! Essential for education and civic training of the people
Considered serious risks as stated by Paul Freund (Harvard Law School)
Article 3, Section 1

PEOPLE VS ROXAS
G.R. No. 172604 August 17, 2010

This is an appeal by way of automatic review on the Decision dated 13 January 2006, affirming the
judgement of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting appelant Venancio Roxas y Arguelles for the
crimes of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder of Agnes Gurindola,
Violation of R.A. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, and Theft.

Facts:
1. On or about 12 January 1994, accused-appellant Venancio Roxas, conspired with another Roberto
Gungon, to take away and kidnap Agnes Guirindola.
a. On January 12, 1994, Agnes Guirindola was flagged down by a man wearing a PNP
reflectorized vest.
Agnes was driving her mothers car, a RED NISSAN SENTRA SEDAN with plate TKR 837,
along Panay Avenue in Quezon City.
She was flagged down by a man wearing a PNP reflectorized vest and was asked to make a U-
turn, alleging that the street was a one-way street.
The man, later identified as Venancio Roxas (Roxas), proceeded to the RIGHT SIDE/
PASSENGER SIDE of the car and informed Agnes that the street she entered had been made
into a one-way street because of an accident that occurred two days ago.
Roxas asked for Agness license and gave her a paper to sign.
Agnes PRETENDED to sign the paper, placing a CHECK MARK instead.
Roxas asked Agnes to open the door so he could show her the one-way sign and the other traffic
aide and instructed her to drive to the corner of the street.
The other traffic aide was not at the corner so Agnes asked Roxas where she could drop him off,
to which he instructed her to make a left turn from the corner so he could alight somewhere
along MOTHER IGNACIA.
Agnes handed Roxas a P50, assuming he was waiting for a bribe, after which Roxas returned her
license.

b. Agnes was held at gunpoint after receiving her license.
Roxas switched off the engine of Agness car after returning her license.
Roxas poked a gun at Agnes, telling her, Miss, kailangan ko ang kotse mo.
Agnes begged Roxas to just take the car.

c. Agnes was taken along with her car and was shot in Baranggay Bagong Pook, San Jose, Batangas.
Roxas opened the rear door and a second passenger, later identified as Roberto Gungon
(Gungon), entered the car and pulled Agnes towards the back seat, where he held her shoulder
and leg.
Roxas took the drivers seat, while Gungon suggested that they bring Agnes to Philcoa but after
checking his beeper, Gungon suggested, Boss, dalhin na natin siya sa dati, doon na nation siya
i-s.
Roxas stopped along the way where he bought Agnes a bottle of soft drinks and SKYFLAKES
biscuit and asked Gungon to feed her. Agnes refused after seeing TWO TABLETS FLOATING
inside the bottle.
Agnes attempted to escape but Gungon poked the gun at her whenever she made the slightest
movement.
They reached the South Superhighway at around 5 PM, where Roxas and Gungon took turns
urinating.
Agnes took a PRAYER LEAFLET from her wallet when Gungon asked her if she was the girl in
the picture in her wallet. Upon informing Gungon that it was her sister, Gungon got his own
wallet and showed Agnes THREE PICTURES one of his niece, her girlfriend, and Roxas and
a lady with a little child.
Agnes planned to escape again but they were running at around 80-100 KPH so she continued
praying instead.
Gungon offered her the soft drinks again, which she refused but upon seeing how mad Gungon
was, she was forced to drink it. Roxas instructed Gungon to give her TWO MORE TABLETS
because she was big.
Agnes took the tablets but HID THEM UNDER HER TONGUE and SPAT IT OUT INTO HER
HANDKERCHIEF when Roxas and Gungon were not looking.
Agnes requested for a MCDONALDS SANDWICH but Gungon said that they were in the
province and that there was no McDonalds there. Roxas stopped by a bakery and bought Agnes
a TAISAN CAKE. This is where Agnes saw the signboard that read Sto. Tomas or San Jose,
Batangas.
Agnes felt dizzy and fell asleep. When she woke up, she found herself lying at the back seat
with her legs on the lap of Gungon. All of her jewelry (bracelets, earrings, necklace, and watch
amounting to P30,000 to P40,000) and shoes were gone. A CHECK in the amount of P3,000 and
P1,000 in cash were also missing from her wallet. Gungon said they were keeping it for her.
Agnes noticed from the cars clock on the dashboard that it was about 9:30 or 10:00 PM already.
She also noticed that a third passenger had entered the car, sitting on the passenger seat while
Roxas was still driving.
She asked if she could relieve herself to which Roxas said yes. She fixed her hair and Gungon
put her shoes on her feet. He alighted first, leading Agnes to a nearby grassy area where she
urinated.
When Agnes was about to stand up, she saw white sparks and fell down. When she regained
consciousness, the three men and car were gone. Agnes followed a light which led her to a small
house. She saw TWO CHILDREN and a TEENAGER singing inside but upon seeing her, they
ran away. A LADY CARRYING A BABY AT THE STAIRS was also scared and locked herself
in the room. Agnes followed her and knocked at the door, asking for help but she did not
respond.
Agnes went back downstairs and lied down on the sofa when she noticed blood oozing from her
face and there were holes in the LEFT SIDE of her NECK and RIGHT CHEEK.
Agnes heard a vehicle and voices saying there was a blood woman who needed help. She was
carried into a Fiera and brought to the Batangas Regional Hospital where a DR. LAURO R.
SAN JOSE, captain of the neurosurgery department, attended to her.

d. Agnes was transferred from Batangas Regional Hospital to V. Luna General Hospital.
Agness family arrived at the hospital at around 3 AM of 13 January 1994.
She was transferred to V. Luna General Hospital (now AFP Medical Center) where she stayed
for 43 DAYS.
Upon her transfer to V. Luna General Hospital, Agness parents immediately reported the
incident to the NBI.
NBI agents visited Agnes on 17 January 1994 for the cartographic sketches of Roxas and
Gungon.

e. Suspects were arrested.
NBI agents showed 3-4 pictures of Gungon to Agnes on 19 January 1994. GUNGON was
arrested in DAVAO CITY.
Agnes positively IDENTIFIED Gungon in a line up consisting of 5-6 MEN on 1 February 1994.
Roxas was eventually arrested on 11 September 1995 inside the municipal hall of Taysan,
Batangas under the Office of the Mayor, where he used the aliases JOE VILLAMOR and
MARIANITO VILLAMOR.
Agnes positively IDENTIFIED Roxas in a line up as the other perpetrator.

2. On 5 September 2002, the Regional Trial Court found accused-appellant guilty of Kidnapping with
Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder, Violation of R.A. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972, and Theft.

3. Roxas moved for the reconsideration of the decision dated 5 September 2002 and the inhibition of the
Honorable Judge Demetrio Macapagal, Sr.
Roxas argues that the presence of then Justice Secretary Hernando Perez showed the courts
predisposition to convict him.
He also argues that he was DENIED DUE PROCESS because Judge Demetrio Macapagal Sr. had
lost his ability to try and resolve the case with an impartial judgement.

4. The RTC denied appellants motions for inhibition and reconsideration on 8 October 2002 but the case
was referred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.

5. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC on 13 January 2006.

Issue:
W/N the accused-appellant was DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS when the judge lost the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge.

Held:
No. There is no basis for the appellants allegation that he was deprived of due process nor that the trial
conducted was not fair or impartial. Believing the evidence of the prosecution is not a sign of bias. Furthermore,
the presence of the then Justice Secretary is not enough proof to show that the judges decision was influenced
by it. Substantial proof, not merely suspicion, is needed to prove that the appellant was prejudiced by the Justice
Secretarys presence.
Article III, Section 1, B-1

ANG TIBAY V. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)
G.R. 46496. February 27, 1940

Decision on the motion on reconsideration from the CIR on the judgment of the Court; and, from
the National Labor Union, the motion to remand the case to the CIR for a new trial

Facts:
1. Respondent CIR, through the Solicitor-General, filed a motion for reconsideration for the
following legal conclusions (which were in favor of the Petitioner) of the majority opinion of
the Court:
i. That a contract of employment, ends or by will of either party or illegal whenever the
deadline for the payment of wages according to custom locally or finish the work in-
law;
ii. Let the workers of a manufacturing firm, having concluded contract, individually and
collectively , with ell , no fixed time , and have been forced to cease their tarbajos for
having declared lockout at the factory in which tarbajan , leave be employees or
workers of the same ;
iii. That an employer or company has entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with its osbreros no fixed time duration without determiminada be for a work and
refuses to reinstate those workers who resigned following a layoff , not guilty of
incurs unfair practices in the criminal sanction of Article 5 of Law No. 213 of the
Commonwealth , but his refusal to readmit be because these workers belong to a
particular agency worker, since such employees have already left his desertion by
termination of contract under arrest
(translation based on that by Google Translate :P)

i. That a contract of employment, individual as well as collective, without fixed term of
duration, ends or by will of either party or when the deadline for the payment of
wages according to custom in the town or brother-in-law is completed the work;
ii. To workers at a manufacturing firm, which has held contract, already already
collectively, ell, no fixed time, and who have been forced to cease in their tarbajos by
declaring unemployment forced in the factory in which tarbajan, cease to be
employees or workers of the same;
iii. That an employer or partnership that has entered into a collective labour agreement
with its osbreros without duration fixed time and without being for a work
determiminada and refuses to reinstate these workers who had ceased as a result of a
forced strike, is not guilty of unfair practices in incur the criminal sanction of the
article 5 of Act No. 213 of the Commonwealth, even if its refusal to readmit due to
these workers to belong to a particular worker body, since such have already left ofto
be used theirs for termination of the contract under the unemployment.
(translation based on that by Babel Fish :P)

*MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION NOT GRANTED. Court deemed it unnecessary due
to the Motion for a New Trial

2. Respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by
the court and the remanding of the case to the CIR for a new trial and avers that:

1. Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather
soles making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the NLU, is
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather
CIR = Court of industrial relations
2. The claim was but a scheme to systematically discharge all members of the NLU
3. Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay
of leather soles from the States) was part of his scheme
4. The National Worker's Brotherhood (another union in ANG TIBAY) is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which is illegal
5. Majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable in the
exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining
6. The Civil Code (Spanish origin, source of continuous civil war) should not be used to
interpret modern labor legislations (American origin ruled by industrial peace)
7. Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice, unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood over NLU
8. The exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the CIR
9. The attachments are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
herein

Issue:
W/N the guiding principles of administrative due process were observed and if the case should be
remanded to the CIR

Held:
No, due process was not followed; and yes, the motion for a new trial in the CIR is granted. Except as to
the alleged agreement between Ang Tibay and the Union, the record is barren and does not satisfy the
thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. The interest of
justice would be better served if the respondent-movants are given opportunity to present at the hearing
the documents referred to in this motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements but it
must comply with the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character, which are:

(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity,
a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy)
(4) Substantial evidence (meaning such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, or evidence having rational probative force) to support a
finding
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered
Art III, Sec 1 (Aspects of the Proceeding: Fact-Finding and Joint Committee)

Arroyo vs. Department of Justice
G.R. No. 199082 Sept 18, 2012

This is a petition to assail the validity of 1) Comelec Resolution No 9266 creating a joint DOJ-Comelec
Investigation and Fact-finding team on the 2004 and 2007 Election fraud 2) Joint Committee Rules of
Procedure on the Alleged Election Fraud.

Facts:
1. The Comelec created committee jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall
conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses during the 2004 and 2007
elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ constituted a Joint Committee and Fact-finding team on the
2004 and 2007 elections electoral fraud composed of Comelec and DOJ officials.

The Committee shall conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on


the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the
Fact-Finding Team.

Resolutions finding probable cause (Omnibus Election code/other


election laws) shall be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
2. The Fact-Finding Team recommended GMA, Abalos and others be subjected to preliminary
investigation for conspiring to manipulate/manipulating the election results in North and South
Cotabato, and Maguindanao. Mike Arroyo was also recommended to be charged
administratively.

Comelec en banc adopted the resolution and ordered Comelec legal


officers to file the necessary informations before the appropriate courts.

Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Aquilino Pimentel III (Senator


Pimentel) filed a Complaint-Affidavit18 for Electoral Sabotage against
petitioners and twelve others
Issue:
I. W/N the creation of a Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee and
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections Electoral Fraud and Manipulation
Cases is constitutional.

II. W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law to conduct preliminary investigation
jointly with the DOJ.

Held:
I. (Constitutional.) It is not a violation of the equal protection clause.

equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

Not all respondents therein were linked to GMA. Private individuals


were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee


It is Not a violation of due process

there was no proof or even an allegation that the Joint Committee itself made biased
statements that would convey to the public that the members were favoring a
particular party.

Comelec is a collegial body. The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be
considered as that of the entire body itself

therefore, inaccurate to say that there is only one body which acted as evidence-
gatherer, prosecutor and judge(Fact-finding and joint committee have different
mandates)
It does not violate the Independence of the Comelec.

Petitioner: The chairperson is a DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has willingly
surrendered its independence to the DOJ.

As pointed out by the Court in BANAT Party-List v. Comelec, the grant of exclusive
power to investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses was not by virtue of the
Constitution but by the Omnibus Election Code which was eventually amended by
Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts preliminary investigation of
election offenses concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies.

the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of
the constitutional bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the
prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate
of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

II. (Comelec has Jurisdiction.) Publication Requirement

The assailed Joint Committees Rules of Procedure regulate not only the prosecutors
of the DOJ and the Comelec but also the conduct and rights of persons, or the public
in general. The publication requirement should, therefore, not be ignored.

Nevertheless, even if the Joint Committees Rules of Procedure is ineffective for lack
of publication, the proceedings undertaken by the Joint Committee are not rendered
null and void for that reason, because the preliminary investigation was conducted by
the Joint Committee pursuant to the procedures laid down in Rule 112 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure and the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Validity of the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation

GMA claims her right to due process was violated when her request to require Pimentel
to furnish her the documents used as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage.
o Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads: The respondent shall
have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense
o Section 6 (a), Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure:
Conduct of preliminary investigation: The respondent shall have the right to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

However, Senator Pimentel manifested that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to
the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report.130 Therefore, when GMA was furnished with the
documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the right to examine as
guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Anyway, the failure of the complainant to submit documents supporting his allegations in
the complaint may only weaken his claims and eventually works for the benefit of the
respondent as these merely are allegations unsupported by independent evidence.

It is well settled that the absence [or irregularity] of preliminary investigation does not
affect the courts jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the validity of the criminal
information or render it defective.

DISSENTING; J. BRION
Concurrent jurisdiction has been defined as equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter The Comelec and DOJ can have equal jurisdiction while maintaining the INDEPENDENCE of
the Comelec. In order not to trample the mandate of the Constitution, the DOJ should be a mere deputy ot
delegate of the Comelec and not a co-equal partner in the investigation and prosecution of election
offense.


Article III, Section 1
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION v OLALIA JR
GR No. 153675 April 19, 2007

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

Quick Digest: This is a petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify two Orders of RTC Manila Judge
Felixberto Olalia Jr (respondent)
1) Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz (private respondent) to post
bail
2) Order dated April 10 2002 denying the motion to vacate said Order (1) filed by the
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKAR) represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner
The petition alleges both Orders were issued by Olalia with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
Petition was dismissed.

Facts
Muoz was charged before the HK court with 3 counts of offense of accepting an advantage as
agent (bribery). He also faces 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrest were issued
against him.
DOJ then received from the Hong Kong a request for the provisional arrest of Muoz. The
National Bureau of Investigation then filed in with the RTC an application of provisional arrest of
Muoz. RTC issued an order of arrest. NBI agents then arrested and detained him
In the same case that the HKAR filed a petition for extradition of Muoz, he files a petition for
bail. Judge Ricardo Bernardo Jr. denied the petition for bail holding that there is no Philippine
law granting bail in extradition cases and that Muoz is a high flight risk. Thereafter, Judge
Bernardo inhibited himself from the case and Judge Olalia (respondent judge) presided.
Muoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. It was
granted by Judge Olalia (Order dated December 2001).
HKAR filed urgent motion to vacate such decision. It was denied by respondent judge Olalia
(Order dated April 2002). Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that Judge Olalia acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction granting the said Orders as there is no provision in the Constitution granting
bail to a potential extraditee

Issue
Whether or not a prospective extraditee may be granted bail (Topic on Extradition Proceedings under
Procedural Due Process)

Held/Ratio
A prospective extraditee can be granted bail.

In USA vs Purganan, the Court held that the exercise of right to bail is limited to criminal
proceedings and not to extradition. However in light of the various international treaties and also
the modern trend in public international lawgiving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and libertya reexamination of the Courts ruling in Purganan was
made.
! The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed, is recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
international community.
! The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed
and ratified also upholds the rights of every person to life, liberty and due process.
! The Philippines as member of the family of nations has the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedingsto make available such remedies
which include the right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases (Mejoff v Director of Prisons considered the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights), it should also be allowed in extradition cases. Both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence and guilt of the person detained is not an issue.
Although there is no law providing bail to the extraditee, there is also no prohibition from
exercising his constitutional right to post bail.
! The right of the extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the Philippine
treaties concerning the promotion and protection of human rights.
! According to Justice Puno is Purganan case, only clear and convincing evidence will
be considered. Private respondent did not yet show evidence to show that he was not a
flight risk.

WHEREFORE,we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. If not, the trial
court should order the cancellation of his bail and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the
extradition proceedings with dispatch. .

Article III Section 1 Arbitration
RCBC v. Banco de Oro
G.R. No. 196171 and G.R. No. 199238, December 12, 2010

Quick DigestRCBC set forth the grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision dated December 2010 one
of which is that the CA acted contrary to law and prior rulings in vacating the second partial award on the
basis of Chairman Barkers alleged partiality

Facts:
1. RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with Equitable-PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB),
George L. Go and the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc. (Bankard) (2000)
2. There was dispute between the parties when RCBC informed EPCIB and the other selling
shareholders of an overpayment of the subject shares, claiming there was an overstatement of
valuation of accounts amounting to P478 million and that the sellers violated their warranty under
the SPA (2003)
3. As no settlement was reached, RCBC commenced arbitration proceedings with the ICC-ICA in
accordance with Section 10 of the SPA (2004)
i. Section 10. Arbitration: Should there be any dispute arising between the parties
relating to this Agreement which cannot be resolved by agreement of the parties
within 15 days after written notice by a party to another, such matter shall then be
finally settled by arbitration under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of
the International Chamber of Commerce by three arbitrators appointed in
accordance with such rules. The decision of the arbitrators shall be final and
binding upon the parties hereto and the expenses of arbitration shall be paid as
the arbitrators shall determine.
ii. In its Request for Arbitration, Claimant RCBC charged Bankard with deviating
from and contravening generally accepted accounting principles and practices
and resulted in the overpayment of P556 million. For this violation of sellers
representations and warranties under the SPA, RCBC sought its rescission, as
well as payment of actual damages
4. In their answer, EPCIB, Go and the other selling individual shareholders denied RCBCs
allegations contending that RCBCs claim is one for overpayment or price reduction under the
SPA which is already time-barred. A counterclaim for litigation expenses and costs of arbitration
as well as moral and exemplary damages, was likewise raised by the Respondents (2004)
a. Subsequently, the Arbitration Tribunal was constituted where Sir Ian Barker was
appointed by the ICC-ICA as Chairman.
5. The ICC-ICA informed the parties that they are required to pay US$350,000 as advance on costs
pursuant to the ICC Rules of Arbitration (ICC Rules) (2004)
a. RCBC paid its share while Respondents share of the advance on costs was thus fixed at
US$175,000
b. Respondent filed an Application for Separate Advances on Costs stating that it is
improper for them to share equally on the advance cost of Claimants (RCBC) claim
since the total amount of RCBCs claim is substantially higher more than 40 times the
total amount of their counterclaims
c. Respondents refused to pay their share in the advance cost fixed by the ICC-ICA
d. The ICC-ICA informed the parties that if Respondents still failed to pay its share in the
advance cost, it would apply the ICC Rules and request the Arbitration Tribunal to
suspend its work and set a new time limit, and if such requested deposit remains unpaid
at the expiry thereof, the counterclaims would be considered withdrawn
6. The ICC-ICA notified the parties of its decision to increase the advances on costs from
US$350,000 to US$450,000 subject to later readjustments (2005)
a. The ICC-ICA again invited the Respondents to pay the US$100,000 increment.
Respondents, however, refused to pay the increment, insisting that RCBC should bear the
cost of prosecuting its own claim and that compelling the Respondents to fund such
prosecution is inequitable. Respondents reiterated that it was willing to pay the advance
on costs for their counterclaim
b. In view of Respondents continuing refusal to pay its equal share in the advance on costs
and increment, RCBC wrote the ICC-ICA stating that the latter should compel the
Respondents to pay as otherwise RCBC will be prejudiced and the inaction of the ICC-
ICA and the Arbitration Tribunal will detract from the effectiveness of arbitration as a
means of settling disputes
c. Chairman Ian Barker, in a letter stated in part (2006):
i. The Tribunal has no power under the ICC Rules to order the Respondents to pay
the advance on costs sought by the ICC or to give the Claimant any relief against
the Respondents refusal to pay.
d. RCBC paid the additional US$100,000 under the second assessment to avert suspension
of the Arbitration Tribunals proceedings
e. Meanwhile, EPCIBs corporate name was officially changed to Banco De Oro
(BDO)-EPCIB after its merger with BDO was duly approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. As such, BDO assumed all the obligations and liabilities of
EPCIB under the SPA.
7. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered a Partial Award and makes the following declarations (First
Partial Award) (September 2007)
a. The Claimants claim is not time-barred under the provisions of this SPA
b. The Claimant has established the following breaches by the Respondents of the SPA
i. The assets, revenue and net worth of Bankard were overstated
c. Subject to proof of loss the Claimant is entitled to damages for the foregoing breaches
8. RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC a motion to confirm the First Partial Award, while
Respondents filed a motion to vacate the same (October 2007)
a. The Makati City RTC issued an order confirming the First Partial Award and denying
Respondents separate motions to vacate. Respondents motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied
9. ICC-ICA by letter increased again the advance on costs. Respondents declined to pay its
adjudged total share and the ICC-ICA then invited RCBC to substitute for Respondents in paying
the balance. RCBC complied with the request (October 2007)
10. RCBC filed an Application for Reimbursement of Advance on Costs Paid, praying for the
issuance of a partial award directing the Respondents to reimburse its payment representing
Respondents share in the Advance on Costs (2008)
a. Respondents filed their opposition arguing that in issuing the award for advance cost, the
Arbitration Tribunal will be deciding an issue beyond the terms of the Terms of
Reference (TOR)
11. In his letter, Chairman Barker advised the parties, as follows (2008):
a. The Tribunal notes that neither party has referred to an article by Matthew Secomb on the
very subject of the case at bar. To assist both sides (later the court will decide that the
Secomb article was evident partiality of the Tribunal for RCBC) and to ensure that the
Tribunal does not consider material on which the parties have not been given an
opportunity to address, Chairman Barker attached a copy of the article
i. Secomb is the ICC Secretariat
12. RCBC contended that based on Mr. Secombs article, the Arbitration Tribunal is vested with
jurisdiction and authority to render an award with respect to said reimbursement of advance cost
paid by the non-defaulting party.
a. Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that RCBCs application for reimbursement
of advance cost has no basis under the ICC Rules
13. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered the Second Partial Award as follows (2008):
a. Respondents are forthwith to pay to the Claimant the sum of US$290,000
14. EPCIB filed a Motion to Vacate Second Partial Award in the Makati City RTC while RCBC filed
in the same court a Motion to Confirm Second Partial Award (2008)
15. The Makati City RTC issued the Order confirming the Second Partial Award and denying
EPCIBs motion to vacate the same (2009)
a. Said court held that since the parties agreed to submit any dispute under the SPA to
arbitration and to be bound by the ICC Rules, they are also bound to pay in equal shares
the advance on costs
b. It noted that RCBC was forced to pay the share of EPCIB in substitution of the latter to
prevent a suspension of the arbitration proceedings, while EPCIBs non-payment seems
more like a scheme to delay such proceedings
16. EPCIB filed in the CA a petition for review with application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 113525) in accordance with the Special Rules of Court on
Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special ADR Rules) (2010)
a. EPCIB assailed the Makati City RTC in denying its motion to vacate the Second Partial
Award despite the fact that it was issued with evident partiality
17. The Arbitration Tribunal issued the Final Award (2010)
a. BDO filed in the Makati City RTC a petition to vacate final award
b. RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC a motion to confirm final award
18. The CA rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 113525 (found in no. 14), the dispositive
portion of which reverses (December 2010):
a. The Second Partial Award dated May 28, 2008 issued in International Chamber of
Commerce Court of Arbitration
19. RCBC set forth the grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision dated December 2010 one of
which is that the CA acted contrary to law and prior rulings in vacating the second partial award
on the basis of Chairman Barkers alleged partiality

Issue:
W/N there was evident partiality which is a legal ground to vacate the Second Partial Award

Held:
There was evident partiality and therefore constitutes as a legal ground for vacating the Second Partial
Award
1. Special ADR Rules sets forth that evident partiality or corruption in the arbitral tribunal or any of
its members is a ground for vacating an arbitral award
a. The failure of the CA to apply the applicable standard or test for judicial review
prescribed in the Special ADR Rules may warrant the exercise of the Supreme Courts
discretionary powers of judicial review
b. Rule 19.10. Rule on judicial review on arbitration in the PhilippinesAs a general rule,
the court can only vacate or set aside the decision of an arbitral tribunal upon a clear
showing that the award suffers from any of the infirmities or grounds for vacating an
arbitral award
2. Evident partiality is not defined in our arbitration laws. As one of the grounds for vacating an
arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in the United States (US), the term
"encompasses both an arbitrators explicit bias toward one party and an arbitrators inferred bias
when an arbitrator fails to disclose relevant information to the parties."
a. In the Court of Appeals of Oregon, evident partiality in its common definition implies
"the existence of signs and indications that must lead to an identification or inference" of
partiality
b. In Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,
they stated that evident partiality will be found where a reasonable person would have to
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration
3. The Court adopts the reasonable impression of partiality standard, which requires a showing that
a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the
arbitration.
a. Such interest or bias must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than
remote, uncertain, or speculative
b. When a claim of arbitrators evident partiality is made, the court must ascertain from
such record as is available whether the arbitrators conduct was so biased and prejudiced
as to destroy fundamental fairness
4. CA found factual support in BDOs charge of partiality
a. Chairman Barkers furnishing the parties with a copy of the Secomb article. This article
ultimately favored RCBC by advancing its cause. Chairman Barker makes it appear that
he intended good to be done in doing so but due process dictates the cold neutrality of
impartiality
i. By furnishing the parties with a copy of this article, Chairman Barker practically
armed RCBC with supporting legal arguments to deal with the situation when
one of the parties to international commercial arbitration refuses to pay its share
on the advance on costs
b. Applying the foregoing standard, we agree with the CA in finding that Chairman
Barkers act of furnishing the parties with copies of Matthew Secombs article,
considering the attendant circumstances, is indicative of partiality such that a reasonable
man would have to conclude that he was favoring RCBC


Article III Section 1 - Academic Discipline
Guzman v. National University
G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, Narvasa, J.

This is a petition to seek relief from what the petitioners (students Guzman, Urbiztondo, and Ramacula) describe
as the respondents (NU and its officers) "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enroll without valid
grounds. Petition was granted.

Facts
1. Students (Guzman, Urbiztondo and Ramacula) were denied re-enrollment allegedly for their participation in
mass action protests against the school and other related activities.
petitioners allege that they were subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion without cause or if there
be any, without being informed of such cause and without being afforded the opportunity to defend
themselves.

2. Respondents countered:
Petitioners failure to enroll was due to their own fault, enrollment period was over when they tried to
enroll
The students were not of good scholastic standing
Protest activities were without permission and led to the disruption of classes and destruction of property
Guzman has a pending case lodged by the school at the Manila MTC for malicious mischief (destruction
of University property)

Issue: W/N respondent University can deny the students re-enrollment based on the reasons given and the pro-
cesses observed.

Held: No. Apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never
conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated
"in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that dis-
turbed or disrupted classes therein or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise
barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority. The pendency of a civil case
for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish
sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respon-
dents to cite to the Court any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-en-
rollment for poor scholastic standing.

There are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these
are, that
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
Fermin.
Art. 3, Sec. 1
ADMU v. Capulong
This is a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer of issuance of a temporary restraining
order questioning the order of respondent judge (Capulong) reinstating respondent students and to reverse
the decision.
Facts:
Abas and Mendoza, law students of ADMU were prevented by the petitioner from taking their
examinations after having participated in the hazing incident conducted by the Aquila Legis Fraternity
which resulted to the death of Leonardo Lennie Villa and the hospitalization of Bienvenido Marquez.
Lennie Villa died of serious physical injuries at the Chinese General Hospital.
Abas and Mendoza, filed with the RTC of Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for restraining order and preliminary injunction alleging that they were currently enrolled as
students of second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary order is issued, they would be
prevented from taking examinations. The petition principally centered on lack of due process in their
dismissal.
Respondent judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent students and the court ordered petitioners to
conduct special examinations which they were not allowed to take. Thus, this is a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer of issuance of a temporary restraining order questioning the order of
respondent judge (Capulong) reinstating respondent students and to reverse the decision. SC granted the
petition and reversed the order of the respondent judge as he committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: W/N the petitioner violated due process when they expelled the students.
Held/Ratio: No. The school was within its rights when it expelled the students after conducting an
investigation. ADMU did not violate due process. It complied in the requisites enunciated in Guzman v.
NU wherein the court enumerated the minimum standards to be observed by schools before imposing
disciplinary actions. Students do not necessarily have the right to cross-examine the evidence and
testimony against them.


ARTICLE III SECTION 1
SPOUSES EUGENE GO AND ANGELITA GO, MINOR EMERSON KIM GO V COLEGIO
DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN
G.R. No. 169391; OCTOBER 10, 2012

Facts:
1. October: Letran recieved information that fraternities were recruiting members among
Letran's high school students.
2. Letran started an investigation--4 students admitted that they were neophytes of the Tau
Gamma Fraternity.
3. These 4 neophytes identified Emerson Kim Go, a 4th year highschool student, as one of the
fraternity seniors present during their hazing.
4. In an incident report prepared by Letran, it stated a list of fraternity members including Kim.
5. November 23, 2001: a PTA conference was held, informing Kim's mother, petitioner Go, that
neophytes identified Kim as a frat member.
6. Thereafter, Letran asked Kim to explain his side.
7. December 19, 2001: Kim, in a written statement, denied that he was a frat member and that he
did not attend said hazing.
8. On the same day, Letran sent a written notice to inform spouses Go to attend a conference on
January 8 to address the issue of Kim's frat membership. spouses Go did not attend said
conference.
9. january 15: Letran subsequently conveyed to Mrs Go and Kim the decision of Letran to
SUSPEND Kim from Jan 16 to Feb18.
10. Spouses Go filed a case in RTC of Caloocan claiming that Letran unlawfully DISMISSED
Kim, not observing due process.
11. Petitioners claim that due process was not observed under the guidelines set by Ang Tibay v.
CIR. they claim that respondents violated due process by:
a) not conducting a formal inquiry into the charge of Kim
b) not giving them any written notice of the charge
c) not providing them with opportunity to cross examine the neophytes.
12. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Spouses GO.
13. CA rendered judgment in favor of Letran, stating that Letran observed due process.

Issue:
Whether or not due process was observed in suspending Kim.

Held:

Yes. Due process was observed in suspending Kim.

The case of Guzman v. NU should be observed in academic due process rather than the case of Ang
Tibay. Due process in disciplinary cases of students does not entail proceedings similar to judicial or
administrative proceedings.
Minimum standards to be observed:
a) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of the accusation
b) right to answer the charges against them
c) right to be informed of the evidence
d) right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
e) The evidence must be duly considered by the school authorities deciding.

Requirement a - The spouses and Kim were informed of the nature and charge of the
accusation through the written notices given to them for attending the conferences on Jan
8 and 15.

Requirement b and d - They also gave an opportunity to be heard by lettinh Kim answer
the charges against them as proved by the written statement of Kim dated December 19.
Thus, he was also given a chance to adduce evidence on his behalf.

Even though at that time, they havent received the written notice yet, they were
nevertheless given notice through the PTA meeting of the charge against Kim. What is
important is the notice given, not the form of the notice.

Requirement c - In the same PTA meeting, petitioners were informed that the case was
evidenced by the statement of the neopythes, thus they were given the right to be
informed of the evidence.

Cross examination is not needed, as again, this should not be likened to administrative
due process.

Note: Letran merely SUSPENDED Kim and not dismissed, contrary to what spouses
Go allege in their claim.
Article 3 Section 1
LAO GI v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR# 81798 December 29, 1989

Quick Digest Portion: This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners wherein they seek to set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask that a new one be rendered setting aside the order of the CID
(Comnmission on Immigration and Deportation) dated September 28, 1982 and directing it to proceed
with the reception of the evidence in support of the charges against the petitioners.

Facts:
September 3, 1958: Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 191: finding Filomeno Chia, Jr., alias Sia
Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a Filipino citizen born
on November 28, 1899 being the legitimate son of Inocencio Chia and Maria Layug of Guagua,
Pampanga.

October 3, 1980: Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147: cancelling Opinion No. 191: setting aside
the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. A
motion for reconsideration of said Opinion was denied by the Minister of Justice on February 13, 1981.

March 9, 1981: a charge for deportation was filed with the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID) against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children.

March 19, 1981: an amended charge was filed with the CID alleging that said respondents refused to
register as aliens having been required to do so and continued to refuse to register as such. On August 31,
1981 another amended charge was filed alleging that Manuel Chia committed acts of undesirability.

September 4, 1981: said respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended charges on the ground that the
CID has no authority to reopen a matter long settled under Opinion No. 191. The motion to dismiss was
opposed by the private prosecutor. The CID special prosecutor also filed an opposition on the ground that
the citizenship may be threshed out as the occasion may demand and that due process was accorded to
respondents. The respondents filed a reply thereto. The motion to dismiss was denied by the CID and a
motion for reconsideration of said denial was also denied in a resolution dated December 10, 1981.

February 11, 1982: said respondents then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order. After requiring a
comment thereon, on April 28, 1982 this court en banc resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Earlier, Manuel Chia was charged with falsification of public documents in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila in Criminal Case No. 60172 for alleging that he was a Filipino citizen in the execution of
a Deed of Absolute Sale of certain real property. He was acquitted by the trial court in an order dated May
5, 1982 on the ground that Opinion No. 191 of the Secretary of Justice may be equated as res judicata and
that revocation thereof by Opinion No. 147 cannot be considered just, fair and reasonable.

Issue:
WON petitioners are entitled to the right to due process even if they are aliens.

Held:
The petitioners question the Order of Acting Commissioner Nituda that they register as aliens as required
by the Immigration Act. While it is not disputed that it is also within the power and authority of the
Commissioner to require an alien to so register, such a requirement must be predicated on a positive
finding that the person who is so required is an alien. In this case where the very citizenship of the
petitioners is in issue there should be a previous determination by the CID that they are aliens before the
petitioners may be directed and required to register as aliens.

The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign
power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.

Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the
provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings.

Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided:

c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.

Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated
in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground
he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.

Petition is hereby granted and the questioned order of the respondent CID is hereby set aside.


Article III, Section 1

PHILCOMSAT (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation) v ALCUAZ
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989

This petition seeks to annul and set aside an Order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz
of the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which
directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified
lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for
being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial
of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law.

Facts:
1. PHILCOMSAT was granted a franchise to establish, construct, maintain, and operate in the
Philippines to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and
ground terminal or terminals through RA 5514.
2. PHILCOMSAT is also designated as the sole signatory for Philippines in the Agreemnent and
Operating Agreement relating to International Telecommunications Satellite Organization.
3. Since 1968, petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to (1) Phil. Long Distance
Telephone Company, (2) Phil. Global Communications, Inc., (3) Eastern Telecommunications
Phils., Inc., (4) Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT and (5) Capitol Wireless, Inc.

This enable said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable
communication services
4. Under Section 5 of RA 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission (now NTC) but pursuant to EO 196, they were place under the jurisdiction,
control and regulation of respondent NTC including the fixing of rates.

Petitioner filed with NTC an application to continue operating and maintaining their
operation it has been doing and to charge the current rates.

Sep 16, 1987: This application was granted for 6 months and it was extended to another 6
months.
5. NTC further extended the authority granted to petitioner to operate for another six (6) months,
however, NTC directed them to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen
percent (15%) on the current rates.
6. PHILCOMSAT assailed that allowing NTC to fix rates for public service communication does
not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an undue delegation
of legislative power.
7. PHILCOMSAT also assailed that there is a violation of due process because there was no
hearing and prior notice and the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and
confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process.

Issue:
WON there is a violation of due process when NTC directed the price reduction.

Held:
Yes, there was a violation of due process.

In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission

Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates
are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a
legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of.

In The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al.

It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice
of hearing is not required by due process of law.

No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume
that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business
requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-
faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are,
therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the
maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved.

In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which
provides:

Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall have
power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to
the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first
giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the
same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the
present case.

Petitioner is assailing the constitutionality of the EO's because they do not fix a standard.
Held: The NTC is empowered to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operations of public service and communication.
Petitioner = No notice and hearing
Held:
The order is quasi judicial, thus there is a need for due process., PCS was not given the opportunity to cross examine the witness that gave the report
with the NTC based its order on.
Even if the order is temporary in nature, it does not mean that due process is foregone.
With regard to rate fixing, the NTC has no authority to to fix and alter the rate without giving PCS a hearing.
Article 3, Section 1
RADIOCOM v NTC
G.R. No. L-66683 April 23, 1990

Petitioners: Radio Communications of the Phils Inc. (RCPI), Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
(PTTC), Clavecilla Radio System (CRS)

Respondents: National Telecommunication Commission (NTC), PLDT


This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
seeking to annul and set aside the January 25, 1984 order of the NTC and to prohibit respondent
Commission from taking cognizance of, and assuming jurisdiction over the "Application for Approval of
Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities" of PLDT for lack of jurisdiction.

Facts:

1. PLDT applied to NTC for an Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities on
Jan. 4, 1984. On January 25, 1984, the respondent Commission provisionally approved and set
the case for hearing within the prescribed 30-day period allowed by law.
a. On Feb. 2, 1984, NTC issued a notice of hearing scheduled on Feb. 22, 1984 at 9:30am.
All the petitioners were given notice except for PT&T. All the petitioners appeared at the
hearing and moved for some time within which to file an opposition or reply to said
application. Petitioners alleged that neither respondent Commission nor private
respondent PLDT informed them of the existence of this provisional authority.

b. In a resolution dated March 24, 1984, the Second Division of the SC required
respondents to comment, issued a temporary restraining order and transferred the case to
the Court En Banc which was accepted in a resolution dated April 5, 1984.

2. In their petition, petitioners alleged that the application filed by respondent PLDT is not for
approval of rates as its caption misleadingly indicates but for authority to engage in new services
not covered by private respondent's franchise and certificate of public convenience and necessity.
a. Petitioners further claimed that PLDT is limited by its legislative franchise to render only
"radiotelephonic services," exclusive of "radiotelegraphic or record services." Therefore,
the issuance of the provisional authority by the respondent Commission without notice
and hearing constitutes grave abuse of discretion inasmuch as such power or prerogative
exists only for rate cases under Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act.

b. PLDT refuted the facts alleged in the petition as grossly false and misrepresented. PLDT
contends that the provisional approval dated Jan 25 1984 is a valid exercise of NTCs
jurisdiction. PLDT added that its franchise authorizes it to operate not only telephone
system, domestic and international, but also transmission service facilities. In fact, PLDT
pointed out that petitioners themselves with the exception of CLAVECILLA had been
actual users of PLDT lines or channels for data transmission.

Issue:
The main issue is W/N the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in (1)issuing a provisional authority in favor of PLDT,(2) without prior notice to the
petitioners.
Held:
No. The petition is denied because it is devoid of merit. The Public Service Commission found that the
application involved in the present petition is actually an application for approval of rates for digital
transmission service facilities which it may approve provisionally and without the necessity of any notice
and hearing as provided in the above-quoted provision of law. Under the Public Service Act, as amended
(CA No. 146), the Board of Communications then, now the NTC, can fix a provisional amount for the
subscriber's investment to be effective immediately, without hearing.
Moreover, the Commission can hear and approve revised rates without published notices or hearing. The
reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to
adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing. The Commission has the
authority to issue ex parte a provisional permit to operate proposed public service based on the needs and
interest of the public.
Also, as a rule, the court does not interfere with administrative action prior to its completion on finality.
A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to
determine particular questions or matters upon the facts presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall
prevail over the courts. Hence, findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect
but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
As to the notice not given to all of the petitioners, NTC is not required because not all of them are known
to NTC. There is already substantial compliance since most of the petitioners got the notice.




Article III Sec. 1
Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board
GR 96266 July 18, 1991/GR 96349 July 18, 1991/GR 96284, July 18, 1991

Quick Digest: Petition Maceda seeks to declare the nullification of the ERB (Energy Regulatory Board)
Orders dated Dec 5 and 6, 1990 on the ground that hearings conducted on the increase in oil prices did not
allow him substantial cross-examination, a denial of due process
Facts:
1. On August 2, 1990, Upon the outbreak of Persian Gulf war, oil companies filed with the ERP for
an oil price increase
! On September 21, 1990, ERB issues an order granting a 1.42 increase/liter
! Maceda files petition to nullify; SC dismisses and reaffirms ERBs authority even without a
hearing pursuant to section 8 of E.O. 172
! although a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte,
a provisional increase subject to its final disposition
2. ERB sets the application for hearing with due notice to all interested parties
! 3 oil companies filed their motions for leave to file or admit amended/supplemental
applications to further increase the prices of petroleum
! ERB outlines procedure to be observed for the reception of evidence: all the evidence-in-
chief to be placed on record first and then the examination will come later, the cross
examination will come later
! Maceda claims he is denied the right to cross-examine Petron, Caltex, and Shell witnesses
and points out the denial of due process
3. In response to the presidents appeal, the subsequent increase in premium and regular gasoline
was rolled back on Dec. 10, 1990 to the levels mandated in Dec. 5, 1990
Issues:
! W/N the ERB is bound by the same rules governing court proceedings
! W/N there is substantial evidence to support the provisional relief
! W/N the price increase to augment the OPSF will constitute illegal taxation
Held:
1. W/N the ERB is bound by the same rules governing court proceedings
No. The Solicitor General points out that the order and general course of the trial is left to the discretion
of the court. Such procedure is true in administrative bodies such as the ERB which in matters of price
fixing is considered a quasi-legislative body. It is not bound by strict and technical rules of evidence.
2. W/N there is substantial evidence to support the provisional relief
Yes. The Solicitor general commented that the evidence considered by the ERB included (1)certified
copies of bills issued by crude oil suppliers, (2) reports of bankers association of the Philippines on
the peso-dollar exchange rate and (3) the OPSF status reports
3. W/N the price increase to augment the OPSF constitutes illegal taxation
No. The board order authorizing the proceeds generated to be deposited in the OPSF is not an act of
taxation because it is authorized by P.D. 1956

Dissenting Opinions:
1. Paras, J.
! The ERB has no power to tax which is solely the prerogative of Congress.
2. Padilla, J
! Any increase, provisional or otherwise, should be allowed only after the ERB has fully
determine through full hearings that it is necessary

MISSING DIGEST

GLOBE TELECOM VS NTC
435 SCRA 110
Facts:
- The law that was proposed by John Osmena wanted to remove the telecom industry from the grasps of the GOV't and place it at the hands of the market forces.
- At the center of the petition ins the SMS service and its interconnection between Smart and Globe.
- Smart filed a complaint with the NTC which requested for interconnection, this came from a failure of the 2 to implement an intercon.
- NTC reprimanded both smart and globe for this problem, and it further added that SMS is part of the value added service
o it further added that smart and globe were providing SMS services without its authorization.
- The RTC and CA ruled SMS as a VAS, it was after this that the petition of smart changed to one that brought the 2 together, BOTH ALLEDGE THAT SMS IS
NOT VAS.
Issues;
1. W/N NTC can compell globe and smart to secure NTC approval to operate an SMS system
2. W/N SMS is a VAS
Held:
- Globe alledges that the NTC order is violative of due process because it exempted islacom from acuiring the same.
- The court usually accords great respect to the findings of admin agencies, but in this case it can be seen that what was done here was a mere assertion.
- In the NTC resolution, it can not be seen how SMS fits into the VAS
- Globe and smart were also not able to present evidence on their own behalf relating to the nature of SMS as VAS
- There lies a discrepancy in the holding of the NTC that SMS is not a vas for islacom, but it is for G&S
- Globe compelled the NTC to submit the evidence of the hearings, but there was none that was given by the ntc.
o this is violative of the requirement of due process that a party must be able to adduce evidence on its own behalf.
- In the Public Serivce Act it is given that the NTC can investigate without hearing, but the powers that are enumerated here do not include the imposing fines.
o to impose fines, there is a need for notice and hearing pursuant to S21 of the PSA
-
Art 3, Sec. 1
CORONA VS. UHPAP
G.R. No. G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997
Quick Digest: Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issues Administrative Order No. 04-92 which limits the
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to a yearly renewal or cancellation of license which is
assailed to be violative of the due process clause.
FACTS:
1. Prior to A.O. 04-92, the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services governed the
requirements before becoming a pilot.

The rules mandated that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses, and must train as
probationary pilots. After satisfactory performance, they are given permanent and regular
appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach 70 years of age,
unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General
Manager.

2. On July 15, 1992, PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan issued A.O. 04-92 in order to instill
effective discipline through the improvement of pilotage services. The order was an exercise of its
administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under PD 857. The Administrative Order
contains:

All existing regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of
Customs (preceded PPA) and PPA shall remain valid up to December 31 1992 only.

All appointments to harbor pilot positions shall be only for a term of one (1) year from the
date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation after rigid evaluation of
performance.

3. On December 23, 1992, the Office of the President (OP) issued an order directing the PPA to
suspend the implementation of A.O. 04-92.

4. On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato
C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. He states:

The exercise of ones profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited
context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let
alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby.

PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their
profession in PPAs jurisdictional area.
5. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and damages.

The court struck down the administrative issuance and pointed out that the Bureau of Customs,
the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore. Thus, abbreviating
the term within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property
rights of the harbor pilots.

Consequently, any withdrawal or alteration of such property right must be strictly made in
accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not
followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No.
04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From
this decision, petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari.


6. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the due process clause of the
Constitution:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, x x x.

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there
is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process.
Therefore, there is procedural and substantive due process.

Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92
allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby relevant government agencies and the
pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural
aspect of the enactment.

The main issue, however, deals with substantive due process where the property of the
respondents are unduly abbreviated.
ISSUE:
W/N In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents right to exercise their profession and their right to due
process of law?



RATIO
Yes. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing
that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a
license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or
physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their
license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation.
Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at
the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of performance
which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term
renewal. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable
and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
On the aspect of procedural due process, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four
times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail
to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, which issues the licenses of
pilots after administering the pilots examinations, was not consulted, the facts show that the MARINA,
which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board
of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense
involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted.
Nevertheless, substantive due process was not observed, therefore A.O. 04-92 cannot be implemented for
being against Art 3 sec. 1 of the constitution.

Article III and Section 1
CORONA v UHPAP
G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997

Quick Digest Portion This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC regarding
their ruling on the unconstitutionality of PPA Administrative Order 04-92.

Facts:
1. Philippine Ports Authority promulgated PPA Administrative Order 03-85 on March 21,
1985 and PPA Administrative Order 04-92 on July 15, 1992.

PPA AO 03-85 contains the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage


Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in the Philippines.
o This rule contains that aspiring pilots must have pilot licenses and must
train for a number of months in outports and in the Port of Manila. It is
only after such training that they are given permanent and regular
appointments by the PPA. They can practice pilotage until the age of
70 or they are removed by reason of unfitness.

PPA AO 04-92 states all existing regular appointments would only be valid
until December 31, 1992 only. All the subsequent appointments would only
have a term of one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the PPA.
2. United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association through Capt.
Compas questioned PPA AO No. 04-92 before the DOTC.

The secretary of DOTC insisted that the matter review and recall of the
administrative order lies with the PPAs Board of Directors.
3. Capt. Compas appealed the ruling of the DOTC to the Office of the President.

The Office of the President later dismissed the appeal maintaining that it
applied to all harbor pilots in general and it comes within the power of the PPA
to control and regulate pilotage.
4. Capt. Compas filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with a prayer for
TRO. The Manila RTC ruled in favor of Compas declaring that PPA AO 04-92 is null and
void.

Issue:
W/N the license of harbor pilots can be cancelled without due process of law.
Held:
No. Section 1 of Article III states that No person shall be deprived of their life, liberty or
property without due process of law. Their license, which allows them to practice their
profession, comes within the definition of a property. PPA-AO No. 04-92 restricts the pilots from
practicing their profession to only one year. In light of this, due process of law in the form of a
hearing must occur in order to protect the rights of the pilots.
Article 3, Section 1

SALAW v. NLRC
G.R. No. 90786 September 27, 1991

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the NLRC decision affirming the dismissal of Espero
Salaw by his employer, Associated Bank which reversed the decision of the labor arbiter, Benigno
Villarente Jr. declaring the petitioners dismissal as illegal.

Facts:
1. Espero Salaw was dismissed by his employer, Associated Bank

The Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary was able to
extract from him, without the assistance of a counsel a sworn affidavit admitting that he
and a co-employee sold twenty sewing machines and electric generators foreclosed by the
bank from Worldwide Garment and LP Garment and divided the proceeds of Php
60,000.000 among them in equal shares.

He was invited by Rollie Tuazon, the bank manager to appear before the banks Personal
Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC) without the assistance of a counsel.

He was terminated thereafter.


2. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and the labor arbiter, Benigno Villarente Jr. rendered a
decision in his favor.
3. Private respondent, Associated Bank as represented by Jose Tengco, Chairman of the Board and
Rollie Tuazon appealed to the NLRC and were able to obtain a decision affirming the dismissal of
Salaw, thereby reversing the decision of the labor arbiter. Hence, this petition is filed.

Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of Salaw by the Bank is legally justified

Held:
No, the dismissal of Salaw is illegal. In order for an employees dismissal to be legal under the Labor
Code, it must be for an authorized cause and due process notice and hearing must be observed. Salaw
was dismissed without the benefit of due process because he was not given a chance to defend himself
and he was even denied the right to assistance of a counsel.
Article III, Section 1

People v. Nazario
No. L-44143, August 31, 1988

This is an appeal to reverse the Court of First Instance of Quezon's decision finding Eusebio Nazario guilty of
the violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series od 1955, as amended by Ordinance 15 and 12.

Facts
The accused, Eusebio Nazario, was charged for refusing to pay the taxes for his fishpond (362.62 Php) in
the Municipality of Pagbilao, Quezon, in the years 1964-1965 despite being given multiple notices to do
so
Note: Nazario is not a resident of Quezon, but of Manila
! He was said to have violated these Ordinances of Quezon Province:
! Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955
1. Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 (amendment to Ordinance No. 4)
2. Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966 (amendment to Ordinance No. 4)
! Objections of petitioner
! He contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances
speak of "owner and manager"
1. The Ordinance was vague as to the dates of payment
! The Trial Court found him GUILTY

Issue
Whether or not the Ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain

Held:
NO.
The Court found that accused is not merely a lesee but an owner and manager
He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishpond, introduced fish fries into
the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them
Neither are the said Ordinances vague as to dates of payment, they have been definitely established
Ordinance No. 15: In making the tax payable "after the lapse of 3 years starting from the date said
fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries"
Ordinance No. 12: "Beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating
before the year 1964
The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates is concerned,
presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinance vague
Article III Section 1 Ordinance/Statute/Memo Cir./Rules
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

Overview of the Case
The case deals with a petition to declare RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, unconstitutional.
In the case, Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress
upon the court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line
which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm.
He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element
of mens rea (criminal intent) in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The supreme court ruled the law as valid and constitutional: (a) The Congress intended the words
combination and series to be understood in their popular meanings is evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill that eventually became the law. Also, Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
have special application only to free speech cases, not to penal statutes. (b) The reasonable doubt
standard cannot be presumed to be dispensed by the legislature in the law as this standard gives life to
the Due Process clause in the constitution. It is also clear that the legislature did not do away with the
reasonable doubt standard as shown in their deliberations. (c) The court said that plunder as defined by
RA 7080 is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent (mens rea). This is shown by the an
earlier resolution of the Congress placing plunder as one of several heinous crimes ,and is implied with
the application of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the RPC to the prosecutions under the said
Plunder Law.


Case Digest

Facts
1. Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate informations for violation of RA
7080, RA 7659, RA 3019, RA 6713, RA 6085, etc. (April 4, 2011)
2. Estrada (Petitioner) filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation and for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses to give
the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack
of probable cause. (April 11,2011)
a.) The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are
charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
b.) On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution finding that "a
probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for
the arrest of the accused."
c.) On June 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

3. Petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for
vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense.
(June 14,2011)
a.) Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash on June 21,2011
b.) Petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition 5 days later (June 26,2001)
c.) On July 9, 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

4. The petitioner filed the instant petition to the Supreme Court and oral arguments were made on
September 18, 2001 where the issues were summarized and delineated.


Issue:
1. W/N The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;
2. W/N The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
3. W/N Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it.

Held:
1. NO. The Plunder Law is NOT unconstitutional for being vague.
a.) A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
b.) There is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define
each and every word in an enactment. It is enough that the legislative will is clear, or at least,
can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
c.) It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. (Note: Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary was used to show the definition of the words
"combination and "series.)
d.) As shown from the legislative deliberations on the bill, which eventually became the Plunder
Law, the Congress intended the words "combination and "series to be understood in their
popular meanings.
e.) Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced.
f.) A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
g.) The statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions.
h.) Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as
in all other statutes.
i.) A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.
j.) The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.

*Gallego v. Sandiganbayan - Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par.
(e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that
the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition
by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness violate due process in that it does not
give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. This Court found that there was nothing
vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in the said law, which was understood in its
primary and general acceptation.


2. NO. The Plunder Law does not require less evidence for proving the crimes of plunder. The
use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It was shown in the
legislative deliberations that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard of
quantum of proof in the crime of plunder.
a.) This "reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.
b.) What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act
alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
c.) In short, only the relevant acts (which number should sufficient enough for them to be
considered as a combination or series of acts) constituting a certain pattern must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt, it is not necessary that every act alleged in the information
is proven.
d.) As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime
must be proved and the requisite criminal intent (mens rea) must be shown.
e.) Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them.
f.) Section 4 is a purely procedural measure and does not define nor establish any substantive
right in favor of the accused.

3. The crime of plunder is a malum in se, as deemed in the decision of Congress in 1993 to
include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
a.) The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it
is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong,
they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it
would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking,
without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

b.) The application of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that criminal intent (mens
rea) is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined
by his criminal intent.



Decision
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Mendoza. Puno, Vitug, JJ.,
concurred and joins J. Mendoza's concurring opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see dissenting opinion. Mendoza, J., please
see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Carpio, J., no part. Was one of the complainants before Ombudsman.



!"#$%$&" (#)*)(*! +!,, -./,01 2301,- 45 637/58
9"*:(;$< =>< ?3@?A77.@/ 32.@.3@
#$*B$*)6$*< =>< 0,2C7C1, ?3@?A77.@/ 32.@.3@
D$#E*$*< =>< -.00,@1.@/ 32.@.3@
#$%:(< =>< 0,2C7C1, -.00,@1.@/ 32.@.3@
F*$%"!G!$*&)$B(< =>< -.00,@1.@/ 32.@.3@
!$*:(H$IGBE&)"%%";< =>< -.00,@1.@/ 32.@.3@
!



!"#$%&%'%&"#() )(+ && ,&-.$%$ /0120 3 01245 (%%67 $.,89.6 !(#,.)(9&(


!:;<=-><?;@; .A;BC><D -EFGDBBD? )>HD? IGJK;F #;C;K 9;C>J $EHDBG> %;< %><@ L;KCD? L;BDK;
!"#" %&" '()*+, %&-./0.1 '23 4,,'

567#898 -: 68%9;!8%<8=8%
onenLe: <5>>?6;>>?3 @"

lalnLlff: !CSLP L!L8Cl1C LS18AuA

uefendanLs: SAnulCAn8A?An (3
rd
ulvlslon) and LCLL Cl 1PL PlLS.

CASL: eLlLlon Lo declare 8A 7080 (An AcL ueflnlng and enallzlng Lhe
Crlme of lunder), as amended by 8A 7639, unconsLlLuLlonal.


<8AB!#?C%9D
eLlLloner !oseph LsLrada, prosecuLed under an 8A 7080 (An AcL
ueflnlng and enallzlng Lhe Crlme of lunder), wlshes Lo lmpress
upon Lhe CourL LhaL Lhe assalled law ls so defecLlvely fashloned
LhaL lL crosses LhaL Lhln buL dlsLlncL llne whlch dlvldes Lhe valld
from Lhe consLlLuLlonally lnflrm.
Pls conLenLlons of lLs unconsLlLuLlonallLy because accordlng Lo
hlm, (a) lL suffers from Lhe vlce of vagueness, (b) lL dlspenses
wlLh Lhe reasonable doubL" sLandard ln crlmlnal prosecuLlons,
and, (c) lL abollshes Lhe elemenL of !"#$ &"' ln crlmes already
punlshable under Lhe 8C - all of whlch are purporLedly clear
vlolaLlons of Lhe fundamenLal rlghLs of Lhe accused Lo due
process and Lo be lnformed of Lhe naLure and cause of Lhe
agalnsL hlm.
1he focal polnL of Lhe case ls Lhe alleged vagueness of Lhe law ln
Lhe Lerms lL uses. arLlcularly, Lhese Lerms are: comblnaLlon",
serles" ln Lhe key phrase a comblnaLlon or serles of overL or
crlmlnal acLs" found ln SecLlons 1 and 2 (ueflnlLlons of lunder
and enalLles) and Lhe word paLLern" ln SecLlon 4 (8ule of
Lvldence) of Lhe sald law.
8ecause of Lhls, Lhe peLlLloner uses Lhe faclal challenge on Lhe
valldlLy of Lhe menLloned law.
Aprll 4, 2001 ! Cmbudsman flled before Lhe Sandlganbayan 8
separaLe lnformaLlons for vlolaLlon of 8A 7080, 8A 7639, 8A
3019, 8A 6713, 8A 6083, eLc
Aprll 11, 2001 ! LsLrada flled Cmnlbus MoLlon for remand of
Lhe case Lo Cmbudsman for prellmlnary lnvesLlgaLlon and for
reconslderaLlon/relnvesLlgaLlon of Lhe offenses and Lo glve
accused an opporLunlLy Lo flle counLer-affldavlLs and oLher
documenLs necessary Lo prove lack of probable cause. (nC1L:
1he amblgulLy of Lhe charges and vagueness of Lhe law were
never ralsed ln LhaL CM)
Aprll 23, 2001 ! Sandlganbayan 3
rd
ulvlslon lssued 8esoluLlon
flndlng LhaL a probable cause for Lhe offense of LunuL8 exlsLs
Lo [usLlfy Lhe lssuance of warranLs for Lhe arresL of Lhe accused"
!une 21, 2001 ! LsLrada's M8 was denled by Sandlganbayan
!une 14, 2001 ! eLlLloner LsLrada moved Lo quash Lhe
lnformaLlon on Lhe crlmlnal case on Lhe ground LhaL Lhe facLs
alleged Lhereln dld noL consLlLuLe an lndlcLable offense slnce Lhe
law on whlch lL was based was unconsLlLuLlonal for vagueness
and lL charged more Lhan 1 offense.
!une 21, 2001 ! CovernmenL flled ())*$+,+*# ,* ,-" .*,+*# ,*
/0'$-
!une 26, 2001 ! LsLrada submlLLed hls 1")23 ,* ,-" ())*$+,+*#
!uly 9, 2001 ! Sandlganbayan denled peLlLloner's .*,+*# ,*
/0'$-


;66C56D
1) WheLher or noL lunder Law ls unconsLlLuLlonal for belng vague
2) WheLher or noL Lhe lunder Law requlres less evldence for provldlng
Lhe predlcaLe crlmes of plunder and Lherefore vlolaLes Lhe rlghLs of Lhe
accused Lo due process.
3) WheLher or noL lunder as deflned ln 8A 7080 ls a !'20! )&*-+4+,0!,
and lf so, wheLher lL ls wlLhln Lhe power of Congress Lo so classlfy lL.


!"#$%&%'%&"#() )(+ && ,&-.$%$ /0120 3 01245 (%%67 $.,89.6 !(#,.)(9&(


!:;<=-><?;@; .A;BC><D -EFGDBBD? )>HD? IGJK;F #;C;K 9;C>J $EHDBG> %;< %><@ L;KCD? L;BDK;
!"#$%&'($)# +,- .!/&0")'#1
(##&" 2 !
ln Lhe quesLlon wheLher or noL Lhe lunder Law ls
unconsLlLuLlonal, Lhe courL held LhaL lL ls noL.
As long as Lhe law affords some comprehenslble gulde or rule
LhaL would lnform Lhose who are sub[ecL Lo lL whaL conducL
would render Lhem llable Lo lLs penalLles, lLs valldlLy wlll be
susLalned.
1he amended lnformaLlon lLself closely Lracks Lhe language of
law, lndlcaLlng wlLh reasonable cerLalnLy Lhe varlous elemenLs
of Lhe offense whlch, Lhe peLlLloner ls alleged Lo have
commlLLed.
1he CourL dlscerns noLhlng ln Lhe foregolng LhaL ls vague or
amblguous LhaL wlll confuse peLlLloner ln hls defense.
eLlLloner however bewalls Lhe fallure of Lhe law Lo provlde for
Lhe sLaLuLory deflnlLlon of Lhe Lerms comblnaLlon" and serles"
ln Lhe key phrase a comblnaLlon or serles of overL or crlmlnal
acLs. 1hese omlsslons, accordlng Lo Lhe peLlLloner, render Lhe
lunder Law unconsLlLuLlonal for belng lmpermlsslbly vague and
overbroad and deny hlm Lhe rlghL Lo be lnformed of Lhe naLure
and cause of Lhe accusaLlon agalnsL hlm, hence vlolaLlve of hls
fundamenLal rlghL Lo due process.
A sLaLuLe ls noL rendered uncerLaln and vold merely because
general Lerms are used hereln, or because of Lhe employmenL
of Lerms wlLhouL deflnlng Lhem. 1here ls no poslLlve
consLlLuLlonal or sLaLuLory command requlrlng Lhe leglslaLure Lo
deflne each and every word ln an enacLmenL.
lL ls a well-seLLled prlnclple of legal hermeneuLlcs LhaL words of
a sLaLuLe wlll be lnLerpreLed ln Lhelr naLural, plaln, and ordlnary
accepLaLlon and slgnlflcaLlon - unless lL ls evldenL LhaL Lhe
leglslaLure lnLended a Lechnlcal or speclal legal meanlng Lo
Lhose words.
1haL Congress lnLended Lhe words comblnaLlon" and serles"
Lo be undersLood ln Lhelr popular meanlngs ls evldenL from Lhe
leglslaLlve dellberaLlons on Lhe blll LhaL evenLually became Lhe
law. ComblnaLlon" - refers Lo aL leasL 2 acLs falllng under
dlfferenL caLegorles of enumeraLlon provlded ln Sec. 1, Serles"
- 2 or more overL or crlmlnal acLs falllng under Lhe same
caLegory of enumeraLlon found ln Sec. 1, and aLLern" - a
comblnaLlon or serles of overL or crlmlnal acLs enumeraLed ln
Sec. 1 LhaL ls dlrecLed Lowards Lhe publlc offlcer's common goal
Lo amass lll-goLLen wealLh, and elLher an overall unlawful
scheme or consplracy Lo achleve sald goal.
eLlLloner's rellance on Lhe vold-for-vagueness" docLrlne ls
manlfesLly mlsplaced.
A sLaLuLe or acL may be sald Lo be vague when lL lacks
comprehenslble sLandards LhaL men of common lnLelllgence
mosL necessarlly guess aL lLs meanlng and dlffer ln lLs
appllcaLlon.
ln such lnsLance, Lhe sLaLuLe ls repugnanL Lo Lhe ConsLlLuLlon
flrsL lf lL vlolaLes due process for fallure Lo accord persons,
especlally Lhe parLles LargeLed by lL, falr noLlce of whaL conducL
Lo avold and secondly when, lL leaves law enforcers unbrldled
dlscreLlon ln carrylng ouL lLs provlslons and becomes an
arblLrary flexlng of Lhe CovernmenL muscle.
1he allegaLlons LhaL Lhe lunder Law ls vague and overbroad do
noL [usLlfy a faclal revlew of lLs valldlLy.
A faclal challenge ls allowed Lo be made on a vague sLaLuLe and
one whlch ls overbroad because of posslble chllllng effecL"
upon proLecLed speech.
1hls raLlonale does noL apply Lo penal sLaLuLes. CverbreadLh
and vagueness docLrlnes have speclal appllcaLlon only Lo free
speech cases.

Callego v. Sandlganbayan
- 1o emphaslze Lhe polnL LhaL courLs are loaLhed Lo declare a
sLaLuLe vold for uncerLalnLy unless Lhe law lLself ls so lmperfecL
and deflclenL ln lLs deLalls, and ls suscepLlble of no reasonable
consLrucLlon LhaL wlll supporL and glve lL effecL.
!"#$%&%'%&"#() )(+ && ,&-.$%$ /0120 3 01245 (%%67 $.,89.6 !(#,.)(9&(


!:;<=-><?;@; .A;BC><D -EFGDBBD? )>HD? IGJK;F #;C;K 9;C>J $EHDBG> %;< %><@ L;KCD? L;BDK;
- ln Lhe case, peLlLloners challenged consLlLuLlonallLy of SecLlon 3
of 1he AnLl-CrafL and CorrupL racLlces AcL for belng vague
parLlcularly Lhe Lerm unwarranLed" (saylng LhaL Lhls Lerm ls
hlghly lmpreclse and elasLlc wlLh no common law meanlng or
seLLled deflnlLlon by prlor [udlclal or admlnlsLraLlve precedenLs).
- 1he CourL dlsmlssed Lhe peLlLlon flndlng LhaL Lhere was noLhlng
vague or amblguous ln Lhe use of Lhe Lerm unwarranLed"
whlch was undersLood ln lLs prlmary and general accepLaLlon.

!""#$ & !
ln Lhe second lssue, peLlLloner says LhaL SecLlon 4 of Lhe lunder
Law clrcumvenLs Lhe obllgaLlon of Lhe prosecuLlon Lo prove
beyond reasonable doubL Lhe acLs consLlLuLlng Lhe crlme of
plunder when lL requlres only proof of a paLLern of overL or
crlmlnal acLs showlng unlawful scheme or consplracy.
under Sec. 4 of 8ule of Lvldence lL sLaLes LhaL: lor purposes of
esLabllshlng Lhe crlme of plunder, lL shall noL be necessary Lo
prove each and every crlmlnal acL done by Lhe accused ln
furLherance of Lhe scheme or consplracy Lo amass, accumulaLe
or acqulre lll-goLLen wealLh, lL belng sufflclenL Lo esLabllsh
beyond reasonable doubL a paLLern of overL or crlmlnal acLs
lndlcaLlve of Lhe overall unlawful scheme or consplracy.
ln a crlmlnal prosecuLlon for plunder, as ln all oLher crlmes, Lhe
accused always has ln hls favor Lhe presumpLlon of lnnocence
guaranLeed by Lhe 8lll of 8lghLs, and unless Lhe SLaLe succeeds
ln demonsLraLlng by proof beyond reasonable doubL LhaL
culpablllLy lles, Lhe accused ls enLlLled Lo an acqulLLal.
1he reasonable doubL" sLandard has acqulred such exalLed
sLaLure ln Lhe realm of consLlLuLlonal law as lL glves llfe Lo Lhe
uue rocess Clause whlch proLecLs Lhe accused agalnsL
convlcLlon excepL upon proof of reasonable doubL of every facL
necessary Lo consLlLuLe Lhe crlme wlLh whlch he ls charged.
WhaL Lhe prosecuLlon needs Lo prove beyond reasonable doubL
ls only a number of acLs sufflclenL Lo form a comblnaLlon or
serles whlch would consLlLuLe a paLLern and lnvolvlng an
amounL of aL leasL 30,000,000.00. 1here ls no need Lo prove
each and every oLher acL alleged ln Lhe lnformaLlon Lo have
been commlLLed by Lhe accused ln furLherance of Lhe overall
unlawful scheme or consplracy Lo amass, accumulaLe, or acqulre
lll-goLLen wealLh.
8elaLlve Lo peLlLloner's conLenLlons on Lhe purporLed defecL of
SecLlon 4 LhaL paLLern" ls a very lmporLanL elemenL of Lhe
crlme of plunder" and LhaL wlLhouL lL Lhe accused cannoL be
convlcLed of plunder - Lhe CourL does noL subscrlbe Lo
peLlLloner's sLand.
All Lhe essenLlal elemenLs of plunder can be undersLood from
SecLlons 1 and 2 (comblnaLlon" and serles") and paLLern" ls
noL one of Lhem. Also, SecLlon 4 ls a purely procedural measure
and does noL deflne nor esLabllsh any subsLanLlve rlghL ln favor
of Lhe accused.

!""#$ ' !
1he CourL answered LhaL plunder as deflned ln 8A 7080 ls Lo be
consldered as !"#$! &' ()* whlch requlres proof of crlmlnal
lnLenL.
reclsely because Lhe consLlLuLlve crlmes are !"#" &' () Lhe
elemenL of !)'( +)" musL be proven ln a prosecuLlon for
plunder.
lL ls noLeworLhy LhaL Lhe amended lnformaLlon alleges LhaL Lhe
crlme of plunder was commlLLed wlllfully, unlawfully and
crlmlnally." lL Lhus alleges gullLy knowledge on Lhe parL of
peLlLloner.
1he appllcaLlon of mlLlgaLlng and exLenuaLlng clrcumsLances ln
Lhe 8C Lo prosecuLlons under Lhe AnLl-lunder Law lndlcaLes
qulLe clearly LhaL mens rea ls an elemenL of plunder slnce Lhe
degree of responslblllLy of Lhe offender ls deLermlned by hls
crlmlnal lnLenL.
llnally, any doubL as Lo wheLher Lhe crlme of plunder ls a
malum ln se musL be deemed Lo have been resolved ln Lhe
afflrmaLlve by Lhe declslon of Congress ln 1993 Lo lnclude lL
!"#$%&%'%&"#() )(+ && ,&-.$%$ /0120 3 01245 (%%67 $.,89.6 !(#,.)(9&(


!:;<=-><?;@; .A;BC><D -EFGDBBD? )>HD? IGJK;F #;C;K 9;C>J $EHDBG> %;< %><@ L;KCD? L;BDK;
among Lhe helnous crlmes punlshable by !"#$%&'() +"!+",%- Lo
deaLh.
Also, LsLrada llkewlse assalls valldlLy of 8A 7639 (whlch
amended 8A 7080) on consLlLuLlonal grounds buL lL ls a dead
lssue because lL has been eLernally conslgned by eople v.
Lchegaray Lo Lhe archlves of [urlsprudenLlal hlsLory. 1he
declaraLlon of Lhls CourL LhaL 8A 7639 ls consLlLuLlonally valld
sLands as a declaraLlon of Lhe SLaLe and becomes by necessary
effecL asslmllaLed ln Lhe ConsLlLuLlon now as an lnLegral parL of
lL.


"#$%& '()*#+,-
CourL holds LhaL 8A 7080 oLherwlse known as Lhe lunder Law, as
amended by 8A 7639, ls CCnS1l1u1lCnAL.
ConsequenLly, Lhe peLlLlon Lo declare Lhe law unconsLlLuLlonal ls
ulSMlSSLu for lack of merlL.
.(/%)%,( 0/#$#0$.

1($*02%3 453 67869::;8< 7=;8;78
8.A. no. 7080 ls noL a regulaLlon of speech, buL a crlmlnal sLaLuLe
deslgned Lo combaL grafL and corrupLlon, especlally Lhose
commlLLed by hlghly-placed publlc offlclals.
As conducL and noL speech ls lLs ob[ecL, Lhe CourL cannoL Lake
chances by examlnlng oLher provlslons noL before lL wlLhouL
rlsklng vlLal lnLeresLs of socleLy.
Such sLaLuLe musL be examlned only as applled" Lo Lhe
defendanL and lf found valld as Lo hlm, Lhe sLaLuLe as a whole
should noL be declared unconsLlLuLlonal for overbreadLh or
vagueness of lLs oLher provlslons
Concluslons:
1. 1haL Lhe valldlLy of AnLl-lunder Law, cannoL be deLermlned by
applylng Lhe LesL of sLrlcL scruLlny ln free speech cases wlLhouL
dlsasLrous consequences Lo Lhe SLaLe's efforL Lo prosecuLe
crlmes and LhaL, conLrary Lo peLlLloner's conLenLlon, Lhe sLaLuLe
musL be presumed Lo be consLlLuLlonal
2. 1haL ln deLermlnlng Lhe consLlLuLlonallLy of Lhe AnLl-lunder Law,
lLs provlslons musL be consldered ln llghL of Lhe parLlcular acLs
alleged Lo have been commlLLed by peLlLloner,
3. 1haL, as applled Lo peLlLloner, Lhe sLaLuLe ls nelLher vague nor
overbroad,
4. 1haL, conLrary Lo Lhe conLenLlon of Lhe Cmbudsman and Lhe
SollclLor Ceneral, Lhe crlme of plunder ls a .-$%. ') &" and noL
a .-$%. +!(/'0',%. and Lhe burden of provlng each and every
predlcamenL crlme ls on Lhe prosecuLlon.

8.A. no. 7080 ls valld and Lhe peLlLlon should be dlsmlssed.

/%$>%$#?%$3 453 @A=B:BCA 67869::;8< 7=;8;78
llrsL lssue:
1he absence of sLaLuLory deflnlLlons of words used ln a sLaLuLe
wlll noL render Lhe law vold for vagueness," lf Lhe meanlngs of
such words can be deLermlned Lhrough [udlclal funcLlon of
#()&,!%#,'().
Slmple sLaLuLory consLrucLlon, noL a declaraLlon of
unconsLlLuLlonallLy, ls Lhe key Lo Lhe alleged vague words of Lhe
AnLl-lunder Law.
MosL baslc rule ln sLaLuLory consLrucLlon: ascerLaln Lhe meanlng
of a Lerm from Lhe leglslaLlve proceedlngs.
LeglslaLlve lnLenL ls paramounL ln [udlclal revlew of a law's
meanlng
1he 8ecord of Lhe !olnL Conference MeeLlng held May 7, 1991
suggesLs LhaL Lhe dlscusslon among Lhe leglslaLors seemed Lo
have degeneraLed lnLo a cluLch of unflnlshed senLences and
unlnLelllglble phrases. 1he dellberaLlons dld noL acLually sound
Lhe way Lhey were subsequenLly Lranscrlbed or as Lhey now
appear on Lhe 8ecord.
LeglslaLors of boLh chambers knew whaL Lhey were Lalklng abouL,
spoke Lhelr mlnds, and undersLood each oLher well, for Lhe
8ecord lLself does noL lndlcaLe conLrary.
!"#$%&%'%&"#() )(+ && ,&-.$%$ /0120 3 01245 (%%67 $.,89.6 !(#,.)(9&(


!:;<=-><?;@; .A;BC><D -EFGDBBD? )>HD? IGJK;F #;C;K 9;C>J $EHDBG> %;< %><@ L;KCD? L;BDK;
nelLher does lL show any deLalls or mlnuLlae LhaL would lndlcaLe
LhaL Lhey abandoned Lhelr earller undersLandlng of Lhe Lerms
!"#$%&'(%"& and )*+%*).
1he peLlLloner's lnslnuaLlon LhaL 8A 7080 has falled Lo speclfy
preclsely Lhe mlnlmum number of malefacLors needed for an
offense Lo be properly classlfled as plunder ls lncongruous, lf noL
LoLally mlsleadlng. 1he maLhemaLlcal speclflcaLlon or preclse
quanLlflcaLlon ls essenLlally wlLhouL basls.
1he peLlLloner mlsconsLrues Lhe concepL of overbreadLh".
1he law musL be proven Lo be clearly and unequlvocally
repugnanL Lo Lhe ConsLlLuLlon before Lhls CourL may declare lLs
unconsLlLuLlonallLy. 1o [usLlfy Lhe nulllflcaLlon of Lhe law, Lhere
musL be a clear, unequlvocal breach of Lhe consLlLuLlon, noL a
doubLful argumenLaLlve lmpllcaLlon.
Second lssue:
1he peLlLloner has mlsundersLood Lhe lmporL of SecLlon 4.
Lalala ldk hehe
1hlrd lssue:
,-* #'(*+ "/ !0'))%/%!'(%"& %) &"( +*'001 )%2&%/%!'&(, conLrary Lo
whaL peLlLloner would have us belleve. 1he key ls wheLher Lhe
same burden of proof-proof beyond reasonable doubL- would
apply.
Concurrlng ln Lhe oplnlon of Lhe sollclLor general: lf lL ls conceded
LhaL Lhe leglslaLure possesses Lhe requlslLe power and auLhorlLy
Lo declare, by legal flaL, LhaL acLs noL lnherenLly crlmlnal ln
naLure are punlshable as offenses under speclal laws, Lhen wlLh
more reason can lL punlsh as offenses under speclal laws Lhose
acLs LhaL are '0+*'31 %&-*+*&(01 !+%#%&'0.

!"#$%"%& ()& *+,,-./+.0 12+.+1.
1he charge agalnsL Lhe peLlLloner ln Lhe Amended lnformaLlon ln
Crlmlnal Case no. 26338 does noL consLlLuLe plunder" under
8.A. no. 7080, as amended by 8. A. no. 7639. lf aL all, Lhe acLs
charged may consLlLuLe offenses punlshable under Lhe AnLl-
CrafL and CorrupL racLlces AcL (8.A. no. 3019) or Lhe 8evlsed
enal Code.
1he lnformaLlon charglng peLlLloner wlLh plunder may be quashed
wlLhouL pre[udlce Lo Lhe flllng of new lnformaLlons for acLs
under 8.A. no. 3019, of Lhe 8evlsed enal Code and oLher laws.
uouble [eopardy would noL bar Lhe flllng of Lhe same because Lhe
dlsmlssal of Lhe case ls made wlLh Lhe express consenL of Lhe
peLlLloner-accused

#"345& ()& ,-2676/- *+,,-./+.0 12+.+1.
lL ls unnecessary Lo rule on Lhe unconsLlLuLlonallLy of Lhe enLlre
law, 8.A. no. 7080, as amended by 8.A. no. 7639 alLhough
sharlng Lhe oplnlon ln Lhe case of 4*"50* 6 7!-'2'+'18 LhaL Lhe
helnous crlme law ls unconsLlLuLlonal. Pence, Lhe amendmenLs
Lo Lhe plunder law prescrlblng Lhe deaLh penalLy Lherefore are
unconsLlLuLlonal.
1he plunder law penallzes acLs LhaL are #'0' %& )*, and
consequenLly, Lhe charges musL be Lhe speclflc acLs alleged Lo
be ln vlolaLlon of Lhe la, commlLLed wlLh mallce and crlmlnal
lnLenL.
SecLlon 4, 8.A. no. 7080 musL be lnLerpreLed as requlrlng proof
beyond reasonable doubL of all Lhe elemenLs of plunder as
prescrlbed ln Lhe law, lncludlng Lhe elemenLs of Lhe componenL
crlmes, oLherwlse, Lhe secLlon wlll be unconsLlLuLlonal.

8%"39:;:"%<=">5& ()& *+,,-./+.0 12+.+1.
ueflnlLeness ls a due process requlremenL. vagueness and
unlnLelllglblllLy wlll lnvarlably lead Lo arblLrary governmenL
acLlon.
1he purpose of Lhe due process clause ls Lo exclude everyLhlng
LhaL ls arblLrary and caprlclous affecLlng Lhe rlghLs of Lhe clLlzen.
Congress, ln exerclslng lLs power Lo declare whaL acLs consLlLuLe a
crlme, musL lnform Lhe clLlzen wlLh reasonable preclslon whaL
acLs lL lnLends Lo prohlblL so LhaL he may have a cerLaln
undersLandable rule of conducL and know whaL acLs lL ls hls duLy
Lo avold.
!"#$%&%'%&"#() )(+ && ,&-.$%$ /0120 3 01245 (%%67 $.,89.6 !(#,.)(9&(


!:;<=-><?;@; .A;BC><D -EFGDBBD? )>HD? IGJK;F #;C;K 9;C>J $EHDBG> %;< %><@ L;KCD? L;BDK;
1he quesLloned sLaLuLes were enacLed purporLedly ln Lhe lnLeresL
of [usLlce, publlc peace and order, and Lhe rule of law. 8A nos.
7080 and 7639 do noL serve Lhese purposes. 1hese sLaLuLes
allow Lhe prosecuLors and Lhe courLs arblLrary and Loo broad
dlscreLlonary powers ln Lhelr enforcemenL. lalr, equal and
lmparLlal [usLlce would be denled.

"#$%&'#()*+,-.//.01 231 456678958: ;<585;8
8.A. no. 7080 ls unconsLlLuLlonal because lL vlolaLes Lhe due
process clause of Lhe consLlLuLlon.
1he vagueness of lLs Lerms and lLs lncorporaLlon of a rule of
evldence LhaL reduces Lhe burden of Lhe prosecuLlon ln provlng
Lhe crlme of plunder Lramples upon Lhe baslc consLlLuLlonal
rlghLs of Lhe accused.
1he lssue before Lhls CourL ls noL Lhe gullL or lnnocence of Mr.
LsLrada buL Lhe consLlLuLlonallLy of Lhe law as lL poses a serlous
LhreaL Lo Lhe llfe, llberLy and properLy of anyone who may come
under lLs unconsLlLuLlonal provlslons.


S. An accessory flle for SeparaLe Cplnlons wlll be uploaded hereafLer :3
Article III, Section 1
Moldex Realty, Inc. v. Villabona
G.R. No. 175123 July 4, 2012

Petition for review assailing the decision of the RTC as violative of petitioners right to due process to
present their evidence.

Facts:
- Spouses Villabona alleged that they are the true owners of Lot No. 2346 and Lot No. 2527, which
they acquired by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by their parents
- Sometime in January 1996, Moldex, through its representative Sayo, negotiated with the purchase
of the lots for P1.5 M (for both lots). Sayo was able to obtain from Respondent the Original
Certificate of Title
- Respondents alleged that Moldex caused the cancellation and transfer of OCTs through allegedly
falsified Deeds of Absolute Sale executed May 1996
- Trial ensued. After presentation of Ricardo Villabona as first witness, counsel for respondents
Atty. Suarez, prayed for resetting of a hearing two times. Thus, Judge Ballutay, RTC Executive
Judge issued an Order that presentation of evidence for plaintiffs is closed and terminated since
nothing was heard over on the part of the plaintiffs during the scheduled day of the hearing.
- Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order insisting that they still to
present two more witnesses but they were again absent for the following scheduled dates for
hearing
- RTC issued an Order submitting the case for decision based on whatever evidence had been
adduced. The Court gave Moldex 15 days to submit their written formal offer of evidence from
their receipt of the Order.
- Without waiting for the submission of written formal offer of evidence, RTC rendered its
Decision ordering Moldex to pay the respondents damages and declaring the Transfer Certificates
null and void.
- Petitioner Moldex filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the decision was rendered
without the 15-day period given to petitioners to formally submit their evidence. Motion was
denied.
- Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: WON the trial court violated the parties right to due process

Held:
YES. The procedure adopted by the RTC was contrary to Rule 30, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Upon
failure of the parties to present an amicable settlement, what the trial court should have done was to
continue the trial by allowing petitioners to present their evidence. Summary or outright dismissals of
actions are not proper where there are factual matters in dispute which need presentation and appreciation
of evidence
Article III, Sec. 1 Due Process

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., V HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
ADRIANO URTESUELA
GR No. 88050 January 30, 1992

This is a petition for review from the decision of the CA directing petitioner to pay Urtesuela
damages awarded by the POEA.

Facts:

Ponente: Cruz, J.
Quatar national Fishing Co. (acting in behalf of its foreign principal), Pan Asian Logistics
and Trading, a domestic recruiting and placement agency, hired Adriano Urtesuela as
captain of vessel M/V Oryx for 12 months.
The required surety bond (50,000 php) was submitted by Pan Asian and Stronghold
Insurance Co., Inc. to answer for the liabilities of the employer.
Urtesuela assumed duties on April 1982 but was terminated and repatriated to Manila 3
months later. He filed a complaint against Pan Asia with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration for breach of contract and damages.
POEA granted the amount of 6,374 php representing his salaries and value of unused
vacation leaves plus attorneys fees and costs. A writ of execution was issued against Pan
Asia but since the company ceased to operate, such can be executed only upon its cash
bond of 10,000 php.
Urtesuela filed a complaint against Stronghold with the Insurance Commission on the
basis of aforementioned surety bond. IC held that complaint should be reformed saying
that it is POEA, not Urtesuela who should bring the suit.
CA reversed the ruling and declared Urtesuela because he is the actual beneficiary of the
bond.
Petitioner asks for reversal of CA decision saying that due process was violated since it
was not impleaded in the complaint, there was no notification of the complaint and did
not participate in the hearing.
Issue:

WON POEA decision binds Stronghold even if it was not directly impleaded?

Held:

Yes. In the surety bond, petitioner bound itself to answer for all liabilities which the
POEA may impose against principal in connection with the recruitment of Filipino
seamen. Strictly interpreted, petitioner agreed to answer for whatever decision regardless
of WON it was impleaded and had the opportunity to defend itself.
Petitioner is deemed by implied notice to have given the opportunity to present its side,
and if it did not decide to intervene as co-defendant, it cannot now complain that it was
denied due process. The right to hearing is not absolute and can validly be waived as long
as party is given opportunity to be heard. A party cannot be compelled to speak when it
has chosen to be silent.

Petition is denied and the CAs decision affirmed in toto.
Art III, Sec 1- Tariff and Customs Code
Feeder International Line vs. Court of Appeals (CA)
GR No. 94262 May 31, 1991
Quick digest: The petitioner Feeder International seeks to reverse the decision of respondent CA, affirming
the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals which found the vessel M/T ULU WAI liable under Section
2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and its cargo liable under Section 2530(a), (f)
and (1-1) of the same Code ordering the forfeiture of the said vessel and its cargo, on the ground that the
petitioner was deprived of property without due process and that the decision was not made on the basis of
circumstantial evidence.
Facts:
1. M/T ULU WAI a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International
Shipping Lines of Singapore left Singapore carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of
fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.
2. The vessel anchored at Guiuanon, Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. A civilian
informer notified the Iloilo authorities.
3. The Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team and found that the vessel did not have
the required ship and shipping documents on board, except for a clearance from Singaporean port officials
clearing the vessel for Zamboanga.
4. The vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention was issued after due
investigation.
5. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the
District Collector denied in an Order.
6. The District Collector issued his decision finding M/T ULU WAI guilty of violating Section 2530 (a)
of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464) and her cargo of gas oil and fuel oil guilty of
violating Section 2530 (a), (f) and (1-1) and forfeited in favour of the RP.
7. Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision affirming in toto the
decision of the District Collector.
8. Petitioner filed a petition for review of the decisions of the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs
with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a
restraining order to enjoin the Commissioner from implementing his decision. The Court of Tax Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Commissioner.
9. Petitioner filed a petition in the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Tax Appeals decision. SC
issued a resolution referring the disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals.
This is in view of the SC decision in Development Bank of the Phils vs CA: final judgments or
decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals.
10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and then denied the
petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration.
11. Petitioners filed an instant petition in the SC seeking the reversal of the decision of CA.
Issues:
1. W/N the CA erred in finding that there had been illegal importation on the basis of circumstantial
evidence
2. W/N the petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law because of the lack of assistance
of counsel
3. W/N the petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law because its right to be presumed
innocent was not recognized
Held:
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
1. W/N the CA erred in finding that there had been illegal importation on the basis of circumstantial
evidence
No. A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs law is not penal in nature (do not result in the
conviction of the offender) and is purely civil and administrative in character. The degree of proof required
is merely substantial evidence (relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion).
Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when the carrying vessel
enter the jurisdiction of the Phils with intention to unload therein. Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely
susceptible of direct proof but must be inferred from the facts. The Government has sufficiently established
that an illegal importation or at least an attempt thereof has been committed on the basis of substantial
evidence.
2. W/N the petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law because of the lack of assistance
of counsel
No. The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or a law. Exception is made in the charter only during the custodial investigation of a person
suspected of a crime and during the trial of the accused. Since the forfeiture proceeding is not criminal in
nature, the assistance of counsel is not deemed essential.
3. W/N the petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law because its right to be presumed
innocent was not recognized
No. The petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed
innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.

MISSING DIGEST

CB vs CA
220 SCRA 536
Article 3, Section 1

PEREZ VS. MADRONA
G.R. No. 184478, March 21, 2012
This is a petition to reverse the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the Lower court that
the respondents are entitled to permanent injunction which restrained the petitioner from carrying
out the threatened demolition of the permitted fence and gate of the respondents.
Facts:
1. Respondent spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are registered owners of a
residential property located in lot 22. Block B, France street corner Italy Street, Green Heights
subdivision, Phase II, Marikina City.
a. Respondents built their house thereon and enclosed it with a concrete fence and steel
gate.
2. In 1999 respondents received a letter from Jaime Perez, chief of the demolition office. It stated:
a. The structure of the house violated the law in the FF. aspects:
i. PD 109 national building code
ii. Anti Squatting law
iii. Encroachment on rivers, esteros, drainage channels and other waterways.
iv. Illegally occupied/constructed improvements within the road right of way.
3. The spouses Madrona sent the petitioner a three page letter which contained:
a. An accusation libellous in nature as it is condemning him and his property without due
process
b. Perez had no basis and authority since there is no court order which authorizes him to
authorize the structure.
c. The cited legal bases do not give the petitioner the authority to demolish the structure.
d. The letter of Perez contained a false accusation that the property of the spouses extended
to the sidewalk.
4. After a year Perez sent another letter which gave the petitioner 10 days from the receipt of the
letter to: Clear and remove the illegal structures which were protruding to the structure.
5. The respondents injunction complaint they alleged that the letter of Perez:
a. Petitioners letters made it appear that their property encroached and directed them to
remove it, otherwise he would take the corresponding action.
b. The removal of the fence would put the family of the spouses in jeopardy.
c. The petitioner has no legal standing to demolish
d. The respondents enjoy the legal presumption of rightful possession of their property.
e. Perez should prove his claims in court.
f. Petitioners act of demolition even in the guise of right of way has no factual or legal
basis.
6. Respondents sought the issuance of a TRO from the RTC. And also a permanent injunction that
would prevent the others from demolishing their property.
7. Petitoiner filed an Urgent Ex Parte motion for an extension to file an answer. But the counsel of
Perez failed to file an answer. Thus the petitioner was declared in default. \
8. On 2003, the RTC issued an order dismissing the injunction complaint without prejudice.
a. It said that the respondents have not filed a case, thus it shows a lack of interest because
they failed to prosecute their claim for an unreasonable length of time.
b. However, upon the motion of the spouses the complaint was reinstated.
9. The RTC ruled in favour of the spouses and enjoined any person from demolishing any part of
their property.
a. The RTCs reason was that the spouses were the lalwful owners of their property and they
are entitled to the peaceful and open possession of ever inch of their property.
i. The threat to demolish is a violation of their rights as property owners.
b. This is a decision that the CA affirmed
Issues:
1. Did the trial court err in reinstating the complaint of the respondents?
2. Are the requisites of an issuance of a writ of injunction present?
Held:
1. The perusal of the spouses motion for reconsideration shows that there was no negligence by the
respondents.
a. The respondents were under the impression that the RTC would issue the order to
continue proceedings once it considers that the CA decession has already been dealt with
finality.
b. The records show that the CA has already issued an entry of judgement at the time the
dismissal order was issued.
c. As correctly found by the CA and the RTC, the respondents did not err in reinstating the
complaint of the spouses Madrona.
d. There was no bases for the dismissal of the complaint.
2. The requisites for the issuance of an injunction are present.
a. 2 Requisites for an injunction
i. There must be a right which is to be protected
ii. The acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.
b. In the present case, both requisites for the issuance of the injunction are present.
i. If the Perez really wanted to have the fence of the respondents removed, he
should go to court and prove the violations in the construction of the concrete
fence.
c. Unless the thing is a nuisance per se it way not be abated summarily without judicial
intervention.
i. A thing is a nuisance per se if it affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be abated under the defined law of necessity.
ii. The fence of the respondents is not a nuisance per se. it is not injurious to the
health and comfort of the community.
Details in the Decision Cande might ask:

Court awards 10,000 in moral damages to the respondents pursuant to A2217 of the Civil Code.

Exemplary damages of 5,000. This is to serve as an example to other public officials to be more
circumspect in the performance of their duties.

Nuisance per Se = The Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality.
ABAKADA vs Ermita
Sept. 1, 2005

Quick Digest: This petition consists of 5 consolidated petitions to declare RA 9337 or more
popularly known as the E-VAT Law which amends the National Internal Revenue Code, or
certain parts of it, as unconstitutional.

Facts
1. RA 9337 An act amending sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997, popularly known as the E-VAT law was passed by Congress and approved
by Pres. Arroyo
RA 9337 is a consolidation of 3 legislative bills, 2 House Bills and a Senate Bill.
All of which were certified as urgent by the President in order to hasten its
passing.
The bill was signed into law by the President on May 24, 2005.
2. Before the effectivity of RA 9337, several parties filed petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of certain parts of the law
After the laws enactment but before its effectivity, 4 parties each filed petitions
before the SC questioning the constitutionality of certain parts of the law
1. ABAKADA GURO party- list questions the constitutionality of
sections 4, 5 and 6. These sections pertain to the imposition of 10%
value added tax (VAT) on the sale of goods and properties, the
importation of goods, and the sale of services and use or lease of
properties. They also question a provision authorizing the President to
increase the VAT rate to 12% contingent upon certain events. They
argue that such provisions constitute abandonment by Congress of its
exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Art. 6, Sec. 28(2) of
the Constitution.
2. Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, et al., also assail sections 4, 5, and 6 of the
law. They also assail the stand-by authority of the President to increase
the VAT rate. They also argue this stand-by authority violates the due
process clause embodied in Art. 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution because:
a. 12% increase is ambiguous because it does not state whether it
will be returned to the original 10% if the conditions are no
long satisfied
b. Rate is unfair and unreasonable as the people are unsure of the
applicable VAT rate year after year
c. Increase in VAT rate should only be based on fiscal adequacy
3. Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers Inc., et al., assail Sec. 8 and 12
of RA 9337 which involves input taxes on depreciable goods, limit on
the amount of input tax to be credited to output tax and the deduction
of final withholding taxes. They argue that these provisions are
unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and
confiscatory. They base their argument on the constitutional right
on non-deprivation of life, liberty and property without due
process of law under Art. 3, Sec. 1. They argue that input tax partakes
the nature of a property and may not be confiscated, limited, or
appropriated without due process of law.
4. Members of the HR led by Rep. Francis Escudero likewise question
the constitutionality of Sec. 4,5, and 6 of RA 9337 based on the same
argument as ABAKADA GURO party-list
Respondents mainly argue that the law has sufficiently met the standards set by
jurisprudence regarding the issue of undue delegation of legislative power. They
also aruge the every law is presumed to be constitutional and in this case, the
petitioners have not sufficiently proven is invalidity. They manifest that RA
9337 is the anchor of the governments fiscal reform agenda. A reform I the
value-added syste, of taxation is the core revenue measure that will tilt the
balance toward a sustainable macroeconomic environment necessary for
economic growth
3. On the date RA 9337 was supposed to take effect, the Supreme Court issued a TRO
against the enforcement and implementation of the law
Supreme Court issued a TRO on July 1, 2005, the effectivity date of RA 9337,
which took effect immediately
In the oral arguments regarding the TRO, the SC, through Justice Panganiban,
manifested the primary reason behind the issuance of the TRO.
The SC had concerns about confusion in implementing the law. This is mainly
because the people were at the mercy of confusion regarding the price increase in
products and services due to the effect of implementing value-added taxes.
The SC wanted the government to clarify the different issues regarding the laws
implementation
After the issuance of the TRO, Governor Enrique Garcia also filed a petition for
certiorari alleging the unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that the
limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered
establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, thus violating the
principle that tax collection and revenue should be solely allocated for public
purposes and expenditures. Allowing these establishments to pass on the tax to
consumer is inequitable, in violation of Art. 6, Sec. 28(1) of the Constitution.

Issue
1. Whether Sec. 8 and Sec. 12 of RA 9337 are arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and
confiscatory in that it violates Art. 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution

Held: No, it did not
Doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for
proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such
showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.
Input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due
process clause. A VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a
mere statutory privilege. The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights
must be born in mind for persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges.



Article III Section 1
British American Tobacco v. Camacho
As Sec. of Finance and Parayno, Jr. as Commissioner of BIR
[G.R. No. 163583, August 20, 2008]

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City Br. 61.

Facts:

1. Petitioner contends that Sec. 145 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) as recodified in
RA 8424 (Tax Reform Act) and further amended by RA 9334 is violative of the equal protection
and uniformity clauses of the Constitution such that through its legislative classification freeze,
new brands are at a disadvantage having higher tax rates compared to those older brands covered
by such freeze which may have the same current net retail price.
2. Petitioner is the owner of a new brand of cigarettes (Lucky Strike). It filed on September 1, 2003
before the aforementioned RTC a petition for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of said section of the
NIRC together with Revenue Regulations Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 6-2003 issued by the BIR.
- Jan. 1, 1997: RA 8284 amendments; Sec. 145 of the NIRC provides for four tiers of tax rates
(low, medium, high, premium) based on the net retail price per pack of cigarettes which is
based on a survey done in October 1, 1996 for the duly registered and active brands as of that
time. Meanwhile, those brands not covered will be classified based on their current net retail
price.
- Rev. Reg. No. 1-97: Classified existing brands (brands registered on or before Jan. 1,
1997/RA 8424) from new brands which were registered thereafter providing that their (new
brands) tax category will be based on their suggested retail price (SRP) until a survey by the
Bureau has been conducted to determine its actual retail price after three months of its
introduction to the market.
- June 2001: Petitioner introduced their Lucky Strike brand of cigarettes which had an SRP of
P9.90/pack therefore belonging to the high tax rate of P8.96/pack.
- Rev. Reg. No. 9-2003: Empowered the BIR to make survey every two years on the current
retail price of the products for the reclassification of their tax rates or for new tax category.
- Rev. Mem. No. 6-2003: Issued guidelines for the net retail price of new brands of cigarettes
and alcohol products.
- Rev. Reg. 22-3003: Issued to implement the revised tax classification of the new brands (after
Jan. 1, 1997) based on the survey (RR No. 1-97), which revealed that Lucky Strike has a
current net retail price of P22 thus should be categorized in the premium rate of P13.44/pack.
3. On Sept. 4, 2003, the RTC denied the TRO, saying that it has no power to restrain tax collection.
Then it also denied the Motion to Dismiss on March 2004 but issued the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction for the Revenue Regulations and Memorandums. On a motion for reconsideration,
both the parties agreed that it was their (the law and rules/orders) constitutionality that is being
ultimately questioned.
4. On May 2004, RTC uplifted the writ and upheld their constitutionality, thus this petition for
review in the Supreme Court.
5. Jan. 2005: RA 9334 amendments; This provided for the legislative freeze on brands of cigarettes
introduced between Jan. 2, 1997- Dec. 31, 2003, saying that their current tax rate/category will be
that which the BIR has assigned to them together with those old brands (prior to said date)
contained in Annex D of the petition shall remain in their categories until revised by Congress.
Thus, it resulted for petitioner having higher tax for their products, prompting them to amend
their petition to assail the validity of RA 9334 and praying for a lower tax category, citing other
brands such as Philip Morris and Marlboro being unduly benefited because their category are still
based on the Oct. 1996 tax base (and all those listed in Annex D) and thus having lower taxes
than them despite the disparity in their prices. Said companies filed their respective motion for
intervention which the Court granted.

Issues:
Procedural-
1. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2. W/N petitioner is estopped from complaining about the authority of the Bureau upon entering the
field/market, knowing and complying with its policies
Substantive-
3. W/N Section 145 of the NIRC as amended by RA 9334, by retaining the Annex D (with tax base
as of Oct. 1996) and the classification freeze violates the equal protection and uniformity of
taxation clause of the Constitution
4. W/N the Revenue Regulations and Revenue Memorandum Orders are valid
5. W/N petitioner should be categorized in a lower tax category
6. W/N RA 8240 as amended by RA 9334 violates the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT) of 1947

Held:
1. YES. Art. 8 Sec. 1 of the Constitution vests the courts with judicial power, thus having
jurisdiction in cases wherein the constitutionality of the law or rule is challenged. It is not the
Court of Tax Appeals who have the jurisdiction for the reason just mentioned.
2. NO. Petitioner did not do any misrepresentations or misleading acts as requirement for estoppel
upon complying with the Bureau regarding the NIRC and its rules and regulations, and it was also
mentioned that the unconstitutionality of the law may still be attacked though it was never done
before.
3. NO. To fulfil the rational basis test to stand the test of equal protection and uniformity, a
legislative classification must 1) rationally further a legitimate state interest, 2) have reasonable
classifications, and 3) rest upon some ground of difference having fair and substantial relation to
the object of legislation. The Court finds the classification freeze in the NIRC as having fulfilled
these standards and mentioned that it was adopted by Congress for practicality and expediency, to
have a uniform mechanism of taxation specially for fixing the tax rates of new brands, for
stability in short. As regards the correctness of these schemes adopted by Congress (including
retaining Annex D in the amendments), the Court refused to delve into that question declaring
that it is already inquiring into the wisdom of legislators which it cannot and should not do for
respect for a co-equal branch.
4. NO. The BIR clearly erred in issuing such orders since there is nowhere in Section 145 of the
NIRC a granting of the power and authority for it to conduct resurveys and reclassifications every
two years or earlier on said products for their new tax rates.
5. NO. It cannot avail of being into a lower tax category since it failed to compel or ask the BIR for
the mandatory survey of its actual net retail price after three months of introduction of its product,
thus the subsequent survey (long after the three-month mandatory period) was the first survey it
had, availing it of no re-classification because technically, it was its first, thus cannot be reversed
(perhaps only for those reclassified based on the Regulation and Memorandums which later were
invalidated).
6. NO. It doesnt violate the GATT since the classification freeze is both applicable equally to local
and imported products, and even assuming for the sake of discussion that it is prejudicial to the
other one, it cannot prevail over RA 8240 as amended by RA 9334 because the latter one must
prevail being a later enactment of Congress as statutes (since both have the force of it only) and
as a special law dealing with taxation.