LEGAL ETHICS Page | 1

1. IN RE: ALMACEN
-Rule 11.03

We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses
what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given
'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings
but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority,
4
or that it is articulated by a lawyer.
5
Such right is especially
recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,
6
because then the
court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct.
12
They should and expect critical evaluation of
their performance.
13
For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is
rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as
a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges.

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen."

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and
their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring
them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be
visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted
guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer
of the courts, a lawyer is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.

Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his
studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were
made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.

Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon: A publication which tends to impede, obstruct,
embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A
publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them
or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise
criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind
of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-
important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In
the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the
courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy
public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action
pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the
newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending
case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would
lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his
statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the
judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for
contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for
contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the
tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his
sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the
disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and
ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the
pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The
sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by
removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of
an attorney.
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make
an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here
in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on
Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its
way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade
against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all
calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its
members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but
also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its
members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices"
and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to
pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his
actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and
disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no
regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and
reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and
feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of
administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.
They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract
public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members
into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming
feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth.
It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the
lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it
cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary
powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any
other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be,
above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting
to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy
criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain
them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must
be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any
tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against
the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act
not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office.
30
So that, in a very real sense, if
there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the
individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes
and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to
discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it.
31
So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact
alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because
public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases
which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and
judge is absolutely inexistent.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never
be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing
that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate
and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of
respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His
demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension
should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 2

indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us
discretion on the matter
33
but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from
the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in
degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority.
The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty.
Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last.
For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court
that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

2. JUDGE LACUROM vs JACOBA
-Rule 11.03

We first examine the charge against Velasco-Jacoba. By signing the 30 July 2001
motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to be
meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature
supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of
paper to that of a court document.

Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only
because of her husbands request but she did not know its contents beforehand.
Apparently, this practice of signing each others pleadings is a long-standing
arrangement between the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, [s]o implicit is
[their] trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she]
already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the
other. By Velasco-Jacobasown admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule
7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground for
subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the
contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.
[39]


We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in
the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement
pointing to him as the author of the motion. The marital privilege rule, being a rule of
evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation
or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent.
[43]
This waiver applies
to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly
exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his clients cause. We recall his
use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal
monstrosity, horrendous mistake,horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary
and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacobaacknowledged that
the words created a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect.

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts
of courts and judges.
[45]
However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by
the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on
Judge Lacuroms Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly
and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a
lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.
[46]
The use of unnecessary
language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in
judicial administration.


3. ROXAS vs DE ZUZUARREGUI
-Rule 11.03

Self-approbation, pride and self-esteem should not erode and dim the
luster and dignity of this Court. Against overweening bluster and superciliousness,
nay, lordly claim, this Court must stand steadfast, unmoved and uncompromising in
upholding what is right and proper. In such posture, the mandate of affording every
man the equal protection of the law cannot dwindle. Strict adherence to ethical
conduct and righteousness without veering away from responsibility will foster an
impregnable respect, deference and even reverence to this Courts decisions and
pronouncements.

After reviewing the records of these cases, We firmly stand by our decision which
Atty. Roxas described to be unjust, unfair and impossible, and arrived at through
considerations other than the pure merits of the case. Atty. Roxass insistence that
said decision did not meet the standards or adhered to the basic characteristics of fair
and just decision, such as objectivity, neutrality and conformity to the laws and the
Constitution, is simply without basis. The fact that the decision was not in his favor
does not mean that the same was contrary to our laws and was not rendered in a fair
and impartial manner.

In his letter subject of this contempt proceeding, Atty. Roxas accused
Justice Nazario of deciding the case through considerations other than the pure
merits of the case. He averred that we will never understand what moved the
Honorable Justice to decide as she did and what forces and influences caused her to
reason out her decision in such an unfair and unjust manner as to compromise the
reputation, integrity and dignity itself of the Supreme Court, as a venerable institution
of justice. He then ended by mocking her when he said sleep well if you still can
and that her earthly life will [be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of Justice where
only the merits of Your Honors life will be relevant and material and where
technicalities can shield no one from his or her wrongdoings.

As to the Court, supposedly the last vanguard and bulwark of justice, he
likewise accuses it of making itself, wittingly or unwittingly, a party to the wrongdoing
by giving official and judicial sanction and conformity to the unjust claims of the
adverse party. He added: This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the
least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an impossible decision could spring forth
from the Supreme Court, the ultimate administrator and last bulwark of justice. As it
stands, instead of being an administrator of justice, the Supreme Court is ironically a
dispenser of injustice.

In his letter of explanation, Atty. Roxas extended apologies to Justice Nazario, to the
other members of the High Court and to the High Court itself as a revered institution
and ultimate dispenser of justice. He said he was merely exercising his right to
express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of the
Honorable Courts ruling. He explained that his criticism of the assailed ruling was
done in good faith with no intention whatsoever to offend any member, much less
tarnish the image of the Court. Instead of resorting to public criticism through media
exposure, he chose to ventilate his criticism in a very discreet and private manner by
writing a personal letter confined to the hallowed halls of the Court and within bounds
of decency and propriety.

We find the explanations of Atty. Roxas unsatisfactory. The accusation against
Justice Nazario is clearly without basis. The attack on the person of
Justice Nazario has caused her pain and embarrassment. His letter is full of
contemptuous remarks tending to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode public
confidence that should be accorded it.

To prevent liability from attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his
rights to free speech and privacy of communication. The invocation of these rights will
not, however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory
statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The making
of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free
speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the
courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be
used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and
confidence therein.
[25]
Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones
irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its
magistrates.
[26]


This Court does not curtail the right of a lawyer, or any person for that
matter, to be critical of courts and judges as long as they are made in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels.
In the case at bar, we find the statements made by Atty. Roxas to have
been made mala fides and exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. By his
unfair and unfounded accusation against Justice Nazario, and his mocking of the
Court for allegedly being part of a wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice, he
abused his liberty of speech.

Atty. Roxas likewise cannot hide under the mantle of the right to privacy. It must be
disclosed that prior to his letter addressed to Justice Nazario, Atty. Roxas first wrote
then Chief Justice Panganiban asking for an investigation as to how the assailed
decision was rendered and to sanction the perpetrators. The accusations contained
therein are similar to those in his letter to JusticeNazario. The fact that his letters were
merely addressed to the Justices of this Court and were not disseminated to the media
is of no moment. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the
performance of their judicial functions, become part of the judicial record and are a
matter of concern for the entire court.
[30]
As can be gathered from the records, the
letter to then Chief Justice Panganiban was merely noted and no show-cause order
was issued in the hope that Atty. Roxas would stop his assault on the
Court. However, since Atty. Roxas persisted in attacking the Court via his second
letter, it behooved the Court to order him to explain why he should not be held in
contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action.

4. POBRE vs DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
-Rule 11.03

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded
upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning
process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or
its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating
forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege
would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and
distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment
against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.
[2]


This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech.
Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight
functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 3

every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how
the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative
floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity
and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not
destroy the privilege.
[3]
The disciplinary authority of the assembly
[4]
and the voters, not
the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.
[5]


For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of
the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator
Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration
of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of
decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in
question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was
quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme
Court of idiots.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly
violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer
of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are
keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.
[7]
Senator Santiago should have
known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the
peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her
statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered
for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale
of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be
allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the
Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are
agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the
individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather
a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting
injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the
administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer
holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct
also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.
[14]


Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their
private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor,
[15]
a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the
practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference
is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of
lawyers professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated
to the actual practice of their professionwould show them to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.
[16]


The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on
Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter
disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal
circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any
sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of
disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive
and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It
is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect
courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary
non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them
against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made
responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.
[18]
It is
intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its
members.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint,
stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare.
We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senators use of
intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear
violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.
[21]


5. GO vs ABROGAR
-Rule 11.04
Before closing, the Court has a few observations regarding the conduct of petitioner
and his counsel in this case. The petitioner alleges that:

Now it can be told, that the fishy and suspicious actuations of Atty. Javier was
done for the sole purpose of making sure that Jimmy T. Go will lose his case. With
due respect, to our mind, it can even be said that the respondent IBank and its
counsel Atty. Benedicto Valerio, Alberto Looyuko, petitioners nemesis against
whom he initiated several cases, andLooyukos counsel Atty. Flaminiano, the
Honorable Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
150Zeuz Abrogar and Petitioners negligent counsel Atty. Javier are in cahoots
with one another in their common objective to pin down Mr. Jimmy T. Go. Our
apprehension is not without basis, consider the following: x x x
[16]


Petitioner thereafter goes on to state the basis for his accusations against everyone
connected to the case:
[17]
1) Looyuko had withdrawn his appeal; 2)
Atty. Flaminiano conformed to the writ of execution; 3) Atty. Javier neglected his case
and continued to represent Looyuko in other cases; 4) Looyuko supported the Motion
to Cite petitioner for contempt that was filed by the Bank; and, 5) Judge Abrogar was
once an assistant fiscal under then Manila City Fiscal Atty.Flaminiano.

Petitioners particular attack against an RTC Judge is a serious accusation
that erodes trust and confidence in our judicial system. This Court will not hesitate to
sanction persons who recklessly and nonchalantly impute ill motives that are nothing
more than unfounded speculations. The above suspicious circumstances
enumerated, whether taken together or separately, are plainly unjustified as they fail to
even remotely show the existence of a grand conspiracy against petitioner. For all their
derogatory implication, they are clearly unsubstantiated and disrespectful to a member
of the Bench.

The Court is also dismayed that such baseless attacks were assisted by
counsel, who is an officer of the court. Under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS. In particular, he shall not attribute to a
judge motives not supported by the records or by evidence. A lawyer should submit
grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only. Atty. Caneda, Jr. should
have known better than to permit the irresponsible and unsupported claim against
Judge Abrogar to be included in the pleadings. Allowing such statements to be made
is against a lawyers oath of office and goes against the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Atty. Gregorio D. Caneda, Jr.
are STRICTLY WARNED not to make disrespectful statements against a Judge
without basis in the records or the evidence.

6. FUDOT vs CATTLEYA LAND
-Rule 11.04

We find Atty. De La Serna guilty of indirect contempt. A lawyer is, first and
foremost, an officer of the court. Corollary to his duty to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and judicial officers is to support the courts against "unjust
criticism and clamor."
[62]
His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts
to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice, as it
is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice."
[63]
As we held in one case:
It is [the] respondents duty as an officer of the court, to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to
promoteconfidence in the fair administration of justice and in the
Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy. x x x
[64]


As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a lawyer is
expected to bring to the fore irregular and questionable practices of those sitting in
court which tend to corrode the judicial machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable
information that anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it is incumbent upon him
to report the matter to the Court so that it may be properly acted upon. An omission or
even a delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the publics trust in, the
judicial system.

The Court is perplexed by the actuations of Atty. De La Serna. Claiming that he
had been informed that a member of the Court was involved in bribery,
yet he chose to remain silent in the meantime and to divulge the information long
after he had come to know that he lost the case. He claims that as early as 25
September 2007, Mr. Chan told him that he had already spent P10 Million for Justice
Tinga; yet he failed to inform the Court of this matter waited until 4 November
2007 before he divulged the alleged bribery in his Request for Inhibition. According to
him, he only became convinced that the bribe took place after he received a copy of
the decision. Yet there was no mention of the alleged bribery in his motion for
reconsideration dated 20 October 2007. For this, he offers the lame pretext that
adverted bribery is a mere extraneous matter (that) is not relevant as far as the legal
issues are concerned in this case, and because his request for inhibition dated 4
November 2007, where the matter was mentioned for the first time, at least does not
have a deadline.
[65]
While admitting that he did not even verify from other sources if
Mr. Chans statement had any factual basis, De La Serna offers another feeble
explanation for his delayed reaction in that he could not just go to the Supreme Court
and request for investigation, as he could not even pass through the guards.
[66]
A
lawyer of De La Sernas caliber and experience would know that there is a proper way
of lodging a formal complaint for investigation, including sending it by registered mail.
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 4


That De La Serna did not report the matter immediately to the Court
suffuses unshakeable dubiety to his claim that Mr.
Chan had uttered the statements attributed to him. That De La Serna brought up the
issue of bribery after an unfavorable decision was issued makes the allegation all the
more a contrived afterthought, a hastily concocted story brought to cast doubts on the
integrity not only of Justice Tinga, but also of the entire Supreme Court.

This is not to say, however, that as an officer of the court, Atty. De La Serna
cannot criticize the court.
[67]
We have long recognized and respected the right of a
lawyer, or any person, for that matter, to be critical of courts and magistrates as long
as they are made in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels.

Everything considered on the basis of the proofs on record, reason and normal
discernment, Atty. De La Sernas statements bear the badges of falsehood while the
common version of the witnesses who disputed his statements is imbued with the
hallmarks of truth. There is more. De La Sernas declarations were
maliciously and irresponsibly made. They exceeded the boundaries of
decencyand propriety. The libelous attack on the integrity and credibility of Justice
Tinga tend to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode public confidence that should
be accorded to it.

Atty. De La Serna has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
criticism. His irresponsible and baseless
statements, his unrepentant stance and smug insistence of his malicious and
unfounded accusation against Justice Tinga have sullied the dignity and authority of
this Court. Beyond question, therefore, De La Sernas culpability for indirect contempt
warrants the penalty of a fine not exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months or both under the Rules.
[72]


7. IN RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO BAGABUYO
-Rule 11.05

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an
officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and
should not promote distrust in the administration of justice.

The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from
the practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
[12]
for any of the
causes mentioned in Sec. 27
[13]
of the same Rule. Respondent was given the
opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of
due process has been duly satisfied.

In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,
[14]
Rule 138 and Sec.
9,
[15]
Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted
to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondents suspension
from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension
and other relevant documents.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found
that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which
maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and respondents
criticism of the trial courts Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio
station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation
of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was
complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent
chose to remain silent.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the
trial courts order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that
the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities
are devolved by law as a consequence.
[17]
Membership in the bar imposes upon them
certain obligations.
[18]
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a
lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states
that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused
the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order
dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be
released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge
Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor
lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in
the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondents
statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still
pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer
shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent
violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not
resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge
Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer
when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado,
he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the
example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers.

8. AGUSTIN vs EMPLEO
-Canon 12

On July 26, 2005, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Acerey C.
Pacheco, submitted his Report and Recommendation.
[10]
Said the Commissioner in
his report:

It is a fact as established by the records that no compromise
agreement was submitted to the court despite the receipt of the Order
datedSeptember 25, 1998. While it is true that as counsel, respondent
do not decide for the complainant to enter into such kind of agreement,
respondent is however, duty bound to assist the court in the speedy
disposition of cases.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents asseveration that he waited for the
complainant to provide him with details of the compromise agreement
but the latter failed to come does not inspire belief in the face of the
denials made by the complainant. Not even a piece of paper or letter
requesting the complainant to provide him with the details of the
agreement was presented to substantiate such allegation.

And even assuming arguendo that respondent indeed asked
the complainant of such details, the period of almost four (4) years from
September 25, 1998 (date of the Order requiring the submission of the
compromise agreement) up to August 5, 2002 (date of the Order
dismissing the case for failure to submit the same) without doing
anything to avoid the case being left hanging on the air betrays
respondents duty towards the court. As an officer of the court whose
primary function is to assist the court in the impartial and speedy
adjudication of cases, respondent ought to be vigilant and avoid any act
or omission that only impedes and obstructs speedy disposition of cases.

In the case at bar, the period of almost four (4) years of
waiting constitutes inaction that caused unnecessary delay in the
disposition of said cases. The fact that no damage or prejudice was
sustained by the complainant, he being the defendant in that case, is of
no moment.
We are in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

First and foremost among the duties of a lawyer is his duty to the
court. The chief mission of an attorney is to assist in the administration of justice and
to this end, his clients success in the case is subordinate. As mandated in Canon 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND
CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Like the court itself, a lawyer is an instrument to advance its ends: the
speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the
prompt satisfaction of final judgments.
[13]
A lawyer should not only help attain these
objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede,
obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
[14]


True, a lawyer cannot enter into a compromise agreement without his clients
consent. Be it remembered, however, that a lawyer is also an officer of the court with
the correlative duty to see to it that cases are disposed in the soonest possible time.
Here, respondent, fully aware that there is a pending court order for the
submission of a compromise agreement, should have taken pains to remind
complainant about it and ascertain the true intent of the latter regarding the same, so
that he, as complainants counsel, can make the necessary legal action in order for the
case not to be unduly delayed and appear not to be indefinitely pending in the docket
of the court concerned.

Moreover, by respondents inaction to the court order in Civil Case No. B-
259, he has very well violated his Attorneys Oath to obey the laws and legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities.

LEGAL ETHICS Page | 5

Lastly, we cannot but note that respondent's conduct relative to the civil case in
question likewise fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which demands that a lawyer
shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 of said Canon further
states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

As complainants counsel in Civil Case No. B-259, it was
respondent to invite his clients attention as to the compromise agreement,
especially so when there is a pending court order for the submission of the
same. There is nothing in the record which shows that respondent did anything in
this respect, even when, as per his admission, he and complainant were in
communication at that time, albeit, with regards to another case.

Thus, by just letting the court order for the submission of a compromise
agreement in Civil Case No. B-259remain unacted upon resulting in the pendency of
that case for almost four (4) years until its dismissal for the parties non-compliance,
respondent sorely failed to perform what is required of him as a lawyer and a member
of the Bar.

9. FORONDA vs GUERRERO
-Rule 12.02

The respondent was vehement in denying that he abused legal processes and
remedies, as the issues raised in the subsequent actions he filed were valid and
meritorious, the resolution of which were indispensable for the orderly administration of
justice. Thus:
It is basic that a counsel may resort to all legal reliefs and remedies available and to
invoke all pertinent provisions of the law and rules, to protect the interest of a client in
order that justice may be done and duly administered. In fact, it is not only the right of
a counsel to do so but rather, it is his bounden and sacred obligation as an officer of
the court and as an advocate who is tasked to protect the interest of a client within the
bounds of law.

We agree that the respondent is administratively liable. We concur with the
following observations made by IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala in her
Report and Recommendation dated October 3, 2003:

The issue being raised by the respondent on behalf of his clients in all the complaints,
appeals, petitions and motions he has filed is the question of non-eligibility of Ramona
Alcaraz to acquire property in the Philippines and the nullity of the sale between
Alcaraz and the Coronels. These issues have already been passed upon and upheld
by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In the case docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 65783, the First Division of the Court of Appeals observed that
Mabanags counsel, (respondent herein) has questioned the non-eligibility of Ramona
Alcaraz to acquire property in the Philippines for the nth time although as early as 30
July 1998, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47710 had already affirmed the
lower courts ruling that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the eligibility of
Alcaraz to own property in the Philippines. The petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135820 upheld the right of Ramona Alcaraz as one of
the vendees in the deed of sale. The Supreme Court passed judgment on her capacity
to buy the property. The issue was recycled in CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, Entry of
Judgment was already issued by the Supreme Court on 2 January 1997.
However, petitioner has succeeded for more than five (5) years now to hold at
bay the full implementation of the judgment in point. Likewise, in dismissing the
complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client before RTC QC Branch 83
docketed as Case No. Q-97-31268 entitled Mabanag vs. Patricia Ramona Alcaraz, et.
al. to declare Patricia Alcaraz ineligible to acquire real property, the court observed
that for failure of the plaintiffs to get a favorable decision of the earlier case,
they tried to prevent the execution by disqualifying herein defendant. (Emphasis
ours).

Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at
the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding
execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.
[22]
Such filing of multiple
petitions constitutes abuse of the Courts processes and improper conduct that tends
to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as
contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious
petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment)
subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or
for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts,
and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with
truth and honor.
[23]


We note that while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their
clients and zeal in the defense of their clients right, they should not forget that they
are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
[24]


In filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same subject
matter, the respondent violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that a lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. He also violated Rule 12.02
[25]
and
Rule 12.04
[26]
of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate to delay no man for money
or malice.

We find that the IBPs recommended penalty of one years suspension from the
practice of law is not commensurate to the respondents transgression. He shall thus
be meted a two-year suspension from the practice of law, effective immediately.

10. SEBASTIAN vs BAJAR
-Rule 12.02

Respondent avers that she merely availed of all the legal remedies for her
client. In Suzuki v. Tiamson,
[70]
the Court enunciated that while lawyers owe their
entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients
rights, they should not forget that they are first and foremost, officers of the court,
bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. Respondents act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite
the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is
beyond the bounds of the law. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices
for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes
of the state the administration of justice.
[71]


Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting
as Tanliocos counsel, filed cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of
Possession despite the finality of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves the
same issues. The Court held that an important factor in determining the existence of
forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the
filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.
[72]
Indeed, while a lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and
administration of justice.
[73]


11. MANIPUD vs BAUTISTA
-Rule 12.02

Respondent alleged that the only issue for resolution before the IBP is
whether he violated the rule on forum shopping; that assuming the IBP could validly
take cognizance of other issues, still it was complainants fault that he transacted with
an impostor; and that he did not know the person of Jovita Macasieb until the latter
hired his services as lawyer.

In the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Atty. Lolita
A. Quisumbing, she found that respondent is not administratively liable for lack of
showing that the filing of the second complaint was done deliberately and willfully to
commit forum shopping. Thus:

To merit disciplinary action, forum shopping must be willful and
deliberate. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that, should
there be any pending action or claim before any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency, a complete statement of its status should be given.

In the present case, respondent explained his actions in this wise:

In the second complaint the respondent called
the attention of the Court that there was a pending (sic)
between the parties, Civil Case No. 2005-178. Hence,
the purpose is not to obtain favorable decision, but to
have the issue resolved in Civil Case No. 2005-178. To
bring home his point, the respondent attached as Annex
E the first complaint.

The respondent should not be blamed for the
institution of the second complaint. He was misled by
the very act of the complainant. Complainant had filed
the application for foreclosure on December 20,
2004. This was the subject of Civil Case No. 178. All
that he had to do was request the sheriff with whom he
had filed the application to proceed with the
foreclosure. There is absolutely no need for
complainant to make a second application. In making
the second application, it was impressed upon the mind
of the respondent that it was another foreclosure.

In sum, respondent acted in good faith in filing the second
complaint since it was established that it was his immediate reaction
upon finding out that a second application for extrajudicial
foreclosure was filed. If, indeed, there was intent to commit forum-
shopping, he would not have alleged in the second complaint the
fact of filing of the first complaint and attached a copy of the same.

The objective of the rule against forum-shopping was
cited in Municipality of Taguig, et al vs. Court of
Appeals. Said the Supreme Court

What is truly important to
consider in determining whether
forum shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused the courts and
parties-litigants by a party who asks
different courts and/or administrative
agencies to rule on the same or
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 6

related causes and/or grant the
same or substantially the same
reliefs, in the process creating the
possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by the
differentfora upon the same issues.

In this case, no undue vexation was caused to the
Court and petitioner as the fact of filing of the first case was
alleged in the second complaint and secondly, soon
thereafter, inasmuch as both cases were raffled to the same
branch, the first case was dismissed by the said
Court. Hence, there was no danger of different courts ruling
on the same issues.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully
recommended that the Complaint against respondent ATTY.
FELICIANO C. BAUTISTA be dismissed for lack of merit.
(Citations omitted)

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in a Resolution dated February 6,
2008.

Moreover, we note that complainant, in his Comment on the Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors with Motion for Reinvestigation filed before this Court,
failed to assail the findings and resolution of the IBP with regard to the issue on forum
shopping. As such, we find no reason to disturb the same.

12. SANTIAGO vs RAFANAN
-Rule 12.08

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor
Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by
respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A lawyer shall
avoid testifying in behalf of his client.

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of
his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing,
authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his
testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of
the case to another counsel.

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a
witness,[31] except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising
from an attorney-client relationship.[32]

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the
task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as
advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In
contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the
cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a
disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety
rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.

Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness
for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the
truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as
disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their
sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to
be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The
testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and
untruthful.[33]

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and
at the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from
testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to
withdraw from active management of the case.[34]

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by
Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable
for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and
defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal
action in which the latters life and liberty are at stake.[35] It is the fundamental right of
the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They
are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence
as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according
to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense
counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong
conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every
defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients
would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.[36]

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the
defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of
the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed
the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not
dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which
lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was
submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely
inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation
has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of
crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and
protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.[38] The investigation is
advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to
refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to
believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in
future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the ends of
justice, the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active
prosecution of these cases.

13. BERNABE vs BARCELONA
-Canon13

Complainant alleges:
6. As agreed upon, I, together with Romana Soriano, proceeded to Max
Restaurant. We arrived at around 12:00 noon. Atty. Barcelona came at
around 1:00 P.M. He even told us that he just came from the Supreme Court
where he fixed the case of Mr. Daen. It surprised me though, that he did not
have with him any single document at the time. Then, I handed him a pay-to-
cash check for TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND (P24,000.00) Pesos, dated
January 29, 1999. We told him that the check may be encashed on the said
date. Although, he said that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not accept
check he nonetheless accepted it saying that he will have the same
rediscounted. We thereafter left.

Under the facts established by complainant, respondent should not only be
suspended, but disbarred from practice. A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like
the court itself, and instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is
to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the courts a lawyer should
seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is a disastrous to the
continuity of the government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
people. [Malcolm Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus has it been said
a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.

The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and
malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of
mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible
and cannot be tolerated. Respondent made a mockery of the Judiciary and further
eroded public confidence in courts and lawyers when he ignored the proceedings in
the Aquino case and in the present case. More so, when he misrepresented to
complainant that he has connections with a Member of the Court to accommodate his
client and that Justices of the Court accept money. Indubitably, he does not deserve
to remain a member of the Bar any minute longer.

14. BILDNER vs ILUSORIO and Singson
-Canon 13

As to the complaint for disbarment, there is a well-grounded reason
to believe that Atty. Singson indeed attempted to influence Judge Reyes decide a
case in favor of Atty. Singsons client. The interplay of the following documentary
evidence, earlier cited, provides the reason: (1) the transcript of the stenographic
notes of the May 31, 2000 hearing in the sala of Judge Reyes in Civil Case 4537-R
when the judge made it of record about the attempt to bribe; (2) the affidavit of Judge
Reyes dated December 23, 2004 narrating in some detail how and thru whom the
attempt to bribe adverted to was made; and (3) the affidavit of Atty. Sevilla who
admitted having been approached by Atty. Singson to intercede for his case pending
with Judge Reyes. Significantly, Atty. Singson admitted having made phone calls to
Judge Reyes, either in his residence or office in Baguio City during the period material.
He offers the lame excuse, however, that he was merely following up the status of a
temporary restraining order applied for and sometimes asking for the resetting of
hearings.

The Court finds the explanation proffered as puerile as it is preposterous.
Matters touching on case status could and should be done through the court staff, and
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 7

resetting is usually accomplished thru proper written motion or in open court. And
going by Judge Reyes affidavit, the incriminating calls were sometimes made late in
the evening and sometimes in the most unusual hours, such as while Judge Reyes
was playing golf with Atty. Sevilla. Atty. Sevilla lent corroborative support to Judge
Reyes statements, particularly about the fact that Atty. Singson wanted Judge Reyes
apprised that they, Singson and Sevilla, were law school classmates.

The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judgeor a
judge evincing a willingnessto discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending
in that judges sala cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk
on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla,
leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule
in his clients favor. This conduct is not acceptable in the legal profession. Canon 13
of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins it:

Canon 13. A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

At this juncture, the Court takes particular stock of the ensuing statement
Judge Reyes made in his affidavit: x x x Atty. Sevilla, being a close family friend,
immediately intimated to [me] that Atty. Singson wanted a favorable decision and that
there was a not so vague an offer of a bribe from him (Atty. Singson). Judge Reyes
reiterated the bribe attempt during the hearing on May 31, 2000, and made reference
to the figure PhP 500,000, the amount Atty. Singson offered through Atty. Sevilla. As
may be expected, Atty. Singson dismissed Judge Reyes account as hearsay and
questioned the non-filing of any complaint for attempted bribery or disciplinary action
by Judge Reyes at or near the time it was said to have been committed.

First, we must stress the difficulty of proving bribery. The transaction is
always done in secret and often only between the two parties concerned. Indeed,
there is no concrete evidence in the records regarding the commission by Atty.
Singson of attempted bribery. Even Atty. Sevilla did not mention any related matter in
his affidavit. Nevertheless, Judge Reyes disclosures in his affidavit and in open court
deserve some weight. The possibility of an attempted bribery is not far from reality
considering Atty. Singsons persistent phone calls, one of which he made while Judge
Reyes was with Atty. Sevilla. Judge Reyes declaration may have been an emotional
outburst as described by Atty. Singson, but the spontaneity of an outburst only gives it
more weight.

While the alleged attempted bribery may perhaps not be supported by
evidence other than Judge Reyes statements, there is nevertheless enough proof to
hold Atty. Singson liable for unethical behavior of attempting to influence a judge, itself
a transgression of considerable gravity. However, heeding the injunction against
decreeing disbarment where a lesser sanction would suffice to accomplish the desired
end, a suspension for one year from the practice of law appears appropriate.

15. FOODSPHERE, INC vs MAURICIO
-Rule 13.02

The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for
every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession,
[37]
which confidence may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.

By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in
deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to
advance his interest to obtain funds for his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships
and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.

He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates:

A lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.

For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a
status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of
any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks
against complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1
also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes. For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a
member of the legal profession to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities.

Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, by using intemperate language.

By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of
the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity
of the legal profession.
[40]


The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be
underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,
[41]
the therein complainant engaged therein-
herein respondents services as she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice
advocacy of respondent, a media personality,
[42]
only to later find out that after he
demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor
any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to
him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same
could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant.

16. HADJULA vs MADIANDA
-Canon 15

As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was
also then a friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive
documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment
complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a
veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship
imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the
profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer,
respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or
revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not
inclined to handle the clients case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is
the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it
make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to
memorialize the relationship. As we said in Burbe v. Magulta,
[6]
-

A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very
first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding
the formers business. To constitute professional employment, it is not
essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion.

It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or
charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.

It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any
kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employments is established.

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding
the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant
or the non-payment of the formers fees.

Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the
attorney-client privilege communication, viz:

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by
the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived.
[7]


With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of
preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, the documents shown and the information revealed in confidence to
the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases
in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.

The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from
possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.

The seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the Court feels
that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent
acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the error of respondents ways, what at
bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing
charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and
data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent
gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even
the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated
by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a
negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.

17. MACARILAY vs SERIA
-Canon 15

Admittedly, respondent received the amount of P20,000 as acceptance fee for
the cases he had agreed to file on behalf of complainant. Plainly, he was less than
candid in his dealings with his client; he displayed lack of honesty and fidelity to her
cause. Sufficiently established were the following acts: (1) despite his receipt on May
16, 2002, of P20,000 for filing fees, he did not file the cases he had agreed to handle;
(2) he deceived complainant when he lied by saying that a civil complaint had been
filed in the sala of one Judge Regala of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; (3)
respondent refused to return the money he had received for the filing fees. These
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 8

misrepresentations, lies and lapses constituted a breach of his sworn duty as a lawyer
and of the ethical standards he was required to honor and observe.

Lawyers owe full devotion to the protection of the interests of their clients, as
well as warmth and zeal in the defense of the latters rights.
[14]
Once they agree to
handle a case, lawyers are bound to give to it their utmost attention, skill and
competence, regardless of its significance.
[15]
Public interest requires that they exert
their best efforts and use all their learning and ability in the speedy prosecution or
defense of the clients cause.
[16]
Those who perform that duty with diligence and
candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of
justice.
[17]
They do honor to the bar and help maintain the communitys respect for the
legal profession.
[18]

Moreover, the lawyer-client relationship, being one of confidence, requires
lawyers to give the client timely, adequate and truthful updates on the developments of
the case.
[19]
In this manner, the trust and faith of clients in their counsel would remain
unimpaired.

Indeed, respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to file
the complaints as he was supposed to. Unbelievable is his claim that the complaints
were ready as early as April 5, 2002, but that these were not filed anyway because
complainant had refused to sign them, absent the correct address of the defendant
(Albaria Mohammad).

First, evidence abound that it was complainant who was insistent that the
cases be filed. She repeatedly inquired about the case, but respondent would not give
her any clear answer. Later on, he lied to her by saying that the complaint was
pending in the sala of one Judge Regala. His deception on top of his failure to file the
cases were raised in the letter dated March 26, 2003,
[20]
written by Atty. Noel Sorreda,
her new counsel. In his April 4, 2003 reply,
[21]
respondent did not mention anything
about the complaints that had allegedly been prepared as early as April 5,
2002. Commissioner Villadolid aptly observed in his Report:
x x x The fact that respondents 4 April 2003 letter-response to said letter, as well as
respondents subsequent letter dated 23 May 2003, did not contain either gives further
credence to complainants version of the facts. Notably, it was only in respondents
letter dated 14 July 2003 that respondent raised such defenses for the first
time. Considering that said 14 July 2003 letter was in response to complainants 28
June 2003 letter demanding the return of certain amounts for legal services which
complainant believed respondent did not render, this Commissioner is inclined to
believe that such defenses are mere afterthought to defeat complainants claim for the
return of said amounts.

Were it not for the vigilance of complainant in inquiring about the status of her
cases, she would not have known that the complaints had not been filed at
all. Respondent deliberately withheld informing her of his inaction, notwithstanding her
repeated follow-ups. Thus, he is deemed to have wronged her and effectively
betrayed the trust she had placed in him.

Second, his alleged lack of knowledge of the correct address of the defendant
is not a hindrance to the filing of a complaint. Indeed, such address is material to the
service of summons
[22]
which, however, presupposes that a complaint has been
properly filed in court. Furthermore, Section 14 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court
[23]
provides for remedies when the defendants address is unknown. Thus,
respondent should have nevertheless filed the complaint, especially because
complainant had already given him payment for the filing fees. His attempt to cover up
his negligence by wrongfully shifting the blame to her cannot be countenanced by this
Court.

Finally, respondent should have returned the money to complainant following
his failure to file the cases.
[24]
Where the client gives money to the lawyer for a specific
purpose -- such as to file an action or to appeal an adverse judgment -- the latter
should, upon failure to do so, immediately return it to the former.
[25]
The unjustified
withholding of funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary
action against the lawyer.
[26]


It was sufficiently proven that, all in all, complainant had paid
respondent P48,000:
Similarly, a review of the records reveals that contrary to Respondents claim, in
addition to the P20,000.00 covered by the check dated 18 March 2002 which
complainant paid during the parties initial meeting, complainant made subsequent
payments to respondent. Balaoro confirms that when she and complainant went back
to respondents office on 5 April 2002, complainant paid respondent P3,000.00
and P5,000.00 in cash. Another P20,000.00 was likewise paid to respondent as
evidenced by the RCBC check dated 16 May 2002 issued by complainant to
respondent.
[27]


Likewise established was the obvious fact that the only legal service rendered
by respondent consisted of the notarization of the Deed of Sale covering the property
purchased by complainant and the filing of the adverse claim. We agree with
Commissioner Villadolid that P8,000 was sufficient compensation for the services
actually rendered. Hence, respondent must return to complainant the balance
of P40,000 plus legal interest.

The failure of respondent to discharge his duty properly constitutes an
infringement of ethical standards and of his oath. Such failure makes him answerable
not just to his client, but also to this Court, to the legal profession, and to the general
public.
[28]
The recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six
months is in accordance with jurisprudence.
[29]


18. REGALA et al vs SANDIGANBAYAN et al
-Rule 15.02

Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the
door to a whole spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by
limited information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client
relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between
lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and
fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain
effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option
but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.

The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing
to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.

As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in
mystery.
[30]
Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the
United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of his client.
[31]

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information
is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship
has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a
client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as
a general rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his
opponent is.
[32]
He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.
[33]

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by
some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client
unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
clients name is privileged.
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could
qualify as exceptions to the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the
privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client
seeks legal assistance.
[44]
Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client
relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be
confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such
revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.
[45]

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client
may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the clients name itself has an
independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.
[46]

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench,
therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the
general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said
client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal
service sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG
itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which
constitutes petitioners ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their
clients covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the
clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the
financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in
question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among
others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their clients shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was
part and parcel of petitioners legal service to their clients. More important, it
constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for
which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth
in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name
would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where
none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, that would inevitably form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a... crime."
[47]

An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on
the services of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around
the law for the purpose of committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 9

he might have previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney about
it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be
invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception because
whether or not the act for which the advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be
used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the
prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.

There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the
prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient
and readily available source of information in the building of a case against the
latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one
which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy
prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature
of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such
retainer is obviously protected by the privilege.
[53]
It follows that petitioner attorneys in
the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's
identity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.

In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation
that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built
upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from
compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information
which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may
not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so
intimate in this case that it would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In
this sense, the name is as much "communication" as information revealed directly
about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly
privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to
charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client
relationship.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of
their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because
the facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the
clients name is not privileged information.

If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential
privilege under the circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the
client, then it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients
in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their
duties.

By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but
worse, to submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship,
as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering
their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link that
would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a
crime.

We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the
petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by
respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
[64]
It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from
prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the
PCGGs demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but
also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the
attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at
the expense of such rights.

An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of
attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that
they should wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters
learned in confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not
mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not
willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional
right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate
the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.

It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take
its full course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the
effects of further litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose
from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing them to
disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to
them when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would
be to sanction an unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The case
hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners'
heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate to recover ill-gotten
wealth, we will not sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the
right against self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.

19. MERCADO vs VITRIOLO
-Rule 15.02

We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for
falsification of public document against his former client.

A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client
and the rule on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in
order.

In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special
powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly
confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential
nature that is required by necessity and public interest.
[15]
Only by such confidentiality
and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an
attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause
is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
[16]
Thus, the preservation and
protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an
attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of justice.
[17]
One rule
adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep
inviolate his clients secrets or confidence and not to abuse them.
[18]
Thus, the duty of
a lawyer to preserve his clients secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the
attorney-client relationship,
[19]
and continues even after the clients death.
[20]
It is the
glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a
man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed
rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyers tongue is tied from
ever disclosing it.
[21]
With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his
attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment and
enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the clients cause.

Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the
factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
[22]


In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made
the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule
on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain
the lawyer or the latter declines the employment.
[23]
The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.
[24]

On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for
some purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not
privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca,
[25]
where the client and his
wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten
years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of
the lease rentals would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be
delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of
creditors which he had confidentially supplied counsel for the purpose of carrying out
the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in
violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those
of the client. As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the
aforesaid lease contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the
confidential list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the
list of his creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation then existing
between them, but on account of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of
the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a
private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality.
[26]
The client must intend the communication to be confidential.
[27]

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act
of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as
the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of
the purpose for which it was given.
[28]

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a
compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client
and delivered to the opposing party,
[29]
an offer and counter-offer for settlement,
[30]
or a
document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity,
[31]
are not
privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.
[32]

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional
capacity.
[33]

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for
mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to
his rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to
his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
[34]


If the client seeks an accounting service,
[35]
or business or personal
assistance,
[36]
and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication
disclosed for such purpose.

LEGAL ETHICS Page | 10

Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record
fails to substantiate complainants allegations. We note that complainant did not even
specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her
claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that
respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal
action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint
disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by
respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit
of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the
existence of facts which the complainant must prove.

20. PFLEIDER vs PALANCA
-Rule 15.02

Final count. It is charged that the list of creditors which Pfleider had "confidentially"
supplied Palanca for the purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the
lease contract was disclosed by Palanca, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to
parties whose interests are adverse to those of Pfleider.

As Pfleider himself, however, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease
contract between the parties, complainant furnished respondent with a confidential list
of his creditors."
This should indicate that Pfleider delivered the list of his creditors to Palanca not
because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the
lease agreement. A violation therefore of the confidence that accompanied the delivery
of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the
fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client. Moreover, Pfleider fails to controvert
Palanca's claim that there is no such thing as a "confidential" list of creditors and that
the list of creditors referred to by Pfleider is the same list which forms part of the
pleadings in civil case 9187 (the action for rescission of the lease contract) now,
pending between the complainant and the respondent lawyer, and therefore is
embraced within the category of public records open to the perusal of persons properly
interested therein.


21. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY vs ARQUILLO
-Rule 15.03
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients.
[7]
Corollary
to this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting interests, except with all the
concerned clients written consent, given after a full disclosure of the facts.
[8]


When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of
interests, the existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in
representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is
also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new
retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first
client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any
knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance
of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorneys duty to give
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double dealing in the performance of that duty.
[9]


In the present case, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, as counsel for Respondent Jose
C. Castro in NLRC Case Nos. I-05-1083-97 to I-05-1109-97, filed a Motion to Dismiss
those cases. Shortly thereafter, a position paper was filed by Atty. Arquillo as counsel
for several complainants in consolidated NLRC Case Nos. I-05-1087-97, I-05-1088-97,
I-05-1091-97, I-05-1092-97, I-05-1096-97, I-05-1097-97, and I-05-1109-97. All the
cases in the second set were included in the first one, for which he had filed the
subject Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, in his position paper for the complainants,
Atty. Arquillo protected his other client, Respondent Jose C. Castro, in these words:

In his two-page Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Arquillo claims that there was
no conflict of interest in his representation of both the respondent and the
complainants in the same consolidated cases, because all of them were allegedly on
the same side. Attaching to the Motion the Decision of Labor Arbiter Norma C.
Olegario on the consolidated NLRC cases, Atty. Arquillo theorizes that her judgment
absolved Castro of personal liability for the illegal dismissal of the complainants; this
fact allegedly showed that there was no conflict in the interests of all the parties
concerned.

This Court does not agree. Atty. Arquillos acts cannot be justified by the fact
that, in the end, Castro was proven to be not personally liable for the claims of the
dismissed employees. Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first,
the lawyer should have known that there was an obvious conflict of interests,
regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same side. It cannot be
denied that the dismissed employees were the complainants in the same cases in
which Castro was one of the respondents. Indeed, Commissioner Funa correctly
enounced: As counsel for complainants, [r]espondent had the duty to oppose
the Motion to Dismiss filed by Jose G. Castro. But under the circumstance, it would be
impossible since [r]espondent is also the counsel of Jose G. Castro. And it appears
that it was [r]espondent who prepared the Motion to Dismiss, which he should be
opposing [a]s counsel of Jose G. Castro, Respondent had the duty to prove the
Complaint wrong. But Respondent cannot do this because he is the counsel for the
complainants. Here lies the inconsistency. The inconsistency of interests is very
clear.

Thus it has been noted The attorney in that situation will not be able to pursue, with
vigor and zeal, the clients claim against the other and to properly represent the latter
in the unrelated action, or, if he can do so, he cannot avoid being suspected by the
defeated client of disloyalty or partiality in favor of the successful client. The foregoing
considerations will strongly tend to deprive the relation of attorney and client of those
special elements which make it one of trust and confidence[.] (Legal Ethics, Agpalo,
p. 230, 4th ed.; In re De la Rosa, 21 Phil. 258)
[11]


An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine
grounded on public policy that a lawyers representation of both sides of an issue is
highly improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with
respect to the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies
even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.
[12]


22. GONZALES vs CABUCANA
-Rule 15.03

We find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.

It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
[24]
Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as
the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree.
[25]
Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
[26]


One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty.
[27]


As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs. Bamba,
[28]


The proscription against representation of conflicting
interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present
clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment
that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that
which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would
be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to
the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It
is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose
the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers
respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of
the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
[29]


The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the
civil case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal
cases filed by Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no
merit. The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated,
constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing
which this Court cannot allow.
[30]


Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in
the civil case and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not
agree. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in
the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting interests
applies.

As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:
[31]


[W]e can not sanction his taking up the cause of the
adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from
his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to
keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the
bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest,
corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is
highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which
he is a distinguished member, into public disrepute and suspicion and
undermine the integrity of justice.
[32]


The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest
intention will also not exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition
inoperative.
[33]


In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no
other lawyer is willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there
may be instances where lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made
to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective
one.
[34]
Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the
spouses case other than him, still he should have observed the requirements laid
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 11

down by the rules by conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then seek
the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts.
[35]
These
respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.

We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is
representing the Gatcheco spouses pro bono and that it was his firm and not
respondent personally, which handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted by
complainant herself, Atty. Edmar Cabucana signed the civil case of complainant by
stating first the name of the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND
CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which, his name and signature appear; while herein
respondent signed the pleadings for the Gatcheco spouses only with his
name,
[39]
without any mention of the law firm. We also note the observation of the IBP
Commissioner Reyes that there was no malice and bad faith in respondents
acceptance of the Gatchecos cases as shown by the move of complainant to
withdraw the case.

23. HEIRS of LYDIO FALAME vs BAGUIO
-Rule 15.03

There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation
of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not
raised in the initiatory pleading, it was put forward in complainants position paper filed
with the IBP and in the petition filed with the Court. In fact, respondent proffered his
defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP and likewise in his
comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the answer with
motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio as his client. Such absence of attorney-
client relationship is the essential element of his defense to the charge of conflict of
interest, as articulated in his subsequent submissions.

The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been
adequately apprised of and heard on the issue. In administrative cases, the
requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings. Actual adversarial proceedings only become necessary for clarification
when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague
testimonies. Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.
[33]


Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former
client.
[34]
The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to contest
for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility
of such situation will develop.
[35]
The rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used.
[36]
In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is
remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention
to represent conflicting interests.
[37]


The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a
client if that representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving
the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client
only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the
fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
[38]
In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong
points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.
[39]


The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The clients
confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional
employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything
which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously
represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired
in the previous relation.
[40]


In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him. His highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect
the client at all hazards and costs even to himself.
[41]
The protection given to the client
is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected
by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
[42]


In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and
Raleigh as defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation
between Lydio and respondent was established despite the fact that it was only
Raleigh who paid him. The case of Hilado v. David
[43]
tells us that it is immaterial
whether such employment was paid, promised or charged for.
[44]

As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the
stance that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil
case involving the same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse,
has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in
common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts
which debase respondents rights as a co-owner.

The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydios death
or through the completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is
not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to that
of Lydio.
[45]
Precedents tell us that even after the termination of his employment, an
attorney may not act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even
though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could
operate to his clients disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment.
[46]
And
while complainants have never been respondents clients, they derive their rights to
the property from Lydios ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil
case.

For representing Raleighs cause which is adverse to that of his former client
Raleighs supposed co-ownership of the subject property respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests. Having previously undertaken joint representation
ofLydio and Raleigh, respondent should have diligently studied and anticipated the
potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted.
[47]
Heretofore,
respondent is enjoined to look at any representation situation from the point of view
that there are possible conflicts; and further, to think in terms of impaired loyalty that
is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair loyalty to a
client.
[48]
Considering, however, that this is respondents first offense, the Court
resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe a higher degree of
fidelity in the practice of his profession.
[49]


24. ROLLON vs NARAVAL
-Rule 15.05

Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should have given
her a candid, honest opinion on the merits and the status of the case. Apparently, the
civil suit between Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided against the
latter. In fact, the judgment had long become final and executory. But he withheld
such vital information from complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as filing and
service fee and thereby gave her hope that her case would be acted upon.

Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers
give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the
case, neither overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a
case would have some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an
obligation on the part of lawyers.
[15]
If they find that their clients cause is defenseless,
then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than to
traverse the incontrovertible.
[16]
The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking
constitutes a violation of his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his clients.
[17]


Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to return the
money of complainant despite her repeated demands. His conduct was clearly
indicative of lack of integrity and moral soundness; he was clinging to something that
did not belong to him, and that he absolutely had no right to keep or use.
[18]


Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their clients money and property that may
come into their possession.
[19]
As respondent obviously did nothing on the case of
complainant, the amount she had given -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by his
law office -- was never applied to the filing fee. His failure to return her money upon
demand gave rise to the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and
thereby betrayed the trust she had reposed in him.
[20]
His failure to do so constituted a
gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.
[21]

The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes
and the courts,
[22]
but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in
dealing with the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.
[23]
Respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a
member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him
answerable not just to her, but also to this Court, to the legal profession, and to the
general public.
[24]
Given the crucial importance of his role in the administration of
justice, his misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and
dignity of the profession.
[25]


25. LEMOINE vs BALON JR.
-Rule 15.06
-Canon16

Respondent winded up his letter as follows, quoted verbatim:

We would like to make it clear that we cannot give you the aforesaid amount until and
unless our attorneys fees will be forthwith agreed and settled. In the same manner,
should you be barbaric and uncivilized with your approached, we will not hesitate to
make a proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for the
authenticity of your visa, Department of Labor and Employment for your working
status, Bureau of Internal Revenue for your taxation compliance and the National
Bureau of Investigation [with] which we have a good network...

LEGAL ETHICS Page | 12

Respondents threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to
possible sanctions from certain government agencies with which he bragged to have a
good network reflects lack of character, self-respect, and justness.

Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Filipino lawyers principal source of ethical rules, which
Canon 16 bears on the principal complaint of complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust
all moneys and properties of his client that he may come to possess. This
commandment entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering
an accounting of all money or property received for or from the client
[36]
as well as
delivery of the funds or property to the client when due or upon demand.
[37]
Respondent
breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainants insurance
claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to his
co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to complainant.

In fact, long after respondent received the December 23, 1998 check
for P525,000.00 he, by his letter of March 26, 1999 to Garcia, had even the temerity to
state that the claim was still pending and recommend acceptance of the 50% offer . . .
which is P350,000.00 pesos. His explanation that he prepared and sent this letter on
Garcias express request is nauseating. A lawyer, like respondent, would not and
should not commit prevarication, documented at that, on the mere request of a friend.

By respondents failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held
for the benefit of his client, he committed professional misconduct.
[38]
Such misconduct
is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously done on purpose through the
employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about
the release of the check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been
deprived of the use of the proceeds thereof.

A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only
violates his duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades
himself and besmirches the fair name of an honorable profession.
[39]


That respondent had a lien on complainants funds for his attorneys fees did
not relieve him of his duty to account for it.
[40]
The lawyers continuing exercise of his
retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to
be charged. In case of disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being
unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his
possession to the payment of his fees.
[41]
He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the
necessary action or proper motion with the proper court to fix the amount of such
fees.
[42]


In respondents case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring the matter of
his compensation for judicial determination so that his and complainants sharp
disagreement thereon could have been put to an end. Instead, respondent stubbornly
and in bad faith held on to complainants funds with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorneys fees sought. This is an appalling
abuse by respondent of the exercise of an attorneys retaining lien which by no means
is an absolute right and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money
and property to his client when due or upon demand.

Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorneys
fees. After he received the check and after complainant had discovered its release to
him, he was already asking for 50%, objection to which complainant communicated to
him. Why respondent had to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about one year
when all the while he has been in custody of the proceeds of the check defies
comprehension. At any rate, it smacks of opportunism, to say the least.

It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in
possession of complainants funds in the amount of over half a million pesos. The
deceptions and lies that he peddled to conceal, until its discovery by complainant after
about a year, his receipt of the funds and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly
oppressive manner point to his lack of good moral character. Worse, by respondents
turnaround in his Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to
complainants friend Garcia the amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent claims,
is all that complainant is entitled to, he in effect has declared that he has nothing more
to turn over to complainant. Such incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to remit
complainants funds, and gives rise to the conclusion that he has misappropriated
them.
[45]


In fine, by respondents questioned acts, he has shown that he is no longer fit
to remain a member of the noble profession that is the law.

26. GONZALES vs SABACAJAN
-Rule 15.07

As a lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful remedies provided by law to
protect the interests of his client. The records do not show that he or his client have
availed of said remedies, instead of merely resorting to unexplained, if not curt,
refusals to accommodate the requests of complainants. Also, he cannot be unaware of
the imposable sanctions on a counsel who resorts to unlawful means that would cause
injustice to the adversaries of his client.

The Court accordingly finds that respondent has not exercised the good faith and
diligence required of lawyers in handling the legal affairs of their clients. If
complainants did have the alleged monetary obligations to his client, that does not
warrant his summarily confiscating their certificates of title since there is no showing in
the records that the same were given as collaterals to secure the payment of a debt.
Neither is there any intimation that there is a court order authorizing him to take and
retain custody of said certificates of title.

Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall impress upon his client
the need for compliance with the laws and principles of fairness. Instead, he unjustly
refused to give to complainants their certificates of titles supposedly to enforce
payment of their alleged financial obligations to his client and presumably to impress
the latter of his power to do so.





27. ADRIMISIN vs JAVIER
-Canon 16

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 16 and Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The Code mandates every lawyer
to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
[21]
Consequently, a lawyer should account for the money received
from a client.
[22]
The Code also enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him,
[23]
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Respondent himself admitted the receipt of P500 from complainant as payment for
the bail bond as shown in his testimony and in Exhibit A. By his receipt
of the amount, respondent agreed to take up complainants cause and owed fidelity
to complainant and her cause, even if complainant never paid any fee. Lawyering is
not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, notmoney, is the
primary consideration.
[24]


A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf
of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
[26]


This is not the first time respondent is found to have unlawfully withheld
and misappropriated money. In Igual v. Javier,
[27]
the Court held that respondent had
unjustifiably refused to return Iguals money upon demand and his absence of integrity
was highlighted by his half-baked excuses, hoary pretenses and blatant lies in his
testimony before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The Court suspended Javier
from the practice of law for a period of one month and ordered him to restitute the
amount of P7,000 to Igual. In that case, we reminded respondent that he
was expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility for the relationship between an attorney and his client is
highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
[28]


We reiterate this reminder. Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to
them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.
[29]
Those who are guilty of such infraction may be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
[30]


28. ALMENDAREZ JR vs LANGIT
-Canon 16

Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum
of money representing the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting
for and returning such sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his
capacity as counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for
complainant.

Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the trial courts approval
of the motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds to him,
respondent could have collected any lien which he had over them in connection with
his legal services, provided he gave prompt notice to complainant. A lawyer is not
entitled to unilaterally appropriate his clients money for himself by the mere fact that
the client owes him attorneys fees.[10] In this case, respondent did not even seek to
prove the existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to retain the money.

Respondents failure to turn over the money to complainant despite the latters
demands gives rise to the presumption that he had converted the money for his
personal use and benefit. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics, impairing public confidence in the legal profession.
The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary, requiring utmost good faith,
loyalty, and fidelity on the part of the attorney. Respondent miserably failed in this
regard. Instead, he demonstrated a lack of integrity, care, and devotion required by the
legal profession from its members. Whenever a lawyer is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of the public, this Court has the right and duty to withdraw his privilege
as officer of the Court and member of the Bar.
[15]


29. MORTERA vs PAGATPATAN
-Canon 16

How far may a lawyer go to ensure that he gets paid? The answer to this
question is stated clearly in Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 13

Lawyers
[1]
and in decisions
[2]
applying the same, but it is apparently not plain enough
to the respondent in this case. It therefore behooves us to make an example of him
for the improvement of the legal profession.
Respondents responsibility to the complainants is unequivocally stated in
Canons 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The four rules governing
this situation were: he owed candor to his clients;
[10]
he was bound to account for
whatever money he received for and from them;
[11]
as a lawyer, he was obligated to
keep his own money separate from that of his clients;
[12]
and, although he was entitled
to a lien over the funds in order to satisfy his lawful fees,
[13]
he was also bound to give
prompt notice to his clients of such liens and to deliver the funds to them upon demand
or when due. Respondent violated each and every one of these rules.

Respondent cited the need to protect the money from other persons claiming to be
heirs of Eusebio Montera
[14]
and from the volatile temperament of the
complainants
[15]
but did not present any evidence at all to prove either claim. Thus,
these claims should be ignored.

Because the respondent admitted concealing his clients money, the only
question in our minds is how severe his punishment should be.

However, in the more recent case of de Guzman Buado and Lising v.
Layag
[18]
which involved a violation of Canons 15, 16 and 17, the Court En
Banc imposed the much heavier penalty of indefinite suspension.

In imposing upon Layag the penalty of indefinite suspension, the Court En
Banc considered his years of experience as a lawyer, his ignorance of the law,
specifically the Civil Code, and his violation of not one but three Canons.

Even though, on its face, this case has more in common with Pujalte than
with Layag, a one-year suspension seems too lenient for a number of reasons.

First, the respondent in this case has been a practicing lawyer since 1974
[19]
and
even runs his own small law firm. For all his vast experience, however, he claims that
he has done nothing wrong by concealing and withholding his clients money from
them.
[20]
Coming from a seasoned practitioner of the law, this attitude is
inexcusable.

Second, the respondent had other means of recovering his fees, having filed a
case for that purpose which was, however, dismissed for his failure to properly implead
an indispensable party.
[21]
In short, having botched his own effort to recover his fees,
he sought to simply subvert both law and proper procedure by holding on to the
money.

Clearly, the respondents actuations were thoroughly tainted with bad faith, deceit
and utter contempt of his sworn duty as a lawyer. Thus, a heavier penalty than a mere
one-year suspension is definitely called for.

30. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY vs MIJARES
-Canon 16

The only question presented in this case is whether or not respondent Mijares is guilty
of misappropriating the P500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for
use in facilitating and processing the titling of a property that it claimed.

Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client
such that he must promptly account for whatever money or property his client may
have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee of said money or property, he must hold
them separate from that of his own and make sure that they are used for their intended
purpose. If not used, he must return the money or property immediately to his client
upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have misappropriated the
same in violation of the trust reposed on him.
[4]
A lawyers conversion of funds
entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics.
[5]


Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically,
the only evidence on record that the Court can consider is the Universitys evidence
that he got P500,000.00 from complainant for expenses in facilitating and processing
its title application; that he undertook to return the money if he did not succeed in his
purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained the MMDA approval of the
application; and that he nonetheless refused to return the money despite repeated
demands. Unopposed, this evidence supports the finding of guilt of the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

Besides, even if the Court were to consider the defense that Mijares laid
out in his answer, the same does not rouse sympathy. He claims that he gave
the P500,000.00 to Undersecretary Lacuna, with the Universitys conformity, for a
favorable MMDA endorsement to the Mayor of Manila. He also claims that, in a
complete turnaround, Lacuna later said that he could not provide the endorsement
because, as it turned out, the MMDA had previously given such endorsement of the
Universitys earlier application and the Mayor of Manila did not act on that
endorsement.

But, if this were so, there was no reason for Mijares not to face the
University and make it see that it had no cause for complaint, having given him
clearance to pass on the P500,000.00 to Lacuna. Instead, Mijares kept silent. He did
not deny that the University went all over town looking for him after he could not return
the money. Nor did he take any action to compel Lacuna to hand back the money that
the University gave him. More, his not showing up to testify on his behalf at the
investigation of the case is a dead giveaway of the lack of merit of his defense. No
evidence exists to temper the doom that he faces.

Even more unfortunate for Mijares, he admitted under oath having bribed
a government official to act favorably on his clients application to acquire title to a
dried-up creek. That is quite dishonest. The Court is not, therefore, inclined to let him
off with the penalty of indefinite suspension which is another way of saying he can
resume his practice after a time if he returns the money and makes a promise to shape
up.

The Court is also not inclined to go along with the IBPs recommendation that
the Court include in its decision an order directing Mijares to return the P500,000.00
that the University entrusted to him. The University knowingly gave him that money to
spend for facilitation and processing. It is not nave. There is no legitimate expense
called facilitation fee. This term is a deodorized word for bribe money. The Court will
not permit the conversion of a disbarment proceeding into a remedy for recovering
bribe money lost in a bad deal.

31. SESBREO vs CA
-Rule 16.03

Now, on the main issue of whether or not respondents are liable for
damages for breach of contract. After a careful scrutiny of the record of the case, we
find no compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts conclusion. We would like to
stress at this point that the compromise agreement had been validly entered into by
the respondents and thecamineros and the same became the basis of the judgment
rendered by this Court. Its validity, therefore, had been laid to rest as early as 1979
when the Court promulgated its decision in Commissioner of Public Highways v.
Burgos.
[36]
In fact, the judgment had already been fully satisfied by the respondents. It
was precisely this full satisfaction of judgment that gave rise to the instant controversy,
based primarily on the petitioners claim that he was prejudiced because of the
following: 1) the wrong computation in the camineros money claims by using the
provincial and not the national wage rate; and 2) the mode of satisfying the judgment
through direct payment which impaired his registered charging lien.

To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful
disbursements in keeping with his dignity as an officer of the court, the law creates in
favor of a lawyer a lien, not only upon the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession until what is due him has been paid, but
also a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued
pursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein his services have been
retained by the client.
[37]
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides:

Section 37. Attorneys liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the
funds, documents and papers of his client, which have lawfully come into
his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance
of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from
and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of
such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice
thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall
have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as
his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just
fees and disbursements.


A charging lien is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to the lawyer
for services in a suit secured to him out of the judgment or recovery in that particular
suit. It is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff should not be allowed to
appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the
services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment.
[38]


In this case, the existence of petitioners charging lien is undisputed since it was
properly registered in the records. The parties even acknowledged its existence in
their compromise agreement. However, a problem arose when the respondents
directly paid in full the camineros money claims and did not withhold that portion which
corresponds to petitioners fees.
In the instant case, the petitioner rightly commenced an action against both his clients
and the judgment debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the
complaint against his clients was withdrawn on the ground that he had settled his
differences with them. He maintained the case against respondents because,
according to him, the computation of the camineros money claims should have been
based on the national and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that
the respondents should be made liable for the difference.

in this case, the petitioner had withdrawn his complaint against the camineros with
whom he had a contract for legal services. The withdrawal was premised on a
settlement, which indicates that his former clients already paid their obligations. This
is bolstered by the certification of the clerk of court that his former clients had
deposited their passbooks to ensure payment of the agreed fees. Having been paid
by his clients in accordance with the agreement, his claim against the respondents,
therefore, has no leg to stand on.

LEGAL ETHICS Page | 14

Neither can the petitioner rely on Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares,
etc.
[42]
where this court declared that satisfaction of the judgment, in general, does not
by itself bar or extinguish the attorneys liens, as the court may even vacate such
satisfaction and enforce judgment for the amount of the lien.
[43]
However, the
satisfaction of the judgment extinguishes the lien if there has been a waiver, as shown
either by the attorneys conduct or by his passive omission.
[44]
In the instant case,
petitioners act in withdrawing the case against the camineros and agreeing to settle
their dispute may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien. No rule will allow a
lawyer to collect from his client and then collect anew from the judgment debtor
except, perhaps, on a claim for a bigger amount which, as earlier discussed, is
baseless.
Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law
advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a
job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy
a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a public
interest, for which it is subject to state regulation.
[45]


32. FRIAS vs BAUTISTA LOZADA
-Rule 16.04

Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of Canon 16.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case and by independent advice.
A lawyer's act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It
comes within those acts considered as abuse of client's confidence. The canon
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on her obligation.


33. HERNANDEZ vs GO
-Canon 17

The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty. Lydia A.
Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted as follows:
The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent in addition to his having
discussed, advised and gave solutions to complainants legal problems and liabilities
to her creditors and even requested her creditors for extension of time to pay
complainants accounts constitute practice of law as legal counsel for consultation
aside from representing complainant in other cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client
relations between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent.

It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed report to the
complainant on how he paid complainants creditors without selling her
properties. Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them out of his own
funds; then later on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of complainants
properties in utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence was submitted by the
respondent concerning the value of the said sale of complainants properties.

As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his obligation and duty as
complainants legal adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting complainants
properties in his name and possession in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that
respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, we have to
modify its recommended penalty.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.

The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and
confidence in herein respondent, that when she engaged his services, she entrusted
to him her land titles and allowed him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds
thereof would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent, however, abused her trust
and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself and spent
his own money to pay her obligations. As correctly observed by Investigating IBP
Commissioner Lydia Navarro, respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to
the complainant on how much he sold the latters lots and the amounts paid to her
creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant could have
earned more. Records show that she did not receive any amount from
respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty as
complainants counsel.

Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best efforts and ability
to protect the interests of his clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence
and candor not only protects his clients cause; he also serves the ends of justice and
does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the legal profession.
[9]


34. ANGALAN va DELANTE
-Canon 17

Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Canon 16 states that lawyers shall hold in trust all properties of
their clients that may come into their possession. Respondent should have held in
trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the property to complainants upon
demand.
[24]
Instead of holding in trust the property of complainants, respondent (1)
transferred the title of the property to his name, (2) refused to return the property to
complainants, and (3) referred to complainants charges as malicious and untruthful.

Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them. Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence
complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the
Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of
respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of
protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants
and transferred the title of the property to his name.
A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is
incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.

35. EDQUIBAL vs FERRER
-Canon 18

Records show that respondent was the counsel of record for the appellants,
complainants mother and other relatives in CA-G.R. CV No. 65019. The Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2000 clearly states that the "notice sent to
counsel for defendants-appellants requiring him to file appellants brief within
forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof, was received by him on March 16,
2000."
4
However, respondent failed to file the appellants brief despite receipt of such
notice.
Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 2. Counsel and guardians. The counsel and guardians ad litemof the parties
in the court of origin shall be respectively considered as their counsel and
guardians ad litemin the Court of Appeals. When others appear or are appointed,
notice thereof shall be served immediately on the adverse party and filed with the
court.
If it were true that respondent did not agree to represent the appellants in CA-G.R. CV
No. 65019, why did he not file with the Court of Appeals a motion to withdraw as their
counsel? Obviously, his negligence, which resulted in the dismissal of the appeal,
caused prejudice to his clients. Likewise, respondents failure to inform complainant of
the status of his mothers appeal is inexcusable.

It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence.
Thus, there is a need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the
developments in his case.
5
A client should never be left groping in the dark, for to do
so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the lawyer so
retained in particular and the legal profession in general.

Respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the
opposite of negligence."

A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm
of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the
interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or
withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied.
7
It is axiomatic in the
practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.

The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or
that "extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights."
8
All that is required is
ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater
familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard, respondents failure to attend to his clients
appeal is clearly wanting.

Accordingly and considering the circumstances of this case, we find a need to scale
the recommended penalty upward. Here, we are convinced that respondent deserves
the penalty of suspension for three (3) months.

36. OVERGAARD vs VALDEZ
-Canon 18
-Rule 18.03
-Rule 18.04

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice
or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an
attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.

The respondent has indubitably fallen below the exacting standards demanded of
members of the bar. He did not merely neglect his client's cause, he abandoned his
client and left him without any recourse but to hire another lawyer. He not only failed to
properly handle the cases which were entrusted to his care, he refused to do a single
thing in connection with these cases. He did not file any pleading to defend his client;
he did not even enter his appearance in these cases. Moreover, he disregarded the
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 15

complainant's letters and electronic mails and rejected the complainant's phone calls.
All the complainant was asking for was a report of the status of the cases but the
respondent could not be reached no matter what the complainant did to get in touch
with him. After receipt of the full amount of fees under the Retainer Agreement, he
simply disappeared, leaving the client defenseless and plainly prejudiced in the cases
against him. Warrants of arrest were even issued against the complainant due to the
respondent's gross and inexcusable negligence in failing to ascertain the status of the
case and to inform his client of the arraignment. It was not a mere failure on the
respondent's part to inform the complainant of matters concerning the cases, it was an
unmistakable evasion of duty. To hide from the complainant, avoid his calls, ignore his
letters, and leave him helpless is unforgivable; and to commit all these acts and
omissions after receiving the full amount of legal fees and after assuring the client of
his commitment and responsibility violates the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Deceitful
conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary to justice,
modesty or good morals.
25
It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
26
Representing to the complainant that
he would take care of the cases filed against him,
27
assuring the complainant that his
property involved in a civil case would be safeguarded,
28
and then collecting the full
amount of legal fees of PhP900,000.00, only to desert the complainant after receipt of
the fees, were manifestly deceitful and dishonest.

The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client." Necessity and public interest
enjoin lawyers to be honest and truthful when dealing with his client. A lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
29
However, instead of devoting himself to the client's cause, the
respondent avoided the complainant, forgot about the cases he was handling for him
and ostensibly abandoned him. The client reposed his trust in his lawyer with full faith
that the lawyer would not betray him or abscond from his responsibilities. By assuring
the complainant that he would take care of the cases included in the Retainer
Agreement, and even accepting fees, the respondent defrauded the complainant when
he did not do a single thing he was expected to do.

A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
30
A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
31
Respondent should indeed be held liable, for he was not just
incompetent, he was practically useless; he was not just negligent, he was indolent;
and rather than being of help to the complainant, he prejudiced the client.
Respondent's inaction with respect to the matters entrusted to his care is obvious; and
his failure to file an answer to the complaint for disbarment against him and to attend
the hearings in connection therewith, without any explanation or request for resetting,
despite proper notice from the IBP, is clear evidence of negligence on his part.

The Code of Professional Responsibility further provides that a lawyer is required to
keep the client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.
32
The respondent did the opposite. Despite
the complainant's efforts to consult him and notwithstanding numerous attempts to
contact him, simply to ask for an update of the status of the cases, the respondent was
able to avoid the complainant and never bothered to reply.

After months of waiting for a reply from the respondent, and discovering that the
respondent had been remiss in his duties, the complainant demanded the return of the
documents he had turned over to the respondent. He also demanded the return of the
money he had paid for the legal services that were not rendered and expenses of
litigation which were not incurred. However, the respondent rejected the complainant's
demands.

Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that "a
lawyer shall account for all money and property collected or received for and from the
client." The complainant paid $16,854.00 to the respondent via telegraphic bank
transfer. This was considered as complete payment for the PhP900,000.00 that was
stipulated as the consideration for the legal services to be rendered. However, since
the respondent did not carry out any of the services he was engaged to perform, nor
did he appear in court or make any payment in connection with litigation, or give any
explanation as to how such a large sum of money was spent and allocated, he must
immediately return the money he received from the client upon demand. However, he
refused to return the money he received from the complainant despite written
demands, and was not even able to give a single report regarding the status of the
cases.

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose - such as for filing fees - but not used for failure to file the case, must
immediately be returned to the client on demand.
33

The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of responsibility
to the courts and his client but also a wanton disregard for his duties as a lawyer. It is
deplorable that members of the bar, such as the respondent, betray not only the trust
of their client, but also public trust. For the practice of law is a profession, a form of
public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who
possess good moral character.
41
Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the
responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the privilege
to practice law. We must protect the administration of justice by requiring those who
exercise this function to be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.




37. FERNANDEZ vs NOVERO JR.
-Rule 18.02

After review of the records of this case, the Court finds the report of the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP to be well taken. The records clearly show that respondent
has been negligent in the performance of his duties as complainants counsel. His
failure to file his formal offer of exhibits constitutes inexcusable negligence as it proved
fatal to the cause of his client since it led to the dismissal of the case. To compound
his inefficiency, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration outside the reglementary
period, which was thus accordingly denied by the trial court for being filed out of time.
Hence, the order issued by the trial court dismissing the case became final.
Respondents acts and omission clearly constitute violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

A counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even
malfeasance or nonfeasance, would be binding on his client. Verily, a lawyer owes to
the client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation.
Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure,
and anyone who deals with them has the right to expect not just a good amount of
professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the clients
cause.
7


Respondents attempt to evade responsibility by shifting the blame on complainant is
apparent. His averment that complainant failed to turn over to him the records and
stenographic notes of the case only highlights his incompetence and inadequacy in
handling complainants case. Considering that respondent has been practicing law for
almost 15 years, he should have known that he could easily obtain a copy of the
records and stenographic notes from the court where the case was docketed.

Respondent likewise refers to the alleged obnoxious attitude of complainant in trying to
manipulate the manner in which he was handling the case as the main reason for his
failure to formally offer his exhibits in contravention of the order of the court. But
respondent should bear in mind that while a lawyer owes utmost zeal and devotion to
the interest of his client, he also has the responsibility of employing only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and he should not allow the
latter to dictate the procedure in handling the case.
8
As this Court said in another case:
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and zeal
in the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the end that
nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He
must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of his
clients cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties
to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the
judge or the general public.
9


As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not have taken cognizance of
the complaint because the letter-complaint was not verified, as required in Rule 139-B,
1 of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys,
10
suffice it to say
that such constitutes only a formal defect and does not affect the jurisdiction of the
Court over the subject matter of the complaint. "The verification is merely a formal
requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true
and correct the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act
on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be
served."
11


38. SANTOS TAN vs ROBISO
-Rule 18.03

(IBP) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The issues are: (1) whether respondent was negligent in handling complainants case;
and (2) whether respondent should be disciplined for issuing a bouncing check. To
thresh out the issues, the IBP conducted the mandatory conference/hearing and
thereafter required both parties to submit their respective verified position papers.

The hearing officer, Caesar Dulay, in his Report and Recommendation dated 20
November 2007,
23
recommended that respondent be suspended for one month with
strong warning that a commission of a similar offense would be dealt with more
severity in the future. He also recommended that respondent be ordered to reimburse
complainant the amount of P70,000.00, P30,000.00 of which corresponds to the
services rendered by him on a quantum meruit. He did not find respondent to be
grossly negligent in the performance of his duties as there was nothing more
respondent could do in accelerating the resolution of the motions which were already
submitted for resolution. The filing of additional pleadings or papers with the court
would not be necessary. During the time the motion for reconsideration was pending
the regular presiding judge of the court was under suspension and the acting presiding
judge who issued the resolution considering the motion as submitted for resolution
was not disposed to act on said motion but instead opted to wait for the regular
presiding judge to act on it.

However, the hearing officer recommended that respondent be made liable for issuing
the bouncing check. Whatever was respondents reason for issuing the check, the fact
remains that the same was dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 16

insufficient funds. If respondents purpose was just to appease complainant to make
her leave his office and he firmly believed that he had no obligation to return
the P100,000.00, then he could have issued a stop-payment order to the bank before
the encashment of the check, the hearing officer added.

The Board of Governors of the IBP, in a Resolution on 14 December 2007, adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation with modification that the
recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law be increased to one
year.
24


The Court affirms the findings of the IBP. On the issue of negligence on the part of
respondent in handling complainants case, the Court agrees that based on the facts
presented there was nothing that he could have done to expedite the resolution of the
motion for reconsideration then pending before the RTC. The RTC had already
ordered that the motion for reconsideration be submitted for resolution. Respondent
could not be faulted if the acting presiding judge did not want to act on the motion until
the regular presiding judge return.
Regarding the other issues, as a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law,
especially Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. Blg. 22). By issuing a check in violation of
the provisions of this law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.

As such, we have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with suspension from the practice of law.
28
The IBP Board of Governors recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year. However, the
Court notes that, in practice, acceptance fees of lawyers are generally non-refundable
and the fact that, in the present case, respondent is willing to make good the amount
of the bouncing check. Thus, we deem that one month suspension from the practice of
law and the restitution of P85,000.00 to complainant would be sufficient in this case.

39. SPOUSES GARCIA vs BALA
-Rule 18.04
Conduct Unbecoming

Having become aware of the wrong remedy he had erroneously taken, respondent
purposely evaded complainants, refused to update them on the appeal, and misled
them as to his whereabouts.
24
Moreover, on June 17, 1998, he uttered invectives at
them when they visited him for an update on the case.
25

Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a "lawyer shall keep
the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the clients request for information." Accordingly, complainants had the right to be
updated on the developments and status of the case for which they had engaged the
services of respondent.
26
But he apparently denied them that right.

The Court may ascertain how much attorneys fees are reasonable under the
circumstances.
31
In the present case, the request of complainants for a full refund of
the attorneys fees they had paid effectively challenged the contract; it was as though
the parties had no express stipulation as to those fees.
32
Quantum meruit therefore
applies.
Quantum meruit -- meaning "as much as he deserves" -- is used as basis for
determining a lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract.
33
Lawyers must
be able to show that they are entitled to reasonable compensation for their efforts in
pursuing their clients case, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of
legal fees.
34
Based on the circumstances of the present case, the legal services
actually rendered by respondent were too insignificant for remuneration because of the
uselessness of the remedy he took.

This Court has imposed the penalty of suspension for six months for a lawyers
negligence in failing to perfect an appeal.
35
Considering the similarity of the
circumstances with those prevailing in this case, we find the imposition of the same
penalty reasonable.

40. UY vs TANSINSIN
-Rule 18.03
-Rule 18.04

Respondents failure to file the required pleadings is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Resposibility
19
which states:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Aside from failing to file the required pleadings, respondent also lacked candor in
dealing with his client, as he omitted to apprise complainant of the status of her
ejectment case.
It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence.
Thus, there is a need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the
developments in his case. A client should never be left groping in the dark, for to do so
would be to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained
in particular and in the legal profession in general.
20
Respondents act demonstrates
utter disregard of Rule 18.04, Canon 18, Code of Professional Resposibility, which
states:
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.

All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the
interest of complainant, respondent indeed violated Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent is reminded that the practice
of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent
intellectually, academically and morally.
Considering the circumstances surrounding the instant case, a three-month
suspension from the practice of law is the proper penalty.

41. ONG vs UNTO
-Canon 19

The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
[14]
It mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the
bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain
an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised
the good faith required of a lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. It is
evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his
letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the
complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of
criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. We find the respondents
action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did not have
any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the
respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is
inexcusable.

The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone
who could provide him any information against the complainant just so he would have
a leverage in his actions against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to
the rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding
[15]
and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
[16]
In the case of Choa vs. Chiongson,
[17]
we held:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his right, as well
as the exercise of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds
of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable
results of his clients case with the end view of promoting respect for the law and legal
processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him
to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the
law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the
Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; Needless to state, the
lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common
sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client
does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party.

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A
lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity.
[18]
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be
eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus,
every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote
public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
[19]


42. PEA vs APARICIO
-Canon 19
-Rule 19.01

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law," reminding legal
practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice;
to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and
must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
24
In particular, Rule 19.01
commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded
or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to
secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases
against the lawyer's client.
25


In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe.
Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the
amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including
moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of
documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.
The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to
blackmail.

Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or
exposure or opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person as a
condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some
secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." In common parlance and in general
acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money
either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 17

influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the
credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or
the crime of the victim.
26


In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the
same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party,
and, with boldness, asserting that "a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to
report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the State."
29
He
further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition
and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.

Respondent's assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that
respondent's threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure
some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client's demands. It was not
respondent's intention to point out complainant's violations of the law as he so gallantly
claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to "keep silent" about
the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.

Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this
jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship
that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent,
the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps
necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a
specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple
demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant
which have nothing to do with his client's claim for separation pay. The letter was
obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims.
Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule
under which a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is
not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used
it to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of
his client.

43. BRIONES vs JIMENEZ
-Rule 19.01

However, there is sufficient ground in support of complainants claim that respondent
violated Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Records reveal that
before respondent assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against herein
complainant, he sent demand letters to the latter to comply with the Order of Judge
Tipon to deliver the residue of the estate to the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson.
Considering that complainant did not reply to the demand letters, respondent opted to
file said criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of
the court.

The Order referred to is the third part of the assailed Order dated April 3, 2002 which
directs complainant to deliver the residue to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. As
aptly pointed out by complainant, respondent should have first filed the proper motion
with the RTC for execution of the third part of said Order instead of immediately
resorting to the filing of criminal complaint against him. A mere perusal of the rest of
the Order dated April 3, 2002 readily discloses that the approval of the report of
complainant as Special Administrator was suspended prior to the audit of the
administration of complainant. Consequently, the RTC would still have to determine
and define the residue referred to in the subject Order. The filing of the criminal
complaint was evidently premature.

Respondent claims that he acted in good faith and in fact, did not violate Rule 19.01
because he assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against herein
complainant after the latter ignored the demand letters sent to him; and that a lawyer
owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability. The Court is not
convinced. Fair play demands that respondent should have filed the proper motion
with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate delivered to his
clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.

As held in Suzuki v. Tiamson:
16
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with zeal. However, the same Canon provides
that a lawyers performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds
of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. Canon
15, Rule 15.07 also obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance with the
laws and the principle of fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous
practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the
purposes of the state the administration of justice. While lawyers owe their entire
devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients right,
they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to
exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
17


44. BAUTISTA vs GONZALES
-Canon 20

Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety
was committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the
Fortunados. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent
and the Fortunados, is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the
expenses of litigation. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of
litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between
respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to
respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney
agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous
[JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against
public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the
action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in
dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The
execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and
his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

45. PINEDA vs DE JESUS
-Canon 20

The issues raised in this petition are:
(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the claim for additional
legal fees and
(2) whether respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.

First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary petition as an
incident of the main action in which his services were rendered or in an independent
suit against his client. The former is preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.
9
The Pasig
RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed,
had jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal fees. Respondents sought to
collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties awarded
to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were demanding was additional
payment for legal services rendered in the same case.

Second, the professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was
governed by the principle ofquantum meruit which means "as much as the lawyer
deserves."
10
The recovery of attorneys fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case,
where there is no express agreement for the payment of attorneys fees. Basically, it is
a legal mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the
fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids
unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.

Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be avoided
and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.
11

In the case at bar, respondents motion for payment of their lawyers fees was not
meant to collect what was justly due them; the fact was, they had already been
adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given to them
was an act of unconscionable greed which is shocking to this Court.
As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an honorable
profession, the primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents despicable behavior
which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some people. The vernacular has a
word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent profession and not a
money-making trade. Compensation should be but a mere incident.
12

Respondents claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not charge
petitioner a fee based on percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect. The
payments to them in cash, checks, free products and services from petitioners
business all of which were not denied by respondents more than sufficed for the
work they did. The "full payment for settlement"
13
should have discharged petitioners
obligation to them.

46. DALISAY vs MAURICIO
-Canon 20

Respondent insists that he is entitled to attorneys fees since he gave legal advice and
opinions to complainant on her problems and those of her family. Just like any other
professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services. However, he should
charge only a reasonable amount of fees. Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that "A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable
fees." There is, however, no hard and fast rule which will serve as guide in
determining what is or what is not a reasonable fee. That must be determined from
the facts of each case.
5
The power to determine the reasonableness or the
unconscionable character of a lawyers fee is a matter falling within the regulatory
prerogative of the Court.
6


It is now clear to us that since respondent did not take any step to assist complainant
in her case, chargingP56,000.00 is improper. While giving legal advice and opinion on
complainants problems and those of her family constitutes legal service, however, the
attorneys fee must be reasonable. Obviously, P56,000.00 is exorbitant.
We cannot understand why respondent initially demanded P8,000.00 as filing fee from
complainant when he very well knew that the docket fee for Civil Case No. 00-044 had
been paid. If it was intended as a docket fee for another case, why did he not file the
corresponding complaint?
By his inaction in Civil Case No.00-044, respondent violated Canons 17, 18 and 18.03,
earlier cited, as well as his Oath as an attorney. Likewise, in collecting from
complainant exorbitant consulting fee, respondent violated Canon 20 of the same
Code. For all these violations, respondent should be penalized.


LEGAL ETHICS Page | 18

47. CUETO vs JIMENEZ
-Rule 20.04

Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "[a]
lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud." Likewise, in
Canon 14 of the Canons of Professional Ethics it states that, "[c]ontroversies with
clients concerning compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be
compatible with his self-respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense
for his service; and lawsuits with the clients should be resorted to only to prevent
injustice, imposition or fraud."

There was clearly no imposition, injustice or fraud obtaining in this case to justify the
legal action taken by respondent. As borne out by the records, complainant Cueto had
already paid more than half of respondents fee. To resort to a suit to recover the
balance reveals a certain kind of shameful conduct and inconsiderate behavior that
clearly undermines the tenet embodied in Canon 15 that "[A] lawyer should observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client." And
what can we say about the failure of respondents son Jose III to pay his own
obligation to complainant Cueto? It in all probability explains why Cueto ran short of
funds. Respondent therefore should have been more tolerant of the delay incurred by
complainant Cueto.

We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession.
9
He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients. He should always remind himself that the legal
profession is imbued with public service. Remuneration is a mere incident.
Although we acknowledge that every lawyer must be paid what is due to him, he must
never resort to judicial action to recover his fees, in a manner that detracts from the
dignity of the profession.

48. VENTEREZ et al vs COSME
-Canon 22
-Rule 22.01

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the
attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause.
18
The right of an attorney to
withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however,
considerably restricted.
19
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an
attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion.
20
He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.
21
A lawyer's
right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's
written consent or from a good cause.
22


Section 26, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire
at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client,
should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that
he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly
employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.

A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written
consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse
party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application
with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine
whether the lawyer ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must
be based on a good cause.
23


What constitute good cause for the withdrawal of services by the counsel are identified
under Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:
CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD
CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Rule 22.01-- A lawyer may WITHDRAW his services in any of the following cases:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in
connection with the matter he is handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these
canons and rules;
c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best
interest of the client;
d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult
for him to carry out the employment effectively;
e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails
to comply with the retainer agreement;
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
g) Other similar cases.

The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds aforementioned. Neither can
the circumstances of this case be considered analogous to the grounds thus explicitly
enumerated. Contrary to respondents contention, his professional relations as a
lawyer with his clients are not terminated by the simple turnover of the records of the
case to his clients. Respondents defense completely crumbles in face of the fact that
Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981 and, hence, had no
authority to withdraw the records of the said case from respondent or to terminate the
latters services.

Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services, he,
however, cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The
lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the
court.
24
Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of
record who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests
of his clients require.
25
He must still appear before the court to protect the interest of
his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are
not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record.

Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent
remains counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and whether he
has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot immediately do so and leave
his clients without representation. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a
written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing,
in which event, the attorney should see to it that the name of the new attorney is
recorded in the case.
26
Respondent did not comply with these obligations. Therefore,
he remains the counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981 with the
duty to protect complainants interest. Had he made the necessary inquiries as to the
status of the case, he would have known that he was still the counsel of record as no
entry of appearance was ever made by another counsel. It would have been easily
discernible on his part that there was no change in his status as complainants lawyer.
As of that time, their client-lawyer relationship was still subsisting. Therefore, he would
have known that the Motion for Reconsideration was denied; and a writ of execution
had been issued under the circumstances.

All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the
interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable." Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege
bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.
This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public.

49. DE CHAVEZ BLANCO vs LUMASAG
-Rule 138 Section 27

Records show that two lots had been sold by respondent as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale of 11 March 1990. Respondent, however, taking advantage of the
absence of complainant and her spouse from the Philippines and their complete trust
in him, deceitfully informed them in a letter dated 20 March 1990 that he had sold only
one. It can be reasonably deduced from the exchanges between the parties that the
proceeds of the first lot had been transmitted to complainant and her spouse.
Respondents contention, though, that he had been authorized to retain the proceeds
of the second is specious, as complainant and her spouse could not have given the
same, having been left in the dark as regards its sale. And despite repeated demands,
to date, there is no showing that the outstanding amount has been paid. Thus,
respondents deceitful conduct warrants disciplinary sanction and a directive for the
remittance of the remaining proceeds is in order.

Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for
a party to a case without authority to so do.
Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. The Court finds, however, that
suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme
penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member
of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, the Court will also
not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this
case, the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension of two (2) years for
respondent to be too severe, considering his advanced age. The Court believes that a
suspension of six (6) months is sufficient. Suspension, by the way, is not primarily
intended as punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal
profession.
17


50. STEMMERIK vs MAS
-Rule 138 Section 27

Respondents Administrative Infractions
And His Liability Therefor

Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the
law and uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law,
they must ensure that the law functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument of
oppression or deception. Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of
the legal profession and has been found wanting. Respondent committed a serious
breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable violation of the Code of
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 19

Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession. All lawyers take
an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no falsehood.
21
That
oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust that should
be upheld and kept inviolable at all times.
22
Lawyers are servants of the law
23
and the
law is their master. They should not simply obey the laws, they should also inspire
respect for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation.
Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred
or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.

This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds,
24
to mean that "under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire
private or agricultural lands, including residential lands." The provision is a declaration
of imperative constitutional policy.
25


Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional
policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law.
Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.

By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and
that de Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and
in behalf of complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-
Dummy Law.
26


Respondents misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner
could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring
complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a
falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed
in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and misled him into parting
with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by
pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase
of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.

Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act
after unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.
For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyers oath and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM

A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal
knowledge to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear
and present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish
the image of the bar and degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he
also betrays everything that the legal profession stands for.

It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support
Dick the Butchers call, "Kill all lawyers!"
27
A disgrace to their professional brethren,
they must be purged from the bar.

51. LUSTESTICA vs BERNABE
-Rule 138 Section 27

We cannot overemphasize the important role a notary public performs. In Gonzales v.
Ramos,
11
we stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but
one invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity.
12
A notarized document is, by law, entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face.
13
It is for this reason that a notary public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties;
otherwise, the publics confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.
14


The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the respondent in
discharging his duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the
affiants before him and failed to comply with the most basic function that a notary
public must do, i.e., to require the parties presentation of their residence certificates or
any other document to prove their identities. Given the respondents admission in his
pleading that the donors were already dead when he notarized the Deed of Donation,
we have no doubt that he failed in his duty to ascertain the identities of the persons
who appeared before him as donors in the Deed of Donation.
Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only
as a notary public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public
Act No. 2103), but also Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The respondent engaged in dishonest conduct because he falsely represented in his
Acknowledgment that the persons who appeared before him were "known to him" to
be the same persons who executed the Deed of Donation, despite the fact that he did
not know them and did not ascertain their identities as he attested.
17

Moreover, the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct when he did not observe the
requirements under Section 1 of the Old Notarial Law that requires notaries public to
certify that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented, before the
notaries public, the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
certificate) and to enter the residence certificates number, place, and date of issue as
part of the certification.
18
The unfilled spaces in the Acknowledgment where the
residence certificate numbers should have been clearly established that the
respondent did not perform this legal duty.

We find that Atty. Bernabe should be disbarred from the practice of law and
perpetually disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public. We emphasize
that this is respondents second offense and while he does not appear to have any
participation in the falsification of the Deed of Donation, his contribution was his gross
negligence for failing to ascertain the identity of the persons who appeared before him
as the donors. This is highlighted by his admission
27
in his Answer that he did not
personally know the parties and was not acquainted with them. The blank spaces in
the Acknowledgment indicate that he did not even require these parties to produce
documents that would prove that they are the same persons they claim to be.

52. GARRIDO vs GARRIDO and VALENCIA
-Rule 138 Section 27

Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among
others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required
to take before admission to the practice of law.

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community.
20
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense
of decency.
21
We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising
from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
22

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who
contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his
disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to
the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies;
thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women.
He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for
leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was
already married to Constancia.
26
This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to
lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding
the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal
liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two
marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional
implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6)
children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon
the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a
daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who
was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with
Maelotisea was not "valid."
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in
Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while
another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited
and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded
wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10)
years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to
the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to
his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal
knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage
declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession,
specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the
ethical rules of the profession.
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 20


He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his
admission to the Bar.
27
As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath,
28
Section 20(a) of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
29
and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,
30
all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In
marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second
marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted
his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands
that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that,
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession."

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he
would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws.
When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and
selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression
that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to
satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from
unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and
norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
31
Lawyers are bound to maintain
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing.
32
Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye
and community approbation.
33
Needless to state, those whose conduct both public
and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, accordingly penalized.
34


Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia
should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective
reality.
36
To have good moral character, a person must have the personal
characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation,
i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or
she is held by the public in the place where she is known.
37
The requirement of good
moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to
protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect
errant lawyers from themselves.
38
Each purpose is as important as the other.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions
grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she
married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has
a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the
confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic
relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already
mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the
point of shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she professed to be the
lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage
to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his
second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal
profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality.
Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar
and after she became a member of the legal profession.

Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed
by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where
circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications
required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido
and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.
In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally
demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush
aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the
integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker
victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love
triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

53. ALCANTARA et al vs DE VERA
-Rule 138 Section 27

A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal
profession should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross
misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the
IBP Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the
respondent filed against his former client, her family members, the family corporation
of his former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP
who issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his
former client received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former
client, a total of twelve (12) different cases in various fora which included the Securities
and Exchange Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the
Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department
of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court.
13

In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had
previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members
of the Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-
138; 97-139; and 97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned
cases are re-filing of previously dismissed cases.
14


Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different
fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without
any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present
case, however, we find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his
former client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show
her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law.

The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being
dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in
conspiracy with a renegade member of the complainants family, the defendants
named in the cases and the foul language used in the pleadings and motions
15
all
indicate that the respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His
act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by
anger and frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary complaint
against him for infidelity in the custody of a clients funds.

In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,
16
the Court pronounced that it is professionally
irresponsible for a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto,
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Although
no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this
right must be exercised in good faith.
17


As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice.1avvphil They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself,
he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and
inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A
lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any
unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization,
charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
18
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and
consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his
duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he
did so against a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule
21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and
information acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios
counsel. Information as to the structure and operations of the family corporation,
private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of
the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired
through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct
violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.

54. VALENCIA vs ANTINIW
-Rule 138 Section 27

Respondent was disbarred from the practice of law pursuant to the Decision
promulgated on April 26, 1991
48
which pertinently reads, as follows:
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed
falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court
prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the
court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client. (Santos vs. Dichoso,
84 SCRA 622) but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers
Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but
to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that
end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must
advocate his clients cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill
he can marshall, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his clients
LEGAL ETHICS Page | 21

interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining
the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor.
(Pangan vs Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most
important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re:
Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer
whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs.
CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment
depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function
should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts and the public
may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison 125 SCRA 293).
Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.
49


However, the record shows that the long period of respondents disbarment gave him
the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance,
and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting
standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court.
During respondents disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his
professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for
reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has
regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and
professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of
the judiciary.

In Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
50
the disbarment of a lawyer was lifted for the
reasons quoted hereunder:
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite
apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on
his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is
worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal
profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and
reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards
the legal profession demands from its practitioners.
51


Moreover, it is well-settled that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to
punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the
judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court.
Restorative justice, not retribution, is our goal in disciplinary proceedings.
52


Guided by this doctrine and considering the evidence submitted by respondent
satisfactorily showing his contrition and his being again worthy of membership in the
legal profession, the Court finds that it is now time to lift herein respondents
disbarment and reinstate him to the august halls of the legal profession, but with the
following reminder:
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the
rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality
and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions
required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal
profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to
discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty as well x x x. That
is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.
53


Likewise, respondent is enjoined to keep in mind that:
Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
laws, as he is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the
very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic.
54


WHEREFORE, the disbarment of DIONISIO C. ANTINIW from the practice of law
is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment




Disbarment Proceedings

The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual
attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court
and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the
profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar

Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis
[51]
and they
belong to a class of their own.
[52]
They are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officer.
[53]
They involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
[54]


A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the administration of
justice from the misconduct of its officers. This Court requires that its officers shall be
competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom the public may repose
confidence.
[55]
Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts, and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any
professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue as officers of
the Court.
[56]


We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the
complaint or desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief
Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment
proceedings. Indeed, the Courts exercise of its power to take cognizance of
administrative cases against lawyers is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies
between parties, but to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of
unworthy practices in his profession.
[37]

The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a
source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and
reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.

Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty
in disbarment or suspension proceedings.
[57]


Practice of Law

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the
rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and
faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a
right but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
demanded of its members.
[27]


Prescription of Admin Proceedings

At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred
by prescription. As early as 1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,
[29]
to wit:

The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to
disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance that the facts set up
as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a
criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment
proceeding x x x (5AM. JUR. 434)
[30]


This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-
Lozada
[31]
where the Court held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of
the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of administrative
complaints against lawyers, should be struck down as void and of no legal effect for
being ultra vires.
[32]


Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of
offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in
the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the
Bar.
13
We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling.
14
First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of
justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.
15
The
admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards
for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State
may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment
case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or
her own;
16
effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.