Case studies of some concrete Case studies of some concrete

structural failures
R bi Whittl Robin Whittle
Design Errors Design Errors
Design errors alone are seldom the cause of the failure
of a structure When failure does occur it is usually the of a structure. When failure does occur it is usually the
result of errors in at least three different aspects of
construction (e.g. design, detailing, and construction construction (e.g. design, detailing, and construction
errors).
Case Study 1
Collapse of a reinforced concrete structure, Collapse of a reinforced concrete structure,
This factory building included concrete columns and a
steel truss for the roof.
Concreteguttertofactorybuilding
Guttercollapse
Edge beam and column connection
Concrete gutter
Edge beam
Column
Loadingatfailure
Crane cage and
Sand 18.6kN
g
bricks 6kN
L4 J 4 K4
H4
I4 L4 J 4 K4
H4
I4
Mechanismoffailure(1)
Piles of sand
and bricks and bricks
Steel truss.
Beam and gutter
start to rotate
Cracks start
to open up
Mechanism of failure (2)
Sand and bricks
collect into corner
Steel truss.
Cracks start
tto open up
Th t l b
Beam and gutter
continue to rotate
and start to move
out and down.
The outer column bars
stay attached to the beam
and drag the outer face of
the column away.
The full length links
fail as the column
bars pull out
out and down.
Mechanismoffailure(3)
Steel truss.
Column outer bars remain
attached to the beam.
The outer links
fail as the column
bars pull out and
down.
Beam and gutter fall,
dragging the outer
column bars with them.
Cracks extends down the
l il i h h column until either the
column bars fail or pull
out at a lap.
2T8s
2T20s
Steel truss.
Reinforcement layout
T10s@100
links @ 300 (stopped off at beam cage)
2T20s
T8 links@130
T8 (stopped off at beam cage)
T20s T20s
2T16s
links @ 300 T8links @ 300 T8
Thebeamhadbeendesignedtotakethetorsionfromthegutterloadingbutthejoint
withthecolumnhadnotbeendesignedtotakethetorsion.
Thetoptwolinksinthecolumnhadbeendetailedtoencloseallthecolumn
mainbarsbutthecontractorhadreducedtheirlengthforeaseofconstruction.
Even if these links had been constructed correctly they would have been Eveniftheselinkshadbeenconstructedcorrectlytheywouldhavebeen
inadequatetosupporttheloading.
cracks form
Simple model of failure mechanism
cracks form
T1
G tt l b
T1
applied
torque
tension
Gutter slab
compression
T2
tension
Appliedtorquefromselfweight
plussandandbrickpile=76kNm
Column
T2
p p
Resistancefromtensilestrength
ofconcrete(say2MPa)=74kNm ( y )
Appliedloadexceedsresistance
Summary
Two people were killed
Design error. No consideration was given in the
calculations of howforces were transmitted through the calculations of how forces were transmitted through the
joint between the edge beam and column.
Detailing error. Inadequate connection between beam
and column reinforcement.
Construction error. Column links were excluded for
convenience
Case Study 2
Widespread cracking in p g
post-tensioned/reinforced concrete frame
This structure did not collapse but the cause of the cracking
took a long time to establish and the subsequent litigation
was very costly was very costly.
The design was of a five storey car park for which the
construction period was extremely short (8 months) In construction period was extremely short (8 months). In
consequence the prestressing work was carried out under a
very tight schedule.
The post-tensioned
prestressed beamwas prestressed beam was
cast in one operation
and fully stressed a few
days later.
Fi e da s after stressing Five days after stressing
cracks appeared in
many parts of the many parts of the
structure.
Problem
Whilst the problem was debated, in order to proceed with
t ti ith i i d l th t i construction with minimum delay, the prestressing was
altered to a two-stage process only 50% applied at first
and the remaining prestress after two weeks and the remaining prestress after two weeks.
After much discussion it was concluded that when early y
thermal effects were included with the other shortening
effects, the total shortening of the prestressed beams was
ffi i t t th ki sufficient to cause the cracking.
Temperature Time effect on concrete
As the chemical action
of the cement takes
place the concrete place the concrete
heats up.
During this period the g p
concrete is plastic and
the increase in volume
results in a fatter results in a fatter
rather than a longer
beam.
However when the
cooling phase starts
the concrete has
hardened and is no
longer plastic. The
length shortens. length shortens.
The cracking of the parts of the structure resulted in a change in the
Summary
The cracking of the parts of the structure resulted in a change in the
programme of work causing extra cost to the Main Contractor.
Although the contract was completed on time the ensuing dispute was Although the contract was completed on time the ensuing dispute was
very costly.
When the case came to court it was agreed that it was reasonable
h h i l i ld h b to assume that, at that time, a normal engineer would not have been
expected to include early thermal effects in the analysis. The code of
practice stated that unless the lesser section dimension is greater
than 600mm and the cement content is greater than 400kg/m
3
there is
no need to consider early thermal effect.
The result of the investigation brought about a change to normal The result of the investigation brought about a change to normal
design procedures. It is now common to consider early thermal
effects in the design of long length continuous reinforced and
t db d l b prestressed beams and slabs.
Case Study 3
Temperature effects on a Temperature effects on a
long-span hybrid structure
The ground level of a two storey underground car park slab was
not covered Ambient temperature changes caused continual not covered. Ambient temperature changes caused continual
movement.
The structure consisted of 16m spanning hollowcore units bearing
on precast concrete beam nibs.
Movement joints had been shown on the drawings but these did
not function correctly for a variety of reasons not function correctly for a variety of reasons.
Causes of cracking
Movement
Hard material can
prevent movement
Friction can
Movement
Rotation
Rotation
Rotation can Friction can
cause cracking
(a) (b)
Rotation can
cause spalling
(c) (a) (b) (c)
The upper surface of the slab was exposed to the weather and in
particular to large variations in temperature The latter caused particular to large variations in temperature. The latter caused
movement and rotation of the units and their supports. This resulted in
severe cracking of the supporting nibs and in some places cracking at
the end of the hollowcore units Even after repair of the cracks they the end of the hollowcore units. Even after repair of the cracks they
reappeared each subsequent year for more than five years.
Shear tension
Possible failure mechanisms for
the hollowcore units
Anchorage
slip
Large crack
close to
Shear tension
crack
close to
support
(a)
(b)
H ll it i h tl l bl t th ff t f ki Hollowcore units are inherently vulnerable to the effects of cracking
close to the support as there is no shear reinforcement and they
rely on the tension strength of the concrete.
Anchorage bond failure can occur when cracks occur close to the
support. This can cause the prestressing strands to slip. The crack
size increases until the unit fails either in anchorage bond (a) or in
shear (b).
Summary
The reoccurrence of cracking of the supporting nibs each year
eventually required a temporary support structure to be built.
Protection from falling concrete was also required.
Concern that the hollowcore slabs might eventually fail in shear or g y
anchorage has led to the possibility of a rebuild.
The cost of remedial work and litigation fees have escalated each The cost of remedial work and litigation fees have escalated each
year as the decision on what action to take is delayed.
Lesson: It is essential to name a single designer or engineer who Lesson: It is essential to name a single designer or engineer who
retains overall responsibility for the stability of the structure, the
compatibility of the design, and details of the parts and components,
h ll f th d i i l di d t ili f th t even where some or all of the design including detailing of those parts
and components are not carried out by this engineer.
Case Study 4 Case Study 4
Piled raft for tower block Piled raft for tower block
The design of the raft assumed that the walls of the two level
basement car parks would act with the raft over the piles to transmit
the shear and bending forces to the outer piles the shear and bending forces to the outer piles.
The walls of the basement had almost full height openings, placed
one above the other, and contained only nominal reinforcement.
Original design
Columns
Core walls
The combined strength of
these walls plus the 1.5m
thick slab was quite thick slab was quite
inadequate to transmit
the loads.
The mistake was
discovered whilst the
tower block was being
Possible line of shear failure
g
constructed.
Basement car parks
Piled raft
Schematic arrangement of new raft
The remedial work
required a newraft required a new raft
to be constructed
beneath the existing
Existing raft
one
Existing raft
3.5m
Piles scabbled to
take newconcrete
New supplementary
raft to take shear
take new concrete
Remedial work
Placing of concrete for the lower part of the new raft was carried out
conventionally.
I d t hi d b d ith th i ti ft th t f In order to achieve good bond with the existing raft the upper part of
the new raft was packed with single sized aggregate and then
grouted with a retarded and fluid cement paste.
The grout was introduced under pressure to the back of the pour
through a complicated system of metal pipes, pinned to the
underside of the existing raft The method produced a wall of grout underside of the existing raft. The method produced a wall of grout
that extended from top to bottom of the pour and that flowed forward
towards the peripheral shutters with the top surface behind the
bottom bottom.
Pipes were so placed to let the air our in front of the grout surface,
then to indicate where and when the grout had arrived, and then to g
allow grouting to continue from immediately behind the advancing
wall of grout. Grouting was continuous until the work was complete.
Inappropriate Use of Inappropriate Use of
Code of Practice Clauses
Case Study 5 y
Ferry Bridge Cooling Tower Collapse
This incident should really be in a chapter of its own as the failure
resulted in a change of philosophy in the design code of practice, CP resulted in a change of philosophy in the design code of practice, CP
114. Although there were some defects in wall thickness, it was
concluded that the main cause of the collapse was because the design
value chosen for the wind load was too small No account had been value chosen for the wind load was too small. No account had been
taken of the venturi effect of the wind passing through the towers
upwind.
This collapse ensured the early adoption of a limit state code of practice
in the UK resulting in a completely new approach to design. The first
draft of the Unified code appeared in 1968 and in 1972 it was published draft of the Unified code appeared in 1968 and in 1972 it was published
as CP110. This was the first comprehensive limit state code of
practice ever published.
InNovember1965,threeoutof
eightcoolingtowerscollapsed
duringahighwind.
Eachtowerwas375feethigh
Thewindloadintheinitialdesign
i l d ti t d wasseriouslyunderestimated.
CP114 PermissibleStressDesign
wasused.
Thiscollapseensuredtheearly
adoptionoflimitstatedesign.
In1968thefirstdraftofthe
unifiedcodeappeared.
In 1972 this was published as In1972thiswaspublishedas
CP110.
Thewindspeedpassingbetween
theupwindtowersincreased
i ifi l hi d hi h significantly.Thiscausedahigher
windforceonthedownwindtowers.
Itispossiblethatconsiderationof
the load combinations required for theloadcombinationsrequiredfor
limitstatedesignmighthavebeen
sufficienttopreventthecollapse.
Load combination
W
G
Permissible Stress Design:
(CP114)
h
w
G
( )
G x b/2 W x h
w
w
New Limit State Design:
(CP110)
1 0 (G b/2) 1 4 (W h )
b
1.0 (G x b/2) 1.4 (W x h
w
)
Inadequate Assessment of q
Critical Force Paths
Case Study 6 Case Study 6
Shear wall with holes and corner supports Shear wall with holes and corner supports
A multi-storey shear wall required so many openings (windows,
doors etc) that the load path became very complicated doors, etc) that the load path became very complicated.
The designer assumed that the load would flow to the corners at
each floor and then track vertically down the edge of the wall. y g
Since the wall was built insitu as a homogenous structure, strain
compatibility caused the load to flow back into the full width of wall.
The result was that several storeys of load were supported by a
deep beam at the bottom of the wall, which transferred the load to
its end supports at first floor level. its end supports at first floor level.
Deep beam failure
Design Behaviour
Thedesignassumed
thattheloadfrom
the wall would be
Theactualload
transfertothe
corner columns took thewallwouldbe
transferredtothe
cornercolumnsat
eachfloorlevel.
cornercolumnstook
placeatthebottom
ofthewall.
The height of the
Thetieforcesat
eachfloorlevelwere
Theheightofthe
naturalarchwas
only0.6xtheSpan.
small.
Thiscausedlarge
horizontaltieforces
atthebottomofthe
ll
No wall
wall.
No wall
o a
(a)
(b)
Model of force path
Th d f th
actual
force path
tie
Theassumedforcepath
downtheedgeswould
not require ties at top and
assumed
force path
force path
notrequiretiesattopand
bottom.
tie
Howeverwithoutthese
theactualforcepath
ld l k
without tie rein-
wouldcauselargecracks
toopenupatthetopand
bottom surfaces
forcement large
cracks form
bottomsurfaces
Case Study 7
Design of boot nibs
The conventional assumption taken for the effective depth and lever
arm for a short cantilever is unsafe for a boot nib.
The design compression zone for such a model would be close to The design compression zone for such a model would be close to
the bottom face of the beam and likely to fall outside the beam
reinforcement (both the links and main reinforcement).
Strut and tie modelling is helpful to understand why this is so. The
strut must be supported mechanically by the reinforcement of the
supporting beam. The effective lever armbecomes much smaller supporting beam. The effective lever arm becomes much smaller
and the tension force in the nib top reinforcement much larger than
assumed by the short cantilever approach.
Design of boot nibs
Traditionaldesignofcantileversandnibsassumesaneffectivedepth,d
c
,betweenthe
c
outercompressionfaceandthecentroidoftensionreinforcement.Thiscouldcause
thebottomlayerofconcreteinthecoverzonetospalloff.
The strut should be designed to shed its load on to the corner bar of the beam The
d
Thestrutshouldbedesignedtosheditsloadontothecornerbarofthebeam.The
verticalcomponentoftheforceisthentakenbythelinkleg.
d
b
z
b
F
Ed
a
c
F
c
F
c
=F
Ed
xa
c
/z
b
Forceinlinkleg:
H
Ed
F
t2d
F
t2d
=F
c
+F
ed
Thisisadditiontoany
shear that the link is
z
n
z
F
t1d
shearthatthelinkis
carrying.
d
c
z
c
Poor detailing
Case Study 8
Failureofcellularwallstructure
inanoffshoreoilplatform p
Sleipner offshore oil platform collapse
Theplatformincludedalargecellular
concretestructurebelowthethree
towers.
Duringconstructiontheplatform
underwentsubmergingfordeck
matingafterwhichtheplanwasto
raiseitagainandtowittoitsfinal
h l f ld positionintheoilfield.
Itwasduringthesubmersionthatone
f th t i ll i th ll l t t ofthetricellsinthecellularstructure
failed.
This caused uncontrollable sinking Thiscauseduncontrollablesinking
thatledtoanimplosionofthe
structureandcompletecollapse.
Plan form of the cellular structure
see detail see detail
Tri-cell wall shape
550
800
Water
pressure
5
8
0
0
Actual shape of construction
Originaldesignshape
i h li d i l ll
Actualshapeofconstruction
withcylindricalwalls
Thenaturalarchactionprovidedbythegeometrywasnotpresentinthemodifiedform.
Thequadrilateralfiniteelementsfortheanalysisweredistortedintheregionofthetricell
cornersfromtheidealsquareshape.Thisledtoerrorsintheresults.
Tri-cell joint detail
Thecriticalshearsectionwas
f d h h d d b reinforcedwithTheadedbars.
Thedesignrequiredthatthe
lengthoftheTheadedbarsto g
extendacrossthefullwidthof
section.
As they were difficult to fix
compression
failure
Astheyweredifficulttofix
throughtheouterlayerof
reinforcementitwasdecidedto
reduce their length.
initial cracking
'T' headed bar
as required
reducetheirlength.
Acrackedformedatacornerof
thecellandspreadtotheendof
the T bar
'T' headed bar
as fixed
theTbar.
Waterpressurebecameactivein
thecrack.
as fixed
water pressure
Ashearcrackdevelopedintothe
compressionzoneandthisfailed
in a brittle manner.
p
inabrittlemanner.
Summary
This catastrophic failure was the result of a number of errors:
The analysis program was set up with a finite element mesh that was
too coarse to provide accurate shear results.
The T headed bars were too short and allowed the shear resistance
t b f Thi b bl th i f th f il to become unsafe. This was probably the primary cause of the failure.
There was minimal checking of the design and detailing.
In previous designs the geometry of tri-cells had been formed by
intersecting cylinders. The geometry of tri-cells was altered on this
project in order to make the formwork simpler to construct project in order to make the formwork simpler to construct.
Unfortunately the new form did not allow arching action to take place.
The rebuild retained the cylindrical geometry in the tri-cells and the The rebuild retained the cylindrical geometry in the tri cells and the
reinforcement was detailed to ensure mechanical linkage. T headed
bars were extended to the outer reinforcement.
Case Study 9 Case Study 9
Camden School for Girls
Assembly hallroofcollapse
This disaster could also be called the miracle of the decade. On 13
J une, 1973 late in the evening the roof of the assembly hall crashed to g y
the ground.
In the words of the caretaker, he heard a loud rumble, went to
investigate by torch light and found the whole roof weighing many investigate by torch light, and found the whole roof weighing many
tons had collapsed.
Twenty four hours before this event some five hundred parents had Twenty four hours before this event some five hundred parents had
attended a meeting in the hall, chairs were still laid out.
Camden School for Girls
Edge beamwhich had Edge beam which had
supported the precast
beams
Part of the roof
which had
collapsed on to
the chairs below
Collapsed roof lying on the floor below Collapsed roof lying on the floor below
Summary
The principal cause of the collapse was inadequate
bearing for beam seatings and deterioration of concrete
t b d Thi f th fi t b ildi f d at beam ends. This was one of the first buildings found
to have suffered from the effects of high alumina cement.
This was an example of inadequate design and poor
detailing of the end bearing nibs built into the supporting g g pp g
beam for the precast beams. The reduction in strength
caused by HAC left no margin for temperature effects.
The combination of these effects was likely to have
triggered the collapse triggered the collapse.
Case Study 10
Ronan Point collapse
Precast concrete panel building
This collapse was a significant event for the industry in This collapse was a significant event for the industry in
the UK and marked the partial demise of the precast
industry. Large precast panel and frame construction
became much less popular in the following two decades.
Information gathered from the incident led to major g j
changes to the UK Building Regulations (1970) and codes
of practice (starting with the precast concrete code,
CP 116, in 1970) with regard to progressive collapse and
robustness. More recently the Eurocodes have included
accidental load and robustness clauses accidental load and robustness clauses.
In the early hours of 16 May
1968 a gas explosion in a g p
bathroom on an upper floor
shook the building, resulting in
h i ll f the instantaneous collapse of
part of one wing of the building.
Four people were killed.
The cause of collapse: The cause of collapse:
The possibility of unusual, and hence non-codified, loads occurring
was not considered in design. g
The structure was inadequately mechanically tied together.
Comment
Traditional two-storey housing, pre World War 2, would not
have had any engineering input; brick wall thicknesses and
ti b fl j i t i ib d b th L d Cit timber floor joist sizes were prescribed by the London City
Council Building By-laws, and similar regulations outside
London London.
There had been gas explosions before this incident in
similar types of dwelling but the damage and any similar types of dwelling, but the damage, and any
casualties, had usually been limited to one household, and
the risk was accepted as a fact of life. p
There were no precedents for progressive collapse, when
system building was introduced. y g
Poor Construction
Case Study 11
Car park collapse
Pipers Row
Car park collapse
The car park was constructed using the lift slab method. This involved e ca pa as co s uc edus g e s ab e od s o ed
casting the slabs one on top of another on the ground. Precast columns
were positioned and then the slabs were jacked up the columns until at
the correct level The slabs were then held in place by the use of wedges the correct level. The slabs were then held in place by the use of wedges.
This form of construction had been used in many places in the UK
during the 1970s and 80s and has been a common formof construction during the 1970s and 80s and has been a common form of construction
in the USA. It has provided reasonably robust structures. The very
nature of the construction method focuses attention on the column/slab
j i t I it ti th t t h li d th t joint. In some situations the structure has relied on the moment
resistance of these joints, i.e. an unbraced frame. In other situations
separate insitu core structures have been built to take the sway forces.
In March 1997 a 120 tonne section of the roof of the car park collapsed
onto the floor below . This occurred at 3am when, fortunately, nobody y y
was around. It was immediately clear from the debris that a punching
shear failure had taken place.
Final connection between the slab and the column was made via a steel
collar in the slab and a steel insert in the column into which wedges were
fixed.
The steel collar supported the slab on angles that formed an H in plan.
Summary
The 230mm thick slab was constructed with concrete
of highly variable quality.
Areas of low quality concrete deteriorated probably
through freeze thaw action.
In some places this deterioration had occurred to a
depth of 100mm and this had been repaired.
The repair was poorly bonded to the parent material.
This left a slab which was effectively split into two
layers with the only connection being the longitudinal
steel passing through the repair into the original concrete.
Further deterioration of the original concrete, and in
particular its bond strength to the top steel, reduced what
composite action existed until failure occurred.
Case Study 12
Flat slab construction for a hotel
For a short time in the early 1970s the Government provided loans for
the construction of hotels. In order to be eligible the construction
period had to be very tight.
The workmanship of some of the hotels built at this time was shoddy The workmanship of some of the hotels, built at this time, was shoddy.
For one such hotel this was not discovered until twenty years later
when a major refurbishment was taking place j g p
Hotel of the 1970s
This shows the structural layout of a typical floor, flat slab. The depth
of the slab was 250mm. The spans along the building were 7.2m and
across the building were 6.1m and 7.4m.
The top surface of the slabs was very uneven and did not appear to have
Problem
The top surface of the slabs was very uneven and did not appear to have
been levelled (by hand or power float). In some places boot marks had
been left.
Cracks (generally not larger than 0.3mm width) had occurred on the upper
surface radiating from the corners of the columns with one or two small
cracks running tangentially. Large cracks (up to 1mm width) had occurred g g y g ( p )
at some of the construction joints.
The deflection of one of the slab bays of an upper floor was large, over
75 75mm.
An independent adviser decided that:
the punching shear was close to its limit Additional steel shear heads the punching shear was close to its limit. Additional steel shear heads
were constructed and fitted to all column slab intersections.
the bending strength of the longer spanning bays was at its limit.
After a year of measuring the deflection of one bay of the slab it was
found that no movement had occurred. The reason for such large
deflections was not understood deflections was not understood.
In one of the bays the skirting board between two edge columns had been
made in two equal lengths split in the middle (as shown) Deflections of
A second independent check revealed:
made in two equal lengths split in the middle (as shown). Deflections of
between 15 and 20mm had occurred below each half of the skirting board.
This represented an edge deflection of up to 50mm.
Since the skirting board was attached to the wall it was likely that it was
fitted this way and that much of the deflection had taken place before fitted this way and that much of the deflection had taken place before
construction of the wall.
This was confirmed by finding that the bottom courses of the external wall
had been laid on the sagging shape of the slab and the following courses had been laid on the sagging shape of the slab and the following courses
adjusted so that they were level at the window sills above the floor.
Summary
The second independent check concluded:
Punching shear capacity: Both BS 8110 and BS EN 1992-1-1)
provide reliable methods for predicting punching shear capacity using
The second independent check concluded:
characteristic values for the concrete strength instead of the factored
design values and the as built information concerning the
reinforcement (i.e. the size, spacing and cover to the bars). An ( , p g )
assessment of the safety can be made by comparing the worst
credible loads with the resistance.
F thi it ti th l l ti h d th t th t dibl l d
Bending capacity: The top cover to the reinforcement near the
For this situation the calculations showed that the worst credible loads
could be carried with a sufficient safety factor.
Bending capacity: The top cover to the reinforcement near the
column supports was found to be on average 30mm more than
specified.
Once reasonable moment redistribution had been included in the
calculations there was still sufficient overall moment capacity in the
slab without requiring any reduction to the design safetyfactors. slab without requiring any reduction to the design safety factors.
Conclusion
Although the construction workmanship had been very
poor the structure was not in danger of collapsing.
A great deal of money had been spent unnecessarily.
Case Study 13
Precast concrete tank
A liquid storage tank was constructed with precast wall panels. The
diameter and height of the tank were 12.2m and 7m.
The tank collapsed suddenly within two years of construction.
Liquid storage tank
1
2
.
2
m
Anchor unit
The vertical panels were held in place by unbonded prestressed tendons
threaded through horizontal PVC ducts, embedded in the concrete and
fully encircling the tank at set levels throughout the height.
Section through precast panel
23mm PVC duct
Interface with
adjacent unit
In order to achieve watertight construction of the edges of the
wall units required to be built with very small tolerances. A rubber
f strip was inserted within the joint between each set of adjacent
panels. The water tests showed leaks. Several attempts were
made to seal these before watertightness was achieved.
Plastic sheathing and grease around the tendons was intended to
provide protection fromcorrosion provide protection from corrosion.
Detail at anchorage of tendons
PVC d t t
Anchorage cast
into concrete
7-wire greased tendon
PVC duct cast
into concrete
Screw in cap
Sheath over tendon
cut back from end
filled with grease
Sheath over tendon
cut back from end
The grease used in this particular type of unbonded tendon (12.5mm
diameter Tyesa 7-wire strand) was found to emulsify when in contact y ) y
with water. This allowed any water that had penetrated the anchor
zone not only to come into contact with the bare part of the tendons
but also to penetrate into the sheathing. but also to penetrate into the sheathing.
Summary
The alloy steel of the particular prestressing tendons
d i thi t t h d i t t used in this structure had a microstructure
susceptible to stress-corrosion cracking, and the
stress in the tendons was greater than 50%of the stress in the tendons was greater than 50% of the
yield strength.
Moisture in contact with the tendons provided a Moisture in contact with the tendons provided a
corrosive environment.
On examination after the collapse it was found that On examination after the collapse, it was found that
stress-corrosion cracking had taken place in many
parts of the unbonded tendons.
Poor Management
Case Study 14
Placing of precast units Placing of precast units
Floor collapse
precast slab jacked
into position
The spine beam carrying
PLACINGOFPRECASTUNITS
precast slabs
wall supporting
The spine beam, carrying
precast planks, lost its bearing
because a labourer, in trying to
jack one of the final planks into
precast slabs
pp g
spine beam
jac o e o e a pa s o
position, actually levered out
the wall panel supporting the
end of the spine beam.
i b
p
This caused the spine beam to
lose its bearing which led to the
collapse of the floor
spine beam
wall shifted outwards causing
i b t f ll ff it b i
t l b j k d
collapse of the floor.
spine beam to fall off its bearing
precast slab jacked
into position
Plan
lacer bars not in
l t ti f j ki
The lacer bars had not been
inserted at the time of erecting
and laying of the floor elements.
place at time of jacking
Section
Summary
This is an example where the management should have had
more control on howthe erection and placing of precast units more control on how the erection and placing of precast units
took place.
More importantly, it should have ensured that the lacer bars
at the ends of the spine beam were in place before the
erection of floor units took place.
Poor Planning
Case Study 15
Power station on the river Thames
The power station was constructed on the north bank of the Thames
in the early 1960s Originally it was to be coal fired to produce in the early 1960s. Originally it was to be coal fired to produce
1500MW.
Th f d ti f th t ti it 20 000 i f d The foundations of the power station sit on 20,000 reinforced
concrete piles.
Special on site casting yard
Each pile was 430mm square, 18m long.
Piling rig
Several pile rigs were set up with
diesel driven hammers.
A il h i t d i t iti d A pile was hoisted into position and
then given a tap by the hammer to get
the point of the pile through the top
crust of the marshland.
Then under its own weight the pile
dropped 15mthrough the mud! dropped 15m through the mud!
Each pile was then driven into the
gravel to a specified set. g p
Piling commenced from the edge of the
Procedure
g g
site closest to the river and continued
inland 250m placing piles at 1.5m
centres (on average) centres (on average).
This took about eighteen months.
Excavation for the foundations started Excavation for the foundations started
from the same end and commenced
six months after the start of piling.
Concreting of the foundations also
started from the same end of the site.
After a year after the start of piling After a year after the start of piling,
when concreting of the foundations
had reached about a 1/3 of the way
l th it it di d th t along the site, it was discovered that
the tops of the piles that were still
exposed were moving.
Measurements showed that this movement was up to 1.5m !
Remedial work
a) Additional 600 vertical piles to compensate the
reduction in vertical capacity of the existing piles
b) Additional 200 raked piles to compensate the horizontal
force component caused by the bent piles.
The resulting remedial and extra work caused by this
movement was very large. For example the existing piles
no longer followed the plan layout for the eight inlet and
outlet culverts that wound their way through the site
bringing cooling water to the condensers and returning it to bringing cooling water to the condensers and returning it to
the River Thames.
On site decisions making changes to the design had to On site decisions, making changes to the design, had to
be taken each day
Summary
The programme for the contracts on this project did not
foresee the problems caused by progressing the work from
one end of the site to the other.
In previous similar projects there had been a significant
delay between piling and the start of excavation which delay between piling and the start of excavation which
allowed enough time for much of the soil pressure to
dissipate.
In order to keep a tight programme one possible solution
might have been to start the piling fromboth ends of the might have been to start the piling from both ends of the
site.
Deliberate Malpractice
Case Study 16
Floor with excessive deflection
Case Study 16
The building in question was a telephone exchange and had
been built in the mid 1970s, ten years earlier than the
i ti ti Th l b f t i l d b h d b d i d investigation. The slab of a typical end bay had been designed
as single way spanning between two shallow haunched beams.
The span was 9m with a slab only 250mm thick which many
engineers would consider to be too thin.
Ten years after the building had been completed the operators
were complaining that the deflection was still increasing and were complaining that the deflection was still increasing and
causing some of the switch-gear to become faulty. The
designers asked for a second opinion on the design of the slab.
The calculations and drawings were checked and no major flaw
was found. It was just conceivable that creep and shrinkage
effects were still increasing Asite visit was arranged effects were still increasing. A site visit was arranged.
A
Typical end bay layout
9 m
600
A
250 thick slab
300
250 thick slab
Excessive deflection
(still increasing after 10
years) years)
AA
A - A
Summary (1)
The visit to site included the inspection of the slab close to a column.
The screed had been removed to expose the top surface of the
t t l l b A d h k f th h d f th t structural slab. As a crude check of the hardness of the concrete
surface, a penknife was used. Quite unexpectedly the blade of the knife
penetrated into the concrete surface right up to the hilt ! A further
check of the soffit of the slab gave a similar result.
An additional interesting feature of the soffit was the presence of a
number of shallowdisc shaped (flying saucers) pieces of concrete number of shallow disc shaped ( flying saucers ) pieces of concrete
(150mm diameter) which were separating from the surface. One such
piece came away as it was being examined.
Although the slab had been designed to span one-way, the supporting
beam was sufficiently flexible for the slab to behave more like a flat
slab The flying saucers had occurred in the compression areas of the slab. The flying saucers had occurred in the compression areas of the
soffit and were considered to be the effect of spalling.
Summary (2)
It was clear that the slab in question required immediate additional
support and the rest of the building required core testing.
After cores had been taken throughout the building it was discovered
that the concrete cube strength, which should have been 25MPa, was
on average only 5MPa on average only 5MPa.
The sub-contractor had deliberately reduced the cement content in y
the specified mix. Major remedial work followed.
C St d 17 Case Study 17
Insitu columns supporting a precast building
This building was constructed with precast elements above ground.
Below ground the foundations, columns and beams were
constructedinsitu constructed insitu.
Construction had reached an advanced stage when cracks
d i th i it l j t b l th ti ith th appeared in the insitu columns just below the connection with the
precast columns.
Layout of elements
Precast beams, columns
and slabs and slabs
See detail of column
connection
Insitu beams and columns
connection
Street level
Existing
Transfer beams
retaining
wall
Intended construction procedure
Column cast with large
polystyrene box-out
Polystyrene totally
removed; CHS 114 dia
dowel cast in with fresh
concrete filling box out concrete filling box-out
Column reinforced
as normal
As constructed
Only thin layer of
concrete cast in
CHS dowel pushed
into polystyrene
concrete cast in
top of column
Onlytop layer of Only top layer of
polystyrene removed
Existing insitu Existing insitu
column
Load from 7
First sign of imminent failure
Precast column
floors above
Grouting tube
Severe cracking of
i it l ll
Load from precast unit
supported on thin outer
shell of insitu column
insitu column wall
Insitu column
Remedial work
In order to repair the top of the insitu columns the
load fromthe precast building had to be removed load from the precast building had to be removed.
This was achieved by providing props and jacks y p g p p j
close to the existing precast columns at each floor
level and creating a new load path to the ground.
This released the load in the insitu columns below, and
allowed the required remedial work to take place allowed the required remedial work to take place
- reconstruction of the top of the insitu columns.
Thank you for your attention