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Vietnam 1946: How the War Began
Geoffrey C. Gunn
a
a
Faculty of Economics , Nagasaki University , Nagasaki, Japan
Published online: 26 Sep 2011.
To cite this article: Geoffrey C. Gunn (2011) Vietnam 1946: How the War Began, Journal of
Contemporary Asia, 41:4, 686-690
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2011.610624
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dictate how the region should develop and how the fragile ecosystems of the delta
should be manipulated and controlled. Indeed, the engineered transformations
that outside political authorities have consistently tried to impose on the region
really since the early nineteenth century have generally wreaked considerable havoc
on humans and ecosystems alike. A strong advocate of participatory democracy,
local solutions and economic/environmental sustainability, Biggs believes that the
deltas future is at great risk, dependent in large part on quelling the ambitions of
outside powers (whether in Hanoi or Beijing) to over-engineer the delta, on
promoting greater negotiation and mediation in decision making and on supporting
local people, institutions and practices wherever and whenever possible. Given the
rapid pace of development in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) and the fact of
global warming, the deltas fate will likely be decided soon.
As one can see from the above, Quagmire is a rich, rich book. For all its merits,
though, it is at times a bit of a slough. Biggs is faithful to his sources, which often
relate to discrete parts of the delta rather than to the region as a whole, which makes
it dicult for readers to assess whether he is talking pattern or variation. Moreover,
the book would have beneted from more of a spine, as well as some quantication
and greater use of statistics relating to population, landholding/tenure patterns, crop
production, exports and the like. Biggs argument is only gradually unveiled and not
always linear and, to my way of thinking, the author may come down a little too
hard at times on expertise, the culture of objectivity, etc., while romanticising local
knowledge. None the less, Biggs is clearly a major talent, who has written a path-
breaking book that enables us to see, experience and interpret the delta anew.
Peter A. Coclanis 2011
Department of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
Email: coclanis@unc.edu
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2011.610623
Vietnam 1946: How the War Began
Stein Tnnesson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010)
This work by the former director of the Oslo International Peace Research Institute,
actually an update of an earlier published French edition, raises very large questions
about top-level decision making, free will and the inevitability of war. Essentially
this is a study of the crucial ten months between February and December 1946,
leading to the outbreak of the First Indochina or French War. A determinately
actor-orientated approach to diplomatic history, author Stein Tnnesson seeks to
sift the hawks from the doves among some score of key French and an even smaller
group of Vietnamese decision makers who are introduced, examined, judged and
even crucied. He also posits, two revisionist theses, namely that the French and
Vietnamese alike were lured into a compromise agreement by the Nationalist
Chinese or what he calls a Chinese trap and, second, that the Vietnamese were
lured into a French trap in Hanoi on 19 December 1946 by French hawks who
sought to settle matters on the battleground.
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As veteran French Indochina specialist Philippe Devillers writes in a foreword,
just how were the French going to retake northern Vietnam still under Chinese
military administration, albeit alongside the Viet Minh who had declared
independence on 2 September 1945? Still, a compromise was brokered between the
two antagonists, the Franco-Vietnamese Agreement of 6 March 1946 (in Dalat), and
the Modus Vivendi Agreement of 14 September (in Fontainebleau) signed by Ho Chi
Minh. These agreements could have led to the peaceful decolonisation of Vietnam,
especially as the French now recognised the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)
as interlocutors. Even so, the reunication of Vietnam as insisted by the DRV was
never accepted by the French (or their American successors), just as the French
sought to reassert political and economic hegemony over the north. At the heart of
this book, mined from an array of French archival sources, alongside a select
number of Vietnamese sources, is the sense that French intelligence and policy
makers ultimately neglected the strength of Vietnamese nationalism (although this is
not made explicit), in fact advice that French Indochina specialist Paul Mus had
tendered during the Japanese occupation.
As Tnnesson writes in the Introduction, it was still possible up until 19 December
1946, when ghting broke out in the streets of Hanoi, to prevent war. Few then could
have predicted a 30-year war, especially as there was a 9-month breathing period.
But which side really provoked the crisis of 19 December? Tnnesson directly lays
the blame on the heads of a Saigon-based trio (the war party) who could not
tolerate a communist regime. These were the acerbic French High Commissioner
Thierry dArgenlieu (appointed by and answering to Charles de Gaulle), supreme
commander Jean-Etienne Valluy and Le on Pignon, French Commissioner of
Political Aairs (and from 1948 himself High Commissioner). On the other side,
the author also interrogates the motives, actions and rationalisation of General Vo
Nguyen Giap in ordering the assault in Hanoi for which he now takes full credit,
albeit walking into a trap set by the Saigon trio.
Chapter 1 explains the clash of republican ideals between the French Fourth
Republic and the newly installed DRV government, especially as the former rejected
the unied nation claims of the latter (actually reclaimed from Emperor Bao Dai
under Japan). During this period of compromise, the Viet Minh also sought to draw
a line between the DRV as a state and the Viet Minh as a political organisation. But,
in order to sow dissension, French intelligence was obsessed with nding moderate
versus radical Viet Minh leaders with Ho Chi Minh seen as a moderate. Ho Chi
Minh also emerges in Tnnessons account as a highly intelligent, charming and
pragmatic leader alongside, especially, military specialists like Giap.
Chapter 2 outlines the 6 March 1946 Agreement which, Tnnesson maintains,
actually stood as a regional model for decolonisation at its time. France recognised
the DRV as a free state but within the French Union. There would be a future
referendum and limits were imposed upon French forces north of the 16
th
parallel.
But rather than being a liberal gesture oered by the Paris government, he contends,
France fell into a Chinese trap. Simply, the Nationalist Chinese who had been
mandated by the Allies to take the Japanese surrender in northern Indochina,
refused a French force landing in the north until an agreement had been signed with
Ho. This was a triangular arrangement, although in my reading, it was paramount
on the part of the Viet Minh that China be gotten rid of as the more ancient and
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pernicious enemy, especially as it was also backing a range of political factions and
pro-China warlords inside Indochina. More could have been made of the threat
posed by these pro-China groups to a peaceful outcome, more anti-French than the
Viet Minh and a force within and without the DRV government, at least while the
Chinese occupation forces remained in situ. The author duly contextualises Franco-
Chinese negotiations. He also examines negotiations conducted by the single French
Provisional Government representative in Hanoi, Jean Sainteny, with Ho, Giap and
others. As the author allows, the triangular power structure imposed some peace
until the nal Chinese withdrawal on 18 September. Still, such a view diminishes
both French and Vietnamese agency in entering into the Agreement on their own
terms, even setting aside the question of sincerity.
Chapter 3 backgrounds the Modus Vivendi Agreement signed on 14 September in
Fontainebleu, reecting Ho Chi Minhs willingness to compromise. Disagreements
between Minister for Overseas France, Maurice Moutet and dArgenlieu, who
lacked faith in the Agreement, are also exposed. What appeared to be a French
victory, with France gaining long-term concessions without having to acknowledge
DRV independence, turned to Viet Minh propaganda advantage with a ceasere and
widespread popular support in the south for national unity.
In Chapter 4, Tnnesson argues that decision making behind the Haiphong
massacre of November 1946 was made in Saigon by dArgenlieu between 11 and 13
November 1946, on the premise of destroying Ho Chi Minhs government. More
generally, the Saigon trio hatched an array of coup detat strategies in contravention
of the 6 March spirit. French moderation in the north only owed to a delay in
Chinese withdrawal, ongoing negotiations at Fontainebleau and the French focus on
the south, as with playing a future Bao Dai card. As well known, the showdown in
Haiphong, when it came, was over collection of customs dues in the port (eectively
applying a French economic choke on the DRV), leading to a ve-day battle and a
French massacre, including air attacks on eeing civilians. Blame is clear (a local
French commander, Pierre Louis De` bes, and General Valluy), but Tnnesson also
weighs up French domestic politics. With the metropolitan electoral triumph of the
socialists and communists, dArgenlieu was under threat. Still, with the shadow of de
Gaulle at his side, he was also capable of presenting Paris with a French military fait
accompli at Haiphong and strategic Langson in the mountains. Likewise, Tnnesson
explains, the Christian Democrat-dominated Georges Bidault government cannot be
held entirely blameless. Remarkably, the DRV oered restraint in these awful
circumstances. Ho Chi Minh was still ready to talk.
In Chapter 5, the French Trap, Tnnesson traces the four weeks between the
Haiphong massacre and the outbreak of war on 19 December 1946. Various stages
are discerned linking Saigon priorities and metropolitan developments, notably the
fourth week of December coinciding with the election of socialist Le on Blum as
premier. He also retails conversations between Giap and General Louis Constant
Morlie` re, the French ultimatum, the evacuation of Vietnamese civilians and
government from Hanoi, and the unexpected failure by the Viet Minh to
counterattack. Turning to the decision-making process, Tnnesson also depicts
severe conicts of interest between the war party in Saigon who wanted to renounce
the cease-re, crush the DRV and call down even greater military expenditure, and
the Morlie` re-Valluy concern over the fate of French civilians and garrisons. In this
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layered reading of complex telegraphed communications, Tnnesson does not
neglect intra-ministerial/intra-service debates on cost-cutting, and deliberations on
whether or not to retain dArgenlieu. The pages are crowded with facts, but the
preservation of French cultural and economic interests was the main reason for
inexibility in 1946-47, just as France also feared contamination of other colonies.
We learn of an unsent conciliatory telegram from Minister Marius Moutet. We also
learn of attempts to separate Ho Chi Minh from extremists like Giap (the
Sainteny mission). But French intelligence also missed the point that the real
decisions were being made by such individuals as Truong Chinh, Le Duc Tho, Ho
and Giap, not the DRV diplomats (more the pity that we are not privy to their
communications). For all its rifts and compromises, French intelligence also oered
information on premeditated Vietnamese plans for a general oensive all through
December 1946. Incredibly, we learn, a message from Ho to Blum was deliberately
delayed by Saigon, just as Blums reply was lost in the sending. Hanoi was a powder
keg. Preparations for a surprise attack against the French were conrmed on 18
December, with both sides playing each others blu to forestall, or in the case of the
French, to cover up an expected onslaught. Giap and Ho thus fell into a French
trap.
As explained in Chapter 6, with lights and power cut in Hanoi on 19 December,
pro-Viet Minh militia massacred some 20-30 French civilians with others made
hostage, along with co-ordinated attacks on all French garrisons north of Danang.
The French counter-attacked and held the city at least through until the Geneva
Conference of 1954. Tnnesson raises many questions as to the orders for the attack,
alongside conciliatory letters penned early that day by Ho. He believes that, given
the opaque rationalisations of the events by the Vietnamese side, something must
have gone wrong for them that night (including cancelled orders). Among many
queries, the Vietnamese knew that Blum wanted to intervene and, if so, why did local
militia forces press the (vile and botched) attack. There is no reason to accept the
standard Giap explanation that everything went according to conscious decision by
the leadership. Why didnt main force Viet Minh battalions join the attack? Was this
Giaps error? Tnnesson then enters an hour-by-hour analysis of the nights events.
In any case, the French needed Giap to take the initiative. Even so, he asserts, the
enigma of what happened on that night may never be resolved.
In a conclusion (Chapter 7, If only . . . ), Tnnesson seeks to review and revise,
rst, understandings relating to the Franco-Vietnamese Agreement of 6 March 1946.
As he recaps, peace was imposed by China, rather than conceded by liberals in Paris.
The French were warned to fall in line or face an international war. Ho Chi Minh
also signed under Chinese duress. While neither side was completely sincere, at least
over the next few months a policy of accords was entered into by both sides. Second,
the outbreak of war on 19 December was not a premeditated Vietnamese attack,
Giaps mistimed and miscalculated actions aside, just when Blums socialist
government was stirring, actually playing into the hands of the hardliner French
in Saigon, giving them just the pretext to back out of talks and settle for military
action. If only the telegrams had actually been delivered. Of the Great Powers, only
China sought some kind of intervention to stem the ghting. Tnnesson then lines
up the key actors and attributes blame or praise. The trio in Saigon (the war party)
had the power to prevent the Indochina War but backed o. De Gaulle rmly
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backed dArgenlieu. Pignon, in turn, sought to deliver a psychological shock by
playing the Bao Dai card. Morlie` re and Sainteny emerge as pawns of the war
party. Bidault, powerful and in power in 1946, was too mindful of the integrity of
the entire French Union. The veteran socialist, Blum, who had the will to
communicate with Ho Chi Minh, was sabotaged in Saigon by dArgenlieu.
Although the French communists were simpatico to Vietnamese unity, they were
also patriotic French. General Le Clerc (who spearheaded the French invasion of
the south alongside the British) was not so liberal as sometimes made out. Socialist
Marius Moutet, a friend of Ho Chi Minh (and Ho had many French friends),
did not assert his authority over the Saigon clique. We may never know if Ho and
Giap were in agreement on 19 December. But if the decision to attack in Hanoi
was Giaps, then it was also epochal in opening up the way for victories over the
French, Americans and Chinese or, seen another way, he started a whole string of
wars (along with death and suering) (and lived to write about them). In
retrospect, both sides seem to be saying that war was inevitable after Haiphong.
But Tnnesson, who also personally engaged Giap in Hanoi, calls the generals
blu, the French were not about to attack in Hanoi on 16 December. They did not
issue an ultimatum. Giap fell into a French trap.
To sum up, the author has made strenuous eorts to identify the processes of top-
level decision making on both sides, allowing only that we lack crucial Vietnamese
documentation and, obviously, unrecorded conversations. Still, such lacunae do not
prevent the author from making judgmental statements on, especially Giap, just
as the general 100 at this writing and long outliving all the protagonists of this
epoch adjusts his recall of events to the exigency of the times. Another important
nding of this study, at least from a peace studies perspective, is that that
bureaucrats (as with the Saigon clique), local commanders (as in Haiphong) and
militias (as in Hanoi), could also subvert the top-level decision makers. In other
ways, Tnnessons work lances through such ocialised versions from the French
side, as with Thierry dArgenlieus, Chronique dIndochine 1945-1947 (Paris: Albin
Michel, 1985). It also complements David Marrs Vietnam 1945: The Quest for
Power (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995). It is hard to critique this
book for its symmetry, its density and impressive scholarship, especially in
unravelling labyrinthine metropolitan and local (Saigon) power plays, along with
day-to-day and street-level actions in Haiphong and Hanoi. Still, I think for a work
which foregrounds leadership and decision making, the reader could be better served
with even more recall of the Dalat and Fontainebleau agreements. Beyond that, we
are also left wondering as to the general psychological shock on all the actors
especially including local-level actors of the preceding three years of Japanese
occupation in Indochina and the March 1945 coup, on top of 80 years French
colonialism, especially as it weighed upon the great imponderable of anti-French
Vietnamese nationalism.
Georey C. Gunn 2011
Faculty of Economics, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki, Japan
Email: nag-gunn@net.nagasaki-u.ac.jp
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2011.610624
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