American

Isolationism
As we have seen, America was not exactly the most “sociable”
of nations. Our interactions with foreign countries were few
and far between. There is a historical precedent for America
to be isolated from foreign affairs; in particular, 8 different
events pave the way for this country to stay out of World War II well past its beginning.

Name Summary
Washington's Farewell
Address, 1796

Monroe Doctrine,
1823

Treaty of Versailles,
1919

Washington
Conference, 1921

Four-Power Treaty,
1922

Nine-Power Treaty,
1922

Kellogg-Briand Pact,
1928

Neutrality Acts, 1935

Read Roosevelt's response about “the German Menace”. Based on the acts you see
above, why was his position so difficult? Do you think he was persuasive enough?
 What is Roosevelt's problem?

What are Roosevelt's best solutions?

Destroyers-for-Bases:

Lend-Lease:

Ignore for the moment anything that you might already know about World War II and
focus on the facts:
• Fact: Most Americans did not want to get involved
• Fact: It was illegal to lend support to Britain
• Fact: France had surrendered, and Britain was on the verge
• Fact: A depression is still going on in your country (unemployment is at a still
high 15%)

My question to you is: Would you have supported the war? Would you want your
President focused more on domestic or foreign issues? Defend your response.
 George Washington's Farewell Address
“The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending
our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as
possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled
with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote
relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of
which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be
unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary
vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combination and collisions of her
friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a

different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the
period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external
annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality
we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when
belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us,
will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace
or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to
stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any
part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European
ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of
the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me
not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing
engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private
affairs that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those
engagements be observed in their genuine sense, but in my opinion it is
unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a

respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for
extraordinary emergencies.”
 Monroe Doctrine

“In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we

have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is
only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced, that we resent
injuries, or make preparation for our defence
…
We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between
the United States and those powers, to declare, that we should consider any
attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this
hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies
or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not
interfere.
…
We [declare] our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we
have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur,
which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall
make a corresponding change, on the part of the United States, indispensable
to their security.
…
Our policy, in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the
wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless
remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of
its powers; to consider the government de facto [by default] as the legitimate
government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those
relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just
claims of every power; submitting to injuries from none.
…
It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves,
in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.”
 Treaty of Versailles
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)
Library of Congress LC-USZ62-96172
Evans, p. 173

Resolved (two-thirds of the senators present concurring therein), that the

Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty of peace with
Germany concluded at Versailles on the 28th day of June, 1919, subject to
the following reservations and understandings, which are hereby made a part
and condition of this resolution of ratification, which ratification is not to take
effect or bind the United States until the said reservations and
understandings adopted by the Senate have been accepted by an exchange of
notes as a part and a condition of this resolution of ratification by at least
three of the four principal allied and associated powers, to wit, Great Britain,
France, Italy, and Japan:

1. The United States so understands and construes Article I that in case of

notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations, as provided in said article,
the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all Its international
obligations and all its obligations under the said Covenant have been fulfilled,
and notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent
resolution of the Congress of the United States.

2. The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial

integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in
controversies between nations -- whether members of the League or not --
under the provisions of Article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of
the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in
any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole
power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval
forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.

3. No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article 22, Part
1, or any other provision of the treaty of peace with Germany, except by
action of the Congress of the United States.
 4. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what
questions are within its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic
and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs,
including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the
suppression of traffic in women and children, and in opium and other
dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the
jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty to be submitted
in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or of the
Assembly of the League of Nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or
recommendation of any other power.

5. The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the

Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations provided for in said
treaty of peace any questions which in the judgment of the United
States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy, commonly
known as the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the
United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the
jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any
provision contained in the said treaty of peace with Germany.
 Washington Conference
Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy,
and Japan, Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922

Article III
...Contracting Powers shall abandon their respective capital ship building
programs, and no new capital ships shall be constructed or acquired.

Article VI
No capital ship of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a
calibre in excess of 16 inches (406 millimetres).

Article XII
No vessel of war of any of the Contracting Powers, hereafter laid down, other
than a capital ship, shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203
millimetres).

Article XIV
No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the
installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships
into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the
mounting of guns not exceeding 6 inch (152 millimetres) calibre.

Article XVIII
Each of the Contracting Powers undertakes not to dispose by gift, sale or any
mode of transfer of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may
become a vessel of war in the Navy of any foreign Power.
 Four Power Treaty
Treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and
Japan, Signed at Washington December 13, 1921

The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to respect their

rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the
region of the Pacific Ocean.

If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a

controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights
which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the
harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite
the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole
subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

II

If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power,
the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and
frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient
measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the
particular situation.
 Nine Power Treaty
Treaty between the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire,
China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal, Signed at
Washington February 6, 1922

ARTICLE I
The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and
administrative integrity of China;

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to

develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and
maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry
of all nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek

special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or
citizens of friendly States,[2] and from countenancing action inimical to the
security of such States.

ARTICLE II
The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement,
arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or
collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the
principles stated in Article I.

ARTICLE III
With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or
equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the
Contracting Powers, other than China, agree that they will not seek, nor
support their respective nationals in seeking-

(a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their

interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or
economic development in any designated region of China;

(b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any
other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in
China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local
authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its
scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical
 application of the principle of equal opportunity.

It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this Article are not to be so

construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be
necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial, or financial
undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research.

China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in the foregoing

stipulations of this Article in dealing with applications for economic rights and
privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether
parties to the present Treaty or not.

ARTICLE IV
The Contracting Powers agree not to support any agreements by their
respective nationals with each other designed to create Spheres of Influence
or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in
designated parts of Chinese territory.

...

ARTICLE VII
The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the
opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the
present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there
shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers
concerned.
 Kellogg-Briand Pact
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN REICH, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE BELGIANS,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF
GREAT BRITAIN IRELAND AND THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE
SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA, HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY, HIS
MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF POLAND, AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their

respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national
policy in their relations with one another.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

ARTICLE III

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in
the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements,
and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments
of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington.

This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding
paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the
other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a
Power shall be deposited at Washington and the Treaty shall immediately
upon such deposit become effective as; between the Power thus adhering and
the other Powers parties hereto.

It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States to furnish each
Government named in the Preamble and every Government subsequently
adhering to this Treaty with a certified copy of the Treaty and of every
instrument of ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the
Government of the United States telegraphically to notify such Governments
immediately upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or
adherence.
PROBLEM: Very few Americans have television sets, and even if they did,
there is no CNN or satellite news to beam the terrible images of Nazi occupation
into viewers homes. How can FDR bring the war to the people?

SOLUTION:

PROBLEM: The German Luftwaffe (air force) has stepped up their

bombing raids on Britain. The British Royal Air Force has responded, but still no
luck. FDR knows that he can't send troops or military support, but he
desperately wants to help his British allies. How can FDR help the British
without violating U.S. law?

SOLUTION:
PROBLEM: FDR is gearing the country up for war. He has instituted the
first peacetime draft in U.S. history, and most observers see that he is preparing
for American involvement on the continent. Here's the problem: the country is
still in the midst of a Depression, with unemployment at almost 15%. Most of
the federal money is being used in the New Deal. It seems as though FDR is
going to bring the country out of a Depression AND fight a war at the same time.
How can FDR pay for the war?

SOLUTION:

PROBLEM: The so-called “Axis Powers” of Germany, Italy, and Japan have
begun their assault. Despite the presence of the Axis on three continents (Asia,
Africa, and Europe), most of the attention has centered on Europe with the
Nazis. But policymakers can't forget the Pacific Ocean either. FDR is faced
with a tactical decision. Where should FDR focus his troops and support?

SOLUTION: