PALACOL VS.

FERRER-CALLEJA

Petitioners cited Galvadores v. Trajano wherein it was ruled that no check-offs from
any amount due employees may be effected without individual written
authorizations duly signed by the employees specifically stating the amount,
purpose, and beneficiary of the deduction.

Galvadores provides "that employees are protected by law from unwarranted
practices that diminish their compensation without their knowledge and consent."

GENERAL RUBBER AND FOOTWEAR CORPORATION VS. DRILON

Generally, a judgment on a compromise agreement puts an end to a litigation and is
immediately executory. However, the Rules [of Court] require a special authority
before an attorney can compromise the litigation of [his] clients. The authority to
compromise cannot lightly be presumed and should be duly established by evidence.
As aptly held by the Secretary of Labor, the records are bereft of showing that the
individual members consented to the said agreement. Undoubtedly, the compromise
agreement was executed to the prejudice of the complainants who never consented
thereto, hence, it is null and void. The judgment based on such agreement does not
bind the individual members or complainants who are not parties thereto nor
signatories therein.

Money claims due to laborers cannot be the object of settlement or compromise
effected by a union or counsel without the specific individual consent of each laborer
concerned. The beneficiaries are the individual complainants themselves. The union to
which they belong can only assist them but cannot decide for them.

It should perhaps be made clear that the Court is not here saying that accrued
money claims can never be effectively waived by workers and employees. What the
Court is saying is that, in the present case, the private respondents never purported
to waive their claims to accrued differential pay. Assuming that private respondents
had actually and individually purported to waive such claims, a second question
would then have arisen: whether such waiver could be given legal effect or
whether, on the contrary, it was violative of public policy. Fortunately, we do not
have to address this second question here.

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS. CASIO

In Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, the Court held that
notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was at the instance of the federation and
that the federation undertook to hold the company free from any liability resulting
from the dismissal of several employees, the company may still be held liable if it
was remiss in its duty to accord the would-be dismissed employees their right to be
heard on the matter.
LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LIMITED VS. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LEGENDA

Once a union acquires a legitimate status as a labor organization, it continues as
such until its certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an independent
action for cancellation.

Section 11, Paragraph II, Rule IX of D.O. 9, which provides for the dismissal of a
petition for certification election based on the lack of legal personality of a labor
organization only in the following instances:

(1) appellant is not listed by the Regional Office or the BLR in its registry of
legitimate labor organizations; or

(2) appellant's legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality.

Since appellant is listed in the registry of legitimate labor organizations, and its
legitimacy has not been revoked or cancelled with finality, the granting of its
petition for certification election is proper.

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER) VS. CHARTER CHEMCIAL
AND COATING CORPORATION.

The inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory employees in petitioner union does not
divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. The appellate courts
reliance on Toyota is misplaced in view of this Courts subsequent ruling in Republic
v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter Kawashima). In Kawashima,
we explained at length how and why the Toyota doctrine no longer holds sway
under the altered state of the law and rules applicable to this case, viz:

Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees
Union-PGTWO in which the core issue was whether mingling affects the legitimacy
of a labor organization and its right to file a petition for certification election. This
time, given the altered legal milieu, the Court abandoned the view
in Toyota and Dunlopand reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is
a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in
one labor organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof.
Thus, the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may
exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any
mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership
cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its
registration, unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.

In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue Packing
Products Plants-San Miguel Packaging Products-San Miguel Corp. Monthlies Rank-
and-File Union-FFW, the Court explained that since the 1997 Amended Omnibus
Rules does not require a local or chapter to provide a list of its members, it would
be improper for the DOLE to deny recognition to said local or chapter on account of
any question pertaining to its individual members.

More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, which
involved a petition for cancellation of union registration filed by the employer in
1999 against a rank-and-file labor organization on the ground of mixed
membership: the Court therein reiterated its ruling in Tagaytay Highlands that the
inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of
the Labor Code

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., EMPLOYEES ASSOCATION-NATU VS. THE INSULAR LIFE
ASSURANCE CO., LTD.
Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply
because it was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not
proximately cause the result intended.
For success of purpose is not, and should not, be the criterion in determining
whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice.
Perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate the company from charges of
discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work the company
delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the company had chosen xxx to
screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that the
chosen company employees having been involved in unpleasant incidents with
the picketers during the strike were hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the
mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of
reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of
union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint
or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join
unions as to constitute unfair labor practice.
Where the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an
employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to
reinstatement with back pay.
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the
positions of these union members have already been filled by replacements.
AHS/PHIIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION (FFW) VS. NLRC
Concededly, retrenchment to prevent losses is considered a just cause for
terminating employment
22
and the decision whether to resort to such move or not
is a management prerogative.
23
Basic, however, in human relations is the precept
that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights, and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observed honesty and good
faith."
24


Art. 284 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by Sec. 15 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130, provides:

Art. 284. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to present losses, or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for
the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a written notice
on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one [1] month
before the intended date thereof. ... In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
case of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due
to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one [1] month or at least one-half [1/2] month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six [6] months shall be considered
one [1] whole year.

In the case at bar, the company offered to pay the 31 dismissed employees one
month salary in lieu of the one [1] month written notice required by law. This
practice was allowed under the termination Pay Laws whereby if the employee is
dismissed on the basis of just cause, the employer is not required to serve advance
written notice based on the number of years the employee has served the
employer, nor is the employer required to grant termination pay. It is only where
the dismissal is without just cause that the employer must serve timely notice on
the employee, otherwise the employer is obliged to pay the required termination
compensation, except where other applicable statutes provide a different
remedy.
27
Otherwise stated, it was the employer's failure to serve notice upon the
employee, not the cause for the dismissal, that rendered the employer answerable
for terminal pay.
28
Thus, notice may effectively be substituted by payment of the
termination pay.

Under the New Labor Code, however, even if the dismissal is based on a just cause
under Art. 284, the one-month written notice to both the affected employee and the
Minister labor is required, on top of the separation pay.

SHELL OIL WORKERS' UNION, PETITIONER, VS. SHELL COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, LTD., AND THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

Indrustrial Peace Act; Scope of management prerogative; Effect of collective
bargaining agreement.It is to be admitted that the stand of ShelI Company as to
the scope of management prerogative is not devoid of plausibility if it were not
bound by what was stipulated. The growth of industrial democracy fostered by the
institution of collective bargaining with the workers entitled to be represented by a
union of their choice, has no doubt contracted the sphere of what appertains solely
to the employer. What was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract
certainly precluded Shell Company from carrying out what otherwise would have
been within its prerogative if to do so would be violative thereof.

Same; Collective bargaining agreement must be respected.The crucial question is
whether the then existing collective bargaining contract running for three years
from August 1, 1966 to December 31, 1069 constituted a bar to such a decision
reached by management? The answer must be in the affirmative. As correct
stressed in the brief for the petitioner, there was specific coverage concerning the
security guard section in the collective bargaining contract, It is found not only in
the body thereof but in the two appendices concerning the age schedules as well as
the premium pay and the night compensation to which the personnel in such
section were entitled. It was thus an assurance of security of tenure, at least, during
the lifetime of the agreement. For what is involved is the integrity of the agreement
reached, terms of which should be binding on both parties. One of them may be
released, but only with the consent of the other. The right to object belongs to the
latter; and if exercised, must be respected. Such a state of affairs should continue
during the existence of the contract. Only thus may there be compliance with and
fulfillment of the covenants in a valid subsisting agreement.

Same; Failure to comply constitutes an unfair labor practice.The Shell Company, in
failing to manifest fealty to what was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining
contract, was thus guilty of an unfair labor practice. Such a doctrine first found
expression in Republic Savings Bank vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-20303,
Sept. 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 226.

In the industrial Peace Act, an unfair labor practice is committed by a labor union or
its agent by its refusal 'to bargain collectively with the employer'. However, the
collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement, being a
continuous process, the duty to bargain necessarily imposing on the parties the
obligation to live up to the terms of such a collective bargaining agreement if
entered into, it is undeniable that non-compliance therewith constitutes an unfair
labor practice.

Same; Right of labor to strike.Accordingly, the unfair labor practice strike called
by the Union did have the impress of validity. Rightly, labor is justified in making
use of such a weapon in its arsenal to counteract what is clearly outlawed by the
Industrial Peace Act. That would be one way to assure that the objectives of
unionization and collective bargaining would not be thwarted. It would, of course,
file an unfair labor practice case before the Court of Industrial Relations. It is not
precluded, however, from relying on its own resources to frustrate such an effort
on the part of an employer.

There is this categorial pronouncement from the present Chief Justice: "Again, the
legality of the strike follows as a corollary to the finding of fact, made in the
decision appealed from which is supported by substantial evidence to the
effect that the strike had triggered by the Company's failure to abide by the terms
and conditions of its collective bargaining agreement with the Union, by the
discrimination, resorted to by the company, with regard to hire and tenure of
employment, and the dismissal of employees due to union activities, as well as the
refusal of the company to bargain collectively in good faith."

It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by
the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the
inducing factor for staging a strike.

The right to self-organization so sedulously guarded by the Industrial Peace Act
explicitly includes the right "to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and to the mutual aid or protection."

As a matter of fact, a strike may not be staged only when, during the pendency of an
industrial dispute, the Court of industrial Relations has issued the proper injunction
against the laborers (section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended).

Same; When to strike.Necessarily so, the choice as to when such an objective may
be attained by striking likewise belongs to it. There is the rejection of the concept
that an outside authority, even if governmental, should make the decisions for it as
to ends which are desirable and how they may be achieved. The assumption is that
labor can be trusted to determine for itself when the right to strike may be availed
of in order to attain a successful fruition in their disputes with management. It is
true that there is a requirement in the Act that before the employees may do so,
they must file with the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor a notice of
their intention to strike. Such a requisite however, as has been repeatedly declared
by this Court, does not have to be complied with in case of unf air labor practice
strike, which certainly is entitled to greater judicial protection if the Industrial
Peace Act is to be rendered meaningful.

Same; How strike to be conducted.What is clearly within the law is the concerted
activity of cessation of work in order that a union's economic demands may be
granted or that an employer cease and desist from an unfair labor practice. That the
law recognizes as a right. There is though a disapproval of the utilization of force to
attain such as objective. For implicit in the very concept of a legal order is the
maintenance of peacef ul ways. A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may
be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unf air
labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is
tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to
strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A
different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the
strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to
as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as
to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed.

Except on those few days specified then, the Shell Company could not allege that
the strike was conducted in a manner other than peaceful. Under the
circumstances, it would be going too far to consider that it thereby became illegal.
This is not by any means to condone the utilization of force by labor to attain its
objectives. It is only to show awareness that is labor conflicts, the tension that fills
the air as well as the feeling of frustration and bitterness could break out in
sporadic acts of violence. If there be in this case a weighing of interests in the
balance, the ban the law imposes on unfair labor practices by management that
could provoke a strike and its requirement that it be conducted peaceably, it would
be, to repeat, unjustified, considering all the facts disclosed, to stamp the strike with
illegality. It is enough that individual liability be incurred by those guilty of such
acts of violence that call for loss of employee status.

Strikes are usually attended by "the excitement, the heat and the passion of the
direct participants in the labor dispute, at the peak thereof ...." There is the
recognition by this Court, speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as such
being "inherently explosive." It is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices
to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment by the
guilty party.

even if there was a mistake in good faith by the Union that an unfair labor practice
was committed by the Shell Company when such was not the case, still the
wholesale termination of employee status of all the officers of the Union, decreed by
CIR, hardly commends itself for approval. Such a drastic blow to a labor
organization, leaving it leaderless, has serious repercussions. The immediate effect
is to weaken the Union. New leaders may of course emerge. It would not be
unlikely, under the circumstances, that they would be less than vigorous in the
prosecution of labor's claims. They may be prove to fall victims to counsels of
timidity and apprehension. At the forefront of their consciousness must be an
awareness that a mistaken move could well mean their discharge from
employment. That would be to render the right to self-organization illusory.

Same; State protection to labor.The plain and unqualified constitutional command
of protection to labor should not be lost sight of. The State is thus under obligation
to lend its aid and its succor to the efforts of its labor elements to improve their
economic condition. It is now generally accepted that unionization is a means to
such an end. It should be encouraged. Thereby, labor's strength, what there is of it,
becomes solidified. It can bargain as a collectivity. Management then will not
always have the upper hand nor be in a position to ignore its just demands. That, at
any rate, is the policy behind the Industrial Peace Act. The judiciary and
administrative agencies in construing it must ever be conscious of Its implications.
Only thus may there be f idelity to what is ordained by the f undamental law. For if
it were otherwise, Instead of protection, there would be neglect or disregard. That
is to negate the fundamental principle that the Constitution is the supreme law.

The strike cannot be declared illegal, there being a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement by respondent company. Even if it were otherwise, however,
this Court cannot lend sanction of its approval to the outright dismissal of all union
officers, a move that certainly would have the effect of considerably weakening a
labor organization, and thus in effect frustrate the policy of the Industrial Peace Act
to encourage unionization.

Essentially, the freedom to manage the business remains with management. It still
has plenty of elbow room for making its wishes prevail. In much the same way that
labor unions may be expected to resist to the utmost what they consider to be an
unwelcome intrusion into their exclusive domain, they cannot justly object to
management equally being jealous of its prerogatives. More specifically, it cannot
be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of
what units are essential for its operation. To it belongs the ultimate determination
of whether services should be performed by its personnel or contracted to outside
agencies.

MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION VS. NLRC

The charge of disloyalty against Beloncio arose from her emotional remark to a
waitress who happened to be a union steward, "Wala akong tiwala sa Union ninyo."
The remark was made in the course of a heated discussion regarding Beloncio's
efforts to make a lazy and recalcitrant waiter adopt a better attitude towards his
work.
The case fell within the jurisdiction of the of the NLRC, not the BLR. The question
extended to the dismissal of Beloncio or steps leading thereto. Necessarily, when
the hotel decides the recommended dismissal, its acts would be subject to scrutiny.
Particularly, it will be asked whether it violates or not the existing CBA. Certainly,
violations of the CBA would be unfair labor practice.