Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33695 May 15, 1989
MANUFACTURER'S BANK & TRUST CO., petitioner,
vs.
DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIES, INC., and ALFONSO TAN, respondents
Calapatia, Gaviola & Associates for petitioner.
Antonio N. Lucero, Jr. for respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
The propriety of a judgment on the pleadings is the principal issue in the case at
bar. The rule is set out in Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. ..
Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the recovery of a sum of money against Diversified Industries, Inc. and
Alfonso Tan. 1 The complaint alleged. 2
2. That on December 17, 1963 the defendants were granted a loan in the form of an
agreement for credit in current account in the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P125,000.00) with interest at the rate of 10% per annum
computed upon average daily balances, a copy of the xx Agreement for Credit in
Current Account .. (being attached) as Annex "A" ..
3. That the loan became due and pay able on February 26, 1965, but the defendants
failed and refused to liquidate their obligations, leaving an outstanding balance of
P100,119.21 as of June 25, 1965;
4. That by reason of the unjust refusal on the part of the defendants to satisfy their
just and valid obligation upon maturity, the plaintiff was compelled to engage the
services of counsel for a fee equivalent to 10% of the total sum due which the
defendants have expressly agreed to pay in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, Annex "A".
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed .. that judgment be rendered in favor of
the plaintiff ordering the defendant to pay:
a) the sum of P100,119.27 plus interest thereon from June 26, 1965 until complete
payment is made;
b) the sum equivalent to 10% of the total sum due as attorney's fees;
c) the costs of suit.
PLAINTIFF prays for such other remedy as this Honorable Court may deem just and
equitable under the premises.
In their answer, 3 the defendants admitted the averments of paragraph 2 of the
complaint (and paragraph 1 thereof relative to the parties' personal circumstances);
but they professed to have no "sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief
as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 and,
therefore, .. (denied) the same."
Manufacturers Bank moved for judgment on the pleadings. 4 It adverted to the
defendants' admissions of the parties' personal circumstances and "the fact that the
defendants were granted a loan in the form of an Agreement for Credit in Current
Account in the sum of P125,000.00 with interest at the rate of 10% per annum
computed upon average daily balances, a copy of which agreement has been
attached as Annex A of the complaint." It also branded as contrived and
inefficacious the defendants' profession of lack of knowledge of "the fact that the
loan was due and payable on February 26, 1965 and that the same has been
unliquidated as of the time that the complaint was filed," as well as the fact "of
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total sum due since
1) the Agreement for Credit in Current Account which the defendants had
expressly admitted clearly stated that the loan would automatically be due and
payable on February 26, 1965 and that attorney's fees would be payable at the rate
of 10% of amount due, and hence, it was not credible for them to claim to have no
knowledge of the transactions in question, including the drawing they had made in
virtue of the agreement; and
2) by letter dated October 18, 1966, written to Manufacturers Bank by defendant
Alfonso Tan, as President of Diversified Industries (copy attached to the motion),
the latter had requested that they be allowed to pay the obligation by installments
at the rate of P20,000.00 every six (6) months until the same was paid in full.
The defendants, Diversified Industries and Tan, filed an opposition to the bank's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. 5 They alleged that neither the amounts
drawn against the overdraft account nor the current balance due from them, were
within the knowledge either of Alfonso Tan because he was a mere "guarantor"
or even of Diversified Industries because its account officer had long since
resigned, and moreover, they could not be expected to know the attorney's fees
that Manufacturers Bank had undertaken to pay to its attorney. They also theorized
that since there was no allegation that they had in fact made drawings against the
overdraft account, no obligation to pay a sum of money had been pleaded and
therefore, the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
On the same date the defendants filed a motion for leave to amend their answer,
and the amended answer itself. 6 Their motion alleged that their original pleading
had failed to embody their true plea respecting every material allegation of the
complaint and had failed to set forth their affirmative defenses. Their amended
answer
1) again admitted the execution of the Agreement for Credit in Current Account but
stressed that (a) at time of execution and delivery of the agreement, the bank had
not disbursed a single centavo, and (b) the agreement failed to reflect the true
intent of the parties which was that Tan, as "guarantor" of Diversified Industries,
was merely an 94 accommodation party;
2) denied (a) the claim that defendants' obligation had become due on February 26,
1965 as expressly stipulated because the bank had extended the term of payment
at said defendants' behest; (b) having knowledge of the veracity of the claim that
their outstanding balance was P100,119.21 as of June 25, 1961; and (c) having
knowledge of Manufacturers Bank's engagement of counsel for a fee of 10% of the
total amount due; and
3) set up the following "affirmative defenses:" (a) Tan was meant to be only a
guarantor of Diversified Industries, with the benefit of excursion and since this was
not expressed in the agreement, the agreement failed to express the parties' real
intention; (b) the term of the agreement had been renewed without Tan's consent
and therefore, the guaranty had been extinguished; (c) there had been no demand
for payment before suit was instituted; (d) alternatively, Tan's hability, if not that of
a guarantor, was solidary only as regards payment of interest and merely joint as
regards payment of the principal; and (e) the complaint fails to state a cause of
action.
The Court denied the defendants' motion for leave to amend their answer and
rendered judgment on the pleadings. 7 It opined that the original answer failed to
tender any issue, the defendants' asserted lack of knowledge or information
regarding matters principally and necessarily within their knowledge could not be
considered a specific denial. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants, Diversified
Industries, Inc. and Alfonso Tan to pay the plaintiff the sum of One Hundred
Thousand One Hundred Nineteen Pesos and Twenty Seven Centavos (P100,119.27),
with interest thereon at the legal rate, from 26 June 1965 until fully paid, plus the
sum of 110% on the amount due as and for attorney's fees. Costs against
defendants.
From this judgment appeal was taken to this Court on questions of law by the
defendants as well as the plaintiff, Manufacturers Bank.
Manufacturers Bank faults the Trial Court for (1) not specifying the defendants'
liability to it to be joint and several; and (2) requiring payment by defendants of
interest only at the legal rate instead of that stipulated in their agreement.
On the other hand, Diversified Industries and Alfonso Tan ascribe the following
errors to the Court a quo: (1) refusing to admit their amended answer; (2) not
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action; and (3) rendering
judgment on the pleadings.
Of no little significance is the fact that the motion to amend the answer was
presented only after two (2) years had lapsed from the date of its filing, and only
after the plaintiff had drawn attention to its patent and grave imperfections and
moved for judgment on the pleadings. Equally noteworthy is that defendants never
challenged the authenticity of their letter to the bank dated October 18, 1966,
advising that they had made, thru an Atty. Colayco, payment on their account and
requesting that they be allowed to pay their obligation by installments at the rate of
P20,000.00 every six (6) months. 8 These facts, considered conjointly with the
admissions expressly made in the pleadings and those reasonably inferable
therefrom, dictate a verdict in favor of the plaintiff bank.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the amendment of the answer in
substantial aspects was not a matter of right, 9 but lay in the discretion of the
Court. 10 Where amendment is not a matter of right, a bare assertion of a desire to
amend the pleading because certain matters had not been therein alleged, or the
submission of an amended one, without more, is obviously not sufficient. It is
needful to state to the Court some reasonable ground justifying its exercise of
discretion to allow amendment. 11 Indeed, the Rules elsewhere provide that
judicial admissions "can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been
made through palpable mistake." 12 It is thus incumbent upon a party desiring to
amend his pleading, in other words, to furnish the Court with some adequate
foundation for it to grant leave to amend the pleading. This was not done by the
defendants. Their motion merely declared that they had failed to include certain
allegations and defenses in their original answer, but gave no explanation for their
failure to do so at the time they drew up that pleading or within a reasonable time
thereafter, and why they had not essayed such amendment until after two (2) years
and only after their receipt of plaintiff bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings
which cited certain serious defects of their answer. The absence of such an
explanation, and the implicit admission of liability in their letter of October 18, 1966
requesting that they be permitted to pay in installments of P20,000.00 every six (6)
months not unreasonably engendered the belief in the mind of the Court a quo that
their motion had been "made with intent to delay the action" 13 by relieving them
from the effects of their judicial admissions without a showing of palpable mistake,
or other acceptable absolutory cause.
An analysis of the amended answer readily discloses its lack of merit if not its arrant
sophistry, adding persuasiveness to the Trial Court's resolution of the controversy.
The claim that defendant Tan was only an "accommodation party" or a "guarantor,"
or that he was solidarily bound only as regards interest, flies in the teeth of the
Agreement for Credit in Current Account. The agreement clearly and categorically
expresses the solidary character of the obligations of Tan and his firm, who are
referred to jointly as the "First Party."
The First Party agree to be jointly and severally bound by and to comply with the
following terms and conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
3. The principal and interest of this loan shall be due and become payable on
demand by the Second Party (Manufacturers Bank) whether in writing or otherwise;
Provided, That in any case, this loan shall automatically be due and become payable
and this agreement be terminated on February 26, 1965, without necessity of
demand.
The denials in the amended answer are cut from the same bolt as those in the
original answer. They are sham denials, consisting of an avowed lack of knowledge
of facts which could not but be clearly known to the defendants or ought to be or
could quite easily have been known by them. 14 Their disclaimer of knowledge of
the amount of their outstanding balance is implausible, but even if true, cannot be
deemed a proper denial because concerning something they could very easily have
learned or verified had they wished to. Their disclaimer of knowledge of the
amount of the fee undertaken to be paid by the Manufacturers Bank to its
attorneys is immaterial because not prayed for in the complaint, the claim being in
fact for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due, as expressly
stipulated in the contract. And the averment that their obligation was not yet due
because plaintiff bank had extended the term of payment is also specious, being
contrary to the defendants' written request to the bank that they be allowed to
repay their loan in stated installments.
The correctness, therefore, of the Trial Court's denial of the motion to amend
answer and the propriety of the assailed judgment on the pleadings are beyond
civil. Amendment in the circumstances was clearly subject to said Court's discretion
the exercise of which cannot be faulted; and the defendants' original answer in
truth tendered no issue, or otherwise admitted the allegations of the complaint
material and necessary to a valid decision. 15
Finally, since the Agreement for Credit on Current Account plainly declares both
Diversified Industries and Alfonso Tan jointly and severally liable for both principal
and interest on the loan, the interest being fixed at 10% per annum, it was error for
the Trial Court to decline to so hold them both solidarily liable, and to set the
interest payable at the legal rate instead of the stipulated rate of 10% of the total
amount due.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED WITH THE
MODIFICATION that the liability to Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. of Diversified
Industries, Inc. and Alfonso Tan is pronounced to be joint and several, and the
interest payable on their obligation is fixed at 10% per annum of the total amount
due, in accordance with the Agreement of Credit on Current Account, with costs
against the latter.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.









Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 74766 December 21, 1987
DOMINGO VERGARA, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE T. SUELTO Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Davao City,
Branch IV, MANOLITO GUINOO ROMEO MONTEBON and PORFERIO CABASE
respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
Two issues are involved in the instant special civil action of mandamus. The first is
whether or not the appropriateness of a summary judgment may ever be so self-
evident in a case as to make it well nigh a duty on the part of the Trial Judge to
grant the plaintiff's motion therefor. The second relates to the propriety of the filing
directly with this Court an application for a writ of mandamus against a municipal
trial court, considering that jurisdiction to issue this extraordinary writ is also
possessed by the Court of Appeals as well as the Regional Trial Court of the district.
To resolve the first issue it will be necessary to deal with the facts in some detail.
Petitioner Vergara commenced in the Municipal Trial Court of Davao City an action
for illegal detainer against the private respondents. 1 His complaint 2 alleged in
essence that
1) he is the owner of a commercial building consisting of three (3) sections, each of
which is separately occupied by the defendants (private respondents herein) as
lessees;
2) the defendants' lease contracts, two of which were written, were all on "a month
to month basis," and originally prescribed a monthly rental of P350.00, later
increase to P450.00;
3) because the defendants all defaulted in the payment of their rentals for many
months, Vergara's lawyer sent each of them a letter "(1) demanding payment of
their unpaid rentals, (2) terminating their lease contracts effective at the end of
December 1985 on two grounds: non- payment of rentals and plaintiff's need of the
property for some other purpose, and (3) demanding that defendants vacate the
leased premises not later than the end of said month of December 1985; "
4) the defendants sent Vergara a joint reply pertinently reading as follows:
This is to confirm our verbal commitment with you to leave the said premises as
soon as you need it. However due to mainly economic reason, we request for an
extension of three months (3) to enable us to find new space wherein we can
continue our sole livelihood;
in addition, defendant Montebon also paid a part of his arrearage;
5) later however, the defendants wrote Vergara another letter; this time, while
acknowledging the latter's ownership of the building and their status as lessees
thereof they announced their refusal to vacate the premises on the ground that the
lot on which the building stands, though titled in Vergara's name, was part of a tract
of land Identified as Lot 508 which had been ordered reverted to the public domain
by the Regional Trial Court (Branch XIV) in a decision rendered in Civil Case No.
16192 for "Cancellation of Titles and Reversion" entitled "Republic of the
Philippines vs. Kwong Tai Lung y Cia et al. ;
6) Vergara wrote back to them, pointing out the error of the position thus taken by
them, and reiterating his demand to vacate; his reply having gone unheeded, he
initiated the requisite proceedings before the Office of the Barangay Captain; and
when the controversy was not settled by conciliation, he instituted the ejectment
suit at bar.
In their answer to the complaint, 3 defendants Guinoo, Montebon and Cabase
1) denied the averments of the complaint relative to their and the plaintiff's
personal circumstances;
2) denied Vergara's ownership of the building and the fact that it consisted of three
sections separately leased by him:
3) claimed that their lease contract with Vergara were null and void;
4) denied having initially paid rentals but thereafter defaulting and incurring
arrearages in the amounts specified in the complaint, claiming that they had been
"occupying the premises in the concept of an owner;"
5) denied knowledge and hence professed inability to form a belief regarding either
their joint letter to Vergara (copy of which was attached to the complaint) or of the
reply thereto by Vergara's lawyer;
6) denied liability to Vergara for damages because as member(s) of good standing
of (a group calling itself) Salandanan et al Landless Association Inc., ... (they were)
occupying the land as owners;" and
7) claimed that in virtue of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
16192 declaring null and void the title issued over "lot 508"- of which Vergara's was
formerly a part they were claiming Vergara's land "as their share as member of
Salandanan et al Landless Association," which was "a recognized intervenor" in the
case.
Vergara presented a reply to the defendants' answer, chiefly making the point that
neither he nor any of the defendants was a party to Civil Case No. 16192 and hence
could not be bound by whatever judgment or orders might be rendered therein;
that his title to the land was not void nor had it ever been subject of any action for
annulment; and that in any event Civil Case No. 16192 had no relevance to the
"case for ejectment against defendants for non- payment of rents on x x (his)
commercial building. 4
Under date of March 7, 1986 Vergara filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 5 The
motion was verified and had 8 supporting documents annexed to it. 6 It asserted
and sought to substantiate the following propositions, to wit:
1. The 3 defendants were lessees of Vergara's commercial building, their status as
such being established by-
a) the 2 written contracts of lease of Guinoo and Cabase, copies of which were
attached to the verified complaint as Annexes A and B.
b) the demand letters sent by Vergara's lawyer to each of the 3 defendants, copies
of which were attached to the motion for summary judgment as Annexes A, B, and
C thereof;
c) the payment by Montebon on December 20, 1985 of back rentals for November
and December 1984, evidenced by Official Receipt No. 2300, a copy of which was
appended to the motion as Annex D;
d) the joint letter dated December 6, 1985 confirming their "verbal commitment to
leave the ... "premises" as soon as needed and asking for an "extension of three (3
months to enable ... (them) to find new space, " a copy of was attached to the
verified complaint as Annex C thereof.
2. Neither he (Vergara) nor the defendants were parties in Civil Case No. 16192 and
consequently could not be bound by any judgment or order therein promulgated, a
proposition confirmed by the Order of the Court in that action dated February 24,
1986, a copy of which he attached to his motion as Annex E.
3. Civil Case No. 16192, involving "parcels of land, " was relevant to the ejectment
case at bar involving ejectment from Vergara's "commercial building;" and
defendants had acknowledged in their joint letter dated January 7, 1976 that the
building belongs to Vergara, a copy of the letter being attached to the motion as
Annex F.
4. In view of their acknowledgment of Vergara's ownership of the building, the
defendants' claim of ownership of the land on which it stands is "false and absurd."
"Moreover, defendants as lessees are estopped from asserting any adverse claim or
title against plaintiff (Art. 1436 of the Civil Code). "
5. The defendants' answer is patently defective. It flatly denies their own personal
circumstances, and professes lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief about the
exchange of letters between them and Vergara's lawyer-matters about which they
could not but have direct, personal awareness and about which they could not
therefore claim ignorance. 7
Against this motion defendants filed an "Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss." 8 They argued that
1. A genuine issue exists which "cannot be resolved by mere resort to summary
judgment," that issue having arisen from defendants' controversion of Vergara's
claim "of possession and ownership over the commercial building and the land on
which the same is constructed, "
2. Their answer "tendered a genuine issue and does not only consist of a mere
general denial" since in the main "it specifically denied the material averment of
facts in the complaint setting forth the substance of the matters in support of their
denial;" and as regards their declared ignorance of some of the facts alleged in the
complaint, an averment of lack of knowledge was under the Rules equivalent to a
specific denial.
3. The Court had no jurisdiction over the case because "the real issue involved ... is
title and/or ownership of the property and not physical possession," and "this case
should not be by accion interdictal but accion de reivendicacion (sic). "
Vergara submitted a reply dated April 9, 1986, adverting to the distinction between
a summary judgment under Rule 34 and a judgment on the pleadings under Rule
19, and reiterating and amplifying the propositions and arguments set out in his
motion for summary judgment. 9
The incidents were resolved by the respondent Judge in two separate orders
promulgated on the same day, April 15, 1986. The first order denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss. 10 The Judge ruled that-
... Ownership by the plaintiff of this building has not been seriously denied by
defendants who instead insist that their claim to ownership of the land be a ground
for a dismissal of this case for the court's lack of jurisdiction. But the court believes
that this case properly is an Unlawful Detainer action as it assesses the respective
claims of the parties and it (the court), in accordance with the provisions of Section
33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not without authority to resolve the issue of
ownership if only to determine the issue of possession. 11
The second order 12 denied Vergara's motion for summary judgment. The denial
was grounded on the following observations of the respondent Judge:
... Of course, the (plaintiff's) discussion seeks to convince the court that there is no
more need of a trial because conclusively it is claimed that no genuine issue on a
material fact was raised. But it appears from the answer that the material
allegations of facts in the complaint constituting plaintiff's cause of action are
specifically denied and in addition thereto, defendants have put up affirmative
defenses in avoidance of plaintiff's claims. ... .
The rule gives the court limited authority to enter summary judgment. Upon a
motion for summary judgment, the court's sole function is to determine whether
there is an issue of fact to be tried. It does not vest the court with authority to try
the issues on depositions, pleadings, letters or affidavits. ... (I)f there is a
controversy upon any question of fact, there should be a trial of the case upon its
merits. 13
His Honor's observations expose no little confusion about the fundamental nature
of a summary judgment. The confusion is further bared by his statement that the
"only issue in this motion (for summary judgment) is whether, in this Unlawful
Detainer action the material averments of facts constituting plaintiff's cause of
action have been specifically denied in accordance with Section 10, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court." He seems to think it is the same as a judgment on the pleadings
which, of course, it is not.
The confusion is shared by the defendants (private respondents), this being
revealed by their argument that in view of their denial of plaintiff's assertion of
ownership over the premises in question, and their controversion of "the material
facts of the adverse party," their answer did not only consist of a mere "general
denial" but "definitely tendered a genuine issue" "which cannot be resolved by
resort to mere summary judgment." 14 Indeed, they point out that in their answer
they have dealt with each paragraph of the complaint; and "considering therefore
the totality of the allegations of ... (said) answer vis-a-vis the allegations of the
complaint, ... the answer tendered a valid issue. 15
The essential question however is not whether the answer does controvert the
material allegations of the complaint but whether that controversion is bona fides.
The fundamental issue is not whether the answer does tender valid issues as by
setting forth specific denials and/or affirmative defenses but whether the issues
thus tendered are genuine, or fictitious, sham, characterized by bad faith.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that where an answer "fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegation of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading." 16 The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not
comply with the requirements for a specific denial set out in Section 10 (or Section
8) of Rule 8; and it would admit the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleadings not only where it expressly confesses the truthfulness thereof but also if
it omits to deal with them at all. 17
Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the
complaint in the manner indicated by said Section 10 of Rule 8, and/or asserts
affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material
allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or
bar recovery by the plaintiff) in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 6, a
judgment on the pleadings would naturally not be proper.
But even if the answer does tender issues and therefore a judgment on the
pleadings is not proper-a summary judgment may still be rendered on the plaintiff's
motion if he can show to the Court's satisfaction that "except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," 18 that is to say, the
issues thus tendered are not genuine, are in other words sham, fictitious, contrived,
set up in bad faith, patently unsubstantial. 19 The determination may be made by
the Court on the basis of the pleadings, and the depositions, admissions and
affidavits that the movant may submit, as well as those which the defendant may
present in his turn. 20
In this case, the defendants' answer appears on its face to tender issues. It purports
to deal with each of the material allegations of the complaint, and either specifically
denies, or professes lack of knowledge or information to form a belief as to them. It
also sets up affirmative defenses. But the issues thus tendered are sham, not
genuine, as the slightest reflection and analysis win readily demonstrate.
1. To begin with, the defendants' denial of their own personal circumstances, as
these are stated in the complaint, is obviously sham. The accuracy of those stated
circumstances is quite evident. They are in truth all residents of Davao City, doing
business at Cabaguio Avenue, where the plaintiff's building is located, and in which
they have rented space and where they have been maintaining their commercial
establishments under one trade name or another. As fictitious is their denial of
plaintiff's own personal circumstances. They could not but know that those
circumstances had been correctly set down in the complaint, having been dealing
with the plaintiff for years, and he being the owner of the building occupied by
them.
2. Their disavowal of the plaintiff's ownership of the building occupied by them, and
also that the building is composed of three (3) sections, also cannot be genuine.
They had each been occupying those three (3) sections for years and been paying
rentals therefor to the plaintiff. Their answer contains their admission that the
plaintiff has title over the land on which the building stands. 21 There are two (2)
written contracts showing the lease by two of them of the building from the
plaintiff, and a receipt evidencing payment by another of rentals to the plaintiff,
documents which they have made no serious or effective effort to controvert but
which, on the contrary, they have impliedly admitted. There is, too, their own letter
to the plaintiff dated December 6, 1985, acknowledging receipt of the
communication of the latter's lawyer (demanding their vacation of the premises
and payment of rentals in arrears), and confirming their "verbal commitment to you
to leave the said premises as soon as you need it. 22 There is, finally, another letter
of their dated January 7, 1986 referring to Vergara's demand for the payment of
their "rental in arrears" and for them "to vacate the building rented by us." 23
3. Also patently sham is their professed ignorance of the joint letter sent by them to
the plaintiff under date of December 6, 1985, just referred to. It should be noted
that they have not denied writing or sending the letter. What they say is that "they
have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief" as to it. This is
ridiculous. Either they wrote the letter or they did not. Either way, they cannot but
have knowledge of it. To say that they are ignorant of it is palpable dishonesty. In
any event we have already pronounced such a profession of ignorance about a fact
which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge, or means of
knowing as ineffectual, as no denial at all. 24
4. So, too, their denial of ever having paid rents to the plaintiff is fictitious. The facts
on record, to which the plaintiff has drawn attention, inclusive of the official receipt
issued to defendant Montebon, prove they're beyond cavil.
5. Finally, their affirmative defense, in which they assert title in themselves over the
land on which the plaintiff's building stands, is also sham, even an absurdity. They
base their claim on a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in an entirely
separate action in which title over a large tract of land of which the plaintiff's once
formed a part had been annulled, and the land ordered reverted to the public
domain. But neither the plaintiff nor the defendants are parties to this action. The
judgment has moreover been appealed. And the defendants' connection with the
case rests on nothing more substantial than their alleged membership in an
association at whose relation the reversion suit had supposedly been instituted by
the Republic, and which association would presumably have preferential rights to
occupy or acquire the land once finally reverted to the public domain. It is apparent
that defendants' claim of title to the particular lot of the plaintiff is so tenuous and
conjectural as to be practically inexistent. In any event, the claim is utterly
irrelevant to the ejectment suit at bar, which involves merely the question of
whether or not their possession of the plaintiff's premises had become illegal in
virtue of their extended failure to pay rentals and their refusal to vacate the
premises and pay those arrears despite due demand. They are moreover estopped
to dispute the plaintiff's title. "The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his
landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them." 25
Under the circumstances herein set forth at some length, the fitness and propriety
of a summary judgment cannot be disputed. The failure of the respondent Judge to
render such a judgment was due solely to his unfortunate unfamiliarity with the
concept of a summary judgment. It is a failure which we have it in our power to
remedy. No genuine issue having been tendered by the defendants, judgment
should be directed as a matter of right in the plaintiff's favor. To yet require a trial
notwithstanding the pertinent allegations of the pleadings and the other facts
indubitably appearing on record would be a waste of time, and an injustice to the
plaintiff whose obtention of the relief to which he is plainly and patently entitled
would be further delayed. As it is, the delay has already been considerable.
The remedy properly available to the petitioner in the premises, however, is not the
writ of mandamus. Well known is the rule that mandamus issues only to compel
performance of a mandatory, ministerial duty. 26 The determination that under the
facts and circumstances obtaining in a case a summary judgment is proper, and the
motion therefor should be granted and summary judgment consequently rendered,
rests in the sound discretion of a trial court and can not be regarded as a duty of
ministerial function compellable by the extraordinary writ of mandamus. In this
case, the respondent Judge had discretion to make that determination. What
happened was that His Honor made that determination with grave abuse of
discretion. Despite the plain and patent propriety of a summary judgment, he
declined to render such a verdict. The writ of certiorari will lie to correct that grave
abuse of discretion. 27
We turn now to the second question posed in the opening paragraph of this
opinion, as to the propriety of a direct resort to this Court for the remedy of
mandamus or other extraordinary writ against a municipal court, instead of an
attempt to initially obtain that relief from the Regional Trial Court of the district or
the Court of Appeals, both of which tribunals share this Court's jurisdiction to issue
the writ. As a matter of policy such a direct recourse to this Court should not be
allowed. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of
dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where
serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should
generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts
for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific
action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to
be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
In the case at bar, however, to apply the policy by referring the action to the
Regional Trial Court of the district would serve no useful purpose. It would on the
contrary work injustice to the petitioner to whom the relief rightly due has already
been withheld for many years. The case having been filed before this Court as early
as 1986, and having already been subject of an extensive exchange of pleadings, it
should and will now be decided without further delay.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Judge dated April 15, 1986 denying the
petitioner's (plaintiff's) motion for summary judgment, and that dated April 30,
1986 declining to reconsider the same, are hereby annulled and set aside. Said
respondent Judge is hereby commanded forthwith to render a summary judgment
in favor of the petitioner (plaintiff) against the private respondents (defendants),
namely: Manolito Guinoo, Romeo Montebon and Porferio Cabase, in accordance
with the prayer of the former's motion for summary judgment dated March 7,
1986. The appropriateness and correctness of a summary judgment in the premises
having already been adjudged by this Court, His Honor is further commanded to
direct execution of the judgment immediately upon its rendition. This decision is
immediately executory and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained. Costs against private respondents.
Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Paras, * and Gancayco, JJ., concur.























THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131466. November 27, 1998]
CRISTINA DIMAN, CLARISSA DIMAN, GEORGE DIMAN, FELIPE DIMAN and FLORINA
DIMAN, petitioners, vs. HON, FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIAS, BRANCH 255; HEIRS OF VERONICA V. MORENO
LACALLE, REPRESENTED BY JOSE MORENO LACALLE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
NARVASA, C.J.:
The petition for review on certiorari in this case was initially dismissed by
Resolution dated January 14, 1998; but after deliberating on petitioners' motion for
reconsideration dated February 23, 1998, the private respondents' comment
thereon, the reply to the comment, as well as the record of the case itself, the Court
was convinced that the order of dismissal should be reconsidered and the petition
reinstated. It accordingly promulgated a resolution to that effect on October 12,
1998, and required "respondents to file their Comment on the petition within ten
(10) days from notice **."
Notice of the Resolution was duly served on private respondents' attorney on
October 21, 1998. The latter filed a motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days
to file comment, counted from October 31. The Court granted the extension
sought, but only for fifteen (15) days.
The comment was filed late, on November 20, 1998, Counsel's explanation is that
he had sought an extension of 30 days "due to the other volume of legal works
similarly situated and school work of the undersigned as professor of law and dean
of the University of Manila," and had entertained "the honest belief" that it would
be granted. However, he learned belatedly that only a 15-day extension had been
conceded. He forthwith completed the comment and filed it, albeit five days late.
The Court admits the late comment, but takes this occasion to reiterate the familiar
doctrine that no party has a right to an extension of time to comply with an
obligation within the period set therefor by law; motions for extension are not
granted as a matter of course; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the
Court exercised in accordance with the attendant circumstances; the movant is not
justified in assuming that the extension sought will be granted, or that it will be
granted for the length of time suggested by him. It is thus incumbent on any
movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible
of the Court's action on his motion, by time inquiry of the Clerk of Court. Should he
neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have
nobody but himself to blame.
Now, the petition for review on certiorari appends practically all the material
pleadings, motions, orders and judgments in the Regional Trial Court and the Court
of Appeals. The respondents' comment on the petition has been filed, as just
mentioned, and opposes its material averments. There is now no impediment to
the adjudication of petitioners' appeal on the merits on the basis of the record as it
stands at this time. This, the Court will now proceed to do.
In 1991, more than fifty years after the effectivity of the Rules of Courti --
containing provisions relative inter alia to the modes of discoveryii -- this Court had
occasion to observe that "among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges), there
is, if not regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature,
purposes and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned
and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them -- which is a great pity for the
intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-discovery procedure, could, as the
experience of other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrate, effectively shorten the
period of litigation and speed up adjudication."iii
The case at bar deals with one of such modes of discovery -- a request for admission
under Rule 26 of the Rules of 1964; more particularly, the legal consequences of the
failure to respond thereto in the manner indicated by law. It also treats of other
adjective devices to expedite litigation: a summary judgment under Rule 34,iv and a
judgment on demurrer to evidence under Rule 35.v Had the principles involved
been better understood and more faithfully observed, the case might have been
more quickly decided.
Actually, there are several adjective tools incorporated in the Rules of Court
explicitly designed, like those just mentioned, to abbreviate litigation or abort it at
certain stages. Their obvious purpose is to unmask as quickly as may be feasible,
and give short shrift to, untenable causes of action or defenses and thus avoid
waste of time, effort and money.vi For reasons yet to be fathomed, these devices
seem to be of scant familiarity and of infrequent availment, as above observed,
with the result that the salutary objective of the Rules of bringing about a simple,
inexpensive and expeditious system of litigation has not been fully achieved.
Now, to come to grips with the case. There is no disagreement about the
antecedents. The case began in the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias (Branch 255),
where a complaint for "Quieting of Title and Damages" was filed by the Heirs of
Veronica V.Moreno Lacalle (represented by Jose Moreno Lacalle) against Cristina
Diman, Clarissa Diman, George Diman, Felipe Diman and Florina Diman.vii In their
complaint, the Lacalle heirs claimed that:
a) their mother, the late Veronica V. Moreno Lacalle (who died in 1992), was
the owner of a "parcel of land situated at Brgy. Pulang Lupa Uno, Las Pias, **
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 273301 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal;"
b) Veronica Lacalle had acquired the land in 1959 by virtue of a deed of
absolute sale, and retained as caretakers the persons she found in occupancy of the
lot at the time of the sale, namely: Julian Nario and his wife, Adelaida Legaspi, "with
arrangement to share the agricultural fruits" until the former would have need of
the property;
c) the caretakers of the lot were served with a notice for them to vacate the
land (dated November 22, 1994) and an alias writ of demolition (dated June 7,
1994) issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 2619 -- a case for
"ejectment with damages" filed by the Dimans against the Narios, judgment in
which, commanding the Narios' ouster, had supposedly been affirmed by the
Makati Regional Trial Court (Branch 137);
d) neither the deceased Veronica nor any of her heirs had been made parties
to said ejectment action;
e) the complaint for ejectment contains false assertions, and had caused
them injury for which the Dimans should be made to pay damages.
In their answer with counterclaim dated February 2, 1995,viii the Dimans alleged
that:
a) they are the registered and absolute owners of the land registered in their
names under TCT Nos. 90628, 90629 and 58676 (Pasay City), and have no
knowledge of the land claimed by the Lacalle Heirs;
b) they are entitled to eject from their land the Nario Spouses, who were
falsely claiming to be their lessees;
c) if the Heirs' theory is that the land in their title, No. 273301, is the same as
that covered by the Dimans' titles, then said title No. 2733101 is spurious because:
(1) no less than three official agencies -- (i) the Office of the Registrar of Deeds
for Rizal and Regional Registrar for Region IV, (ii) the Registrar of Deeds of Pasay
City, and (iii) the Pangasiwaan Pangtalaan ng Lupain (Land Registration Authority) --
have certified to the absence of any entry in their records concerning TCT No.
273301 covering land with an area of 22,379 square meters in the name of Veronica
Vda. De Moreno Lacalle;
(2) Decree No. N-11601 explicitly cited as basis by TCT No. 273301 refers to
land in Mauban, Quezon Province, according to the records of the Land Registration
Authority; and GLRO Record No. 14978 also expressly mentioned as basis for TCT
No. 273301, refers to a registration case heard in Pangasinan;
and
d) they are entitled to damages on their counterclaim.
After joinder of the issues, the Dimans served on the Heirs on February 2, 1995, a
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION (dated February 2, 1995) of the truth of the following
specified matters of fact, to wit:ix
a) the Heirs' TCT 273301 (Rizal) is not recorded in the Registry of Rizal, or of
Pasay City, or of Paraaque, or of Las Pias;
b) the Dimans' transfer certificates of title are all duly registered in their
names in Pasay City, as alleged in their answer;
c) in the Index Records of Registered Property Owners under Act No. 496 in
the Office of the land Registration Authority, there is no record of any property
situated in Las Pias in the name of Veronica Lacalle, more particularly described in
TCT 273301;
4) the Heirs cannot produce a certified true copy of TCT 273301;
5) neither Veronica Lacalle nor any of her heirs ever declared the property
under TCT 273301 for taxation purposes since its alleged acquisition on February
24, 1959 or since the issuance of said title on August 7, 1959;
6) not a single centavo has been paid by the Heirs as real estate taxes; and
7) no steps have been taken by the Heirs to ascertain the genuineness and
authenticity of the conflicting titles.
The REQUEST FOR ADMISSION was received by Jose Lacalle himself through
registered mail on February 6, 1995, and copy thereof, by the latter's lawyer (Atty.
Cesar T. Ching) on February 4, 1995. However, no response whatever was made to
the request by Lacalle, his lawyer, or anyone else, despite the lapse of the period
therefor fixed by Section 2 of Rule 26 (not less than ten days after service). The
Dimans thereupon filed with the Court a "MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO
REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION," dated March 28,
1995,x giving the Heirs ten (10) more days to file their answer to the request for
admission, a copy of which was personally delivered to the latter's lawyer; but
again, no response whatever was made.
The Dimans then submitted a "MOTION FOR SUMMARRY JUDGMENT" dated April
17, 1995.xi In that motion they drew attention to the Heirs' failure to file any Pre-
Trial Brief, and the several instances when the Heirs failed to appear at scheduled
hearings resulting in the dismissal of their complaint, which was however later
reinstated. They argued that because the heirs had failed to respond to their
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, each of the matters of which an admission was
requested, was deemed admitted pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26. On this basis, and
on the basis of the joint affidavit of Clarissa Diman de los Reyes and Florina Diman
Tan -- attached to the motion and substantiating the facts recited in the request for
admission -- the Dimans asserted that no genuine issue existed and prayed that "a
summary judgment be entered dismissing the case for lack of merit."
The Heirs' counsel filed a two-page opposition dated May 15, 1995xii in which,
betraying an unfortunate unfamiliarity with the concept of summary judgments, he
asserted inter alia that:
"In order for defendants (Dimans) to successfully pray for judgment on the
pleadings, they have to clearly alleged in their permissive counterclaim their cause
of action and if the answer of the plaintiffs (Heirs) to such kind of counterclaim
admit (sic) it or the answer to the counterclaim is a sham, that is the time for the
defendants to move for a judgment summarily. ** ** (D)efendants have no cause
of action for praying for summary judgment. It is the plaintiffs who will pray for
that and not the defendants."
Subsequently, the Dimans submitted a reply dated May 23, 1995;xiii the Heirs, a
rejoinder dated June 1, 1995;xiv and the Dimans, a pleading entitled "Exceptions
and Comment to Plaintiffs' Rejoinder" dated June 8, 1995.xv
The Trial Court denied the Dimans' motion for summary judgment. In its Order of
June 14, 1995,xvi the Court declared that a "perusal of the Complaint and the
Answer will clearly show that material issue is raised in that both plaintiffs and
defendants claimed ownership over the land in dispute, presenting their respective
titles thereto and accused each other of possessing false title to the land." It
stressed, citing jurisprudence, that a summary judgment "is not proper where the
defendant presented defenses tendering factual issues which call for the
presentation of evidence."
The case proceeded to trial in due course. At its start, the Heirs' counsel, Atty.
Michael Moralde, responding to questions of the Court, admitted that his clients
did not have the original copy of the title which was the basis for their cause of
action, but asserted that they were "still searching" for it since "(i)n every
municipality there are several Registry of Deeds." He theorized that the word
"'title' ** is a relative term ** (and) does not only refer to a document but refers to
ownership."xvii
Only Jose Moreno Lacalle gave evidence for the plaintiff Heirs. Like Atty. Moralde,
he admitted that he had no copy "of the document which says ** (his) mother is
the registered owner;" that the deed of sale was not the only basis for his and his
co-heirs' claim to the land, but also "a xerox copy of the ** title ** except that **
(he) cannot find the original;" that "maybe" the original was in possession of the
person who was his mother's agent in all her transactions, a certain Mr. Lopez,
whom he could no longer locate; that he had tried to verify the existence of the title
"from the Register of Deeds of Pasig and Pasay" without success; that he had not,
however, gone to the Register of Deeds of Paraaque or Las Pias.xviii
The Heirs' documentary evidence consisted of (1) Veronica Lacalle's death
certificate, (2) the special power of attorney authorizing Jose Lacalle to act for his
brothers and sisters; and (3) the deed of absolute sale purportedly executed by
Eusebio Mojica, Clara Mojica, Maria Mojica, Antonia Mojica, Amanda Mojica and
Teodora Aranda which deeded over to Veronica Lacalle the "Land 'known as Lot 1
PSU-151453,'" but which made no reference to any Torrens title over it
Shortly after the Heirs rested their case, the Dimans filed a "Motion for Judgment
on Demurrer to Evidence," dated June 25, 1996.xix They summarized the Heirs'
evidence -- focusing attention on the Heirs failure to present "even an
unauthenticated photocopy of the title," and the absence of any proof that any
proceedings for registration of the land under the Torrens Act had been instituted --
and emphasized anew said Heirs' implied admissions resulting from their failure to
answer their (the Dimans') request therefor as a mode of discovery. On these
premises, the Dimans contended that a judgment on demurrer should be rendered,
there being no genuine issue between the parties notwithstanding the ostensible
conflict of averments in their basic pleadings.
The Heirs presented a three-page opposition, dated July 7, 1996.xx In it their
counsel set out the startling contention that "(d)emurrer to evidence is violative to
due process as the judgment be rendered without giving the plaintiff the
opportunity to cross-examine the defendant," and petulantly inquired, "How could
the truth come out without cross-examination of the defendants by plaintiff?"
particularly, as regards "whether their (the Dimans') title is not fake." Said counsel
also posited the amazing notion that "Demurrer to evidence may be correct only in
criminal cases as it is the right of the accused to remain silent, and that includes his
right to file demurrer for fear of cross-examination. But not in Civil Cases." Once
more counsel regrettably exposed his ignorance of quite elementary legal
principles.
Again, the Dimans' efforts at expediting disposition of the litigation were
unsuccessful. By Order dated December 2, 1996,xxi the Trial Court denied their
motion to dismiss. Respecting the Heirs' omission to present in evidence any copy
(even a photocopy) of TCT No. 273301, the Court remarked that "Not being able to
prove the genuineness and authenticity of TCT No. 273301, it being only a mere
xerox copy ** (the Heirs) did not formally offer the same in evidence." However,
the Court said, the deed of sale of the land in Veronica Lacalle's favor that was
submitted instead -- the "genuineness and authenticity ** (of which had) been fully
established" by the certification of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC -- was
adequate for the purpose. According to the Court, "(e)xecution of a deed of
conveyance in a certain prescribed form gave to the transfer of a title to the land
conveyed ** (and) without being controverted by any convincing evidence to the
contrary can be sufficient basis in granting the plaintiffs' relief for quieting of their
title." The Order passed sub silentio on the quaint contentions in the Heirs'
opposition.
The Dimans moved for reconsideration under date of January 2, 1997,xxii inter alia
(1) alleging that although the photocopy of TCT 2773301 annexed to the Heirs'
complaint states that the "certificate is a transfer from T.C.T. No. 259150" (and this,
presumably, would be the vendors' [the Mojicas'] title), no effort whatever was
made to submit proof thereof, and (2) reiterating the proposition that the Heirs
were bound by their implied admissions under Rule 26.
The Dimans also submitted a "SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION"
dated January 7, 1997xxiii in which they invited attention to the identity of the
technical description of the land contained in the deed of sale to Veronica Lacalle
and that set out in TCT No. 273301. It must therefore have been Veronica Lacalle,
they reasoned, who had instituted the registration proceedings leading to the
supposed issuance of said TCT No. 273301. Yet the heirs failed to present evidence
of the record of any such registration proceedings, just as they failed to present
evidence of any authentic copy of the title itself.
The Heirs filed a one-page "Vehement Opposition ** " dated February 15, 1997.xxiv
Once again they reiterated the astounding argument that the Dimans' "insistence
** (on the demurrer to evidence) is tantamount to suppression of their evidence as
they are afraid of cross-examination"!
Again the Trial Court rebuffed the Dimans. In its Order of February 28, 1997,xxv the
Court ruled that the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration and its
supplement had already been passed upon in the Order of December 2, 1996. It
then set the case "for the reception of defendants' evidence on April 22, 1997 **."
What the Dimans did was to commence a special civil action of certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals praying (a) that it set aside the
Orders of June 14, 1995 (denying summary judgment), of December 2, 1996
(denying demurrer to evidence), and of February 28, 1997 (denying
reconsideration); (b) that the Trial Judge be commanded to dismiss the case before
it; and (c) that said judge be prohibited from conducting further proceedings in the
case.
But once again their efforts met with failure. The Appellate Tribunal (Seventh
Division) promulgated judgment on September 9, 1997 decreeing that their petition
be "DENIED due course and DISMISSED." The Court of Appeals held that insofar as
concerned the Order of June 14, 1995, the petition for its invalidation had not been
filed within a reasonable time; and that as regards the Order of December 2, 1996,
the remedy of certiorari was improper because : (1) said order was merely
interlocutory, (2) any error therein constituted only an error of judgment
correctible by appeal, and (3) there was no capriciousness or whimsicality attendant
upon the order. The Dimans' motion for reconsideration was later denied by the
Court of Appeals by Resolution dated November 5, 1997.xxvi
The Dimans thereupon filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari of the
Appellate Tribunal's Decision of September 9, 1997. But seemingly consistent with
the pattern of judicial misfortune which they had theretofore been traversing, their
petition for review was dismissed, by Resolution dated January 14, 1998. Their
appeal was however subsequently reinstated, as earlier recounted.
Now, what first strikes the Court about the case at bar is the regrettable absence of
familiarity, therein laid bare, with the rules of discovery and with the underlying
philosophy and principles of the cognate remedy of summary judgment. That
resulted in the undue protraction of the present action despite ample
demonstration of the absence of any genuine issue -- that is to say, that the issues
ostensibly arising from the pleadings were sham or fictitious.
A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the consequences of a party's
refusal to allow or make discovery should be; it is the law which makes that
determination; and it is grave abuse of discretion for the Court to refuse to
recognize and observe the effects of that refusal as mandated by law. Particularly
as regards request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the law
ordains that when a party is served with a written request that he admit : (1) the
genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with
the request, or (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in
the request, said party is bound within the period designated in the request,xxvii to
file and serve on the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either (10
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or (2) setting
forth in details the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters. If the party served does not respond with such sworn statement, each of
the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.xxviii
In this case, the Dimans' request for admission was duly served by registered mail
on Jose Lacalle on February 6, 1995, and a copy thereof on his lawyers on February
4, 1995. Neither made any response whatever within the reglementary period. Nor
did either of them do so even after receiving copy of the Dimans' "MANIFESTATION
WITH MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION."
dated March 28, 1995. On account thereof, in legal contemplation, the Heirs
impliedly admitted all the facts listed in the request for admission. These plain and
simple legal propositions were disregarded by His Honor.
It is also the law which determines when a summary judgment is proper. It declares
that although the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact -- e.g., there
are denials of, or a conflict in, factual allegations -- if it is shown by admissions,
depositions or affidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious, or not genuine, or, in
the language of the Rules, that "except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entiled to a
judgment as a matter of law,xxix the Court shall render a summary judgment for
the plaintiffxxx or the defendantxxxi as the case may be.xxxii
Parenthetically, the existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings,
on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what
distinguish a proper case for a summary judgmentxxxiii from one for a judgment on
the pleadings under Rule 19 of the 1964 Rules.xxxiv In the latter case, there is no
ostensible issue at all, but the absence of any because of the failure of the
defending party's answer to raise an issue. Rule 19 expresses the principle as
follows:
"Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading **."xxxv
On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist --
i.e., facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no
admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are
in truth set out in the answer -- but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are
sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown by admissions, depositions or admissions.
In other words, as a noted authority remarks, a judgment on the pleadings is a
judgment on the facts as pleaded while a summary judgment is a judgment on the
facts as summarily proven by affidavits, depositions or admissions.xxxvi Another
distinction is that while the remedy of a judgment on the pleadings may be sought
only by a claimant (one seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, supra), a summary judgment may be applied
for by either a claimant or a defending party.
These basic distinctions escaped His Honor. He denied the Dimans' motion for
summary judgment in his Order of June 14, 1995, opining that a "perusal of the
Complaint and the Answer will clearly show that material issue is raised in that both
plaintiffs and defendants claimed ownership over the land in dispute, presenting
their respective titles thereto and accused each other of possessing false title to the
land." He added, citing cases, that a summary judgment "is not proper where the
defendant presented defenses tendering factual issues which call for the
presentation of evidence." Such a ratiocination is grossly erroneous. Clearly, the
grounds relied on by the Judge are proper for the denial of a motion for judgment
on the pleadings -- as to which the essential question, as already remarked, is: are
there issues arising from or generated by the pleadings? -- but not as regards a
motion for summary judgment -- as to which the crucial question is: issues having
been raised by the pleadings, are those issues genuine, or sham or fictitious, as
shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the application
therefor?
Errors on principles so clear and fundamental as those herein involved cannot but
be deemed so egregious as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, being
tantamount to whimsical or capricious exercise of judicial prerogative.
When the Heirs closed their evidence as party plaintiffs, and the Dimans moved to
dismiss on ground of insufficiency of the Heirs' evidence, the Trial Judge was
charged with the duty to assess the evidence to ascertain whether or not "upon the
facts and the law the plaintiff(s) ** (have) shown no right to relief." It was in the
first place incumbent on His Honor to hold the Heirs bound to their admissions
appearing in the record, express and implied. In accordance with Section 2, Rule 26
of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Heirs were impliedly, but no less indubitably,
deemed to have admitted the facts on which admissions had been duly requested
by reason of their failure to reply thereto. Said Section 2 reads as follows:
"SEC. 2. Implied admissions. -- Each of the matters of which an admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the
request, which shall not be less than twn (10) days after service thereof, or within
such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom
the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn
statement either denying specifically the matters on which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either
admit or deny those matters.
Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter requested
shall be promptly submitted to the court for resolution."xxxvii
In determining the chief issue in the case, the Trial Judge should have taken due
account of the following circumstances on record and obvious legal propositions:
1) the Heirs' admissions of the following facts, viz.:
a) the Heirs' TCT 273301 (Rizal) is not recorded in the Registry of Rizal, or of
Pasay City, or of Paraaque, or of Las Pias;
b) on the other hand, the Dimans' transfer certificates of title are all duly
registered in their names in Pasay City;
c) there is no record of any property situated in Las Pias in the name of
Veronica Lacalle -- more particularly described in TCT 273301 -- in the Index Records
of Registered Property Owners under Act No. 496 in the Office of the Land
Registration Authority;
d) the Heirs do not have and cannot produce even a certified true copy of TCT
273301;
e) neither Veronica Lacalle nor any of her heirs ever declared the property
under TCT 273301 for taxation purposes since its alleged acquisition on February
24, 1959 or since the issuance of said title on August 7, 1959;
f) not a single centavo was ever paid by the Heirs as real estate taxes; and
g) no steps were ever taken by the Heirs to ascertain the genuineness and
authenticity of the conflicting titles.
2) the statement in open Court of the Heirs' own counsel that his clients did
not have original copy of the title, that they were fact "still searching" for the
title;xxxviii
3) the testimony of Jose Moreno Lacalle that he had no copy "of the
document which says ** (his) mother is the registered owner" of the land in
question; that he "cannot find the original" which "maybe" was in possession of his
mother's agent, a certain Mr. Lopez, who, he could no longer locate; that he had
tried to verify the existence of the title "from the Register of Deeds of Pasig and
Pasay" without success; that he had not, however, gone to the Register of Deeds of
Paraaque or Las Pias;xxxix
4) that the only document bearing on the issue submitted by the heirs, the deed of
absolute sale purportedly executed by Eusebio Mojica, Clara Mojica, Maria Mojica,
Antonia Mojica, Amanda Mojica and Teodora Aranda -- which deeded over to
Veronica Lacalle the "land 'known as Lot 1 PSU-151453,'" but which made no
reference to any Torrens title over it -- was not accompanied by proof of the
vendors' ownership of the land in question;
5) that the land subject of the Heirs' action for quieting of title being
registered land (being in fact registered in the Dimans' favor), the unregistered
deed of sale relied upon by the Heirs cannot and does not affect said land, or bind
any third party (including the Dimans) for the reason that, as a matter of law:
" ** (N)o deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will
purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or
bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as
evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration;" and it is the
"act of registration (that) shall be the operative act to convey or effect the land in
so far as third persons are concerned," which "registration shall be made in the **
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies."xl
and
6) that there is no proof whatever of the ownership or character of the rights of the
vendors (the Mojicas) over the property purportedly conveyed.
In fine, the Heirs had proven nothing whatever to justify a judgment in their favor.
They had not presented any copy whatever of the title they wished to be quieted.
They had not adduced any proof worthy of the name to establish their
precedessors' ownership of the land. On the contrary, their own evidence, from
whatever aspect viewed, more than persuasively indicated their lack of title over
the land, or the spuriousness of their claim of ownership thereof. The evidence on
record could not be interpreted in any other way, and no other conclusion could be
drawn therefrom except the unmeritoriousness of the complaint. The case at bar is
a classic example of the eminent propriety of a summary judgment, or a judgment
on demurrer to evidence.
Considering these circumstances, including the outlandish grounds of opposition
advanced by the Heirs against the Dimans' motions for summary judgment and for
demurrer to evidence, no less than the obviously mistaken grounds cited by the
Trial Court for denying said motions, this Court has no hesitation in declaring that it
was indeed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial Court to have refused
to render a summary judgment or one on demurrer to evidence. In no sense may
the Trial Court's errors be considered, as the Court of Appeals did in its judgment of
September 9, 1997, as mere errors of judgment correctible by appeal, untarnished
by any capriciousness or whimsicality.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
September 9, 1997 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE: the Orders dated July 14, 1996 and
December 2, 1996 rendered in the action for "Quieting of Title and Damages" --
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3085 of the Regional Trial Court at Las Pias (Branch
255) and entitled "Heirs of Veronica V. Moreno Lacalle, represented by Jose
Moreno Lacalle versus Cristina Diman, Clarissa Diman, George Diman, Felipe Diman
and Florina Diman" -- are annuled; and said Civil Case No. 94-3085 is DISMISSED.
Costs against private respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.









































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78290-94 May 23, 1989
NATALIA REALTY CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PROTACIO RANCHU VALLEZ, CEFERINO MARTINEZ, PABLO ESPEMEDA, AUGUSTO
ARIZOLA and CERIACO BANDOC, defendants-appellants.
Segundo E. Mangohig for petitioner.
Jose Edward L. Navarro for defendants-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:
In these appeals in five (5) consolidated cases 1 certified by the Court of Appeals to
this Court since they involve only a question of law, We affirm the summary
judgment rendered by the court a quo.
Said appeals originated from five (5) civil cases commenced by herein appellee
Natalia Realty Corporation against the five (5) appellants, namely, Protacio Ranchu
Vallez, 2 Ceferino Martinez, 3 Pablo Espemeda 4 Augusta Arizola, 5 and Ceriaco
Bandoc, 6 which were consolidated and assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
LXXI, at Antipolo, Rizal. 7 Plaintiff alleged that the defendants unlawfully occupied
portions of the parcels of land belonging to it and registered in its name under
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 31527 and 31528 (now N-67845) of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal. It was prayed that defendants be adjudged without valid right
whatsoever in plaintiffs land, that they be ordered to vacate the same and to pay
the reasonable compensation and financial reliefs stated in the respective
complaints against them.
After filing their consolidated answer, defendants sought the dismissal of all the
aforesaid complaints for ejectment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Their
motion was denied on September 26, 1983 on a holding that the grounds therefor
are not indubitable.
On October 29, 1983, plaintiff corporation moved for a summary judgment on the
consolidated cases under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. Plaintiff claimed that the
only issue for resolution, if any, is strictly legal; and that "the pleadings manifestly
show that there is no genuine issue or issues as to any material fact averred in the
complaint and that defendants in their common answer to complaint have put up
sham defenses and counterclaims all of which are mere pretended denials and
flimsy defenses." Annexed to said motion is the affidavit of the company's executive
vice-president, Eugenia Oliveros, attesting to the truth of the averments therein. An
opposition was filed by defendants on November 4, 1983 through a "Joint Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment."
On December 16, 1983, the trial court rendered a summary judgment upon finding
that no valid issue was raised by defendants but only "conclusions that because
they have been in actual possession for over 30 years of their respective farm lots
they are entitled to be respected of (sic) such occupancy and as such the complaints
should be dismissed, (par. 4, p. 7, Record, Answer, Civil Case No. 11 7-A) that the
titles of plaintiff are null and void ab initio and should be cancelled and in lieu
thereof issued new certificates of titles (sic) to the defendants in accordance with
the land reform program under P.D. No. 2." 8
Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff ordering the defendants to vacate
the portions of land involved, to forthwith remove therefrom all improvements
they may have constructed thereon, and to pay rentals of P50.00 a month from
January, 1980 until the defendant concerned shall have vacated the premises he
occupied. 9
In a joint notice of appeal, defendants sought appellate review in the then
Intermediate Appellate Court. Their brief, dated June 23, 1984, prayed for the
reversal of the summary judgment rendered by the court below and for the
confirmation of their alleged just titles supposedly under Article 541 of the Civil
Code. It does not appear that appellee corporation filed a brief therein.
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals, in its resolution of November 27, 1986,
certified the aforesaid consolidated appeals to this Court on its finding that "no
question of fact has been raised by appellants for determination by this Court." The
only question, according to the Court of Appeals, is whether or not the court a quo
acted correctly in rendering a summary judgment in the aforesaid cases.
It is settled that a summary judgment under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court is proper
only if there is no genuine issue as to the existence of any material fact. 10 It is
intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear
undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits
on record. 11 This elucidation of its role in procedural law is instructive:
... This Summary Judgment or Accelerated Judgment is a device for weeding out
sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the
expense and loss of time involved in a trial. The very object is "to separate what is
formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial, so
that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial." In conducting the
hearing, the purpose of the judge is not to try the issue, but merely to determine
whether there is a meritorious issue to be tried. Where a motion is made for
summary judgment, such motion is not directed to the pleadings and deals only
with the question of whether there are triable issues of facts and where such issue
exists summary judgment must be denied. Summary judgment should not be
granted where it fairly appears that there is a triable issue to be tried. The Court
should not pass on questions of credibility or weight of evidence, and that the
summary judgment procedure should not be perverted to the trial of disputed
questions of fact upon affidavits'. The test, therefore, of a motion for summary
judgment is whether the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of the
motions are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a
matter of law that there is no defense to the action or the claim is clearly
meritorious.
In proceedings for summary judgment, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to
prove the cause of action and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the
purpose of delay. After plaintiffs burden has been discharged, defendant has the
burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend. 12
The focal point of inquiry is whether or not there is a factual controversy in these
consolidated cases. To resolve this query, the pleadings and documents on file and
an analysis thereof are both indispensable and decisive. The sine qua non of such an
adjudicative recourse is spelled out thus: After the hearing, the judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. 13
The mimeographed complaints filed against the defendants are identical in their
substantial allegations, with the plaintiff alleging as follows:
. . .
3. Plaintiff is the registered owner and in possession of parcels of land situated at
Barrio Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates Nos. 31527 and
31528 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal;
4. That for more than a year before the filing of this Complaint, defendant/s
has/have (sic) unlawfully occupying and possessing a portion of------ square meters,
more or less, with an assessed value of P----------- included in Pcs---------- and within
the aforesaid parcel of land, where his/her/their house and other construction
stand, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, thereby depriving the
plaintiff of the possession of the said portion;
5. Notwithstanding the demands made upon defendant/s to vacate the premises in
question and to remove his/her/their houses and/ or construction therefrom,
he/she/they has/have failed and refused, and still continues to fail and refuse to do
so;
6. As a consequence of the acts of usurpation committed by the defendant's (sic)
plaintiff suffered and will continue to suffer damages at the rate of P50.00 monthly
from January 1980 representing the fair rental value of the premises in question; 14
On the other hand, the position of defendants is the same all throughout the case
and is set out in their "joint and common answer to the complaint," as follows:
x x x
3. In answer to paragraph No. 3 of the plaintiff's complaint, defendants have no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of plaintiffs
claim of titles and consequently denies (sic) the same in that the alleged judgment
or decision from where it derived said titles are null and void as said title numbers
have the same serial numbers as those in the different municipalities of the
Province of Rizal and those included in Metro Manila that said titles are null and
void ab initio and should be cancelled and in lieu thereof issue new certificates of
titles (sic) to the defendants and their privies pursuant to the contract of legal
services with the undersigned counsel for the defendants and their privies who are
members of the Confederation of Farm and Home Lots Proprietors of the
Philippines in accordance with the land reform program as called for under PD No. 2
dated September 26, 1972 and the authority of this Honorable Court under Section
10 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
4. In answer to paragraph No. 4 of the plaintiffs complaint, defendants and their
privies denies (sic) the same, the truth of the matter being that the defendants and
their privies having tacked their respective possessions of their farm and home lots
through their several predecessors in interest without interruption in open,
continuous, public, and adverse (sic) in the concept of owner since time
immemorial by actual possession under claim of ownership as required by Article
433 of the Civil Code and the plaintiff has never identified the property of the
respective defendants in paragraph No. 4 of the complaint that Article 434 of the
Civil Code provides that "In an action to recover, the property must be identified,
and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of
the defendant's claim' and said paragraph No. 4 of the complaint of the plaintiff
shows that it is for an accion reivindicatoria which cannot be had under the
circumstances since many of the defendants and their privies had been in actual,
physical, and material possession of the land in the concept of owner through their
predecessors in interest for more than fifty (50) years beyond the thirty (30) year
limit for an accion reivindicatoria to prosper hence plaintiff (sic) claim by virtue of a
null and void title is untenable because the plaintiff's claim of ownership of the land
in question cannot be maintained in these class suit of cases (sic), that is, the
plaintiff and their privies versus the defendants and their privies and predecessors
in interest.
5. In answer to paragraph No. 5 of the plaintiffs complaint, defendants and their
privies deny the same the truth of the matter being that as stated in the foregoing
paragraphs Nos. 3 and 4 above, defendants and their privies exercised their
ownership of the land in question in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code and the land reform program that the plaintiff should be prosecuted for
violation of the law. 15
x x x
Additionally, but inexplicably, defendants insist that the filing of a motion for
summary judgment is an admission by plaintiff of the prescription of their action
because said motion is applicable only in the inferior courts. They then pontificate
that only three kinds of actions are available to recover possession of real property,
that is, forcible entry or illegal detainer, accion publiciana, and accion de
reivindicacion which actions, according to them, cannot be availed of by the
plaintiff because the only issue in all the three kinds of actions is possession which
the plaintiff allegedly never had from the beginning. 16 The incongruity of their said
propositions dictate that they should be disregarded.
We are, consequently, convinced that the rendition of the questioned summary
judgment by the trial court is proper and valid. Tested against the statutory and
jurisprudential rules above stated, the very allegations of the defendants prove that
no valid issue has been tendered by them, They relied mainly on two points, the
alleged invalidity of the title of the plaintiff and their supposed acquisition of the
properties by adverse possession. Defendants' theses are obviously puerile but they
are entitled to the benefit of clarification.
We note with approval the lower court's patient explanation that, inter alia, the
certificates of title issued in the name of the plaintiff in accordance with the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496) is indefeasible after the expiration of one year from
the entry of the decree of registration. Under Section 38 thereof, a petition for
review of the decree must be presented within one year after its entry as described
and defined in Section 40 of the same. After the lapse of one year, the decree of
registration becomes incontrovertible 17 and is binding upon and conclusive against
all persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the registration
proceedings. 18 The certificates of title of appellee corporation were issued more
than thirty years ago: Title No. 31527 was issued on September 11, 1953, while Title
No. 31528 (now N-67845) was issued on February 19, 1952,
Even assuming arguendo that said titles may still be challenged, the present case
does not provide the vehicle for that remedy since the judicial action required is a
direct, and not a collateral, attack. 19 In fact, under the existing law, Section 48 of
the Property Registration Decree 20 expressly provides that a certificate of title
cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126
of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land
Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496
provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. 21
Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and
inconsequential.
There is nothing either in Presidential Decree No. 2 which may be said to justify
appellants' claim that said decree granted the ownership of said lands to them and
their successors by title. 22 Apparently, appellants were misled or induced to
believe that they acquired the parcels of land in question when the whole country
was declared by the previous regime as a land reform area.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed summary judgment rendered by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 91779 February 7, 1991
GRAND FARMS, INC. and PHILIPPINE SHARES CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE ADRIAN R. OSORIO, as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 171, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; ESPERANZA ECHIVERRI, as Clerk
of Court & Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila;
SERGIO CABRERA, as Deputy Sheriff-in-Charge; and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK, respondents.
Balgos & Perez for petitioners.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:p
The propriety of a summary judgment is raised in issue in the instant petition, with
herein petitioners appealing the decision 1 of respondent court in CA-G.R. SP No.
17535, dated November 29, 1989, which found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent judge in denying petitioners' motion for summary judgment. 2
The antecedents of this case are clear and undisputed. Sometime on April 15, 1988,
petitioners filed Civil Case No. 2816-V88 in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings over their mortgaged properties, with damages, against
respondents clerk of court, deputy sheriff and herein private respondent Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank. 3
Soon after private respondent had filed its answer to the complaint, petitioners
filed a request for admission by private respondent of the allegation, inter alia, that
no formal notice of intention to foreclose the real estate mortgage was sent by
private respondent to petitioners. 4
Private respondent, through its deputy liquidator, responded under oath to the
request and countered that petitioners were "notified of the auction sale by the
posting of notices and the publication of notice in the Metropolitan Newsweek, a
newspaper of general circulation in the province where the subject properties are
located and in the Philippines on February 13, 20 and 28, 1988." 5
On the basis of the alleged implied admission by private respondent that no formal
notice of foreclosure was sent to petitioners, the latter filed a motion for summary
judgment contending that the foreclosure was violative of the provisions of the
mortgage contract, specifically paragraph (k) thereof which provides:
k) All correspondence relative to this Mortgage, including demand letters,
summons, subpoena or notifications of any judicial or extrajudical actions shall be
sent to the Mortgagor at the address given above or at the address that may
hereafter be given in writing by the Mortgagor to the Mortgagee, and the mere act
of sending any correspondence by mail or by personal delivery to the said address
shall be valid and effective notice to the Mortgagor for all legal purposes, and the
fact that any communication is not actually received by the Mortgagor, or that it
has been returned unclaimed to the Mortgagee, or that no person was found at the
address given, or that the address is fictitious, or cannot be located, shall not
excuse or relieve the Mortgagor from the effects of such notice; 6
The motion was opposed by private respondent which argued that petitioners'
reliance on said paragraph (k) of the mortgage contract fails to consider paragraphs
(b) and (d) of the same contract, which respectively provide as follows:
b) . . . For the purpose of extra-judicial foreclosure, the Mortgagor (plaintiff) hereby
appoints the Mortgagee (BF) his attorney-in-fact to sell the property mortgaged, to
sign all documents and perform any act requisite and necessary to accomplish said
purpose and to appoint its substitutes as such attorney-in-fact, with the same
powers as above-specified. The Mortgagor hereby expressly waives the term of
thirty (30) days or any other term granted or which may hereafter be granted him
by law as the period which must elapse before the Mortgagee shall be entitled to
foreclose this mortgage, it being specifically understood and agreed that the said
Mortgagee may foreclose this mortgage at any time after the breach of any
conditions hereof. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
d) Effective upon the breach of any conditions of the mortgage and in addition to
the remedies herein stipulated, the Mortgagee is hereby likewise appointed
attorney-in-fact of the Mortgagor with full powers and authority, with the use of
force, if necessary, to take actual possession of the mortgaged property, without
the necessity for any judicial order or any permission of power to collect rents, to
eject tenants, to lease or sell the mortgaged property, or any part thereof, at public
or private sale without previous notice or adverstisement of any kind and execute
the corresponding bills of sale, lease or other agreement that may be deemed
convenient, to make repairs or improvement to the mortgaged property and pay
for the same and perform any other act which the Mortgagor may deem convenient
. . . 7
On February 27, 1989, the trial court issued an order, denying petitioners' motion
for summary judgment. 8 Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by respondent-judge on the ground that genuine and substantial issues exist
which require the presentation of evidence during the trial, to wit: (a) whether or
not the loan has matured; (b) whether or not private respondent notified
petitioners of the foreclosure of their mortgage; (c) whether or not the notice by
publication of the foreclosure constitutes sufficient notice to petitioners under the
mortgage contract; (d) whether or not the applicant for foreclosure of the mortgage
was a duly authorized representative of private respondent; and (e) whether or not
the foreclosure was enjoined by a resolution of this Court. 9
Petitioners thereafter went on a petition for certiorari to respondent court
attacking said orders of denial as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
As earlier adverted to, respondent court dismissed the petition, holding that no
personal notice was required to foreclose since private respondent was constituted
by petitioners as their attorney-in-fact to sell the mortgaged property. It further
held that paragraph (k) of the mortgage contract merely specified the address
where correspondence should be sent and did not impose an additional condition
on the part of private respondent to notify petitioners personally of the foreclosure.
Respondent court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence the
instant petition.
We rule for petitioners.
The Rules of Court authorize the rendition of a summary judgment if the pleadings,
depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that, except
as to the amount of damages, there is no issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 10 Although an issue may
be raised formally by the pleadings but there is no genuine issue of fact, and all the
facts are within the judicial knowledge of the court, summary judgment may be
granted. 11
The real test, therefore, of a motion for summary judgment is whether the
pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of the motion are sufficient to
overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there
is no defense to the action or that the claim is clearly meritorious. 12
Applying said criteria to the case at bar, we find petitioners' action in the court
below for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of the foreclosure proceedings
and damages ripe for summary judgment. Private respondent tacitly admitted in its
answer to petitioners' request for admission that it did not send any formal notice
of foreclosure to petitioners. Stated otherwise, and as is evident from the records,
there has been no denial by private respondent that no personal notice of the
extrajudicial foreclosure was ever sent to petitioners prior thereto. This omission,
by itself, rendered the foreclosure defective and irregular for being contrary to the
express provisions of the mortgage contract. There is thus no further necessity to
inquire into the other issues cited by the trial court, for the foreclosure may be
annulled solely on the basis of such defect.
While private respondent was constituted as their attorney-in-fact by petitioners,
the inclusion of the aforequoted paragraph (k) in the mortgage contract
nonetheless rendered personal notice to the latter indispensable. As we stated in
Community Savings & Loan Association, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 13
where we had the occasion to construe an identical provision:
On the other important point that militates against the petitioners' first ground for
this petition is the fact that no notice of the foreclosure proceedings was ever sent
by CSLA to the deceased mortgagor Antonio Esguerra or his heirs in spite of an
express stipulation in the mortgage agreement to that effect. Said Real Estate
Mortgage provides, in Sec. 10 thereof that:
(10) All correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters,
summons, subpoenas, or notifications of any judicial or extrajudicial actions shall be
sent to the Mortgagor at the address given above or at the address that may
hereafter be given in writing by the Mortgagor to the Mortgagee, and the mere act
of sending any correspondence by mail or by personal delivery to the said address
shall be valid and effective notice to the Mortgagor for all legal purposes, . . .
(Emphasis in the original text.)
The Court of Appeals, in appreciating the foregoing provision ruled that it is an
additional stipulation between the parties. As such, it is the law between them and
as it not contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy, the same should
be complied with faithfully (Article 1306, New Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus,
while publication of the foreclosure proceedings in the newspaper of general
circulation was complied with, personal notice is still required, as in the case at bar,
when the same was mutually agreed upon by the parties as additional condition of
the mortgage contract. Failure to comply with this additional stipulation would
render illusory Article 1306 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines (p. 37, Rollo).
On the issue of whether or not CSLA notified the private respondents of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale in compliance with Sec. 10 of the mortgage agreement
the Court of Appeals found as follows:
As the record is bereft of any evidence which even impliedly indicate that the
required notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was ever sent to the deceased
debtor-mortgagor Antonio Esguerra or to his heirs, the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the property in question are fatally defective and are not binding on
the deceased debtor-mortgagor or to his heirs (p. 37, Rollo)
Hence, even on the premise that there was no attendant fraud in the proceedings,
the failure of the petitioner bank to comply with the stipulation in the mortgage
document is fatal to the petitioners' cause.
We do not agree with respondent court that paragraph (k) of the mortgage contract
in question was intended merely to indicate the address to which the
communications stated therein should be sent. This interpretation is rejected by the
very text of said paragraph as above construed. We do not see any conceivable
reason why the interpretation placed on an identically worded provision in the
mortgage contract involved in Community Savings & Loan Association, Inc. should
not be adopted with respect to the same provision involved in the case at bar.
Nor may private respondent validly claim that we are supposedly interpreting
paragraph (k) in isolation and without taking into account paragraphs (b) and (d) of
the same contract. There is no irreconcillable conflict between, as in fact a
reconciliation should be made of, the provisions of paragraphs (b) and (d) which
appear first in the mortgage contract and those in paragraph (k) which follow
thereafter and necessarily took into account the provisions of the preceding two
paragraphs. 14 The notices respectively mentioned in paragraphs (d) and (k) are
addressed to the particular purposes contemplated therein. Those mentioned in
paragraph (k) are specific and additional requirements intended for the mortgagors
so that, thus apprised, they may take the necessary legal steps for the protection of
their interests such as the payment of the loan to prevent foreclosure or to
subsequently arrange for redemption of the property foreclosed.
What private respondent would want is to have paragraph (k) considered as non-
existent and consequently disregarded, a proposition which palpably does not merit
consideration. Furthermore, it bears mention that private respondent having
caused the formulation and preparation of the printed mortgage contract in
question, any obscurity that it imputes thereto or which supposedly appears
therein should not favor it as a contracting party. 15
Now, as earlier discussed, to still require a trial notwithstanding private
respondent's admission of the lack of such requisite notice would be a superfluity
and would work injustice to petitioners whose obtention of the relief to which they
are plainly and patently entitled would be further delayed. That undesirable
contingency is obviously one of the reasons why our procedural rules have provided
for summary judgments.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
this case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings in conformity
with this decision. This judgment is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-38280 March 21, 1975
ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. and/or COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Quezon
City, REGINO CLEOFAS, and LUCIA DE LA CRUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-39905 March 21, 1975
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE CAMPOS, REGINO CLEOFAS, and LUCIA DE LA CRUZ, respondents.
Feliciano C. Tumale for petitioner St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc.
Tan Law Office for petitioner Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Juan T. Aquino for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:+.wph!1
The Court decided to dispose of these two cases in a consolidated decision,
considering that the facts in both are the same and the issues are intertwined.
In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the spouses Regino Cleofas and Lucia de la
Cruz filed suit against St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. (or Memorial Park for short),
Araceli Wijangco del Rosario, National Investment and Development Corporation
(or NIDC), Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (or Banco Filipino for short),
the Register of Deeds of Rizal, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the Sheriff
of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-15001). In their amended complaint, the spouses
prayed that they be declared the rightful owners of Lot No. 719 of the Piedad
Estate, that the Torrens Title to said lot be reconstituted, the title thereto of their
deceased predecessor, Antonio Cleofas, having been burned in a fire in 1933; that
the certificates of title over said lot in the name of the Memorial Park, and that in
the name of Wijangco del Rosario, and all the certificates of title from which these
certificates were derived be declared null and void; that the mortgages over said,
lot constituted in favor of Banco Filipino and the NIDC be declared null and void;
and that the Memorial Park be ordered to pay plaintiffs damages. The amended
complaint likewise sought issuance of preliminary injunction and the appointment
of a receiver. The lower court ordered appointment of a receiver, but upon filing of
a bond by the Memorial Park, the receivership was lifted.
After trial, the lower court, on May 2, 1973, rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants. The Memorial Park and Banco Filipino, on
June 23, 1973, filed their joint motion for reconsideration of the decision. On June
30, 1973, they filed a joint motion for new trial. On July 9, 1973, the Memorial Park
filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration with prayer for new trial.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. On January 10,
1974, the plaintiffs moved for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and
restoration of receivership. On February 5, 1974, the trial court denied new trial. On
February 21, 1974, Banco Filipino and the Memorial Park filed their notice of appeal
from the decision of May 2, 1973, and filed their cash bond. Within the
reglementary period they filed their joint record on appeal.
On February 28, 1974, the Memorial Park filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (L-38280) against the trial
judge and the plaintiff spouses, seeking annulment of the court's order denying
new trial, on the ground that the same was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
On March 7, 1974, this Court issued a restraining order as follows:t.hqw
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court,
You (respondent Judge), your agents representatives and/or any person or persons
acting upon your orders or in your place or stead are hereby RESTRAINED from
enforcing your decision dated May 2, 1973 and your order dated February 5, 1974,
all issued in Civil Case No. Q-15001, entitled ,"Regino Cleofas, et al., plaintiff versus
St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc., et al., defendants," of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch IV at Quezon City, and from stopping the business operations of
petitioner herein."
In compliance with the foregoing, the lower court, on March 12, 1974, issued an
order holding "in abeyance until further orders from the Appellate Court," action on
the petition for appointment of a receiver and for execution of judgment pending
appeal, and on March 18, 1974, likewise upon motion of spouses Cleofas and De la
Cruz, deferred the approval of the Joint Record on Appeal "until the Supreme Court
has ruled on the petition for certiorari filed by the defendants."
However, on July 8, 1974, the court, again upon motion of said spouses, dismissed
the appeal filed by both the Memorial Park and Banco Filipino, on the ground that
the same was abandoned when Memorial Park filed the present petition for
certiorari on February 28, 1974, the dismissal order having been brought to the
attention of this Court in the manifestation of the Memorial Park of July 31, 1974.
On January 3, 1975, Banco Filipino, for its part, filed in this Court a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction (L-38843), against the trial
judge and the spouses Cleofas and Dela Cruz, to annul the trial court's order of July
8, 1974 dismissing its own appeal.
The main issue in these two cases is whether or not the respondent Judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the joint appeal of the Memorial Park and
Banco Filipino in its order of July 8, 1974.
And with respect to Case No. L-38280, the main issue is whether or not the
respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when it denied in its order
of February 5, 1974 the motion for new trial of the Memorial Park.
In moving for dismissal of the appeal in the trial court, respondents spouses averred
that "the filing of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Supreme Court by
the principal defendant with the acquiescence of the other defendant subsequent
to the filing of the notice of appeal, appeal bond and motion for extension to file
the record on appeal, in effect, is abandonment of the unperfected appeal;" that
"the defendants could not pursue both remedies, appeal to the Court of Appeals
and appeal by special action to the Supreme Court of one and the same case;" and
that "the dismissal of the appeal is not covered by the restraining order issued by
the Supreme Court in the aforesaid petition filed by one of the defendants in this
case." And the trial court, "finding the reasons for the motion to dismiss to be well
taken, and it appearing that consideration by this Court of the pending motion to
dismiss the appeal is not one of those sought to be restrained by the order of the
Supreme Court," dismissed the appeal in its order of July 8, 1974.
It must be noted that the petitioner in L-38280 is only St. Peter Memorial Park.
Banco Filipino is not a party in that first proceeding before this Court. Thus,
whatever may be the effect of the filing of a petition for certiorari, on the pending
appeal, cannot affect the appeal of Banco Filipino. And the respondent Judge clearly
committed a clear error and a grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
appeal of Banco Filipino due to the filing by the Memorial Park of its petition in L-
38280. Moreover, as will now be explained, the dismissal of the appeal violated the
restraining order issued by this Court.
Even with respect to the Memorial Park, we cannot say there was abandonment of
the appeal. There would have been abandonment if there is incompatibility
between the two remedies sought by the Memorial Park, that is, between said
appeal and the petition for certiorari. The appeal is from the decision of May 2,
1973; the certiorari petition is directed against the order dated February 5, 1974.
Under American Law, a motion for new trial does not work as a waiver of the
appeal, unless there is a rule to the contrary (U.S. v. Hodge, 12 L ed 437). Thus, both
the motion for new trial and the appeal may be pursued at the same time
(McCandless v. Kramer, 76 Idaho 516, 286 P2d 334; Labbe v. Cyr 111 A2d 330). This
ruling is of persuasive effect on us considering the source of our rules on appeal and
new trial. Here, the certiorari petition in L-38280 is in pursuance of the motion for
new trial. Memorial Park can pursue this remedy as well as that of the appeal from
the main decision.
More important, it must be remembered that in L-38280 this Court issued a
restraining order enjoining respondent Judge "from enforcing your decision dated
May 2, 1973." This restraining order was intended to retain the status quo insofar
as said decision and other circumstances surrounding it are concerned. Any court
action or order that would change any circumstance of the decision is necessarily
included in the scope of the restraining order. At the time that restraining order
was issued, the trial court's decision was a decision on appeal. The order dismissing
the appeal tended to change the status quo since by reason of the dismissal, the
enjoined decision became final. For the reasons we have expounded we find said
dismissal order to have been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
Let us now take up the order of February 5, 1974, denying the motion for new trial
of both the Memorial Park and the Banco Filipino, challenged in L-38280.
From the decision of the trial court it appears that the parties do not dispute that
Lot No. 719 of the Piedad Estate forms part of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 614 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, in the name of the
Government of the Philippine Islands. On March 20, 1909, the Director of Lands, as
administrator of the Piedad Estate, executed a contract in favor of Antonio Cleofas
(Sales Certificate No. 923).
According to the said decision, private respondents' evidence indicated that
Antonio Cleofas, their predecessor, took possession of the lot and occupied the
same until his death sometime in 1945. However, Antonio's title was burned in a
fire sometime in 1933. Private respondents did not take any step to reconstruct said
title until the real estate boom in Quezon City. But when they filed a petition for
reconstruction in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City), they discovered
that the lot was already covered by TCT No. 21893 in the name of Trino Narciso and
Aniceto Martin, predecessors of the Memorial Park.
In support of their allegation that a certificate of title to Lot No. 719 was issued in
favor of Antonio Cleofas, respondents presented Exh. A, which is Sheet 15 of O.C.T
No. 614, mother title of the Piedad Estate. This title contained many sheets to
record transactions because the estate was large.
On the other hand, the decision states, that the Memorial Park and Banco Filipino
presented evidence to the following effect: On July 15, 1921, Antonio Cleofas
executed a Deed of Assignment of Sales Certificate No. 923 (over Lot 719) in favor
of Aniceto Martin (Exh. 1), before the Friar Lands Division of the Bureau of Lands,
which deed was approved on July 22, 1921. On May 2, 1932, the Bureau of Lands
issued Deed of Conveyance No. 25874 over Lot No. 719 (Exh. 2), in favor of Aniceto
Martin and Trino Narciso, upon the latter's payment of the full price of the lot. On
the basis of this deed, there issued to Aniceto Martin and Trino Narciso, on June 17,
1932, TCT No. 21893 (Exh. 3). Martin and Narciso declared the lot in their name, for
purposes of taxation (Exh. 4, dated March 12, 1935). On May 1, 1937, they sold tile
lot to Nazario Roque (Exh. 5), in view of which, TCT No. 32258 (Exh. 6) was issued to
Roque. Upon his death, TCT No. 12360 was issued to his heirs, Basilisa and Carmen
Roque. In 1967 St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. purchased Lot No. 719, for value and in
good faith, from Carmen and Basilisa Roque.
On the basis of Exh. A, respondent Judge made the finding that "on Page 15 of
O.C.T. No. 614, by virtue of Sale Certificate No. 923 issued by the Bureau of Lands to
Antonio Cleofas executed on March 20, 1909, an entry was made in the name of
Antonio Cleofas on July, 1929 showing the award and final sale of Lot No. 719 to
him by the government, owner of Lot No. 719 of the Piedad Estate."
Exh. A (Sheet 15 of O.C.T No. 614), however, is torn, and the only data appearing
thereon are as follows:t.hqw
Document Number - 4357-0-614
Kind Sale Executed in
favor of Antonio Cleofas
et als. Conditions
I hereby certify.................
herein described ..............
certificate of sale..............
Lands, for the sum...........
as certificate of T .............
T-63 at the Book of...........
deed of sale ratified .........
tary Vicente Garcia ..........
and filed in T-No. 156......
The motion for new trial is based on newly discovered evidence. It alleges
that:t.hqw
Fully convinced of the validity of its title, having discovered no flaw in spite of
extraordinary diligence and extensive search into record connected with Lot No.
719 of the Piedad Estate, defendant St. Peter assessed and analyzed the situation
after receipt of a copy of the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
Defendant St. Peter was certain of one thing: that a certificate of title over Lot No.
719) of the Piedad Estate could not have been issued in favor of Cleofas because all
rights thereto had been assigned to Martin predecessor-in-interest of defendant St.
Peter (Exh. "1"), pursuant to which Exh. "2" (Deed of Conveyance from bureau of
Lands to Martin) and Exh. "3" (TCT No, 21893) were issued, also all in favor of
Martin.
So, defendant St. Peter started on the premise now that the entry in favor of
Antonio Cleofas, et als. on Sheet 15 of OCT No. 614 (the major portion of which
appear to have been torn off and lost) must refer to another lot of the Piedad
Estate and not to lot No. 719.
Defendant St. Peter took another hard look at the said incomplete entry concerning
Antonio Cleofas, et als on sheet 15 of OCT 614. It provided only three valuable clues
to start on, namely:
1) "T-63 at the Book of ------"
2) "tary Vicente Garcia ------"
3) "and filed in T-No. 156 ---"
Knowing that during the particular period in question, TCTs had only 5 digits,
defendant St. Peter surmised that "T-No 156 " refers to TCT No. 156 with 2 digits
missing. The said defendant then thought it only had to look at 100 TCTs or from
TCT No. 15600 up to TCT No. 15699 to discover the remaining two digits and finally,
the missing link.
"T-63 at the book of " was a vital clue. It turned out to be a volume in the Register
of Deeds of Rizal containing 200 TCTs (from No. 15501 to 15699), and as
conjectured, included the 15600 series. And defendant St. Peter discovered TCT No.
15694:
1) in the name of Antonio Cleofas, et als.
2) covering Lot No. 640 (not 719) of the Piedad Estate.
3) transferred from OCT No. 614.
4) and referring to Sheet 15 of OCT No. 614.
5) issued on July 15, 1929.
The hunch of defendant St. Peter became a reality. The entry on sheet or page 15 of
OCT no. 614 refers to another lot (not 719) and another title (TCT No. 15694
covering Lot No. 640 of the Piedad Estate).
It is important to state as the Register of Deeds of Rizal will testify, that there is no
other TCT in the series from No. 15601 to 15699 (except for No. 15694) in the name
of Antonio Cleofas, alleged processor of plaintiff.
Defendant St. Peter still had another clue: "Vicente Garcia", the notary whose name
kept cropping up in the various documents involved in the case at bar.
Another search was conducted in the musty record of the and files of Notary Public
Vicente Garcia were found to be intact They disclosed:t.hqw
1) Entry No. 1977 in the Notary's book referring to Deed No. 18562 in favor of
"Antonio Cleofas y hermanos" referring to lot No. 640 of the Piedad Estate.
2) Deed No. 18562 conveying Lot No. 640 of the Piedad Estate from the Bureau of
Lands to Antonio Cleofas, et als.
It is, therefore, now a certainty that the certificate of title to on sheet or page 15 of
OCT no. 614 in the name of Antonio Cleofas et als is another certificate of title
covering a different lot (TCT N4 15694 of Lot 640 of the Piedad Estate), and not a
certificate of title covering Lot No. 719.
The foregoing are newly discovered evidence within the meaning of paragraph (b),
Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and/or not presented due to mistake or
excusable negligence within the purview of paragraph (a) supra. Certified copies of
these are attached hereto as:
1) Annex "a" TCT no. 15694.
2) Annex "b" Entry No. 1977 of Notary Public Vicente Garcia.
3) Annex "c" Deed No. 18562"
As heretofore stated, the trial court refused to grant new trial.
The questions presented in L-38280 are : (1) Is certiorari the proper remedy,
ordinary appeal being available to petitioner St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. (2) Did
respondent Judge commit grave abuse of discretion and/or excess of jurisdiction
when he denied the motion for new trial?
As contended by herein respondents, the general rule is that the extraordinary writ
of certiorari is not proper when ordinary appeal is available. However, we have
granted the writ in cases where it is shown that appeal would be inadequate, slow,
insufficient and will not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the
order complained of (Jose vs. Zulueta, 2 SCRA 578; 57 Phil. 893; Botelho Shipping
Corporation vs. Leuterio, 8 SCRA 127; People vs. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 756). In fact, in
"Alfonso vs. Yatco," 80 Phil. 407, to avoid future litigations, we passed upon a
petition for certiorari though the proper remedy was appeal. Indeed, as we held in
"Ramos vs. Central Bank," 41 SCRA 584:t.hqw
Nor would it serve the interest of justice to dismiss the case at this stage and let a
new petition be filed in another court. In Bay View vs. Manila Hotel Worker's Union
(L-21803, 17 December 1966), this Court, through Mr. Justice Conrado V. Sanchez,
pointed out the evils attending split jurisdictions, saying:t.hqw
"To draw a tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in... litigations. A
piece meal resort to one Court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits... The
time to be lost, effort wasted, anxiety augmented, additional expense
incurred...these are considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction.
Indeed, it is more in keeping with orderly administration of justice that all the
causes of action here be cognizable and heard by only one court ... (Cas. cit., 18
SCRA 953)."
The grounds cited by petitioners for the allowance of the writ of certiorari, justify
the giving of due course to the petitions in these two cases, for ordinary appeal will
not be adequate. As many memorial lot buyers are affected, and the very integrity
of the torrens system is at stake, public interest is involved.
We now address ourselves to the issue of whether respondent Judge committed
grave abuse of discretion and/or excess of jurisdiction when he denied petitioner's
motion for new trial, based on the evidence attached to the said motion and which
we recited earlier in this decision.
Under paragraph (b), Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for the
grant of new trial based on:t.hqw
Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered, and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter
the result,
are: (1) that such evidence has been discovered after the trial; (2) that even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence, it could not have been discovered and
produced at that trial; and (3) that such evidence is of such a nature as to alter the
result of the case if admitted (People vs. Ventura, 5 SCRA 741).
This rule for the granting of a motion for new trial, as all other rules of procedure,
should be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy
determination of their rights. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth,
and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest
opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to find out such truth. The
dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities (Sec. 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court; Talavera vs.
Mangoba, L-18373, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 837).
Gauged by these standards, we find the evidence proposed to be presented by
petitioner in a new trial are newly discovered evidence within the contemplation of
the Rules of Court. The said evidence could not have been produced during the trial
because the subject-matter of the trial was Lot No. 719. Petitioner correctly
searched, discovered and presented during that trial, all documents pertaining to
Lot No. 719 only. The evidence sought to be presented in a new trial by petitioner
became pertinent and important only after trial, when judgment was rendered by
respondent Judge that private respondents have a valid and subsisting title to Lot
No. 719 on the basis of sheet 15 of OCT No. 614 (Exh. "A") which on its fact does
not mention Lot No. 719. Based on the incomplete data appearing on Exh. "A",
petitioner conducted a new search and discovered the evidence it now seeks to
present in a new trial, indubitably showing that sheet 15 of OCT No. 614 refers to a
title to Lot No. 640, and not to Lot No. 719 in the name of petitioner. If admitted in
a new trial, these newly discovered evidence will probably alter the judgment of the
trial court.
In making the foregoing conclusions, we do not by any means intend to prejudge
the effect of such evidence on the outcome of the case. We are confining ourselves
to the conclusion that the evidence intended to be submitted, "would probably
alter the result."
We hold that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion for new trial, having disregarded in a capricious and arbitrary manner, the
newly discovered evidence (PAL vs. Salcedo, L-22110, Sept. 29, 1967; People vs.
Halasa,
L-21495, July 21, 1967; Palma vs. Q & S, Inc., 17 SCRA 100, People vs. Gutierrez, 26
SCRA 143).
We rule, therefore, in favor of new trial. The grant of new trial necessarily vacates
the judgment (See. 5, Rule 37, Revised Rules of Court; Knowles vs. Thompson, 65 P
468; Evansville vs. Cooksey, 112 NE 541) subject of the appeal which, consequently,
becomes moot.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions in L-38280 and L-39905 are
granted, the orders of February 5, 1974 and July 8, 1974 are hereby declared null
and void and set aside, and both cases are remanded to the trial court for new trial
pursuant to the motion to that effect of both Banco Filipino and Memorial Park,
dated June 30, 1973, which is hereby granted. Costs against private respondents.
Makalintal, C.J., and Antonio, J., concur.1wph1.t
Aquino J., is on leave.



Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:
I would like to make clear that my reason for concurring in the holding in the main
opinion that certiorari is the proper remedy in relation to the trial court's denial of
petitioners' motion for new trial notwithstanding that they had already filed their
respective notices of appeal, appeal bonds and motions for extension to file their
records on appeal is that such special civil action may be resorted to when it is
patent from the nature of the purported newly discovered evidence that movant
can more or less conclusively show that the factual issue to which such evidence
relates would have to be decided differently if the same were to be admitted by the
court. In such a situation, it is obvious to me that to give due course to the appeal
and merely allow the denial of the motion for new trial to be assigned as an error in
appellant's brief would only result in unnecessary delay of the final disposition of
the controversy between the parties. Since it is more likely that the decision would
have to be changed or modified after the new evidence is presented, I see no sense
in leaving the question of its admission for resolution in the appeal, when after all
the already evident ultimate result would be to return the case to the trial court for
its reception.
The other aspect of respondents' contention that the evidence involved in these
cases is not newly discovered is to my mind secondary. Assuming there is some
plausibility in respondents' pose in this respect, I am persuaded nevertheless that
substantial justice would be better attained by admitting the preferred evidence,
which as already observed, appears to be indubitable. The main opinion prefers to
reserve judgment on this point, but I feel it is more honest to say that if new trial
must be granted in these in spite of the fact that petitioners have already taken
their appeal within the reglementary period, it is only because the facts anyone can
infer or deduce from the evidence being offered, which is documentary and official,
are apparently more proximate to the truth, in the light of common experience.
As I see it, the net result of Our decision cannot prejudice the respondents. It is
quite obvious that it is Lot 640 and not Lot 719 that belongs to them, and they do
not pretend that they have acquired more than one lot in Piedad Estate, so as to
entitle them to both Lots 640 and 719. The accident that caused the loss of their
title, TCT 15694 is no reason at all for courts to unjustly enrich them by adjudicating
to them Lot 719, when all they have to do is assert their right over Lot 640 which is
the one that appears recorded in their name in the official records which up to now
stand unchallenged, much less impugned.
Fernando, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I would like to make clear that my reason for concurring in the holding in the main
opinion that certiorari is the proper remedy in relation to the trial court's denial of
petitioners' motion for new trial notwithstanding that they had already filed their
respective notices of appeal, appeal bonds and motions for extension to file their
records on appeal is that such special civil action may be resorted to when it is
patent from the nature of the purported newly discovered evidence that movant
can more or less conclusively show that the factual issue to which such evidence
relates would have to be decided differently if the same were to be admitted by the
court. In such a situation, it is obvious to me that to give due course to the appeal
and merely allow the denial of the motion for new trial to be assigned as an error in
appellant's brief would only result in unnecessary delay of the final disposition of
the controversy between the parties. Since it is more likely that the decision would
have to be changed or modified after the new evidence is presented, I see no sense
in leaving the question of its admission for resolution in the appeal, when after all
the already evident ultimate result would be to return the case to the trial court for
its reception.
The other aspect of respondents' contention that the evidence involved in these
cases is not newly discovered is to my mind secondary. Assuming there is some
plausibility in respondents' pose in this respect, I am persuaded nevertheless that
substantial justice would be better attained by admitting the preferred evidence,
which as already observed, appears to be indubitable. The main opinion prefers to
reserve judgment on this point, but I feel it is more honest to say that if new trial
must be granted in these in spite of the fact that petitioners have already taken
their appeal within the reglementary period, it is only because the facts anyone can
infer or deduce from the evidence being offered, which is documentary and official,
are apparently more proximate to the truth, in the light of common experience.
As I see it, the net result of Our decision cannot prejudice the respondents. It is
quite obvious that it is Lot 640 and not Lot 719 that belongs to them, and they do
not pretend that they have acquired more than one lot in Piedad Estate, so as to
entitle them to both Lots 640 and 719. The accident that caused the loss of their
title, TCT 15694 is no reason at all for courts to unjustly enrich them by adjudicating
to them Lot 719, when all they have to do is assert their right over Lot 640 which is
the one that appears recorded in their name in the official records which up to now
stand unchallenged, much less impugned.
Fernando, J., concurs.

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