Performance Theory and The Study of Ritual

Performance Theory and the Study of Ri tual
by
RONALD L. GRI MES
The boundari es of rel i gi ous studi es are i ncreasi ngl y permeabl e. Rel i gi ous studi es
schol ars are as l i kel y to be col l aborati ng wi th anthropol ogi sts or performance
studi es schol ars as wi th phi l osophers or theol ogi ans. So i t shoul d be no sur-
pri se that "performance" has become an i mportant conceptual bri dge among
di sci pl i nes. Not onl y does i t appear i n ti tl es such as Sacred Performance: Islam,
Sexuality and Sacrifice (Combs-Schi l l i ng 1989), Affecting Performance: Meaning,
Movement, and Experience in Okiek Women's Initiation (Kratz 1994) and Ritual,
Performance, Media (Hughes-Freel and 1998), i t i s l i sted as a cruci al category i n
the recent vol ume, Critical Terms for Religious Studies (Tayl or 1998).
There have been at l east two i mportant moments i n the recent di scussi on of
ri tual and performance. One was epi tomi zed by the col l aborati on of Vi ctor Tur-
ner, Ri chard Schechner, and Ervi ng Goffman at the turn of the decade from the
1970s to the 1980s. The other was the publ i cati on of cri ti ques of performance
theori es i n the 1990s. The earl i er phase, whi ch saw ri tual studi es emerge as a
sel f-consci ous di sci pl i ne, was deci si vel y shaped by the thi nki ng of three very
prol i fi c wri ters, whose work I wi l l summari ze and onl y bri efl y anal yze. Because
the l ater phase conti nues i nto the present, I wi l l summari ze it l ess thoroughl y
and cri ti ci ze i t more ful l y.
These two moments i n the hi story of ri tual theory make the most sense
agai nst a bri ef hi stori cal background chroni cl i ng the emergence of so-cal l ed
performance approaches to ri tual . Si nce the myth and ri tual theory of the
Cambri dge School was a quest for ori gi ns, speci fi cal l y the ori gi ns of theater in
pri mordi al ri tual , I wi l l not summari ze thi s l ate ni neteenth and earl y twenti eth
century approach. Contemporary theori sts have l argel y gi ven up ori gi n ques-
ti ons for the sake of functi on questi ons.
The Emergence of Cul tural Performance as a Category
Al though the use of dramati sti c pri nci pl es ("rol e," for i nstance) as i nterpreti ve
anal ogs to soci al i nteracti on dates back at l east to the 1930s, i t was not unti l the
mi d-1950s that anythi ng resembl i ng cul tural performance theory began to
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Ronal d L. Gri mes
emerge. I n 1954 Mi l ton Si nger v i si ted I ndi a. Not offi ci al l y fi el dwork, the vi si t
was prel i mi nar}'. I ts goal was to determi ne what he mi ght subsequentl y research
there. I n serv i ce of thi s ai m, he trav el ed, observ ed, and i nterv i ewed. Besi des hi s
baggage, he carri ed a theory consi sti ng l argel y of Robert Redfi el d's di sti ncti ons
between great and l i ttl e tradi ti ons, as wel l as the two noti ons: ethos and worl d-
v i ew. Si nger assumed he knew what a ci v i l i zati on and a tradi ti on were, so he
thought he mi ght study "the cul tural pattern of I ndi a," but soon he began to
wonder: I s thi s too l arge a uni t of study ? What, he asked, mi ght be a more
v i abl e uni t?
Si nger's report, publ i shed a year l ater, i n 1955-56, i s remarkabl e not onl y
for the grandeur of hi s aspi rati on but al so for hi s candor i n reporti ng how i l l
serv ed he was by hi s theori es. Staggered by I ndi a's regi onal v ari ati ons and i ts
bewi l deri ng l i ngui sti c and rel i gi ous di v ersi ty, he fi gured out what every new
fi el dworker soon di scov ers: One must focus, fi nd "the smal l est manageabl e
uni t" of research (Si nger 1955: 25). He qui ckl y recogni zed the di ssonance be-
tween uni ts of i ndi genous experi ence and those of schol arl y observ ati on. So, he
asked, how mi ght one discover a uni t rather than impose or import one?
When Si nger asked hi s I ndi an fri ends and consul tants how he mi ght study
the cul tural pattern of I ndi a, they di rected hi m to ri tes, festi v al s, reci tati ons,
pray ers, and pl ay si n short, to what he cal l ed "cul tural performances." These
became "the el ementary consti tuents of the cul ture and the ul ti mate uni ts of ob-
serv ati on" (Si nger 1955: 27). He assumed rather than argued that such perform-
ances di spl ay what i s central for a cul ture, that they more rev eal i ngl y expose
deepl y hel d v al ues than do other, non-performati v e aspects of the same cul ture.
Besi des bei ng i ndi genous uni ts, performance ev ents had the added adv an-
tage of bei ng bounded. They had cl ear begi nni ngs and endi ngs. They exi sted
somewhere i n parti cul ar. And, unl i ke i deas i n the head or v al ues i n the heart,
they were observabl e, even photographabl e. Cul tural themes and val ues, Si nger
di scov ered, appear i n cul tural performances, whi ch uti l i ze v ari ous cul tural
medi a such as si ngi ng, danci ng, and acti ng. Gi v en the l i mi tati ons of human
fi ni tude and the constrai nts of cross-cul tural fi el d research, the onl y possi bl e
access to a whol e cul ture, a "total ci v i l i zati on," i s by way of i ts most rev eal i ng
consti tuent parts.
I f there i s a si ngl e, modern begi nni ng of cul tural performance theory,
perhaps Si nger's di scov ery (or assumpti on) i s i t. Hi s approach, he sai d, di d not
ari se as the resul t of a theatri cal anal ogy carri ed i nto the fi el d by an ethno-
grapher and then appl i ed to the data. I nstead, the ethnographer found hi s
theori es l argel y i nappl i cabl e and repl aced or modi fi ed them wi th the noti on of
cul tural performances, and he di d so because i ndi genous consul tants poi nted
hi m toward them. Today , we may consi der hi m mi staken, or we may object
that he has i mported a Western assumpti on (that performances encode cul tural
v al ues), but we may not accuse hi m of woodenl y i mposi ng theatri cal anal ogi es
on other soci eti es.
Performance Theory and the Study of Ri tual \\\
More wi del y known than Si nger's report was the use Cl i fford Geertz made
of Si nger's i dea some twenty-fi ve years later. What student of rel i gi on has not
been requi red to read "Rel i gi on as a Cul tural System"? Some have even had to
memori ze i ts famous defi ni ti on of rel i gi on, of whi ch Geertz's arti cl e is an ex-
posi ti on:
A rel i gi on i s: (1) a system of symbol s whi ch acts to (2) establ i sh powerful , pervasi ve,
and l ong-l asti ng moods and moti vati ons i n men by (3) formul ati ng concepti ons of a
general order of exi stence and (4) cl othi ng these concepti ons wi th such an aura of
factual i ty that (5) the moods and moti v ati ons seem uni quel y real i sti c. (Geertz 1973: 90)
Geertz attri buted to ri tual the power for generati ng rel i gi on's aura of factual i ty.
Whatever metaphysi cal real i ty the gods may or may not have, he argued, they
enter the human pl ane i n "concrete acts," that i s, in "performances" (Geertz
1973: 112-13). Expl i ci tl y fol l owi ng Si nger, Geertz cl ai med that we have access
to thi ngs emoti onal and conceptual , to a peopl e's ethos and worl d vi ew, by
way of publ i c cul tural performances. Geertz was keenl y aware that parti ci pants
understand ri tual performances differently from observers. For parti ci pants
such a performance i s a rel i gi ous ri te, whi l e for an observer i t is a mere enter-
tai ni ng spectacl e, an aestheti c form. For observers, these performances may be
"model s of" what parti ci pants bel i eve, but for parti ci pants these performances
are "model s for" what they bel i eve; they have prescri pti ve force. "I n these
pl asti c dramas men attai n thei r fai th as they portray i t" (Geertz 1973:114).
A decade l ater, Geertz consi dered three, genre-bl urri ng anal ogi es: soci al
l i fe as game, as drama, and as text. He found the resul ts of usi ng the dramati c
anal ogy (on whi ch performance theory apparentl y depends) confusi ng for two
reasons. One was that there were confl i cti ng ways of usi ng i t; the other was the
tendency to overgeneral i ze and to i gnore cul tural and hi stori cal parti cul ars.
One the one hand, he sai d, the symbol i c action approach (represented by
Kenneth Burke) emphasi zes the communi cati ve, persuasi ve, and pol i ti cal di-
mensi ons of drama. On the other, the ri tual theory approach (represented by
Vi ctor Turner) emphasi zes experi ence (rather than communi cati on) and conc-
entrates on the connecti on between rel i gi on and theater. Geertz worri ed about
the di vi de between these two sub-school s and cri ti ci zed thei r tendency to create
"a form for al l seasons," a theoreti cal construct i nsuffi ci entl y nuanced to dis-
cri mi nate among the myri ad forms of soci al i nteracti on (Geertz 1983: 28).
Al though Geertz woul d l ater study the hi ghl y drama-ori ented Bal i nese
theater state, treati ng the royal pal ace as if i t were a stage, and ci vi l ceremony
as i f i t were theater, he never ful l y subscri bed to the methods and preoccu-
pati ons of Burke, Turner, or Goffman even though he empl oyed dramaturgi cal
l anguage, often i nconcl asti cal l y, in order to debunk "the pretensi ons upon
whi ch the soci ety turned" (Geertz 1980:113, 116).
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Ronal d L. Gri mes
The Performati ve Convergence
Ervi ng Goffman
The turn to drama and performance transpi res most ful l y in the wri ti ng of
soci ol ogi st Ervi ng Goffman, anthropol ogi st Vi ctor Turner, and performance
studi es schol ar Ri chard Schechner. Al though other writers occasi onal l y study
performati ve di mensi on of ri tual or use an occasi onal dramati sti c metaphor,
these are the theori sts whose wri ti ng on the topi c i s most sustai ned and prol i fi c.
Goffman appl i es both ri tual i sti c and dramati sti c termi nol ogy to ordinary
soci al i nteracti on: Greeti ng and departi ng are "ceremoni al "; servi ng food in a
restaurant is "dramati c." As he used them, the terms "ri tual ," "ceremony," and
"drama" often sounded i nterchangeabl e, as if there were no si gni fi cant dif-
ferences among them. Soci al performance is ceremoni al , "an expressi ve reju-
venati on and reaffi rmati on of the moral val ues of the communi ty" (Goffman
1959: 35). I nsofar as a performance is taken to condense real i ty i tsel f (rather
than bei ng a mere si mul ati on of it), the performance is sai d to be "ceremoni al ."
Goffman's concepti on of ceremony, or ri tual (he typi cal l y uses the terms i nter-
changeabl y), was thoroughl y Durkhei mi an.
Occasi onal l y, Goffman di scri mi nated between performance and ceremony.
For i nstance, i n Frame Analysis, he remarks, "A play keys l i fe, a ceremony keys
an event" (Goffman 1974: 58). He means that a pl ay si mul ates ordi nary l i fe in
general , whi l e a ceremony stri ps a deed of its ordi nary context in order to
create a hi ghl y focused event. In pl ays, he says, performers pretend to be char-
acters other than themsel ves, whi l e in ceremoni es performers epi tomi ze rather
than pretend.
The i dea of performance is i mportant to Goffman i nsofaras i t gives hi s
theory i ts cri ti cal edge. Acti ons are deemed performances when they are not
only done but done to be seen. I n bei ng done to be seen, they i nevi tabl y mi s-
represent, thus the outcome of Goffman's theory i s a hermeneuti c of suspi ci on.
The Goffman-i nspi red i nterpreter is set to searching for the backstage area, in
whi ch he or she can spy the face behi nd the front-stage mask. From a Goff-
mani an perspecti ve, all soci al i nteracti on is performance, and performance
becomes ri tual i zed when someone i nsi sts on the sacred unquesti onabl eness of
what i s bei ng presented. To ri tual i ze i s to deny or hi de the di screpancy between
front and back stage behavi or.
Goffman i s at hi s most ri tual l y serious when he asserts, "The self is in part a
ceremoni al thi ng, a sacred object whi ch must be treated wi th proper ritual
care" (Goffman 1967: 91). I n hi s vi ew, a ceremony, or ri te, i s not merel y a thi ng
done or only an anal ogy for soci al i nteracti on. Rather, ceremony is how the self
is consti tuted. The ri tual l y consti tuted self is essenti al to survi val in soci ety, a
"sacred game." Goffman confl ates l udi c (pl ay-dri ven), ri tual i sti c, and dramati c
l anguage to present a vi ew of contemporary, supposedl y secul ar l i fe i n whi ch
113
the sacred, game-consti tuted self becomes a god: "The i ndi vi dual is so vi abl e a
god because he can actual l y understand the ceremoni al si gni fi cance of the way
he i s treated, and qui te on hi s own can respond dramati cal l y to what is prof-
fered hi m. I n contacts between such dei ti es there i s no need for mi ddl emen-
each of these gods is abl e to serve as hi s own pri est" (Goffman 1967: 95).
Whereas the noti on of performance al l owed Goffman to questi on and ex-
pose, the noti on of ceremony (or ri tual ) connoted the acti vi ty of tranqui l i zi ng
questi ons, evadi ng cri ti ci sm. Thus, in hi s theory, the term "ri tual " i s suspect in
a way that the word "performance" never i s. Thi s vi ew is both the strength and
weakness of hi s theory. On the one hand, Goffman, more than any other schol -
ar, has hel ped us noti ce what some cal l ri tual i zati on and others, i nteracti on
ri tual : the repeti ti ve, styl i zed bi ts that suffuse ordi nary l i fe. On the other, he
had l i ttl e i nterest in "speci al " ri tes such as hi ghl y di fferenti ated l i turgi es; the
ordi nary worl d was ri tual enough. Hi s i deas are l i ttl e hel p in studyi ng formal
ri tes, si nce hi s conceptual power arose from the metaphori c move of i nter-
preti ng ordi nary i nteracti on as if i t were ri tual .
Goffman woul d i ncul cate a hermeneuti c of suspi ci on. There is nothi ng
wrong wi th suspi ci on, si nce ri tes are means of expl oi tati on as surel y as they are
of heal i ng. But i f suspi ci on and debunki ng are the only postures that observers
and i nterpreters assume, the atti tude becomes sel f-consumi ng and forecl oses
the possi bi l i ty of genui ne i nteracti on between ri tual performers and ri tual
theori sts.
Vi ctor Turner
If Ervi ng Goffman was the ri tual skeptic empl oyi ng the i dea of performance to
debunk hi ghl y managed personae or expose ri tual cover-ups, Vi ctor Turner
was the ri tual enthusi ast usi ng the i dea of drama to enhance and transform the
rei gni ng concepti on of ri tual . By construi ng everyday l i fe as performati ve,
Goffman saw i t as ri ddl ed wi th pretense. By consi deri ng soci al processes as
dramati c, Turner saw it as confl i ct ri dden but also cul tural l y generati ve. For
Turner, as for Goffman, soci ety itself i s i nherentl y dramati c, creati ng the pos-
si bi l i ty for stage drama and the i nescapabi l i ty of performance in ri tual .
Li ke Mi l ton Si nger, Vi ctor Turner bel i eved he had di scovered drama in the
fi el d, that he did not carry the concept of drama i nto the fi el d wi th hi m. How-
ever, the phenomenon he tagged "soci al drama" did not consi st of pl ays and
cel ebrati ons, as i t had for Si nger, but rather of patterned soci al confl i cts. They
fol l ow a predi cabl e and uni versal form: breach, cri si s, redress, and rei nte-
grati on. Thi s sort of drama, sai d Turner, is pri or to, and the ground of, stage
drama. The two ki nds of drama feed one another.
Turner was convi nced that the redressi ve phase, i n both i ts rel i gi ous and i ts
l egal forms, is a pri mary source of ri tual (Turner 1991:12, 17). Si nce he hel d that
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Ronal d L. Gri mes
the l i mi nal phase of the ri tual process gi ves ri se to theater, the i mpl i ed sequen-
ce i s: soci al drama, ri tual , theater. Turner put i t another way that i s perhaps
truer to hi s i ntenti ons, because i t makes the process sound l ess l i near and more
di al ecti cal : "The processual form of soci al dramas i s i mpl i ci t i n aestheti c
dramas (even i f onl y by reversal or negati on), whi l e the rhetoric of soci al dra-
masand hence the shape of argumenti s drawn from cul tural performances.
There i s a l ot of Perry Mason i n Watergate!" (Turner 1979: 81; see al so Turner
1980:153).
The argument i mpl i ed by thi s scheme i s l ess a cl ai m about what once hap-
pened l ong ago (as when the Cambri dge school cl ai med that drama emerged
from pri mordi al ri tual ) than i t i s a general i zati on about ev eryone's experi ence
i n every soci ety (Turner 1980:149).
1
To eval uate Turner's thesi s one woul d hav e
to ask questi ons such as: Does soci al drama ever hav e other phases? Or more
phases? Or fewer? And, does ri tual ever ari se from the other phases (breach,
cri si s, or rei ntegrati on)? Or from outsi de the soci al -drama process al together?
From the 1950s through the 1970s "drama" was Turner's preferred term; in
thi s peri od he wrote works such as "Frame, Fl ow, and Refl ecti on: Ri tual and
Drama as Publ i c Li mi nal i ty" (Turner 1977), "Dramati c Ri tual /Ri tual Drama"
(Turner 1979), "Soci al Dramas and Stori es about Them" (Turner 1980), and
Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors (Turner 1974). But by the earl y 1980s, i nfl uenced
by Ri chard Schechner and the emergi ng fi el d of performance studi es, Turner
began to speak more frequentl y about performance i n arti cl es such as "Per-
formi ng Ethnography " (Turner/Turner 1982) and "Li mi nal i ty and the Perform-
ati ve Genres" (Turner 1985), and The Anthropology of Performance (Turner 1987).
Al though the terms "ri tual " and "drama" were al most synonymous for
Turner, the connotati on of "drama" was that of patterned soci al confl i ct, whi l e
"performance" suggested rol e pl ayi ng and the awareness of bei ng watched.
Al though Turner probabl y wrote more about the rel ati ons between ri tual and
drama (or performance) than any Western schol ar i n the twenti eth century, he
showed l i ttl e i nterest i n dramati sm, the extended appl i cati on of the drama
anal ogy, the systemati c exposi ti on of ei ther ri tual or of non-theatri cal l i fe as if
they were theatri cal .
2
Turner nev er qui te made theater an object of study i n the way he di d ri tual .
Neverthel ess, he cel ebrated theater and attri buted to i t somethi ng of a pri -
vi l eged rol e as "the most forceful , active ... genre of cul tural performance"
1 Turner, howev er, never compl etel y gave up the evol uti onary bel i ef that aestheti c forms
of cul tural performance were deri ved from the rel i gi ous and ri tual i sti c ones. See, for
i nstance, Turner 1980:161.
2 As far as I know, the onl y attempt at a ful l y dramati sti c approach to ri tual is Davi d
Col e's The Theatrical Event (Col e 1975). I t uses a set of categori esscri pt, actor, audi -
ence, scene, l anguage, and i nterpretati onto expl ore connecti ons between theater and
a speci fi c ki nd of ri tual i zi ng, shamani sm.
115
(Turner 1982: 104). I n compl ex i ndustri al soci eti es, he hel d, theater accom-
pl i shes many of the functi ons tradi ti onal l y achi eved i n smal l -scal e ones by ri tes
of passage. But theater, because i t depends on the l i mi noi d rather than the l i mi -
nal , has the added advantage of bei ng "suffused wi th freedom" (Turner 1982:
120). Howev er generati ve of creati vi ty the l i mi nal phase of a ri te of passage
may be, i t i s repl eteespeci al l y i n i ni ti ati on ri teswi th total i tari an dangers,
whereas contemporary Western theatri cal experi ence, because i t i s chosen, en-
hances rather than obl i terates i ndi vi dual i ty. Even though i t often seems that
Turner liked ri tual more, he sounds l i ke he trusted theater more. For i nstance, he
worri ed about the mystery-l aden ri tual i zi ng of Jerzy Grotowski 's paratheatri cal
events but prai sed the i conocl asti c theatri cal i zi ng of Ri chard Schechner.
I n defendi ng hi msel f agai nst Geertz's cl ai ms that the anthropol ogi cal use of
dramati sti c anal ogi es l eads to overgeneral i zati ons and that textual anal ogi es
are more nuanced, Turner repl i ed that texts, whether soci al or l i terary, are best
understood not i n the abstract but i n the context of the performances they
i nspi re (Turner 1982: 107). Turner saw no good reason why anthropol ogi sts
shoul d not make use of both metaphors, as both he and Geertz, i n fact, di d. He
remai ned convi nced that experi ence i s deepest when soci al drama and stage
drama, performance and text, i l l umi ne one another, not when one i s treated as
more real than the other.
Because ri tes are essenti al l y performati ve, Turner eventual l y fel t the need
to teach about them i n a performati ve manner. What he cal l ed "performi ng eth-
nography " (Turner/Turner 1982), was an attempt to understand other cul tures'
ri tes by enacti ng them dramati cal l y i n cl assrooms and workshops. I n col l abora-
ti on wi th Ri chard Schechner, Ervi ng Goffman, Edi th Turner (hi s wi fe), and
others he turned hi s ethnography of the Ndembu i nto a "ethnodramati c" scri pt,
for whi ch the agoni sti c soci al drama scheme provi ded the basi c form (Turner
1979: 84). The workshops transpi red in a seri es of nested frames. The ethno-
graphi cal l y constructed ri tual scri pt was nested wi th a pl ay-drama frame, and
the pl ay-drama frame wi thi n a pedagogi cal frame. Much of the l earni ng oc-
curred as students i n the workshops experi enced frame sl i ppage, and as they
fai l ed to enter or sustai n a frame.
Al though deepl y i nfl uenced by Vi ctor Turner's i deas, I al so hav e reserva-
ti ons about them. I t i s one thi ng to study ri tual and drama comparati vel y, qui te
another to cl ai m that ri tual uni versal l y ari ses from soci al drama. Even though
there are good exampl es i n whi ch i t does, I know of no convi nci ng evi dence
that thi s i s the usual , much l ess the uni versal , way ri tes emerge.
Another probl em i s that of bui l di ng val ue judgements i nto the defi ni ti on of
ri tual , i n effect, maki ng "ri tual " mean "good ri tual " or "real ri tual ," thus usi ng
i t as a cri teri on.
3
Turner defi ned ri tual and ceremony i n such a way that "cere-
3 A more ful l y devel oped cri ti que of hi s defi ni ti on can be found i n Gri mes 1990.
116
Ronal d L. Gri mes
mony " merel y confi rms or consol i dates, whi l e "ri tual " transforms. He frequent-
l y dropped an addi ti onal adjecti v e, "tr ue" or "pur e," i n front of "r i tual " to
i ndi cate that he was not tal ki ng about ceremony. "Rel i gi on," he says, l i ke art,
lives i nsofar as i t i s performed, that i s, i nsofar as ri tual s are 'goi ng concerns.' I f
y ou wi sh to spay or gel d rel i gi on, fi rst remov e i ts ri tual s, i ts generati v e and
regenerati v e processes" (Turner 1980: 167). The metaphori c i denti fi cati on of
ri tes wi th sex organs i s qui te rev eal i ng.
For Turner, the pri mary model for transformati on was the ri te of passage,
speci fi cal l y the l i mi nal phase of i ni ti ati on. And i f one exami nes hi s and v an
Gennep's sources, i t i s cl ear that the predomi nant exampl es are of mal e i ni ti -
ati on. I n the fi nal anal ysi s, Turner defi ned the whol e of ri tual i n terms of a part,
a v ery smal l one at that. I ni ti ati on furni shed the ori gi nal paradi gm not onl y for
ri tual i n general but for cul tural creati v i ty and change.
Because ri tes of passage, l i mi nal i ty, soci al drama, and communitas hav e be-
come such generati v e i deas, and because they conti nue to be unrefl ecti v el y
ci ted and popul arl y v enerated, we shoul d recogni ze some of thei r l i mi tati ons.
For i nstance, i s i t real l y as obv i ous as Turner cl ai ms that ri tes transform? I n
some soci eti es ri tes are not ev en thought to transform, that i s, to change thi ngs
fundamental l y . I nstead, ri tes of bi rth, comi ng of age, marri age and death protect
parti ci pants, or they celebrate transformati ons that hav e al ready occurred by
other means. The Bemba say thei r ri tes purify women at the moment of fi rst
menses. Thi s i s a v i ew qui te di fferent from one whi ch hol ds that the ri te trans-
forms gi rl s i nto women. And i t suggests that we cannot assume that ri tes
transform any more than we can assume they conserv e. I n my v i ew the most
v exi ng probl em i n Turner's theory of ri tual i s not hi s dramati sm (as some hav e
cl ai med) but hi s "transformati oni sm," the i deol ogi cal assumpti on that ri tes, by
defi ni ti on, transform. Some do; some do not. Whi ch do and whi ch do not
shoul d be a matter of observ ati on, not of defi ni ti on. Not al l ri tual actors i ntend
to transform, but ev en i f they do, the i ntenti on does not guarantee the resul ts. A
group may i ntend to transform and fai l to do so, or, as Vi ncent Crapanzano has
shown regardi ng the i ni ti ati on of Musl i m boy s i n Morocco, i t may say i t
transforms when, i n fact, i t does not (Crapanzano 1980).
Ri chard Schechner
Al though Ri chard Schechner conti nues certai n l i nes of thought dev el oped by
Turner, Schechner i s far too prol i fi c and hi s sources too di v erse to be regarded
as a mere Turneri an. I n rel i gi ous studi es and anthropol ogy Schechner i s l ess
wel l known than Turner, but Schechner not onl y faci l i tated Turner's i n-
v ol v ement i n experi mental theater and nurtured hi s i nterest i n performance
theory, he consol i dated the fi el d of performance studi es. Few other schol ars or
117
di rectors hav e Schedul er's vari ed experi ence as an observer of ri tes and as an
experi menter wi th dramati c and ri tual i sti c processes.
Schechner i s a theater di rector as wel l as a performance studi es schol ar and
edi tor of The Drama Review. The Performance Group, whi ch met i n the Per-
formi ng Garage under hi s di recti on, was a wi del y known experi mental theater
col l ecti ve. Hi s theatri cal and theoreti cal research i s wi del y studi ed i n drama
departments as wel l as experi mental theater ci rcl es. Not a systemati cal l y theo-
reti cal wri ter, he i s neverthel ess a prol i fi c one who cuts an i mpressi ve swath
from practi ce to observati on to theory. Hi s wri ti ng fal l s i nto four rough cate-
gori es: (1) theatricalspi ri ted, someti mes propheti c, parti ci pati on i n ongoi ng
debates about contemporary experi mental theater; (2) theoreticalschemati c at-
tempts to di agram and conceptual i ze the genres and dynami cs of performance;
(3) ethnographicanecdotal wri ti ngs based on fi el d study and observati on; and
(4) culturalessays on the modern-to-postmodern transi ti on. For ri tual studi es
the most i mportant essays are "Drama, Scri pt, Theatre and Performance" and
"From Ri tual to Theatre and Back" (Schechner 1977), "Restorati on of Behav i or"
(Schechner 1985), "Performers and Spectators Transported and Transformed"
(Schechner 1985) and "The Future of Ri tual " (Schechner 1993).
Many of Schechner's l ater i deas are foreshadowed i n the earl y pi ece, "Si x
Axi oms for Env i ronmental Theatre" (Schechner 1973; wri tten i n 1968). He treats
the theatri cal event as a set of rel ated transacti ons i n whi ch no el ement (actor,
text, etc.) has automati c precedence, and he rejects any attempt to predefi ne the
uses of theater space or to establ i sh one-di mensi onal theori es that expl ai n
everythi ng theatri cal . What he cal l s "env i ronmental " theater i s pol y-focused
and al l -encompassi ng, not dependent on havi ng one pl ace defi ned as "for
acti ng" and another, "for the audi ence." From thi s basi c posi ti on most of hi s
l ater i deas fol l ow.
Schechner refuses to i sol ate ri tual from drama and pl ay, treati ng al l three as
forms of performance, whi ch he defi nes as "ri tual i zed behav i or ... permeated
by pl ay " (Schechner 1977: 52). The outcome of treati ng ri tual as a speci es of per-
formance i s a theory of ri tual that pl aces i t among, rather than above or outsi de,
a l arge range of other cul tural acti vi ti es. I n hi s di scussi on of "the magni tudes of
performance" (Schechner/Appel 1990: 20-21), Schechner l ays out a massi v e and
i mpressi ve chart compari ng sacred ri tes of passage wi th sandl ot basebal l ,
hostage cri ses, the Ol ympi c games, nati onal network tel evi si on, and a host of
other human acti vi ti es. Hi s ai m i s not to equate them but to demonstrate how
they uti l i ze the same basi c temporal and spati al processes.
Defi ni ng ri tual i n rel ati on to other ki nds of performance, Schechner
di sti ngui shes "transformati on" from "transportati on" (Schechner 1985: 117ff.;
Schechner 1977: 63ff.). On the one hand, ri tes of passage effect a transformati on
of soci al state: A dead person becomes an ancestor; a man and a woman be-
come one fl esh, and so on. On the other, Euro-Ameri can actors are transported,
carri ed away by, and i nto, thei r rol es, but they are al ways returned to them-
118
Ronal d L. Gri mes
sel ves. Thei r performances do not effect a change of status in the way a ri te of
passage does. Western stage actors re-enter ordi nary l i fe at the same poi nt they
l eft i t.
Transportati on, however, is not i denti cal wi th theater nor transformati on
wi th ri tual . Possessi on ri tes can transport and certai n ki nds of theater, that of
Jerzy Grotowski for i nstance, can transform. Ri tual performance may not "go
anywhere." Such i s the case, for exampl e, wi th the Sanskri t drama of the
Natyasastra. It does not develop toward an Ari stotel ean resol uti on but works
out vari ati ons of themes, resulting in a col l ecti ve transportati on rather than a
goal -ori ented transformati on. So i t seems that Schechner i mpl i ci tl y recogni zes
that ri tual i s not necessari l y transformati ve.
Even though Schechner emphasi zes the si mi l ari ti es among drama, popul ar
entertai nment, and ri tual , he does not i gnore the essenti al di fferences, whi ch he
pl ots on a conti nuum runni ng from effi cacy to entertai nment (Schechner 1977:
75ff.). The basi c opposi ti on, he i nsi sts, is not between ri tual and theater but be-
tween effi cacy and entertai nment. Both ri tual i sti c and theatri cal acti vi ty effect
and entertai n, but ri tual emphasizes effi cacy and theater, entertai nment. Schech-
ner's own theatri cal val ues are such that he woul d reject a purel y entertai n-
ment-ori ented theater. When a performance is effi caci ous, he teasi ngl y cal l s i t a
"transformance." Al though thi s sort of transformati on is tradi ti onal l y attri-
buted to ri tes of passage, theater has i ts own ways: Destructi ve behavi or is
di spl ayed and thus rendered non-destructi ve; ordi nary peopl e are made i nto
extraordi nary characters transformi ng actors i nto stars.
4
So for Schechner ri tual and theater have i mportant di fferences, but they are
not absol ute opposi tes. They become so only in speci fi c cul tures where aes-
theti c theater emerges or where ri tual i s shorn of i ts entertai ni ng functi ons. In
many cul tures and hi stori cal peri ods, performance is a "brai ded structure" of
effi cacy and entertai nment. Someti mes the brai d is l oose and someti mes, ti ght.
When i t i s ti ght, ri tual i zati on i s ri fe. In Schechner's thumbnai l hi stori cal sketch
of Western theater, thi s ti ghteni ng occurs in fi fth-century Atheni an theater, late
medi eval and Renai ssance theater, and in Ameri can experi mental theater of the
l ate 1960s and earl y 1970s. In all three hi stori cal moments there was noti ceabl e
ri tual i zi ng. "Effi cacy," he says of experi mental theater, "l i es at the i deol ogi cal
heart of al l aspects of thi s new theatre" (Schechner 1977: 77). Schechner's own
theatri cal producti ons have tried to overcome what he regards as the senile,
i neffectual aestheti c of Western theater. Hi s reason for argui ng that No, Katha-
kal i , Bal i nese Ketchak, and medi eval European moral i ty pl ays offer the best
4 Mi chel l e Anderson (Anderson 1982: 106) has extended the anal yti cal scope of Schech-
ner's effi cacy-entertai nment conti nuum by showi ng how effi caci ous Voodoo ri tual is
regul arl y associ ated wi th cl osed spaces or back regi ons not accessi bl e to touri sts;
whereas entertai nment Voodoo i s consi stentl y correl ated wi th front regi ons open to the
publ i c.
119
model s for the future of theater i s that they bal ance modes of transformati on.
Not mere shows, they are "showi ngs of doi ngs" (Schechner 1977: 66).
By i nsi sti ng that the di sti ncti ve el ement i n ri tual i s i ts transformati ve
effi cacy, Schechner i l l ustrates hi s debt to the i ntel l ectual tradi ti on that l i nks van
Gennep and Turner. Al though Schechner says l i ttl e or nothi ng about ri tes of
passage theory, and he wri tes l i ttl e about i ni ti ati on, he consi ders both theater
and touri sm through l enses ground on ri tes of passage and i ni ti ati on theory.
For hi m, ri tual performances do rather than merel y mean; they initiate acti on
rather than merel y refl ect on i t.
Schechner argues that the convergence of ri tual and theater i s most evi dent
i n theater's workshop-rehearsal phase (Schechner 1977: 132ff.). Ri tual i zi ng i s
l ess evi dent i n the fi ni shed producti on than i n the preparati on process. Schech-
ner makes an i mportant di sti ncti on between actor trai ni ng and rehearsal .
Duri ng rehearsal exact procedures are set i n pl ace to be repeated l ater, whereas
actor trai ni ng grows out of workshops and i s not ai med at a speci fi c producti on
but at communi cati ng general i zed ski l l s and bodi l y as wel l as atti tudi nal
readi ness.
I n most Western acti ng tradi ti ons emphasi s i s upon rehearsal , whi l e i n
Asi an ones such as No the emphasi s i s upon preparati on. Postmodern theater
has wi tnessed a growi ng i nterest i n preparati on and thus Asi an performance
methods. One cannot rehearse transformati on, onl y prepare for i t.
I n earl y phases of the theatri cal process, says Schechner, actors and di rec-
tors search for acti ons that work, ones they wi l l keep for performance. I n doi ng
so, he argues, they undergo the phases of a tradi ti onal ri te of passage. Fi rst,
they separate themsel ves from ordi nary street l i fe and begi n to stri p away
cl i ches; they are made "r aw." Next, they undergo an i ni ti ati on i nto the l i fe and
ski l l s of the group i n order to gather new materi al s. They combi ne personal
el ements wi th non-personal ones such as texts. They ei ther l earn by rote i mi ta-
ti on or el se master a generati ve code that enabl es them to bui l d characters and
stri ng together acti ons. And fi nal l y, they rei ntegrate themsel ves i nto the l arger
soci ety by presenti ng l ong stri ps of restored behavi or for publ i c vi ewi ng. They
present themsel ves transformed, "cooked." Duri ng the rehearsal process the
onl y audi ence i s the group i tsel f; i t i s a ki nd of congregati on or tri be. I n thi s
respect the rehearsal process, more obvi ousl y than the theatri cal product, is
aki n to a ri te of passage.
Theatre ari ses when an audi ence emerges as a separate group, when i t i s
acci dental rather than i ntegral (Schechner 1977: 46). I ntegral audi ences do not
pay as stri ct attenti on to the performance as acci dental audi ences do. I n fact,
not payi ng di rect attenti on i s one way of showi ng off the fact that one al ready
knows what i s goi ng on. Rel axed i nattenti on creates the proper condi ti ons
under whi ch a performance can be absorbed, thereby exerci si ng formati ve
power over everyday l i fe.
120
Ronal d L. Gri mes
Appl y i ng Schedul er's theory requi res not onl y that one observ e al l the
phases of a performati v e ev ent from trai ni ng through aftermath but al so cal l s
upon i nterpreters to noti ce the i ntensi ty and shape of an acti on. Li ke Turner,
Schechner pay s consi derabl e attenti on to "fl ow," a state of consci ousness i n
whi ch actors are not separated from themsel v es and acti on seems to ari se spon-
taneousl y of i ts own accord. Di al ecti cal l y opposed to, but necessari l y connected
wi th, fl ow i s refl exi v i ty, a state of consci ousness i n whi ch a soci ety recogni zes
i tsel f. Understandi ng a performance requi res one to study the rhy thm of mov e-
ment between fl ow and refl exi vi ty. Performances di ffer wi del y i n the way they
bui l d toward the concentrated attenti on of fl ow and i n the way they di stance
themsel v es i n refl exi v i ty.
Schechner i s especi al l y astute i n hi s anal ysi s of postmodern ri tual i zi ng, or
what he cal l s "r estor ed" behav i or, ev ents transpi ri ng between fact and fi cti on
(Schechner 1985: 35ff.). Unl i ke most rel i gi ous studi es schol ars and anthropol -
ogi sts he attends to ri tes theatri cal i zed for touri sts i n Hai ti or for the cameras of
Western anthropol ogi sts i n I ndi a. Such performances are the resul ts not of
reachi ng back to some ori gi nal , archai c l ayer but of pursui ng conti nuous cul -
tural rei nv enti on.
Schechner's compari son of theme parks such as Pl i moth [si c] Pl antati on i n
Pl y mouth, Massachusetts, wi th tradi ti onal ri tes i s one of the most suggesti v e
treatments i n current schol arshi p. He shows how ri tual i sts and performers
cross and re-cross the l i nes of make-bel i ev e. The eras, costumes, setti ngs, and
behav i or restored by ri tes and theme parks such as Wi l l i amsburg are fabri -
cati ons; parti ci pants are "not not actors." The doubl e negati v e i s Schechner's
way of suggesti ng how drasti cal l y i mmersed i n ambi gui ty these ev ents are.
One cannot say these performers are actors any more than ri tual actors are, but
nei ther i s i t accurate to say they are not actors, so by descri bi ng them as "not
not" actors, Schechner cal l s attenti on to thei r parti ci pati on i n both real ms,
fi cti on and real i ty. Al though Schechner seems to rev el i n restored behav i or, he
al so worri es that i t, i n the form of i nternati onal touri sm, can feed i nto a worl d
monocul ture.
Schechner
7
s "restored behav i or," l i ke Turner's "l i mi noi d" and "subjunc-
ti v e," i s an attempt to defi ne an emergent ri tual sensi bi l i ty i n the postmodern
worl d. The tone, howev er, i s di fferent. Schechner's emphasi s fal l s on the fi cti ve,
contri v ed nature of such events. Si nce ri tual i sts "rebehav e," they never act
nai v el y : There i s no fi rst, or ori gi nal , act that charters subsequent performances.
Consequentl y , actors are abl e to di stance themsel v es from thei r acti ons, whi ch
they can then treat l i ke a stri p of fi l m consi sti ng of frames whose sequence and
number can be modi fi ed and rearranged. Because restored behav i or i s separa-
bl e from performers, i t can be composed i nto scenari os and di rected by rubri cs;
i t faci l i tates refl exi v i ty, seei ng oursel v es act. Performances are not necessari l y
based on actual ev ents i n the past but rather on prev i ous performances, "non-
ev ents." Restored behav i or al l ows performers to become someone other, or, as
Performance Theory and the Study of Ri tual 121
Schechner, in hi s i mpi sh manner, puts i t "to rebecome what they never were"
(Schechner 1991: 443).
Schedul er
7
s and Turner's i deas are qui te compati bl e. Si nce my cri ti que of
Schechner woul d echo much of what I sai d about Turner's preoccupati on wi th
transformati on, I wi l l not repeat i t here. Schechner seems comfortabl e wi th
Turner's vi ew of soci al drama as the ori gi n of ri tual and theater, but he some-
ti mes put the matter more bl untl y by argui ng that vi ol ence and sexual i ty are
the dri vi ng, generati ve forces of ri tual and dramati c performance (Schechner
1993). It woul d be di ffi cul t to deny the central i ty of both themes in Western
theater and fi l m, but i t al so woul d not be di ffi cul t to fi nd exampl es of ri tual that
evade or el i de them. Even i f sexuality and vi ol ence were utterl y pervasi ve as
themes, that woul d not be proof that they were the generati ve sources of ri tual .
I am much l ess i ncl i ned than either Turner or Schechner to thi nk there i s a
si ngl e source of ri tual i zi ng.
Goffman, Turner, and Schechner are not the only ones to have wri tten
about the rel ati ons between ri tual and performance. I have chosen to concentra-
te on them, because I bel i eve that further theori zi ng about ri tual 's performati ve
di mensi ons wi l l be most effecti ve i f i t el i ci ts a thorough appreci ati on and criti-
que of thei r work. There are many others who have wri tten about performance
and ri tual : Bobby Alexander (Alexander 1997), M.E. Combs-Schilling (Combs-
Schilling 1989), Margaret Thompson Drewal (Cominsky 1977), Tom Dri ver
(Driver 1998), James Fernandez (Fernandez 1974a, 1974b, 1977), Fel i ci a Hughes-
Freel and (Hughes-Freel and 1998; Hughes-Freel and/Crai n 1998), Cori nne Kratz
(Kratz 1994), Carol Laderman and Mari na Roseman (Laderman/Roseman 1996),
Gilbert Lewi s (Lewi s 1980), Roy Rappaport (Rappaport 1999), Edward L. Schief-
felin (Schi effel i n 1985), Stanl ey Tambi ah (Tambi ah 1979), and I (Gri mes 1990a,
1992a, 1994). But none of us has been as consi stentl y focused on the topi c, as
prol i fi c, and as i nfl uenti al .
The Cri ti cal Turn
The convergence that I have sketched was characteri zed by enormous i ntel l ec-
tual energy, wi despread i nterdi sci pl i nary col l aborati on, and ri sky experi menta-
ti on. The second moment, whi ch we are sti l l i n, is l ess dari ngl y col l aborati ve,
not so energeti c, and skepti cal of the ri tual studi es i n general, performance
approaches in parti cul ar.
For i nstance, a bri ef but trenchant cri ti que of Turner has been advanced by
Carol i ne Bynum (Bynum 1984; see also Li ncol n 1981). Her arguments are aimed
speci fi cal l y at hi s theory of l i mi nal i ty and hi s noti on of domi nant symbol s.
Even though her reservati ons are based on women's stori es rather than
women's ri tes, they i mpl y a rejecti on of basi c assumpti ons in ri tes of passage
theory. Bynum's argument can be summari zed in four rel ated statements: (1)
122
Ronal d L. Gri mes
Compared wi th men's l i ves, women's l i ves have ei ther fewer or no turni ng
poi nts. Even i f men's lives develop by uti l i zi ng confl i ct and devel opi ng in
di sti nct stages, women's l i ves do not, or, i f they do, women's dramas are often
i ncompl ete. (2) Women's symbol s do not i nvert their l i ves; they enhance thei r
l i ves. The symbol s emphasi ze conti nui ty, not reversal . (3) Li mi nal i ty is not a
meani ngful category for women, because ei ther they are permanentl y l i mi nal
(thus the category i s meani ngl ess) or they are never trul y l i mi nal at all. (4)
Li mi nal i ty i s a theory from the poi nt of vi ew of a man l ooki ng at women, not a
theory that assumes the poi nt of view of women l ooki ng at the worl d. Thus,
says Bynum, l i mi nal i ty i s better understood as a temporary respi te from obl i ga-
ti on by l i te men of power.
5
Thi s cri ti que i s a far cry from the Turneri an cel ebrati on of l i mi nal i ty as the
engi ne of ri tual and cul ture, and i t shoul d make one cauti ous about defi ni ti ons.
When Robbi e Davi s-Fl oyd, for i nstance, defines ri tual as "a patterned, repe-
ti ti ve, and symbol i c enactment of a cul tural bel i ef or val ue," addi ng that "i ts
pri mary purpose i s transformati on" (Davi s-Fl oyd 1992: 8), she ri sks contami -
nati ng her femi ni st treatment of bi rth ri tual wi th a vi ew of ri tual skewed by i ts
over-rel i ance on the model of mal e i ni ti ati on ri tes. When cl ai mi ng that rites
transform, i t is i mportant not to romanti ci ze or merel y theori ze. A way to avoi d
both errors i s to speci fy what a rite changes and to say what degree of change
transpi res. In an i ni ti ati on, for i nstance, transformati on may occur i n: a parti ci -
pant's sel f-percepti on; i n restructured rel ati onshi ps wi th cosmi c or divine
powers; in access to power, knowl edge or goods; and in re-defi ned ki n- and
other soci al rel ati onshi ps. We need to ask: What are the "before" and "after"
states, and how do they compare? How si gni fi cant is the change? Who is
changed by a gi ven ri te of passage? What happens to ri tual theory if we admi t
that l i mi nal i ty i s a gender-speci fi c category?
I n addi ti on to the transformati oni sm and taci t sexi sm of Turner's and
Schechner' s i ni ti ati on-deri ved model s, i t is not a foregone concl usi on that per-
formance theori es of ri tual are the best ones. Al though I bel i eve they could be,
they wi l l never in fact be worthwhi l e unl ess we fi rst cri ti que and consol i date
them.
Catheri ne Bel l has done ri tual studi es the servi ce of l aunchi ng the most
seri ous and sustai ned cri ti que of performance-ori ented approaches to ri tual .
Al though I consi der several of her arguments to be wrong-headed, Bel l has
opened up an i mportant debate. Her theoreti cal contri buti on is contai ned
l argel y i n two books, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (Bell 1992) and Ritual:
Perspectives and Dimensions (Bell 1997), as wel l as one key article, "Performance"
(Bell 1998). In al l three she i s ambi val ent about both ri tual and theory. She is
concerned that ri tes as wel l as theories of ri tual have assumed an aura of
5 Bri ef parts of thi s secti on are modi fi cati ons borrowed from Gri mes 2000.
123
unquesti oned uni v ersal i ty, thereby exerci si ng an unwarranted domi nati on. At
ti mes she seems to deny that she hersel f i s presenti ng a defi ni ti on of ri tual or a
theoreti cal al ternati v e (Bel l 1992: i x, 80, 140). The fi rst sentence of Perspectives
puts "r i tual " i n quotati on marks (Bel l 1997: i x); they appear and di sappear
throughout the book. Someti mes the word ri tual i s preceded by pejorati v e
adjecti v es such as "so-cal l ed." Bel l says she resi sts formal defi ni ti ons and
expl i ci t theori es because she thi nks ri tual i s not "an i ntri nsi c, uni v ersal category
or feature of human behav i or" (Bel l 1997: i x).
I f Bel l 's wri ti ng were more i roni c and pl ay ful or consi stentl y deconstruc-
ti ve, i t woul d be poi ntl ess to engage her ambi v al ence. Li ke tryi ng to "sol v e" a
Zen koan, the exerci se woul d be futi l e because the ci rcul ari ty and ambi v al ence
woul d be i nfi ni te and thus i rresol v abl e. But i n my v i ew, Bel l acts as if ri tual
exi sts: She wri tes al most si x hundred pages on the topi c. I n addi ti on, she i s
suffi ci entl y theoreti cal both to defi ne ri tual and to cri ti ci ze other peopl e's
theori es of i t. Si nce one can both l ocate and debate her defi ni ti ons and theo-
reti cal statements, i t makes sense to regard her ambi v al ence as penul ti mate
rather than ul ti mate, a rhetori cal defense rather than a thoroughgoi ng, decon-
structi oni st (or non-essenti al i st) epi stemol ogy. Li kel y, Bel l woul d resi st at-
tempts to read her through her works, as wel l as attempts to treat her wri ti ngs
as a theory, but her own method i nv i tes one to "read thr ough" her words:
"Ul ti matel y , thi s book wi l l argue that tal k about ri tual may rev eal more about
the speakers than about the bespoken" (Bel l 1997: xi ). I f thi s cl ai m i s true about
ri tual theori sts i n general , i t i s al so true of Bel l hersel f.
The Ci rcul ari ty of Ri tual i zati on
I n concl udi ng her fi rst book, Bel l descri bes her own posi ti on as one i n whi ch
"ri tual as such does not exi st" (Bel l 1992: 141). But thi s fact does not stop her
from usi ng the term, ei ther when summari zi ng other schol ars' v i ews or when
expl ai ni ng her own. Despi te her repeatedl y expressed desi re to di spense wi th
the category of ri tual , she nev erthel ess uses i t, offeri ng characteri zati ons that
act l i ke defi ni ti ons, for exampl e, "The most subtl e and central qual i ty of those
acti ons we tend to cal l ri tual i s the pri macy of the body mov i ng about wi thi n a
speci al l y constructed space, si mul taneousl y defi ni ng (i mposi ng) and ex-
peri enci ng (recei v i ng) the v al ues orderi ng the env i ronment" (Bel l 1997: 82).
Bel l 's wri ti ng i s repl ete wi th statements that sound l i ke defi ni ti ons ev en though
she may i ntend them to be onl y descri pti ons: "Ri tual i s the medi um chosen to
i nv oke those ordered rel ati onshi ps that are thought to obtai n between human
bei ngs i n the here-and-now and non-i mmedi ate sources of power, authori ty
and v al ue" (Bel l 1997: xi ). Read i n context, i t i s often i mpossi bl e to know whose
v i ew she i s representi nghers, other theori sts, or ri tual i sts themsel v es.
124
Ronal d L. Gri mes
Bel l 's reservati ons about the uni versal i zi ng and hegemoni c pretensi ons of
the term "ri tual " l ead her to prefer the term "ri tual i zati on." She hopes to avoi d
the twi n di l emma, i nto whi ch every one el se fal l s, namel y, that of too neatl y
and narrowl y cordoni ng off ri tual from other soci al behav i or and that of
maki ng i t a di mensi on of al l human acti vi ty. Another outcome of Bel l 's argu-
ment agai nst the ci rcul ari ty that she fi nds so characteri sti c of ri tual theory i s
that i t chal l enges the cl ai m that ri tual provi des a pri vi l eged wi ndow on cul tural
meani ng. Wi th the l oss of thi s pri vi l ege, she says, ri tual requi res a di fferent
pl aci ng or frami ng. I t must be mov ed out of the real m of the paradi gmati c and
speci al and i nto the context of ordi nary soci al acti vi ty. Focusi ng on ri tual i -
zati on, she bel i eves, wi l l hel p theori sts avoi d fal sel y and neatl y treati ng ri tual
as speci al .
Bel l defi nes ri tual i zati on formal l y and mi ni mal l y, as "a way of acti ng that
di fferenti ates some acts from others" (Bel l 1992: i x). But repeated reference to
other qual i ti es of acti on i mpl y that they too are defi ni ti ve. Ri tual i zati on i s al so
"a strategy for the constructi on of a l i mi ted and l i mi ti ng power rel ati onshi p
(Bel l 1992: 8), and i t ai ms at "the producti on of a ri tual i zed body " (Bel l 1992:
98). The ful l er, i mpl i ed defi ni ti on, then, woul d go somethi ng l i ke thi s: "Ri tual i -
zati on i s a way of acti ng that di fferenti ates i tsel f from others, produci ng a
ri tual i zed body and constructi ng a l i mi ted and l i mi ti ng power rel ati onshi p."
Al though Bel l i s hesi tant to defi ne "ri tual " i n a way that i s cross-cul tural or
uni versal , she seems to hav e few such reservati ons about her own defi ni ti on of
"ri tual i zati on." Readers cannot assume that Bel l 's cri ti que of "ri tual 's" uni ver-
sal i zi ng pretensi ons wi l l l ead her to refrai n from uni versal i zi ng. She has her
own way of re-i mporti ng what she casts out to sea. For exampl e, she says,
"Despi te the potenti al for great cul tural vari ati ons, however, i t i s sti l l possi bl e
to poi nt to some basic strategies [my emphasi s] that appear to underl i ne many
ways of ri tual i zi ng" (Bel l 1997: 166). She then conti nues descri bi ng ri tes and
ri tual -l i ke acti vi ti es wi th an eye to ferreti ng out strategi es that characteri ze not
onl y ri tual i zati on but ri tual -l i ke acti vi ti es as wel l . The procedure di ffers l i ttl e
from those that i nspi re schol ars to search for wi despread ri tual patterns that
they l abel "ri tual ." Whether one cal l s them "basi c" rather than "uni v ersal "
hardl y matters.
By the end of Ritual Theory Bel l i s summari zi ng the qual i ti es of ri tual i zati on
i n a way that paral l el s other theori sts' attempts to defi ne ri tual . Ri tual i zati on,
she tel l s us, i s characteri zed by di fferenti ati on, formal i zati on, peri odi ci ty, bodi -
l i ness, schemati zati on, mastery, and negoti ati on (Bel l 1992: 220). Bel l does not
treat these features as defi ni ti ve, but she does say they are "very common [my
emphasi s] to ri tual i zati on." They are not uni que, but, i n tandem wi th one an-
other, they render ri tual i zati on as an i denti fi abl e, i f not speci al , domai n, a way
of acti ng that theori sts can recogni ze. One does not avoi d uni versal i sm by
usi ng the term "common" i nstead of "uni v ersal ."
125
Bel l 's cri ti que of the term "ri tual " does not prevent her from usi ng it; she
does not rel y excl usi vel y on the term "ri tual i zati on" as one mi ght expect. If one
tracks her gl obal i zi ng statements through both books, the term "ri tual i zati on"
grows consi derabl y beyond i ts i ni ti al , mi ni mal formul ati on. For i nstance, she
says,
Fundamental to all [my emphasi s] strategi es of ri tual i zati on exami ned previ ousl y is the
appeal to a more embraci ng authori tati ve order that l i es beyond the i mmedi ate si tua-
ti on. Ri tual i zati on is generally [my emphasi s] a way of engagi ng some wi de consensus
that those acti ng are doi ng so as a type of natural response to a worl d concei ved and
i nterpreted as affected by forces that transcend i ttranscend i t i n ti me, i nfl uence, and
meani ng, i f not i n ontol ogi cal status. Ri tual i zati on tends to posi t the exi stence of a type
of authori tati v e real i ty that i s seen to di ctate to the i mmedi ate si tuati on (Bel l 1997: 169).
What Bel l gi ves away wi th the ri ght hand (a defi ni ti on of ri tual ) she takes back
wi th the left (a set of general i zati ons about ri tual i zati on). Her i mpl i ed defini-
ti on of ri tual i zati on i s as amorphous and as uni versal i sti c as any of those she
cri ti ci zes.
Bel l counsel s theori sts not to assume thei r defi ni ti ons wi l l fit all the data
everywhere in the worl d. She al so counsel s modesty in maki ng cl ai ms about
ri tual 's power. Bel l hopes to formul ate a bal anced, real i sti c understandi ng of
the power of ri tual i zati on. She i nsi sts that i t is power, not merel y a mask for, or
expressi on of, power emanati ng from el sewhere, a mere functi onal or expres-
si ve medi um (Bell 1992: 197). One the one hand, she does not el evate ri tual
above the jockeyi ng for power that typi fi es all human i nteracti on. On the other,
she does not thi nk ri tual i zati on has the power to achi eve anythi ng very
effecti vel y; i t is "a rather bl unt tool " (Bell 1992: 212, 222).
Most of what Bel l conceptual i zes under the rubri c "ri tual i zati on," I woul d
have di scussed as "ceremony," but my di sagreement wi th her is not merel y
termi nol ogi cal . I agree that strategi zi ng to establ i sh systems of domi nati on and
i nscri bi ng val ue-l aden schemes in the body i s one of the tasks that all rites
engage in to some extent and that some ki nds of ri tual engage in al most
excl usi vel y. There are other ki nds and other l ayers however.
The Hegemony of Theory
Just as Bel l speaks of ri tual i zati on rather than ritual, she regards her wri ti ngs as
refl ecti on rather than as theory. "Thi s description of acting ri tual l y does not
necessari l y add up to a neat theoreti cal model than can be readi l y appl i ed
el sewhere ..." (Bell 1992: 141). If she were merel y bei ng modest, refusi ng to
boast that her theory is fi ni shed or compl ete, I woul d have no qual ms about
thi s and other si mi l ar di scl ai mers. Theori es should never be al l owed to rest, as
if they had attai ned the status of neat model s. But by the second book Bel l is
referring back to the "theoreti cal arguments" of her fi rst book (Bell 1997: x), and
126
Ronal d L. Gri mes
she is appl yi ng her own i nsi ghts as i f they were, in fact, a model . So I read her
di scl ai mers as servi ng a defensi ve functi on: She does not want to be i ncl uded
among the theori sts she cri ti ci zes. But in my vi ew, her cl assi fi cati ons, de-
scri pti ons, hi stori cal sketches, cri ti ques of other theori sts, as wel l as her
defi ni ti ons, expl i ci t and i mpl i ci t, consti tute theori zi ng. And as theory, they
must necessari l y be "appl i ed el sewhere" by hersel f and by others. Otherwi se,
why make general i zati on at all? Otherwi se, how mi ght one test thei r range of
appl i cabi l i ty?
It woul d be unfai r to expect Bel l 's fi rst book to be a ful l -bl own theory, si nce
i t i s a l oosel y rel ated col l ecti on of essays. But the book i s unmi stakabl y theo-
reti cal in i ntent, and i ts theoreti cal meri ts deserve to be debated. Bel l does, after
al l , cl ai m that she has forged a framework (Bell 1992: 219), and a framework is a
theoreti cal construct. The second book is far more systemati c. Even though it
pursues an i ntroductory agenda, i t also does much of what we expect of any
theory: pose defi ni ti ons, lay out categori es, exami ne the hi story of theory, and
argue for her own al ternati ve theory. In addi ti on, Bel l i s far too vi gorous in her
cri ti que of previ ous theori es for one to accept her ci rcumspecti on about theory
as a mere deferral or as a neutral non-posi ti on. Hers i s a hi ghl y pol emi cal
theoryhowever pi ecemeal of ri tual .
Despi te i ts ti tl e, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice says l i ttl e about speci fi c ritual
practi ces. Even when Bel l is tal ki ng about practi ce, her focus is usual l y the
practi ce of theori zi ng rather than the practi ces of ri tual i zati on. The fi rst chapter,
cal l ed "Constructi ng Ri tual ," is about the constructi on of the idea of ri tual ; i t is
not about the constructi on of ri tes. It is mai nl y about what schol ars do, not
about what ri tual i sts do. The book is l argel y about the concept of ri tual and
about ri tual theory. Even so, i t i s l ess an argument wi th theori sts than i t is a
hypothesi s about the soci al and i ntel l ectual functi ons of both theori zi ng and
ri tual i zi ng. It has far more to say about the act of theori zi ng than about the act
of ri tual i zi ng. In my opi ni on Bel l 's own most accurate summary of the book's
fundamental i ntenti on is that i t i s "an anal yti cal expl orati on of the soci al
exi stence of the concept of ri tual " (Bell 1992: i x).
A major di ffi cul ty in reading Bel l is her tendency to bl eed the boundary
between ri tes (the speci fi c enactments) and ri tual (the general i dea). My cri ti -
ci sm is not merel y that she does not use the terms in the way I use them, but
that the sl i ppage di spl aces agency away from human actors, notabl y ri tual i sts
and ri tual theori sts. Someti mes she is preci se in maki ng the di sti ncti ons
between ri tual acti vi ty and formal theori es of ri tual . At other ti mes the
boundari es are fuzzy or nonexi stent. For i nstance, she remarks, "From the
perspecti ve of ri tual i zati on the categori es of sacred and profane appear in a
di fferent l i ght" (Bell 1992: 91). Does she mean from the vi ewpoi nt of ri tual i sts
(ri tual actors) engaged in ri tual i zati on? Or does she mean from the poi nt of
vi ew of theori sts engaged i n thi nki ng about ri tual ? Probabl y the l atter, but even
i f we can guess correctl y in thi s i nstance, the repeated col l apsi ng of categori es,
127
whi ch regul arl y resul ts in the deletion of ei ther the ri tual theori st or the ri tual
practi ti oner, consti tutes a serious probl em for readers wanti ng to make sense of
her theory. Bel l observes, "Ri tual has si mul taneousl y become an object, a meth-
od, and even somethi ng of a styl e of schol arshi p ..." (Bell 1992: 3). Al though I
understand her poi nt, i t i s di ffi cul t to tel l whether Bel l is acti ng strategi cal l y or
carel essl y when "ri tual " rather than "ri tual studi es" is construed as a styl e of
schol arshi p.
Not onl y does Bel l often rhetori cal l y confl ate ri tes wi th ri tual , ri tual i zati on,
or even ri tual studi es, she rei fi es them. Ri tual i zati on, she decl ares, occurs when
"certai n soci al acti ons strategi cal l y di sti ngui sh themsel ves in rel ati on to other
acti ons" (Bell 1992: 74). Do acti ons di sti ngui sh themsel ves? Or do ri tual i sts,
ri tual actors, do that? Bel l uses thi s rei fi ed, refl exi ve constructi on throughout
her wri ti ng (see, e.g., Bel l 1992: 90). Another example: "The term 'ri tual ,' whi ch
pi oneered the attempt to get beyond confessi onal perspecti ves ..." (Bell 1998:
205). Here, i t i s the term i tsel f, rather than theori sts who use the term, that does
the pi oneeri ng. It is strange that someone who emphasi zes strategi c purpose
woul d el i mi nate ri tual actorsthose who strategi zei n such a way that ac-
ti ons themsel ves are i magi ned as doing the di sti ngui shi ng.
Bel l too i s concerned about rei fi cati on; she devotes an enti re secti on to it
(Bell 1997: 253ff.). But what she means by the term is the assumpti on that ri tual
has a substanti ve, uni versal form. What I mean by i t i s the tendency to treat
ei ther ri tes or the i dea of ri tual rather than ri tual i sts or ri tual theori sts as actors
and therefore as the subjects of verbs in sentences.
To the extent that Bel l wants to di scri mi nate between the part of ri tual that
bel ongs to the theori st and the part that bel ongs to the phenomenon i tsel f, one
woul d expect her to be fasti di ous about the di sti ncti on between ri tes and schol -
arly theori zi ng about ri tual . Bel l anti ci pates this sort of a cri ti que by admi tti ng
that her treatment may not be entirely free of the ci rcul ari ty that she l ocates in
other theori sts (Bell 1992: 219). I woul d say that i t is not at all free of such
ci rcul ari ty.
The fact that her treatment is so strongl y marked by ci rcul ari ty rai ses an
i nteresti ng questi on: Why i s i t so hard for al l of us, Bel l i ncl uded, to avoi d the
ci rcul ari ty that she both describes and i l l ustrates? I s i t perhaps an i nevi tabl e
outcome, not just of mi nd/body dual i sm, but of the academy and its need to
establ i sh "si des" and then "medi ate" them? Is the rhythm of pol ari zi ng and
then reconci l i ng pecul i ar to the study of ri tual in parti cul ar, or i s i t endemi c to
theori zi ng in general ? To put i t another way, is there somethi ng about the
study of ri tual speci fi cal l y that i nduces ri tual i zati on in the mi nds of theori sts,
dri vi ng them i nto the ci rcul ari ty of di fferenti ati ng and then reconci l i ng? I do
not thi nk so. Bel l bl ames ri tual theori sts for consti tuti ng the object of thei r
study. Do theori sts of other sorts do any di fferentl y? I doubt i t. Is there any
i mportant term in Western schol arshi prel i gi on, matter, mi nd, creati on,
real i tythat is not marked by i ts own hi story and soci ol ogy? Agai n, I doubt it.
128
Ronald L. Grimes
All primary terms in all theories in all languages carry their own linguistic and
cultural baggage. It is useful to be reminded of this fact but pointless to talk or
act as if culture- or history-free terminology were a possibility. "Ritualization"
no more successfully escapes Western gravity than "ritual" does. On occasion
Bell suggests that dichotomizing is endemic to all theorizing (Bell 1992: 48). If
so, we should not expect her own theorizing to be any exception.
In my view Bell's most important contribution is less to the study of ritual
than to the study of theory-making. She shows how the notion of ritual is
repeatedly used by scholars as a third term for reconciling two other, initially
bifurcated terms, most notably the pairs thoughtaction and scholarritualist.
Bell is at her most persuasive in showing how inevitably theory-making is a
strategic activity.
Bell's argument makes theorists look very much like Lvi-Strauss's "pri-
mitives" whose mythic minds are always splitting the world into polarized
pieces and then gluing them together again at some supposedly higher level.
Bell takes Clifford Geertz, for example, to considerable task, accusing him of
treating ritual as both an activity and as the fusion of thought and activity. It is
as if Ritual, a contending party in a neighborhood quarrel, were to offer him- or
herself as the mediator of the very quarrel in which he or she is engaged. Bell's
critique of Geertz's "expedient homologizing" amounts to an expose of the
scholar's new clothes. The scholar, in effect, invents, constructs, or projects con-
tradictions and oppositions "out there" in the ritual world in order to have
some problem to solve "in here" in the intellectual world. And Bell has caught
him in the act. The portrait of Geertz is both devastating and funny. But it
differs little from Bell's own identification of, and slippage between, ritual
activity, on the one hand, and ritual discourse, on the other.
However critical Bell may be of theorists' strategies, readers are seldom
informed of the strategic aims of Bell's own theory-making, except insofar as it
is to expose the designs-to-power characteristic of other theorists. Theory -
making, she implies, amounts to an act of domination insofar as it is an attempt
to exercise power in the arena of cultural knowledge. (If we were to read her in
terms of her own principles, we would be forced to construe her denial that she
has produced a theory as a way of covering up her own attempt to dominate
the field of ritual studies.)
Bell is no happier with ritual studies than with ritual, but her dismissal of it
depends on caricatures, for instance: "Ritual studies, as a recent mode of dis-
course, has claimed an odd exemption from the general critique that scholar-
ship distorts and exploits, tending to see itself, by virtue of its interest in ritual
performances per se, as somehow able to transcend the politics of those who
study and those who are studied" (Bell 1992: ix). Because of her rhetorical pre-
dilection for casting abstractions as subjects of sentences, it is impossible to
know whose discourse she has in mind. But I, for one, have never claimed such
an exemption. In fact, I have regularly insisted that ritual studies and ritual
129
cri ti ci sm, l i ke ri tes themsel ves, are deepl y embedded i n pol i ti cs. And I know of
no other ri tual studi es schol ar who cl ai ms thi s "odd exempti on." I f al l Bel l
means i s we coul d be more aware of the pol i ti cs of our categori es, who coul d
di sagree? But I suspect that she i s doi ng more, namel y, di si denti fyi ng wi th
ri tual studi es and i denti fyi ng wi th practi ce theori sts.
The Mi srecogni ti on of Performance
Bel l i s cri ti cal of what she cal l s "performance approaches" to the study of ri tual .
Si nce I consi der performance theory frui tful , I take i ssue wi th her. Bel l 's po-
si ti on i n Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions depends i n part on rejecti ng
performance theori es of ri tual and accepti ng a practi ce theory i nstead. Among
those she treats as hol di ng performance theori es of ri tual are Kenneth Burke,
Vi ctor Turner, Ervi ng Goffman, Mi l ton Si nger, Cl i fford Geertz, Gi l bert Lewi s,
Stanl ey Tambi ah, Roy Rappaport, J.L. Austi n, Robert Wuthnow, and mysel f. By
her account, Gi l bert Lewi s and Stanl ey Tambi ah are the most cauti ous and
sophi sti cated representati ves.
I n Ritual Theory Bel l puts "performance" i n quotati on marks, consi ders
performance theory "grav el y di sadv antaged," and di smi sses i t i n ei ght and a
hal f pages. She credi ts performance theori sts wi th desi ri ng to transcend the
conventi onal di chotomi es but thi nks they fai l i n thei r attempt. She cri ti ci zes us
for assumi ng that ri tual enacts "pri or conceptual enti ti es" (Bel l 1992: 38), wal -
l owi ng i n a v ague extended anal ogy, conceptual i zi ng ri tual i n a sel f-i nterested
way, and of hav i ng no way to di fferenti ate among ways of performi ng.
Dual i sms, she thi nks, creep i n the back door of performance theory. There
are al ways other thi ngs pri or to, or more fundamental than, ri tual thi ngs that
ri tual seeks to express, i f not a scri pt, then a structure or a body, a taci t meani ng
or a soci al rol e. But she hersel f does not escape the di l emma. She speaks of
practi ce as i ncorporati ng a "framework" "embedded i n the act i tsel f" (Bel l 1992:
85). A framework, l i ke a conceptual enti ty or text, i s somehow both "i n" the
ri tual performance and the ground of i t. Gi ven her cri ti que of ri tual theory, one
woul d expect Bel l to be better abl e to escape the i mpl i cati ons of the contai ner
metaphors (e.g., "embedded i n") that trap most, i f not al l , ri tual theori sts.
For the most part Bel l treats the noti on of performance as a mere anal ogy:
Performance theory amounts to an extended expl orati on of the statement:
Ri tual i s like drama. Occasi onal l y, for i nstance i n di scussi ng Si nger, she treats
the noti on of performance as more than an anal ogy, but the "method," i f there
i s one, i s too obscure and i mpreci se to be useful . Bel l concl udes that per-
formance theory "rests of course on the sl i ppery i mpl i cati ons of an extended
metaphor" (Bel l 1992: 42). The performance anal ogy i s not much i mprovement
on that other, even more revered anal ogy: Ri tual i s l i ke a text (that one can
130
Ronal d L. Gri mes
"read"). I n fact, she bel i eves that the drama anal ogy i s but a vari ati on of the text
anal ogy, i nasmuch as both requi re i nterpreters to get at taci t meani ngs.
Bel l i ndi cts performance theori sts, especi al l y Turner and me, for maki ng
oursel ves i nto a pecul i ar ki nd of audi ence necessary to the ri tual event (Bel l
1992: 39). In her vi ew we subscri be to dramati sti c anal ogi es, because, by an
"expedi ent l ogi c," ri tual i nterpreters make themsel ves a necessary audi ence for
ri tual performances. "We textual i ze ... not because ri tes are i ntri nsi cal l y l i ke
texts, but because we approach both l ooki ng for meani ng as somethi ng that can
be deci phered, decoded, or i nterpreted" (Bel l 1992: 45). Bel l 's cl ai m i s that
performance theori sts deval ue the ri te i tsel f by posi ti ng a l atent meani ng that
can be di scerned from a cl ose readi ng or observati on of the surface of a ri te.
Why do they do so? To make themsel ves necessarycrassl y, to keep them-
sel ves empl oyed. She i gnores the obvi ous fact that for Turner drama i s both a
source of ri tual and a part of ri tual , not merel y an anal og to i t. She overl ooks the
fact that for me drama i s l ess an analog to ri tual than an object of study, whi ch I
compare to ri tual .
I n her l ater vol ume, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions, Bel l 's portrai t of
performance theory i s a bi t more descri pti ve and a l i ttl e l ess pol emi cal . She ex-
presses appreci ati on for performance theori sts' abi l i ty to conceptual i ze acti ve
rather than passi v e rol es for ri tual i sts and to arti cul ate ri tual 's rol e i n creati vi ty
and soci al change. She suggests that performance theory construes ri tual as (1)
a sensuous event (2) framed by the use of styl i zati on, metaphor, and rhythm
and (3) capabl e of transformati ve effi cacy, and (4) characteri zed publ i c refl ex-
i vi ty (Bel l 1997: 74-75). But i n the end, Bel l sti l l consi ders performance theory a
"wel ter of confusi ng emphases and agendas" (Bel l 1997: 73) i mposed upon
other cul tures wi thout attempti ng to grasp parti ci pants' ways of cl assi fyi ng
ri tual and other types of human acti vi ty. She adheres to her earl i er preference
for practi ce theory rather than performance theory, and she conti nues to con-
strue the l atter as an exerci se i n extended anal ogy-maki ng, to i nterpreti ng one
unknown (ri tual ) i n terms of another unknown (drama), a cri ti ci sm that appl i es
to Goffman but onl y partl y to Turner and not at al l to Schechner.
6
I n "Performance" (Bel l 1998: 209ff.) Bel l summari zes the contri buti on of
performance theori sts i n a somewhat di fferent way. They (1) emphasi ze human
agents as acti ve creators; (2) attend to the emoti onal , aestheti c, physi cal , and
sensory aspects of rel i gi on; and (3) hav e a greater awareness of the schol ar's
own posi ti on i n rel ati on to observed acti on. I n "Performance," Bel l i s ki nder to
performance theori sts. Even though she sti l l thi nks practi ce theori sts hav e a
"surer focus" on the depl oyment of power i n ri tual , she appears l ess i ncl i ned to
6 Cl i fford Geertz (Geertz 1983, chapter 1), Max Gl uckman (Gl uckman 1977), and Ray-
mond Fi rth (Fi rth 1974) al l previ ousl y expressed reservati ons about drama as an
anthropol ogi cal concept.
131
pol ari ze performance theory and practi ce theory. I nstead she emphasi zes thei r
conti nui ty: "By v i rtue of a shared concern to deal wi th acti on as acti on, al l of
these theoreti cal ori entati ons [performance theory and practi ce theory] can be
l oosel y grouped as 'performance approaches' to the study of rel i gi on" (Bel l
1998: 205). She no l onger accuses performance theori sts of i mposi ng predeter-
mi ned categori es. Rather the theori sts try to "di scl ose the hol i sti c dynami cs of
the phenomenon i n i ts own terms" and to "l et the acti vi ti es under scruti ny hav e
ontol ogi cal and anal yti c pri ori ty" (Bel l 1998: 211, 215). I nstead of bl ami ng
performance theori sts wi th hegemoni c strategi es, she credi ts them wi th "nego-
ti ati ng l ess reducti ve and arrogant rel ati onshi p between the peopl e who study
and the peopl e who are studi ed" (Bel l 1998: 220). Her mai n reservati on seems
to be that metaphors of performance, systemati cal l y appl i ed, mi ght become so
domi nant that they occl ude the object of study.
My mai n di sagreement wi th Bel l 's attempt to characteri ze performance i n
her arti cl e for Critical Terms for Religious Studies i s wi th her suggesti on that
usi ng performance approaches may, i n fact, undermi ne the useful ness of the
concept of ri tual (Bel l 1998: 218). Apparentl y, she bel i evesand I do notthat
those who use the noti on of performance i n performance studi es are l ess uni -
versal i sti c i n thei r aspi rati ons than those who use the noti on of ri tual i n ri tual
studi es. Essenti al i sm and uni versal i sm are temptati ons of every theori st, and
they pl ague every theory.
Practi ce Theory
Bel l , hav i ng rejected performance theory and i ts rel i ance on the noti on of
acti on, neverthel ess repeatedl y uses the noti on of acti on when she turns to
practi ce theory, whi ch she consi ders a better al ternati ve. Practi ce theori sts i n-
cl ude Karl Marx, Marshal Sahl i ns, Frederi c Jameson, Antoni o Gramsci , and
Pi erre Bourdi eu. Though Bel l has some reservati ons about these wri ters, she
fi nd the i dea of ri tual practi ce a more frui tful starti ng pl ace than that of ri tual
performance. By doi ng so, she bel i eves that she focuses on the "i rreduci bl e act
i tsel f" (Bel l 1997: 81) rather than on somethi ng el se behi nd or bel ow ri tual . I f
ri tual i s practi ce rather than performance, i t i s, i n her vi ew, (1) si tuati onal , (2)
strategi c, (3) fraught wi th mi srecogni ti on, and (4) commi tted to reproduci ng or
reconfi guri ng the order of power i n the worl d. "Ri tual necessarily [my em-
phasi s] shares these four features of practi ce" (Bel l 1997: 88). I n short, ri tual ,
understood from a practi ce perspecti ve, ai ms at "redempti v e hegemony " (Bel l
1997: 81); i t attempts to save the worl d by domi nati ng i t.
Bel l i denti fi es three trai ts common to practi ce theori es: (1) thei r i nsi stence
that ri tual i s a central arena i n the hi stori cal process whereby patterns are both
reproduced and transformed; (2) thei r assumpti on that ri tual s do not merel y
mean but al so construct and i nscri be power rel ati onshi ps; and (3) thei r attempt
132
Ronal d L. Gri mes
to jetti son the category of ri tual al together (Bell 1997: 83). Si nce all three traits
typi fy her own posi ti on, and si nce she summari zes her own work under the
headi ng of practi ce theory, it is fai r, I thi nk, to treat her own theori zi ng as a
vari ant of practi ce theory.
Despi te her pol emi cs agai nst performance theory for i ts supposed uni ver-
sal i sm, Bel l regul arl y makes statements about practi ce and practi ce theory that
radi ate uni versal i sti c aspi rati ons. Often they are i mpl i ed in phrases such as thi s:
"Human practi ce in general [emphasi s mi ne] has some common features . . . "
and these features, natural l y, perfectl y match those of practi ce theory. Not only
does Bel l regul arl y make taci t, uni versal i sti c cl ai ms, she makes judgments that
are reducti oni sti c, and they do not echo cl ai ms made by ri tual parti ci pants,
whose understandi ng of ritual Bel l woul d defend from hegemoni cal l y i ncl i ned
performance theori sts. For i nstance, she says, "The ri tual pri nci pl es of ri tual
practi ce are nothing other [emphasis mi ne] than the fl exi bl e sets of schemes and
strategi es acqui red and depl oyed by an agent who has embodi ed them" (Bell
1997: 82). Thi s cl ai m may be true, but it does not ari se directly from rites
studi ed or ri tual i sts consul ted. Rather i t is an axi om of practi ce theory, as i s the
statement, "The agents of ri tual i zati on do not see [my emphasi s] how they pro-
ject thi s schemati cal l y qual i fi ed envi ronment or how they reembody those same
schemes through the physi cal experi ence of movi ng about wi thi n its spati al and
temporal di mensi ons. The goal of ri tual i zati on as such is compl etel y ci rcul ar"
(Bell 1997: 81).
Perhaps ri tual i zati on i s ci rcul ar, but i t is no more ci rcul ar than the theo-
reti cal l y dri ven argument that the purpose of ri tual is to produce ri tual i zed
bodi es. If we ask who has the i nsi ght necessary to noti ce and expose thi s pro-
jecti on, the answer is obvi ous: the practi ce theori st hersel f. Apparentl y, per-
formance theori sts and ri tual i sts, unl i ke practi ce theori sts, are bl i nd to i ts
exi stence. Accordi ng to Bel l , the practi ce-ori ented ri tual theori st's job is "to
formul ate the unexpressed assumpti ons that consti tute the actor's strategi c un-
derstandi ng of the pl ace, purpose, and trajectory of the act" (Bell 1992: 85). Bel l ,
who so regul arl y objects when interpreters search for meani ngs "behi nd" ritual
acts, and who so regul arl y assumes that she needs to protect ri tual i sts from
theori sts and i nterpreters, now assumes a pri vi l eged posi ti on whereby she can
spy a ri tual i sf s strategi es even though that ri tual i st does not know he or she
even has a strategy.
The fact that "mi srecogni ti on" i s defined i nto the phenomenon of practi ce
(and thus ri tual ), i nsures that schol arl y theori sts and observers now have a role,
namel y, recogni zi ng mi srecogni ti ons and unmaski ng "strategi c bl i ndness." In
Bel l 's vi ew "schol ars, ri tual i nventors, and ri tual parti ci pants do not usual l y see
how schol arshi p has constructed thi s noti on of ri tual or the type of authori ty i t
has acqui red. They [emphasi s mi ne] thi nk of 'ri tual in general ' as somethi ng
that has been there all along ..." (Bell 1997: 263). The we/they opposi ti on set up
here and el sewhere i n Bel l 's wri ti ngs is not between practi ti oners and theori sts
133
but between her theory, on the one si de, and ri tual i sts and other theori sts on
the other. Apparentl y, she is not subject to the same bl i ndness as they. Thus,
Bel l 's own strategy emerges, and i t does not seem much di fferent from the
strategi es of ri tual studi es schol ars. It is dri ven by the same opposi ti ons and
medi ati ons and the same projecti ons of researchers' i nterests onto the ri tual
phenomenon i tsel f.
I have no quarrel wi th the noti on that ri tual i zati on (to use the term in Bel l 's
sense) needs to be seen in cul tural context and thus as strategi c. And I agree
that "acti ng ri tual l y i s fi rst and foremost a matter of nuanced contrasts and the
evocati on of strategi c, val ue-l aden di sti ncti ons" (Bell 1992: 90). Thi s ki nd of
statement i s vi rtual l y a consensus posi ti on among students of ri tual . There is
nothi ng new and l i ttl e controversi al i n i t. The fact that ri tual acti ons are pri-
vileged by virtue of their differences from other ways of acting i mpl i es that
ritualization is a domai n of some sort, whether permeabl e or fi rml y demar-
cated. So Bel l hardl y escapes from treati ng ri tual as somethi ng speci al . I n her
vi ew ri tual i zati on i s acti vi ty that "regards i tsel f" not only as di fferent but as
superi or, whi ch i s to say, domi nant. The i mpl i cati on seems to be that by defini-
ti on ri tual amounts to a group's sel f-servi ng acti vi ty, a ki nd of practi ced pre-
tension. Someti mes Bel l implies a contrast between "normal " and "strategi c"
acti vi ty (Bell 1992: 91) in whi ch ri tual i s i denti fi ed wi th the strategi c. At other
ti mes she puts ri tual i zati on and other acti vi ti es in the same cl ass by vi rtue of
thei r shared strategi c i ntenti ons.
I have no objecti on to sayi ng that peopl e use ri tual means to create soci al
di fferenti ati on, but when the sheer act of ri tual di fferenti ati on i s sai d to create
the sacred (Bel l 1992: 91), Bel l (like Smi th, who hol ds a si mi l ar vi ew) has en-
tered the real m of metaphysi cs and is engaged in theol ogi cal di scourse, though
not of the churchl y ki nd. The vi ew is Durkhei mi an in i ts emphasi s on the soci al
ori gi n of sacral i ty, al though unl i ke Durkhei m, Bel l emphasi zes the pri ori ty of
ri tual rather than that of myth. Why ri tual , i f it is a parti cul arl y "mute" acti vi ty
(Bell 1992: 93) as she cl ai ms, should have such power is not at all obvi ous to me.
Bodi es, Inscri bed and Bl i nd
Bel l , who stri dentl y argues agai nst dual i sm in theori zi ng about ri tual , never-
thel ess treats ri tual as desi gned to avoi d di scourse and systemati c thi nki ng (Bell
1992: 93). She i mpl i es an obvi ous dual i sm, the very one she i denti fi es as central
to the theori es she rejects. The dual i sm gets ampl i fi ed by the cl ai m that the taci t
ai m of ri tual i zati onone that ri tual i sts are apparentl y not aware ofi s the pro-
ducti on of ri tual i zed bodi es.
One coul d easi l y produce counter exampl es, tradi ti ons in whi ch teachers of
ri tual are expl i ci tl y aware that the formati on of ri tual i zed bodi es, both soci al
and physi cal , i s one of thei r ai ms. Even so, i t is l i kel y true, as Peter Berger and
134
Ronald L. Grimes
others have said, that cultural life is replete with "things" we create and then,
having forgotten that we created them, we treat them as objectively "out there."
So I agree that ritualists can "misrecognize" ritual and that ritual theorists
too may miscrecognize what they are doing. But I know of no evidence show-
ing that ritual, due to its inherent bodiliness, is more regularly misrecognized
than any other cultural activity.
Ritual sensibilities are only sometimes, and only partly, matters of implicit-
ly cultivated dispositions. They are not always, as Bell implies, completely tacit.
Some ritual knowledge is self-consciously and critically held by participants.
No doubt, we embody much more than we know, including the hierarchical
assumptions about power embedded in our own culture, but this fact hardly
warrants defining ritualization as a kind of blindness that only theorists, prac-
tice theorists in particular, are capable of seeing.
When Bell discusses the importance of the body to ritual, she repeatedly
speaks of the body as a kind of repository which is "invested" with a sense of
ritual. A reader imagines the body as a kind of soft material upon which stra-
tegic "schemes" are "impressed" (Bell 1992: 98), thus implying the priority of
the schemes and passivity of the body. The ritualizing body is characterized by
Bell as containing "socially instinctive automatisms" (Bell 1992: 99) of which it
is not aware and the circularity of which it necessarily "misrecognizes." In my
view "automatisms" suggests that ritual action is mindless, and thus that Bell
reintroduces the mind/body split that she discovers and rejects in writings by
others theorists.
In my view some of the body's functions are obviously beyond the grasp of
consciousness, but probably not beyond articulation, and other bodily func-
tions are clearly obvious to consciousness. By certain kinds of ritual practices it
is possible to become aware of many of them. So neither ritual nor the body
should so unequivocally be associated with misrecognition and lack of self-
awareness. This association verges on implying that ritual is irrational, a view
Bell castigates. The association is further reinforced by Bell's deconstructionist
argument that ritual is not only empty of signification but that it is a never-
never land in which problems are deferred by being "endlessly retranslated in
strings of deferred schemes" (Bell 1992: 106). She implies that ritual not only
does not solve problems, it perpetuates them by promising resolutions while
never supplying them. I would accept this view as a characterization of one
kind of ritual infelicity, but not as a definition of ritual's only function.
I do not accept the view that the sole purpose of ritual (or ritualization) is to
generate ritualized bodies. Some kinds of ritual have the power to do that;
others do not. Everything depends on what kind of rite one is considering and
how deeply and thoroughly it is practiced. Rites vary greatly in the degree to
which they are capable of driving their meanings into the bone.
Bell's attitude toward ritual is what Paul Ricoeur has called a "hermeneutic
of suspicion." In one respect Bell's suspicion and my call for "ritual criticism"
135
are very much al i ke. One of our ai ms is to demysti fy orders of domi nati on so i t
i s not so easy for rites to be drafted i nto repl i cati ng the status quo and proppi ng
up prejudi ci al hi erarchi es. A pri mary di fference between us, however, is my
dramati sti cal l y-i nspi red desi re to ask: Who is i nscri bi ng the val ues that we fi nd
suspect? Bel l 's deconstructi oni st-i nspi red tendency is to attri bute strategi c pur-
pose to ri tual i tsel f. "The purpose of ri tual i zati on/' she says, "i s to ri tual i ze
persons, who depl oy schemes of ri tual i zati on in order to domi nate (shi ft or
nuance) other, nonri tual i zed si tuati ons to render them more coherent wi th the
val ues of the ri tual i zi ng schemes and capabl e of mol di ng percepti ons" (Bell
1992: 108). In statements l i ke this she posi ts a paradi gmati c functi on for ri tual ,
even though she el sewhere rejects treati ng ri tes as paradi gms. Whereas she is
content to have ri tual i zati on do the purposi ng, I want to know who, speci fi cal -
l y, entertai ns what purposes. Bel l 's deconstructi oni st rhetori c l eads her i nto
vol ati l i zi ng not just the proverbi al "author" but the ri tual i st and the theori st as
wel l . Thi s strategy, i t seems to me, only further mysti fi es the ri tual process by
attri buti ng agency to the act i tsel f rather than to speci fi c ri tual agents. The only
fortunate consequence I can see in thi s rhetori cal tacti c is that i t someti mes
avoi ds maki ng ri tual i sts themsel ves sound stupi d:
[Ri tual i zati on] i s a way of acti ng that sees i tsel f as respondi ng to a pl ace, event, force,
probl em, or tradi ti on. I t tends to see i tsel f as the natural or appropri ate thi ng to do i n
the ci rcumstances. Ri tual i zati on does not see how i t acti vel y creates pl ace, force, event,
and tradi ti on, how i t redefi nes or generates the ci rcumstances to whi ch i t i s respondi ng.
I t does not see how i ts own acti ons reorder and rei nterpret the ci rcumstances so as to
afford the sense of a fi t among the mai n spheres of experi encebody, communi ty, and
cosmos. (Bel l 1992:109)
Si nce ri tual i sts, not ri tual i zati on, "see," i t i s reveal i ng to i magi ne thi s statement
wi th "ri tual i sts" rather than "ri tual i zati on" as i ts subject. And then further spe-
ci fy these ri tual i sts: Such-and-such a medi ci ne person in such-and-such a tribe,
such-and-such a rabbi in such-and-such a synagogue. Surel y, there are pri ests
and shamans and rabbi s who do, i n fact, know that they are acti vel y creati ng
pl ace and tradi ti on, just as there are some who do not. But do we really want to
attri bute compl ete bl i ndness to every act of ri tual i zati on, a bl i ndness that only
we observers and theori sts see?
I am qui te wi l l i ng to acknowl edge, even poi nt out, the bl i ndness, the stra-
tegi c mi srecogni ti on, of ri tual practi ti oners. But such bl i ndness is not pecul i ar
to ri tual practi ce, and i t i mpl i cates the practi ce of theori zi ng as much as i t does
that of ri tual i zi ng. I do not bel i eve we can afford the arrogance, consci ous or
unconsci ous, of defi ni ng unwi tti ng, yet strategic, mani pul ati on i nto every ri tual
act of every i ndi vi dual or groupwhi ch is the effect of maki ng such cl ai ms as a
matter of defi ni ti on and theory rather than as geographi cal l y and socially
l ocated acts of ri tual cri ti ci sm. Such a vi ew not onl y di spl aces ri tual actors, it
pri vi l eges theori sts who bel i eve themsel ves capabl e of seeing ri tual i sts' mi s-
recogni ti ons.
136
Ronal d L. Gri mes
Bel l 's posi ti on i s strong i n several i mportant respects. She i s percepti ve in
exposi ng the ci rcul ari ty of ri tual theory and ri tual practi ce. She shows how
ri tual opposi ti ons (bl ack/whi te, mal e/femal e, l eft/ri ght, etc.) are rooted in soci al
di sti ncti ons and then i nscri bed in the body. She makes readers aware of the
asymmetri cal nature of such opposi ti ons: They usual l y establ i sh one party as
domi nant. And she noti ces how l oosel y systemati c a ri tual system really i s. The
strengths of her posi ti on l i e in the cogency wi th whi ch she has argued these
poi nts. But in the l ast anal ysi s Bel l does not avoid the traps she most wants to
avoi d: bi furcati ng and medi ati ng, theori zi ng about ri tual , posi ti ng functi ons
and defi ni ng qual i ti es of ri tual , and constructi ng pri vi l eged posi ti ons for theo-
ri sts themsel ves.
In my vi ew, we schol ars of ri tual have l i ttl e choi ce but to define and theo-
ri ze about i t. If we do not do i t expl i ci tl y, i t wi l l happen taci tl y. It i s true, as Bel l
compl ai ns, that performance approaches are pi ecemeal and confusi ng, but this
is reason for more systemati c, more cri ti cal theory rather than l ess. I agree that
we shoul d resi st creati ng pri vi l eged posi ti ons for theori sts and that we shoul d
be wary of creati ng fal se dual i sms whi ch we then resol ve by appeal s to ri tual as
some ki nd of magi cal medi ator. But, unl i ke Bel l , I do not fi nd practi ce theori es
any more preci se or coherent than performance theori es; they too are frag-
mentary. They add an i ncreased awareness of strategi c bi ds for power that co-
opt ri tual s i nto servi ce, but there is no i nherent i ncompati bi l i ty between the two
ki nds of theory. Mai nl y, ritual studi es needs consol i dati on and cri ti quecon-
sol i dati on of fragmentary theori es and cri ti que of major and emergent ones.
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Performance Theory and The Study of Ritual

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