Bautista v Gonzales AM 1625

FACTS: Atty. Ramon Gonzales was charged with malpractice,

deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath by
Angel Bautista. The following acts constituting the charge
were alleged: engaging into a champertous contract with
client, representing conflicting interests, transferring to
himself one-half of the properties while litigation is still
pending, inducement of a complainant to enter a contract
with him, falsifying documents, disloyalty and treachery to
client, misleading the court, harassment through filing several
complaints. Atty. Gonzales denied all allegations. In 1983, the
case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. In 1988, Atty.
Gonzales filed a motion to dismiss the complaint since the
long delay in the resolution violates his constitutional right to
due process and speedy disposition of cases. The Solicitor
General then submitted his report and recommended Atty.
Gonzaless suspension for six months. Atty. Gonzales then
filed a motion to refer the case to the IBP as per Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gonzaless case must necessarily
be referred to the IBP?

RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that reference to the
IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the
Court for it is not an exclusive procedure. Under Sections 13
and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct
disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP
by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or
to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court.
The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report
and recommendation submitted by the investigating official
and the evidence presented by the parties. Also, at the time
of the effectivity of Rule 139-B, the investigation conducted
by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially
completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only
pending cases shall be transferred to IBP. The Supreme Court
noted that referral to IBP will result not only in duplication of
the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also
to further delay in the disposition of the present case which
has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.

SUSPENDED for 6 months.

Martin v Felix AC 2760 and 2851

FACTS: Cecilia Zulueta de Martin sought advice from Atty.
Alfonso Felix for a legal separation case against Alfredo
Martin, her husband and herein petitioner, on the ground of
illicit affairs. Atty. Felix initially discouraged the filing. A year
later, Cecilia approached Atty. Felix for the same complaint
but now with a contention that Alfredo Martin is having an
extremely expensive affair with a woman named Noemi. Atty.
Felix still discouraged the suit. Soon after, Cecilias father,
who is personally known to Atty. Felix asked for the latters
help in the filing of the case now on the grounds of
abandonment, being involved in numerous affairs and
squandering away conjugal property. He took the case and
filed it in the CFI. Together with Cecilia, they also filed an
administrative complaint against Alfredo Martin at the PRC.
Alfredo then countered with nine criminal charges against
Cecilia and Atty. Felix including falsification of documents
and with acts allegedly constituting grossly immoral conduct
since Atty. Felix is claimed to be having abnormal sexual acts
with his nephew and maid. Also, Alfredo contends that Atty.
Felix has been living with a Thai mistress despite being
lawfully married to a Maria Concepcion. Atty. Felix denied all
allegations and even asserted that his marriage with his wife
was void ab initio for his wife had a previous marriage with
another man.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Felix is guilty for gross immoral
conduct
RULING: No since the opposing party has failed to produce
such degree of proof as to warrant the disbarment of
respondent attorney. The Supreme Court held that from the
records, Atty. Felix has established that his wife did not
separate from him after the cathcing him in a compromising
situation with her young nephew; the fact is that respondent
chose to send her to the United States and Spain after he
learned of Marias prior marriage and illicit affairs in order to
protect his family from any scandal. The claim of both
complainants that respondent indulged in immoral and
abnormal sexual acts have not been substantiated or
supported by any concrete evidence. As to the criminal
relationship with the Thai woman, the records show that
there is nothing bigamous in the said relationship considering
that respondent was never legally married to Maria. Such a
relationship can neither be bigamous nor adulterous because
the essential element of an existing valid marriage is lacking.
Maria and Alfredo werent able to satisfy the burden of proof
against Atty. Felix. The Court reiterated that in disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition
of the administrative penalty.

DISMISSED.


In Re: Wenceslao Laureta G.R. No. L-68635 March 1987

FACTS: Eva Illustre wrote letters to several Supreme Court
justices which contained a stance of dangling threats to
effect a change of the Court's adverse resolution. In October
1986, the Supreme Court issued a resolution stating that just
because a case is resolved against the interests of a party,
does not mean that it is an "unjust decision" or that it has
been "railroaded". Following the resolution, Illustre then
again wrote letters to several justices with similar content,
noting that the respective 4-page minute but extended
resolutions apparently impressive for their lack of merit
deliberately unsigned that exposed their lack of judicial
integrity. After having lost her case before the Supreme
Court, Illustre filed on December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint
before the Tanodbayan. Several justices of the Supreme
Court were charged with having knowingly and deliberately
rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute
Resolution, as well as several Court of Appeals justices on
their unjust resolution. Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez
and Justice Pedro Yap of this Court were also maliciously
charged with having used their power and influence in
persuading and inducing the members of the First Division of
this Court into promulgating their "unjust extended Minute
Resolution. Illustres counsel Atty. Laureta himself reportedly
circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was
widely publicized in almost all dailies on December 1986,
without any copy furnished this Court nor the members who
were charged. Soon, Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed
petitioner's Complaint. Afterwards, a resolution as issued by
the Supreme Court ordering Atty. Laureta and petitioner
Illustre to show cause why they should not be disciplinary
sanctioned and held in contempt respectively for their acts.
Illustre then answered, praying that the contempt
proceedings against her be dismissed, she contends, in
essence, that: (1) "there was no intention to affront the
honor and dignity" of the Court; (2) the letters addressed to
the individual Justices were private in character and were
never meant for anybody; (3) if her statements in those
letters were really contemptuous, the Court "should have
immediately taken disciplinary proceedings" against her; she
instituted the complaint before the Tanodbayan "in my
honest behalf that I lost my case before the Supreme Court
not because of lack of merit or of its own merits; (5) Laureta
is not her counsel in the case before the Tanodbayan; (8)
before the latter body, she has "established not only
probable cause but has also proved the collective culpability
(of the Justices concerned) as charge. Atty. Laureta at the
same time answered: (1) he is not respondent Ilustre's
counsel before the Tanodbayan; (2) it was he who dissuaded
her from calling her intended press conference and from
circulating copies of her complaint "not only in the
performance of duty as an officer of the court, but also as a
former president of Manila III Chapter of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and as a professional lecturer in Legal and
Judicial Ethics; (3) he did not prepare respondent Ilustre's
letters to the individual Justices

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Laureta has liability for
besmirching acts against the Courts

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court found the explanations of
both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta unsatisfactory. Their
reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced.
Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with
the performance of their judicial functions become part of
the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
Court. In the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it
refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the
expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court
en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the
unjustness and unfairness of their accusations. The Court is
far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. It must
act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous
attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to
safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. They
are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with
respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices. In the
Manifestation and Motion, dated June 25, 1986, filed by Atty.
Laureta, the same phrases were incanted:
the promptitude with which the Resolution of 14
May 1986 was promulgated (par. 9, Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 5) unequaled in the entire
history of the Supreme Court in so far as petitions
given due course is concerned ...
Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters
ostensibly authored by Ilustre. Atty. Laureta's obsession to
receive the answer to his queries surfaces again in the second
letters. Also, the reports received by the members of the
Court that copies of the complaint filed with the Tanodbayan
were distributed to the editors of the metropolitan
newspapers in envelopes bearing the name of respondent
Laureta, who was heard over the radio speaking on the same
complaint. Such bolstered the Supreme Courts disagreement
with the respondents. As stressed by this Court in an early
case, as such lawyer, "Whatever steps his client takes should
be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16
of the Canons of Legal E times should be reminded him that
'(a) lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to
prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer
himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their
conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses
and suitors. If a client pursuits in such wrongdoing the lawyer
should terminate their relation. As an officer of the Court,
respondent Laureta, should realize that the cardinal principle
he would grossly impair and violate is that of the
independence of the judiciary, which the members of the bar
are called upon to defend and preserve. The independence of
the judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing the
supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. Also,
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are suit generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaint nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.

SUSPENDED until further orders Atty. Laureta; CONTEMPT
Illustre

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
FACTS: same as previous case

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Laureta is guilty of grave
professional misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
an attorney and officer of the Court.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the argument
premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not
impressed with merit. What due process abhors is absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard. The word "hearing" does not
necessarily connote a "trial-type" proceeding. Atty. Laureta
was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the
reasons why he should not be subjected to dispose action.
Atty. Laureta denied having authored the letters written by
Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his
having circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed
before said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of
his profession. But the Court believed otherwise.
Furthermore, the copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution
dismissing Ilustre's Complaint was furnished Atty. Laureta as
"counsel for the complainant" at his address of record. Upon
the delivery at the residence of Atty. Laureta where the
latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision.
If, indeed, the lawyer-client relationship between her
husband and Ilustre had been allegedly completely severed,
all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the
copy intended for Ilustre. To note also is Atty. Laureta's own
admission, he was the one called by a "reporter" of DZRH to
comment on the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If he
had nothing to do with the complaint, he would not have
been pinpointed at all. The logical step for him to have taken
was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting
Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary courtesy and
propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. The impudence and
lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces
when he asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he
"understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as
manifested in the serialized publication of the Per Curiam
Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing
editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court
rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last
year."

motion DENIED. SUSPENDED from practice

Montecillo v Gica G.R. No. L-36800

FACTS: Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation
against Montecillo but the latter was acquitted and even
rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo for
damages. On appeal to the City Court, the decision was
upheld but upon appeal to Court of Appeals, the decision was
reversed in favor of Gica. Atty. del Mar was counsel for
Montecillo and he he moved for a reconsideration of the
Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly
rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through
negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals
allowed itself to be deceived. The Court of Appeals then
admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and
abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant
reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his
second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of
court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all
penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President
of the Philippines and that the next appeal that will he
interposed, will be to the President of the Philippines. The
Appelate court then ordered Atty. Del Mar to show reason
why he should not be punished for contempt of court. Atty.
del Mar made a written explanation stating he was only
informing the court of his course of action and reiterated the
same contentions plus he sent another letter to the same
Justices reminding them of a civil case he instituted against
them for damages due to decision rendered not in
accordance with law and justice. Court of Appeals held him
guilty of contempt and suspended Atty. del Mar from practice
of law. Afterwards, he filed a certiorari case for of the
decision of the Appellate Cour and a motion for
reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of
this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court
who supported the resolution denying his petition. The
Supreme Court denied his motion for lack of merit. He then
filed a manifestation stating: I would have filed against the
Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to
the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the
abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica. The Supreme
Court then issued a resolution ordering Atty. del Mar to show
cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him
for the contemptuous statements. Atty. del Mar then replied
that he has already decided to retire from a life of militancy
to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human
deficiencies. Atty. del Mar also pleaded that he has suffered
repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him
dizzy and unstable mentally and physically and that he is
asking forgiveness for all of his mistakes.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. del Mar is guilty of contempt of
court

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the tenor of this
explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as
a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant
justification. A practicing lawyer and officer of the court
facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to
voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would
negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for
contempt in defense of its integrity and honor. It is the duty
of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful.
Lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much
more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues
involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. Criminal contempt
has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the
dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially.
It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which
tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.

SUSPENDED until further orders

Zaldivar v Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos 79690-707

FACTS: Zaldivar is one of several defendants in several
criminal cases for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. He then file
with the Supreme Courta Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and mandamus naming as respondents both the
Sandiganbayan and Raul M. Gonzalez assailing the
recommending the filing of criminal information against him
and the denial of his motion to quash and that Gonzalez, as
Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority
independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases
for graft and corruption against public officials and
employees. The Supreme Court then issued a temporary
restraining order to cease and desist hearing Zaldivars cases.
Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a second Petition
for certiorari and Prohibition naming only Gonzales as
respondent. He again raised the argument of the
Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution.
The Court required Gonzales to comment. Four days prior to
issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order, the
Office of the Tanodbayan instituted a criminal case against
Zaldivar and other with the Sandiganbayan. Zaldivar filed with
the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt citing grounds that
Gonzales caused the filing of the information against
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the
Sandiganbayan; and (2) issued certain allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the
proceedings. in the 30 November 1987 issue of the
"Philippine Daily Globe, Gonzales remarked:
The Supreme Court order stopping him from investigating
graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can
aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the
progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it
appears that while rich and influential "
The high tribunal's order 'heightens the people's
apprehension over the justice system in this country.
I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the
thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent
the progress of a trial
The Court required respondent Gonzalez "to comment and
soon issued a resolution ordering Gonzales to cease and
desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases
with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers
and functions of the Ombudsman. A motion of consideration
was then filed by Gonzales, averring the following:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a
leading member of the court ... and he was asked to
'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;'
"
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain
from investigating the COA report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will
embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
cases against (two Members of the Court)."
The court then required Gonzalez to explain in writing within
ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be
punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions. Gonzalez subsequently filed an
Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging,
among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988
Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that
presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he
gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial
judge] is still available to him. The Court denied his motions

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzaless statements are constitutive
of contempt

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court has in the past penalized as
contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary
sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the statements
made by Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that as regulator and guardian of the
legal profession, it has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys. The Supreme Court has inherent power to punish
for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the
conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers
and all other persons connected in any manner with a case
before the Court. The power to punish for contempt is
"necessary for its own protection against an improper
interference with the due administration of justice. It should
not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to
disclaim any bias or prejudice against the respondent that
would prevent them from acting in accordance with the
exacting requirements of their oaths of office. Reference of
complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory
upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly
not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge
consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no
need for further investigation of facts in the present case for
it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that
he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him.
Although the principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that
he was merely exercising his constitutional right of free
speech, freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important
public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. Also, Gonzalez, apart from being
a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special
Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the
Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the
repository of the judicial power in the government of the
Republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of
a private practicing lawyer.

GUILTY of contempt and misconduct. SUSPENDED
indefinitely.

Tapucar v Tapucar AC 4148

FACTS: Remedios Tapucar sought the disbarment of her
husband Atty. Lauro Tapucar on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena.
Atty. Tapucar has actually been already administratively
charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the
court wherein he was initially suspended as his function of a
CFI Judge in Agusan del Norte and subsequently dismissed
from such position. Despite such administrative cases, Atty.
Tapucar cohabited, had a child and contracted marriage with
Elena in a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court
Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done
while he was married to Remedios. The matter was referred
to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines with the resulting recommendation of
disbarment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tapucars acts warrant
disbarment

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that good moral
character is not only a condition precedent for admission to
the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain ones good standing. Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice.
Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the
faith and confidence of the public that justice is administered
with dignity and civility. The Court may disbar or suspend a
lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Also, the
record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon
by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a
woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. Keeping a mistress,
entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists,
as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and
their children, show his disregard of family obligations,
morality and decency, the law and the lawyers oath.

DISBARRED.

Delos Reyes v Aznar AC 1334

FACTS: Rosario delos Reyes is a second year medical student
of Southwestern University (Cebu) and Atty. Aznar is the
chairman of the university. Rosario alleged that Atty. Aznar
had carnal knowledge of her for several times under threat
that she would fail in her Pathology subject. She furthered
that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a
certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion. Atty.
Aznar denied allegations and knowledge of Rosario delos
Reyes. The Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Throughout the
period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the
allegations made against him. Aznar however contended that
delos Reyes intended to wreck vengeance against respondent
by reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation of
the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment
for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of
her subjects. He did not appear in the hearing and only sent
persons to give testimonies to his favor. The Solicitor General
found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar
has been substantiated by sufficient evidence both
testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and
uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion and
recommended suspension from practice of law for three
years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Aznar is guilty of immoral
conduct

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that such accusation
was substantiated. Atty. Aznar failed to adduce evidence
sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability. Also, while
this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have
done more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly
traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put
in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person
to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot
dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral
standards of the law profession. Under Section 27, Rule 138,
"(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice. It
is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as
'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community. A married man with
children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman
of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all
her subjects in case she refused.

DISBARRED.

Barrientos v Daarol AC 1512

FACTS: Victoria Barrientos sought the disbarment of Atty.
Daarol on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
Barrientos was a teenager and single when she met Atty.
Daarol through her sisters friend. Their friendship turned
into courtship that ultimately led to Atty. Daarols proposal to
Barrientos for marriages. Barrientos, being in love,
consented. However, before their planned marriage, they
have had several episodes of sexual intercourse with which
Barrientos initially hesitated. Soon, she submitted to a
pregnancy test and the result was positive; she informed
Atty. Daaorl and he suggested to have the fetus aborted but
she objected and he did not insist; he then told her not to
worry because they would get married within one month and
he would talk to her parents about their marriage. It was
soon agreed that the marriage would be celebrated in Manila
so as not to create a scandal. When Atty. Daarol came to see
Barrientos and her mother now residing at Singalong, Manila,
he told them that he could not marry complainant because
he was already married. However, Atty. Daarol reassured her
that since he has been separated from his wife for 16 years,
he would work for the annulment of his marriage and,
subsequently marry Barrientos. Soon, after delivering the
baby, none was heard of from Atty. Daarol. Barrientos went
back to Dipolog City to look for Atty. Daarol but to no avail.
She then consulted a lawyer and filed an administrative case
against respondent with the National Electrification
Administration but such was ultimately dismissed and thus
she filed the present administrative case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Daarol was guilty of deceit and
gross immoral conduct

RULING: Yes. Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral
delinquency . The Supreme Court held that from the records,
it appears indubitable that complainant was never informed
by respondent attorney of his real status as a married
individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by
Atty. Daarol only after the complainant became pregnant.
Even then, Atty. Daarol misrepresented himself as being
eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife
for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the
assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first
marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that
respondent never bothered to annul said marriage. More
importantly, he knew all along that the mere fact of
separation alone is not a ground for annulment of marriage
and does not vest him legal capacity to contract another
marriage. He resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his
sexual desires. The Supreme Court noted the perverted sense
of respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see
nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being
married and that he even suggested abortion. He even had
the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as
such, could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired
into the possibility of marrying Barrientos. If respondent
knew, that notwithstanding his being a moslem convert, he
cannot marry complainant, then it was grossly immoral for
him to have sexual intercourse with complainant because he
knew the existence of a legal impediment. Respondent may
not, therefore, escape responsibility thru his dubious claim
that he has embraced the Islam religion. Good moral
character is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar
(Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with
upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which
all lawyers must possess.

GUILTY of gross immoral conduct. DISBARRED.

De Eco v Ramirez AC 1647

FACTS: Elena Vda. de Eco, an illiterate from Sorsogon, filed a
complaint against Atty. Benjamin Ramirez. Atty. Ramirez was
then counsel for Communications Insurance Co., Inc. On
January 1966, Vda. de Eco filed suit against the Hapseng
Bakery and Grocery and its insurer, Communications
Insurance Co., Inc. for the death of her husband while in the
employ of the bakery. According to De Eco, sometime January
1976, she went to the office of the insurance company to
follow up the case. She was met by Ramirez. He then told
them that the insurance company was not liable for her
husbands death but the company will help by giving them
"P650.00 as limos. She then thumbmarked a blank piece of
paper and her daughter signed as witness. On January 29,
1976, the Workmens Commission decided the case in favor
of Vda. de Eco and ordered the Hapseng Bakery and the
Communications Insurance Co. jointly and severally to pay
the sum of P4,880.00. However, upon the issuing of the writ
of execution, Atty. Ramirez informed them that the sum of
P4,880.00 was already paid to Vda. de Eco on January 15,
1976.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Ramirez made it appear that
complainant signed a receipt on January 15, 1976 for
P4,880.00 as full payment for the complainants claim

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court noted IBPs findings that De
Eco could not have signed together with her daughter as
witness for the full amount of P4,880.00 because that January
15, 1976 receipt could not have known or anticipated the
award of the Workmens Compensation Commission on
January 29, 1976 against respondents company,
Communications Insurance Co. Inc., for P4,880.00. So, by
preponderance of evidence, it has been amply proved that
respondent lawyer Benjamin Ramirez deceived complainant
by making it appear in a document on January 15, 1976 that
she received P4,880 or more than what she actually received.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in such office. His act of defrauding
an illiterate complainant of the monetary award for her
husbands death, for which she waited nearly ten years, is
deplorable and should not be viewed lightly.

SUSPENDED for 1 year

Constantino v Saludares AC 2029

FACTS: Constantino charges Atty. Saludares of conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer for the non-payment of a loan which
the latter obtained from the formers son. Atty. Saludares
borrowed money in the amount of P1,000.00 from
Constantinos son Luis, Jr. Atty. Saludares procured the loan
purportedly for an urgent personal obligation. He failed to
comply with his promise. Subsequent demands for payment
were then made by Luis, Jr. but to no avail. Luis, Jr. left the
country and afterwards wrote his father, authorizing the
latter to collect the sum of money but again to no avail.
Constantino then sought assistance from the Civil Relations
Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through
an affidavit-complaint. The Civil Relations Office in turn
endorsed the affidavit-complaint to this Court. Atty.
Saludares averred that the complaint was without basis and
malicious in nature. He however, categorically admits having
borrowed money from complainant's son, Luis, Jr. He reasons
out that he was unable to repay the loan because Luis, Jr.
failed to appear at the appointed place of the payment. The
case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Saludares was guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer

RULING: Yes. Attys Saludaress conduct is unbecoming and
does not speak well of a member of the Bar. The Supreme
Court held that by Atty. Saludaress failure to present
convincing evidence to justify his non-payment of the debt,
not to mention his seeming indifference to the complaint
brought against him made apparent by his unreasonable
absence from the proceedings before the Solicitor General,
respondent failed to demonstrate that he still possessed the
integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar.
Granting arguendo that he failed to meet Luis, Jr. at the
appointed place of payment, respondent does not deny the
fact that he has refused and still refuses to repay the
P1,000.00 loan despite repeated demands. Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provides that a
lawyer must not engage in unlawful, immoral or deceitful
conduct. A lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. No moral qualification for bar
membership is more important that truthfulness and candor.

SUSPENDED for 3 months

De Jesus v Collado AC 3806

FACTS: De Jesus sought for the disbarment through letter-
complaints regarding Atty. Collado , a Court Attorney of the
Office of the Clerk of Court, for having issued nine bouncing
checks amounting to some 200k. Such actions led to the
initiation of an administrative investigation. The court
required Atty. Collado to comment to which he did and
ordered the Commission on Immigration and Deportation to
issue a hold-departure order to stop respondent from leaving
the country. In addition to, the Court, further directed the
Office of Administrative Services to complete its civil service
disciplinary investigation. Pending resolution of the instant
case, the Court was apprised by de Jesus, through an affidavit
of desistance that she is no longer interested to proceed with
all the administrative and criminal cases she filed against
Collado since the latter has already paid her obligation in full.
Despite such desistance, Court considered that there was no
legal obstacle to a definitive resolution of the two complaints
filed against respondent.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Collado is guilty of serious misconduct

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that although no
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been
obtained against respondent Collado. they do not , however,
believe that conviction for the criminal charges raised against
her is essential, so far as either the administrative or civil
service case or the disbarment charge against her is
concerned. B. P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious misconduct on
the part of a member of the Bar. The Court has also held that
a member of the Bar must observe honesty and fairness even
in private transactions.

SUSPENDED in practice of law for 1 year. DISMISSED from
Civil Service retirement benefits forfeited.

Dinoy v Rosal AC 3721

FACTS: Dinoy sent the Secretary of Justice an unverified letter
charging Atty. Jesus Rosal with having notarized a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of one Estela Gentacutan, at a
time when some of the principals were already dead. The
Court referred it to the Committee on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. A series of communications
were then exchanged between Mr. Dinoy and the
Committee. He presented evidences: (a) a xerox copy of a
death certificate issued by the Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Cebu City indicating that one Cesaria Bacalla died on 10
February 1981; (b) a photograph of a headstone indicating
that Jose Gentacutan died on 2 April 1974; and (c) a xerox
copy of a certification issued by the Parish Church of San
Nicolas, Cebu City indicating that the skeletal remains of Jose
Gentacutan have been interred in the Calamba Roman
Catholic Cemetery, Cebu City. While the investigation was
going on, Dinoy, submitted a "Supplementary Affidavit
where he declared that the act complained of is illegal and
unlawful and Atty. Rosal should be punished for this act thru
disbarment from the practice of law. Atty. Rosal answered
that notwithstanding the heavy workload of documents to be
notarized which he faced on the day he dealt with the
document in question, he was able to interview each of the
persons who executed the Special Power of Attorney
regarding their personal circumstances and the consequences
of their act; he was satisfied the persons who signed the
document were the ones who represented themselves to be
such. Soon, the IBP found that Atty. Rosal failed to exercise
due diligence in ascertaining the identities and capacities of
the individuals who executed the document but there was no
proof that he acted with malice, ill-will or bad faith in
committing the negligent act complained of; Dinoy cannot
therefore insist upon the disbarment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rosal committed an illegal act of
natarization

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court adopted the IBP findings as
its own. It is the duty of the notarial officer to demand that a
document be signed in his presence by the real parties
thereto; the notarial officer must observe "utmost care" to
comply with the elementary formalities in the performance of
his duties. Atty. Rosals failure to observe the required
standard of care was not only evident from his inconsistent
admissions.

SUSPENDED for 3 months (lowered that of IBPs
recommendation of 6 months as the SC found it too harsh)

Gamido v New Bilibid Prisons Officials G.R. 114829

FACTS: The Court asked Atty. de la Rea to to show cause why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him for making
it appear in the jurat of the petition in this case that Maximo
Gamido subscribed the verification and swore to before him,
as notary public when in truth and in fact the latter did not.
Atty. dela Rea admitted having executed the jurat without
the presence of petitioner Gamido but alleged that: since it is
jurat and not an acknowledgement, it would be alright to do
so without his presence and since he has been in and out of
New Bilibid Prisons, not only because his office is near but
because he has handled a number of cases involving
prisoners and guards of NBP as well as some of its personnel.
He then apologized to the Court and assures it that
henceforth he would be more careful and circumspect.

ISSUE: Whether or not is liable for such irregularity of
notarization

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that his explanation is
unsatisfactory; however, his spontaneous voluntary
admission may be considered in mitigation of his liability. As a
notary public for a long time, as evidenced by the fact that his
questioned jurat is indicated to have been entered in Book 45
of his notarial register, he should know the similarities and
differences between a jurat and an acknowledgement.
A jurat which is, normally in this form:
Subscribed and sworn to before me in
_______________, this ____ day of ____________,
affiant having exhibited to me his Community
(before, Residence) Tax Certificate No.
____________ issued at ______________ on
____________.
It is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that
the instrument was sworn to before him. As to
acknowledgment, Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary
public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to
take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him
and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. It is
obvious that the party acknowledging must likewise appear
before the notary public or any other person authorized to
take acknowledgments of instruments or documents. His
prior acquaintance and friendship with petitioner Gamido
provides no excuse for non-compliance with his duty. He
could have gone to the latter's cell since he openly admitted
that he has "been in and out of New Bilibid Prisons.

FINED 5k and WARNED.

Fernandez v Grecia AC 3694

FACTS: Fernandez sought the disbarment of Atty. Grecia for
dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft
of some pages from a medical chart which was material
evidence in a damage suit. Actually, Atty. Grecia he was
previously disbarred for his immoral complicity or "unholy
alliance" with a judge in Quezon City. However, three years
later, the Court, heeding his pleas for compassions and his
promise to mend his ways, reinstated him in the profession.
But here comes the present case, eight months later. Fe Linda
Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted
as a patient at St. Luke's Hospital. She was diagnosed with
mild pre-eclampsia and was subsequently discharged.
However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day
and unfortunately died with her unborn child. Damaso Aves
sought for damages against the hospital and the attending
doctors for damages. His counsel was Atty. Grecia. The
medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by
St. Luke's, as requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were
entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles.
On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning,
upon arriving in court for another hearing of the case,
Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder
containing the medical records of Mrs. Aves. Grecia
surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of the medical records.
Robles and a clerk named Sandico saw the act. Sandico even
saw Atty. Grecia turn over the crumpled pages to a man
waiting outside the building. Sandico and Robles reported
such to Judge Capulong. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring
the man to her chamber. On the way back to chamber, Judge
Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St.
Luke's counsel, Attorney Melanie Limson. She requested
them to come to her office. Judge Capulong confronted the
man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia
had passed on to him. The man at first denied that he had the
papers in his possession but subsequently turned them over.
Judge Capulong then directed the Valenzuela Police to find
out who the man was. The man was known to be Sid, the
driver of Atty. Grecia. However, Atty. Grecia denied such.
Because of due stress to her and her court officials, Judge
Capulong inhibited from the case. Judge Bernad took over.
On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case
against Grecia. At the investigation of the case by Judge
Bernad, Damaso Aves, the surviving spouse of the late Fe
Linda Aves and testified that it was Attorney Bu Castro,
counsel of the defendants who lifted two pages from the
medical folder and planted such evidence to frame up Atty.
Grecia. Atty. Grecia corroborated such and even added that
he has no driver and the police investigator fabricated such
information. However, Judge Bernad found the court
employee, Maria Arnie Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of
Court Avelina Robles entirely credible and "without any
noticeable guile nor attempt at fabrication. The missing pages
showed that after Mrs. Aves was readmitted to the hospital,
the doctors were able to stabilize her blood pressure with a
normal reading of 120/80.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Grecia was guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that on the basis of the
evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is
convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M.
Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical
chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01,
canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility as well as
canon 7 thereof which provide that:
Canon 1. . . .
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent
Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He
has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a
member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has
forfeited his membership in the BAR.

GUILTY of grave misconduct, dishonesty and gross unethical
behavior. DISBARRED.

In Re: Edilion AC 1928

FACTS: Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
attorney. The IBP issued a resolution recommending to the
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its
Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues. On January 27, 1976, the Court required the
respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment reiterating his
refusal to pay. Edillon argues that it was an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled,
as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues. He is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and property plus to association guaranteed to him by
the Constitution

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the payment of IBP fees is a
violation to Edillons constitutional right to liberty and
property and association. Whether or not the provision of the
Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void.


RULIN G: No. The Supreme Court held that to compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative
of his constitutional freedom to associate. Also, it clear that
under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. The practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities. All legislation directing the integration
of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. Republic Act No. 6397 authorizing the Supreme
Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did
so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State.
More importantly is the unequivocal grant of precise power
to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar
...,

No. The Court saw nothing in the Constitution that prohibits
the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of the Philippine Bar. The Supreme
Court held that the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to
recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is
found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws
(supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order
applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to
the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall
be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the
following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. ...

DISBARRED.


In Re: Rovero AC 126

FACTS: Solicitor General filed for disbarment against Atty.
Rovero on the ground of having been convicted of smuggling.
Rovero admits the existence of the of the decision of the
Collector of Customs, and his conviction by the Court of
Appeals, but sets up the defense that they are not sufficient
to disqualify him from the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of smuggling warrants
disbarment

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that under section 25,
Rule 127, of the Rules of court, a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney for a
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and this
ground is apart from any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office as lawyer. Moral turpitude includes any
act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals. Roveros conviction of smuggling by final decision of
the Court of Appeals certainly involves an act done contrary
at least to honesty or good morals.

DISBARRED.

Zaldivar v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 80578

FACTS: In October 1988, the Supreme Court suspended
respondent Raul M. Gonzales from the practice of law for an
indefinite period. After more than four years from his
suspension, Raul M. Gonzales filed ex-parte Motion 2 to lift
his suspension from the practice of law, alleging that:

1. he gave free legal aid services to the poor and
needy of Zambales and Iloilo, by paying lawyers to
do the same
2. he has pursued civic work, especially for the poor
and displaced people in Zambales, during the height
of Mt. Pinatubo eruption
3. he had participated in the Third International Dialog
on the Transition to Global Society, at Landegg
Academy in Wienacht, Switzerland and brought
honor to the country by delivering a paper entitled,
"The Meaning of Justice" cited by Mr. Justice
Anthony Kennedy of the US Supreme Court as "one
of the better papers presented and discussed at the
conference;"
4. he has a long record in the service of human rights
and the Rule of Law, especially during the Martial
Law years;
5. his suspension on for 51 months has been the
longest in Philippine legal annals;
6. he states his profound regrets for the inconvenience
which he has caused to the Court
7. he reiterates very sincerely his respect to the
institution

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzales should be reinstated as an
attorney

RULING : Yes. The Supreme Court held that theirs is not a
court of vengeance but of justice. Gonzaless remorse has
softened his arrogance and made up for his misconduct. His
contrition, so noticeably absent in his earlier pleadings, has
washed clean the offense of his disrespect. Raul N. Gonzales
suspension from the practice of law for more than four (4)
years has given him ample time and opportunity to amend his
erring ways, rehabilitate himself, and thus, prove himself
worthy once again to enjoy the privileges of membership of
the Bar.

suspension LIFTED.