***Fourth amendment: stops are different than searches, do the analysis of each separately!

When
tackling a question:
where are you, what right, what exclusionary rule [result for passenger will differ if car is searched v. car
seized]. Seizsure comes before search!


Rakas v. Illinois
Rakas v. Illinois Case Brief
United States Supreme Court
439 U.S. 128 (1978)

ISSUE: May passengers in an automobile that was the subject of an
unconstitutional search and seizure assert the exclusionary rule to exclude the
evidence obtained from that search and seizure against them?
HOLDING: No.
FACTS:
Ds were passengers in a car that was stopped because police believed it matched
the description of a car used as a robbery getaway car
Occupants were ordered out of the car, and it was then searched
A box of rifle shells in the locked glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle on
the front passenger seat were seized
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Ds moved to exclude the evidence as being violative of the 4th Amdt.
Trial judge concluded that they lacked standing and denied the suppression
motion
REASONING:
Reject target theory: Exclusionary rule for 4th Amdt. violations does not
extend to violations of 4th Amdt. rights of 3rd parties
4th Amdt. rights are personal rights
Exclusionary rule seeks to effectuate the guarantees of the 4th Amdt., so it
is proper to permit only those Ds whose rights have been violated to
benefit from the rules protections
Abandon distinction: The better analysis in standing cases is to focus on the
extent of a particular Ds rights under the 4th Amdt., rather than relying on
any separate but intertwined concept of standing
Question is whether the challenged search or seizure violated a Ds 4th
Amdt. rights who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it
Jones test not valid: The legitimately on premises phrase coined
in Jones creates too broad a gauge for measuring 4th Amdt. rights
Jones merely standings for the proposition that one may have a legally
sufficient interest in a place other than his home to be protected
against governmental intrusions into that place
Phrase at best gives superficial clarity to determining whether ones 4th
Amdt. rights were violated
Ds claims invalid: Ds had neither a property nor a possessory interest in the car,
nor an interest in the property seized
The fact that they were legitimately on the premises is insufficient to
determine that their 4th Amdt. rights were violated
COMMENTS:
Rakas: 4th Amdt. rights are personal rights
4th Amdt. claims in vehicle stops:
If the stop itself was illegal, then everyone in the car has a suppression
claim
But if the stop was legal, but the search was illegal, then the passengers
dont have a suppression claim (need a possessory interest)
No suppression claim for passengers: Passengers had no suppression claim
because they showed no property or possessory interest in the car NOR and
interest in the things seized
Property interests are not dispositive; they can be overcome by the totality
of the factors (who was the driver, whos on the title, sleeping in car,
caring for car, spare key) need to treat the car as ones own
Pennsylvania v. Mimms: Police can order everyone out of a car during a traffic
stop, and if officer has reasonable suspicion, officer can do a Terry patdown
of the occupants
OTHER CASES:
Alderman v. United States: Suppression of the product of a 4th Amdt. violation
can be successfully urged by only those whose rights were violated by the
search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of
the damaging evidence
4th Amdt. rights are personal rights and cannot be asserted vicariously
Minnesota v. Olson: In general, an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in his hosts home despite not having a legal interest in the
premises
Question of intent of the owner and intent of the guest to stay the night
(toothbrush, clothes there, spent the night there before, spend nights at
peoples houses frequently, etc.)
Dont actually have to spend the night, just have the requisite intent to stay
the night
Act of sleeping put someone in a particularly vulnerable position
Rawlings v. Kentucky: Ownership of the property seized as the result of a search
does not by itself entitle an individual to challenge the search
The individual must demonstrate that his or her legitimate expectation of
privacy was violated by search
Ownership is but one factor to consider
Simmons v. United States: A Ds admission of ownership of contraband at a
suppression hearing in order to establish standing cannot be used as
substantive proof of guilt against him at trial
No longer need automatic standing rule when one is charged with
possession of contraband
What-Happens-in-Vegas-Stays-in-Vegas Rule
BUT testimony at suppression hearing can be used by prosecution to
impeach D at trial
So D can really only testify at one hearing or the other
United States v. Payner: IRS agents were told to deliberately ignore the 4th
Amdt.s prohibition against unreasonable seizures and search the briefcase
of a banker in order to charge the bankers customers
HELD, bankers customers still do not have standing to bring a 4th Amdt. claim
for suppression despite the bad faith of the IRS



Minnesota v. Carter
Minnesota v. Carter Case Brief
United States Supreme Court
525 U.S. 83 (1998)

ISSUE: Does a temporary houseguest who is not staying overnight have a
legitimate expectation of privacy such that he can object to an allegedly
unreasonable search of the house?
HOLDING: No.
FACTS:
Police received a tip from a CI that cocaine was being packaged in a particular
ground-level apartment as the CI had seen this in progress
Officer Thielen observed the apartment a saw through an opening in the closed
blinds that this activity was indeed occurring
Police then stopped a car that was leaving the apartment in which Carter and
Johns were driving and found a gun on the vehicles floor
Later search of the car revealed pagers, a scale, and 47 grams of cocaine
Police returned to the apartment and found cocaine residue on the kitchen table
and plastic baggies, so they arrested Thompson, the lessee of the apartment
Carter and John had never visited the apartment before and came there
from Chicago just to do this packaging of the cocaine
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Ds moved to suppress the evidence as being the product of an unreasonable
search and seizure
Trial Ct. denied, holding that as temporary out-of-state visitors, Ds were not
entitled to bring a claim for suppression
Ct. App. affirmed
Minn. Sup. Ct. reversed, holding that Ds had standing because they had a
legitimate expectation of privacy; also determined that the officers viewing
was an unreasonable search
REASONING:
Dont use standing: Minn. courts used the standing analysis, but the correct
approach is that the D must demonstrate that he personally has an
expectation of privacy in the place searched and that such expectation is
reasonable
Olson N/A: While an overnight guest may claim a legitimate expectation of
privacy, one is merely present with the consent of the house owner may not
Ds were not overnight guests and were only there for a matter of hours for
a business transaction
Expectations of privacy are diminished when premises are used just for
commercial transactions
Any search that may have occurred did violated Ds 4th Amdt. rights
CONCURRENCE Scalia:
Obvious meaning of the theirhouses language of the 4th Amdt. is that each
person has the right to privacy in his own house
Entirely impossible to give an Olson characterization to an apartment that one
uses to package cocaine
CONCURRENCE Kennedy:
Almost all social house guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus
protection against unreasonable searches
Ds have no privacy right because they have established nothing more than a
fleeting and insubstantial connection with the apartment
CONCURRENCE Breyer: No claim for suppression because the alleged
search did not violate the 4th Amdt.
DISSENT Ginsburg:
When a homeowner or lessor who personally invites a guest into her home to
share in a common endeavor, whatever that may be, or for business
purposes, legal or not, that guest should shared his hosts shelter from
unreasonable searches and seizures
Not the legitimately on premises criterion
A home owner cannot be secure in his house if the govt. can enter it to obtain
evidence against one of his guests
One need not remain overnight to anticipate privacy in anothers home



Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States Case Brief
United States Supreme Court
251 U.S. 385 (1920)

ISSUE: May the Govt. use the knowledge it gained from reading illegally seized
documents as evidence against Ds at trial?
HOLDING: No.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Ds were indicted on a single charge and were arrested in their home
Reps. of the DOJ then went to the office of the company and took all books,
papers, and documents found there without any authority
All employees were told to go to the DAs offce
Ds petitioned the Dist. Ct. for return of the evidence illegally seized
DA said evidence was before the Grand Jury; based on an invalid
subpoena for certain documents
Dist. Ct. ordered a return of the originals but photographs and copies were
retained
Subpoenas for the originals were then served upon Ds, and they refused to
comply
= Contempt
Govt. now seeks to avail itself of the knowledge it obtained through the illegal
seizure
REASONING:
May not use evidence: The essence of the 4th Amdt.s provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all
Allowing knowledge from documents to be used would reduce the 4th
Amdt. to a mere form of words
Independent Source: If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source,
they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Govt.s
own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed
COMMENTS:
Independent Source Doctrine: Is the illegal search the proximate cause of the
discovery of the evidence?



Murray v. United States
Murray v. United States Case Brief
United States Supreme Court
487 U.S. 533 (1988)

ISSUE: Must evidence obtained through a legal search be suppressed if an illegal
search was conducted prior to the legal one but the knowledge gained through the
illegal search was not used to obtain the warrant?
HOLDING: No, probably not.
FACTS:
Fed. law enforcement agents received tips from informants re. Murray and
Carter, so agents surveilled both going into a warehouse in South Boston
Agents saw the two drive the truck and the camper out of the warehouse, and
after following them, the agents stopped them and arrested them
Both vehicles contained marijuana
Several of the agents then forced entry into the warehouse and observed several
bales of marijuana, but left without disturbing them
Agents applied for a search warrant but did not mention the prior illegal search at
all warrant issued
270 bales of marijuana and notebooks listing customers were found
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Ds moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the subsequent legal search was
tainted by the initial unlawful entry even though the issuing magistrate
didnt know of the illegal search
Denied
Ct. App. affirmed
RULES:
Exclusionary Rule: Prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials
seized during an unlawful search and of testimony concerning knowledge
acquired during an unlawful search
Derivative Evidence: The exclusionary rule also prohibits the introduction
of derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is the
product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an
indirect result of the unlawful search up to the point at which the
connection with the unlawful search becomes so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint
Independent Source Doctrine: Allows into evidence all evidence acquired in a
fashion untainted by the illegal evidence-gathering activity
REASONING:
Police incentives: An officer with PC sufficient to obtain a search warrant would
be foolish to enter the premises first in an unlawful manner because he
would risk suppression of all the evidence on the premises, both seen and
unseen
Officer would have to convince a magistrate and the later trial judge that
the info unlawfully obtained didnt affect either the decision to seek a
search warrant or the magistrates decision in issuing the warrant
Apply independent source doctrine: While knowledge of the marijuana was
obtained during the first unlawful search, it was also obtained through the
second lawful search, so theres no valid reason not to apply the doctrine
Seizure of tangible evidence: So long as the later, lawful seizure is genuinely
independent of an earlier, tainted one, there is no reason why the
independent source doctrine shouldnt apply to tangible evidence
Ct. App. said it was independent here, but Dist. Ct. didnt specifically
determine that agents would have sought a warrant but for the
unlawful search = remand


Nix v. Williams
Nix v. Williams Case Brief
United States Supreme Court
467 U.S. 431 (1984)

ISSUE: Should the inevitable discovery doctrine apply to allow admission of
evidence that would have been discovered if search teams continued as they would
have if D had not led the police to the body?
HOLDING: Yes.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
At the 2nd trial, Ds statements and the fact that D directed the police to the body
were not admitted into evidence
Evidence of condition of the body, articles, photographs, and results of
post mortem tests were admitted, however
Trial Ct. determined that the State proved by a preponderance that has the search
not been suspended, Vs body would have been discovered w/i a short time
Iowa Sup. Ct. affirmed
Dist. Ct. denied habeas petition, determining that the body would have inevitably
have been found in much the same condition
Ct. App. reversed, holding that the State had not met the absence-of-bad-faith
requirement for an inevitable discovery doctrine
RULES:
Exclusionary Rule: Applies not only to illegally obtained evidence itself, but also
to other incriminating evidence derived from the primary evidence
Exceptions:
Independent Source Doctrine: Allows admission of evidence that has been
discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional
violation
REASONING:
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: If the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means, then the evidence should be
admitted into evidence
Excluding such evidence would put the police in a worse position then
they would have been in, which is contrary to the interests of society
No absence-of-bad-faith reqt: There is no requirement that the prosecution must
prove the absence of bad faith
Such a reqt would place courts in the position of withholding from juries
relevant and undoubted truth that would have been available absent
unlawful police conduct
Enormous societal costs
Officers will be deterred by the threat of departmental discipline and civil
liability
Exclusion doesnt add to fairness at trial: Exclusion of physical evidence that
would inevitably have been discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or
fairness of a criminal trial
Reliability of evidence in no way affected here
Fairness can be achieved by placing the State and the D in the same
position they would have been in but for the unlawful police conduct
Discovery inevitable here: Had Williams not led the police to Vs body, the
volunteer search teams would have found the body
Body was found in a culvert where the teams were told to look
Polk Cty. would have been searched just like the others (map obtained already)