Final 14 September 2001

4.5 Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys

Discussion Paper and Non-indin! "uidelines
Introductory note:
OCHA was requested by the Deputy Secretary-Generals Task orce on secur!ty pol!cy
to prepare dra"t #u!del!nes on the use o" $!l!tary and ar$ed escorts "or hu$an!tar!an
con%oys& The "ollow!n# te't was elaborated !n collaborat!on w!th IASC $e$ber bod!es(
)*S+COO,D( D-.O( acade$!c re%!ewers and "!eld collea#ues !n a nu$ber o"
or#an!/at!ons& They were appro%ed "or !$ple$entat!on by the Inter-A#ency Stand!n#
Co$$!ttee 0ork!n# Group $eet!n# o" 1ay 2334& The te't as appro%ed by the IASC
0ork!n# Group was then sub$!tted to the O""!ce o" 5e#al A""a!rs "or re%!ew( a"ter wh!ch a
nu$ber o" add!t!onal $od!"!cat!ons were $ade&
-art I re%!ews the broader pol!cy conte't& It concludes that( due to chan#es !n the nature
o" con"l!ct and !n the nature o" hu$an!tar!an ass!stance( $!l!tary or ar$ed escorts are( !n
a l!$!ted nu$ber o" cases( necessary& In these cases( they should be used spar!n#ly(
and only !n accordance w!th clear #u!del!nes& -art II cons!sts o" two sets o" non-b!nd!n#
#u!del!nes: one on when escorts $!#ht be used( the other on how they $!#ht be used&
Part #
#ntroduction$ Efforts to sustain %umanitarian operations in an environment c%aracteri&ed 'y
t%e erosion of %umanitarian space
One important assumption of humanitarian operations in war has been that military forces have
more to gain by focussing their efforts on military targets than they do by focussing on non-military
ones.
1
arties to many conflicts have been willing to accept humanitarian operations in the belief
that such operations do not represent a significant obstacle to the achievement of their own military
goals and that humanitarian organi!ations are not a party to the conflict. "nternational humanitarian
law has sought to build on this distinction between the military domain and the non-military domain#
see$ing to create what is now sometimes referred to as %humanitarian space&.
2
"n see$ing to
consolidate this humanitarian space# the use of armed or military escorts for humanitarian convoys
has generally not been appropriate.
'he distinction between military targets and non-military targets# however# has often been
problematic. (ilitary and political leaders have fre)uently seen the entire population of the adverse
party as the enemy# and as an appropriate ob*ect of military operations. 'he suffering of %enemy&
populations is not# in these cases# an incidental conse)uence of military operations# it is often the
ob*ect of those operations.
+

,ven when there has not been a deliberate attempt to target civilians# civilians have increasingly
been the victims of %area weapons&# including the aerial bombardment of populated areas. -y the
1
Claude Bruderlein, Towards a New Strategic Approach to Humanitarian Protection and the Use of Protected Areas, 2.
New York and Geneva: United Nations (OCHA), 2.
2
!"id, #itin$ %ean &i#tet, 'evelo()ent and (rin#i(les o* international +u)anitarian law., Geneva, Henr- 'unant
!nstitute, 1./0.

1
2ee, *or e3a)(le, Brooks '. 2i)(son and %ean 4. Berlin, eds, 2+er)an5s Civil 6ar: 2ele#ted Corres(onden#e o*
6illia) 7. 2+er)an, 1/891/80 (Universit- o* Nort+ Carolina &ress, 2).
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S 1
time of 9orld 9ar ""# the distinction between combatants and civilians was seriously strained.
4
'hus#
despite the e:pansion and further codification of international humanitarian law and the laws of war#
the number of civilians $illed as a percentage of total mortality has risen during the past century.
.
9ithin the humanitarian community there is an ongoing debate as to how to deal with this process.
One viewpoint stresses that the appropriate response to this blurring of the military and non-military
domains is to reassert the impartiality# neutrality and independent identity of the humanitarian
community# and to ta$e all reasonable steps to reinforce the distinction between military actors and
humanitarian ones.
;
'he emphasis here is on strengthening negotiated access to beneficiaries. 1
somewhat different view asserts that# with the erosion of consensual premises on which international
humanitarian action is based# a new emphasis must be placed on the en"orce$ent# including the
enforcement by military means# of certain minimum standards.
<
"n this conte:t# the use of military or
armed escorts is seen as a response to changed circumstances = as a new means to achieve a
long-standing humanitarian goal.
'his debate is made more urgent by two other processes. First# humanitarian wor$ers are
increasingly the victims of harassment and armed attac$. Sometimes# this is part of a deliberate
effort to thwart the delivery of humanitarian aid and services to %enemy& populations# or a function of
the e:tent to which %humanitarian& organi!ations are no longer seen as impartial# neutral and
independent. Sometimes# it is merely a function of the gangsterism# criminality and general
fragmentation of authority that are associated with many modern conflicts# particularly in %failed
states&.
>

'he second process driving the debate on the relationship between the military and humanitarian
communities is the evolution of military thin$ing in regard to the provision of humanitarian aid and
services. "n 71'O and elsewhere there has been an evolution of the doctrine of military-civilian
operations# with an increasing tendency for military forces being used to support the delivery of
humanitarian aid# and sometimes even to provide this aid directly.
?
Preparation of !uidelines ( five preliminary )uestions$
"n an effort to address some of these issues# the 4eputy Secretary-@eneral of the /nited 7ations
convened a 'as$ Force on policy issues associated with staff security. 'his 'as$ Force met in 7ew
3or$ on 1<-1> 7ovember 1???# and made recommendations in a number of areas.
10
One of those
:
2ee, *or e3a)(le, &eter Calvo#oressi, Gu- 6int and %o+n &rit#+ard, 7otal 6ar, 2
nd
ed. (;ondon: &en$uin, 1./.), 012.
0
<sti)ates o* t+e #ivilian (er#enta$e o* total )ortalit- are unrelia"le. <sti)ates in t+e *ollowin$ #on*li#ts +ave "een
advan#ed wit+in t+e United Nations (A=C=1 2> 1?/), #ited in <s"@orn >osen"lad, !nternational +u)anitarian law o*
ar)ed #on*li#t, (Geneva: Henri 'unant !nstitute, 1.?.), 0098.
6orld 6ar !, 0 AB 6orld 6ar !!, :/ AB Corean 6ar /: AB 4ietna) 6ar /0DA.
8
2ee, *or e3a)(le, <d 2#+enken"er$ van Eiero( in FCivil9Eilitar- Coo(eration in t+e 6ake o* Cosovo: A Hu)anitarian
&ers(e#tive5, Con*eren#e on Civil9Eilitar- Coo(eration, Co(en+a$en, 192 2e(te)"er 2.
?
2ee, *or e3a)(le, t+e Bra+i)i re(ort (A=00=10), (aras. 0, 81.
/
General Asse)"l- resolution 0:=1.2 (1? 'e#e)"er 1...) de(lores t+e in#reasin$ loss o* li*e to United Nations
+u)anitarian (ersonnel in t+e *ield and t+e G#ontinuous erosion o* res(e#t *or t+e (rin#i(les and rules o* international
+u)anitarian law., 7+e >e(ort o* t+e 2e#retar-9General on 2a*et- and 2e#urit- o* United Nations &ersonnel (A00=:.:,
1/ O#to"er 2) (rovides a )ore detailed a##ount o* t+e risin$ level o* inse#urit-.

.
2ee, *or e3a)(le, %ean9'aniel 7au3e, F7+e !C>C and #ivil9)ilitar- #oo(eration in situations o* ar)ed #on*li#t5, :0
t+

>ose9>ot+ 2e)inar, Eontreu3, 2 Ear#+ 2.
1
F>e(ort o* t+e 7ask Hor#es on &oli#- and ;e$al and O(erational !ssues5, #ir#ulated "- a note o* t+e 'e(ut- 2e#retar-9
General dated 2/ Ear#+ 2.
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S 2
recommendations was that guidelines should be developed regarding the use of military or armed
escorts for humanitarian convoys. O561 was as$ed to draft the guidelines.
'he number of missions in which this issue arises is relatively small. /nited 7ations humanitarian
convoys move without military or armed escorts in 1. of the 22 comple: emergencies with which
O561 is closely involved at the present. 7evertheless# the issue spea$s to wider issues of
humanitarian-military relations.
"n see$ing to prepare guidelines on the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys#
five sets of )uestions can be as$edA
i. 4oes the nature of modern conflict present ris$s to humanitarian wor$ers that were
not present in the pastB
ii. "f so# is military or armed protection for humanitarian convoys an appropriate
response# or would association with military actors compromise the impartiality of
humanitarian organi!ationsB
iii. "f humanitarian convoys are at greater ris$# and if association with the military would
not compromise their principles or operations# would the provision of military or armed
escorts actually be of useB 9ould it increase security or diminish itB 9ould it pass
the threshold of the /nited 7ations (inimum Operating Security @uidelines or fall
below itB 9ould it increase the amount of assistance that could be delivered# or
reduce itB 9ould it increase the security of beneficiary populations or compromise itB
iv. 9hat would be the conse)uences of not using armed or military escorts for
humanitarian convoysB
v. 9hat policies and practices have already been put in place with respect to the use of
armed or military escorts and how effective have these beenB
i. Growing threat to humanitarian workers
(odern warfare tends to offer increased ris$ to humanitarian wor$ers. 'hree principal reasons can
be identified for this.
6a7 The !ncreas!n#ly !rre#ular nature o" war"are
4uring the period 1?00-1?.0 the overwhelming bul$ of military activity was conducted by
regular forces. 'he forces were characteri!ed by strong command# control and communication#
strong internal discipline and a clear distinction between the use of force for military purposes and
the use of force for private or criminal purposes. 4uring this period# humanitarian wor$ers =
principally from 2ed 5ross (ovement = operated with the consent of the belligerents# and were
rarely under any significant degree of physical threat. 'he 2ed 5ross symbol provided a protective
value that was almost universally recogni!ed.
11
4uring the period 1?.0-2000 the bul$ of military activity was conducted by irregular forces.
"nter-state warfare# which had accounted for most military activity in the previous half-century# was
largely replaced by wars of national liberation# wars of insurgency# wars of secession and# in the last
years of the century# a sort of gangster warfare that was part-ethnic# part-political and part-criminal.
11
!nternational Co))ittee o* t+e >ed Cross (!C>C), G&rin#i(les and res(onse in international +u)anitarian assistan#e
and (rote#tion (C. 7+e use o* ar)ed es#orts),, &resented at t+e 28
t+
!nternational Con*eren#e o* t+e >ed Cross and >ed
Cres#ent, 10 2e(te)"er 1..0.
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S +
5ommand# control and communication was often wea$er than in the preceding period# as was
internal discipline. 'he increasing use of child soldiers# and of soldiers operating under the use of
drugs# may have e:acerbated this trend# as may have the criminali!ation and %privati!ation& of
conflict.
12
6b7 +ros!on o" percept!on o" !$part!al!ty o" hu$an!tar!ans:
The !ncreas!n# nu$ber o" hu$an!tar!an or#an!/at!ons
rior to 1?.0# the 2ed 5ross (ovement was overwhelmingly dominant in the provision of
humanitarian services in armed conflict. "ts impartiality and neutrality were generally accepted. -y
the end of the 20
th
century hundreds of non-governmental organi!ations were active in ma*or conflict
areas.
1+
(any of these had religious# ethnic or national affiliations which made them the ob*ects of
suspicion in conflicts which themselves had a religious or ethnic character. "n some cases# the
suspicions were well founded# and other organi!ations = genuinely committed to humanitarian
principles = suffered by association.
14

6c7 +ros!on o" percept!on o" !$part!al!ty o" hu$an!tar!ans:
The chan#!n# role o" hu$an!tar!an or#an!/at!ons
4uring the ma*or conflicts of the period 1?00-1?.0# humanitarian organi!ations tended not to
underta$e activities that might have affected the outcome of the conflict. 7o humanitarian
organi!ation# for e:ample# provided food to the general population of 0eningrad during the 1?41-
1?44 siege of that city. "ndeed# there seemed to be a general acceptance that the @erman policy of
starving 0eningrad into submission was a legitimate war aim.
1.
'here was# therefore# no conflict in
that case between the actions of the besiegers and those of the humanitarian community.
Fifty years later# there is increasingly a clash of purposes. 'he use of hunger as a weapon of
war is one e:ample. 'he resurgence of this practice in recent conflicts has been met by a growing
insistence by the humanitarian community that food aid must be brought to those in need. 9hen
one or more belligerents has made active use of hunger for military purposes in conflicts in
1fghanistan# 1ngola# -osnia and 6er!egovina# 5roatia# Cosovo# Somalia# southern Sudan# northern
/ganda and elsewhere# humanitarian organi!ations have put themselves in harm&s way by
attempting to provide food.
1;
'he humanitarian community has sometimes responded# as in -osnia
and 6er!egovina# by associating itself with military actors which are Dor are seen to beE party to the
conflict.
1<

12
A=00=:.:, Anne3 !!.
11
!n Bosnia and HerIe$ovina, over 1, (eo(le *ro) over 20 +u)anitarian or$aniIations #arr-in$ valid UNHC> !'
#ards in 1..0. Eark Cutts, F7+e Hu)anitarian o(eration in Bosnia and HerIe$ovina, 1..29.0: 'ile))as in ne$otiatin$
+u)anitarian a##ess,5 (Geneva: UNHC>, New !ssues in >e*u$ee >esear#+ J 6orkin$ &a(er No. /, 1...), ?. !n Cosovo,
at least 1/ NGOs were o(eratin$ in 1.... 2u+rke, Barut#iski, Garlo#k and 2andison, F7+e Cosovo >e*u$ee Crisis: And
inde(endent evaluation o* UNHC>5s e)er$en#- (re(aredness and res(onse,5 (Geneva: UNHC>, He"ruar- 2), 80.
1:
2ee, *or e3a)(le, Cutts a"ove, ?, 219:. 2ee also, !C>C, a"ove, G&rin#i(les and res(onse.,
10
%ust as t+e ;ie"er Code (Art. 1?) states t+at, G!t is law*ul to starve t+e +ostile "elli$erent, ar)ed or unar)ed, so t+at it
leads to t+e s(eedier su"@e#tion o* t+e ene)-,, so t+e Eilitar- 7ri"unal at Nuren"er$ stated t+at, in res(e#t o* t+e sie$e o*
;enin$rad, Gt+e #uttin$ o** o* ever- sour#e o* sustenan#e *ro) wit+out is dee)ed le$iti)ate., 6ar Cri)es >e(orts 4ol.
12, /:.
18
2ee, *or instan#e, A#tion A$ainst Hun$er (ACH), Geo(oliti#s o* Hun$er: 2921 J Hun$er and &ower. Boulder:
;-nne >ienner, 2. 2ee also, Cat+erine Bertini, G2tate)ent to t+e United Nations 2e#urit- Coun#il 'e"ate on 2e#urit-
o* UN Hu)anitarian &ersonnel, New York, . He"ruar- 2,, (>o)e: 6orld Hood &ro$ra))e, 2).
1?
;arr- Einear et al, FHu)anitarian A#tion in t+e Hor)er Yu$oslavia: 7+e U.N.5s >ole, 1..191..15, 6atson !nstitute
O##asional &a(er 2eries K1/, 1..:, /1911.
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S 4
!!& Impartiality and the use of force including armed escorts
'here are many cases in which the use of force# including armed escorts# would compromise the
impartiality of humanitarian organi!ations.
'here are also circumstances# however# in which the use of armed or military escorts for
humanitarian convoys would !ncrease the capacity of such organi!ations to provide assistance in an
impartial manner# that is# Fregardless of the race# creed or nationality of the recipients G and on the
basis of need alone.H
1>
'he e:ample of siege situations has already been given# and could be
e:panded to cover other situations in which one belligerent# controlling access to areas controlled by
another belligerent# might see$ to reduce the amount of aid flowing to what they see as an enemy
population. 4uring the conflict in -osnia and 6er!egovina# humanitarian organi!ations were unable
to deliver aid on the basis of need due to the lac$ of cooperation of those military factions controlling
access to the most needy populations. Only when military escorts were provided = and when a
credible use of force pro*ected by those providing the escorts = was the imbalance somewhat
corrected.
1?
!!!& Utility of armed or military escorts
'here are many cases = the great ma*ority = in which the use of armed or military escorts would be
counter-productive. 'he use of such escorts can compromise the security of humanitarian
personnel and can reduce their capacity to provide assistance effectively on the basis of need and
regardless of race# creed or nationality. For e:ampleA
. 5ooperation with an outside military force = including cooperation with a /7-
mandated force = can lead local actors to associate humanitarian organi!ations with
the political and military ob*ectives of that force.
. 5ooperation with armed or military escorts which do not have the capacity to prevail if
attac$ed = and to $eep routes open for further convoys = can ma$e a convoy or
convoy route more vulnerable than it would be without an escort.

. 4ependence on support from a military or armed force = whether foreign or local =
often ma$es it impossible to operate without such force.
. 5ooperation with one belligerent can ma$e it impossible or unsafe to operate in
territory controlled by another belligerent# unless there is an agreement on hand-over
at the boundary.
'hese problems are e:acerbated when# as is usually the case# humanitarian actors remain in a
conflict !one after the departure of e:ternal military forces.
!%& Consequence of non-use of military or armed escorts
2egardless of their utility# there are some humanitarian organi!ations which = for reasons of broader
principle = will not use military or armed escorts to protect their convoys. 'his position may
contribute to a general trend towards direct provision of humanitarian services by foreign military
forces.
1/
7+is *or)ulation o* t+e +u)anitarian i)(erative is t+at o* Arti#le 2 o* t+e FCode o* Condu#t *or t+e !nternational >ed
Cross and >ed Cres#ent Eove)ent and NGOs in 'isaster >elie*5, 1..:.
1.
Cutts, 1:918.
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S .
9hen humanitarian organi!ations are unwilling or unable to provide humanitarian services# foreign
military forces are increasingly li$ely to fill the gap. 'his is true whether the reasons are military De.g.
when they are part of an effort to secure the good will of the population within which a force is
operatingE# or narrowly institutional De.g. when there is a need for military forces to be seen to be
active during periods of low threatE or immediately political De.g. as a part of a public relations effort
directed towards constituencies in the sending stateE.
'he e:perience in Cosovo appears to be a further e:ample of the e:tent to which bilateral and
military actors can and will assume functions normally carried out by independent humanitarian
organi!ations.
20
,ven if the Cosovo case is not repeated# however# Fcertain 9estern states# the ,/
and 71'O are rethin$ing military doctrine# particularly in the field of security# and are see$ing way of
using some of their military capabilities and assets# which are presently under-utili!ed# for civilian
purposes.H
21
%& Policies and practices already in place
9ithin the /nited 7ations# the development of policies with respect to the use of armed and military
escorts for humanitarian convoys# and with respect to related issues such as the use of armed or
military security for fi:ed installations# has been fragmented. -roadly# however# members of the
/nited 7ations system have adopted policies which recogni!e the need for armed or military escorts
in e:ceptional circumstances.
22

'he use of armed guards provided by security service companies to escort convoys would be
governed by the Security 4irective disseminated on ? Ianuary 1??; on the use of armed guards by
organi!ations of the /nited 7ations system. Such use would be sub*ect to the authori!ation of the
/nited 7ations Security 5oordinator.
9ith respect to the protection by /nited 7ations forces# the authori!ation for the dispatch of such a
force# whether in the case of peace$eeping or peace enforcement# falls within the competence of the
Security 5ouncil# which shall also determine the mandate of such a force. 1ny protection e:pected
from a military component of a /7 peace operation to humanitarian convoys must be consistent with
the mandate of the /7 peace operation as established by the 5ouncil.
9ithin the community of humanitarian organi!ations outside the /nited 7ations there is a spectrum
of policy. 'he 2ed 5ross (ovement holds that# Fas a general principle# any armed protection for any
component of the (ovement is in conflict with the following Fundamental rinciplesA humanity#
independence# impartiality and neutrality.H
2+
Some other organi!ations# including especially
implementing partners of /nited 7ations agencies# have no such policy ob*ections.
24
Some efforts have been made to establish a common policy for all humanitarian organi!ations#
including both those members of the /nited 7ations system with humanitarian mandates as well as
humanitarian non-governmental organi!ations. "n 1??.# the "nter-1gency Standing 5ommittee
2
Hor )ore, see ;arr- Einear et al, FNA7O and Hu)anitarian A#tion in t+e Cosovo Crisis5 in 6atson !nstitute
O##asional &a(ers 2eries K18, 2.
21
'au:e# ibid.
22
5ompare# for e:ample# /7652# The Secur!ty and C!%!l!an and Hu$an!tar!an Character o" ,e"u#ee Ca$ps and
Settle$ents# ,5J4?JS5J"7F.2# 1??? with /7S,5OO24# )n!ted *at!ons Secur!ty Operat!ons 1anual# 1??..
21
"nternational 5ommittee of the 2ed 5ross D"525E# %2eport on the use of armed protection for humanitarian assistance&#
e:tracted from %9or$ing aper# 5ouncil of delegates# 1??.&# presented at the "525 and "nternational Federation# 5ouncil of
delegates# @eneva# 1-2 4ecember 1??..
2:
5utts# ;-10.
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S ;
9or$ing @roup adopted the 2eport of the 'as$ Force on the /se of (ilitary and 5ivil 4efence
1ssets in Support of 6umanitarian Operations.
2.
'he 2eport did not refer to the use of armed or
military escorts in particular# but did establish si: general %operating principles& with respect to the
use of all military assets in support of humanitarian operations. 'hese stated thatA
i. 4ecisions to accept military assets must be made by humanitarian organi!ations# not
political authorities# and based solely on humanitarian criteria.
ii. (ilitary assets should be re)uested only where there is no comparable civilian
alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need.
'he military asset must therefore be uni)ue in nature or timeliness of deployment#
and its use should be a last resort.
iii. 1 humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and
character. 'he operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the
humanitarian organi!ation responsible for that operation# whatever the specific
command arrangements for the military asset itself. 'o the e:tent possible# the
military asset should operate unarmed and be civilian in appearance.
iv. 5ountries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should
ensure that they respect the code of conduct and principles of the humanitarian
organi!ation responsible for that deployment.
v. 'he large-scale involvement of military personnel in the direct delivery of
humanitarian assistance should be avoided.
vi. 1ny use of military assets should ensure that the humanitarian operation retains its
international and multilateral character.
2;
'he broadest of these principles = points i and ii above = can clearly be applied to the specific case
of armed and military escorts. oints iii-vi may be less applicable. oint iii# for e:ample# might
undermine the capacity of an armed or military escort to offer a credible deterrent to would-be
attac$ers.
"n practice# the positions of the various humanitarian organi!ations are not far apart# though different
criteria may be applied in the decision-ma$ing process.
Conclusion$
'he generally restrictive practice of all ma*or humanitarian organi!ations is appropriate. 9hatever
policy guidelines are put in place should reflect the broad aim of limiting the circumstances in which
organi!ations will have to resort to the use of armed or military escorts.
'he convergence of practice among humanitarian organi!ations in the field is to be applauded# and
should be reinforced# with a view# where possible# to having a common position among all
humanitarian organi!ations in any given operation.
20
/nited 7ations 4epartment of 6umanitarian 1ffairs# %"nter-1gency Standing 5ommittee 9or$ing @roup# K"Kth (eeting#
2< September 1??.# @enevaA Summary 2ecord&.
28
/nited 7ations 4epartment of 6umanitarian 1ffairs# %'he /se of (ilitary and 5ivil 4efence 1ssets in Support of
6umanitarian OperationsA 2eport of the 'as$ Force&# 2< September 1??..
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S <
9hatever guidelines are approved should reflect two levels of decision-ma$ingA first# when to use
armed or military escorts and# second# having ta$en the decision to use such an escort# how to do
so.
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S >
Part II
Non-binding guidelines on when to use military or armed escorts
General rule
As a $eneral rule, +u)anitarian #onvo-s will not use ar)ed or )ilitar- es#orts.
Exceptions (criteria
<3#e(tions to t+e $eneral rule will "e #onsidered, as a last resort, and onl- w+en all o* t+e *ollowin$ #riteria
+ave "een )et:
i. So!ereignt". 7+e soverei$n (ower or lo#al #ontrollin$ aut+orit- (Ft+e lo#al aut+orities5) is
unwillin$ or una"le to (rovide a se#ure environ)ent wit+out t+e use o* )ilitar- or ar)ed
es#orts.
ii. Need. 7+e level o* +u)anitarian need is su#+ t+at t+e la#k o* +u)anitarian assistan#e would
lead to una##e(ta"le +u)an su**erin$, -et assistan#e #annot "e delivered wit+out t+e use o*
)ilitar- or ar)ed es#orts.
iii. Safet". Ar)ed or )ilitar- es#orts #an (rovided in a wa- w+i#+ would (rovide t+e #redi"le
deterrent needed to en+an#e t+e sa*et- o* +u)anitarian (ersonnel and t+e #a(a#it- to (rovide
assistan#e to intended "ene*i#iaries wit+out #o)(ro)isin$ t+e se#urit- o* "ene*i#iaries and
ot+er lo#al (o(ulations.
iv. Sustaina#ilit". 7+e use o* an ar)ed or )ilitar- es#ort would not #o)(ro)ise t+e lon$er9ter)
#a(a#it- o* t+e or$aniIation sa*el- and e**e#tivel- to *ul*il its )andate.
Exceptions (procedures
6it+in t+e United Nations s-ste), t+e deter)ination as to w+et+er or not t+e #riteria +ave "een )et will
nor)all- "e )ade "- t+e 'esi$nated O**i#ial. 7+e 'esi$nated O**i#ial is a##ounta"le *or )atters #on#ernin$
t+e se#urit- o* United Nations (ersonnel and (ro(ert- to t+e 2e#retar-9General, t+rou$+ t+e United Nations
2e#urit- Coordinator.
Note$ %n most cases& #ut not all& a single indi!idual ser!es as Humanitarian 'oordinator& (esident
'oordinator and )esignated *fficial. The authorit" of the (esident 'oordinator with respect
to UN staff and propert" is stated in full in section + paragraph ,- of the UN .ield Securit"
Hand#oo/.
>e#o$niIin$ t+at a #o))on (osition a)on$ +u)anitarian a#tors will in#rease t+e se#urit- o* all, t+e
'esi$nated O**i#ial (or Hu)anitarian Coordinator, as a((ro(riate) will #onsult widel- wit+in t+e +u)anitarian
#o))unit- "e*ore )akin$ a deter)ination. 7+e 'esi$nated O**i#ial will invite re(resentatives o* t+e non9UN
+u)anitarian #o))unit- to (arti#i(ate, eit+er as )e)"ers or as o"servers, in t+e work o* t+e 2e#urit-
Eana$e)ent 7ea).
6it+ res(e#t to t+e so!ereignt" #riterion, t+e 'esi$nated O**i#ial will *or)all- en$a$e t+e lo#al aut+orities to
deter)ine w+et+er or not t+e- are willin$ or a"le to (rovide t+e ne#essar- se#ure environ)ent and to *ul*il
t+eir o"li$ations under international +u)anitarian law. 7+e 'esi$nated O**i#ial will *or)all- advise )e)"ers
o* t+e +u)anitarian #o))unit- as to t+e role o* *or#es o(eratin$ under a 2e#urit- Coun#il )andate wit+
res(e#t to su((ort to t+at #o))unit-, and to t+e (rovisions o* status9o*9*or#es a$ree)ent t+at )a- "e in *or#e.
Note$ There has #een confusion in some cases as to whether or not a countr"
agreement0S*.A0S*1A is in force& who is co!ered #" it& and what it means in practice. The
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S ?
)esignated *fficial will endea!our to clarif" this issue for representati!es of the wider
humanitarian communit" as a #asis for securit" planning.
6it+ res(e#t to t+e safet" #riterion, t+e *a#tors to "e #onsidered "- t+e 'esi$nated O**i#ial will in#lude t+e
*ollowin$:
. 6+o is (rovidin$ t+e es#ortL (<.$. UN *or#es #ondu#tin$ (ea#e o(erations, w+ose a#tions
s+all "e $overned "- de#isions o* t+e 2e#urit- Coun#ilB ot+er international *or#esB $overn)ent
*or#esB *or#es o* non9state a#torsB ar)ed $uards (rovided "- se#urit- servi#e #o)(anies,
w+ose use, *or t+e UN #o))unit-, is su"@e#t to t+e a((roval o* t+e UN 2e#urit- Coordinator.)
. 6+at are t+eir #a(a#itiesL (<.$. Can t+e- (rovide intelli$en#e on t+e se#urit- situationL 6ill
t+e- re(resent an e**e#tive deterrent to atta#kL 6ill t+e- "e #redi"le in t+e event o* su#+ an
atta#kL 6+at are t+eir rules o* en$a$e)entL 6+at are t+e #o))and and #ontrol
arran$e)entsL 'o t+e- +ave a #a(a#it- *or e3tra#tionL Can t+e- kee( a route o(en and se#ure
*or *uture #onvo-s on#e *or#e +as "een used to )ove one #onvo- t+rou$+L)
. How +i$+ is t+e (rote#tion o* +u)anitarian #onvo-s on t+e (riorities o* t+ose (rovidin$ t+e
es#ortsL Are t+e es#orts t+e)selves a (otential sour#e o* inse#urit-L
. !s t+ere a #+oi#eL (<.$. Are t+ose w+o are (rovidin$ t+e es#orts insistin$ J
*or (oliti#al, )ilitar-, e#ono)i# or #ri)inal reasons J on t+eir useL !* so, w+at are t+e (ossi"le
#onseMuen#es o* resistin$L)
. 6ould t+e use o* es#orts in one area +ave a deleterious e**e#t on t+e #a(a#it- o* t+e
or$aniIation to *ul*il its )andate in ot+er areasL (<.$. !* es#orts are to "e (rovided "- a
"elli$erent, would t+at a**e#t t+e a"ilit- to o(erate in areas not #ontrolled "- t+at "elli$erentL)
6it+ res(e#t to t+e sustaina#ilit" #riterion, t+e 'esi$nated O**i#ial will #onsider w+et+er t+e use o* ar)ed or
)ilitar- es#orts )i$+t )ake it )ore di**i#ult to (rovide aid later. (<.$. !* es#orts are "ein$ (rovided "- an
e3ternal )ilitar- *or#e, w+at will +a((en w+en, as is usuall- t+e #ase, t+at )ilitar- *or#e leaves, "ut
+u)anitarian o(erations +ave to #ontinueL)
Note$ There are occasions when the safet" or sustaina#ilit" criteria will not #e met& as determined
#" the )*. %n these cases it ma" #e appropriate to suspend operations or to withdraw.
Persisting with operations in the face of unaccepta#l" high ris/ is rarel" an effecti!e means of
meeting humanitarian needs. *n more than one occasion& political authorities ha!e
encouraged humanitarian actors to continue operations 2 under militar" and armed escort&
and in the face of unaccepta#l" high ris/ 2 as an excuse for not addressing the root causes of
a humanitarian crisis.
(elations with forces operating under a United Nations mandate
7+e role and )andate o* *or#es o(eratin$ under a United Nations )andate is de*ined "- t+e United Nations
2e#urit- Coun#il, and is "indin$. 7+e 2e#retar-9General5s Note o* 1 O#to"er 2 will $uide t+e relations+i(
"etween >e(resentatives o* t+e 2e#retar-9General, >esident Coordinators and Hu)anitarian Coordinators in
t+e e3e#ution o* t+is )andate. 7+e relations+i( "etween t+e (oliti#al=)ilitar- ele)ents o* t+e United Nations
(resen#e and t+e +u)anitarian (resen#e J in#ludin$ on t+e use o* )ilitar- es#orts *or +u)anitarian #onvo-s J
will "e deter)ined "- a$ree)ent "etween t+e 2>2G=>2G and HC=>C, and will "e #on$ruent wit+ t+e 2e#urit-
Coun#il )andate. !n a##ordan#e wit+ (ara$ra(+ / o* t+e 2e#retar-9General5s Note, t+e 2>2G=>2G and t+e
HC=>C s+ould resolve (oli#- di**eren#es at t+e *ield level. 6+ere t+is is not (ossi"le, t+e issue will "e "rou$+t
to t+e HeadMuarters task *or#e *or resolution.
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S 10
Note 3$ The num#er of situations in which there is the possi#ilit" of escorts #" U.N.4mandated forces
is !er" few. At present& onl" East Timor& Eritrea0Ethiopia and Sierra 5eone are possi#le
examples& and in none of those are escorts actuall" used.
Note ,$The 6rahimi report (Section %%0E proposes a notion of impartialit" which
would& in some circumstances& #e 7uite distinct from the humanitarian principles that would
go!ern the deli!er" of humanitarian assistance. %n such circumstances& there would not #e
automatic identit" of interest #etween United Nations elements reporting to the (SG0S(SG
and those coordinated #" the H'0('.
Non-binding guidelines on how to use military or armed escorts
Guiding principles for humanitarian4militar" relations
!n situations in w+i#+ an e3ternal )ilitar- a#tor is (resent, t+e relations+i( "etween t+e +u)anitarian
#o))unit- and t+e e3ternal )ilitar- *or#es s+ould "e "ased on a nu)"er o* $uidin$ (rin#i(les, in#ludin$:
i. The primac" of the humanitarian organi8ations in humanitarian wor/. !n t+e *irst instan#e,
+u)anitarian work s+ould "e (er*or)ed "- +u)anitarian or$aniIations. !nso*ar as )ilitar-
or$aniIations +ave an i))ediate role to (la- in su((ortin$ +u)anitarian work, it s+ould "e in
t+e (rovision o* a se#ure environ)ent and=or in t+e (rovision o* lo$isiti#s su((ort w+en
reMuested "- +u)anitarian or$aniIations.

ii. Primac" of humanitarian criteria. 'e#ision to reMuest or a##e(t t+e use o* )ilitar- or ar)ed
es#orts )ust "e )ade "- +u)anitarian or$aniIations, not (oliti#al or )ilitar- aut+orities,
"ased solel- on +u)anitarian #riteria.
iii. Humanitarian identit". Hu)anitarian #onvo-s )ust retain t+eir #ivilian nature and #+ara#ter.
Ot+er t+an t+e ve+i#les, wea(ons and (ersonnel (rovidin$ t+e es#orts, t+e #onvo-s )ust
re)ain e3#lusivel- +u)anitarian and ar)ed (ersonnel s+ould re)ain in se(arate ve+i#les. !n
order to $ive visi"ilit- to t+e #ivilian #+ara#ter o* +u)anitarian #onvo-s, ve+i#les ot+er t+an
t+e ones used to trans(ort ar)ed es#orts )a- "e *itted wit+ GNo 6ea(ons, sti#kers.
Note$ 9here external militar" actors are in!ol!ed& the a#o!e guiding
principles should #e agreed in ad!ance. (epresentati!es of the humanitarian communit" ma"
wish to consider the preparation of agreements with ma:or militar" esta#lishments confirming
these principles as a #asis for cooperation and di!ision of la#our in the area of escorts for
humanitarian con!o"s.
'ollecti!e action #" the humanitarian communit" 2 Negotiation process
6+ere (ossi"le, a sin$le tea) J re(resentin$ all +u)anitarian or$aniIations seekin$ ar)ed or )ilitar- es#orts
*or t+eir #onvo-s J s+ould ne$otiate t+e es#ort arran$e)ents. &rior to t+ese ne$otiations, t+e tea) s+ould +ave
a #o))on a((roa#+ to t+e (ro#edural ele)ents to "e ne$otiated.
Note$ .or example$
. 9hether the humanitarian organi8ations will ma/e a consolidated agreement on
#ehalf of all interested organi8ations& or whether separate agreements with each
organi8ation will #e necessar".
. 9ith which parties the escort agreement will #e negotiated.
. At what le!el the escort agreement will #e negotiated.
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S 11
. 9hether the agreement will #e a formal and written one& or whether it will #e an
informal understanding.
. 9hat terms and conditions will #e accepted; whether or not the escort pro!ider will
#e paid& and costs in!ol!ed.
. 9hat the political ramifications of the agreement are; what issues of legal lia#ilit"
arise& and whether or not the pri!ileges and immunities of the United Nations can #e
in!o/ed& and who will #e co!ered #" them.
. 9hether or not the existence and contents of the agreement will #e made generall"
a!aila#le.
'ollecti!e action #" the humanitarian communit" 2 Negotiation su#stance
6+ere (ossi"le, t+e +u)anitarian ne$otiatin$ tea) s+ould +ave a #o))on (osition on t+e su"stantive
ele)ents to "e ne$otiated.
Note$ .or example$
. Procedures with respect to pre4mo!ement securit" assessment (e.g. the role of the )*
and S1T in assessing the threat le!el and ma/ing appropriate arrangements; whether
or not there will #e a formal determination of <phases=& each re7uiring an appropriate
configuration.
. Procedures with respect to the composition of con!o"s (e.g. whether UN and NG*
!ehicles #e mixed; whether or not a consolidated manifest will #e a!aila#le& and to
whom; whether passengers will #e allowed and& if so& what categories of passengers.
. Procedures with respect to con!o" command and control (e.g. who will ha!e authorit"
o!er the configuration of the con!o" and o!er whether or not to a#ort a con!o"& or to
reroute it; whether or not escorted !ehicles will ha!e the authorit" to lea!e the con!o"
unilaterall".
. Procedures with respect to the carriage and use of weapons (e.g. humanitarian
con!o"s must retain their ci!ilian nature and character. *ther than the !ehicles&
weapons and personnel pro!iding the escorts& the con!o"s must remain exclusi!el"
humanitarian. Armed personnel should remain in separate !ehicles.
. Procedures with respect to communication and liaison (e.g. how will the escorts
communicate with those escorted& en route and at head7uarters.
. Procedures with respect to demands for preappro!ed mo!ement& chec/points& stops&
searches& pa"ment& etc.
. Procedures with respect to interacting with persons encountered en route.
. Procedures with respect to securit" incidents.
'ollecti!e action #" the humanitarian communit" 44 'odes of 'onduct
7+e +u)anitarian #o))unit- will en#oura$e t+e develo()ent o* situation9s(e#i*i# #odes o* #ondu#t, "ased on
a #o))on *ra)ework, to "e ela"orated "- re(resentatives o* t+e UN and non9UN +u)anitarian #o))unit-.
2u#+ #odes o* #ondu#t s+ould "e #onsistent wit+ t+e United Nations Eini)u) O(eratin$ 2e#urit- 2tandards
*or t+at lo#ation.
4.. /S, OF ("0"'123 O2 12(,4 ,S5O2'S FO2 6/(17"'12"17 5O78O3S 12