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This document discusses rethinking ethics of science and technology using pragmatism. It argues that traditional moral theories are unable to adequately address the dynamic nature of technology. It presents a "likely story" example to illustrate how technological developments like organ transplantation challenge existing social and moral norms. As science advances our understanding of concepts like death, new norms emerge to replace outdated ones. The document suggests pragmatism may provide an alternative approach for evaluating new technologies and resolving conflicts between scientific progress and established social values.
This document discusses rethinking ethics of science and technology using pragmatism. It argues that traditional moral theories are unable to adequately address the dynamic nature of technology. It presents a "likely story" example to illustrate how technological developments like organ transplantation challenge existing social and moral norms. As science advances our understanding of concepts like death, new norms emerge to replace outdated ones. The document suggests pragmatism may provide an alternative approach for evaluating new technologies and resolving conflicts between scientific progress and established social values.
This document discusses rethinking ethics of science and technology using pragmatism. It argues that traditional moral theories are unable to adequately address the dynamic nature of technology. It presents a "likely story" example to illustrate how technological developments like organ transplantation challenge existing social and moral norms. As science advances our understanding of concepts like death, new norms emerge to replace outdated ones. The document suggests pragmatism may provide an alternative approach for evaluating new technologies and resolving conflicts between scientific progress and established social values.
Wanderley Dias da Silva wanderley.diasdasilva@student.kuleuven.be
In this paper I am interested in some prominent themes in science, technology and ethics notably, how more appropriate perceptions of technological artefacts and developments in general can improve the quality and effectiveness of contemporary discourses in the field. It is certain that traditional moral theories seem unable to cope adequately with the strongly dynamic nature of our technological culture. My second, more specific task, then, is to lay out an alternative approach to bear upon the broad question of the place of ethics in a technological world. 1 This question is often thought to imply a dilemma: should society be involved in the evaluation of science and technology, or should it leave it to scientists, engineers, technicians, and technocrats? But, as I hope will become clear, the dilemma is false. For one thing, it is safe to say that technology is not outside society, but it is rather another element of it. Thus the technical question is already a social one. 2
The discussion is divided into five sections. I begin with a likely story to illustrate the false dilemma mentioned above. I focus primarily in the conflict between social and moral symbolic landmarks on the one hand, and technological development on the other. In section 2 I outline Keulartz et al.s discussion on the technological blindness of traditional applied ethics and classical philosophy of technology. 3 Next, in section 3 I lay out their critique of the normative deficit of the constructivism proposed by modern technology studies. In section 4 I summarize Keulartz et al.s pragmatist alternative. 4 By going over these matters I hope to show the unique value of pragmatism in considering moral issues in our modern technological culture.
1 For this purpose, I have in mind a pragmatist model elaborated by Keulartz et al. See note 3 below for reference purposes. 2 I follow the account of Guido Van Steendam, in Ethics of Science and Technology, Lectures at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium; October 10 November 29, 2010. There is nothing new in my rendering of this argument here. 3 Ethics in Technological Culture: A Programmatic Proposal for a Pragmatist Approach, Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 29/1 (Winter 2004), 3-29.In this paper Ill provide the reader with in-text edition and page references. 4 To be sure, I do not pretend to offer a comprehensive review of their pragmatist project here since that is obviously beyond the scope of this paper but only a clarification of their major arguments. Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology Dias da Silva|2
1. The False Dilemma
Let us begin with the ending: it is above all else urgent not to think of social evaluation as divorced from scientific or technological evaluation. Why? The typical question of whether society should be involved in the assessment of science and technology (or technology for short) is, at its very best, a false dilemma or even a philosophical myth. So, it is important to remember that so-called ethical issues in technology do not actually arise between science and society, but rather between two scientific processes or practices. This is to say, then, that the question of whether society should be involved in the evaluation of science and technology, or whether it should leave it to scientists, engineers, technicians, and technocrats, is groundless. Simply, the alleged technical question is already a social one. But this can be probably best illustrated by means of an example.
Consider this likely story. Last week Jack was driving home back from London on M1. Suddenly he drives through deep standing water, loses control of his car and collides head-on with a heavy lorry. Jack is rushed to hospital, but physicians declare him dead minutes later. Now, according to the Human Tissue Act 2004 covering England, Wales and Northern Ireland if Jack had not, while alive and competent, given consent for some or all of his organs or tissue to be donated following his death, the medical staff will have to approach his relatives or other relevant persons to establish any known wishes of his to do so. As it happens, there is no record of Jacks consent; and now the hospital is negotiating organs and tissue recovery with his family. We need to interrupt our likely story now to say more about the dilemma we put aside earlier.
On the one hand, it is safe to say (1) that the organs and tissues recovered from Jacks body can save the lives of various patients waiting for transplantation. One the other hand, however, we cannot ignore (2) that there might be some religious and bioethical arguments against the donation. I do not want to poke into these arguments. The most important lesson that emerges from this narrative is that: (1) poses the question of priority; i.e., the claim that, all things considered, we should do our best to save lives, for example; and (2) is a pointer to the landmark criterion or social symbolic constructions; i.e., the question of whether the principles underlying our actions satisfy certain ethical or social standards particularly whether they can be universalized. It will be no surprise that such landmarks function as conceptual restrictions for society. As a matter of fact, it is certain that people generally limit their ethical considerations by holding on to those landmarks. What happens to these moral or social constructions in the course of history, however, remains to be seen. To this end, we must return to our story.
Let us suppose for a moment that Jacks accident did not happen last week; but some time ago, when for religious or philosophical reasons the human heart was still believed to be the seat of the soul. It is certainly not hard to see that such a principle would function as a conceptual restriction against heart transplantation. More simply, it is safe to say that, under the seat of the soul perspective, heart transplantation would surely be considered morally unacceptable. As a matter of fact, this was exactly the case when, in December 1967, Dr. Christian Barnard performed the first heart transplant in history. (And failure of the heart was then the legal and medical definition of death.) Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology Dias da Silva|3
Of course there is nothing new in this case. From the discovery of Penicillin, there have always been debates regarding the moral issues involved in new scientific inventions. So, naturally when the first heart transplant was performed, many considered it unethical, immoral. What is more, the controversy occupied the front pages of magazines around the world.
On the face of it, then, we can say that actions which are perceived as contradicting symbolic constructions or landmarks, come to be morally disapproved; for they seem to weaken social cohesion. To be sure, it will not be necessary particularly in such a short essay to dwell laboriously on the peculiarities of how (or perhaps why) society tends to hold so tight to those landmarks (albeit, to dismiss the power of religious beliefs in the consolidation of those symbolic constraints would be rather metaphorical and inconclusive, to say the least). For we are here more interested in the way applied ethics try to assess and cope with those technological development.
In any case, with the increasing ability of medical experts to resuscitate people with no heartbeat, the need for a better definition of death became obvious. To cut a long story short, since the 1960s, legal and medical communities have for obvious reasons adopted brain death as the legal explanation of mortality. Put simply, the old seat- of-the-soul landmark was replaced by a new one. Thus heart transplantation no longer counted as morally objectionable. So, the lesson to be learned is, as Harbers and Koenis 5 put it, simply this: social and moral standards are not merely determined by symbolic constructions..., but just as much by material objects: [e.g.,] Fire, food, money, steam engines, dikes and polders, sewage pipes, viruses and computer systems have just as strong a binding effects as symbolic constructions, if not more so (2004:4).
This brings us back to Van Steendams remark that alleged ethical issues in science and technology do not actually arise between science and society, but rather between two scientific processes or practices. How is this? Simply, as a matter of fact, we inhabit a world full of people continuously discovering and inventing new things (and ideas); and sometimes this strongly dynamic characteristic of society generates conflicts. This is to say that old ways of life are repetitively being replaced by new ones. Hence, norms and values are always being put up for discussion, and we regularly find ourselves confronted with new moral problems (ibid).
Now, presumably, any effective moral theory must be able to accommodate those changes. But, as I hope will become clear, because traditional philosophy (i.e., applied ethics and classical philosophy of technology) tends to adopt totally unquestioning principles as starting points for its inquiries, it surely lacks insight to cope with the strongly dynamic and pluralist character of our technological culture. That is to say that contrary to what traditional philosophy supposes the moral conflicts that evolve in the process of technological development are as much part of society as technology itself. It is therefore necessary to adopt a more appropriate perception of technological artefacts and developments in general, if we are to improve the quality and effectiveness of contemporary discourses on ethics of technology.
5 1999, 4, in Keulartz et al. 2004. Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology Dias da Silva|4
So, if indeed it seems necessary to propose another moral theory to repair the technological blindness of traditional philosophy one that seems to accommodate the fact that social and moral evaluations of technology are more complex than the typical question of whether society should be involved in the assessment of technological development I suggest the pragmatist approach sketched by Keulartz et al. in their essay Ethics in Technological Culture: A Programmatic Proposal for a Pragmatist Approach. We turn now to their discussion.
2. Technological Blindness of Traditional Ethics and Classical Philosophy
Keulartz et al. begin by giving an overview of the so-called technological blindness that seems to affect traditional philosophy in general. The main culprit, they say, is the classical belief that technology and society form each others opposites and, as such, the idea of a technological culture could only be an oxymoron (ibid:7). They explain the origin and nature of this technological blindness, as derived from the two traditions upon which modern philosophy is built. They say modern philosophy is largely shaped by empiricism and rationalism. Empiricism as modelled by the works of Francis Bacon launched a utopian program aimed basically at achieving social progress through scientific and technological means. Rationalism, on the other hand, rests on an obsession with the so-called unshakable foundation upon which knowledge can be systematically constructed. So, The imagine of man that arises from modern philosophy is one of a completely autonomous subject who uses science and technology in a sovereign way to achieve his or her aims (ibid:5). As it happens, this humanistic, heroic and self-centred individual is still, they say, to a large extent the subject of applied ethics in general. To illustrate their point, Keulartz et al. refer to De Vries thus:
Depending on the sort of ethical theory one supports, attention will be focused either on the presuppositions underlying actions or on the consequences of actions. In the former case [rationalism], the question to be answered is whether the principle underlying the actions satisfies ethical criteria, particularly whether it can be universalized. In the latter case, one asks whether the action contributes to the aggregated individual welfare [empiricism] (1999, 19).
In other words, moral theorists seem to restrict their focuses on the cement holding society together to the values, principles, norms, and rules by which people attune their actions to each other (2004:5). Whats wrong with this approach? It should clear by now that societys moral landmarks are not merely determined by symbolic interpretations, but just as much by scientific and technological developments. This is to say in line with Harbers and Koenis 6 that science and technology have just as strong a binding effect as symbolic constructions, if not more so. Against this background, Keulartz et al. argue that applied ethics seem to view technology mainly in instrumental terms; it can be used for good or for bad but does not form a subject of consideration in its own rights (ibid:6). In this view (of technology as a neutral resource), applied ethics will often evaluate scientific progress accordingly, depending on whether it conflicts with its symbolic constructions or not.
6 See previous note. Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology Dias da Silva|5
But this, however, is by no means the only concept of technology that emerges from the vast sphere of modern philosophy. There is the classical substantive view professed by traditional philosophy of technology. Two particular names had a direct impact on the development of classical philosophy of technology, Martin Heidegger and Jaques Ellul. According to these philosophers, science is anything but neutral an innocent resource that can be used for good or for bad. On the contrary, for Heidegger, technology tends to disclose the world as standing reserve (Bestand). In a technological world, he says, the primary end is that of efficiency and, as such, things come to reveal themselves to us as mere resources. So, ultimately technology might extinguish all the other modes of perception. As Keulartz et al. point out, Back in the 1930s, Heidegger had already predicted that the human being would be relegated to a mere technicized animal, once he became the main resource for technological control. Ellul, for his part, talks of a sort of technological determinism. That is, the idea that contrary to what modern philosophy supposed not man, but technology is in reality autonomous. Otherwise stated, Technology has not brought about liberation but instead a new form of slavery. On this picture, then, technology has unmistakably apocalyptic and prophetic characteristics (ibid:7). But what can we learn from this?
Keulartz et at. believe its quite safe to say that, as a result of the anthropocentricism of traditional ethics and the prophetic characteristic of classical philosophy of technology, applied ethics has not yet opened up the black box of technological development. It surely pays attention to the moral problems invoked by the use of new technologies. Yet it remains blind to the moral significance of technology itself. This, they say, condemns applied ethics to be left running to catch up with the facts. Moreover, as long as it clings to its anthropocentric prejudices, [traditional] ethics will not be able to accommodate adequately the dynamic character of the present technological culture. Whats more, the foundationalism that has dominated traditional philosophy for such a long time is mainly aimed at underpinning moral rules and judgements on the basis of one or more universal starting points [absolute landmarks] or principles. As a consequence, little attention or perhaps no attention at all is actually paid to change of norms and morals over time (ibid:10).
Now, whats the relevance of this account to the problem of ethics? No doubt, says Keulartz et al., that traditional philosophy seems to have insufficient insight into the moral significance of technological development and systems and that it cannot cope adequately with the dynamic character of the technological culture in which we live (ibid:25). To be sure, few of us would probably entertain any serious doubt about the significant role of change in the construction of social and moral constructions. Consider the case of Jack, as we have seen earlier.
Our likely story makes it clear that technological development embodies particular options and restrictions, i.e., it invites certain kinds of actions or behaviour and discourage other ones, and thus reinforce or alter existing role divisions and power structures (ibid). Or, in Van Steendams terms: on the one hand, Jacks story poses the question of priority: i.e., the claim that, all things considered, we should do our best to save lives, for example. On the other, its a pointer to the landmark criterion or social symbolic constructions. But this, we have suggested, is a misconception. Such false impression emerges from the mistaken assumption that the implications of scientific Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology Dias da Silva|6
and technological artefacts are limited to the particular practices for which they are intended. But in reality the functioning of a particular tool depends on a variety of action anchors or actors. Unfortunately, the significance of this insight for applied ethics has until now, says Keulartz et al., not been acknowledged sufficiently (ibid). To sum it up, then, it isnt difficult to see that, as a result of its technological blindness and foundationalist tendencies, traditional ethics is barely able to cope with the changes and renewals that are an everyday affair in our technological culture in a creative or innovative way.
That is precisely why modern science and technology studies (STS) search for a democratic control and normative assessment of technological developments. That is, the evaluation of technology, according to STS, isnt within the scope of applied ethics. This extreme approach, however, is certainly not without its problems; for, by holding on this agnostic or even antagonistic attitude towards ethics (ibid:12), STS take moral norms and values on holiday. Now we have to see what Keulartz et al. mean by this.
3. The Normative Deficit of Constructivism
Keulartz et al. point out that STS have eventually replaced both Heideggers substantive vision of technology and Elluls technological determinism with a more pluralistic concept. In their own terms, Modern technology studies have opened up the black box of technological development and revealed the intimate intertwinement of technology and society. So its safe to say that, technology does not operate upon society as an external neutral or otherwise influence, but its actually part of it. STS holds that both scientific facts and technological artefacts appear to be the outcome of negotiations, in which many diverse actors are involved. On this view, we must at any rate understand that technology isnt completely autonomous at all. That is, science and technology dont follow their own patters but rather are a fairly random result of social interaction (ibid). The question, therefore, is not how to relate science and culture, but rather how to understand the way these two are interconnected.
This new way of seeing things is called constructivism. Constructivism does not view culture as unilaterally subject to technological imperatives, but argues that there is a coevaluation of technology and society. Thus, to be able to introduce technological artefacts successfully into society, one must change certain aspects of society, while one can also say that the development and design of these artefacts takes place in a social field of influence, with many different players, each with diverse interests, aims, resources, and means of power. But this, however, is by no means the end of the matter. According to Keulartz et al., STS have vigorously exposed the normative significance of technological artefacts (ibid). At this point we ought to slow down and explain these premises carefully.
Constructivism comes in two broad varieties, moderate constructivism (MC) and radical constructivism (RC). One form of moderate constructivism in particular, Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) defends the idea that science and technology can be explained by social factors like dominant group interests or existing power structures. In other words, applied ethics needs not worry about technological Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology Dias da Silva|7
artefacts and development; these can be analysed by following the basis of society and its structures. This is to say that (1) technological artefacts should not be interpreted as intrinsic and invariable features and that (2) the kind of script that artefacts display depends on the specific context in which they are designed, developed, and used (ibid:13). It isnt hard to see that MC is already lacking in normative assessment. But its when we turn to RC that normative evaluation goes on astray for good.
For its part, RC blames MC for simply replacing one form of determinism (technological) with social determinism. So, to explain technological development, RC subscribes to (1) but not to (2). In this view, both technology and society are mere fabrications. That is to say that, technological artefacts have no value built into them. Thus, we cannot determine what the specific context looks like apart from the interpretations of relevant actors.... In other words, if there is any need for normative evaluation, we should simple follow the actors of science and technology without taking sides. Hence, according to RC, what counts as the capacity and effect of a technology is socially structured and is consequently contingent and open to renegotiation (ibid). Whats wrong with both forms of constructivism?
Here Keulartz et al. refer to Radder, who thinks that RC is guilty of judgemental relativism. That is, the assumption that any interpretation is as valid or as invalid as any other. This, however, as Keulartz et al. point out, cannot work in practice. The best option seems to be the actor-network approach MC endorses. But, again, Radder holds that the danger here is that evaluation is based exclusively from the winners point of view rather than from the losers point of view. Keulartz et al. think, however, that one thing is for sure: their use is difficult to reconcile with ethical deliberation, in which justified norms and values are sought in order to evaluate the development of technologies. Again, Keulartz et al. refer to Radder, who believes that STS should overcome its fear of becoming explicitly normative. He concludes that one should try to combine the achievements of the empirical approach their more adequate views on the practices of science and technology with normative insights concerning the problematic aspects of our techno scientific world... Its precisely this combination that Keulartz et al. intend with their pragmatist proposal to ethics in a technological culture (ibid:14). The following is a summary of that model.
4. The Pragmatist Alternative
As Keulartz et al. explain, given the wide diversity of philosophers, it is clear that pragmatism must not be understood as a systematic theory in the usual sense, but rather as a particular series of theses; theses which can be and were argued very differently by different philosophers with different concerns (ibid:15). Ill, then, take off from the tripartite pragmatist antitheses Keulartz et al. describe in pages 16-7:
1. Antifoundationalism: That is, pragmatists reject the obsession for certainty which philosophers have celebrated since Plato. All our convictions, without exception, are of a provisional nature and are in principle susceptible to repeal or review. More simply, pragmatists adhere to a particular form of fallibilism (ibid:16). 2. Antidualism: Here we are not talking simply of the dualism of essence and appearance which, again, philosophers have celebrated since Plato but also other forms of dualism such as theory/practice, consciousness/external reality, fact/value and duty/inclination and Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology Dias da Silva|8
so on. It should be clear by now that traditional philosophy and applied ethics are strongly influenced by some sort of dualism. Pragmatists, on the other hand, deny such an elevated state to these distinctions and give then only a functional significance, in accordance with their potential usefulness for problem solving. This is to say that, these distinctions do not precede research but are formed or construed only during the research itself, with a view to practice. Hence, the dividing lines between these distinctions arent clear and fixed forever from the beginning, whatever that beginning may be (ibid). 3. Antiscepticism: Its important to note that, according to pragmatism, fallibilism should not be mistaken by scepticism. True, pragmatists deny that absolute truth can be achieved by metaphysical guarantees, but this does not mean that people are left at the mercy of universal doubt. Or, in Peirces words, there is a world of difference between fallible knowledge and no knowledge at all. What pragmatists claim instead is that there is only more and less reliable knowledge. So for example, the Cartesian assumption that philosophy must start with real or initial scepticism is seen as an illusion. Pragmatism assumes instead that we can never begin our research with complete doubt; i.e., we always enter philosophy with prejudices. So, says Peirce, one must have reasons to doubt, as well as to believe (ibid:17).
These three antitheses are of vital importance for a pragmatic approach to ethics. A pragmatic moral theory turns crucially on the possibilities for living and working together. In Keulartz et al.s own terms, While consequentialists take collective happiness to be the moral touchstone and deontologists, the obliging character of moral norms, peaceful cohabitation and fruitful cooperation serve as the moral touchstone for pragmatism. So, to sum it up, pragmatism rejects both dualism and scepticism. The former is counterproductive because it encourages black-and-white thinking, which brings conflicts to a head and leads debates to degenerate into unproductive boundary disputes, or gets stuck in childish does not does too exchange. The latter also forms an obstacle to a creative tackling of problems because it simply cultivates philosophical doubt at the expense of real doubt (ibid).
But how does pragmatism plan to solve the problems created by both dualism and scepticism? Put differently, how does pragmatism avoid (1) technological blindness and (2) normative deficit? It would appear that the moral point of reference to cooperation and peaceful cohabitation typical of pragmatism reinforces two important progressive problemshifts models (ibid, emphasis added).
(a) Process/Product shift: Keulartz et at. say that because of its attention to the settlement of conflicts for the sake of further cooperation, pragmatism has always been interested as much in the process of (moral) inquiry as in its ready-made products (ibid). This is to say that, to promote fairness and quality of the process of inquiry and deliberation, it is essential that all those concerned can have their say and that decisions are made on the basis of a careful consideration of all relevant conflicting moral claims and arguments (ibid:18). (b) Justification/Discovery shift: A second shift to which pragmatism gives rise is a shift in emphasis from the context of justification to the context of discovery... That is, pragmatists pay as much attention to the justification of moral judgments as they do to heuristics, to the art of invention. This, says Keulartz et al., avoids the problems of more traditional philosophical models, which attach too much importance upon justifying moral values. This shift between contexts is often referred to as the split personality of pragmatism, a term referring to the distinction between the rationalist [context of Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology Dias da Silva|9
justification] and the romantic [context of discovery] side of pragmatism. But how does this work? The rationalist side of pragmatism is concerned with the cognitive capacity for argumentative problem solving and justification, while the romantic side is concerned with the creative capacity for the innovation and invention of vocabularies which provide new meanings and open new perspectives (ibid). Now we need to investigate the outcome of this progressive problemshifting tools.
It seems that if we combine the distinction between rationalist and romantic aspects of pragmatism with the distinction between product-oriented and process-oriented approaches, we arrive at a matrix of tasks for a pragmatist ethics. We shall consider this matrix of tasks in a while. First, its important to note here that, according to Keulartz et al., some of these tasks are well known to prevailing forms of applied ethics, but others constitute supplements that [we] believe are necessary to make ethics better geared to dealing with moral problems in a technological culture (ibid:19).
Keulartz et al. explain that, depending upon the moral problem at hand, pragmatists will switch between these different tasks and their corresponding methods and tools (ibid). These methods and tools are determined according to the basic rationalist-romantic distinction described above, and are divided into four groups of tasks. In connection to the context of justification (the rationalist side of pragmatism), we are left with two sets of tasks: (a) traditional ethics and (b) discourse ethics; and, in the context of discovery (romantic side), we have: (c) dramatic rehearsal and (d) conflict management.
To be sure, different applied ethics models will make use of one of these methods and respective sets of tasks. It wont be necessary, particular in an essay aiming to investigate the methods used by pragmatists, to dwell laboriously on this matter. We are here more interested in the general claim Keulartz et al. make that applied ethics has insufficient insight to cope adequately with the dynamic character of our technological world precisely because its limited to one method (ibid:25). I, therefore, propose to summary their major arguments thus.
So, in the context of justification, (a) will provide the arguments and justifications for or against specific courses of action. This is often the methods of traditional ethicists, lawyers or moral scientists. Keulartz et at. point out that the common methods in applied ethics are principlism, casuistry, cost-benefit analysis, and so on. Meanwhile (b) aims at improving the structure of public debate and decision making. That is, it supposes that one should help to develop procedures and institutions that guarantee equal access to public deliberation and fair representation of all relevant arguments to ensure that moral decisions are based on the force of the better argument rather than on the forces of power, money, and the like (ibid:19).
To Keulartz et al. for common and familiar types of problems for which the relevant ethical considerations are in principle known, the prevailing rationalist tools of applied ethics and discourse ethics usually suffice, while for new problems for which existing rules and routines are not adequate, itll be necessary to resort to the romantic side of pragmatism (ibid). To this end, (c) offers the possibility of criticizing and renewing vocabularies, exploring possible future worlds, while (d) helps with the open confrontation of heterogeneous moral vocabularies and worldviews. The former Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology Dias da Silva|10
involves detailed descriptions of complex scenarios, of various competing possible lines of action and courses of conduct. The latter aims at dealing with the fundamental value conflicts that arise from assessment and evaluation of technological developments (ibid:21). The latter, they say, is possibly the most important for a pragmatist ethics, since the problems that threaten cooperation and cohabitation are most pregnant and manifest in handling such value conflicts. It would appear that the antifoundationalism and antiessentialism characteristic of pragmatism plays a crucial role here, since pragmatism will look for solutions in a more practical direction instead of looking for ultimate moral truths or foundations for the only right answer as traditional ethics tends to do (ibid:23).
With this matrix of tools and tasks, pragmatists believe they can offer an ethics that is well-equipped for our technological world. Its clear from the model described above that pragmatists dont propose to radically break with the current practice of ethics, as its the case with STS, but rather is complementary in character (ibid:24). This is to say that, unlike more traditional methods, which tend to hold tight to symbolic restrictions (and thus will be limited by one single method and task for every situation), pragmatists propose to switch between these different tasks and their corresponding methods or tools. Keulartz et al. conclude by pointing out, however, that to develop an ethics that is well equipped for our technological culture, further theoretical analysis of the tasks we have suggested and practical experimentation with the corresponding tools are required (ibid:25). I wont attempt to pursue this possibility further here. Rather, Ill close with some further observations relating the nature and ground of pragmatism.
5. General Comments
So, it will be found, upon consideration, that pragmatism seems to avoid both the technological blindness of traditional applied ethics and the normative deficit that disturbs STS. It is worth recalling the simple logic behind Keulartz et al.s project here. We know that pragmatism from its outset aims at bridging the ever-widening abysm between two divergent tendencies in modern philosophy: empiricism and rationalism. Empirical theorists and scientists reject most rationalist propositions because they lacked, they say, objective evidence. Rationalists, for their part, believe that empiricism is a threat to moral and religious values. Pragmatism, on the other hand, aims at mediating between these traditions, combining what was most significant in each of them. So, like empiricists, the pragmatists thought that we have no conception of the whole of reality. This is to say that, we know things from many perspectives, and we must settle for a multifaceted approach to knowledge. And like rationalists and idealists, [pragmatists] saw morality, religion, and human purpose as constituting a significant aspect of our experience. 7
As it happens, there is a considerable demand for such approach in the dynamic technological world we live. We do not have to poke too deeply into the different assumptions and arguments some of the great moral philosophers have constructed in the course of history to arrive at one simple conclusion perhaps the only conclusion possible that they cannot all be correct. There should be little doubt that Plato,
7 For a lucid evaluation of this topic, see Samuel E. Stumpf and James Fieser, Philosophy: History and Problems, 7 th edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 372. Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology Dias da Silva|11
Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Nietzsche, and so on possessed incredible philosophical insight. Yet, their various ethical theories differ drastically from each other. On this picture, it is safe to say that perhaps none of these models is correct. (Or perhaps there is no metaethical criterion to which we can appeal in order to test them.) Hence, the only way to check their validity is to see whether they work in practice. And it is not hard to see that all of them, to one extent or another, could in principle work, depending on a particular social framework. As we have seen earlier, there are situations where traditional ethics can cope with moral problems in a technological world. But the lack of insight (and its amnesia regarding the fact that we inhabit a pluralist society in which it is clearly difficult to achieve a consensus on controversial issues particularly the ones that evolve from technological artefacts and development) turns traditional ethics into a sort of blind uncle. 8 Against this background, we can surely argue that there is no single theory that can possibly offer a full, real definition of something as socially and culturally complex as science and technology. Now I hope the reader will forgive what may seem a rather esoteric route into this topic, but here I can only remember the tale of the Buddhist master who wanted his disciples to be aware of the limitations of human understanding. The monk blindfolded his young students and took them in front of an elephant. Then he asked each one to touch a part of the animal, and try to describe what they perceived. Each monk described elephant according to the part of the animal they were holding. Obviously none of the descriptions were real and complete ones. The point being made is simply this: any absolute, unquestionable model is bound to fail; it is like trying to describing an elephant blindfoldedly. But of course the solution is certainly not to do away with moral principles and social evaluation of technology altogether as STS suggest. For it should be clear by now that technology is not separated from society; it is rather a crucial element of it. Social evaluation is not divorced from scientific or technological evaluation. The technical question is, as already pointed out, a social one. In this light, what pragmatist ethics is advocating is that we need to take account of both the role of moral intuition and the value of development. Metaphorically, we need to try and see the whole elephant i.e., if we want to describe it appropriately. To this end, the different methods and tasks Keulartz et al. propose in their paper can be a source of hope; for pragmatism is better equipped to cope with the highly dynamic character of our modern technological world. In short, its various methods and tasks can improve the quality and effectiveness of contemporary discourses on ethics of science and technology. However, as Keulartz et al. admit, this pragmatist matrix of tools and tasks needs further theoretical analysis and practical experimentation. I will not attempt to investigate this claim here. Meanwhile, it is above all else urgent not to think of social evaluation as divorced from scientific or technological evaluation....
8 Albeit, as the popular saying has it, a blind uncle is better than no uncle at all.