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CHAPTER 10: WALZER=S COMPLEX EQUALITY






CONTENTS
[pp 250 B 282]
Page
10.1. Introduction 250
10.2. Overview of Walzer=s Theory of Complex Equality 251
10.3. Commentary on Walzer=s Theory 255
10.4. Walzer Contra Rawls 271
10.5. Equality in Walzer=s Theory of Complex Equality 274
10.6. Complex Equality and the CEOP Model 280



10.1. INTRODUCTION

Walzer=s theory is radically different from the preceding theories in that he eschews an abstract or purely
philosophical approach to distributive justice, which he rejects because a theory of distributive justice
must be situated within a particular social context. Although his approach to justice is commonly held to
be communitarian because of its Asociological@ bias, it has strong liberal, some would say libertarian,
elements. Walzer=s theory is of value mainly because of his emphasis that the social ideal of equality is
best served when distinct goods, such as money, are not allowed to dominate the distribution of other
goods, such as public office or the political process. Walzer urges us to conceive of equality as a plural
conception with many different inequalities cancelling each other out so that overall people are equal even
as they are unequal in specific respects. This notion Walzer calls Acomplex equality@, which, according to
him is preferable over traditional conceptions of equality, which he calls Asimple equality@.

In the section that follows the main aspects of Walzer=s theory of complex equality is presented as a novel
alternative to political theories in general, and Rawls=s political theory in particular.
1
This is followed, in
Section 10.3., by a discussion and an assessment of the main attributes of the theory. In Section 10.4. the
main differences between the theories of Rawls and Walzer are noted and in Section 10.5. Walzer=s
conception of equality is discussed. As usual, this chapter is concluded with a discussion of the relevance
of Walzer=s notion of Acomplex equality@ for the CEOP model (Section 10.6.).



1
Walzer M. (1983): Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, New York: Basic Books.


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10.2. OVERVIEW OF WALZER=S THEORY OF COMPLEX EQUALITY

Although Walzer=s theory is called Acomplex equality@, the main focus of his theory is on the social
meaning of goods, which are, according to him sphere-specific and culture dependent, and which
determines the appropriate distributive principles. Walzer=s argument for his approach to distributive
justice is best summarized in his own words:

ADifferent social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different
procedures, by different agents; and all these differences derive from different understandings of the social
goods themselves -- the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism.@
2


It is therefore, according to Walzer, the cultural meaning of goods, that determines the just distribution for
those goods, and, because these goods can have different meanings, different distributional principles and
procedures may be necessary, each autonomous from the other, for:

Awhen meanings are distinct, distributions must be autonomous. Every social good or set of goods
constitutes, as it were, a distributive sphere within which only certain criteria and arrangements are
appropriate. Money is inappropriate in the sphere of ecclesiastical office; it is an intrusion from another
sphere. And piety should make for no advantage in the marketplace, as the marketplace has commonly been
understood@
3


Therefore, Walzer makes three claims regarding distributive justice:

(i) Different goods have different social meanings and their respective distributions must be
done in accordance with these different meanings.

(ii) Any good belonging to one sphere of life should not be allowed to dominate the
distribution of a good belonging to another sphere. For example, a distribution that gives
dominance in the political sphere to Person A, should not result in Person A also
achieving dominance in the economic sphere. Another way of putting this is that
distributions between different spheres should take place independently of each other.

(iii) It is the history and culture of a particular community that determine the meaning of
social goods. Walzer therefore objects to two kinds of abstraction in political theorizing

2
Walzer (1983): p 6.
3
Idem: p. 10.


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and suggests that two kinds of particularity should be kept in mind when talking of
justice, namely that distributive principles must be good-specific and, secondly, that
these good-specific principles must be culture-specific.
4


4
Walzer claims that Rawls fails on both these counts.
What are the implications of this conception of distributive justice for his conception of equality? For
Walzer, inequalities are not wrong as such, it is when inequalities in one sphere are allowed to lead to
inequalities in another sphere, that our socio-political arrangements should guard against. This is where
Walzer=s distinction between Adominance@ and Amonopoly@ is important, which he describes as follows:



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AI call a good dominant if the individuals who have it, because they have it, can command a wide range of
other goods. It is monopolised whenever a single man or woman, a monarch in the world of value -- or a
group of men and women, oligarchs -- successfully hold it against all rivals. Dominance describes a way of
using social goods that isnt limited by their intrinsic meanings or that shapes those meanings in its own
image. Monopoly describes a way of owning or controlling social goods in order to exploit their
dominance.@
5


This distinction allows him to contrast two sorts of demand for egalitarian justice: first, the claim that the
dominant good,
6
whatever it is, should be redistributed so that it can become equally or at least more
widely shared (this amounts to saying that monopoly is unjust); and second, the claim that the way should
be opened for the autonomous distribution of all social goods (this amounts to saying that dominance is
unjust). Walzer >s argument is for the latter rather than for the former, that is for the autonomous
distribution of goods, distribution in accordance with the good-specific meanings of each, rather than for
the more equal distribution of whatever good happens to be dominant in a particular sphere. It is the
prevention of exchanges between distinct spheres that is the focus of Walzer=s notion of complex
equality.
7


This distinction between monopoly and dominance leads to a distinction between >simple and >complex
equality. To explain this distinction, Walzer asks us to imagine a society in which everything is up for
sale and every citizen has as much money as every other. Under these circumstances equality is multiplied
through the conversion process, until it extends across the full range of social goods, for money is the
only good and dominates all spheres through the conversion process, and it is equally distributed. This is
what Walzer calls a case of Asimple equality@. This is not bad as far as it goes, but the problem is that this
is an unstable situation that will quickly deteriorate, through market exchanges, into new inequalities
unless unacceptably strong state intervention is used to break up incipient monopolies and forms of
dominance in various spheres. Walzer proposes that a better strategy is to use the conception of Acomplex

5
Idem: pp. 10-11.
6
The Afocal variable@ in Sen=s terminology B see Chapter 9 supra.
7
ASo, whilst there remains, of course, a concern that goods be distributed in accordance with their own meanings, the thrust of
Walzers theory is such as to focus attention not so much on the distribution of goods considered one by one as on the prevention of
exchanges between them. Thus, putting it very crudely, what is unjust about capitalist society is not so much the unequal distribution of
money as the fact that money is able to bring its possessor goods, such as health care or education, that properly belong to different
distributive spheres. In Walzers terminology, what is wrong is that money is a >dominant good, one that >tyrannizes over others. And the
mistake in focusing on the more equal distribution of money rather than the prevention of exchanges between it and other goods is that of
pursuing >simple rather than >complex equality@ [Mulhall & Swift (1994): p 147].


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equality@, for which he offers the following motivation:

AI want to argue that we should focus on the reduction of dominance -- not, or not primarily, on the break-
up or constraint of monopoly. We should consider what it might mean to narrow the range within which
particular goods are convertible and to vindicate the autonomy of distributive spheres... Imagine now a
society in which different social goods are monopolistically held C as they are in fact and as they always
will be, barring continual state intervention C but in which no particular good is generally convertible...
This is a complex egalitarian society. Though there will be many small inequalities, inequality will not be
multiplied through the conversion process. Nor will it be summed across different goods, because the
autonomy of distributions will tend to produce a variety of local monopolies, held by different groups of
men and women.@
8


From this perspective inequality as such is not wrong (for monopoly is not inappropriate within the
spheres), what is wrong is what Walzer calls Atyranny@, that is the disregard of the distinctness of the
principles internal to each distributive sphere. The regime of complex equality

Ais the opposite of tyranny. It establishes a set of relationships such that domination is impossible. In formal
terms, complex equality means that no citizens standing in one sphere or with regard to one social good
can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere with regard to some other good. Thus citizen X may
be chosen over citizen Y for political office, and then the two of them will be unequal in the sphere of
politics. But they will not be unequal generally so long as X=s office gives him no advantages over Y in any
other sphere C superior medical care, access to better schools for his children, entrepreneurial
opportunities, and so on.@
9


In short, the way to achieve justice is vigilantly to patrol the borders between spheres, preventing
conversions between goods whose meanings, and hence principles of just distribution, are distinct. From
the preceding, Walzer proposes the following general distributive rule:

A[N]o social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y merely
because they possess y and without regard to the meaning of x.@
10


J ustice requires that each good be distributed in accordance with its own sphere-specific principles, which
are discovered through interpretation of its social meaning. A society is tyrannical if one good dominates
others, if it violates those meanings.


8
Walzer (1983): p 17.
9
Idem: pp 19C20.
10
Idem: p 20.


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Walzer provides a further argument in favour of complex equality, namely that it is already practiced in
any society which prohibits exchanges between different spheres, by, what he calls, Ablocked exchanges@.
Walzer provides many examples of Ablocked exchanges@,
11
which are a source of greater equality (by
preventing inequality in one sphere to lead automatically to inequalities in other spheres) as well as a
bulwark against tyrannical tendencies (by preventing dominance in one sphere to spill over to other
spheres), while simultaneously fostering social diversity between and within groups by ensuring that
control over individuals in one sphere of life does not automatically mean control within the context of
another sphere, at any rate not by the same person or agency. A Ablocked exchange@ is the rules which in
practice maintain boundaries between social institutions and practices. Examples of blocked exchanges
are those market rules proscribing the trading in votes, persons, judicial verdicts, etc on the free market;
the rules relating to kinship that prohibit the extension of favour to kin outside the sphere of family life;
and the rules governing the exercise of political power, and so forth. The Aspheres of justice@, according to
Walzer, include: membership itself (i.e. citizenship or community membership), security and welfare,
money and commodities, office, hard work, free time, education, kinship and love, divine grace,
recognition and political power.


11
Idem: pp 282 -- 284.


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For Walzer the recognition of different spheres and of the proper boundaries between spheres is a
necessary but not sufficient precondition for justice.
12
Walzer seems to postulate a positive relationship
between the number of distinct spheres a society recognizes and maintains and the likelihood that it will
be a just society. Intuitively this seems accurate. For example, a medieval society where the king=s
dominance extended over political power, wealth, choice of wives, the church and so forth, appears, to
the modern western eye at any rate, as more illiberal and unjust than a society where the ruler=s monopoly
is circumscribed, for example, by confining it to the sphere of politics. However, this example and the
conclusion drawn, may not be apposite from a Walzerian perspective, for Walzer seems to argue that the
illiberal monarchy will meet the Ainternal standards of justice@,
13
if all, or most of its members, accept as
just the unequal division of power, prerogatives and wealth.
14
The logic of Walzer=s theory demands that
one should accept this conclusion but it can certainly be called into question. Walzer argues that the
history and culture of a given society may have caused unequal distributions to be generally regarded as
just and hence, that it is just, because the distributive principles are in accord with the social meaning of
the goods to be distributed. But pulling this normative rabbit out of the empirical hat of shared
understandings leaves one with a sense of unease. Maybe the easiest resolution to this counterintuitive
dilemma is to assume, for the purposes of this thesis at any rate, that situations which appear unjust to us,
in all likelihood will, if tested properly, reveal that the necessary shared understandings do not prevail in
society at large. Whether it is a case of false consciousness or fear of reprisal or repression, one cannot
seriously accept that an Auntouchable@ will declare the caste system in India to be just. Even if he did so,
one may argue that for the untouchable to make an informed judgement on this matter, he or she must first
be provided with adequate resources to make an Aauthentic choice@ (see Chapter 8 on the issue of
Aauthentic choice@). By the same token, while it may have been that the most white South Africans
accepted apartheid=s distributive rules as just and that certain blacks concurred, a valid testing of the
populace at large would have shown that the majority of people did not share this understanding. The fact
that a powerful and despotic agency claims that something is just and supported by most people, does not
make it so B for it to be just, in the Walzerian sense, one will first have to determine (empirically) whether
most people indeed regard it as just, in which event it will be just with no further appeal possible to any
abstract notions of justice. A possible further solution to the problem is to make use of Walzer=s idea of a
Athin morality@, which peoples across cultures share and which he contrasts with the Athick morality@
members of the same community share.
15
Based on this contrast between the minimalist (or thin theory)
and the maximalist (or thick theory) one may postulate (I do not know whether Walzer would have agreed
with my extrapolation) that in a plural society, such as ours, a minimalist conception of justice between

12
AThe theory of justice is alert to differences, sensitive to boundaries. It doesn=t follow fromthe theory, however, that societies
are more just if they are more differentiated. J ustice simply has more scope in such societies, because there are more distinct goods, more
distributive principles, more agents, more procedures. And the more scope justice has, the more certain it is that complex equality will be the
formthat justice takes@ [Idem: p 315].
13
Walzer (1983); p 315.
14
Idem: pp 313 B 315.
15
Walzer M. (1994): Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, London: University of Notre Dame Press.


257
racial and ethnic groups is the best one can aspire to. From this postulate one may further conjecture that
in cases of great disparity between racial or ethnic groups in a particular sphere over the social meaning of
goods (and hence a great polarization of positions regarding the appropriate distributive rules to be
applied in that sphere), an egalitarian distribution should be the starting point with the onus on the
opponents of this to prove their case to the egalitarians.


10.3. COMMENTARY ON WALZER=S THEORY

10.3.1. Introduction

The idea that different goods should be distributed for different reasons, and that we should discourage
conversions between goods whose meanings are distinct, has a great deal of intuitive appeal, because
many examples of prohibited conversions already exist in societies. For instance, we do not allow the
selling or buying of votes or the commodification of public offices. Similarly, various goods, collectively
known as social welfare benefits, are distributed in accordance with different rules than those applicable
to ordinary commodities exchanged in the open market. For example, health care is distributed differently
from employment, and education is distributed differently from religion, and, furthermore, there is no
requirement that within any of these spheres, the distributive principles should result in equal allocations.
This much must be clear: although each sphere will be defined by a focal variable (e.g. health care or
education), nothing in Walzer=s theory prescribes that these variables, whatever they may be, must be
distributed equally, for the whole point of his notion of Acomplex equality@ is that the many inequalities
will result in complex or overall equality.
16
Likewise, the distributive rules applicable within the sphere of
the family are prohibited when applied in the sphere of public life or in the private sphere of employment:
favouring one=s children or siblings over outsiders in distributing family goods, such as love and affection
and the general means of living, within the family is allowed, even expected, whereas distributing goods
such as jobs in the spheres outside the family to those nearest to one, is either prohibited or at least
frowned upon as Anepotism@ or Afavouritism@.

Walzer=s work is remarkable for its commitment to actually trying to understand and describe the diverse
ways in which human lives are actually lived and in this sense comes nearest to the idea of value

16
Compare the following passage, especially the words I emphasised: AIf this is right, then we would have to pay a price for
complex equality: the refusal to assign the full range of social goods on the basis of a single talent or a single achievement, in the state or the
market or the arts and sciences, would deprive us of some great and glorious achievements. But it would also free us fromthe domination of
tyrannical selves. I suppose that tyrannical selves have a relatively easy time planning their careers. Unjust societies make for simplified
projects, since they hold forth the promise that success in winning one social good can be converted into general success B a triumphant
parade through all the spheres. But this triumph can only be achieved at the expense of other people seeking other, valued but non-dominant,
goods. A just society, by contrast, makes for complicated life plans, in which the self distributes itself, as it were, among the spheres,
figuring simultaneously as a loving parent, a qualified worker, a committed citizen, an apt student, a discerning critic, a faithful member of
the church, a helpful neighbor. No doubt, it is easy to imagine people distributing themselves in this way and earning, as it were, less
complementary adjectives. I mean only to argue that we are more likely to aimat these different qualities if we are sure that intrinsic or at
least different rewards are available for each of themCand no single convertible reward available for any one of them@ [Walzer (1994): pp 37
B 38]. Fromthe words in bold it is clear what Walzer had in mind: I may be a loving parent but an uncommitted citizen or an apathetic
member of my church while at the same time being an apt student. In a word, excelling in one sphere does not translate into excellence in
another sphere.


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pluralism (that is, the idea that society should be tolerant of different conceptions of the good). It treats
plurality of ends as a cornerstone of its theory, both in principle and in substance where other liberal
theories endorse it in a highly abstract form as of normative importance for a theory of justice. The
triumph of liberal western doctrines over that of communism and the increased affluence in the western
world and the concomitant ability of each person to give expression to individual choice, have attenuated
the idea of equality as an organizing principle, at any rate in its simple form. By proposing a theory that
explicitly focuses on the social meaning of institutions and diverse ways of life, Walzer tries to reconcile
the ideas of a plurality of choices with that of equality. His foundational premise is that it is the social
meanings attached to goods that determine their fair distributional rules. His historical methodology is
grounded in the notion that cultural interpretation is the best way to determine what will constitute social
justice for a specific culture, at a specific time and in respect of specific spheres of life lived in that
particular culture.

Despite its intuitive appeal, Walzer=s theory has attracted considerable critical comment, some of which is
attended to in the paragraphs that follow. In Section 10.3.2. I try to answer the question whether Walzer=s
complex equality is a feasible theory and I conclude that, while it may not be perfectly realizable, there is
enough evidence to at least point the way in which a society may move towards the Walzerian ideal. In
Section 10.3.3. the charge that Walzer=s theory espouses a type of moral relativism is discussed. I
conclude that Walzer cannot be interpreted to have meant that the community=s shared understanding is
the ultimate arbiter of moral worth and that a more proper interpretation will be to see Walzer as making
an appeal for cultural tolerance and against xenophobia and cultural superiority. Section 10.3.4. deals with
the value of membership to a community and concludes with the observation that social forces will
subvert efforts to erode cultural groups. The danger that money and commodities pose to the
independence of other spheres is the topic of Section 10.3.5. In the sphere of employment Walzer makes
an interesting distinction between petty bourgeoisie employment and employment in larger organizations.
These and other issues relating to the sphere of office and employment are covered in Section 10.3.6.. In
Section 10.3.7. I come to the conclusion that Walzer=s theory suffers from some incoherence in that
Walzer claims that complex equality avoids massive state intervention to preserve equality but that in
practice his theory may well require just such state intervention to protect the integrity of distinct spheres
of life. Section 10.3.8. deals with the important role that equal citizenship plays in Walzer=s conception of
equality as complex equality, and in Section 10.3.9. Walzer=s response to his critics is summarized.

10.3.2. Is It a Feasible Theory?

Rustin
17
questions whether Walzer=s idealist assumption that dominant spheres should not dominate
subordinate spheres, is tenable. For Rustin a theory of Acomplex inequality@ that gave proper recognition
to the fact that in all societies there are spheres that carry more weight, such as money, kinship or politics
that dominate other spheres and hence society as a whole, while showing how some autonomy could be

17
Rustin M.: AEquality in Post-Modern Times@, in David Miller & Michael Walzer (Eds), (1995): pp 17 -- 44.


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preserved for the other, non-dominant spheres, would have been a more useful approach to social justice.
For example, private property and wealth in capitalist societies dominate or distort the distributive rules
applicable to the sphere of health, rendering the normative criteria of health goods, an ambivalent mixture
of distributive rules based on individual need and as a legitimate object of commodity exchange. In a
capitalist society spheres are ranked in terms of their respective power to shape society and the dominance
of private property and wealth in this respect cannot be refuted. Neither can the recognition of boundaries
and blocked exchanges between spheres establish parity between competing spheres.
18



18
Idem: p 35.


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The critique therefore is that Walzer=s theory is based on unrealistic assumptions about social reality in
assuming that the dominance of certain goods may be tamed by keeping it in its appropriate cultural
corral. This is certainly true for society as it is at present, but ignores the fact that it is possible for
societies to change over time. This static model of society is refuted by many historical examples, such as
the disappearance of feudal lords and the hereditary power of royals. In the sphere of employment the
steady erosion of managerial prerogative, by limiting it to the sphere of employment,
19
is another
illustration that society does change its distributive rules to conform more closely with changes in societal
conceptions of justice. To state that societal institutions, as these are presently constituted, do not conform
to the Walzerian ideal is totally uninteresting, the interesting part is to assess how likely it is for society to
change in important respects to make it possible for Walzer=s model to become a reality. By necessity,
such a discussion will have to be culture- and sphere specific, for Walzer=s precepts dictate that one must
evaluate these matters in an historical and particularist manner. Taking the sphere of money (or
commodities) as an example, one may readily identify a number of instances where the present South
African government has strengthened the boundaries between, for example, the commodity sphere and the
spheres of education and health. In education, government funding of schools is strongly skewed in
favour of poor communities and schools are not allowed to turn a pupil away because of the inability of
his parents or guardian to pay the school fees. Measures such as these obviously do not obliterate the
influence of wealth in the sphere of education, but it does lessen, to some extent, the dominance of wealth
in that sphere. Who is to say that this process will not continue? Likewise, in the sphere of health,
government has, in the past, prohibited expensive operations in state hospitals and has, through
legislative measures, reduced the ability of medical aid schemes to control entry to their medical aid
schemes. Also, the rates for medical care at state hospitals had been reduced. Once again, these measures
are imperfect obstacles to the intrusion of wealth into the sphere of health, but it certainly may be
interpreted as the start of constructing a fence between the spheres of commodity and that of health. The
fact that the present fences and the guards patrolling these fences (for example the office of the auditor-
general and the Heath Commission) do not constitute impermeable barriers to the corrosive effects of
money, does not mean that it is impossible, over time, to strengthen these institutions. Note that I am not
saying that I necessarily agree with all the aspects of educational and health reform taking place in South
Africa, I am simply using these as examples of how fences may be (and are) erected between the sphere of
commodity and these two spheres. It is of course perfectly possible that the movement may be in the
opposite direction (i.e. to an increase rather than a decrease in the commodification of non-commodity
spheres). Who is to say whether the internet and other technologies may not have this effect (by, for
example, reducing central governments= ability to regulate private commercial activities)? We simply do
not know what the affects of these rapid technological changes will turn out to be (could the first users of
the printing press have foreseen what profound influence that technological advance will come to have on
societies world-wide?). I do not intend to pursue this point further, but I hope that the examples provided

19
In medieval times an employer was responsible for the physical, moral and religious well-being of the employee and therefore
was entitled to discipline employees for what he considered to be transgressions in these spheres. Modern labour law limits the employer=s
jurisdiction to the sphere of employment and generally outlaws any intrusions on the part of the employer into the employee=s activities in
the non-employment spheres.


261
illustrate the point that the status quo cannot be used as an adequate argument against the feasibility of
Walzer=s theory.

10.3.3. Moral Relativism and Complex Equality

Various writers accuse Walzer of propounding a form of moral skepticism and that it is wrong to infer
from the fact that something has social meaning, even if this meaning is widely accepted within a society,
that, because of its universal social endorsement, it is morally justified. The fact that a coherent caste
system exists and is supported by a community, does not automatically make it a morally just system
impervious to outside critique.
20


Carens and Rustin
21
accuse Walzer of professing to be a moral relativist but that in his practical examples
he uses universal/abstract normative arguments and principles in support of his theory. Chief amongst
these is Walzer=s assumption that all societies have distinct spheres and that this is therefore a universal
norm. My anthropological knowledge is inadequate, but I will be surprised if there does not exists a
society or a tribe somewhere which, maybe because of an extreme form of collectivism and communal
life, does not recognize distinct spheres.

20
Idem: pp 49 -- 51.
21
Rustin M.: AEquality in Post-Modern Times@, in David Millar and Michael Walzer (Eds) (1995): pp 17 B 44; and Carens J .:
AComplex J ustice, Cultural Difference, and Political Community@, in David Millar and Michael Walzer (Eds) (1995): pp 45 B 66.


262
The idea of moral relativism may be illustrated by the following example. I sometimes suspect that in
traditional African culture the meaning of holding political power differs from that of the traditional
western conception in that holding political office confers rights and duties on the incumbent that is much
nearer to that of a father or parent in the sphere of the family. A father has a duty to protect his family
members against outside dangers and must guard against a family member being excluded from the
family circle, even if that person has done something wrong. Now, if I am right about the traditional
African conception of being a political leader, this has obvious implications for what will be considered
the duties of a leader and what will constitute proper conduct by the leader B and these may, to the
western eye, border on nepotism, favouritism and a failure to exercise proper party discipline in the face
of transgressions by lesser political party functionaries. However, the social meaning of political power
and high office can only be determined by sociological and anthropological research and I admit that this
example is speculation on my part.
22
An example of the particularist nature of social meanings that is less
speculative, it being based on empirical research, is the following regarding the correlation between the
cultural variable Acollectivism@ and national wealth. Collectivism is one of the cultural variables which
differs systematically and significantly between different cultures and thus is used, together with other
significant discriminant variables, to define cultural distinctness. Of interest is that there seems to be a
strong positive correlation between the collectivism variable and national wealth.
23
But the more
interesting finding is the direction of causation rather the fact that these two variables tend to co-vary. It is
not the case, as libertarians would like to assert, that collectivistic values cause economic inefficiencies
whereas individualistic values and the business practices emanating from these result in economic
efficiencies, and therefore that it is a matter of mere common sense that individualistically inclined
cultures will generate more wealth than do collectivistic societies. The exact opposite is true: as a society=s
wealth increases, its members= value systems become more individualistic. It is wealth that causes
individualism rather than individualism that creates wealth. The members of poor communities are,
maybe as an expedient of daily survival, committed to collectivist values, whereas the members of
wealthy societies hold individualistic values. An agency analysis provides a ready answer to this counter-
intuitive empirical finding: the poor will hold more basic survival- related conceptions of the good and, as
rational agents will use those means best suited and available to them in pursuit of these ends, which more
often than not, will be that of comity and reciprocal and communal assistance to one another. This is the
best, if not the only, way that the end of survival can be pursued in a world of acute scarcity. Not so in the
case of the wealthy, where survival issues are not at stake. In this case the agent=s ends may be more

22
The following interesting analogous example is provided in the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: AAgainst this
background, it is possible to understand the ethical crises associated, on the one hand, with the growth of literacy, the development of the
African novel, and access to Western literary forms, and on the other, with urbanization and the growth of commodity production and wage
labour. Each of these changes contributes to undermining the compatibility of traditional ethical ideas of kinship and community and
contemporary practical life. The problemof political corruption in many African states has arisen in part fromthe fact that state officials in
the modern sector are paid salaries intended to support a family unit closer to a Euro-American nuclear model. These officials inherit
obligations to corporate groups, such as lineages and places of origin, that they cannot sustain. Similarly, the question of nepotismor
tribalismin the state bureaucracy should be seen in the context of a conflict between formal rights-based notions of the role of state agents
and traditional corporate obligations@ [Appiah K.A.: AEthical Systems, African@, in Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Edward Craig
(General Editor), New York: Routledge (1998), pp 430 B 435: pp 433 B 434].
23
Hofstede G.(1980): Culture=s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values, Newbury Park, California:
Sage Publications, Inc: pp 231 B 233.


263
directed towards individual self-realization rather than towards basic survival issues; ends that require, for
their most effective pursuit, maximum control over the use of resources directed at the individual=s
idiosyncratic conception of the good. For the rational and wealthy agent it simply would be counter to his
interests to support a social arrangement in which he must part with some of his resources for egalitarian
purposes, because this will diminish his ability to pursue his own ends. All this implies that the social
meaning of goods (and hence their appropriate or just distributive principles) may, and will, differ in
accordance with cultural values, such as the variable defined by the individualism-collectivism
continuum.

Carens also questions the appropriateness of Walzer=s critical judgements of historical societies:

AWalzers frequent use of historical examples evokes, without directly addressing, the question of
the relationship between contemporary moral standards and the past. One of Walzers goals
seems to be to make us aware of differences in social understandings of goods without arousing
the urge to judge these differences because moral criticism would be anachronistic.@
24


Against this charge of cultural particularity leading to moral skepticism, Stassen argues that critics who
accuse Walzer of moral skepticism misread Walzer.
25
According to Stassen, Walzer=s method of Adeep
interpretation@ is grounded transculturally by affirming two universal principles (mutual respect for all
persons and their communities and opposition to domination) and three universal sets of rights (right to
life, to liberty and to community, each in its positive as well as negative sense). Although the substantive
form and content in which these two principles and three rights are expressed may differ from society to
society, due to historical and cultural differences, their essence is present in all societies. Thus even if at a
particular time and historical moment in a society=s history, the majority of its members adhere to laws
and practices that are in breach of these transculturally valid norms, we can express judgement over the
justness of that society by reference to these norms. In this sense Walzer=s theory is not a morally
relativistic theory. Walzer=s idea of a thick and a thin morality may also be brought into play here (in the
following passage Walzer criticizes Asimple equality@):


24
Idem: p 58, n 15.
25
Stassen G.: AMichael Walzer=s Situated J ustice@, in Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1994: pp 375-399.


264
ANo one good rules over all the others, such that possessing it brings everything else in train. J ustice
requires the defense of difference B different goods distributed for different reasons among different groups
of peopleCand it is this requirement that makes justice a thick or maximalist moral idea, reflecting the ac-
tual thickness of particular cultures and societies. Simple and straightforward equality is a very thin idea,
reiterated in one form or another in (almost) every distributive system, and useful in the criticism of certain
gross injustices, but quite incapable of governing the full range of distributions. It serves more as a
constraint, a kind of critical minimalismCas when we say that someone is not being treated Alike a human
being@ or when we condemn racial discrimination. Any effort to enforce equality across the board is
immediately self-contradictory for the enforcement would require a radical concentration, and therefore a
radically unequal distribution, of political power. A simple and straightforward hierarchyCthe old over the
young, the educated over the ignorant, the well-born over the low-bornCmakes even more directly for
domination; it is simply the triumph of one good over all the others. Each of the goods that have shaped
conventional hierarchies can play its part in a complex distributive system: seniority in the management of
a factory or company, for example, learning in the organization of a school or academy, familial reputation
in the social register and the gossip column. But a society in which any one of these was effectively
dominant would be a one-dimensional, a frighteningly thin, society@.
26


Walzer cannot be interpreted to have meant that the community=s shared understanding is the ultimate
arbiter of moral worth, for such an interpretation will have Walzer endorsing the practices of Nazi
Germany or apartheid South Africa. A better interpretation will be to see Walzer as making an appeal for
cultural tolerance and against xenophobia and cultural superiority. Critics of Walzer frequently rely on his
statement that every Asubstantive account of distributive justice is a local account@,
27
to ascribe just such a
Asociety as moral supremist@ accusation against Walzer. However, these critics want to pull a normative
rabbit out of a descriptive hat. Having mistakenly concluded that Walzer=s theory will lead to
unacceptable consequences they ascribe normative value to what is an unexceptional observation. They
are correct in the limited sense that Walzer does say that we cannot start with absolute universal norms for
distributive justice, because there are none. But his starting place, Athe local account@ is not the final
destination. Starting with the particular account of distributive justice held by a specific community,
nothing in what Walzer says limits us in accepting that account as the morally correct or final account. At
most Walzer can be read as warning us to respect diverse accounts of distributive justice and to afford
them at least presumptive moral validity.

Support for the interpretation that Walzer does not rule out universal norms, may be found in the
cautionary footnote he appended to the previously cited sentence:

AAt the same time, it may be the case, ... that certain internal principles, certain conceptions of social goods,
are reiterated in many, perhaps in all, human societies. That is an empirical matter. It cannot be determined
by philosophical argument among ourselves B nor even by philosophical argument among some ideal
version of ourselves.@
28


One could of course quibble that this does not qualify as a universal norm because it derives its

26
Walzer (1994): pp 32 B 33.
27
Walzer (1983): p 314.
28
Idem: p 314.


265
justification from an empirical rather than a normative base. However, following Rawls=s technique of
reflective equilibrium it is difficult to envisage a situation where a person could convincingly argue that,
despite universal adherence, something is normatively abhorrent. Maybe this is putting it too strongly, for
as it stands, this view will cloth slavery in moral respectability in a world where slavery is universally
endorsed and practised as morally right. A more defensible principle would be that it would be very
difficult, given such empirical circumstances, to show, by way of reflective equilibrium, that the practice
of slavery is morally wrong.

10.3.4. The Value of Community

Walzer attributes to persons the right of membership, which, in its negative form, is the right not to be
excluded or deprived of community, and in its positive form, expresses the right of persons to establish
and preserve distinct communities that command the respect and recognition of others. From this it
follows that particular historical communities have a positive right to preserve their ways of life and
shared understandings, which is likened to an individual=s consent and must be respected as such.
29

Walzer in fact says that we are one another=s equals because we are all

Aculture-producing creatures; we make and inhabit meaningful worlds@,

and that

Awe do justice to actual men and women by respecting their particular creations ... J ustice is rooted in the
distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts, that constitute a shared way of life. To
override those understandings is (always) to act unjustly.@
30


Walzer therefore affords priority to the value of community and gives a number of reasons for doing so,
some of which are:

(i) That distributive justice depends on the existence of Aindependent cities or countries
capable of arranging their own patterns of division and exchange ...@.
31


(ii) AThe primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human
community@.
32



29
Stassen (1994): pp 375-399: p 384.
30
Walzer (1983): p 314.
31
Idem: p 31.
32
Op cit.


266
(iii) The choice of membership structures determines Aall our other distributive choices: ...
with whom we make those choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes,
to whom we allocate goods and services@.
33


Of particular interest is Walzer=s argument that at some level, be it state or local, communities
will exercise an admissions policy. Indeed, if the state does not fulfil this function the local
community will, for


33
Op cit.


267
Athe distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure, and, without it, cannot be conceived as a
stable feature of human life.@
34


This insight into the importance of cultural communities is of particular importance in plural societies,
such as ours. It implies that social forces will undermine any efforts to erode cultural distinctiveness,
which at best, if it were successful, would yield deracinated individuals. As Stassen puts it:

A[P]olitical scientists have learned that neighborhoods demand their own distinctive community and that
such distinctiveness depends on restricted membership. If the state does not restrict immigration,
neighborhoods will B thus becoming ethnic, class, or religious ghettoes.@
35


10.3.5. Money and Commodities

Provided that effective blocks are in place, Walzer does not regard the unequal distribution of money and
commodities as unjust in itself:

AOnce we have blocked every wrongful exchange and controlled the sheer weight of money itself, we have
no reason to worry about the answers the market provides ... given the right blocks, there is no such thing as
a maldistribution of consumer goods. It just doesn=t matter, from the standpoint of complex equality, that
you have a yacht and I don=t, or that the sound system of her hi-fi set is greatly superior to his, or that we
buy our rugs from Sears Roebuck and they get theirs from the Orient. People will focus on such matters, or
not: that is a question of culture, not of distributive justice. So long as yachts and hi-fi sets and rugs have
only use value and individualized symbol value, their unequal distribution doesn=t matter.@
36


Barry, while being critical of Walzer=s depiction of the social origins of the criteria for distribution in the
sphere of money, endorses the importance that social meanings can play in determining the just
distributions in other spheres. However, according to Barry, the social meaning of goods is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for determining the just distribution of goods even in these cases.
37


However, for Walzer=s conception of justice it is crucial that social and political arrangements should

34
Idem: p 39.
35
Stassen (1994): p 387.
36
Walzer (1983): pp 107 B 108.
37
Barry B.: ABook Review: Intimations of J ustice@, in Columbia Law Review Vol. 84, 1984, pp 806-815: pp 810 B 812.


268
block money=s domination of other spheres. J ustice (and liberty) requires that other spheres be protected
against the tyranny of money:

AA radically laissez-faire economy would be like a totalitarian state, invading every other sphere,
dominating every other distributive process.@
38



38
Walzer (1983): p 119.


269
Where the accumulation of money in the hands of one institution, such as in the commodities market,
becomes so vast that individuals cannot be said to bargain freely and fairly as equals, Walzer proposes a
number of measures to guard the right to liberty: the welfare state must guarantee the basic needs of life;
union organization and collective bargaining must be promoted and protected by the law; powerful
corporations
39
must be subjected to some form of democratic participation in decision-making;
40
a
progressive income tax scheme may be needed; and a limit placed on the inheritance of large fortunes.
41

These Walzerian prescriptions for a more just society is strongly reminiscent of Rawls=s argument that the
concentration of vast wealth in a few hands distorts the democratic process. Dworkin also points out that a
comprehensive theory of equality of resources will have to incorporate an account of the political process
and the legal system.
42
However, like Rawls and Dworkin, I do not propose to go into these matters in the
presentation of the CEOP model, although I accept the validity of their comments in this regard.

10.3.6. The Sphere of Office or Employment

Walzer argues that in Western cultures the social understanding of the distribution of jobs is that this must
be done in accordance with a person=s ability to do the job. He argues this on the basis of human needs
having to do with life goods and self-respect: (i) the needs of Aconsumers of goods and services who

39
When corporations become so huge that they exercise an illegitimate kind of power over the lives of their employees and their
fellow citizens, they are no longer called private commodities, >any more than the irrigation systemof the ancient Egyptians, the roads of the
Romans or the Incas, the cathedrals of medieval Europe, or the weapons of a modern army are called commodities, for they generate a kind
of power that lifts themout of the economic sphere=@ [Stassen (1994): p 391; the quotation cited by Stassen is fromWalzer (1983): p 122].
40
Walzer justifies workplace democracy in terms of our understanding of power. For a critique of this defence of workplace
democracy, see: Cohen J .: ABook Review: Spheres of J ustice: A Defense of Pluralismand Equality@, in The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 83,
1986, pp 457-468: p 465.
41
Walzer (1983): pp 119 B 127.
42
Dworkin (2000): pp 65 B 66.


270
depend upon the competence of office holders@
43
; and (ii) the need for self-respect, which depends on job
incumbents to have been selected for a job Abecause they really possess ... the talents ... necessary to the
office.@
44


Walzer makes a telling distinction between Aoffices@ and Apetty bourgeoisie employment@. The former is
restricted to employment in large institutions where the relationship between employee and employer is
formal and impersonal, as opposed to the small family type of business or small shop or service. Walzer
first cautions generally that in the sphere of offices:

AThe inevitable tendency of all efforts to achieve political control and equality of opportunity is to reinforce
and enhance centralized power. As in the other areas of social life, the attempt to defeat tyranny raises the
spectre of new tyrannies.@
45


43
Idem: p 131.
44
Idem: p 152.
45
Idem: p 160.



271
He secondly argues that equality of opportunity should not be imposed on the petty bourgeoisie type of
employment, firstly because it is impractical; secondly it would require too much centralized control; and
lastly, it would entail too much stifling of liberty in relation to the small gain in equality of life goods.
46

Furthermore:

AWe should not prohibit small businesses from hiring friend and family; neither should we prevent
commune-based factories from favouring relatives, friends, members of this or that ethnic, religious, or
political group B because they are choosing not merely workers but members of their community.@
47


Lastly, speaking of the American society, Walzer argues that while affirmative action is in accord with
their social understanding and history, the imposition of quotas would not be, for it would violate rights.
48

49
This is an interesting observation in that one may speculate to what extent this shared social meaning of
the good of jobs, is mirrored in contemporary South African society. Certainly it seems likely that our
Courts will find that a strict quota system will amount to unfair discrimination, for, given our history, a
resurrection of the much hated Ajob reservation@, albeit in favour of the previously disadvantaged, is
unthinkable. It is also almost certain that the purpose of the legislator in passing the Employment Equity
Act, Act 55 of 1998, was not to allow for quotas. However, as remarked previously, the Walzerian logic
requires of us to assess the widely held shared understanding and not be satisfied by the ipse dixit of
agencies of authority, such as Parliament and the courts. My informal observations lead me to suspect that
one may find considerable support amongst the previously disadvantaged for the notion that the strongest
forms of affirmative action measures, such as quota systems, are just because of our apartheid past. I do
not agree with this normative claim, but leave this topic here, it falling to be decided by the political
process, the courts= determination of the boni mores of society and primarily by empirical research.

10.3.7. The Coherence of Complex Equality as a Conception of Equality


46
Idem: p 161.
47
Stassen (1994): p 392.
48
Walzer=s discussion of quotas is on pp 148 B 154 [Walzer (1983)].
49
On Ahard work@, see Walzer (1983): Chapter 6; and Stassen (1994): pp 393 B 394.


272
Barry
50
argues, first of all, that if it is true that Aonce the meaning of a good has been established, the
appropriate criteria of distribution follow directly@, then justice is consistent with any distribution of
money, because the meaning of money carries no implications for its just distribution.
51
Barry=s critique
on this score is mistaken, for while Walzer will agree with him that money has no distributive criterion,
this is to miss the point; what is wrong with money, is not its unequal distribution, but the fact that it is
allowed to migrate from the sphere of commodities to other spheres, such as the political sphere.

Barry further charges Walzer that his theory is incoherent because it professes not to use universal
abstractions. But his two ideas (that separate spheres and meaning determines distributive justice) may be
subversive of each other in that it may be that some tribe=s meaning of justice requires a single sphere.
This will lead to the idea that separate spheres must be a universal abstraction, something that Walzer
would not like to admit.
52


Thirdly, Barry rejects Walzer=s theory as Aself-refuting@ for holding that there can be no such thing as
international distributive justice, while the world is manifestly unjustly divided between rich and poor
countries, with the former consuming the vast majority of goods while the latter=s inhabitants go without
the most basic necessities of life.
53


It has to be admitted that complex equality, as exemplified by Walzer=s open-ended distributive principle,
has no obvious egalitarian content.
54
Swift discusses four possible meanings of Aequality@ that can be
derived from Walzer=s Spheres of Justice:
55


(i) The notion of equal respect for the capacity of all human beings to create culture.
56


(ii) The notion that equality is to be equated with the absence of domination.
57


50
Barry B.: ASpherical J ustice and Global Injustice@, in Miller & Walzer (Eds), (1995): pp 67-80.
51
Idem: pp 67 -- 70.
52
Idem: pp 72 -- 75.
53
Idem: p 79.
54
Swift A.: AThe Sociology of Complex Equality@, in Miller & Walzer (Eds) (1995), pp 253 -- 280: p 256.
55
Idem: p p 256 B 261.
56
Based on the following quote fromSpheres of Justice: ABy virtue of what characteristics are we one anothers equals? One
characteristic above all is central to my argument. We are (all of us) culture-producing creatures; we make and inhabit meaningful worlds.
Since there is no way to rank and order these worlds with regard to their understanding of social goods, we do justice to actual men and
women by respecting their particular creations. And they claimjustice, and resist tyranny, by insisting on the meaning of social goods
among themselves. J ustice is rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts, that constitute a shared way of
life. To override those understandings is (always) to act unjustly@ [Walzer (1983): p 314)].


273

57
AThe root meaning of equality is negative; egalitarianismin its origins is an abolitionist politics. It aims at eliminating not all
differences but a particular set of differences, and a different set in different times and places. Its targets are always specific: aristocratic
privilege, capitalist wealth, bureaucratic power, racial or sexual supremacy. In each of these cases, however, the struggle has something like
the same form. What is at stake is the ability of a group of people to dominate their fellows. Its not the fact that there are rich and poor that
generates egalitarian politics but the fact that the rich >grind the faces of the poor=, impose their poverty upon them, command their
deferential behavior. Similarly, its not the existence of aristocrats and commoners or of office holders and ordinary citizens (and certainly
not the existence of different races or sexes) that produces the popular demand for the abolition of social and political difference; its what
aristocrats do to commoners, what office holders do to ordinary citizens, what people with power do to those without it. The experience of
subordinationCof personal subordination, above allClies behind the vision of equality. Opponents of the vision often claimthat the
animating passions of egalitarian politics are envy and resentment, and its true enough that such passions fester in every subordinate group.
To some extent they will shape its politics: thus the >crude communism= that Marx described in his early manuscripts, and which is nothing
but the enactment of envy.

But envy and resentment are uncomfortable passions; no one enjoys them; and I think it is accurate to say that
egalitarianismis not so much their acting out as it is a conscious attempt to escape the condition that produces them. Or that makes them
deadlyCfor there is a kind of envy that lies, so to speak, on the surface of social life and has no serious consequences. I may envy my
neighbors green thumb or his rich baritone voice or even his ability to win the respect of our mutual friends, but none of this will lead me to
organize a political movement. The aimof political egalitarianismis a society free fromdomination. This is the lively hope named by the
word equality: no more bowing and scraping, fawning and toadying; no more fearful trembling; no more high-and-mightiness; no more
masters, no more slaves. It is not a hope for the elimination of differences; we dont all have to be the same or have the same amounts of the
same things. Men and women are one anothers equals (for all important moral and political purposes) when no one possesses or controls the
means of domination. But the means of domination are differently constituted in different societies. Birth and blood, landed wealth, capital,
education, divine grace, state powerCall these have served at one time or another to enable some people to dominate others. Domination is
always mediated by some set of social goods. Though the experience is personal, nothing in the persons themselves determines its character.
Hence, again, equality as we have dreamed of it does not require the repression of persons. We have to understand and control social goods;
we do not have to stretch or shrink human beings@ [Walzer (1983): pp xii B xiii].


274
(iii) Miller=s idea that complex equality is best understood as equality of status.

(iv) Swift=s idea that goods should be commensurable, in opposition to Miller=s premise, in
the sense that a high ranking in one distributional sphere can be offset by a low ranking
in another distributional sphere. The idea being that there will be a low correlation
between rankings in different spheres if distributional autonomy is preserved.
58


Swift also argues that advantages are inherently convertible:
59
AIf advantage is Protean, then the
task of fettering it is Sisyphean.@
60
Therefore, the regulation of the conversion of advantages
through commodification and individual freedom, would need massive state intervention to
block conversions.
61
For example, restrictions will have to be tightened on the ownership and
transfer of newspapers and other forms of mass media; donations to political parties and the
permissible amounts that these parties may spent on campaigns will have to be regulated; private
schools and the amounts spend by parents on the education of their children will have to be
strictly circumscribed; and so on and so forth. The fact that in some countries legislation with the
aim of regulating some of these transfers from one sphere to another (for instance donations to
political parties and caps on campaign spending) already exists, does not alter the fact that such
legislation (and the regulating authorities necessary to ensure compliance) amounts to state

58
AImagine now a society in which different social goods are monopolistically heldCas they are in fact and always will be,
barring continual state interventionCbut in which no particular good is generally convertible. As I go along, I shall try to define the precise
limits on convertibility, but for now the general description will suffice. This is a complex egalitarian society. Though there will be many
small inequalities, inequality will not be multiplied through the conversion process. Nor will it be summed across different goods, because
the autonomy of distributions will tend to produce a variety of local monopolies, held by different groups of men and women. I dont want to
claimthat complex equality would necessarily be more stable than simple equality, but I aminclined to think that it would open the way for
more diffused and particularized forms of social conflict. And the resistance to convertibility would be maintained, in large degree, by
ordinary men and women within their own spheres of competence and control, without large-scale state action@ [Walzer (1983): p 17].
59
Swift (1995), pp 253 -- 280: p p 261 B 267.
60
Idem: p 263.
61
Idem: pp 266 B 267.


275
interference in the private sphere. In this sense, Walzer=s theory is incoherent because it purports
to prevent direct state intervention in the distribution of social goods, yet, if Swift is correct, his
theory will require considerable and ongoing state intervention.

10.3.8. Complex Equality and Equal Citizenship

Miller shows the pivotal role that the notion of Aequal citizenship@ plays in Walzer=s theory.
According to Miller, Walzer regards citizenship as much more than merely a formal status. The
notion that everyone has some say, however small, in one or another sphere, should engender
some sense of equal citizenship in the individual. This conclusion is based on the assumption that
if complex equality prevails each person will enjoy a relatively high rank in one or more sphere
while ranking relatively low in others, and the fact that an individual has this high status in at
least some social institutions will engender a sense of participation in, and being a valued
member of, civil society. Now, because, under complex equality, individuals= differential
rankings in different spheres will cancel each other out, so that their aggregate standing in
society will be equal, they should have a sense that they are equal citizens. In contrast, under
simple equality, the oppressed and disadvantaged are uniformly oppressed and at a disadvantage
across spheres, which leads to alienation from civil society and a sense of being not valued as a
citizen. This value, of providing everyone with some sense of equal citizenship, guides us
towards preserving as many distinct spheres of justice as possible (because the more spheres
there are the greater is the scope of complex equality to flourish), and to promote those spheres
which are in danger of disappearing from social life.
62
An example of what Miller has in mind
could be the disappearance of the National Symphony Orchestra in February 2000, owing to the
withdrawal of funding by the SABC. Certainly the supporters of classical music may feel that
they are being marginalized by this move. If we allow medical treatment to become a commodity
like any other (for example, by allowing private hospitals), we are enlarging the market economy
as a sphere of life while diminishing another sphere (in our example, the provision of public
health care services). On the other hand, if we recognize medicine as a good to be provided on
the basis of need outside the market economy, we reinforce equal citizenship between persons
who may be highly unequal in the market sphere. Miller suggests:

AWe may appeal to the principle of citizenship in cases where goods already have distributive criteria
attached to them, but these criteria are in dispute: some people favour one mode of distribution, others
another B or perhaps all of us feel some pull in both directions and are unsure about the right answer. In
these circumstances it makes sense to take a broader view, to ask not only >how will implementing different

62
Miller D.: AIntroduction@, in Miller & Walzer (Eds), (1995), pp 1 -- 16: p 12.


276
answers to that question influence our standing as equal citizens=.@
63


Swift argues that status as a citizen may be universally accepted as the basis for equal distribution of some
goods, thereby offsetting the distribution of resources resulting from the occupational structure of
society.
64
Scales of occupational status represent people=s synthetic judgements about the general
desirability of occupations: standard of living; power and influence over other people; level of
qualifications; and value to society:
65


A[W]idespread agreement that occupational prestige is not autonomous of the distribution of material
resources in society.@
66


63
Idem: p 13.
64
Swift (1995): pp 275 B 280.
65
Idem: p 270.
66
Idem: p 271.



277
The question is whether those aspects of a job that are rewarded with prestige can be separated from those
that receive more material returns. In the Eastern Bloc countries this was done to some extent by
importing the idea of Avalue to society@: manual labour was needed and was ideologically praised, but it
also attracted rewards (if not money, then other material rewards).
67


Swift seems to indicate that citizenship should qualify one for substantive material rewards, and cites the
opinion that support for this view can be found in Rawls=s theory, presumably in the priority of certain
basic primary goods. However, we must take into account the issue of relativities when formulating a
policy to regulate the public provision of certain goods to persons qua citizens. Does the fact that a person
uses his market power to procure for himself more of a particular Acitizen good@, mean that others are
denied that which they are entitled to as citizens?
68
Swift uses the example of equality of opportunity as
such a citizen good. In the case of education, the ability to buy better education may be objected to on the
basis that equal education is closely linked to equality of opportunity. On the other hand, no such close
link exists between health services and equality of opportunity and hence no such objection can be raised
if a particular individual were to buy additional health care over and above that what he is entitled to by
virtue of his citizenship.
69
Swift would therefore block the conversion of market power or advantage into
educational advantage. Swift would restrict Walzer=s

A... quite general claim about the injustice of conversions to cases where to permit them would be to deny
the equality of people as citizens.@
70


But what goods can be identified for this (apart from the rights mentioned by Rawls)?

67
Idem: pp 272 B 275.
68
Idem: pp 279 B 280.
69
Swift attaches two conditions to this: first, the assumption is that health care is a resource whose supply is not restricted so that
me buying more health care does not reduce the provision of public health care services to others by virtue of their citizenship rights; and,
secondly, that the provision of private (or commodified) health care services should not result in the deterioration of public health care
services over time. He suggests that should this happen, it would be justified to force the better off to participate in the public health care
system, if this is the only way of ensuring that citizenship needs are properly met [Swift, in Miller & Walzer (1995): p 280, notes 34 and 35].
70
Idem: p 280.


278

10.3.9. Walzer=s Reply to His Critics

In replying to some of the criticisms levelled at his theory, Walzer raises the following points:
71



71
Walzer M.: AResponse@, in Miller & Walzer (Eds), (1995): pp 281-297.
(a) Walzer argues that complex equality is future-directed, rather than an ideal for the here-
and-now. In present societies simple equality is the logical answer due to historical unfair
discrimination which gave rise to present inequalities. However, this does not mean that
we should not strive to reform our political and social institutions to prevent or reduce
the dominance of one sphere over another.



279
(b) In defending complex inequality against the notion of simple equality, Walzer points out
that in the latter the same people win out in every sphere for the same reason, while in
the former the same people may also win out in every sphere but for different reasons. If,
in complex equality a underclass will develop then it will be because they had a fair
chance in every sphere but were rejected in every sphere without having been
discriminated against. The present underclass bears no resemblance to this hypothetical
group of people, because of the pernicious effects of racism and sexism, amongst other
things.
72


(c) Morality has a role to play in distributive justice in that it sets the basic parameters within
which distributions take place, but in a moderating way, rather than being directly
implicated as a distributive justice principle. For example, the idea of individual
responsibility will play an important role in the sphere of criminal justice distribution but
not in the sphere of health care [i.e. although a person may be responsible for his own
illness he will nevertheless still receive health care].

(d) Walzer argues that an historical account of the development of society will show that
complex equality should at least be considered as a plausible alternative to simple
equality as a social ideal.
73
It is only when we include other values in our conception of

72
Idem: pp 290-291.
73
AI aminclined to think that Michael Rustin is right to argue that the theory of complex equality needs, and lends itself to, a
historical account of social differentiation. He is not suggesting that we repeat the progressist and Marxist mistake of valuing the future
because it is, or will be, there. Indeed, on some accounts, we are moving toward a less differentiated society where numeral literacy and
technical intelligence, and the education that provides or certifies them, will dominate over all other talents and goods. The point of a Rustin-


280
distributive justice, such as freedom, mutual respect for each other and our different
cultural communities and needs, that complex equality can be realized fully:




like story would be to show how complex equality arises out of or fails because of actual social processes and conflicts. Its categories reflect
real talk in the real world, and their use requires us to take sides in actual conflicts. Complex equality answers to questions asked with
increasing urgency in the course of modern history. Certainly, it seemed for a long time (and the case might still be made) that social
differentiation was the decisive fact about modernity. It would be possible to give a historical account of each of the spheres along these
lines: the liberation of the market fromreligious control (the just price, the ban on usury) and political control (mercantilism), the separation
of workplace and household (the factory system), the walling off of church and state (religious toleration, autonomy of politics), the creation
of independent schools and universities (academic freedom), the barring of kinship considerations (nepotism) fromprofessional life and the
civil service, the ban on the sale of offices and public services (simony, bribery), and so on. It is important to stress that none of these were
absolute achievements; nor can they plausibly be described as a simple linear process. But they do hang together so as to constitute a
recognizable way of life, within which men and women inhabit many different spheres, adapting themselves to different roles, observing
different rules, exercising different talents, even fashioning different identities. Hence, at least, the possibility of complex equality. ... Merit
may well be the coming distributive principle, the goods that it best fits increasingly dominant over all others. And the local inequalities that
differentiation allows are large enough and significant enough right now to make simple equality an entirely comprehensible choice.
Complexity also has to be a choice, which is why I have treated its historical examples as exemplary rather than directional in character.
None the less, the history that Rustin would tell is the history of our way of life, and it can also be read as the gradual enactment of a set of
values that we have good reasons to defend: freedom, individual autonomy, mutual respect, something like Millers equality of status, and
pluralismitself, which seems to me the condition of all the others. It is when we reflect on distributive justice in its largest sense, and on the
values that we would like to see realized in all the spheres, that complex equality comes into its own@ [Idem: pp 296-297].


281
AIt is when we reflect on distributive justice in its largest sense, and on the values that we would
like to see realized in all the spheres, that complex equality comes into its own.@
74



10.4. WALZER CONTRA RAWLS

Like Sen, Walzer clearly had liberal theories in general,
75
and Rawls=s theory in particular, in mind in
much of what he wrote and in the development of his theory of complex equality. It is therefore
instructive to look at some of the similarities and differences between the two theories. These are listed
below, followed by some commentary.

(a) First of all, Walzer can be distinguished from the other communitarian
76
critiques of
Rawls in that his critique is goods-based rather than being directed at Rawls=s purported
mistaken conception of the person and the person=s relation to his community.

74
Idem: p 297.
75
I should hasten to add that Walzer cannot be regarded as Aanti-liberal@, as is clear fromthe following comments by Mulhall and
Swift: AIf anything, what emerges is an impeccably liberal emphasis upon the need to respect alien cultures and to give priority to persuasion
rather than force when political disputes arise C an attempt to create a space for tolerance without allowing that tolerance to paralyse action
on truly fundamental matters@ [Mulhall & Swift (1994): p 146]; and AIt may, however, be worth pointing out that Walzers criticisms of
Rawls do not entail that he opposes liberalismper se, or at least does not entail that he is hostile to certain central strands of typically liberal
political thinking. Walzer is clearly opposed to political theories that give undue emphasis to enshrining individual rights in law in a way
that seriously encroaches upon the democratic process; and in so far as the Rawlsian emphasis upon primary goods is a manifestation of the
general liberal attempt to be maximally neutral between competing conceptions of the good, Walzer is opposed to that attempt. On the other
hand, his demand that the political theorist attend to the particularity of social meanings reflects a commitment to the values of tolerance and
respect for alien cultures that is impeccably liberal; and in so far as liberal ideas and values have permeated the institutions and practices of
our society, then a Walzerian respect for the social meanings that our goods now carry may well result in recognizably liberal conclusions.
After all, although his emphasis upon preventing conversions between goods seems to conflict with Rawlss attempt to give absolute priority
to individual freedom, the general idea of a separation of spheres has a respectable liberal ancestry. It is, after all, liberals who are keen to
insist on the separation, and separability, of church and state, of the economic and the political, and, more generally, of private and public@
[Mulhall & Swift (1994): p 155].
76
But see text below, where I point out that Walzer=s Acommunitarianism@ is of a special kind.


282
Nevertheless, Walzer=s focus on goods and their appropriate distributive principles does
involve

Aa claim about the importance of the community as the repository of value and thus, implicitly,
about the priority of the community over the individual; and the key elements of his critique can
be restated in terms that relate them more directly to a conception of the person and of what is in
their interests or constitutes their well-being. Moreover, it will also become clear that the
presuppositions of Rawlss approach to distributive matters to which Walzer takes exception are
in fact a consequence of the distinctive Rawlsian concern for the freedom of the individual -- as
epitomized in his prohibition on the invocation of conceptions of the good in the sphere of
politics.@
77



77
Mulhall & Swift (1994): p 129.


283
(b) Secondly, Walzer rejects Rawls=s methodology as being too abstract
78
to account for the
cultural meaning of goods. Walzer rejects Rawlss conception of primary goods, because:
(i) the Rawlsian list of >basic goods that can be applied cross-culturally fails to respect
cultural difference and seeks an abstraction from meaning that renders goods
meaningless; and (ii) this list ignores the fact that even within the same cultural
community, different goods should be distributed for different reasons.

(c) Thirdly, for Walzer, unlike Rawls, the case for the welfare state begins with a theory of
membership, not rights:

AWelfare rights are fixed only when a community adopts some program of mutual provision.
There are strong arguments to be made that, under given historical conditions, such- and-such a
program should be adopted. But these are not arguments about individual rights; they are
arguments about the character of a particular political community.@
79


(d) In the fourth place, Walzer=s conception of the person differs markedly from that of
Rawls and provides the basis from which to see how his approach to equality differs from
that of Rawls:

ABy virtue of what characteristics are we one anothers equals? One characteristic above all is central to my
argument. We are (all of us) culture-producing creatures; we make and inhabit meaningful worlds. Since
there is no way to rank and order these worlds with regard to their understanding of social goods, we do
justice to actual men and women by respecting their particular creations. And they claim justice, and resist
tyranny, by insisting on the meaning of social goods among themselves. J ustice is rooted in the distinct
understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts, that constitute a shared way of life. To override
those understandings is (always) to act unjustly.@
80


78
A... what he identifies in Rawls and condemns in general is any mode of political theorizing that fails to pay attention to the
cultural particularity of the contexts within which such theorizing must have application. In brief, it is Rawlss emphasis upon primary goods
and the resulting appearance of universal scope attaching to his conclusions that falls foul of Walzers claimthat any theory of justice must
base itself upon a careful reading of the particular social meanings of the goods whose distribution is at issue, on pain both of failing to
respect democratic values and of failing to be utilizable in any concrete social circumstances@ [Idem: p 154].

79
Walzer: AWelfare, Membership and Need@, in Sandel (Ed) (1984): Liberalism and Its Critics, pp 200 B 218: p 204.
80
Walzer (1983): p 314.


284

Under point one I grouped Walzer together with the communitarian school of thought. This classification
needs clarification because in certain respects Walzer may be viewed as being more of a liberal (or even a
libertarian) than a communitarian. Walzer=s communitarianism resides in the emphasis that he places on
community values and cultural variables as the arbitrators of the social meaning of goods. In this sense,
the community is prior to the individual and hence Walzer=s classification as a communitarian.
Additionally, Walzer=s emphasis on the particularity of social meanings and his consequent rejection of
highly abstract notions of justice align him with the communitarian school. However, in his understanding
of sphere-specific equality, Walzer=s liberalism comes to the fore. Once the social meaning of goods has
determined the distributive rules appropriate for a particular sphere, the individual=s autonomy and
rationality is given free reign and inequalities resulting for this must be tolerated. On a different
interpretation one may argue that this Aliberalism@ is rather superficial because the rules within which
inequalities are permitted are embedded in cultural meanings and shared understandings, which once
again lead to the conclusion that the community is prior to the individual and that Rawls=s individuated
self, unencumbered by social and cultural baggage, cannot easily find a home in Walzer=s conception of
justice.

In summary, one may say that Walzer and Rawls has this in common: both support the idea that basic
civil and political rights and liberties should be equally distributed; both argue that the principle of equal
opportunity should regulate the distribution of jobs; both support the principle that educational
opportunities should not be dependent for its distribution on the arbitrary variables of the circumstances of
birth and the natural lottery but should be allocated on the basis of capacity to benefit from it; and both
oppose the concentration of wealth on the basis that this may lead to distortions of the political in a
democracy.
81
Where Walzer and Rawls differ is that Rawls is able, because of the level of abstraction of
his theory, to advance principles (such as the difference principle) of justice that may be justified and
articulated without recourse to controversial sociological assumptions which can only be verified by
extensive empirical research. I am not sure that this fact necessarily reflects negatively on Walzer=s theory
because the price one has to pay for moving from the more abstract to the more particularist is exactly that
one has to abandon the purity of normative reasoning for the confusing and often contradictory world of
the sociological. Rawls avoids this sociological swamp by deftly announcing that the appropriate time to
deal with these issues is at the constitutional, legislative and administrative phases respectively. Walzer, in
contrast, endeavours to work from the start with a thick conception of the good and this unavoidably
makes his theory vulnerable to sociological doubts and attack. However, one may be pretty sure that had
Rawls ventured beyond the abstraction of the agreement reached in the original position, he would have
encountered similar problems of an empirical nature. When the normative blends with the empirical
things become messy and a theorist who dare to venture that far should accept that doubts regarding the
feasibility and coherence of his theory come with the terrain. Certainly Walzer=s theory is in need of some
refinement and much sociological backing but this does not mean that he did not make a valuable

81
Also see Barry, in Miller & Walzer (1995): p 79.


285
contribution to our understanding of what it means to hold that a distributive scheme in a particular
context is just or unjust. First amongst these is the valuable insight that no single set of distributive rules
are appropriate in all of life=s domains and the awareness that what may be regarded as just in one society
may be viewed as unjust in another.






10.5. EQUALITY IN WALZER=S THEORY OF COMPLEX EQUALITY

10.5.1. Walzer=s Conception of Complex Equality

Theories of justice typically try to identify some fundamental principle or principles animating our
considered judgements that a particular political and social arrangement is just or unjust. These principles
are frequently described in abstract terms and by implication their presumptive applicability is of a
universal nature. Examples of such Auniversal@ or Afoundational@ principles are: Aequal treatment@ [persons
are treated justly when they are all given equal consideration by some agency]; Adesert@ [persons are
treated justly if their respective rewards are proportional to their respective degrees of desert, however this
may be determined]; and Aindividual rights@ [persons are treated justly if a listed number of inalienable
rights are equally recognized for all]. We are then asked to evaluate the justness of a particular action or
arrangement by assessing the degree to which it conforms to the precepts dictated by the fundamental
principle of choice.

Walzer=s theory of justice is developed in a very different way. It does not rely on one or two principles,
but is radically pluralistic and rejects the notion that principles of justice are capable of universal
application. Instead, we must consider justice within the context of a particular community and time and
the meaning that justice has for that community at that time. In addition to the plurality of conceptions of
justice between different societies or cultures, there is also a plurality of conceptions of justice within a
specific community, derived from the different meanings a community attaches to different social goods
the community produces and distributes. For example, the principles governing the distribution of
resources to health care may differ from the distributive principles deemed just in the sphere of job
allocation, or the distributive principles regulating public honour may differ from the principles applicable
to the distribution of monetary rewards, and so forth. The CEOP model presented in Chapter 11 endorses
this Aempirical@ approach to equality and distributive justice in that for its implementation the criteria for
equal opportunity are to be determined separately for each sphere and by means of empirical research.
The logic behind this strategy is that the identified predicates for distributive justice and equality of
opportunity will represent the social meaning of goods in a particular sphere. However, as Walzer points
out (see point (i) under Section 10.3.8. supra), complex equality is future-oriented and were the result of
such empirical research followed without further ado, it may amount to an endorsement of the status quo


286
which may reflect discriminatory practices and attitudes. In such cases, which should be not to difficult to
identify, corrective measures based on the principle of substantive equality of opportunity may well be a
necessary intervention. For example, should the empirical research indicate that the best predictor of
success (or failure) is one or more of the categories protected by Section 9 of our Constitution (race, sex,
gender, etc), this will create a strong presumption that unfair discrimination is at work and that this needs
rectification by a strict application of either the formal equality and/or substantive equality of opportunity
principles.

Although Walzer rejects the search for an underlying criterion to explain this plurality of distributive
principles in the different spheres of life, his theory does seem to make one implicit claim. This is that in
any society, individual inequalities obtaining in different spheres may Acancel@ each other out so that
overall most of its members are more or less equal. This situation of overall equality, Walzer calls
Acomplex equality@ and this is what constitutes a just society. In order for complex equality to be
achieved, a society must ensure that an individual=s dominance or higher ranking in one sphere cannot be
converted into dominance in another sphere. For example, dominance in the sphere of politics should not
result in dominance in another sphere or spheres, such as religion or business:

AIn formal terms, complex equality means that no citizen=s standing in one sphere or with regard to one
social good can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with regard to some other good. Thus,
citizen X may be chosen over citizen Y for political office, and then the two of them will be unequal in the
sphere of politics. But they will not be unequal generally so long as X=s office gives him no advantages
over Y in any other sphere B superior medical care, access to better schools for his children, entrepreneurial
opportunity, and so on.@
82


Walzer identifies the following as the main categories of goods in contemporary liberal societies: security
and welfare; money and commodities, office, hard work, free time, education, kinship and love, divine
grace, recognition and political power. This idea of complex equality is depicted in Table 10.1. Persons A
to E are ranked differently (therefore unequally) in four different spheres of life, yet on aggregate they are
roughly equal. Note that the crucial assumption in this example is that the different spheres are roughly of
equal importance to the individual=s achievement of the good.



Ranking

Person

Sphere

Sphere

Sphere

Sphere

A

1

5

3

4

B

2

4

2

5

C

3

3

1

1


82
Walzer (1983): p 19.


287
D 4 2 4 3

E

5

1

5

2

Aggregate
Equality

15

15

15

15

Table 10.1.: Spherical Inequalities Yield Aggregate Or Complex Equality

Walzer=s claim that inequalities will cancel one another out, so to speak, is never fully argued by him,
apart from his bland assertion that it is unlikely that dominance in all spheres will accumulate to one
person or group of people, if the rules of distributive justice specific to one sphere are honoured and are
not allowed to invade other spheres.
83
One way of making this argument is to say that a person
disadvantaged in one sphere is compensated by his relative advantage in another sphere or spheres. This
defence of complex equality will, however, render Walzer=s theory incoherent, because the very notion of
complex equality rests on the idea that goods belonging to different spheres are incommensurable; and it
therefore makes no sense to say that a deficiency in one good is somehow compensated for by an
abundance in another good. Miller proposes another way of understanding complex equality, namely as a
specific form of equality of status:

AAs I have indicated, I believe we should read Walzers claim as a claim about status. In a society which
realizes complex equality, people enjoy a basic equality of status which overrides their unequal standing in
particular spheres of justice such as money and power.@
84


Under what circumstances can we say that, even if distributions are autonomous within spheres, that
complex equality is not achieved? Three possibilities come to mind: (i) if any particular person outranks
any other person in all or most spheres; (ii) if some persons outrank others, but it is not possible to

83
Miller discusses this situation more fully: AHaving identified the sense of equality that underlies complex equality and sketched
the argument that links pluralismwith equality, I now want to examine that argument more carefully and critically. Let us accept for the
moment the basic Walzerian assumption that social goods are irreducibly plural and that each has its own proper criterion of distribution.
Why might a society embodying these principles fail to achieve the condition we have identified as complex equality? One possibility is
simply that the same individuals might win out in all the spheres of distribution. This possibility is considered by Walzer and his reaction to
it is that such an outcome is highly unlikely to occur (since the qualities needed to succeed in the various spheres are quite different), but that
if it did this would >suggest in the strongest way that a society of equals was not a lively possibility (Spheres, 20). To take this further, we
need to look more closely at what it means for one set of individuals to outstrip others across the spheres. Let us say that A outranks B when
A scores more highly than B in every distributive sphere that engages our sense of justice (A is wealthier than B, more highly educated, has
greater political influence, etc.)@ [Miller & Walzer (1995): pp 209 B 221]. Also see the text infra.
84
Miller, in Miller & Walzer (1995): p 206.


288
partition society into classes so that all the members of the one class outrank all the members of the other
class; and (iii) if some persons outrank others and it is possible to partition the society as contemplated
under (ii).

Looking at situation (i), it should be clear that this would be too stringent a measure to test for equality of
status or complex equality in a society. If person A outranks person B in all pertinent distributions so that
it could reasonably be said that person A is superior in status to person B, person A would still be equal or
inferior to many other individuals and person B would be equal to or superior to many individuals other
than person A. Status judgements should be made, not by comparing a particular person with another
particular person, but by comparing individuals or groups of individuals against society as a whole. Only
if person A is superior in all pertinent spheres to all the other persons comprising the society, then one
could say that equal status does not obtain. Likewise, even if a number of individuals outrank a number of
other individuals, but their superior ranking is not attributable to class membership, it cannot be said that
complex equality does not prevail. It is only under situation (iii) that complex equality would be breached,
as is the case in a society divided by castes or aristocratic classes or race or the rich versus a poor
underclass, where typically, a relatively small group of people will outrank the less fortunate class on
most of the spheres of life. To the extent that modern societies have an underclass whose members are
marginalized in terms of jobs, wealth, education, housing, medical benefits and social standing, can one
say that complex equality does not obtain. Within the upper and the lower class, complex equality will be
satisfied, but not as between the classes, because sufficient systematic outranking will be present as
between members of the two classes to defeat the Walzerian ideal of complex equality.

In general, the more spheres a society endorses and maintains, the better the prospects for complex
equality because the less likely it would be that persons will be outranked on most of the spheres that are
regarded as important in that society. This consideration should counsel us against collapsing spheres into
each other and rather to preserve distinct distributive spheres that are under threat of assimilation by other
stronger spheres.

Miller concludes by saying:

AGiven the degree of pluralism already present in modern liberal democracies, however, the complex
egalitarian=s claim, that social equality may be achieved through justice being done in a multiplicity of
autonomous distributive spheres, is a plausible one.@
85


There is a certain sense in which it may be said that, despite Walzer=s liberalism (within spheres that is),
his is an egalitarian theory. First of all, there is of course the argument that, while the boundaries between
spheres are strictly maintained, inequalities will cancel one another out so that overall, or complex
equality will be maintained. Secondly, there is the minimalist idea that between different racial, cultural

85
Idem: p 225.


289
and ethnic groups, thin morality will dictate that the common understanding between these diverse groups
will be that distributive justice requires an egalitarian distributive rule. Thirdly, one may argue that, as
long as the autonomy between spheres is maintained, vast accumulations of wealth, power and influence,
as is possible under a simple equality regime, will be less likely or constrained because if, for example,
wealth is prevented from purchasing political patronage, the wealthy will be less able to accumulate too
much power and influence in other spheres.

10.5.2. Complex Versus Simple Equality

Walzer=s theory recognizes and tries to accommodate the reality of value pluralism found in modern
societies. For him the notion of simple equality is too narrow to embody the fact that equality is a
complex concept that is infused with historical and culturally specific content. Simple equality requires
the equal possession or enjoyment of some advantage, X, by all the members of a defined group, where X
may be resources, rights, opportunity, capacities or welfare. Under simple equality a focal advantage,
such as equal individual rights and freedoms are selected and equalized, as far as is practically possible,
across all individuals. This inevitably causes inequalities in the non-favoured contenders, such as
resources, so that the overall outcome is anything but egalitarian. Complex equality, on the other hand,
does not select a focal advantage to be equalized and indeed abandons the quest for a direct application of
any form of equality in respect of a particular good or advantage. I use the term Adirect application@ in the
sense of aprioristically determining in the abstract that justice requires an equal distribution -- it is of
course possible that in some spheres the social meaning of goods dictates that these particular goods must
be distributed equally, but this is a contingent possibility and not derived from any normative system of
thought (other than the principle that distributive rules are sphere-specific). Complex equality invites us to
view social equality as the by-product of many separate inequalities in the distribution of goods belonging
to different spheres of life. Complex equality therefore describes the overall attribute of a set of social
relationships rather than focussing on the equalization of one or more particular advantage. The crucial
precondition for complex equality is the recognition and protection of many irreducibly different kinds of
goods and a plurality of distributional rules for these. This condition is met if dominance over one good,
say money, is not allowed to lead to dominance in another good, such as political power.

Under the simple equality doctrine, equality is a constitutive part of the idea of justice. Once the
appropriate focal variable has been identified, an equal distribution of that variable will satisfy the
requirements of distributive justice. Under complex equality, however, distributive justice and the ideal of
equality are seen as independent social ideals, the one not subsumed under the other. J ustice comprises the
various distributional rules governing the allocation of goods in different spheres of life and may be just
without being egalitarian, when viewed within a specific sphere. Equality, on the other hand, is a
predicate of society as a whole, if the sets of different distributive rules applicable to that society=s
different spheres of life are just. The link between complex equality and justice is hence essentially an
empirical one. The claim is that if goods are distributed in accordance with rules reflective of the social
meaning attached to a particular type of good and if this is true for all spheres as autonomous distributive
domains [i.e. no seepage occurs from one sphere to another] then, as a matter of empirical fact, we will


290
find that the many inequalities roughly cancel one another out so that each individual will be able to
regard himself as enjoying equal status with his fellow members of society, if not in any specific sphere
but overall. Participation and status in some of the different domains of civil society should engender a
sense of equal citizenship. For example, I may be of low rank and status in the sphere of politics (and may
regard my right to vote as merely symbolic with little likelihood of influencing affairs of state) but at the
same time I may hold a position as an office bearer in my trade union, which gives me status in the sphere
of employment and which allows me to experience the benefits of direct democracy. This may strengthen
my belief in democracy and my equality as a member of civil society, although I readily acknowledge that
I am a minor or insignificant player on the national political stage.

Miller rejects simple equality in favour of complex equality for a number of reasons.
86
First, because none
of the contenders for that something that is so fundamental to human beings that justice requires it must
be equally distributed, is without deficiencies. The very elusiveness of the ideal focal variable, AX@, makes
simple equality a futile dream and we may confidently accept that no single aspect of life is so important
to human life and well-being that it warrants elevation to the status of the one and only focal variable.
Where the different conceptions of X clash, as they inevitably do, there is no more basic or fundamental
value that is capable of a reconciliation between the opposing views of what will constitute the ideal
egalitarian society. Secondly, suppose that we have equalized on a particular focal variable and then find
that a different distributive pattern, which is inegalitarian, will yield a Pareto improvement.
87
If we are
convinced of the importance of that particular focal variable for human life, how are we to justify not
implementing the Pareto superior distribution, which will lead to everyone=s having more of the desired
focal variable, even if it will lead to an unequal distribution? One possible solution would be to adopt
something like the Rawlsian difference principle to justify deviations from simple equality. Cohen admits
that Pareto-superior inequalities are possible but argues that these are incompatible with the values
attached to a certain type of community and hence should be rejected in favour of equality, even though
this will give persons less of the particular good. Cohen therefore preserves the ideal of equality by
invoking the value of community as an independent good.
88


The virtue of the concept of complex equality is that it acknowledges the plurality of principles of justice
and tries to make this very pluralism the basis of equality. Rather than trying to reduce distributive justice
to one simple egalitarian form, the very plurality of goods and distributive rules, which subverts simple
equality, is used to promote the notion of complex equality.
89
The only prerequisite is that spheres should

86
Miller D.: AComplex Equality@, in Miller & Walzer (Eds), (1995), pp 197-225.
87
The principle of Pareto optimality holds that a distribution is APareto optimal@ if it is impossible to replace it with another
distribution without making some persons (at least one) better off without at the same time making other persons (at least one) worse off.
More accurately, one may refer to it as APareto efficiency@, since the most efficient distribution is that one which cannot be changed without
improving the position of at least one person without at the same time disadvantaging at least one other individual.
88
Cohen, in Darwall (1995): pp 331 B 397.
89
AI want to argue that we should focus on the reduction of dominanceCnot, or not primarily, on the break-up or the constraint of
monopoly. We should consider what it might mean to narrow the range within which particular goods are convertible and to vindicate the


291
operate autonomously, that is, dominance in one sphere should not be permitted to lead to dominance in
another sphere:

AThe critique of dominance and domination points toward an open-ended distributive principle. No
social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y merely
because they possess y and without regard to the meaning of x. @
90



autonomy of distributive spheres. But this line of argument, though it is not uncommon historically, has never fully emerged in philosophical
writing. Philosophers have tended to criticize (or to justify) existing or emerging monopolies of wealth, power, and education. Or, they have
criticized (or justified) particular conversionsCof wealth into education or of office into wealth. And all this, most often, in the name of
some radically simplified distributive system. The critique of dominance will suggest instead a way of reshaping and then living with the
actual complexity of distributions. Imagine now a society in which different social goods are monopolistically heldCas they are in fact and
always will be, barring continual state interventionCbut in which no particular good is generally convertible. As I go along, I shall try to
define the precise limits on convertibility, but for now the general description will suffice. This is a complex egalitarian society. Though
there will be many small inequalities, inequality will not be multiplied through the conversion process. Nor will it be summed across
different goods, because the autonomy of distributions will tend to produce a variety of local monopolies, held by different groups of men
and women. I dont want to claimthat complex equality would necessarily be more stable than simple equality, but I aminclined to think
that it would open the way for more diffused and particularized forms of social conflict. And the resistance to convertibility would be
maintained, in large degree, by ordinary men and women within their own spheres of competence and control, without large-scale state
action@ [Walzer (1983): p 17].
90
Walzer (1983): p 20.


292
In short, Walzer=s notion of Acomplex equality@ can be summarized as the idea that a plurality of
inequalities among people will result in an overall equality. The notion of Aoverall equality@ should, of
course, not be taken to mean literal equality. For one, a higher ranking in one sphere cannot be offset
against a lower ranking in another sphere because the appropriate criteria for the respective spheres may
not admit such arithmetic manipulations. Secondly, in actual societies it will be common to find
individuals who consistently outrank others across important spheres so that they are overall better off
than the latter. However, the point made by Walzer=s claim is that, theoretically, if spheres are
independent of each other (and the variables that determine rankings in different spheres do not co-vary),
it is mathematically or statistically plausible that inequalities would cancel each other out, if these can be
reduced to a common denominator or metric. In contrast, under simple equality, the variables determining
rankings in different spheres will more often than not correlate significantly, so that even theoretically
overall equality will not prevail. It should also be noted that Walzer does not rule out the possibility of a
particular individual becoming dominant in all spheres and thus that overall inequality will triumph over
complex equality, but he believes that as long as the boundaries between spheres are policed efficiently,
this is highly unlikely.
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10.6. COMPLEX EQUALITY AND THE CEOP MODEL

In this section I note the possible implications that Walzer=s theory may have for the CEOP model,
discussed in the next chapter. First and most important of all, the model of compound equality of
opportunity proposed in Chapter 11 is embedded in a wider framework of distributive justice that owes
much to Walzer=s idea that conceptions of distributive justice should be sphere-specific because we are all
(equally) culture-producing beings.

But how may this Walzerian ideal be given practical expression? The Walzerian logic for determining a
conception of justice will entail something like the following: first some sort of sociological or social
psychological study to determine the social meaning of some benchmark goods, has to be undertaken;
secondly, appropriate distributive rules must be derived from these social meanings of different goods;
and, thirdly, institutional arrangements must be established and maintained that are capable of ensuring
that these differential sets of distributional rules operate independently of each other, so that dominance in
one distributional sphere does not lead to dominance in another sphere. An example will illustrate the
methodology suggested by Walzer: Assume one wishes to determine the distributive justness of rules for
health care, one will start by investigating the importance and meaning of health and health care for the
members of a society. Supposing that the revealed social meaning is that of a need that should be satisfied
by public resources, the distributive rules may require taxation earmarked for that purpose and the
provision of largely free health care to the public at large. As will be explained in the next chapter, the
implementation process of the CEOP model follows very much the same strategy.


91
Op cit.
Secondly, Walzer=s view that what matters about people is their capacity to >make and inhabit meaningful
worlds, to endow the natural world and brute objects with significance and value, resembles Taylors


293
vision of human beings as self-interpreting animals. Where Rawls identifies persons= highest-order
interests as being their capacity as individuals rationally to frame, revise and pursue conceptions of the
good, Walzer argues that such processes are necessarily dependent upon cultural constructions that are es-
sentially communal. Implicit in the model proposed in Chapter 11 is recognition of the influence that
culture and communal values will play in determining the classificatory framework, or typologies, which
are required for the implementation of the model.

Thirdly, the CEOP model may be capable of accommodating the fact that one=s standing in some spheres
of life are more important to one=s achievement of the good life than a comparable standing in another
sphere, by taking this into account when determining the cut-off point for the termination of the
presumption of individual non-accountability in a particular sphere. For example, if it turns out that
education plays a more important role in a person=s life and the welfare of his or her community than do
being held accountable for his criminal conduct, this may result in the cut-off point for education being set
later in life than is the case with criminal accountability.

Fourthly, the digression into the sphere of membership and community in Section 10.3.4, was necessary
because, although the CEOP model suggested in this thesis does not directly address this issue, a more
developed theoretical model may well use the concept of membership to justify the application of formal
equality of opportunity for membership to a particular group within a sphere, or to create new spheres, or
to determine standards for membership to a particular group within a sphere that differ from the admission
standards for other groups within that sphere (i.e. the possibility of Asub-spheres@ within a particular
sphere). For example, deviations from the principle of substantive equality of opportunity is justified in
the CEOP model by efficiency considerations and third party interests. Also, in particular situations, such
as membership to certain professions and cultural or religious associations, the culture and social meaning
attached to the good of membership may provide additional support or justification for replacing
substantive equality of opportunity with formal equality of opportunity as the operative admissions
principle. For example, subscribing to the code of conduct, principles, goals and tenets of a professional,
cultural or religious association may determine eligibility for membership and it would indeed be difficult
to conceive of a role for substantive equality of opportunity in cases such as religious belief, unless one is
to permit perfectionist and paternalistic interventions.

Fifthly, the CEOP model, as it is presented in this thesis does not accommodate Walzer=s distinction
between petty bourgeoisie employment and employment in larger impersonal organizations, because
doing so will entail allowing for deviations from the principle of formal equality of opportunity, in cases
such as family businesses. However, I can see no reason why such a deviation may not be slotted under
one of the permissible grounds for deviation, namely third party interests, which in this context, may refer
to the interest of a family or a community. A more refined CEOP model may therefore well be able to
accommodate this insight of Walzer that the quality and nature of the employment relationship may differ
from situation to situation (from the impersonal commercial relationship of the large corporation to the
more personal and comprehensive relationship of the small family business) and therefore justify different
conceptions of distributive justice in the allocation of the good of employment.