Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 7

Pedro Azul vs Judge Jose Castro & Rosalinda


Due Process Impartial and Competent Court
Azul owns and operates a construction shop. To finance it he entered a loan agreement with Tecson in
the amount of P391k. Tecson was only able to collect P141k thus leaving about P250k as a balance. She
filed a petition for collection of sum of money before the Rizal RTC and the case was given to J
Sarmiento. On 27 Mar 79, Azul received the copy of the complaint. On 10 Apr 79, Azul filed a motion for
a 15 day extension to file for responsive pleading. Azul was unaware that J Sarmiento retired and was
temporarily substituted by J Aover who granted the extension but only for 5 days starting the next day.
But Azul only received the notice granting such on the 23
of the same month way passed the 5 day
period. On the 17
of April, Tecson already filed a motion to dismiss averring that Azuls 5 day extension
has already lapsed. On the 18
of the same month, J Castro, the permanent judge to replace J Sarmiento
took office and he ordered Azul to be in default due to the lapse of the 5 day extension. J Castro
proceeded with the reception of evidence the next day and of course without Azuls evidence as he was
still unaware of him being in default. On April 27
, J Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On May 2
unaware that J Castro already decided the case appealed to remove his default status. On May 7
received the decision rendered by the court on Apr 27
(but on record the date of receipt was May 5
Azul filed a motion for new trial on June 6th. The lower court denied the same on the 20
of the same
month. On Aug 1
, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3
but was reconsidered on the
hence Azul filed his record on appeal on the 21
and J Castro approved it on the 27
but surprisingly
upon motion of Tecson on the 30
, J Castro set aside its earlier decisaion on the 27
. Finally, J Castro
denied the appeal on the 7
of September.
ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due process.
HELD: The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied due process. The constitutional provision on due
process commands all who wield public authority, but most peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly
maintain standards of fundamental fairness and to insure that procedural safeguards essential to a fair
trial are observed at all stages of a proceeding. It may be argued that when the Azuls counsel asked for
a fifteen (15) day extension from April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was imprudent and neglectful for
him to assume that said first extension would be granted. However, the records show that Atty. Camaya
personally went to the session hall of the court with his motion for postponement only to be informed
that J Sarmiento had just retired but that his motion would be considered submitted for resolution.
Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in Quezon City are literally swamped with their own heavy
loads of cases, counsel may be excused for assuming that, at the very least, he had the requested fifteen
(15) days to file his responsive pleading. It is likewise inexplicable why J Aover, who had not
permanently taken over the sala vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that only a five-day
extension would be allowed. And to compound the Azuls problems, the order was sent by mail and
received only twelve (12) days later or after the five-day period. Before the much publicized Project
Mercury of the Bureau of Posts, a court should have known that court orders requiring acts to be done in
a matter of days should not be sent by mail. Meanwhile, the petitioner was declared in default. The
motion to declare defendant in default is dated April 17, 1979. No copy was furnished the petitioner. It
was acted upon on April 18, 1979, the very first day in office of J Castro in Quezon City.

Mayor Miguel Paderanga vs Judge Cesar Azura
Due Process Hostility Between the Judge and the Parties Inhibition
Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself
from deciding on pending cases brought before him on the grounds that they have lost confidence in
him, that he entertained tax suits against the city and had issued TROs on the sales of properties when it
is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura
is bias, oppressive and is abusive in his power.
ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.
HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), All the foregoing
notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate
guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by
way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or
with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a
state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way
that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . .
The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is
that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge . . .

Filemon David vs Judge Gregorio Aquilizan et
on November 23, 2010
Due Process Hearing
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend
and caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of
corn cobs an dthe share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew the land from the brothers and
has not allowed them to go back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do
so. David denied that the borthers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before
but he resigned to take care of his dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered
the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the case filed by
the brothers against David and after three months he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without
any hearing. David averred he was denied due process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no
hearing conducted but he said the decision has already become final and executory as the period for
appeal has already lapsed.
ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be
attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due process. And it has been
held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation
when the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment
has been rendered at all.

Anita Lorenzana vs Polly Cayetano
on November 23, 2010
Due Process Hearing
Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila Railroad Company (later from the Bureau of
Lands). She later purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had the property be rented to tenants
occupying stalls. Due to nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment cases against her tenant. On the
other hand, Cayetano was an occupant of a parcel of land adjacent to that of Lorenzanas land. Cayetano
was renting the same from the Bureau of Lands. The lower court granted Lorenzanas ejectment cases.
Lorenzana then secured a writ of execution to forcibly eject her tenants but she included to eject
Cayetanos property. Cayetano was not a party to the ejectment cases so she prayed for the lower court
that her property be not touched. The lower court denied Cayetanos petition. The CA, upon appeal,
favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is now a party to the ejectment cases as she already
brought herself to the Courts jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cayetanos right to due process has been violated.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the CA. It must be noted that respondent was
not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not
make her appearance in and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to court
to protect her property from demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and
executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases, Cayetano remains a third person
to such judgment, which does not bind her; nor can its writ of execution be informed against her since
she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases.

Zambales Chromite Mining et al vs Court of
on November 25, 2010
Due Process Administrative Due Process
ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be declared the
rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting
their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM
appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon
was assigned as the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the
appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then
appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the
disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not
apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director
of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to
disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily
and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA
reversed Gozons finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by
Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be
given due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the
CA remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own
contentions; ZCM wants the CAs earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that
Gozons finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process.
HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had acted with
grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn
out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under
review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the
decision of the CA.

Felicidad Anzaldo vs Jacobo Clave
on November 25, 2010
Due Process Administrative Due Process
Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She
was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed as Science Research
Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr
Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the
one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldos appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation
Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the
Office of the president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD
807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the
chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the
denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed
to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just
affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was inclined to
concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he meant was that he was
concurring with Chairman Claves recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is evident that
Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the
recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. Due process of law means
fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own
recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed
Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.

Miguel Singson vs National Labor Relations
Commission & Philippine Airlines
on November 6, 2010
Due Process Dismissal of Employees
Singson was an employee of PAL. On 7 Jun 1991, a Japanese national alleged that Singson extorted
money from her ($200.00) by accusing her of having excess baggage; and that to settle the issue she
needs to pay said amount to him. Singson was later investigated and the investigating committee found
him guilty. PAL then dismissed Singson from employment. Singson then filed a case before NLRC against
PAL for illegal dismissal, attys fees and damages. Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor of Singson as
he found PALs side insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL appealed to the NLRC. The 2
Division, composed
of Calaycay, Rayala former Arbiter Raul Aquino, of the NLRC took cognizance of the case. NLRC reversed
the decision of Aquino. Singson moved for reconsideration which was denied by NLRC, this time only
Calaycay & Rayala voted.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Singson was denied due process. The SC held that Singson was denied due
process when Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the 2nd Division of the NLRC, in
reviewing PALs appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter. Under Rule VII,
Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, each Division shall consist of one member from
the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers
and employers sectors, respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation and
impartiality among its members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who
are impartial right from the start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered
impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself
from any participation in this case. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the
motion for reconsideration of Singson was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of
Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his
appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of Singsons right to an
impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.

Mayor Bayani Alonte vs Judge Maximo
Savellano, NBI & People of the Philippines
on November 25, 2010
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings Waiver of Right to Due Process
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was
alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonetes house who was then the
mayor of Bian, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Bian. The counsel and the prosecutor later
moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie
executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue
was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J
Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the
same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was
then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano
commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when
clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to
animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of
waiver requires that it not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder
of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on
numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision
earlier promulgated is nullified.