Académique Documents
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Judicial Immunity and a Self Protection Bias
Justice Marshalls Dissenting opinion, post, presents an eloquent argument that Congress, in
enacting Section 1983, did not intend to create any absolute immunity from civil liability for
government officials involved in the judicial process ... (post, 346347) Whatever the correctness
of his historical argument, I fear that this court has already crossed that bridge in Pierson v Ray,
386 US 547, and Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409.
I entirely agree with Justice Marshall, however, that the policies of section 1983 and of common
law witness immunity, as they apply to witnesses who are police officers, do not justify any
absolute immunity for perjurious testimony. I therefore dissent for the reasons stated in Part IV of
Justice Marshalls Opinion. (In Part IV, Justice Marshall argues that absolute police immunity for
perjury is not a compelling or even rational state policy.)
We, the People, must live with and under the policy decisions of our government, whether it be
the judicial, executive or legislative branch. But, whether right or wrong in some remote esoteric
sense we cannot understand, the Constitution entrusts such policymaking into the hands of the
Legislature. If the Judiciary is effectively to balance that policymaking power, it cannot do so
by legislation disguised as case law in usurpation of power reserved to Congress; it must
instead relinquish that illegitimate power back to the People, through the jury trial process.
Just as the majority policy made in Briscoe v Lahue has given us the likes of Mark Fuhrman to
police our streets and testify falsely with impunity, the judicial policy to coverup the
constitutional violations of Brothers of the Robe has created and maintains a good ol boy
network of Mark Fuhrmans within its own ranks.
The problem is that Mark Fuhrman is US. Judges Garcia, Wiggins, Canby and Schroeder are
US. To weed them out in a system that corrupts is to replace them with US, and then we
too will become corrupt in that system. The only solution is to fix the system. It is broken,
and it needs fixing desperately. [Emph. J4J]
The problem is unaccountability to those it injures in violation of Constitutional Rights. The
solution is accountability to those it injures in violation of Constitutional Rights. [Emph. J4J] The
idea of accountability to those you injure is that the injured party, through the process of
law seeking redress, polices the system. Immunity blocks that policing of their government
by the People. [Emph. J4J
It is written that the longest journey begins with but one step in the right direction. When, as
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun found in 1982, we fear that the Court has already crossed that
bridge, if it is a bridge in the wrong direction and you cannot go back, then you must, at least, not
continue on to cross more bridges in the same wrong direction. All is not lost. The Nations future
can still be enriched by the lessons learned, and a price too horrible to contemplate can still be
avoided.
Each case of Judicial Immunity presents to each judge a moral decision:
Shall I obey my oath and support the Constitution? Or, shall I ignore my oath in
support of the more temporal interests that surround us all ?
The "RIGHT TO BE HEARD" is, a fundamental right, and THE VERY REASON FOR THE EXISTENCE OF COURTS" and
nowhere more critical than in the Family Law Court. Canon 3(B)(5) A judge must perform judicial duties impartially
and fairly". Therefore "a judge who impairs the fairness of the proceeding" also "Brings The Judiciary into Disrepute".
OnJudicialMisconductandDiscipline
WITHOUTMERIT:THEEMPTYPROMISEOFJUDICIALDISCIPLINE
http://www.tulanelink.com/tulanelink/sassower_01a.htm
ElenaRuthSassower
Judicial independence is predicated on "good faith" decisionmaking.
It was never intended to include "badfaith" decisionmaking, where a
judge knowingly and deliberately disregards the facts and law of a case.
This is properly the subject of disciplinary review, irrespective of
whether it is correctable on appeal. And egregious error is also
misconduct, since its nature and/or magnitude presuppose that a judge
acted willfully, or that he is incompetent.
" How can you make any assessment of how judicial misconduct
mechanisms are working unless you reach out to the victims of
judicial misconduct who have used them? Elena Ruth Sassower
TheLongTermView,MassachusettsSchoolofLaw,Vol.4,No.1,1997,pp.9097.
Seeoriginalarticle["http://www.tulanelink.com/pdf/withoutmerit1997.pdf].
Themostseriousmisconductbyjudgesisthatwhichistheleastlikelytosubjectthemtodiscipline.Itisnot
whattheydointheirprivatelives,offthebench,butwhattheydoonthebenchinthecourseoflitigation.The
obvious image is the judge who runs his courtroom as if he owns it, who looks down from his elevated
benchandtreatslitigantsandtheirattorneysinanimperiousandabusivefashion.
" But even where a judge is, as he is supposed to be, patient and dignified in his demeanor, every court
appearance,justlikeeverywrittenmotion,involvesajudgerulingonaproceduralorsubstantiveaspectofa
case.Andtherearejudgeswho,whilepresentingaveneeroffairness,areintellectuallydishonest.Theymake
rulings and decisions which are not only agross abuse of discretion, but which knowingly and deliberately
disregard"clearandcontrollinglaw"andobliterate,distort,orfabricatethefactsintherecordtodoso."
Whywouldajudgebeintellectuallydishonest?Hemaybemotivatedbyundisclosedbiasduetopersonalor
political interest. Judicial selection processes are politicallycontrolled and closed, frequently giving us judges
whoarebetterconnectedthantheyarequalified.Andonceonthebench,thesejudgesrewardtheirfriends
and punish their enemies. Although ethical codes require judges to disclose facts bearing upon their
impartiality, they don't always do so. They sit on cases in which they have undisclosed relationships with
parties, their attorneys, or have interests in the outcome, and do so deliberately because they wish to
advantageeitheronesideoveranotherorsometimesthemselves.
IntellectualDishonesty
Everycasehasmanyfacts,anyofwhichmaybeinadvertently"misstated"injudicialdecisions.Butjudicial
misconductisnotaboutinnocent"misstatement"offacts,andcertainlynotaboutperipheralfacts.Itinvolves
a judge's knowing and deliberate misrepresentation of the material facts on which the case pivots. These
factsdeterminetheapplicablelaw.Iftheapplicablelawdoesn'tallowthejudgetodowhathewantstodo,
he's going to have to change the material facts so that the law doesn't apply. When judges don't want to
putthemselvesonrecordasdishonestlyrecitingfacts,theyjustrenderdecisionswithoutreasonsorfactual
findings.
The "RIGHT TO BE HEARD" is, a fundamental right, and THE VERY REASON FOR THE EXISTENCE OF COURTS" and
nowhere more critical than in the Family Law Court. Canon 3(B)(5) A judge must perform judicial duties impartially
and fairly". Therefore "a judge who impairs the fairness of the proceeding" also "Brings The Judiciary into Disrepute".
The prevalence of intellectually dishonest decisions is described by Northwestern Law Professor
Anthony D'Amato in "The Ultimate Injustice: When the Court Misstates the Facts". He shows how
judges at different levels of the state and federal systems manipulate facts and the law to make a
case turn out the way they want it to.
In a speech to federal judges, Hofstra Law Professor Monroe Freedman states: "Frankly, I have had
more than enough of judicial opinions that bear no relationship whatsoever to the cases that have been filed
and argued before the judges. I am talking about judicial opinions that falsify the facts of the cases
that have been argued, judicial opinions that make disingenuous use or omission of material
authorities, judicial opinions that cover up these things with nopublication and nocitation rules."
Afterward, when Professor Freedman sat down, a judge sitting next to him turned to him and said,
"Youdon'tknowthehalfofit."http://www.tulanelink.com/tulanelink/freedman_box.htm
TheMythofRecusal
There'snexttonothingyoucandowhenyou'rebeforeadishonestjudge.He'snotgoingtorespondtoarecusal
motionwith"Hallelujah,you'veshownmethelight.I'llstepdown."Hisdishonestywillcarrythroughtothe
recusalmotion,which,whileassertinghiscompletefairnessandimpartiality,hewilldenyfromthebenchwith
nowrittendecisionor,ifbyawrittendecision,thenonestatingnoreasonsormisstatingthebasisforrecusal.
Andjustasmakingaformalrecusalmotionentailsexpense,asanymotiondoes,sodoestakinganinterimappeal,
whichmaynotbefeasible.
Ofcourse,there'saproblemevenbeforemakingarecusalmotion.Yourlawyermaynotwanttomakeone
becauseitmeanstakingonthejudgebyaccusinghimofbiasedconduct.Alawyer'sethicaldutyistozealously
representeachclient,butlawyershaveotherclientswhosecasesmaycomebeforethatjudge.Anditisnotjust
theirrelationshipwiththatjudgethattheywanttoprotect,butwithhisjudicialbrethren,whoarepartofthe
judge'scircleoffriendsandmaybequitedefensiveofhishonor,whichtheyseeasanextensionoftheirown.
TheChimeraofJudicialDiscipline
Eachofthe50statesandtheDistrictofColumbiahasacommission,committee,council,orreviewboard,whose
purposeistoaddresscomplaintsofjudicialmisconductbystatejudgeswithinitsjurisdiction.Thesedisciplinary
mechanismsfrequentlydismiss,outofhand,complaintsofonthebenchmisconduct,includingabusive
courtroombehaviorandfabricatedjudicialdecisions.Theydothisonthepretensethattheyhavenoauthority
toreview"meritsofmatterswithinajudge'sdiscretion,suchastherulingsanddecisioninaparticularcase,"
whichtheyassertcanonlybereviewedbyanappealtoanappellatecourt.
However,judicialindependenceispredicatedon"goodfaith"decisionmaking.Itwasneverintendedtoinclude
"badfaith"decisionmaking,whereajudgeknowinglyanddeliberatelydisregardsthefactsandlawofacase.
Thisisproperlythesubjectofdisciplinaryreview,irrespectiveofwhetheritiscorrectableonappeal.An
egregiouserrorisalsomisconduct,sinceitsnatureand/ormagnitudepresupposethatajudgeactedwilfully,or
thatheisincompetent.
Underthe1980Act,oneofthestatutorygroundsuponwhichaChiefJudgemaydismissajudicialmisconduct
complaintisifhefindsittobe"directlyrelatedtothemeritsofadecisionorproceduralruling."Althougha
complaintallegingbadfaith,biasedjudicialconductincludinglegallyinsupportableandfactuallydishonest
rulingsshouldnotbedismissedas"meritsrelated,"itinvariablyis.Addinginsulttoinjury,ChiefJudges
sometimestackontotheirdismissalordersanotherstatutorygroundfordismissal,"frivolousness."Intheirview,a
biasclaimsupportedonlybyerroneousrulingsanddecisions,nomatterhowegregious,is"frivolous."
The "RIGHT TO BE HEARD" is, a fundamental right, and THE VERY REASON FOR THE EXISTENCE OF COURTS" and
nowhere more critical than in the Family Law Court. Canon 3(B)(5) A judge must perform judicial duties impartially
and fairly". Therefore "a judge who impairs the fairness of the proceeding" also "Brings The Judiciary into Disrepute".
TheIllusoryRemedyofAppeal
Facedwithadishonestjudge,litigantsoftencaveinatthetriallevelandnevermakeittoappeal.It'stoo
emotionallyandfinanciallydrainingtocontinuebeforeabiasedanddishonestjudge.Thisisnottosaythat
justiceisobtainableonappeal.Evenwithareversal,theonusoftheappealisontheaggrievedlitigant,who,at
best,getswhathewasentitledtoattheoutset,onlyyearslaterandafterspendinguntoldamountsofmoneyon
legalfeesandcosts.Beyondthat,theappellatedecision,ifitevenidentifiesthe"error"asjudicialmisconduct,
willlikelyminimizeit.Notwithstandingtheirethicalduty,appellatejudgesrarely,ifever,takestepstoreferan
erranttrialjudgefordisciplinaryaction.
Andthis...iswheretheappellateprocess"works"!
Judge Scott Gordon
12/12/12 Glenda Veasey proclaims her power, authority, control and decision when
stating: I Decided... SOME Support. AS OPPOSED TO NO SUPPORT AT ALL.
12/12/12 Transcripts pg 15 Veaseys Confession this is not a STIPULATION.
1) Websterdictionary.org states: SOME ; (adj) 1) Consisting of a greater or less portion
or a larger amount, A part or a portion of a larger amount, Not much; a little;
moderate; as, the censure was to some extent just .
(www.websterdictionary.org/definition/some).
2) in child custody cases the statutory "best interests" test for determinations is,
it furthers the paramount goal: preserving the need for continuity and stability in
custody arrangements (Ca Fam 3011, 3040(b)). The guideline statute sets the
principles that courts must to follow applying the rules.
a. Both parents are mutually responsible to support their children. (Sept. 6
th
2011
=84%/16% custody + $0 for 3mo and $215 for Sept) = FAILED
b. Child support orders must ensure that children actually receive fair, timely, and
sufficient support, which reflects the states high standard of living and high
costs of raising children compared to other states. Must is a legislative directive &
removes discretion Glenda Veaseys statements are legal nonsense
3) By definition: SOME SUPPORT is a portion or part of the actual support. Public
Policy requires: that children actually receive fair, timely, and sufficient support.
some support meant as of January 2012 equaled $1147 total support over 7mo. and
over last 34mo the net support available to support my children is $65 per child, and
has caused the loss of our home and damaged family relationships. Glenda Veasey
by action and words had no intention of providing fair support but to give any number
that gave the children something. They didnt need something they needed and were
required to receive an amount to secure their stability in their existing environment.
Therefore this entire argument is a confession to legal ignorance, dereliction of duty,
abuse of discretion, failure to ensure rights and public policy.
That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any
proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady,
888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated
that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that
he has received justice." My children, family, and I do not believe the word justice has any
relationship to any action in this case Stevie Wonder could see impartiality is nonexistent.
Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow
the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given
another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the
judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second
judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself.
No orders issued by a judge who has been disqualified by law are valid. It would appear that
they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.