Cognitive Narratology of Politics

Cognitive Narratology of
Politics
Journal of
Cognitive Semiotics
Vol. IV No. 2

Journal of
Cognitive Semiotics
Volume 4, Number 2
Journal of
Cognitive Semiotics

LDI1ORIAL BOARD
Peer F. Bundgaard, Centre Ior Semiotics, University oI Aarhus, Denmark
erlin Donald, proIessor emeritus, Queen`s University, Ontario, Canada
Bruno Galantucci, Laboratory oI Experimental Semiotics, Yeshiva University, New York City
Todd Oakley, proIessor and chair oI cognitive science, Case Western Reserve University
Gran Sonesson, Centre Ior Cognitive Semiotics, University oI Lund, Sweden

anaging editor: Joel Parthemore, Centre Ior Cognitive Semiotics, University oI Lund,
Sweden, joel.parthemoresemiotik.lu.se.

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PUBLISHING DL1AILS
An earlier version oI this journal was published Irom 2007 to 2010 by Peter Lang. Back issues
may be ordered Irom them, with links on the journal website.
The Journal oI Cognitive Semiotics is currently being published electronically as a peer-
reviewed, open-source journal. It is anticipated that, in 2013, the journal will revert to closed
print/electronic publication.
SBN: 78-87-23-0-4
Contents

Cognitive Narratology of Politics
Guest Lditors
Patrick Colm Hogan and Per Aage Brandt

ntroduction: Cognitive Narratology of Politics / Patrick Colm Hogan...........1
etaphor and War: The etaphor System Used to 1ustify War in the Gulf / George....
LakoII......................................
A Narrative of National Reform:Quanto vale ou por quilo? / Richard A. Gordon.20
mplotting mmigration: The Rhetoric of Border Narratives / Corinne BancroIt.... 40
La Falange: The Structure of a Fascist Dream / Per Aage Brandt............. 7
The Digital Subject: deological irroring in Social News edia / Joseph Darda..... 7
World Literature, Globalization, and the Loss of Stories: On the Political conomy of....
Narrative Today / Patrick Colm Hogan ........................88

Address for correspondence: English Department, U-4025, 215 Glenbrook Road, University of
Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-4025, USA; email: patrick.hogan@uconn.edu.

Patrick Colm Hogan
Department of English and Program in Cognitive Science, University of Connecticut
Cognitive Narratology of Politics

A basic and very simple principle of cognitive science concerns three recurring functions of cognitive
processes. Whether we are speaking of basic sensory perception, object recognition, or semantic
interpretation, our minds commonly do three things to the inputs they are given. First, they select from
those inputs; not all incoming information is processed. Second, they segment the stream of information;
continuous information is not processed as continuous. Third, they provide structure to the selected and
segmented units. Consider visual perception. Visual neurons have receptive fields. For example, some
neurons fire maximally for a particular linear orientation. When faced with such a feature of the world,
those neurons may be said to select that feature and to segment it, reducing it to a unit of neuronal activity.
At the same time that a particular neuron sends activation to visual cortex, it reduces the activation of
nearby neurons through lateral inhibition. At the end of the perceptual process, this inhibition has the
effect of making lines appear sharper, thus giving edges greater salience. This is a form of structuring.
Above the level of sensory neurons, we find similar processes with the operation of, for example,
schemas and prototypes in object recognition. Instances would include seeing a figure as a duck or a rabbit,
a vase or two people facing one another, and so on (to draw on some famous illustrations of visual
ambiguity). In these and other cases, schemas or prototypes orient our selection of perceptual information
(already formed through sensory processing, etc.), our segmentation (what part goes with the ears of the
rabbit or the bill of the duck), and our structuring of the image.
When we go to still more general or abstract levels, our selection, segmentation, and structuring
may operate through larger, more complex and variable structures, prominently metaphors and narratives.
Often, the metaphors themselves involve a sort of tacit narrative. For example, as Lakoff discusses, one
might use the metaphor of rape to characterize a particular series of events. Clearly, this metaphor
suggests a sequence of actions undertaken by agents. Though unstated, a brief narrative is implicit in the
metaphor. We may therefore include metaphors and more prototypical, fully developed stories together
under the shorthand of narrative.
As the preceding example already suggests, the targets of our minds narrative structures (i.e., the
topics we are seeking to understand through narrative organization) involve complexes of agents and
actionspeople doing things. These complexes range from intimate personal relations to broad social and
political events. The latter are particularly complex and beyond the control of individual choice.

COGNITIVE NARRATOLOGY OF POLITICS | 2
Nonetheless, they are shaped by the multiple, interacting understandings of their participants. In other
words, participants ongoing cognitive organization of social and political events orients the development
of those events. It follows that an analysis of cognitive processing is a crucial part of the analysis of social
and political events. More exactly, it follows that a cognitive analysis of metaphorical and narrative
organization is of great importance for understanding such events. That analysis, in its various forms, is
the concern of this issue of Cognitive Semiotics.
More precisely, we may say that there are three broad areas in which it is valuable to examine the
narrative processing of politics. The first and second areas are standard sub-fields of narrative discourse
theory: emplotment and narration. To explain this distinction, we need to begin with the more basic
division between story world and discourse. The story world is, so to speak, the events themselves.
Discourse is how those events are recounted. Discourse, again, has two components. The first is
emplotment. This is the selection, segmentation, and structuring of elements from the story world. The
second component of discourse is narration. This is the communicative aspect of the narrative: roughly,
who is speaking to whom. The third and final area of importance for the narrative processing of politics
extends out from narrative proper (thus emplotment and narration) to the real world conditions
surrounding the production and reception of narratives. This includes such matters as the nature of
communications media and their political economy.
Emplotment is the aspect of narration that most obviously bears on politics, since we organize our
understanding of everything from social programs to election campaigns, from scandals to wars, as
narratives. Here, some further subdivisions are important. First, we have already distinguished between
the micro-narratives of metaphor and the more macro-narrative structures of emplotment proper. This
special issue begins at, so to speak, the foundations of the narrative organization of politics with a reprint
of George Lakoffs classic essay on metaphors of war. In this essay, Lakoff argues persuasively that our
acceptance or rejection war is profoundly affected by the patterns of metaphors we use to think about war.
In consequence, as he says, the choice of metaphors made by political leaders can have life or death
consequencesand not just metaphorically.
Turning to emplotment proper, we may draw two further, related distinctions. The first is between
direct and modeled emplotment. Specifically, we may emplot a particular political situation itself or we
may propose a narrative of some other situation as a model in effect, an elaborated form of metaphor
for the target events. For example, a government official may directly shape a narrative about Saddam
Hussein or may tell a story about Hitler and invite listeners to organize world events related to Hussein by
reference to the story about Hitler. The second essay in this collection takes up the modeling function of
narrative, thus serving as a transition between the analysis of metaphor and the treatment of direct
emplotment. Specifically, Richard Gordon considers a film that emplots part of Brazilian history along
with some present-day fictional events to create cognitive models for thinking about the abstract issue of

Brazilian national identity. Thus that national identity comes to be organized and understood in relation to
particular narratives, used as models.
After Gordons essay, the collection turns to direct emplotment (an approach already begun in
Lakoffs discussion of The Fairy Tale of the Just War). Here, too, it is important to draw a distinction.
Direct emplotments may concern narrative structures that are standard and recurrent or relatively specific.
Standard and recurrent structures would include, for example, heroic tragi-comedy, with its threat/defense
sequence in which the homeland is endangered by an invasion and must protect itself through military
force. Relatively specific structures derive from particular authors or even individual works, though they
almost certainly have some common features with recurring structures. The third essay in the collection,
by Corinne Bancroft, takes up two levels of standard or recurrent structures in the emplotment of illegal
migration, particularly across the U.S./Mexico border. First, she considers the cross-cultural threat/defense
sequence. Second, she examines the more limited, liberal emplotment of border crossing. In both cases, it
is clear that the emplotments have significant consequences for government policies, and therefore human
lives.
Per Aage Brandts essay isolates a more particular emplotment. This is the fascist narrative of Spains
history and imagined future by Jos Antonio Primo de Rivera. Of course, here as elsewhere, the
emplotment is not entirely unique. As Brandt explains, there are connections with the cross-cultural
sacrificial tragi-comedy. Moreover, there are recurring features of fascist emplotment. But this narrative
prototype takes a particular form in the writings of Primo de Rivera and thus in the policies of the Spanish
fascists.
In his focus on a particular author, Brandts essay serves as a transition between emplotment and
narration. Again, narration comprises the communicative components of narrative. These are generally
divisible into implied author, narrator, narratee, and implied reader, with the real author and real reader
standing just outside the narrative, but giving it a source and result in the real world. In his examination of
emplotment in the writings of a single author, Brandt is in effect undertaking an examination of the
implied author an implied author who was apparently not at odds with the real author in this case.
Brandts essay necessarily suggests how an implied reader is constructed in Spanish fascist writings
and how this had an impact on real readers. However, this is not his main concern. The topic leads to the
fifth essay. Joseph Darda takes up the issue of readers. Specifically, he considers the increasingly
important case of new media and the ways in which the new media situate readers in relation to narratives
of political consequence. Outlets such as Facebook place readers in the position of both receivers and
transmitters of ideologically consequential narratives. Though Darda does not make this connection (and
he may well reject the analogy), the new media in some respects recall the allegorical figure of Rumor,
spreading valid and invalid emplotments throughout global communities.

Clearly, Dardas essay serves as a transition as well. It moves us from the world of narration to issues
of real world context. While Darda treats the mediatization of narrative (i.e., its embedment in particular
media of communication), Hogan turns to the encompassing political economy of storytelling. Hogan
argues that economic globalization has consequences for storytelling traditions and the diversity of those
traditions in much the same way it has consequences for languages or other aspects of culture. Hogan
stresses threats to storytelling diversity in this context: threats that are not only aesthetic, but bear on the
ways in which we think about ethics and politics. However, he points out that there are more hopeful
possibilities inherent in this situation as well possibilities that are in part connected with new media.
All the essays in the following pages indicate that the cognitive operation of narrative in politics is
theoretically significant and practically consequential. They differ in the aspects of that significance and
consequence that they consider. In putting together this collection, we have sought breadth of coverage,
treating the major areas in which cognitive narrative theory and political analysis overlap, or should
overlap. However, it is clear that these essays only scratch the surface of the complex and extensive
interconnection of cognition, narrative, and politics. Our hope is that they help to spur the development of
cognitive and narrative political analysis, a form of study that has already made important advances, but
remains in its early stages.
Address for correspondence: Department of Linguistics, University of California Berkeley, 1203
Dwinelle Hall #2650, Berkeley, CA 94720-2650 USA; email: lakoff@berkeley.edu.

George Lakoff
Linguistics Department, University of California at Berkeley
Metaphor and War: he Metaphor !ystem Used to
"ustify War in the Gulf

This article is reprinted by kind permission of the author.It first appeared on the eve of the first Gulf War
in 1991.
Metaphors can kill. The discourse over whether we should go to war in the Gulf is a panorama of
metaphor. Secretary of State Baker sees Saddam as sitting on our economic lifeline. President Bush sees
him as having a stranglehold on our economy. General Schwartzkopf characterizes the occupation of
Kuwait as a rape that is ongoing. The President says that the US is in the Gulf to protect freedom,
protect our future, and protect the innocent, and that we must push Saddam Hussein back. Saddam is
seen as Hitler. It is vital, literally vital, to understand just what role metaphorical thought is playing in
bringing us to the brink of war.
Metaphorical thought, in itself, is neither good nor bad; it is simply commonplace and inescapable.
Abstractions and enormously complex situations are routinely understood via metaphor. Indeed, there is
an extensive, and mostly unconscious, system of metaphor that we use automatically and unreflectively to
understand complexities and abstractions. Part of this system is devoted to understanding international
relations and war. We now know enough about this system to have an idea of how it functions.
The metaphorical understanding of a situation functions in two parts. First, there is a widespread,
relatively fixed set of metaphors that structure how we think. For example, a decision to go to war might
be seen as a form of cost-benefit analysis, where war is justified when the costs of going to war are less
than the costs of not going to war. Second, there is a set of metaphorical definitions that allow one to
apply such a metaphor to a particular situation. In this case, there must be a definition of cost, including
a means of comparing relative costs. The use of a metaphor with a set of definitions becomes pernicious
when it hides realities in a harmful way.
It is important to distinguish what is metaphorical from what is not. Pain, dismemberment, death,
starvation, and the death and injury of loved ones are not metaphorical. They are real and in a war, they
could afflict tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of real human beings, whether Iraqi, Kuwaiti, or
American.
METAPHOR AND WAR | 6
#$ W%& %! '(L))C!* '(L))C! %! BU!)+,!!
Military and international relations strategists use a cost-benefit analysis metaphor. It comes about through
a metaphor that is taken as definitional by most strategic thinkers in the area of international politics.
Clausewitzs metaphor: WAR IS POLITICS PURSUED BY OTHER MEANS.
Karl von Clausewitz was a Prussian general who perceived war in terms of political cost-benefit analysis.
Each nation-state has political objectives, and war may best serve those objectives. The political gains
are to be weighed against acceptable costs. When the costs of war exceed the political gains, the war
should cease.
There is another metaphor implicit here:
POLITICS IS BUSINESS.
Where efficient political management is seen as akin to efficient business management. As in a well-run
business, a well-run government should keep a careful tally of costs and gains. This metaphor for
characterizing politics, together with Clausewitzs metaphor, makes war a matter of cost-benefit analysis:
defining beneficial objectives, tallying the costs, and deciding whether achieving the objectives is
worth the costs.
The New York Times, on November 12, 1990, ran a front-page story announcing that a national
debate has begun as to whether the United States should go to war in the Persian Gulf. The Times
described the debate as defined by what I have called Clausewitzs metaphor (though it described the
metaphor as literal), and then raised the question, what then is the nations political object in the gulf and
what level of sacrifice is it worth? The debate was not over whether Clausewitzs metaphor was
appropriate, but only over how various analysts calculated the relative gains and losses. The same has
been true of the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Clausewitzs metaphor
provides the framework within which most discussion has taken place.
The broad acceptance of Clausewitzs metaphor raises vital questions: what, exactly, makes it a
metaphor rather than a literal truth? Why does it seem so natural to foreign policy experts? How does it fit
into the overall metaphor system for understanding foreign relations and war? And, most importantly,
what realities does it hide?
To answer these questions, let us turn to the system of metaphorical thought most commonly used by
the general public in comprehending international politics.
What follows is a two-part discussion of the role of metaphorical reasoning about the Gulf crisis. The
first part lays out the central metaphor systems used in reasoning about the crisis: both the system used by
foreign policy experts and the system used by the public at large. The second part discusses how the
system has been applied to the crisis in the Gulf.
-$ ., !/!,M!
-$# he state0as0person system
A state is conceptualized as a person, engaging in social relations within a world community. Its land-
mass is its home. It lives in a neighborhood, and has neighbors, friends and enemies. States are seen as
having inherent dispositions: they can be peaceful or aggressive, responsible or irresponsible, industrious
or lazy.
Well-being is wealth. The general well-being of a state is understood in economic terms: its
economic health. A serious threat to economic health can thus be seen as a death threat. To the extent that
a nations economy depends on foreign oil, that oil supply becomes a lifeline (reinforced by the image of
an oil pipeline).
Strength for a state is military strength.
Maturity for the person-state is industrialization. Unindustrialized nations are underdeveloped, with
industrialization as a natural state to be reached. Third-world nations are thus immature children, to be
taught how to develop properly or disciplined if they get out of line. Nations that fail to industrialize at a
rate considered normal are seen as akin to retarded children and judged as backward nations.
Rationality is the maximization of self-interest.
There is an implicit logic to the use of these metaphors: since it is in the interest of every person to be
as strong and healthy as possible, a rational state seeks to maximize wealth and military might.
Violence can further self-interest. It can be stopped in three ways: either a balance of power, so that
no one in a neighborhood is strong enough to threaten anyone else; or the use of collective persuasion by
the community to make violence counter to self-interest; or a cop strong enough to deter violence or
punish it. The cop should act morally, in the communitys interest, and with the sanction of the
community as a whole.
Morality is a matter of accounting, of keeping the moral books balanced. A wrongdoer incurs a debt,
and he must be made to pay. The moral books can be balanced by a return to the situation prior to the
wrongdoing, by giving back what has been taken, by recompense, or by punishment. Justice is the
balancing of the moral books.
War in this metaphor is a fight between two people, a form of hand-to-hand combat. Thus, the US
might seek to push Iraq back out of Kuwait or deal the enemy a heavy blow, or deliver a knockout
punch. A just war is thus a form of combat for the purpose of settling moral accounts.
The most common discourse form in the West where there is combat to settle moral accounts is the
classic fairy tale. When people are replaced by states in such a fairy tale, what results is a scenario for a
just war.
-$- he fairy tale of the 1ust 2ar
Cast of characters: a villain, a victim, and a hero. The victim and the hero may be the same person.
The scenario: a crime is committed by the villain against an innocent victim (typically an assault,
theft, or kidnapping). The offense occurs due to an imbalance of power and creates a moral imbalance.
The hero either gathers helpers or decides to go it alone. The hero makes sacrifices; he undergoes
difficulties, typically making an arduous heroic journey, sometimes across the sea to a treacherous terrain.
The villain is inherently evil perhaps even a monster and thus reasoning with him is out of the question.
The hero is left with no choice but to engage the villain in battle. The hero defeats the villain and rescues
the victim. The moral balance is restored. Victory is achieved. The hero, who always acts honorably, has
proved his manhood and achieved glory. The sacrifice was worthwhile. The hero receives acclaim, along
with the gratitude of the victim and the community.
The fairy tale has an asymmetry built into it. The hero is moral and courageous, while the villain is
amoral and vicious. The hero is rational, but though the villain may be cunning and calculating, he cannot
be reasoned with. Heroes thus cannot negotiate with villains; they must defeat them. The enemy-as-demon
metaphor arises as a consequence of the fact that we understand what a just war is in terms of this fairy
tale.
The most natural way to justify a war on moral grounds is to fit this fairy tale structure to a given
situation. This is done by metaphorical definition; that is, by answering the questions: who is the victim?
Who is the villain? Who is the hero? What is the crime? What counts as victory? Each set of answers
provides a different filled-out scenario.
As the gulf crisis developed, President Bush tried to justify going to war by the use of such a scenario.
At first, he couldnt get his story straight. What happened was that he was using two different sets of
metaphorical definitions, which resulted in two different scenarios:
1. The Rescue Scenario: Iraq is villain; the US is hero; Kuwait is victim; the crime is
kidnap and rape.
2. The Self-Defense Scenario: Iraq is villain; the US is hero; the US and other
industrialized nations are victims; the crime is a death threat: that is, a threat to
economic health.
The American people could not accept the second scenario, since it amounted to trading lives for oil. The
administration has settled on the first, and that seems to have been accepted by the public, the media, and
Congress as providing moral justification for going to war.
-$3 he ruler0for0state metonymy
There is a metonymy that goes hand-in-hand with the state-as-person metaphor:
THE RULER STANDS FOR THE STATE.
Thus, we can refer to Iraq by referring to Saddam Hussein, and so have a single person, not just an
amorphous state, to play the villain in the just war scenario. It is this metonymy that is invoked when the
President says we have to get Saddam out of Kuwait.
Incidentally, the metonymy only applies to those leaders perceived as rulers. Thus, it would be
strange for us, but not for the Iraqis, to describe an American invasion of Kuwait by saying, George Bush
marched into Kuwait.
-$4 he e5perts6 metaphors
Experts in international relations have an additional system of metaphors that are taken as defining a
rational approach. The principal ones are the rational actor metaphor and Clausewitzs metaphor, which
are commonly taught as truths in courses on international relations. We are now in a position to show
precisely what is metaphorical about Clausewitzs metaphor. To do so, we need to look at a system of
metaphors that is presupposed by Clausewitzs metaphor. We will begin with an everyday system of
metaphors for understanding causation.
-$7 he causal commerce system
The causal commerce system is a way to comprehend actions intended to achieve positive effects, but
which may also have negative effects. The system is composed of three metaphors.
Causal transfer: an effect is an object transferred from a cause to an affected party.
For example, sanctions are seen as giving Iraq economic difficulties. Correspondingly, economic
difficulties for Iraq are seen as coming from the sanctions. This metaphor turns purposeful actions into
transfers of objects.
The exchange metaphor for value: the value of something is what you are willing to exchange for it.
Whenever we ask whether it is worth going to war to get Iraq out of Kuwait, we are using the exchange
metaphor for value plus the causal transfer metaphor.
Well-being is wealth: things of value constitute wealth. Increases in well-being are gains; decreases
in well-being are costs.
The metaphor of well-being-as-wealth has the effect of making qualitative effects quantitative. It not only
makes qualitatively different things comparable, it even provides a kind of arithmetic calculus for adding
up costs and gains.
Taken together, these three metaphors portray actions as commercial transactions with costs and
gains. Seeing actions as transactions is crucial to applying ideas from economics to actions in general.
-$8 &isks
A risk is an action taken to achieve a positive effect, where the outcome is uncertain and where there is
also a significant probability of a negative effect. Since causal commerce allows one to see positive effects
of actions as gains and negative effects as costs, it becomes natural to see a risky action metaphorically
as a financial risk of a certain type: namely, a gamble.
RISKS ARE GAMBLES.
In gambling to achieve certain gains, there are stakes that one can lose. When one asks what is at
stake in going to war, one is using the metaphors of causal commerce and risks-as-gambles. These are
also the metaphors that President Bush uses when he refers to strategic moves in the Gulf as a poker
game where it would be foolish for him to show his cards: that is, to make strategic knowledge public.
-$9 he mathematici:ation of metaphor
The causal commerce and risks-as-gambles metaphors lie behind our everyday way of understanding risky
actions as gambles. At this point, mathematics enters the picture, since there is mathematics of gambling:
namely, probability theory, decision theory, and game theory. Since the metaphors of causal commerce
and risks-as-gambles are so common in our everyday thought, their metaphorical nature often goes
unnoticed. As a result, it is not uncommon for social scientists to think that the mathematics of gambling
literally applies to all forms of risky action, and that it can provide a general basis for the scientific study
of risky action, so that risk can be minimized.
-$; &ational action
Within the social sciences, especially in economics, it is common to see a rational person as someone who
acts in his own self-interest: that is, to maximize his own well-being. Hard-core advocates of this view
may even see altruistic action as being ones self-interest if there is a value in feeling righteous about
altruism and in deriving gratitude from others.
In the Causal Commerce system, where well-being is wealth, this view of rational action translates
metaphorically into maximizing gains and minimizing losses. In other words:
RATIONALITY IS PROFIT MAXIMIZATION.
This metaphor presupposes causal commerce plus risks-as-gambles, and brings with it the mathematics of
gambling as applied to risky action. It has the effect of turning specialists in mathematical economics into
scientific specialists in acting rationally so as to minimize risk and cost while maximizing gains.
Suppose we now add the state-as-person metaphor to the rationality-as-profit-maximization metaphor.
The result is:
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IS BUSINESS.
Here the state is a rational actor, whose actions are transactions and who is engaged in maximizing gains
and minimizing costs. This metaphor brings with it the mathematics of cost-benefit calculation and game
theory, which is commonly taught in graduate programs in international relations.
Clausewitzs metaphor the major metaphor preferred by international relations strategists
presupposes this system.
Clausewitzs metaphor: WAR IS POLITICS, PURSUED BY OTHER MEANS.
Since politics is business, war becomes a matter of maximizing political gains and minimizing losses. In
Clausewitzs terms, war is justified when there is more to be gained by going to war than by not going to
war. Morality is absent from Clausewitzs equation, except when there a political cost to acting immorally
or a political gain from acting morally.
Clausewitzs metaphor only allows war to be justified on pragmatic, not moral, grounds. To justify
war on both moral and pragmatic grounds, the fairy tale of the just war and Clausewitzs metaphor must
mesh: the worthwhile sacrifices of the fairy tale must equal Clausewitzs costs, and the victoryin the
fairy tale must equal Clausewitzs gains.
Clausewitzs metaphor is the perfect experts metaphor, since it requires specialists in political cost-
benefit calculation. It sanctions the use of the mathematics of economics, probability theory, decision
theory, and game theory in the name of making foreign policy rational and scientific.
Clausewitzs metaphor is commonly seen as literally true. We are now in a position to see exactly
what makes it metaphorical. First, it uses the state-as-person metaphor. Second, it turns qualitative effects
on human beings into quantifiable costs and gains, thus seeing political action as economics. Third, it sees
rationality as profit-making. Fourth, it sees war in terms of only one dimension of war that of political
expediency which is in turn conceptualized as business.
-$< War as violent crime
To bear in mind what is hidden by Clausewitzs metaphor, we should consider an alternative metaphor
that is not used by professional strategists nor by the general public to understand war as we engage in it.
WAR IS VIOLENT CRIME: MURDER, ASSAULT, KIDNAPPING, ARSON, RAPE, AND THEFT.
Here, war is understood only in terms of its moral dimension and not, say, its political or economic
dimension. The metaphor highlights those aspects of war that would otherwise be seen as major crimes.
There is an us-them asymmetry between the public use of Clausewitzs metaphor and the war-as-
crime metaphor. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is reported on in terms of murder, theft, and rape. The
planned American invasion is never discussed in terms of murder, assault, and arson. Moreover, the US
plans for war are seen, in Clausewitzs terms, as rational calculation. But the Iraqi invasion is discussed
not as a rational move by Saddam, but as the work of a madman. We see Us as rational, moral, and
courageous and Them as criminal and insane.
-$#= War as a competitive game
It has long been noted that we understand war as a competitive game like chess; or as a sport, like football
or boxing. It is a metaphor in which there is a clear winner and loser, and a clear end to the game. The
metaphor highlights strategic thinking, team work, preparedness, the spectators in the world arena, the
glory of winning and the shame of defeat.
This metaphor is taken very seriously. There is a long tradition in the West of training military
officers in team sports and chess. The military is trained to win. This can lead to a metaphor conflict, as it
did in Vietnam, since Clausewitzs metaphor seeks to maximize geopolitical gains, which may or may not
be consistent with absolute military victory.
The situation at present is that the public has accepted the rescue scenario of the just-war fairy tale as
providing moral justification. The president, for internal political reasons, has accepted the competitive
game metaphor as taking precedence over Clausewitzs metaphor: If he must choose, he will go for the
military win over maximizing geopolitical gains. The testimony of the experts before Congress falls
largely within Clausewitzs metaphor. Much of it is testimony about what will maximize gains and
minimize losses.
For all that been questioned in the Congressional hearings, these metaphors have not. It important to
see what they hide.
3$ ., GUL> C(+>L)C
3$# )s !addam irrational?
The villain in the fairy tale of the just war may be cunning, but he cannot be rational. You just do not
reason with a demon, nor do you enter into negotiations with him. The logic of the metaphor demands that
Saddam be irrational. But is he?
Administration policy is confused on the issue. Clausewitzs metaphor, as used by strategists,
assumes that the enemy is rational. He, too, is maximizing gains and minimizing costs. Our strategy from
the outset has been to increase the cost to Saddam. That assumes he is rational and is maximizing his
self-interest.
At the same time, he is being called irrational. The nuclear weapons argument depends on it. If he is
rational, he should follow the logic of deterrence. We have thousands of hydrogen bombs in warheads.
Israel is estimated to have between 100 and 200 deliverable atomic bombs. It would take Saddam at least
eight months and possibly five years before he had a crude, untested atomic bomb on a truck. The most
popular estimate for even a few deliverable nuclear warheads is ten years. The argument that he would not
be deterred by our nuclear arsenal and by Israels assumes irrationality.
The Hitler analogy also assumes that Saddam is a villainous madman. The analogy presupposes a
Hitler myth, in which Hitler too was an irrational demon, rather than a rational self-serving brutal
politician. In the myth, Munich was a mistake, and Hitler could have been stopped early on had England
entered the war then. Military historians disagree as to whether the myth is true. Be that as it may, the
analogy does not hold. Whether or not Saddam is Hitler, Iraq isnt Germany. It has 17 million people, not
70 million. It is economically weak, not strong. It simply is not a threat to the world.
Saddam is certainly immoral, ruthless, and brutal, but there is no evidence that he is anything but
rational. Everything he has done, from assassinating political opponents; to using poison gas against his
political enemies, the Kurds; to invading Kuwait can be seen as furthering his own self-interest.
3$- @u2ait as victim
The classical victim is innocent. To the Iraquis, Kuwait was anything but an innocent ingenue. The war
with Iran virtually bankrupted Iraq. Iraq saw itself as having fought that war partly for the benefit of
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where Shiite citizens supported Khomeinis Islamic Revolution. Kuwait had
agreed to help finance the war, but after the war, the Kuwaitis insisted on repayment of the loan.
Kuwaitis had invested hundreds of billions in Europe, America and Japan but would not invest in Iraq
after the war to help it rebuild. On the contrary: it began what amounted to economic warfare against Iraq
by overproducing its oil quota to hold oil prices down.
In addition, Kuwait had drilled laterally into Iraqi territory in the Rumailah oil field and had extracted
oil from Iraqi territory. Kuwait further took advantage of Iraq by buying its currency, but only at
extremely low exchange rates. Subsequently, wealthy Kuwaitis used that Iraqi currency on trips to Iraq,
where they bought Iraqi goods at bargain rates. Among the things they bought most flamboyantly were
liquor, and prostitutes: widows and orphans of men killed in the war, who, because of the state of the
economy, had no other means of support. All this did not endear Kuwaitis to Iraqis, who were suffering
from over 70% inflation.
Moreover, Kuwaitis had long been resented for good reason by Iraqis and Moslems from other
nations. Capital rich but labor poor, Kuwait imported cheap labor from other Moslem countries to do its
least pleasant work. At the time of the invasion, there were 400,000 Kuwaiti citizens and 2.2 million
foreign laborers who were denied rights of citizenry and treated by the Kuwaitis as lesser beings. In short,
to the Iraqis and to labor-exporting Arab countries, Kuwait is badly miscast as a purely innocent victim.
This does not in any way justify the horrors perpetrated on the Kuwaiti by the Iraqi army. But it is
part of what is hidden when Kuwait is cast as an innocent victim. The legitimate government that we
seek to reinstall is an oppressive monarchy.
3$3 What is victory?
In a fairy tale or a game, victory is well-defined. Once it is achieved, the story or game is over. Neither is
the case in the Gulf crisis. History continues, and victory makes sense only in terms of continuing
history.
The presidents stated objectives are total Iraqi withdrawal and restoration of the Kuwaiti monarchy.
But no one believes the matter will end there, since Saddam would still be in power with all of his forces
intact. General Powell said in his Senate testimony that if Saddam withdrew, the US would have to
strengthen the indigenous countries of the region to achieve a balance of power. Presumably that means
arming Assad, who is every bit as dangerous as Saddam. Would arming another villain count as victory?
If we go to war, what will constitute victory? Suppose we conquer Iraq, wiping out its military
capability. How would Iraq be governed? No puppet government that we set up could govern effectively
since it would be hated by the entire populace. Since Saddam has wiped out all opposition, the only
remaining effective government for the country would be his Baath party. Would it count as a victory if
Saddams friends wound up in power? If not, what other choice is there? And if Iraq has no remaining
military force, how could it defend itself against Syria and Iran? It would certainly not be a victory for us
if either of them took over Iraq. If Syria did, then Assads Arab nationalism would become a threat. If Iran
did, then Islamic fundamentalism would become even more powerful and threatening.
It would seem that the closest thing to a victory for the US in case of war would be to drive the
Iraqis out of Kuwait; destroy just enough of Iraqs military to leave it capable of defending itself against
Syria and Iran; somehow get Saddam out of power, but let his Baath party remain in control of a country
just strong enough to defend itself, but not strong enough to be a threat; and keep the price of oil at a
reasonably low level.
The problems: it is not obvious that we could get Saddam out of power without wiping out most of
Iraqs military capability. We would have invaded an Arab country, which would create vast hatred for us
throughout the Arab world, and would no doubt result in decades of increased terrorism and lack of
cooperation by Arab states. We would, by defeating an Arab nationalist state, strengthen Islamic
fundamentalism. Iraq would remain a cruel dictatorship run by cronies of Saddam. By reinstating the
government of Kuwait, we would inflame the hatred of the poor toward the rich throughout the Arab
world, and thus increase instability. And the price of oil would go through the roof. Even the closest thing
to a victory doesnt look very victorious.
In the debate over whether to go to war, very little time has been spent clarifying what a victory
would be. And if victory cannot be defined, neither can worthwhile sacrifice.
3$ 4 he %raA vie2point
The metaphors used to conceptualize the Gulf crisis hide the most powerful political ideas in the Arab
world: Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. The first seeks to form a racially-based all-Arab
nation; the second, a theocratic all-Islamic state. Though bitterly opposed to one another, they share a
great deal. Both are conceptualized in family terms: an Arab brotherhood and an Islamic brotherhood.
Both see brotherhoods as more legitimate than existing states. Both are at odds with the state-as-person
metaphor, which sees currently existing states as distinct entities with a right to exist in perpetuity.
Also hidden by our metaphors is perhaps the most important daily concern throughout the Arab
world: Arab dignity. Both political movements are seen as ways to achieve dignity through unity. The
current national boundaries are widely perceived as working against Arab dignity in two ways: one
internal and one external.
The internal issue is the division between rich and poor in the Arab world. Poor Arabs see rich Arabs
as rich by accident, by where the British happened to draw the lines that created the contemporary nations
of the Middle East. To see Arabs metaphorically as one big family is to suggest that oil wealth should
belong to all Arabs. To many Arabs, the national boundaries drawn by the colonial powers are illegitimate,
violating the conception of Arabs as a single brotherood and impoverishing millions.
To those impoverished millions, the positive side of Saddams invasion of Kuwait was that it
challenged national borders and brought to the fore the divisions between rich and poor that result from
those lines in the sand. If there is to be peace in the region, these divisions must be addressed, say, by
having rich Arab countries make extensive investments in development that will help poor Arabs. As long
as the huge gulf between rich and poor exists in the Arab world, a large number of poor Arabs will
continue to see one of the superstate solutions either Arab nationalism or Islamic fundamentalism as
being in their self-interest, and the region will continue to be unstable.
The external issue is the weakness. The current national boundaries keep Arab nations squabbling
among themselves and therefore weak relative to Western nations. To unity advocates, what we call
stability means continued weakness.
Weakness is a major theme in the Arab world, and is often conceptualized in sexual terms, even more
than in the West. American officials, in speaking of the rape of Kuwait, are conceptualizing a weak,
defenseless country as female and a strong, militarily powerful country as male. Similarly, it is common
for Arabs to conceptualize the colonization and subsequent domination of the Arab world by the West
especially the US as emasculation.
An Arab proverb that is reported to be popular in Iraq these days is that it is better to be a cock for a
day than a chicken for a year. The message is clear: it is better to be male: that is, strong and dominant for
a short period of time; than to be female: that is, weak and defenseless for a long time. Much of the
support for Saddam among Arabs is due to the fact that he is seen as standing up to the US, even if only
for a while, and that there is a dignity in this. If upholding dignity is an essential part of what defines
Saddams rational self-interest, it is vitally important for our government to know this, since he may be
willing to go to war to be a cock for a day.
The US does not have anything like a proper understanding of the issue of Arab dignity. Take the
question of whether Iraq will come out of this with part of the Rumailah oil fields and two islands, giving
it a port on the Gulf. From Iraqs point of view, these are seen as economic necessities if Iraq is to rebuild.
President Bush has spoken of this as rewarding aggression, using the Third-World-countries-as-children
metaphor, where the great powers are grown-ups who have the obligation to reward or punish children so
as to make them behave properly. This is exactly the attitude that grates on Arabs who want to be treated
with dignity. Instead of seeing Iraq as a sovereign nation that has taken military action for economic
purposes, the president treats Iraq as if it were a child gone bad, who has become the neighborhood bully
and should be properly disciplined by the grown-ups.
The issue of the Rumailah oil fields and the two islands has alternatively been discussed in the media
in terms of saving face. Saving face is a very different concept than upholding Arab dignity and insisting
on being treated as an equal, not an inferior.
3$7 What is hidden Ay seeing the state as a person?
The state-as-person metaphor highlights the ways in which states act as units and hides the internal
structure of the state. Class structure is hidden by this metaphor, as is ethnic composition, religious rivalry,
political parties, the ecology, and the influence of the military and of corporations (especially
multinational corporations).
Consider national interest. It is in a persons interest to be healthy and strong. The state-as-person
metaphor translates this into a national interest of economic health and military strength. But what is in
the national interest may or may not be in the interest of many ordinary citizens, groups, or institutions,
who may become poorer as the GNP rises and weaker as the military gets stronger.
The national interest is a metaphorical concept, and it is defined in America by politicians and
policy makers. For the most part, they are influenced more by the rich than by the poor, more by large
corporations than by small business, and more by developers than ecological activists.
When President Bush argues that going to war would serve our vital national interests, he is using a
metaphor that hides exactly whose interests would be served and whose would not. For example, poor
people, especially blacks and Hispanics, are represented in the military in disproportionately large
numbers, and in a war the lower classes and those ethnic groups will suffer proportionally more casualties.
Thus war is less in the interest of ethnic minorities and the lower classes than the white upper classes.
Also hidden are the interests of the military itself, which are served when war is justified. Hopes that,
after the Cold War, the military might play a smaller role have been dashed by the presidents decision to
prepare for war. He was advised, as he should be, by the National Security Council, which consists
primarily of military men. War is so awful a prospect that one would not like to think that military self-
interest itself could help tilt the balance to a decision for war. But in a democratic society, the question
must be asked, since the justifications for war also justify continued military funding and an undiminished
national political role for the military.
3$8 ,nergy 'olicy
The state-as-person metaphor defines health for the state in economic terms, with our current
understanding of economic health taken as a given, including our dependence on foreign oil. Many
commentators have argued that a change in energy policy to make us less dependent on foreign oil would
be more rational than going to war to preserve our supply of cheap oil from the Gulf. This argument may
have a real force, but it has no metaphorical force when the definition of economic health is taken as fixed.
After all, you dont deal with an attack on your health by changing the definition of health. Metaphorical
logic pushes a change in energy policy out of the spotlight in the current crisis.
I do not want to give the impression that all that is involved here is metaphor. Obviously, there are
powerful corporate interests lined up against a fundamental restructuring of our national energy policy.
What is sad is that they have a very compelling system of metaphorical thought on their side. If the debate
is framed in terms of an attack on our economic health, one cannot argue for redefining what economic
health is without changing the grounds for the debate. And if the debate is framed in terms of rescuing a
victim, then changes in energy policy seem utterly beside the point.
3$9 he Bcosts6 of 2ar
Clausewitzs metaphor requires a calculation of the costs and the gains of going to war. What, exactly,
goes into that calculation and what does not? Certainly American casualties, loss of equipment, and
dollars spent on the operation count as costs. But Vietnam taught us that there are social costs: trauma to
families and communities, disruption of lives, psychological effects on veterans, long-term health
problems in addition to the cost of spending our money on war instead of on vital social needs at home.
Also hidden are political costs: the enmity of Arabs for many years, and the cost of increased
terrorism. Barely discussed is the moral cost that comes from killing and maiming as a way to settle
disputes. And there is the moral cost of using a cost metaphor at all. When we do so, we quantify the
effects of war and thus hide from ourselves the qualitative reality of pain and death.
But those are costs to us. What is most ghoulish about the cost-benefit calculation is that costs to
the other side count as gains for us. In Vietnam, the body counts of killed Viet Cong were taken as
evidence of what was being gained in the war. Dead human beings went on the profit side of our ledger.
There is a lot of talk of American deaths as costs, but Iraqi deaths arent mentioned. The metaphors
of cost-benefit accounting and the fairy tale villain lead us to devalue the lives of Iraqis, even when most
of those actually killed will not be villains at all, but simply innocent draftees or reservists or civilians.
3$; %merica as hero
The classic fairy tale defines what constitutes a hero: it is a person who rescues an innocent victim and
who defeats and punishes a guilty and inherently evil villain, and who does so for moral rather than venal
reasons. If America starts a war, will it be functioning as a hero?
It will certainly not fit the profile very well. First, one of its main goals will be to reinstate the
legitimate government of Kuwait. That means reinstating an absolute monarchy, where women are not
accorded anything resembling reasonable rights, and where 80% of the people living in the country are
foreign workers who do the dirtiest jobs and are not accorded the opportunity to become citizens. This is
not an innocent victim whose rescue makes us heroic.
Second, the actual human beings who will suffer from an all-out attack will, for the most part, be
innocent people who did not take part in the atrocities in Kuwait. Killing and maiming a lot of innocent
bystanders in the process of nabbing a much smaller number of villains does not make one much of a hero.
Third, in the self-defense scenario where oil is at issue, America is acting in its self-interest. But, in
order to qualify as a legitimate hero in the rescue scenario, it must be acting selflessly. Thus, there is a
contradiction between the self-interested hero of the self-defense scenario and the purely selfless hero of
the rescue scenario.
Fourth, America may be a hero to the royal families of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, but it will not be a
hero to most Arabs. Most Arabs do not think in terms of our metaphors. A great many Arabs will see us as
a kind of colonial power using illegitimate force against an Arab brother. To them, we will be villains, not
heroes.
America appears as classic hero only if you dont look carefully at how the metaphor is applied to the
situation. It is here that the state-as-person metaphor functions in a way that hides vital truths. The state-
as-person metaphor hides the internal structure of states and allows us to think of Kuwait as a unitary
entity, the defenseless maiden to be rescued in the fairy tale. The metaphor hides the monarchical
character of Kuwait, and the way Kuwaitis treat women and the vast majority of the people who live in
their country. The state-as-person metaphor also hides the internal structures of Iraq, and thus hides the
actual people who will mostly be killed, maimed, or otherwise harmed in a war. The same metaphor also
hides the internal structure of the US, and therefore hides the fact that is the poor and minorities who will
make the most sacrifices while not getting any significant benefit. And it hides the main ideas that drive
Middle Eastern politics.
3$< hings to Do
War would create much more suffering than it would alleviate, and should be renounced in this case on
humanitarian grounds. There is no shortage of alternatives to war. Troops can be rotated out and brought
to the minimum level to deter an invasion of Saudi Arabia. Economic sanctions can be continued. A
serious system of international inspections can be instituted to prevent the development of Iraqs nuclear
capacity. A certain amount of face-saving for Saddam is better than war. As part of a compromise, the
Kuwaiti monarchy can be sacrificed and elections held in Kuwait. The problems of rich and poor Arabs
must be addressed, with pressures placed on the Kuwaitis and others to invest significantly in
development to help poor Arabs. Balance of power solutions within the region should always be seen as
moves toward reducing, not increasing armaments; positive economic incentives can used, together with
the threat of refusal by us and the Soviets to supply spare parts needed to keep hi-tech military weaponry
functional.
If there is a moral to come out of the Congressional hearings, it is that there are a lot of very
knowledgeable people in this country who have thought about alternatives to war. They should be taken
seriously.
Address for correspondence: University of Georgia, 290 S. Hull Street, Athens, GA 30602 USA.
Email: rgordon@uga.edu.
Richard A. Gordon
Professor of Portuguese and Spanish, Department of Romance Languages
Director, Latin American and Caribbean Studies Institute
A Narratie of Nationa! Reform: "uanto a!e ou # por
$ui!o% &'(()*

Quanto vale ou por quilo? tells the story of to grou!s of "hara"ters: one that !rofits from the "ontinue#
misery of mu"h of the $ra%ilian !o!ulation, an# another that tries to e&!ose an# !unish those in the !rivate
an# !oliti"al se"tors ho are res!onsi'le for su"h e&!loitation. $y e&!loring !arallels 'eteen a time mar(e#
'y Afri"an slavery in $ra%il an# the !resuma'ly more illuminate# !resent, the film attem!ts to lay 'are a
systemi" so"ial an# e"onomi" #is!arity that "ontinues to 'e intertine# ith ra"e. )his arti"le hy!othesi%es
that the narrative lo"ates the solution for some of the nation*s oes in the realm of so"ial i#entity. +ore
s!e"ifi"ally, it argues that the film !ro!oses that the "ountry*s !erni"ious ine,uities are groun#e# in the
!er!etuation of nefarious an# !ersistent attri'utes in un#erstan#ings of $ra%ilianness among mu"h of the
!o!ulation. -f $ra%il is to im!rove, the film a#vises, then !revailing #efinitions of the national grou! must 'e
mo#ifie#. .raing on resear"h in so"ial !sy"hology, an# or( in the area of "ognitive a!!roa"hes to
literature an# "ulture, this arti"le see(s to #e"i!her hat sort of intervention on i#entity the film is ma(ing,
an# hi"h of its elements might lea# to influen"ing vieers* so"ial i#entities.

+e,-ords: film, slavery, so"ial i#entity, nationalism, "lass, ra"e, history.

The title of this Brazilian film which, in English, would be roughly Whats the Price, or Do You
Charge by the Kilo? alludes to one of the key topics evoked by the narrative: the commodification of
poor people by members of the middle and upper classes. The film critiques policies akin to Conservative
British Prime Minister David Camerons notion of the Big Society, which shift safety net programs into
the private sector.
1
Quanto vale portrays such political stances as enabling the more privileged sectors of
society to earn a living, in collusion with politicians, by running or working for non-governmental
organizations dedicated to helping the poor. It proposes that there is little motive among the privileged to
seek lasting economic reform, since so many people are earning a living through poverty.
In order to suggest the historical roots of present-day ills or, perhaps more precisely, to signal that
social injustices have remained constant for centuries, even if their manifestation has changed the film
alternates between scenes that take place in contemporary Brazil, and others set in the Eighteenth

1
The 2010 Conservative Manifesto section, Build the Big Society, has the heading: we will use the state to hel
sti!ulate social action, heling social enterrises to deliver u"lic services and training new co!!unity organi#ers
to hel achieve our a!"ition of every adult citi#en "eing a !e!"er of an active neigh"ourhood grou$ %e will
direct funding to those grous that strengthen co!!unities in derived areas, and we will introduce &ational
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 26
Century.
2
It explores parallels between a time marked by African slavery in Brazil and a presumably more
illuminated present characterized by the proliferation of NGOs, in an attempt to lay bare a perennial
systemic social and economic inequality that continues to be intertwined with race. The de-centralized
story exposes a thread of interconnections among rich, poor, and middle-class characters in both the past
and present settings, thus proposing transhistorical analogies for specific aspects of this web of
relationships during the chronologically distant scenes. The film blurs the epochal divisions through
various formal means, such as the use of the same actors or the same character names, or the fleeting and
phantasmagorical appearance of Eighteenth-Century characters in Twentyfirst-Century scenes.
Essentially, Quanto vale is about how the self-congratulatory white directors of an organization that
strategically assists NGOs Marco Aurlio and Ricardo as well as other relatively light-skinned and
wealthy characters, profit from the continued misery of the population. It is also about the attempts of
Arminda and Dido, along with other relatively darker-skinned and poorer men and women, to expose and
punish the corrupt and hypocritical directors of that organization. The film makes it clear that it is not
principally about the actions of individual villains, or even the shortcomings or destructiveness of such
organizations in general. The narrative leaves no doubt that its focus is the nation, politics, and national
population. In the middle of the film, the disparate story lines are linked by a crystallization of the films
critique of the solidarity market.
3
A female voiceover, which begins there are an estimated 14 to 22,000
social institutions, NGOs, and associations throughout Brazil,
4
makes clear that the topic treated in the
film transcends the specific stories of the protagonists, and that these representative tales have national
relevance. The narrator argues that, if the money involved in the thousands of such Brazilian NGOs were
used directly to help homeless children, their problems would be permanently solved. Later, one of the
films most positively portrayed characters, Dido, refers, in national terms, to some of the problems that
provoke his decision to seek a Robin Hood-like income redistribution
5
through kidnapping: that tells us
something about this country,
6
he says.
7
Toward the end of the film, one of the two men who run the
NGO (featured in Quanto vales critique), Ricardo, declares to a large crowd that his partner, Marco
Aurlio who had been kidnapped by Dido and mutilated was still working to make our country

Citi#en Service, initially for 1' year olds, to hel "ring our country together (Invitation 2010: )*+$
2
The lot of Quanto vale ou por quilo? is insired in art , as the ending credits of the fil! state , "y the short
stories -ai contra !.e "y Machado de /ssis and Cr0nicas do 1io colonial "y &ireu Cavalcanti$
)
2riginal: mercado de solidariedade$ 3nless otherwise noted, all translations fro! the fil! co!e fro! the
su"titles$
4
2riginal: esima-se que existam de 14 mil a 22 mil entidades assistenciais ou ONGs e associaes em todo o rasil!
5
2riginal: redistri"ui#o de renda6 !y translation$
'
2riginal: isso di$ al%uma coisa so"re este pa&s$
*
7n this case he was co!aring the rison syste! to a !odern8day slave shi (navio ne%reiro+, which "roadens and
solidifies the lin9ing of slavery and conte!orary institutions in Bra#il$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 22
better.
8
Besides these explicit references to the nation, Quanto vales large cast is economically and
racially diverse, giving the impression that it seeks to represent a cross-section of the national population.
In this way, I see the film suggesting to Brazilian spectators that they are all implicated.
This article hypothesizes that the film locates the solution for some of the nations main woes in the
realm of social identity. More specifically, it proposes that, even if the countrys pernicious inequalities
are executed through political and economic forces, they are grounded in, and made possible by, the
perpetuation of nefarious and persistent attributes in understandings of Brazilianness among much of the
population. In other words, the narrative indicates that there are grave problems with the country, which
means that there are problems with the Brazilian people. If Brazil is to improve, the film advises, then
prevailing definitions of the national group must be modified. Drawing on research in social psychology
and work in the area of cognitive approaches to literature and culture, this article seeks to decipher what
sort of intervention on politics and identity Quanto vale is making, and which of the films elements
might tend to influence viewers social identities.
.. Proo/ing a socia! identit, crisis
Quanto vale ou por quilo? punctuates its opening credits with the first scene, clearly set in the past.
Through this short, stand-alone narrative, the film introduces one of the main ways that it tries to engage
spectators and realize its social critique. The initial image is a medium shot showing two white men
dragging away a shirtless and disoriented black man while a black woman holds onto one of his arms and
screams for them to let him go. The film then cuts to a point-of-view shot that moves toward the two
white men as they place shackles around the neck of the dazed man. Spectators hear the angry protest
uttered by the character with whom they are visually aligned,
9
as if they themselves are speaking: whats
going on? What are you doing? Hes my slave! You cant do this! You cannot invade my property and
take what belongs to me! This is outrageous! Follow me. Im going to get my documents.
10
The credits
are temporarily suspended as a deep-voiced, authoritative, and ubiquitous narrator begins to speak. (His
matter-of-fact-sounding interventions tend to describe, often with ironic dissonance, what the film
dramatizes.) Here, the voiceover reveals that the indignant slave owner was once a slave herself and
emphasizes that she is seeking a solution through official, legal means, which the film soon shows to be
ineffective. He says:
Before dawn, October 13, 1799. In the outskirts of the kingdoms capital, an expedition ordered by

:
2riginal: tra"al'ando para mel'orar o nosso pa&s!
;
My use of the ter!s align!ent and allegiance are "ased on Murray S!iths wor9$
10
2riginal: que isso? O que que voc(s est#o )a$endo? *sse escravo meu+ ,oc(s n#o podem )a$er isso+ ,oc(s
n#o podem entrar na min'a propriedade e lavar o que meu+ Isso um a"surdo+ ,oc(s v#o comi%o! *u vou pe%ar
os documentos$ The last sentence is !y translation$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 23
slave hunters captures slaves from homes in the hinterland. Among them is Antnio, taken from a
small ranch owned by Joana Maria da Conceio. After seeing her slave carried off, Joana gathers
documents, puts together a small party, and follows the hunters into the bush. Joana is a strong
woman. A freed slave, following the established rules, she saved money to buy slaves to help her
run a small estate. Now, Joana had been robbed. And, believing in justice and the strength of
numbers, she brings together her neighbors to face the expedition leader.
11

As he speaks we see long shots of the progress through the woods of Joana and her party. They reach a
house; and, as one of the white men knocks on the door, the film intercuts a close-up of the face of the
slaves owner, a black woman, played by the well-known actress Zez Motta. Motta portrayed enslaved
characters in two popular films by director Carlos Diegues of which many Brazilian viewers would be
aware: Xica da Silva (1976) and Quilombo (1984). As the door opens, spectators see an old, fat white man
in close-up, who chuckles diabolically as he removes the shackles in another shot roughly from Joanas
point-of-view; they hear the woman whose perspective they share scream her complaint. About halfway
through her discourse, the film shifts away from the subjective camera and frames her in close-up (Figure
1): you are responsible for this injustice! This slave is mine! I have the papers here. You are stealing
from me. Youre a thief! Thieves belong in jail! Yes, resort to violence! My violence is here in these
documents, in the papers, in my rights. White thief!
12
On ethical grounds, spectators would not tend to
identify with Joana, because she is a slave owner. However, the mere fact that they are put in her place
begs closer consideration of the films representation of this character and the effect that it might have on
how spectators interact with the movie. There is, in my view, something interesting going on here.

11
2riginal: madru%ada de 1- de outu"ro de 1.//! Nos arredores da capital do vice-reinado0 uma expedi#o
encomendada de capit#es-do-mato captura escravos em resid(ncias da 1rea rural! 2entre as presas0 est1 3nt4nio0
retirado de uma pequena c'1cara de propriedade de 5oana 6aria da 7oncei#o! 3o presenciar o con)isco de seu
escravo0 5oana re8ne documentos0 )orma uma pequena comitiva0 e parte atr1s dos capit#es0 mata adentro! 5oana
uma mul'er )orte! 3l)orriada e a%indo con)orme o sistema acumulou recursos para comprar escravos que
auxiliassem em sua pequena propriedade! 3%ora0 5oana )ora rou"ada! *0 acreditando na 9ustia e na )ora coletiva0
9unta seus vi$in'os para co"rar e en)rentar o mandante da expedi#o$ The final sentence is !y translation$
12
2riginal: o sen'or o respons1vel por essa in9ustia+ *sse escravo meu+ *u ten'o aqui os documentos! O sen'or
est1 me rou"ando0 o sen'or um ladr#o+ :u%ar de ladr#o na cadeia+; <sem0 usem de viol(ncia+ 3 min'a
viol(ncia est1 aqui0 nesses documentos0 nos papis0 nos meus direitos+ ; ranco ladr#o+ The translation fro! !y
violence is here< onward is !ine$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 27

=igure 1: Slave8owner >oana de!ands the return of the slave$
If any other property had been appropriated, this sequence would convincingly cast her for viewers
as a good and injured person who is attempting, against the odds, to seek redress through non-violent,
legal means: the sort of story that would normally provoke sympathy, or what could be called ethical
alignment. Along the same lines, the film soon shows that she was later condemned for disturbing the
peace during this confrontation: an outcome that would, in another narrative, typically imply that the law
fails to protect marginalized people. However, since spectators would certainly find slavery to be
reprehensible, there would tend to be an ethical disconnect with regard to this character, or what might be
called an ethical non-alignment. For that reason, they would likely feel no allegiance toward her as a
result of the injustice that she denounces. This gap that the film establishes between viewers and the
character conflicts with its forcing of identification with her through, on the one hand, visual alignment,
which often accompanies general efforts to get spectators to identify with a character; and, on the other, a
standard narrative of a person who experiences injustice at the hands of a relatively more powerful
person. Indeed, that she is a black woman, and he a white man, would normally evoke for spectators
broad patterns of racially grounded social injustice. Contributing to these typical identification-producing
techniques is the way Joanas frustration coincides with the more intense and righteous grief of a woman
seemingly a relative who cries out to the white men to let their prisoner go, which would tend to
bolster and endorse Joanas attitude. Similarly, the white mans laugh nudges spectators toward the
woman in the ethical domain. Finally, the persistent visual alignment of viewers with Joana during this
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 28
sequence reinforces the way the film goads spectators to stand with her morally. All these alignments
together seem to tempt or dare spectators to feel some allegiance for a character for whom they have good
reason to feel no allegiance, thus promising to produce a conflicted disposition toward the character.
13

This sort of tension pervades the film and is central to the way it divulges its commentary about Brazil
and the Brazilian population.
Through Joana and the contradictory signals that the film sends to spectators with regard to
identification during these opening moments, Quanto vale starts to suggest that, if spectators look more
closely at themselves, they may not like what they see. Of course, this sequence, which merely (and
fleetingly) overlays onto spectators the ideals of Joana with winking irony, cannot alone hope to provoke
substantial, lasting introspection about their own values. However, it does possibly have an effect in the
parallel that the film establishes between the historical narratives about slavery and the contemporary
narratives that deal fundamentally with NGOs dedicated to helping the poor. The film uses similar
techniques of identification with respect to more negatively portrayed characters in the present-day
portions of the film. Unlike the spectator interface with Joana, however, the film does seem to anticipate
that spectators may very well feel at least at first genuinely and unresistingly aligned, and even allied,
with middle-class and rich characters who ostensibly want to help others. However, Quanto vale proposes
that, like slavery, the massive economy of socially oriented NGOs actually perpetuates poverty and social
injustice. The film emphasizes this analogy through the more privileged characters eventually and
invariably revealing their selfishness and insensitivity, which compromises spectators allegiance and
overlays with uneasiness their alignment with these characters. The inauguration of identification tension
with Joana attempts to guide how viewers interpret contemporary characters whose values the film shows
to be flawed. Associating a slave owner to those who run NGOs clarifies and intensifies its critique. The
film reminds spectators that embracing ideals that may seem legitimate to some in certain contexts may
well be despicable and harmful.
Quanto vale uses the analogy between the Eighteenth Century and the present as a key means to
critique Brazilian society as it currently is; or, perhaps more accurately, the film deploys its historical
intermingling and its identification-provoking tactics in an effort to get Brazilian spectators to take a step
back and think about the values they personally appreciate and condemn in relation to the national group
of which they are part. The opening scene, then, primes viewers for the films proposal that Brazilians
reconsider certain values shared by much of the national population, which we might also conceive of in
terms of commonly held understandings of national identity.

1)
The engage!ent with >oana the fil! invites viewers to e?erience is a9in to what S!ith calls erverse
allegiance$ @is assess!ent that erverse allegiance is actually rather rare, and that !ost fictions that elicit
erverse allegiances do so only te!orarily or strategically (1;;;: 222+, is highly relevant to this oening scene$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 26
My use of the concept of national identity draws on social psychology, especially social identity
theory. In 1972 Henri Tajfel, who initiated this line of research, defined social identity in this way: the
individuals knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value
significance to him of this group membership (quoted in Hogg 2006: 113). Tajfel and John C. Turner, in
an influential 1979 article, defined social identity as those aspects of an individuals self-image that
derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging;
14
they had in mind social
groups such as those defined by religion, ethnicity, race, or nationality. They go on to assert that
individuals assign to these categories, or social groups, value-laden attributes and characteristics (Tajfel
& Turner 1986: 16). With social identity theory in mind, I wish to explore the ways in which the film
proposes that spectators evaluate part of their self concept. In this more specific context, I am examining
how the film encourages Brazilian spectators to rethink the cluster of attributes they have in mind when
they think about the national category of their social identities or what constitutes the value and
emotional significance of the national ingroup for them. As shorthand, I sometimes refer to those
celebrations of the national category of identity that carry with them the promotion of a certain definition
of the group as nationalism, defined broadly by Patrick Hogan (2009: 4) as: any form of in-group
identification for a group defined in part by reference to a geographical area along with some form of
sovereign government over that area. I am interested in the ways that Quanto vale realizes its version of
nationalism. If a particular quality such as cordiality or solidarity or charity is already linked in a viewers
mind to her understanding of Brazilianness, then the films conspicuous treatment of that quality has the
potential to provoke reflection about the understanding she has of the Brazilian national group. The
consequences of that reflection depend on several factors, such as whether the film suggests that the
quality should be held in esteem or questioned, as well as the degree and nature of identification that is
attempted with respect to the character articulating the view.
Overall, the film principally destabilizes the attributes of dominant Brazilian nationalisms and
merely alludes to its own alternative nationalism. Another way to understand its agenda is that it calls into
question commonly held values, such as the ones just mentioned, and proposes the possibility of replacing
them. As is typical of Bianchi films such as Cronicamente invivel (2000) and Os inqulinos (2009), rather
than suggesting a realistic solution, the film generally promotes what might be termed a national-identity
crisis among spectators. One of the promotional items for the film (Figure 2) alludes to this aim: it is a
postcard in the form of an employment ad that reads, seeking optimistic VOLUNTEER spectator content
with the state of the nation.
15
The film challenges this optimism. It invites people to feel uncomfortable,
conflicted, and disposed to reconsider the principles they embrace. One comment on the film published in

14
The citation co!es fro! a 1;:', revised version of the original essay$
15
2riginal: =rocura-se *spectador ,O:<N>?@IO 7ontente e Otimista com aA?B situa#o do pa&s!
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 29
the pressbook, and thus endorsed by those responsible for publicizing it, speaks to this point. Eduardo
Giffoni Florido writes that the film can cause a certain discomfort;
16
it alludes to a society alienated
from itself, in a permanent crisis of values.
17
In the same pressbook, Eduardo Souza Lima writes of the
director: his business is to make people uncomfortable and to inflict reflection.
18
In similar ways,
Christian Petermann, refers to how the director slaps the face of the spectator (2008: 251)
19
and Paulo
Santos Lima says that the film torpedoes Brazilian morality (2008: 253).
20
What Im attempting here is
to explore the nature and consequences of the spectator interface they refer to.

=igure 2: -ro!otional flyer for the fil!$
We might understand the films efforts as attempting to raise consciousness about a broken system
and the historical inertia of injustice. In other words, the film is about a fundamental lack of agency,
among Brazilian spectators, to engage the national power structure and exact change. Arguably the most
positively portrayed character, Arminda, a slave in the sequences set in the past who helps, in the
contemporary context, to run a modest NGO that brings computers to children in the slums, is shown to
fail when she attempts even modest, ad hoc social reform. When she works within the system to expose

1'
2riginal: pode causar um certo descon)orto$
1*
2riginal: uma sociedade alienada de si mesma0 em permanente crise de valores!
1:
2riginal: o seu ne%Ccio incomodar e in)li%ir re)lex#o;!
1;
2riginal: es"o)eteia a cara do espectador$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 2:
theft and corruption in the government and more powerful NGOs, those whom she accuses Ricardo and
the Vereador arrange for someone to kill her. The only hint at the possible empowerment of non-
wealthy people is Didos kidnapping scheme, an approach to social change that Arminda endorses in an
alternate ending to the film after she convinces her would-be assassin not to kill her and instead to
consider her plan. The film suggests that agency comes at a very high and violent cost under current
circumstances. A lasting solution could only come from the unlikely situation of the Brazilian population,
as a whole, changing the values that underlie what the film sees as the countrys systemic injustice.
Fundamentally, Quanto vale indicates that the near-complete impotence of the victims of social injustice
or those who sympathize with them derives from existing understandings of the national in-group
among all citizens. Specifically, it calls attention to what it sees as the counterintuitive consequences of
values that spectators might already associate with Brazilianness, such as charity, solidarity, and
generosity; and which, the film implies, ironically ensure the perpetuation of the lack of agency.
'. A!ignment, a!!egiance, and the cinematic se!f
If the films efforts to promote partial identification with characters that hold little appeal, like Joana,
seek to expose flawed ideals held dear in definitions of the national in-group, the attempt to achieve much
stronger identification among spectators with more appealing, but largely powerless characters (with the
possible exception of Dido) tends to emphasize lack of agency among Brazilian spectators with regard to
the nations situation.
21
I am interested in the tactics the film uses to promote spectator identification with
both more appealing and less appealing characters; and the possible implications of that spectator-
character relationship, if achieved: the part, in other words, that this interface plays in the films social
critique and its challenge to existing understandings of Brazilianness.
My approach to spectator identification draws on Murray Smiths useful breakdown of these
dynamics into allegiance: being favorably disposed toward a character; and alignment: coinciding with
the character in some way, such as visually through a point-of-view shot (see e.g. Smith 1999: 220).
Together, allegiance and alignment can help explain what many people have in mind when they say that
they identify with a character, or what leads to people feeling that way. Smiths concepts combine
fruitfully with Berys Gauts understanding of the same phenomena.
22
I find particularly compelling
Gauts concept of imaginative or aspectual identification and how it facilitates detailed observations about
the relationship between characters and spectators. Gaut understands this sort of interface to mean that

20
2riginal: dispara torpedos na moral "rasileira$
21
&onetheless, identification with Aido, for e?a!le, forces consideration of one radical ath to agency:
resonding violently to a flawed nation whose wealth is concentrated a!ong a few$
22
See -lantinga (2010+ for a view that areciates and revises S!iths concets of align!ent and allegiance$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 29
viewers identify with a character based on diverse aspects of the character with which they coincide
(1999: 205). He divides aspectual identification into several types, including perceptual: seeing what a
character sees; affective: imagining feeling what a character feels; motivational: being privy to the
motives of a character; and epistemic: knowing what a character knows. He anticipates other possible
categories (1999: 208). I would expand his list to take into account e.g. ethical identification: a spectator
shares a sense of good and bad with a character, whose ethics manifest themselves through behaviour or
the revelation of attitudes or beliefs; and social identity identification: the spectator, like the character, is
part of the Brazilian national in-group or the Catholic in-group or the university-professor in-group,
whichever the case may be.
Gauts imaginative identification corresponds roughly with Smiths concept of alignment. Because I
find Smiths term alignment simple and intuitive, I prefer to use it and infuse the concept with some of
Gauts insights. So I refer to affective alignment, where my usage is broader than Gauts, incorporating
feeling what a character feels, which Gaut contemplates through the phrase empathic identification (Gaut
1999: 207); visual alignment rather than perceptual, taking into account e.g. when a spectator sees what a
character sees, rather than merely imagining it, such as through a point-of-view shot; motivational
alignment; epistemic alignment; social identity alignment; and ethical alignment.
With regard to allegiance, I generally follow Murray Smiths definition. I appreciate Smiths
distinction between alignment and allegiance and his assertion that there can be alignment without
allegiance which stands in contrast with authors who have argued or implied that alignment with a
character necessarily creates a basic sympathy for that character (Smith 1995: 187). He writes that to
become allied with a character, the spectator must evaluate the character as representing a morally
desirable (or at least preferable) set of traits, in relation to other characters within the fiction. I have
chosen the term allegiance in part because it captures this combination of evaluation and arousal (Smith
1995: 188). I understand evaluation of moral desirability to be a kind of alignment: ethical alignment; so I
see spectator allegiance with a character as resulting from alignment. More specifically, I believe that
allegiance derives from the accumulation of special sorts of alignment in particular ethical alignment,
which positively predispose a viewer toward the character; and social identity alignment, which appeals
to the tendency for people to show bias toward their in-groups.
23

Combining Smith and Gaut enables one to make more nuanced observations about cinematic
invitations for spectators to identify in diverse ways with characters which is at the core of the nature

2)
/s TaBfel and Turner (1;:':1)+ write: the la"oratory analogue of real8world ethnocentris! is in8grou "ias C
that is, the tendency to favor the in8grou over the out8grou in evaluations and "ehavior$ &ot only are
inco!ati"le grou interests not always sufficient to generate conflict<, "ut there is a good deal of e?eri!ental
evidence that these conditions are not always necessary for the develo!ent of co!etition and discri!ination
"etween grous (Brewer, 1;*;6 Turner, 1;:1+$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 30
and effectiveness of Quanto vales social commentary. This way of looking at identification helps one
recognize a spectrum of approaches and intensities of efforts to provoke identification with different
characters, even unappealing ones; and evaluate the possible consequences of those efforts if they are
successful. Overall, it allows one to understand better how films might provoke alignment between a
heterogeneous sample of spectators and an individual character.
I would like to address one of the salient implications of the character-spectator interface.
Sometimes, films seek to stimulate the sort of allegiance and alignment that invites spectators to see a
character as a guide for understanding one of their social groups. I call this sort of interface a cinematic-
self effect: the film proposes that a viewer accept a character as a model for some aspect of her self-
concept: more specifically, some group within her social identity. I refer not to just any sort of solidarity
and empathy that the film might engage, such as might be associated with personal identity. Rather, I
refer to allegiance/alignment related to social identity. In other words, one category of the spectators
social identity intersects with the same category of an empathetically perceived protagonist, in such a way
that the spectator feels inclined to imagine herself in that persons place. The way the protagonist
conceives that aspect of her identity, and how she reconciles that category with others in a complex social
identity, invites the spectator to follow the same path.
Gauts concept of empathic identification (1999: 206-208), which I categorize under the rubric of
affective alignment, can help to elucidate further what I have in mind with the cinematic-self effect. He
defines it as a dynamic in which one feels toward the situation that confronts the character what the
character (fictionally) feels toward it (1999: 207). He sees it as one possible result of what he calls
imaginative identification, or imaginarily putting oneself in anothers position (1999: 208), which
derives from the workings of aspectual identification.
24
One might understand empathic identification to
be an especially profound combination of allegiance and alignment. Gaut argues that sharing the
characters represented emotions comes from ones imaginarily projecting oneself into the characters
situation (1999: 208).
25
One way to conceive the sort of potentially enticing and lasting version of the
cinematic-self effect I have been considering would be as something akin to or certainly related to
empathic identification, but in the realm of social identity rather than emotion. The spectator doesnt
merely imagine being in a protagonists shoes as she struggles with e.g. simultaneous membership in
different in-groups and how to define them, or experiences a crisis in values. Rather, the cinematic self
might help a spectator to experience vicariously similar internal conflicts and similar resolutions of those
conflicts.

24
Daut sees the sy!athy as one ossi"le ushot of identification, since one can sy!athi#e with so!eone
without e!loying any sort of i!aginative roBection into his osition (1;;;: 20:+$
25
/s @ogan oints out, we have a strong, neurocognitive roensity toward e!athy (200;: ;'+$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 36
An especially clear example of the promotion of the cinematic-self effect is when a film treats
characters as metaphors for the nation or the national in-group. In such cases, everything about the
character has potential impact on understandings of the national category of identity. We see this in
several contemporary Brazilian films about slavery, which encourage in Brazilian spectators allegiance
and alignment with enslaved Brazilian characters.
26
This cluster of films offers through engaging,
attractive characters that share with spectators affiliation in the same national group what would be, for
some viewers, an understanding of what it means to be Brazilian that is somewhat different from the one
they had before watching the film. Through a national stand-in protagonist, a film can tether to the nation
specific values, such as a revolutionary inclination, or promote the symbolic association of a racial or
ethnic group with the country. If a film persuades viewers to embrace a protagonist as a cinematic self,
then the revision of prevailing understandings of the national community that it offers is more likely to
find purchase.
Quanto vales proposal to rethink Brazilianness among spectators who are part of the national in-
group uses tactics that promise to lead to spectator identification with characters who, together, represent
something of a cross-section of the national population and who all, inevitably, act as partial cinematic
selves even less appealing ones; and have, as a result, distinct potential effects on spectators. This film,
however, is unlike the Brazilian slavery films that I have referenced. They generally couple allegiance
with social identity and other sorts of alignment, and thus invite spectators to embrace enduringly the
group attributes modeled by the cinematic selves. Quanto vale primarily tries to provoke an identity crisis
and to upset what it portrays as beliefs commonly held among Brazilians. It carries out this manifest aim
through viewer alignments with the less appealing characters, leading to what I see as a series of perhaps
more fleeting, certainly more uncomfortable cinematic-self effects. The film seeks to open the eyes of
spectators to the harmfulness of the status quo. Indeed, the film aligns viewers in one way or another with
characters who can be found throughout a continuum of appeal. It infuses both more and less attractive
characters with conflicting qualities that promise to provoke a fraught or ambiguous interpretation of
them by spectators. This promoted viewer-character relationship is part and parcel of the films general
inclination toward the destabilization of the spectator self-concept. At the same time, the film offers some
revisions to understandings of what it means to be Brazilian, albeit to a lesser extent than the slavery films
mentioned. It communicates this part of its message through the most appealing characters: the ones for
whom a spectator would tend to develop the most allegiance. While alignment with the less attractive
characters constitutes a provocative challenge for spectators to recognize negative qualities they might

2'
E?a!les include: Dica da Eilva (1;*'+, Quilom"o (1;:4+, 7'ico @ei (1;:5+, O 3lei9adin'oF =aix#o0 %lCria e supl&cio
(2000+, and 7a)undC (2005+$ These fil!s are the focus of a "oo9 !anuscrit in which 7 study the caacity of such
fil!s on slavery to influence understandings of national identity a!ong sectators$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 32
possess, alignment with the more attractive characters and the allegiance that derives from their appeal
is an invitation to embrace a new and presumably more progressive self-concept. If alignment with the
films negative characters promotes an unsettling cinematic-self effect that one would be inclined to shake
off as expeditiously as possible, alignment and allegiance with the more positively portrayed characters
may lead to a lasting and welcome cinematic-self effect.
0. Ambiguous engagements -ith nationa! stand1ins on the continuum of appea!
Perhaps the most important aspect of the films efforts to encourage identification to provoke a crisis
in values are the ones that potentially align spectators with the less appealing characters. The film
provokes identification with people whom it ultimately censures in ways that may lead spectators to take
note of attributes of themselves they might not want to acknowledge. Quanto vale suggests that, whether
or not they recognize it, Brazilian spectators are themselves the problem. The film does this in part by
aligning a viewer first visually, and then in other ways, with a character who later says or does something
clearly reprehensible, thus causing ethical nonalignment. Such is the case with Joana during the opening
scene. Such a tactic may promote reconsideration of values or at least discomfort. It proposes that viewers
imagine themselves as wicked and contemplate whether or not some version of those flawed values
resides in them. Similarly, the film at times provokes unexpected and uncomfortable ethical or ideological
alignment with a character it has already cast negatively. One sees this when some apparently innocuous
position that the spectator holds is espoused by an unappealing person especially when this position is
ultimately shown to be flawed. The result may cause a reappraisal of that notion.
27

A spectator may come to Quanto vale having no reason to find fault with the NGO-based system of
social aid that the film critiques, and indeed have no reason to denounce efforts that derive from the
NGOs values of social solidarity and charity. When the film represents someone supporting that system,
initially the viewer would likely feel ethically aligned toward perhaps preliminarily allied with the
character. This would perhaps be the case regarding spectator engagement with the two directors of the
NGO at the heart of the films critique: Ricardo and Marco Aurlio. At first, they appear dedicated to
increasing the efficiency of efforts to alleviate suffering among the less fortunate. However, with little
delay, the film highlights aspects of their character with which spectators would tend not to identify, such
as their cruelty, greed, and corruption. When the film points out the failings of the system that they
represent, spectators are forced to confront an ideal they held that they might not have considered flawed.
The film argues that such NGOs both provide a source of income for the middle class that depends on the
perpetuation of poverty and act a breeding ground for corruption. The resulting ethical nonalignment

2*
Daut (1;;;: 21'+ discusses how fil!s alert sectators to their own flawed values through such identification$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 33
fosters reconsideration of the qualities these characters embody, which viewers might associate with
Brazil.
Similar dynamics surround another character: the working poor, white woman Mnica, through
whom the film critiques, among other things, the class system and the system of domestic servitude in
Brazil. She is first seen helping an NGO that feeds homeless people, dreaming about founding her own
NGO. Mnica embodies ideas that are portrayed as decent or at least not clearly reprehensible. The film
delays revelation of Mnicas negative attributes along with the explicit condemnation of the solidarity
system, thus helping to promote, among some spectators, an initial allegiance toward Mnica through
ethical alignment. About halfway through the narrative, the film gradually shifts its portrayal of the
character, blending continuing alignments with non-alignments.
Spectators are given access to Mnica in her kitchen as she prepares for her daughters wedding
reception. She dreamily surveys the sumptuous spread in her kitchen, which a loan from her boss Nomia
has financed. A long take with a steadycam follows Mnica around in a medium shot as she looks over
the food, sometimes becoming a subjective camera showing her perspective. The camera placement
aligns viewers visually with Mnica, such as when it follows the standing womans gaze and tilts down to
display a seated girl, Ktia, who is black. Mnica tells her that she is lucky to have been taken in by a
family that treats her as a daughter and hints that she might adopt her. As she makes this proposal, the
camera shifts to the girls perspective and angle. This perhaps previews for spectators the distance and
ethical non-alignment that the film will soon propose be adopted with respect to the older woman.
Overall, this scene invites ethical alignment with Mnica among those who view her offer of adoption as
virtuous rather than paternalistic.
Shortly after her seeming charity toward Ktia, however, Mnica offers her as property to another
person to pay a debt. This encourages those spectators who may have felt an ethical alignment with her
previously to probe the ultimate implications of their own values. A medium shot shows Mnica talking
outside the apartment with Nomia (Figure 3), who insists that Mnica move to the country with her to
work on a new project: a clearly undesirable proposal for Mnica. The start of the dialogue reinforces the
invitation to feel ethically aligned with Mnica on the basis of Nomias exploitation of a power disparity
between the two women. In lieu of relocating with her patron, Mnica makes a counteroffer: what if I
introduced you to a very gifted girl? Shes neat, does everything, and shes no trouble at all. She can do
housework; shes trustworthy, clean. She eats very little. That would solve it, wouldnt it?
28

Significantly, before she even looks down and to her left to where Ktia is kneeling on the ground, the

2:
2riginal: e0 se eu te apresentar uma menina prendada0 limpin'a0 )a$ tudo+ N#o d1 tra"al'o a"solutamente
nen'um!!! Ga$ tudo0 tudo da casa0 de con)iana! :impin'a0 n#o come quase nada! ,oc( ia )icar satis)eita0 n#o 0
No(mia?
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 37
camera follows Mnicas thought and swings down to frame the girl as Mnica begins her proposition
in this way aligning spectators with her in a new way. The film accompanies the womens nefarious
words with what one might call cognitive alignment. This scenes provocation of conflict and tension
with respect to Mnica recalls the opening scene. The film follows visual, cognitive, and perhaps at first
ethical alignment with Mnica with likely ethical non-alignment. The dialogue and timing of the camera
movement invites reconsideration of Mnicas apparent generosity and reflection among spectators who
may have felt aligned with the initial manifestations of Mnicas character, about whether their
presumably fine beliefs are similarly flimsy and their behavior, in the end, comparably self-serving.

=igure ): M0nica leads with her "oss to accet the girl FGtia as ay!ent for a favor$
The way in which the film uses the more positively portrayed characters the ones through which it
offers a possible revision of the national in-group definition that spectators might have in mind and the
relationship it encourages spectators to establish with those characters is relatively straightforward.
Quanto vale ethically aligns spectators with several innocent victims: minor characters, who are slaves in
the past and poor usually dark-skinned people in the present. These characters remind viewers
constantly of the consequences of maintaining the status quo, of the Brazilian population continuing to
esteem the same values. The point is made particularly explicit in the historically remote context of
slavery. That context helps, in turn, through analogy, to highlight the nature and degree of modern-day
suffering. These characters help expose what the film sees as the hypocritical, shallow embrace or ironic,
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 38
unexpected outcomes of such seemingly good dispositions as charity and solidarity. The two characters
with the greatest appeal Arminda and Dido play somewhat different roles in the films commentary,
but both also suffer as a result of the status quo. The film encourages varied alignment with these people
and does not undermine identification as it does with the negative characters. Perhaps most importantly, it
generally shows them to be good, kind people, who distinguish right from wrong in ways with which
spectators would likely agree. This ethical alignment is probably the most important factor in producing
allegiance; in turn, it encourages a positive disposition toward the characters attitudes and beliefs.
If the film combines alignment and non-alignment to the less appealing characters to create tension
and provoke a crisis of values among spectators, it uses Arminda who plays an enslaved character of the
same name in the Eighteenth-Century scenes to show the realization of that crisis and one approach to
take in its wake. Throughout the film, Armindas consciousness of the flaws in the status quo increases to
the point at which she does something about it. The film builds on general alignment with her to model
how spectators might re-think how they understand what Brazilians should value. She is arguably the
films most appealing cinematic self. Armindas solution to her frustration with the injustice of which she
becomes conscious is to carry out an ad hoc and limited revision of values. By accusing the guilty of
corruption and hoping that the existing system will work to punish them, she proposes that charity if it
is superficial and self-serving be replaced by fairness and accountability among those qualities esteemed
by citizens. While the emulation of Armindas earnest effectuation of values among spectators may seem
appealing and realistic, the film makes evident the impotence of such action. In the end, the official and
unofficial power structure has her killed. Notwithstanding the limitations of her characters capacity to
model a path for profound change, the embrace of Arminda as a cinematic self with regard to the national
category of social identities may still contribute to the films persuasive apparatus and the social remedies
it proposes. Her lack of agency in the context of the existing value structure may cause a realization
among Brazilian spectators that they are similarly powerless, so long as the continued acceptance of
current values and current institutional structures is assumed.
Through strategies of alignment, Dido is likewise cast as a potential cinematic self or model for
aspects of a spectators self-concept. He represents someone who, like some Brazilian spectators, does not
require a national identity crisis to recognize the need for change. Before the action of the film, he already
has internalized the lessons that viewers witness Arminda learning and that some might learn with her.
In contrast to Armindas strategy, his solution is to work violently outside the system by kidnapping
rich people to better society through redistribution of wealth. The film tempers the negative impact of
his radical and violent approach, which could cause ethical non-alignment among some spectators. It does
this by promoting consistent and strong identification with the character through ethical, ideological, and
other sorts of alignment such as social-identity and epistemological alignment. The scene in which the
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 36
film introduces viewers to Dido, for example, encourages ethical alignment with him through his
respectful, affectionate, and serene interaction with his mother, who has come to visit him in jail (Figure
4). Dido reveals to his interlocutor (and spectators) his intention to do something about the social injustice
he condemns: Mother Judite, I dont think its right for us to keep on living like this. Suffering and
paralyzed, doing nothing about it. I think that they have to suffer, too, so that they experience some
oppression. For things to be more just.
29
Dido is clearly the hero of the film. In more than one instance,
he speaks directly to spectators and articulates distillations of Quanto vales social critique.

=igure 4: >udite visits her son Aido in Bail$
One scene toward the end of the film begins with Dido talking to a kidnapped Marco Aurlio (Figure
5), then continues with Didos voiceover as we see a now-released, bandaged, and limping Marco Aurlio
entering an ornate theater for a ceremony in which his partner Ricardo will receive an award for his social
engagement. Dido says: two hundred fifty thousand dollars. Kidnapping is a modern trade. It calls for
violence, because it works as advertising to encourage negotiations. Isnt that what really counts
nowadays? Business, marketing. Free enterprise. Kidnapping isnt merely raising funds. Its also income
redistribution.
30
Near the end of the voiceover, the film cuts to a still black-and-white image of a shirtless

2;
2riginal: 6#e 5udite0 eu n#o ac'o certo a %ente )icar vivendo sempre assim! Eo)rendo e parado0 sem )a$er nada!
*u ac'o que eles t(m que so)rer tam"m pra passar um pouco de opress#o! =ra ser mais 9usto$ The translation is
!ine$
)0
2riginal: 2HI mil dClares! EeqJestro um ne%Ccio moderno! =recisa de viol(ncia porque ele )unciona como
propa%anda para estimular a ne%ocia#o! N#o isso o que mais importa 'o9e em dia? usiness0 marKetin%0 livre
iniciativa! EeqJestro n#o sC capta#o de recursos! L tam"m redistri"ui#o de renda$ The final sentence is !y
translation$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 39
and smiling boy as a would-be inspirational musical accompaniment gradually increases in volume and
the shot of the boy optimistically acquires color. The image of the boy that accompanies Didos
comments is reframed as the camera cuts to an extreme long shot that reveals it to be part of a projection
in a theater. For spectators who have watched the entire film and have seen several of these commercials,
it is clear that what they have been seeing is the end one of the Stiner NGO spots.
In addition to the way the film shows Dido taking control of his social context through kidnapping a
corrupt rich person, it facilitates his virtual domination of the audiovisual medium through which the
narratives stand-ins for the existing national power structure Marco Aurlio and Ricardo
communicate their values. His kidnapping strategy and what one might call his representational hijacking
constitute an acquisition of agency, though limited and ephemeral. The only possibility for substantially
challenging social injustice that the film offers is the widespread adoption of the values Dido promotes.
Spectators special access to Didos alternate narrative voiceover for the commercial which one might
see in terms of epistemological, ethical, ideological, and motivational alignment distances them from
the perspective of the privileged audience and lures them closer to the protagonist. The scenes editing
gesture represents a final and private invitation both to internalize a revised set of values and to take
specific action against those who most benefit from the nations current, ailing value system. In this
regard, Dido stands as the films most potentially consequential cinematic self.

=igure 5: Aido e?lains to Marco /urHlio how the ranso! de!ands will "e !ade$
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 3:
If most of the narrative seeks to provoke crisis, Dido largely in harmony with Arminda models
for Brazilian spectators how they might rearrange the values that should be esteemed and rejected among
the national population. It suggests that charity is ultimately harmful and that full socioeconomic equality
should be sought instead. It implies that, if these notions are embraced by enough of the population, if
enough Brazilians think differently about what it means to be Brazilian, then this shift would lead to
increased agency for all, with resulting social and political change. However, until the status quo is
abandoned and a revised perspective toward social injustice assumed, the film proposes, through Dido, an
alternative for the powerless one it portrays as more effective than Armindas. It gives spectators
permission to view violence toward the rich as just and honorable. The film proposes that, to achieve any
true social change in the current context, less fortunate citizens and their allies have little choice but to
partially revise their social identities, incorporating into their new understanding of Brazilianness not only
some of the intuitively appealing values fostered by Arminda, but also some of the more distasteful ones
promoted by Dido. The alternate ending of the film that takes place during the closing credits adds a final
layer to the proposal for social change through spectator change. In the alternate ending, Arminda is not
shot and killed. Instead, she seems to convince her would-be assassin to embrace Didos values. In this
way, her character assumes new viability as a cinematic self. Through Arminda, Quanto vale ou por
quilo? models not only the revision of dominant values, but also the dissemination of those ideas as
would be needed to realize radical national reform.
A /A00A)-1E 23 /A)-2/A4 0E320+ 5 39
R232R2NC2S
Bianchi, S. (director) (2005). Quanto vale ou por quilo?
Florido, E.G. (2005) Quanto vale um ser humano? Pressbook de Quanto vale ou por quilo? 3.
Gaut, B. (1999) Identification and emotion in narrative film. In Plantinga, C. & Smith, G.M. (eds.)
Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion (200-216). London: The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Hogan, P.C. (2009). Understanding Nationalism: On Narrative, Cognitive Science, and Identity.
Columbus, OH, USA: The Ohio State University Press.
Hogg, M.A. (2006) Social identity theory. In Burke, P.J. (ed.), Contemporary Social Psychological
Theories (111-136). Stanford, CA, USA: Stanford University Press.
Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010. (2010). East Sussex, UK:
Pureprint Group.
Lima, E.S. (2005) Citao de um comentrio publicado em O Globo. Pressbook de Quanto vale ou por
quilo? 8.
Lima, P.S. (2008). Em nome de uma solidariedade perversa. Quanto Vale ou por Quilo? dispara
torpedos na moral brasileira. In Aplauso, C. (ed.), Quanto vale ou por quilo? Roteiro de Eduardo
Benaim, Newton Cannito, e Srgio Bianchi. Um filme de Srgio Bianchi (253-255). So Paulo:
Imprensa Oficial. (De: Folha de So Paulo 20/05/2005).
Petermann, C. (2008) Quanto Vale ou por Quilo? Bianchi mira na hipocrisia social. In Aplauso, C.
(ed.), Quanto vale ou por quilo? Roteiro de Eduardo Benaim, Newton Cannito, e Srgio Bianchi.
Um filme de Srgio Bianchi (251-252). So Paulo: Imprensa Oficial. (De: Guia da Folha de So
Paulo 20/05/2005).
Plantinga, C. (2010). I followed the rules, and they all loved you more: Moral judgment and attitudes
toward fictional characters in film. Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 34: 3451.
Smith, M. (1999). Gangsters, cannibals, aesthetes, or apparently perverse allegiances. In Plantinga, C. &
Smith, G.M. (eds.) Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion (217-238). London: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Smith, M. (1995). Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J.C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In Worchel, S. &
Austin, W.G. (eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 2
nd
edition (7-24). Philadelphia:
Psychology Press.
Tajfel, H. (1972). Social categorization. English manuscript of La categorization sociale. In Moscovici, S.
Introduction la Psychologie Sociale, Volume 1 (272-302). Paris: Larousse.
Address for correspondence: 4851 N. Avenida de Franelah, Tucson, AZ 85749 USA; Email:
corinnebancroft@gmail.com.
Corinne Bancroft
St. Gregory College Preparatory School
Emplotting Immigration: The Rhetoric of Border
Narratives

Most everyone in the U.S. knows the stories told about illegal immigration, whether or not they subscribe to
those stories. Right-wing narratives explain how illegals or aliens invade our country to steal our !obs and
smuggle drugs. "iberal narratives !usti#y the illegal entrance o# desperately poor people who come here to
#eed their #amilies. $atrick %ogan, in Understanding Nationalism, reveals the national and psychological
purposes o# such stories and explains how they are #ormed. &his essay addresses the relationship between
these national narratives and migrants actual experiences. 's long-time volunteer o# a humanitarian aid
organi(ation on the U.S.)Mexico border, the author has heard stories about and witnessed the violence and
death caused both by the desert and law en#orcement. &he more #amiliar narratives #rame and conse*uently
limit debate about the nations border en#orcement policies, which #orce people to the most isolated desert
areas where these atrocities occur. &hrough personal anecdotes about motivations #or crossing and
experiences in the desert, migrants o##er critical stories that challenge standard emplotments, providing a new
perspective on an apparently #amiliar problem.

ey!ords: national narrative, immigration, +o More ,eaths, borders, testimonio.

No More Deaths is a Tucson-based organization that provides humanitarian aid food, water, and
medical attention to people crossing the deadliest section of the US Mexico border. After joining the
organization in 2007, on one of my first patrols, I encountered a sixty-one year-old man lying on his back
in an arroyo a little way off the trail. He had with him only a cotton sweatshirt and a gallon of yellow
cow-tank water. Hola. Cmo est seor? Somos voluntarios de la iglesia y traemos comida y agua.
Me llamo Corinne. Sitting up, he answered in perfect English and told us his story. Enrique I have
changed a few facts about him, including his name, to protect his identity has lived for the past forty
years in Phoenix, Arizona, where he owns a company that builds pools. His son lives there; his ex-wife
lives there; all his friends live there. He was stopped at one of the random checkpoints (which tend to
be anything but arbitrary in terms of both the people they actually check and the parts of town the stops
are set up in); they checked his papers and, as a result, he got deported to Mexico. Mexico, for Enrique, is
a foreign country where he has nothing and knows no one. After you are deported, you have a criminal
record and it is nearly impossible to return legally, so his only option was to walk home.
Enriques story is more than just an isolated anecdote. There is, or should be, an important
relationship between the immigration stories debated on a national level and migrants personal
testimonies. The ability for a migrant to tell her own story, let alone determine the outcome, is
compromised by national immigration stories. Enriques story is important, in part, because it resists the
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 23
common paradigms we use to understand immigration and, by extension, the assumptions we make about
immigrants. When imagining an undocumented person, how often does anyone, regardless of political
orientation, picture someone like Enrique: an older man who owns his own company, speaks fluent
English, and has all his relatives in the States? How well does his story fit the narrative prototypes that
shape our political debates on immigration? The answers seem clear: not often and not well.
In the following pages, I will examine the ways in which the national debate over immigration is
emplotted, isolating the main structures and considering their impact on actual migrants. Specifically,
one can identify three anti-immigrant or national story structures that follow an invasion prototype: the
national security story, the economic story and the drug story. In opposition to these, one can also identify
a pro-immigrant or humanitarian story. Interestingly, these stories have some fundamental assumptions
in common, despite their perceived difference in political stance. An examination of these story
prototypes will lead to three points about the effects of these stories and our ethical obligations as citizens.
First, the people whose stories do fit one of these plot structures usually the humanitarian economic
strand become merely characters in other peoples arguments. For instance, because Enrique continued
walking and is probably, due to documentation issues, reluctant to share or correct his story, I can
manipulate his story for whatever rhetorical purpose I want; ironically, I use it to argue that it is unethical
to do so. Second, these national paradigms prevent us from hearing the stories, like Enriques, that do not
fit and from fully knowing the other horrors and atrocities that occur in the desert. As one sees how
Enriques story can be made to fit but actually resists national prototypes, one realizes how
disconnected one is from individuals actual stories. Last, and most important, these national stories are
so strong that they usually create migrants stories for them; even when they dont determine the
trajectory of their experiences, they force their actions. In other words, the three invasion stories, by
motivating and justifying the increased militarization of the border, create the circumstances in which
Enrique and others make the decision to cross the desert. The fear that this creates either of crossing
again or getting sent to detention centers silences people from sharing their experiences.
". #$%IEN IN&$SI'N( ) N$TI'N$% PR'T'T*PES
In Understanding Nationalism, Patrick Colm Hogan argues that, if one accepts Benedict Andersons
famous assertion that nations are imagined communities, one can also understand the cognitive
processes that facilitate this imagination. For Hogan, narrative is the prime tool that organizes and
prioritizes emotions, even in political contexts. He explains, emplotment helps to specify our
understanding, imagination, emotional response, ethical evaluation, and, most important, concrete actions
with respect to the national in-group and national out-groups (Hogan 2009: 200). Historical and current
events, unlike traditional stories, have no clear beginning, middle and end; they have no identifiable
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 24
author, narrator, reader, or even single text for that matter they are complex, interconnected, and very
often contested. Hogan explains that people impose narrative structure onto these events in order to make
them coherent, rationalize their emotional significance and use them as justifications for actions often
towards nationalist ends. As Hogan (2009: 168) points out, the emplotment of nationalism is deeply
consequential for our social and political lives because it organizes legitimate emotions into concrete
actions. He writes:
Insofar as they involve strong emotions, our spontaneous attributions of causality may remain at
least partially impervious to our knowledge about actual causal relations. In other words, our
emotion systems may continue to spontaneously project a single, absolute, malevolent origin to
conflict, even when higher cortical systems have inferred that this is not the case (Hogan 2009:
183).
Organizing our emotions into stories helps us not only to imagine our national collectivity, but also to
identify public responses to common experiences.
Hogan identifies three common prototypes that people have repeatedly used to emplot social and
political events. The most relevant here is the invasion/heroic prototype. The basic plot structure of this
prototype begins with the threat of an invasion that incites national fear and implies a narrative ending of
aggressive defense in order to protect the in-group. Hogan explains how this sort of emplotment emerges
through different genres in a variety of media; he draws examples from the Bible as well as popular films
and presidential addresses. He suggests that the frequency of invasion/heroic plot structures in our
common literary history allows politicians like Bush or F.D.R. to fit national events such as
September 11
th
, or Pearl Harbor, into this structure in a way that justifies war: i.e., aggressive defense. He
uses Independence Day, a blockbuster film in which the United States defends itself from an alien
invasion, as a popular example of this prototype. He writes:
Obviously, fictional space aliens are the culprits in the film. However, films such as this encourage
us to model real and contemporary events on such a fiction and on the historical events of the
Second World War. They create a context in which it is easier to see, for example, the September
11 bombings as an invasion, thus the initiation of a war / the beginning of a heroic plot, rather than,
say, a criminal act (2009: 236).
Hogan explains how, in the film, the imminent extra-terrestrial invasion presents a threat that unites
national sub-groups people of different races, classes, and sexualities against a common enemy that
they must defend themselves from and eventually punish. Hogan suggests that Bush similarly used
September 11
th
as the beginning of a story that implies and requires a specific ending: that is, domination
of the out-group, specifically the devastation of the group that engaged in the bombings (Hogan 2009:
242). He discusses in depth how this emplotment helped lead to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In addition to Independence Day, a number of movies follow the heroic/invasion plot structure that
cast aliens as the invading threat and an aggressive defense as the appropriate response. War of the
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 25
Worlds and Invasion of the Body Snatchers, for instance, are stories of alien invasions that have been
retold multiple times in the past century. War of the Worlds is a good example of a film that sets the stage
for the immigration emplotment. It centers on aliens who invade because they desire our resources.
Although the extraterrestrial threat remains the same mysterious, violent, and seemingly invincible the
role of the protagonist has shifted in the past fifty years. Everyone, from the local California sheriff to the
secretary of state, turns to Dr. Clayton Forrester (Gene Barry 1953) to understand and conquer the
invasion, while Ray Ferrier (Tom Cruise 2005) is just another divorced dad who happens to have his two
kids the weekend the aliens invade. While this seems like a minor discrepancy, it actually reveals a lot
about how the invasion/heroic prototype has shifted. Although Dr. Forrester is a renowned scientist, his
genius does not help him stop the aliens; Earths bacteria kill them. Ray Ferrier, on the other hand, has no
special qualifications to help him stop the aliens; in fact, he has trouble even managing his children. He
actively and aggressively defends himself and his family even though resistance seems hopeless. Ray
Ferriers actions offer a model for what individual Americans should do in the context of an invasion
when a heroic figure particularly a heroic governmental figure does not step up. The government
presumably has initial responsibility for the welfare and protection of the people. In this amended
narrative prototype one may call it the Ferrier Variation the government does not fulfill its
obligations, and an ordinary citizen must heroically shoulder the responsibility. One can see just how
many anti-immigration speakers argue that they are responding to an invasion the federal government is
failing to deal with. Ultimately, in the 2005 version, even with Ray Ferriers heroics, biology again stops
the aliens, suggesting that humans have a natural right to inhabit the Earth. A similar shift occurs in the
Invasion of the Body Snatcher movies, where the method of invasion is infiltrating and taking over human
bodies via pods or bacteria. While both the 1953 and 1978 versions end inconclusively the invasion is
not thwarted the heroic actions of Carol Bennell (Nicole Kidman 2007), an ordinary divorced mom,
make possible complete inoculation of the alien force. These emplotments have interesting, albeit subtle,
repercussions for the immigration issue: they contribute to the idea that immigrants are less than human
(illegal aliens) and that their deaths due to natural causes (the many people who die in the desert
borderlands) are a consequence of the fact that, unlike us, they do not have a natural right to live in this
place.
Interestingly, Avatar follows an almost identical plotline except the roles are reversed: this time
humans are the malevolent force invading another planet, Pandora, in search of resources. Although Jake
Sully (Sam Worthington) is initially trained as an Avatar to serve as bodyguard for a scientist, he is soon
recruited to spy for the private military that wants to conquer Pandora. This half-hearted attack dissolves
as Jake, of course, falls in love with a Navi woman. The military quickly turns to the War of the Worlds
kill-and-conquer approach in order to take the planets essential resources. The stories of these invasions
(War of the Worlds, Invasion of the Body Snatchers, and Avatar) suggest that the native population
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 22
deserve to defend themselves, and one wants them to succeed. In the case of War of the Worlds and
Avatar, the fact that the nature of the planet itself bacteria and tree energy respectively is the saving
force for the native population suggests that they have a natural right to that place. As many critics have
pointed out, Avatar has a liberal tone: it is decidedly anti-imperialist, pro-environment, and anti-war
(think of the aggressive invasion of Iraq). Even in light of these progressive gestures, Avatar nonetheless
contributes to the same prototypical emplotment of border-crossing-as-invasion. Some of the more
politically correct critiques question the white mans role as Navi saviour (see Brooks Messiah
Complex) and imply that a more appropriate hero would belong to the native ethnic group. This
ironically, and unintentionally, suggests more conformity to the invasion/ heroic prototype: the hero
should belong to the in-group. In this way, Avatar may contribute to the national emplotment of
immigration, even if that is directly contrary to the filmmakers intent.
I am not arguing that these films are anti-immigrant propaganda; rather, they contribute to a certain
cognitive structure that understands an aggressive defense as the appropriate and natural response to
perceived threats. Political figures and others implicitly use these structures to organize peoples pre-
existing fears into coherent immigration narratives. For instance, the first statement on the Federal
Reform and Enforcement Coalitions website reads simply put, the FIRE Coalition is about solutions to
the largest invasion in the history of the world happening right under our noses; that is the invasion and
occupation of the United States by illegal aliens from foreign nations. In the same vein, the Americans
for Legal Immigration declare on their website that because of illegal immigration, our nation's very
survival and identity are being threatened along with our national security. This way of framing the story
is not limited to extreme right-wing groups; Colorados former House Representative, Tom Tancredo, has
said:
Massive immigration into this country both legal and illegal when it combines with this cult of
multiculturalism that permeates our society, this philosophy that we have to battle with every bit as
much as we have to battle with illegal immigration. We have to battle with this philosophy of
extreme multiculturalism that tries to tear Americans apart, divide us into little groups.
Of course, the invading forces in the movies represent real threats to the characters: the aliens are violent
and intent on total domination. Needless to say, their counterparts undocumented people or illegal
aliens do not represent such a malevolent danger, despite what these right-wing groups would have one
believe. Why, then, is there such intense fear? Among other things, action-movie rhetoric organizes pre-
existing emotions terror around September 11
th
, anxieties about the economy, and confusion about
drugs into illogical fear of illegal aliens articulated in threats bearing on national security, economics,
and drugs. By discussing the national immigration debate in the same terms and using the same narrative
structure as these invasion movies, politicians, the media, extremists, and others channel emotional
responses into a particular and narrow form of action: increased border security. In analyzing the three
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 26
perceived threats, I hope to show both that the purported solution of increased militarization is illogical
(and ineffective); and that, if the real problems are taken seriously and thought through, logical responses
are not that complicated.
The first threat terrorism uses September 11
th
as the opening chapter for an intensified rhetoric of
fear that justifies not only the wars in the Middle East but also increased homeland security. Hogan
explains how Bush, in his remarks on 14 September 2001, framed September 11
th
as the beginning of the
War on Terror plot, which casts Al Qaeda specifically, and militant Islamists (or sometimes just Muslims)
more generally, as the antagonist. In his 2002 State of the Union, Bush connected his aggressive response
abroad with the need for territorial defense:
Time and distance from the events of September the 11
th
will not make us safer unless we act on its
lessons. America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by
vigorous action abroad and increased vigilance at home. My budget nearly doubles funding for a
sustained strategy of homeland security, focused on four key areas: bioterrorism; emergency
response; airport and border security; and improved intelligence.
Having not mentioned border enforcement in either the 14 September remarks or the address he gave on
the 21
st
, which introduced his plan for homeland security, Bush, four months later, included securing the
border as one of the four central focuses of homeland security. Although the mission of the department
focuses exclusively on prevention of and dealing with terrorist attacks, much of the work of the
department has concentrated on securing the U.S. southern borders. In these 2001 attempts to fulfill this
heroic plot that is, to defend from aggressors locally while punishing them abroad Bush connected the
extreme Islamic terrorist enemy far away with the people crossing the southern border. Consciously or
not, he expanded the enemy group, seemingly based on their common skin color.
Although Bush failed to secure the U.S. southern borders, he established the rhetorical imperative so
strongly that today nine years into the story, so to speak politicians and lobbyists must respond to,
rather than explain, that need. This specific emplotment of fear of immigrants as national security threat
is powerful enough that, in addition to evading our collective logic, it crosses party lines. Both Obama
and McCains campaign platforms included comprehensive immigration reform that featured a secure
our borders component. In a similar gesture, strengthening our commitments on border security and
interior enforcement is one of the four pillars of senators Schumer and Grahams suggested plan for
immigration reform. The invasion story has been so firmly established that many simply assume it.
Rather than establishing the invasion story as Bush worked to do, current conservative government
officials and politicians simply cite the need to secure U.S. borders and point to the Obama
administrations perceived failure to do so. Arizona Governor Jan Brewer recently signed SB1070: a
controversial law that makes federal immigration standards into state laws so her state police force can
enforce them. As she signed it she said, we work to solve a crisis that we did not create and the federal
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 27
government has refused to fix. Sarah Palin said, in her endorsement of the bill, its time for Americans
across this great country to stand up and say were all Arizonans now! and in clear unity we say Mr.
President do your job secure our border! Brewer and Palin are capitalizing on familiarity with the
Ferrier Variation of the invasion/heroic prototype; in the context of an invasion where the presumed
hero (the Federal government) does not step up, ordinary Americans must take it upon themselves to
defend the nation. Rather than explaining as Bush used to do the potential threats the U.S. needs to
protect itself against, Sarah Palin, Jan Brewer, and others simply reference Obamas perceived failure to
fulfill the heroic plot.
Increasing militarization of the border does offer a strong symbolic response to the fear and panic
caused by September 11
th
, but it does not make sense, as Hogan says above, in our higher cortical
systems. Under the DHS, the Border Patrol has nearly doubled in size; 670 miles of wall have been
built; virtual fences have been constructed; and Constitutionally questionable programs such as Operation
Streamline have been implemented to deter people from crossing. This border enforcement strategy is
accompanied by intense internal policing and raids that target undocumented people across the nation,
through Federal agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Patrol, and now through
local laws along the lines of SB 1070. Ironically, the argument that the openness of the southern border
makes the U.S. more vulnerable to terrorism underestimates the ingenuity of potential terrorists and
ignores the recent patterns of terrorist strategies. According to the Border Patrol fact sheet from 2005-8,
99.3% of all apprehensions have been of people coming from Latin America, not the so-called Axis of
Evil countries. In fact, none of the countries that Bush identified as evil are named in the document; the
remaining 0.7% come from China, Canada, and other countries. The people picked up are poorer Latinos
seeking work not potential terrorists. All of the recent terrorists have entered the country legally with
proper documentation. The September 11
th
hijackers and the Christmas Day bomber had visas.
Furthermore, despite these discourses of otherness targeting the Middle East, US citizens, too, can be
and have been terrorists. If we are really concerned about national security, the solution lies not with our
immigration enforcement strategies, but with our intelligence agencies.
The second threat is economic. Fears inspired by the recent economic crisis and passions during the
healthcare debate become articulated in accusations that undocumented workers come here to steal our
jobs and suck up our social services. Recall, for instance, how Congressmen Wilson shouted You lie!
when President Obama assured the nation that illegal immigrants would not be covered by health care
reform. In saying this, Wilson showed that he did not realize how uniform most mainstream politicians
are in their anti-immigrant sentiments. Regardless of how much the government excludes undocumented
people from social services or how many troops the president sends to the border, extreme right-wing
groups such as the Tea Party and Minute Men still demand more. Insofar as the names of these
organizations are reminiscent of how the colonists took their welfare and protection upon themselves in
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 28
the context of governmental failure, they frame the Ferrier Variation as a fundamentally patriotic
gesture. They condemn both Republican and Democratic politicians for their failure to protect American
jobs. William Gheen, the head of the Americans for Legal Immigration PAC, articulated the economic
threat at Houstons Tax Day Tea Party:
Americans are being systematically replaced in our jobs, in our schools, in our universities and in
our healthcare systems and if Barack Obama and his team pass comprehensive Amnesty and turn
fifteen million illegal aliens into voters theyre going to replace all of you at the ballot box and the
borders of the United States will be irreparably destroyed.
Gheen not only illustrates the ways in which he fears this perceived invasion threatens American life; he
also makes clear that the current politicians he includes McCain and other Republicans, as well as
Obama are not fulfilling the appropriate narrative ending of defending the nation. He concludes his
speech with imagery that would work better, perhaps, in one of the invasion films above: our nation is in
a twilight and whether its the setting sun or whether its the rising dawn is up to us. Weve got to be
brave. Gheen evokes the Ferrier Variation, as Palin and Brewer did to defend SB 1070; he argues that,
in the context of institutional failure, citizens are left to defend themselves.
The fears themselves, as in the case of potential terrorist threats, are the result of valid concerns.
Systematically blaming the current economic crisis on undocumented labor, however, is just as illogical
as looking for terrorists on the southern border. According to a study published by the Migration Policy
Institute:
Illegal immigrations overall impact on the US economy is small If we exclude these immigrant
[s losses] from the calculus, however the small net gain that remains after subtracting the US
employers gains is tiny. And if we account for the small fiscal burden that unauthorized
immigrants impose, the overall economic benefit is close enough to zero to be essentially a wash
(Hanson 2009: 1).
From this study, it seems the amount undocumented workers contribute to our economy via the work they
do and the taxes they pay compensates for what little they take in terms of social services. The study
continues: unless the next $10 billion in enforcement is much more effective than the first $15 billion, it
is difficult to see how one could justify a pure enforcement strategy to address illegal immigration, at least
in terms of standard cost benefit analysis (Hanson 2009: 12). Not only is the economic security story
illogical, the projected solution to it is inordinately costly.
The final threat was clearly articulated by an acquaintance from a small ranching community close to
the border; he is not concerned about the innocent illegals seeking work and a better life, but about the
drug traffickers who are tearing apart American families through meth and heroine rings. The drug
threat and associated crime is more complicated than the national security threat, because while there are
no terrorists coming across the U.S. southern borders, many drugs are trafficked through these deserts.
The majority of crime blamed on undocumented people is drug related. The projected solution to this
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 29
threat is, unsurprisingly, the same as the previous two: increased militarization and policing. When Jan
Brewer signed SB 1070 she argued: we cannot sacrifice our safety to the murderous greed of drug
cartels. We cannot stand idly by as drop-houses, kidnappings and violence compromise our quality of
life. At a later point, Brewer made clear how huge she believes the drug threat is; she said, we all know
that the majority of the people that are coming to Arizona and trespassing are now become drug mules.
Although it is impossible to know the exact numbers, the governor grossly exaggerated this accusation.
Brandon Judd, the president of the Border Patrol Union for the Tucson Sector, refuted her assertion
simply: the vast majority of those who we arrest are not smuggling drugs (quoted in a Star article from
2010). Brewer, it seems, imagines one of the most nightmarish manifestations of the drug threat: an army
of evil traffickers marching across the Arizona border to permeate society, addict innocent Americans to
life-threatening drugs, and undermine American families and communities.
Although this emplotment may be a little extreme, it is the dominant story told even by the New
York Times. In the May 31
st
2009 article In heartland death, traces of heroins spread, Randal C.
Archibold tells how two illegal immigrants were prosecuted for manslaughter in the death of Arthur Eisel,
who died of a heroin overdose. Throughout the article, Archibold casts Mr. Eisel as an innocent victim
not, as one might expect, of the vicious drug, but of the ruthless and undocumented dealers. Archibold
channels the strong emotional response readers have to Mr. Eisels death by opening the article with an
image of Mr. Eisels mother huddled stunned and bewildered struggling to cope with her sons death.
The article uses this example to illustrate how Mexican drug cartels are similarly infiltrating Americas
heartland. Although Mr. Parra and Mr. Contreras the dealers in question merely sold Mr. Eisel
heroin, prosecutors found them culpable for his death. Archibold suggests that the federal government
sees this case as a stark illustration of how Mexican drug cartels have pushed heroin sales beyond major
cities into Americas suburban and rural byways, some of which had seen little heroin before; he
continues: federal officials now consider the cartels the greatest organized crime threat to the United
States. Using drugs and related violence as a tool for invasion does seem a pretty scary threat.
Because people have been trained to think in terms of the invasion prototype and have emplotted the
two previous threats into that structure, they similarly see increased militarization as the appropriate
solution for the drug threat. As in the previous two cases, however, militarization is an illogical response.
Many scholars have pointed out that increasing security has probably contributed to the rapid
organization and sophistication of the drug cartels. In Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide,
Peter Andreas suggests: even while failing to control illegal border crossings, law enforcement has
shaped their location, routes, methods, and organization (2000: 8). Making it more challenging to traffic
drugs has encouraged smaller cartels to combine into larger and more violent organizations; which, in
turn, causes the increase of drugs Archibold refers to in his article. Focusing enforcement on north-going
traffic also perpetuates the problem; Brandy McCombs reported in the Arizona Daily Star in 2009 that
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 2:
firearms traffickers find it relatively easy to come to the U.S. and buy the high-powered weapons that
fuel the billion-dollar drug-smuggling trade. In an Associated Press article that appeared in the Star
seven months later, Jacques Billeaud reported that Mexican and U.S. officials estimate the cartels get 95
percent of their guns from the United States. Andreas argues that the United States strategy focuses too
heavily on the supply in terms of both people and drugs, rather than demand. He writes:
In both cases the primary target is the supply (illegal drugs, migrants, and those who smuggle
them) and only secondarily the demand (consumers of drugs, employers of migrant labor); the
foreign supply is defined as the main source of the problem; and deterring the supply through
enhanced policing is promoted as the favored solution (2000: 6).
Focusing on the supply, he argues, is politically easier because it is less controversial; but it is not very
effective. He continues, the overwhelming political focus on curbing the influx of drugs and immigrants
has drawn attention away from the more complex and politically divisive challenge of dealing with the
enormous domestic demand for both psychoactive drugs and cheap migrant labor (Andreas 2000: 8). So
while the threat of illicit substances is more tangible than that of terrorism (at least on the southern
border), the proposed solution is just as much a fantasy. America needs to focus on its own addiction
problems just as much as it needs to question these drugs method of entry.
+. ,RE$%%* T-E* $RE ./ST PE'P%E0 ) T-E -/1$NIT$RI$N PR'T'T*PE
While the three threads of the invasion story seem to be unconscious manifestations of a common
prototype, the humanitarian story has been consciously constructed. Humanitarian storytellers from aid
organizations like No More Deaths, the Samaritans (Arizona), and Border Angels (California) resist the
traditional liberal-conservative divide. While both liberal and conservative politicians work towards a
more secure border, volunteers from such diverse backgrounds as faith communities and anarchist
collectives come together to expose the hypocrisy of policies that use death as a political tool. Because it
is a response to the fear stories, the humanitarian story is almost precisely the inverse of the
invasion/heroic prototype. Rather than stressing the influx of a foreign element into society, the
humanitarian stories focus on the historic integration and interdependence between the groups and the
common humanity Americans share with migrants. Although these stories are intentionally opposed to
the invasion stories which one assumes to be a liberal gesture they are couched in conservative
rhetoric; and, as I will show, all the national stories make similar assumptions.
The first phase of the humanitarian story stresses the economic integration between Latin America
and the United States. Humanitarian storytellers such as No More Death volunteers, Samaritans trainers,
and Border Angels speakers place this response story in the context of the imperialist history of the U.S.
in Latin America and explain how the U.S. government created the current situation. They not only argue
that the U.S. economy is based on migrant labor, but that the U.S. is at least partially responsible for the
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 6;
inability for some Latin American governments to ensure jobs for their people, thus forcing them to
emigrate. Isabel Garcia, the Pima County public defender and long time Derechos Humanos activist,
said, I think its really vital that people realize in this country that we have had a hand in exactly whats
occurring. Until the American public realizes that our own economic policies definitely have a hand in
what is going on at our borders we will not have any true solution.
The 2004 film A Day Without a Mexican cleverly and comically lays out the argument in the exact
inverse form of the economic security story, although it is a little more nuanced and oriented towards
Latinos already living in the U.S. than most humanitarian stories. In the film, a border of impenetrable
fog develops around California as the entire Latino population a third of the states population
disappears; the film shifts back and forth in mockumentary style following various people as they react.
The collective response is almost as traumatic as in some invasion films. A black produce market
develops as people fight for the few remaining fruits and vegetables; schools struggle to stay open; Border
Patrol agents, already missing many of their ranks, page through the classifieds; sports fans riot when the
L.A. Dodgers cancel their game; and a state senator steps up as governor pro tem, because the governor is
in Washington and the second in command disappears. One scientist draws the connection with the alien
invasion prototype explicitly. He says, as he points to the similar shape of a sombrero and a flying
saucer:
I think the government was in on this, to a certain extent. Otherwise why else would they call them
aliens? Illegal aliens? I mean they are Latinos, Hispanics, Mexicans. But really they are just
people. So why is the government calling them aliens if they did not think they were from
somewhere else?
The point of the film is clear: California cannot survive this loss. A Day Without A Mexican is a good
example because of the way it reflects, and mocks, the invasion prototype; but it is, as said, slightly
different from most humanitarian stories, which focus more on migration than on Latinos already in the
United States. Most humanitarian stories tend to be highly academic: re-framing history to understand
how the U.S. is responsible for the situation; and intensely emotional: trying to inspire sympathy for
actual migrants.
The next phase of the story argues that, in the context of the clear integration of and dependency on
Latino people within U.S. borders and with Latin America across them, the increased militarization of the
border is cruelly and intentionally violent. The immediate alternative story
1
begins before September 11
th

in the early 1990s, with the simultaneous passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (1994)
and the establishment of the Border Patrols operations Hold The Line (1993) and Gatekeeper (1994). As

1
A longer alternative story that is told by Chicano and Border Justice activists alike begins with Native American
populations and various Anglo invasions, from Spain and ngland initially and the !nited States afterward" #any
historians, such as $avid %" %uti&rre' and (icki )" *ui', have worked towards this more accurate academic re+
framing of history"
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 63
the name implies, NAFTA made possible the free trade of capital, goods, ideas, and technology but not
of people. Because the United States has a much larger infrastructure for the production of these goods
than, in particular, southern Mexico, the agreement created a large demand for labour in the United States
and a large supply of labour in Mexico. At the same time, the two border patrol operations successfully
sealed off urban areas from illegal migration. This funneled potential border crossers into more desolate
and isolated places. According to INS Commissioner Doris Meissner, the thought at the time was to use
the harsh landscape as a deterrent for crossing; she said, we did believe that geography would be an ally
for us. It was our sense that the number of people crossing through the Arizona desert would go down to
a trickle once people realized what [its] like (quoted in Borden 2000) (Cornelius 2001: 675). The
strategy, in other words, was to use the deaths of the first few hundred to dissuade the rest.
The strategy failed. The Mexican consulates filed 1,700 death reports between 1994 and 2001. The
Border Patrol did not start counting until 1998. Since then, the number has only increased. Coalicion de
Derechos Humanos estimates conservatively that 5,000 people have died since 1994. Although the U.S.
government realized the failure, they only continued the error increasing the militarization and making
the journey more deadly and more treacherous.
In the context of this fairly academic argument, humanitarians build strong sympathy cases for
migrants who become innocent victims of U.S. economic policy and border strategy. In addition to
explaining in those terms, some humanitarians use rhetorical questions or statements: how far would you
walk to feed your family? or drug runners have mothers too. The 2007 film La Misma Luna dramatizes
the argument poignantly and sentimentally. When his grandmother dies just days after his ninth birthday,
Carlitos decides to cross to the U.S., where his mother, Rosario, has lived for the past four years, sending
money home. As mother and son go through their days miles apart waking at the same time; making
the same breakfast; and, of course, looking at the same moon one see the daily challenges Rosario faces
as she tries to live and work without papers and witnesses Carlitos struggles in crossing the border.
Although the film is contrived Carlitos, almost at the point of giving up, sits down after running from
the police only to find himself on the street corner where his mother is it voices the sentiment behind the
emotional emplotments of humanitarian stories. Migrants are not some alien threat but people, just like
us, who love their families and work towards their dreams.
The issue at stake in both the security and humanitarian stories is the militarization of the border.
Invasion plots require it as the solution to three different fears and humanitarians argue that it forces
innocent people to die. Despite the clear opposition between these two perspectives, both stories share
some central assumptions most of which Enriques story resists (although A Day Without A Mexican
highlights the assumptions with humor instead of playing into them). First, all the stories discussed above
assume migrants are leaving, not returning home as Enrique was doing. Second, both the economic
security story and the humanitarian story assume that migrants come looking for low skill work, not
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 64
already, as Enrique was, in the position of owner of a company. Third, the characters in the three security
stories: terrorist, worker, and drug runner; and the humanitarian story: worker or young father, invoke the
image of a young, able-bodied brown man. A Day Without A Mexican illustrates the assumption via a
Missing Jose poster that looks like it used a WANTED template. The sixty-one-year-old Enrique
assured us that his body had no business walking through the desert. We ran into him about fourteen
miles from the border; he had forty or so left to walk. Finally, all these stories are generic and
disconnected from the actual experience of crossing the desert.
2 #3TIENE P$PE%4() 5R'1 N$TI'N$% PR'T'T*PES T' PERS'N$%
TESTI1'NIES
As the preceding discussion suggests, standard ways of emplotting immigration are inadequate at best and
often profoundly harmful, even murderous. From working with No More Deaths and listening to the
personal stories and experiences of actual migrants, I find that three points stand out as particularly
important. The first is that the most important stakeholders in the current, controversial immigration
debate are largely excluded from it. People with little knowledge about the actual experience of
immigration create their own versions of the story, as Brewer does with the drug threat. Those of us who
feel empowered and obligated to speak on behalf of undocumented people have a tendency to co-opt
migrants stories for our own rhetorical purposes. We have to constantly remind ourselves not to tell their
stories for them. For instance, I was on patrol with a retired pastor when we ran into two men who asked
us what may be the most common question migrants ask: why are you here? Drawing from the human
rights and moral imperative discourse of our organization, the pastor answered, because we have to be.
The migrant shook his head politely. No. You dont have to be here. We do. While it would be easy
for me to use these words as evidence for the economic-victim story, Im not convinced this particular
man was making that claim. It is possible he was simply noting that we could be on the road openly
while they had to stay hidden. Im not arguing that his story cannot prove the economic claim, only that
it did not in and of itself. This is an interpretive step that we, the audience of the story, impose; in so
doing, we too often lose the stories of individual migrants.
Second, the national stories can act as a form of border patrol themselves by excluding entire
storylines like Enriques that do not fit the prototypes. Almost half the people we encountered this
year have stories structurally similar to his: they have lived in the U.S. for years and years, had their
papers checked, found themselves in an unknown place, and are now crossing to return home. Because of
the increased deportations under both Bush and Obama, more and more Americans people with jobs,
families, and homes in the U.S. find themselves in a foreign country with few options. Many choose to
put their money on a desolate trail through a harsh desert.
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 65
It is important to stress that the problem of co-opting other peoples stories does not mean one should
not share the stories one hears. Indeed, retelling is crucial. Before continuing north, one man from the
Bay Area asked an unusual question. Tiene papel? Quiero escribir un testimonio: he wanted to write
his story so we could share it. Whenever stories such as these are routinely silenced and excluded, those
of us who hear them have a responsibility to share them. Hearing these experiences that so clearly resist
common assumptions may help in making better policy decisions. In these instances, we, the re-tellers,
have a strong obligation to the author to understand and share her content and intent rather than
manipulating the story to fit our political ends. We should retell their stories in an effort to change the
conditions that silenced them in the first place. Three Samaritan volunteers Kathryn Ferguson, Norma
A. Price, and Ted Parks have eloquently worked to fulfill this obligation in their recent book Crossing
With the Virgin: Stories from the Migrant Trail. By focusing on their experience in individual
encounters, the authors avoid co-opting the stories of the migrants they met. Instead, in the academic and
passionate voice that characterizes the humanitarian stories, these volunteers offer windows into the
experiences of the people they encounter.
Finally, the national stories themselves especially the security stories can determine migrants
stories for them. By pushing people further and further into the desert wilderness, the Border Patrols fear
tactics prevent people from seeking help. One eighteen year-old named Jose wandered into camp after
his group was separated by a Border Patrol buzzing: a technique where a helicopter flies as close as
possible to a group, in order to separate them. Jose was unable to find his group again. He said that, if
we could take him to a specific hill, he would be sure to find them. We walked to hill after hill; they all
looked the same. The events of Joses story were determined by the whim of a Border Patrol helicopter
pilot. I have met people who have hidden for days under the same mesquite tree on the same trail because
they have lost their group and are too afraid of going to jail or facing what the Border Patrol officers will
do to them if they seek help. Both the premise (they are crossing the most desolate part of the desert) and
outcomes (they might make it, get caught, lose their way, or die in the desert) of these migrants stories
are determined by the militarization of the border.
More terrible than the testimonies one hears are the ones one does not. In addition to the stories one
does not hear about people living and working in the U.S., one does not hear about the many women and
children who cross, almost invisibly, though the U.S. deserts. It is eerie to walk down a seemingly
solitary canyon and then up an isolated ridge to find a mesquite tree with lingerie hanging in it, swaying
in the breeze. These are called rape trees, because after a coyote or a man rapes a woman, he hangs her
bra and underwear in the tree to mark the site. There are many in the desert.
2
Less commonly, I have

,
-n .*ape as a weapon of war/ Advancing human rights for women at the !"S"+#e0ico border1, Sylvanna 2alc3n
documents how se0ual abuse of migrant women does not stop at the edges of the desert but often occurs at the
hands of border enforcement agents as well"
-M$".&&/+0 /MM/0R'&/.+ 1 62
friends who have found piles of rocks marked by stick crosses and bones, sometimes with flesh
underneath, marking stories we cannot know. I have a friend who found the body of a fourteen year-old
girl whose story we do know because her younger brother made it to Tucson and asked us to look for her.
Josseline Hernandez Quintero was walking from El Salvador to be with her mother in California. She
either froze to death or died of dehydration. These deaths and rapes are the effects of the stories we tell
on a national level about migrants we do not know and cannot hear.
This is not an argument over stories only over which is truer, or more logical, or more valid but
over lives and ethics. When one reads fiction, one expects authors to manipulate the plot to move the
reader in certain directions. One does not expect the same thing from ones government or national
media. As people who know that narrative has the power to move readers certain directions, we must be
aware and wary of the ways in which these national stories move the public to feel certain things and then
act e.g., vote in certain ways. One cannot have real democracy when such important decisions depend
on illogical, but rhetorically persuasive, tales. Nor can one have ethical democracy when the voices of
twelve million people living within U.S. borders are silenced by the very stories told about them. By
sharing the stories I have heard, I hope to work towards a place when those who have experienced them
can choose to tell them for themselves.
$c6no!ledgements
I appreciate the help that Nancy and Peter Rabinowitz offered me on this paper. I am grateful for the
opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at the annual conference of the International Society
for the Study of Narrative in April 2010 and for the feedback I received there.
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Per Aage Brandt
Case Western Reserve University
La Falange: The Structure of a Fascist Drea

The text proposes a structural narrative reading of Jos Antonio Primo de Riveras falangist discourse
and shows how its thinking is based on spatial and dynamic imagination and a particularly strong
sacrificial nationalist motif !t further suggests that the symbolic dimension in its nationalism
constitutes a driving emotional force to be found in all nationalisms "alangism was a religious
version of fascism# famous for becoming the official ideology of "rancoist $pain% but it shared with
all militant national political forms of thinking the emotionally compelling mystique& the feeling of a
spiritual essence and force emanating from a beloved land and conveying existential identity and
value to its sub'ects# thus 'ustifying and calling for committed violent and sacrificial acts that override
ordinary systems of lawful behavior

!ey"ords& falangism# fascism# narratology# nationalism# social cognition# sacrifice# death

We may believe that political thinking is an argumentative genre that calculates truths within a
quasi-axiomatic system of propositions. However, its readiness to animate polemical discourse
and emotional rhetoric in general shows that this genre of social cognition, interpretation, and
imagination comes with built-in agentive roles and identity-stimulating subjective appeals that
rather would suggest a story structure a narrative constitution from which arguments can be
extracted as episodic elements. If so, the challenging task is to surpass mere intuitive and
LA FALANGE | 58

emotional apperception of each case and determine the articulations and connections that could
shape a given political attitude into a narrative.
1

In this short essay, I will discuss the case of Spanish fascist discourse and propose an
analysis of its semantics, using certain key ideas developed in a study of narrative dynamics as
manifested by literary texts.
2

Spanish fascist thought and discourse was essentially developed in the period immediately
preceding the Civil War (1936-39): i.e. during the Second Republic (1931-36). Its central figure
was a young lawyer, Jos Antonio Primo de Rivera, born in 1903, son of the dictator who died in
1930, and heir of his fathers nobleman title and estate. Jos Antonio founded the militant group
Falange Espaola in 1933 and became a member of parliament the same year. This Falange,
which was extended into Falange Espaola de la Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (F.E.
de las J.O.N.S.) in 1934 after fusion with another group, gave rise to the term falangism, also
called national syndicalism: a doctrine that after Jos Antonios death in 1936
3
was formally

1
Hogan (2009) offers a ground-breaking and inspirational work on nationalism: its narratives and its
cognitive underpinnings. t is a ma!or contribution to t"e field of studies in social cognition currentl#
developing$ and it is a relevant and refres"ing contribution to critical political t"eor# and to building a
meta-"istor# of nationalism across "istorical specificities w"ile respecting t"ese as crucial data.
%ationalism& one of t"e driving forces of international and national politics in t"e 'globali(ed) world
toda#& is discussed as a cross-cultural and transtemporal p"enomenon of social cognition: w"ic" is to sa#&
it takes man# forms but remains a prominent general fact of "uman beings and& t"erefore& can be studied
and elucidated b# researc" on t"e mind and brain. *s Hogan sees it& it comes wit" a s"ort list of standard
stories + narratives + t"at constitute t"e underl#ing discourse structure of nationalism: a "eroic narrative&
a sacrificial narrative& and a romantic narrative. ,"ese narratives eac" contribute a line of argument
serving t"e wa# people talk and reason about nations and t"e collective and individual identification wit"
suc" entities. n Hogan)s view& identit# e-ists in two remarkabl# distinct versions: practical and categorical.
,"e former "as to do wit" dominant material and immaterial features of cultural be"avior$ t"e latter is a
matter of labeling but nevert"eless e-tremel# forceful in motivation and emotion. ,"oug" t"e national
labels can be entirel# void of content on t"e cultural level& t"e# can still generate pride and feelings of
dignit#. *s mentioned in t"e present essa#& would furt"er re-p"rase t"e opposition and see t"e
categorical identit# form as symbolic& in t"e semiotic sense of t"e term: t"ere is a "uge semiotic
difference to e-plore between categori(ation sealed b# a common noun and categori(ation locked into a
proper name$ proper names "ave privileged connections to persons and to t"e cognitive concept of
person"ood t"at underpins sub!ectivit#. Hogan combines identit# anal#sis wit" t"e narrative issue to
s"ow "ow t"e combination works& giving rise to a variet# of nationalisms& from t"e 'worst) to t"e 'best):
from Hitler to .and"i& etc. /esides t"e *merican data& ndian and several 0uropean models are "andled
e-pertl#& w"ic" makes t"is enterprise an unusual comparative and interdisciplinar# e#e opener.
2
/randt (2010).
1
2os3 *ntonio 4rimo de 5ivera was e-ecuted 20 %ovember 1916 in t"e state prison of *licante. 7rancisco
7ranco died 20 %ovember 1989. t "as been suggested t"at 7ranco was deliberatel# kept alive despite a
more t"an critical p"#sical condition to matc" s#mbolicall# t"e mart#rdom of de 5ivera. /ot" are buried in
t"e monumental :alle de los ;a<dos in =adrid. ,"e cult of sacrificial deat" t"us persisted t"roug"out t"e
four decades of falangism& t"oug" softened into 7rancoism.
LA FALANGE | 59

adopted by the fascist regime of the generalissimo Francisco Franco; the founder of the Falange
thus became the all-dominant and celebrated martyr of the new Spanish regime.
4

Jos Antonio explains over and over, through his thousand pages of articles, speeches, and
other verbal manifestations that became the standard reading of the Francoist ideologues how
his beloved country is in a sorry state and must be saved from dissolution by a spiritual
awakening: on the one hand from left-wing socialism and its Marxist theory, pouring in from the
barbarian Asian steppes; and on the other from the ruthlessness of capitalism and its liberal
theory, invading from the West. Instead of adopting one of these antagonistic positions, Spanish
youth are invited to join the ranks of this new movement: a totalitarian, corporatist, vertical
organisation of life national and personal that will make real the countrys destiny in the
universal (destino en lo universal): i.e., its vocation to save Western civilization altogether from
current barbarity and dismemberment. The nation must save itself from political dissolution,
parliamentary inanity, democratic pettiness, internationalism and separatism by unifying its
people (el pueblo: a concept inspired by the vitalist German notion of Volk of course) in one
total and unbreakable block under the leadership of its militant and armed vanguard, ready to die
for this goal, ready for service and sacrifice. Moreover, the nation must save the rest of the
civilized world: hence the universal theme, from Asian barbarians to American financial-
capitalist money mongers. This is a sort of ecstatically transcendental nationalism: Spain must
become the empire it once was, because it represents or rather is the incarnation of the very
religious and military faith and discipline that built the empire in the past. Jos Antonio
incessantly appeals to these two religious/military principles of life and politics: service and
sacrifice (servicio y sacrificio).
In the 26 points of the falangist program (see Appendix 1), these ideas are lined up and
presented as a political plan, including agrarian reform: agriculture must be rationalized and made
profitable; it must be removed from barren soil; land properties that are too large (latifundios)
must be divided; parcels too small (minifundios) must be merged all without modifying private
property. The argument is confusing and must have been rather unconvincing. Jos Antonio
thinks that Spain is mainly agrarian (as is his own family background); Spanish industry is so
small and unimportant, he estimates, that it does not even need a plan. Precisely because the
country is predominantly agrarian, it incarnates the values of the land and soil from which the

>
=# main source is t"e official compilation of textos de doctrina poltica edited b# *gust<n del 5<o
;isneros (198>).
LA FALANGE | 60

authentic, stout, and brave Spaniards grow.
5
Cities, by contrast, are superficial and unessential:
like the new parliament.
6
Authentic values grow in free air, where the soldiers of the new order
enjoy life under the sun or stars, while serving the nation and sacrificing their lives for it (see
appendices 3 italicized section and 4).
Death is a main theme in this discourse. The blue shirts appear in the same sentences as
death; and, surprisingly, in either the glorious or shameful version (1935 speech in Oviedo;
Cisneros 1974: 582): La revolucin nacional la haremos nosotros, slo nosotros, camaradas de
las camisas azules, y la haremos por un mvil espiritual, que es por lo que se muere. (The
national revolution will be made by us, only by us, comrades in blue shirts, and we will do it for a
spiritual cause, which is what human beings die for.)
Pues bien: si os engaamos, alguna soga hallaris en vuestros desvanes y algn rbol
quedar en vuestra llanura; ahorcadnos sin misericordia; la ltima orden que yo dar a mis
camisas azules ser que nos tiren de los pies, para justicia y escarmiento. (Grandes aplausos.)
(but if we deceive you, you will find some rope in your attics, and there will be some trees in
your plains; hang us without mercy; the last order I will give my blue shirts will be to let people
hang us by the feet, as a punishment and a deterrent) (1935 speech in Ciudad Real; Cisneros
1974: 584).
Death and styles of dying are important arguments everywhere in the discourse. This motif
makes it tempting to classify the narrative spaces involved, and to determine their temporal order.
First, there is a view of Spain as agonizing from a general loss of vital force.
7
It is conceptualized

9
n "is speec" of 18 %ovember 1919& "e summari(es t"e program again& and adds (;isneros 198>: 818):
'?Espaa est casi toda campo. El campo es Espaa , and from the fields come the claims of religion and
morality. No way of being tolerant, liberal and pacifist, throwing out the priests gown and the uniform
!"#a sotana y el uniforme$ "El sentido religioso y militar$ "%uando lo religioso y lo militar son los dos &nicos
modos enteros y serios de entender la 'ida$ (',"e gown and t"e uniform@ ,"e religious and militar#
meaning@ A"en t"e religious and t"e militar# are t"e two onl# "onest and serious wa#s of understanding
life@)).
6
'()uello *el %ongreso de los +iputados, se cae a peda-os, se muere de triste-a, todo es aire de pantano
insalubre, todo es barrunto de una muerte pr.xima y sin gloria Esa es una atm.sfera turbia, cansada,
como de taberna al final de una noche crapulosa. No est/ ah nuestro sitio. (;isneros 198>.: 809-806) ('t
Bt"e ;ongressC falls apart& it is d#ing of sadness& all of it is un"ealt"# and swamp# air& all is presentiment of
imminent and infamous deat"D t is a turbid& wear# atmosp"ere of a pub at t"e end of a nig"t of
debauc"er#. ,"is place it not for us)).
8
(cerca de la 0e'oluci.n 1919 (;isneros 198>: 661): 'la re'oluci.n es necesaria, no precisamente cuando
el pueblo est/ corrompido, sino cuando sus instituciones, sus ideas, sus gustos, han llegado a la esterilidad
o est/n pr.ximos a alcan-arla. En estos momentos se produce la degeneraci.n hist.rica. No la muerte por
cat/strofe, sino el encharcamiento en una existencia sin gracia ni esperan-a. 1odas las actitudes colecti'as
nacen enclen)ues, como producto de pare2as reproducti'as casi agotadas. #a 'ida de la comunidad se
achata, se entorpece, se hunde en mal gusto y mediocridad. ()uello no tiene remedio sino mediante un
corte y un nue'o principio. #os surcos necesitan simiente nue'a, simiente hist.rica, por)ue la antigua ya
LA FALANGE | 61

as an exterior agrarian space: a sterile field of death. It represents the initial conditions of the
narrative, the given circumstances that motivate the narration. This is the initial conditional space
in the sequence of narrative spaces I am going to identify. Second, there is a space of impotent
parliamentary action, a portrait of the Congress of Deputies visualized as an interior: a stinking,
dirty tavern on the end of a night of excesses, as described in Note 5. Death happens by
depression; political volition is numbed by insoluble ideological conflict. This tavern of
ordinary politics is a space of crisis, where the representative democratic system is seen as
passively awaiting its definite decay, as if from debauchery; it constitutes, as I mentioned, a
second, critical space in the narrative series. Jos Antonio often stages himself as an agent: a
political representative reluctantly moving from the first to this second space, since he became a
delegate in 1934 and could describe the experience from the inside, which he does dysphorically.
Third, there is an euphoric, open-space vision of the starry night and of the young, strong,
handsome soldiers of a new order standing under the stars in their blue shirts; then facing the sun
(cara al sol)
8
, throwing themselves heroically into a deadly fight for the nation. These willful,
sacrificial militants are not elected but are, of course, falangist volunteers grown from the soil of
the nation and bound for a regime acting by violence instead of negotiation, in the name of the
sublime destiny they incarnate. A mystical space of total reversal or catastrophe that must cost
blood a lot of blood, presumably, to nourish the depleted furrows of the patriotic field.
9

Mystically, it causes the salvation of country and global civilization for the blue-shirts to die in
combat. The sacrificial value of such dying and death will justify a new political world of total
identification with the state whereas a lack of such identification leads to justified execution.
This third, catastrophic space is thus in the imaginary of a falangist the setting where the

ha apurado su fecundidad) (E,"e revolution is necessar#& not e-actl# w"en t"e people is demorali(ed but
w"en its institutions& its ideas& its tastes& "ave reac"ed sterilit# or are close to reac"ing it. n t"ose
moments& "istorical degeneration occurs. %ot a deat" b# catastrop"e& but a state of stagnation in an
e-istence wit"out an# lig"t or "ope. *ll collective actions are born infirm& as progen# of almost e-"austed
reproductive couples. ,"e life of t"e communit# is "ackne#ed& paral#(ed& sinking down in vulgarit# and
mediocrit#. ,"is situation can onl# be c"anged b# a cut and a new beginning. ,"e furrows need new seed
corn& "istoricall# new seed& because t"e old one "as e-"austed its fertilit#)). ,"e metap"or of t"e furrows
recalls a standard identit# trope$ cf. (Hogan 2009: 10): 'one of t"e most common t#pes of nationalist
metap"or parallels t"e citi(en)s relation to t"e national territor# wit" a plant)s relation to eart" + for
e-ample& t"roug" t"e image of roots). *s Fakoff stresses (1991)& conceptual metap"or + especiall# t"e
structural version& w"ic" is "ig"l# emotional + is a main ingredient in political discourse in general$ t"e
most efficient of t"ese metap"ors ma# be t"ose t"at spring from t"e spatial framing of a political model)s
constitutive narrative (see below).
G
7or t"e te-t of t"e falangist "#mn bearing t"is title& see *ppendi- >. ,"e "#mn stresses t"e meaning of
t"e stars (los luceros): namel#& to represent t"e dead falangist comrades and also t"e brig"t future of t"e
singing sub!ects t"emselves.
9
5ecalling and reversing t"e =arseillaise: 'D )ue le sang impur3 abreu'e nos sillons. n 2os3 *ntonio)s
dream& it is t"e pure& spirituall# informed blood of t"e militants t"at revitali(es t"e nation.
LA FALANGE | 62

supernatural forces of the universe enter the human world and unify divine grace, military luck,
the energy of the people, and the sacrificial volition of the blue-shirt vanguard: molding them into
one force achieving the all-reversing change. Spain has been selected by Destiny, a volitional
force of the universe, to save civilization through a sort of Ragnark or Armageddon or
Apocalypse: an eschatological event that will lead to a post-catastrophic world, a fourth and final
space of unity and happiness. In this conclusive space, Spain is enlarged into an empire: strong,
elevated, magnified; a spiritual axis of the Hispanic, the European, and the planetary world.
The change of space induces a change of force; this is, I think,
10
the dynamic trick of all
narratives: by moving the relevant agents from a given space with its specific immanent physical,
social, individual, or transcendent metaphysical
11
forces to a differently invested dynamic space,
different states, events, and acts are made possible. In the case of falangist imagination, the
contrast between the second and third space the tavern of the impotents and the open
landscape of the heroic militants illustrates this change. Destiny can only be fulfilled by these
militants total existential commitment. Such spiritual attitudes and the style of dying they imply
attract the metaphysical, sacrificial force (F) that is needed for the metamorphosis of the nation
from a miserable swamp (first and second space) to a glorious empire (third and fourth space:
Figure 1).

10
n /randt (2010)& provide some literar# e-amples and tentativel# classif# t"e narrativel# active forces:
a discussion cannot develop "ere.
11
=etap"#sical forces include magic of all kinds& divine intervention& satanic spells and maledictions& acts
of t"e unconscious& etc. Htor# logic is generous as to possible inventories of d#namic categories.
LA FALANGE | 63

Figure 1: The falangist story in four spaces.
The political stagnation (St.) in the critical space aggravates the agony (A) in the conditional
space. The initial logic is circular, which is why the saltus toward the catastrophic space is felt as
a decisive movement. Here, the sacrificial warfare is believed to attract the transcendent force
(F), which will lead to the happiness (H) and conclusive, unenclosed version of the nation-
empire.
In the propangandistic discourse that follows, addressees should hear the enunciative call to
join the agents who are determined to achieve the better destiny and death (Ag2 D2) and to
despise those agents who are doomed to pitiable and meaningless waning into nothingness (Ag1
D1). This narrative model almost a mental cartoon in four frames is immediately
intelligible as a format for elementary storytelling, whether realistic, fantastic, or both. It offers a
ready tool for persuasion under suitable circumstances.
12

One must wonder, of course, about the status of such a structure in the context of less
extreme forms of political thinking. Is this a particular, pseudo-poetic, rather pathological way of

12
n (/randt 2010) propose a classification of narrative genres into t"e marvelous& t"e fantastic& t"e
realistic& t"e grotesIue& and t"e absurd: distinctions based on t"e t#pe and densit# of forces invested in
t"eir spaces. ,"e falangist narrative can be classified as fantastic& insofar as its catastrop"ic space involves
a non-agentive and fatal force: a sort of magic& induced b# sacrifice& motivating t"e m#stiIue of a reversal
predetermined b# Jestin#.
LA FALANGE | 64

cognizing a political situation and its possibilities; or is it a model of motives appearing in regular
problem-solving reflection and rumination?
The idea that violence (death-oriented behavior) and happiness (life-oriented behavior) can
work together harmoniously and that a harmony of this sort will overrule ordinary claims of
freedom and self-determination is a cognitive challenge, since it was and probably still is shared
by adult human beings in good mental shape. I think the falangist is saying: I am sacrificing my
life for this cause, so you must respect both me and my cause. The value of the cause its truth
is proven by my very sacrifice. Death is a justifying argument. I can justly threaten others with
death because I am prepared to die myself. The cause justifies the violence, because
paradoxically, the violence justifies the cause! The triumphant cause will, by definition, create
happiness; since that is the goal of political activity, as already Aristotle stated. The militant
falangist is entitled to be happy in anticipation, in the justified belief that he contributes to
creating general happiness. If one is not happy with this thinking, it is for the falangist due to
a failure to commit oneself sacrificially to creating happiness in this way. To explain the paradox,
I would venture the hypothesis that there is, in the human mind, an inherent emotional link
between sacrifice and happiness, perhaps involving pride: opposite of the shame that follows a
failure of commitment. There is a generalizable regularity behind the discursive motif driving the
falangist propaganda and imagination: a regularity that is countered by other motifs in more
complex forms of reflection but which is likely never the less to emerge in intersubjective
situations of stress and distress.
The metaphysical aspect of this motif namely, that transcendent powers will assist the
committed militant and help achieve the realization of a goal-causing sacrifice is probably a
universal existential element of ritual magic that resides in the human emotional system. The
element is controlled and curbed by other experiences of causation that are active in ordinary
situations of problem solving; in the falangist mystique of the nation, however, it seems instead to
be reinforced by the all-dominant proper name of Spain: Espaa. Proper names are always
appealing in human cognition. As elementary units of symbolization, they are revered, feared,
worshipped, and profiled in personal identification: I am a Spaniard; names of nations are
essentialistic and not only locative! One knows from any review of social stereotypes that
national identifiers are among the most active essentializers: Scots are like this, French are like
that. The mechanism is as strong as racist stereotypes and most often expressed under comparable
conditions, by angry, upset subjects. When emotions are strongly stressed, or people need to share
a joke, they easily return to these strong categorical, stereotypical identifiers of nationality, race,
and gender. Quite naturally, one has nationalists everywhere: people identifying, more or less
LA FALANGE | 65

emphatically, with the country of which they are citizens. In nationalism, the subject
spontaneously identifies something essential in his self with something essential stemming from
and given by the nation even if, as in Spain, the nation is a patchwork of regions speaking
different languages and living different kinds of life.
13
Human beings have names that reflect their
nationality; most of these names can only be pronounced correctly in the language of the
corresponding nation. The emotional tie from individual proper name to country name is strong
and direct. There is a correspondingly direct relation from a persons feeling of self to his love for
his country of origin. The symbolic sign naming that country signifies, for him, an identifying
force. Therefore, proper names should be part of the field of cognitive-affective science.
14
Many
individuals get emotional and piloerectile reactions (goose bumps) by the sound musical and,
in particular, vocal of their countrys national hymn. I doubt that this function can be erased by
any acquired, more intellectual and internationalist path of thinking; it is known that stereotypes
are not erased by counter-argumentative information, even if that information is accepted and
believed.
When the schema of what one may call sacrificial magic is reinforced by an identity-
stimulating symbolic call of this kind, it is likely that a narrative of the falangist type emerges, at
least for some time, in the troubled mind of any person who has strong reasons to be upset by an
alarming social situation. It may be less likely that it will stay in charge, spread, solidify, and
become an explicit political doctrine capable of resounding for forty years in the discourse of a
fascist regime. However, once violence is released, it triggers a logic of its own: of fear and
fascination.
R#F#R#$C#S
Brandt, P.A.(2010). Forces and spaces Maupassant, Borges, Hemingway. Toward a
semio-cognitive narratology, Social Science Research Network.

11
*s Fakoff states in "is classic article '=etap"or and war) (1991& this 'olume)& one finds a state4as4person
metap"or or& rat"er& a nation-as-parent-bod# metap"or. t calls for integration of p"#sical parts as of a
bodil# w"ole. ,"e countr# one is from can& metap"oricall#& be one)s mot"er or fat"er or bot". ,"erefore +
if metap"or can drive passion& w"ic" is far from proven + one lo'es t"at countr#& finds it beautiful& and is
willing to protect it and fig"t for its life and welfare. Heparatism appears as a ps#c"otic e-perience of
dis2ecta membra: bod# parts striving to live t"eir own life. ,"e enemies of one)s countr# will be seen as
illnesses of its bod#$ violent or !ust unwanted invaders will be seen as rapists& etc. ,"e metap"or ma# be
driven b# an emotional-relevance sc"ema based in t"e s#mbolic function propose to consider. *ll
structural metap"ors are sc"ema driven& w"ic" e-plains t"eir emotional meaning and inferences.
However& am not convinced t"at metap"or is enoug" to e-plain causall# t"e p"enomenon of
nationalism$ it could be t"e ot"er wa# around: once national feelings are in place& metap"ors e-press it.
1>
Kne could call t"is cognitive principle an emotional nominalism.
LA FALANGE | 66

Cisneros, A.D.R. (ed.) (1974). Obras de Jos Antonio Primo de Rivera. Madrid: Editorial
Almena.
Hogan, P. Colm (2009). Understanding Nationalism. On Narrative, Cognitive Science, and
Identity. Columbus, OH, USA: The Ohio State University Press.
Lakoff, G. (1991). Metaphor and war: The metaphor system used to justify war in the Gulf. Viet
Nam Generation Journal & Newsletter 3(3) and this volume.
LA FALANGE | 67

A%%endi& ': The Falangist Progra ($ora
%rogra)tica de la Falange*
+,

In November, 1934, the Falange adopted a Twenty-Seven-Point Program that was drawn up by
[Ramiro Ledesma Ramos] and given a laconic style by Jos Antonio. As had often been the case
in Mussolinis Italy, doctrines were devised to rationalize what already had been developed in
practice. The manifesto set forth principles regarding national unity and empire, the latter point
being left rather vague. Some Falangists implied that empire meant only cultural influence and
diplomatic leadership, while others (including Jos Antonio in private conversations) expressed
the hope of annexing Portugal. Point 6 proclaimed the State as the totalitarian instrument to
defend the integrity of the fatherland. The ninth paragraph called for vertical national
syndicalism.
16

Other points set forth the need for agrarian and industrial reforms, social justice and
education. The most controversial item was Point 25 pertaining to the Church. Most of the
Falangists of this period hoped to prevent the Church from encroaching upon the states
prerogatives.
Point 27 forbade any further modification of the movements label; but in the summer of
1937, as will be seen, Generalissimo Francisco Franco was to insist that the movement merge
with the reactionary Carlist militia forces and add the word Tradicionalista to the title in Point
26, so that it would read: Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las Juntas Ofensivas Nacional-
Sindicalistas. Point 27 thereupon was dropped. This revised version of 1937 is printed below.
The t"enty-si& %oint %rogra of the Falange (revised. +/01*:
NATION UNITY EMPIRE
1. We believe in the supreme reality of Spain. The strengthening, elevating, and magnifying
of this reality is the urgent collective goal of all Spaniards. Individual, group, and class
interests must inexorably give way in order to achieve this goal.
2. Spain has a single destiny in the world. Every conspiracy against this common unity is
repulsive. Any kind of separatism is a crime which we shall not pardon. The existing

19
7rom "ttp:LLironmarc".orgLinde-.p"pMLtopicL119-a-melange-of-falangeL.
16
n a speec" at t"e %irculo 5ercantil in =adrid on 9 *pril 1919& 2os3 *ntonio made it clear t"at a single
s#stem of 'vertical) national s#ndicates was preferable to =ussolini)s 'parallel) s#ndicates of emplo#ers
and workers. ':ertical) s#ndicates will not reIuire so bureaucratic a structure& "e declared& and 'will be
able to function organicall# - in t"e wa# t"e *rm# does& for e-ample - wit"out an# need for forming
parallel committees of soldiers and officers....) ,"e unions of present-da# Hpain B1980C continue to be
organised as 'vertical s#ndicates).
LA FALANGE | 68

Constitution, to the degree that it encourages disintegration, weakens this common
destiny of Spain. Therefore we demand its annulment in a thundering voice.
3. We have the determination to build an Empire. We affirm that Spains historic fulfillment
lies in Empire. We claim for Spain a pre-eminent position in Europe. We can tolerate
neither international isolation nor foreign interference. As regards the countries of
Hispanic America, we favor unification of their culture, economic interests and power.
Spain will continue to act as the spiritual axis of the Hispanic world as a sign of her pre-
eminence in worldwide enterprises.
4. Our armed forces - on land, sea, and in the air - must be kept trained and sufficiently
large to assure to Spain at all times its complete independence and a status in the world
that befits it. We shall bestow upon our Armed Forces of land, sea, and air all the dignity
they merit, and we shall cause their military conception of life to infuse every aspect of
Spanish life.
5. Spain shall once more seek her glory and her wealth on the sea lanes. Spain must aspire
to become a great maritime power, for reasons of both defense and commerce.
We demand for the fatherland equal status with others in maritime power and aerial
routes.
STATE INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
6. Our State will be a totalitarian instrument to defend the integrity of the fatherland. All
Spaniards will participate in this through their various family, municipal, and syndical
roles. There shall be no participation in it by political parties. We shall implacably
abolish the system of political parties and all of their consequences - inorganic suffrage,
representation of clashing groups, and a Parliament of the type that is all too well known.
7. Human dignity, integrity, and freedom are eternal, intangible values.
But one is not really free unless he is a part of a strong and free nation.
No one will be permitted to use his freedom against the nation, which is the bulwark of
the fatherlands freedom. Rigorous discipline will prevent any attempt to envenom and
disunite the Spanish people or to incite them against the destiny of the fatherland.
8. The National-Syndicalist State will permit all kinds of private initiative that are
compatible with the collective interest, and it will also protect and encourage the
profitable ones.
ECONOMY LABOR CLASS STRUGGLE
9. Our conception of Spain in the economic realm is that of a gigantic syndicate of
producers. We shall organize Spanish society corporatively through a system of vertical
syndicates for the various field of production, all working toward national economic
unity.
10. We repudiate the capitalistic system which shows no understanding of the needs of the
people, dehumanizes private property, and causes workers to be lumped together in a
shapeless, miserable mass of people who are filled with desperation. Our spiritual and
national conception of life also repudiates Marxism. We shall redirect the impetuousness
of those working classes who today are led astray by Marxism, and we shall seek to bring
them into direct participation in fulfilling the great task of the national state.
11. The National-Syndicalist State will not cruelly stand apart from mans economic
struggles, nor watch impassively while the strongest class dominates the weakest. Our
regime will eliminate the very roots of class struggle, because all who work together in
production shall comprise one single organic entity. We reject and we shall prevent at all
LA FALANGE | 69

costs selfish interests from abusing others, and we shall halt anarchy in the field of labor
relations.
12. The first duty of wealth - and our State shall so affirm - is to better the conditions of the
people. It is intolerable that enormous masses of people should live wretchedly while a
small number enjoy all kinds of luxuries.
13. The State will recognize private property as a legitimate means for achieving individual,
family, and social goals, and will protect it against the abuses of large-scale finance
capital, speculators, and money lenders.
14. We shall support the trend toward nationalization of banking services and, through a
system of Corporations, the great public utilities.
15. All Spaniards have the right to work. Public agencies must of necessity provide support
for those who find themselves in desperate straits.
As we proceed toward a totally new structure, we shall maintain and strengthen all the
advantages that existing social legislation gives to workers.
16. Unless they are disabled, all Spaniards have the duty to work. The National-Syndicalist
State will not give the slightest consideration to those who fail to perform some useful
function and who try to live as drones at the expense of the labor of the majority of
people.
LAND
17. We must, at all costs, raise the standard of living in the countryside, which is Spains
permanent source of food. To this end, we demand agreement that will bring to
culmination without further delay the economic and social reforms of the agricultural
sector.
18. Our program of economic reforms will enrich agricultural production by means of the
following:
By assuring a minimum remuneration to all agricultural producers.
By demanding that there be restored to the countryside, in order to provide it
with an adequate endowment, a portion of that which the rural population is
paying to the cities for intellectual and commercial services.
By organizing a truly national system of agricultural credit which will lend
money to farmers at low interest against the guarantee of their property and
crops, and redeem them from usury and local tyrants.
By spreading education with respect to better methods of farming and sheep
raising.
By ordering the rational utilization of lands in accordance with their suitability
and with marketing possibilities.
By adjusting tariff policy in such a way as to protect agriculture and the livestock
industry.
By accelerating reclamation projects. By rationalizing the units of cultivation, so
as to eliminate wasted latifundia and uneconomic, miniscule plots.
19. Our program of social reforms in the field of agriculture will be achieved:
By redistributing arable land in such a way as to revive family farms and give energetic
encouragement to the syndicalization of farm laborers.
LA FALANGE | 70

By redeeming from misery those masses of people who presently are barely eking out a
living on sterile land, and by transferring such people to new and arable lands.
20. We shall undertake a relentless campaign of reforestation and livestock breeding, and we
shall punish severely those who resist it. We shall support the compulsory, temporary
mobilization of all Spanish youth for this historic goal of rebuilding the national
commonwealth.
21. The State may expropriate without indemnity lands of those owners who either acquired
them or exploited them illegally.
22. It will be the primary goal of the National-Syndicalist State to rebuild the communal
patrimonies of the towns.
NATIONAL EDUCATION RELIGION
23. It shall be the essential mission of the State to attain by means of rigorous disciplining of
education a strong, united national spirit, and to instil in the souls of future generations a
sense of rejoicing and pride in the fatherland.
All men shall receive pre-military training to prepare them for the honor of being enlisted
in the National and Popular Army of Spain.
24. Cultural life shall be organized so that no talent will be undeveloped because of
insufficient economic means. All who merit it shall be assured ready access to a higher
education.
25. Our Movement incorporates the Catholic meaning - of glorious tradition, and especially
in Spain - of national reconstruction. The Church and the State will co-ordinate their
respective powers so as to permit no interference or activity that may impair the dignity
of the State or national integrity.
NATIONAL REVOLUTION
26. The Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las JONS demands a new order, as set forth
in the foregoing principles. In the face of the resistance from the present order, it calls for
a revolution to implant this new order. Its method of procedure will be direct, bold, and
combative. Life signifies the art and science of warfare (milicia) and must be lived with a
spirit that is purified by service and sacrifice.
LA FALANGE | 71

A%%endi& '': The Falangist 2ath
+1

In Madrid on February 11, 1934, Ledesmas Jonsistas, who at this stage numbered some 300 and
were composed chiefly of students and taxi drivers, decided to merge with Jos Antonios 2000
Falangists. For the next three years the movement was called the Falange Espanola de las Juntas
de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista, and each local unit was termed a Jons. The emblems, slogans,
and national syndicalist ideology of the Jonsistas were taken over in toto. Leadership came from a
jealous triumvirate composed of Ledesma, Jos Antonio, and the world-renowned aviator Julio
Ruiz de Alda. Jos Antonio momentarily contented himself with supplying the enlarged
movement with its literary and aesthetic overtones, but by October his group managed by a one-
vote margin over the Ledesma faction in the National Council to elevate him to the position of
Jefe Nacional (national leader). Thus, in a democratic way, a single leader was recognized. All
the Falangists were required to take the following oath.
The Falangist 2ath
I swear to give myself always to the service of Spain.
I swear to have no pride other than that of the fatherland and of the Falange and to live under
the Falange in obedience and joy, impetuousness and patience, gallantry and silence.
I swear fidelity and submission to our leaders, honor to the memory of our dead, and
imperturbable perseverance amid all vicissitudes.
I swear, wherever I may be, in order to obey or in order to command that I shall respect our
Hierarchy from the first to the last rank.
I swear to reject and give no ear to any voice of either friend or foe who might weaken the
spirit of the Falange.
I swear to preserve above all the idea of unity: unity among the lands of Spain, unity among
the classes of Spain, unity within the individual man and among the men of Spain.
I swear to live in holy brotherhood with all members of the Falange and to lend every
assistance and eliminate every difference whenever this holy brotherhood requests that I do so.

18
7rom "ttp:LLironmarc".orgLinde-.p"pMLtopicL119-a-melange-of-falangeL.
LA FALANGE | 72

A%%endi& ''': Foundational S%eech 3y 4os5
Antonio Prio de Rivera
The Falange was founded Sunday 29 October 1933 in the theater La Comedia in Madrid. Here
are some excerpts from Jos Antonios speech:
La Patria es una unidad total en que se integran todos los individuos y todas las clases; la Patria
no puede estar en manos de la clase ms fuerte ni del partido mejor organizado. La Patria es una
sntesis trascendente, una sntesis indivisible, con fines propios que cumplir; y nosotros lo que
queremos es que el movimiento de este da, y el Estado que cree, sea el instrumento eficaz,
autoritario, al servicio de esa unidad irrevocable que se llama Patria....
Que desaparezcan los partidos polticos. Nadie ha nacido nunca miembro de un partido
poltico; en cambio nacemos todos miembros de una familia; somos todos vecinos de un
Municipio; nos afanamos todos en el ejercicio de un trabajo.
Queremos que Espaa recobre resueltamente el sentido universal de su cultura y de su
Historia. Y queremos, por ltimo, que si esto ha de lograrse en algn caso por la violencia, no
nos detengamos ante la violencia . Bien est, s, la dialctica como primer instrumento de
comunicacin. Pero no hay ms dialctica admisible que la dialctica de los puos y de las
pistolas cuando se ofende a la justicia o a la Patria. .
[Closing words:] Nuestro sitio est al aire libre, bajo la noche clara, arma al brazo, y en lo
alto, las estrellas. Que sigan los dems con sus festines. Nosotros fuera, en vigilancia tensa,
fervorosa y segura, ya presentimos el amanecer en la alegra de nuestras entraas.

The Fatherland is a total unity that integrates all individuals and all classes; the Fatherland
cannot be left in the hands of the strongest class or of the best organized party. The Fatherland is
a transcendent synthesis, an indivisible synthesis, with goals of its own to fulfill; and what we
want is that the movement born on this day, and the State it will create, be the efficient,
authoritarian instrument that will serve this irrevocable unity called Fatherland.
Let the political parties disappear. Nobody is ever born as member of a political party;
instead we are all born as members of a family; we are all neighbors of a town council; we all toil
in the practice of some profession.
We want Spain to resolutely recover the universal meaning of its culture and its history.
And finally it is our wish, if this has to be achieved by violence, then not to detain ourselves from
using violence. Admittedly, dialectics is good enough as a first instrument of communication.
But there is no other admissible dialectics than the dialectics of the fists and of guns, when justice
or the Fatherland is being offended.
Our place is in the free air, under the clear night sky, weapon in hand, and above us the
stars. Let others continue with their partying. We, who mount guard in the open, diligently,
devotedly, and confidently, already anticipate the daybreak in the joy of our guts.(Cisneros 1974:
66-69).
LA FALANGE | 73

A%%endi& '6: Cara al Sol. the Falangist 7yn
+8

Original lyrics
Cara al Sol con la camisa nueva,
que t bordaste en rojo ayer,
me hallar la muerte si me lleva
y no te vuelvo a ver.
Formar junto a mis compaeros
que hacen guardia sobre los luceros,
impasible el ademn,
y estn presentes en nuestro afn.
Si te dicen que ca,
me fui al puesto que tengo all.
Volvern banderas victoriosas
al paso alegre de la paz
y traern prendidas cinco rosas,
las flechas de mi haz.
Volver a rer la primavera,
que por cielo, tierra y mar se espera.
Arriba, escuadras, a vencer,
que en Espaa empieza a amanecer!
Espaa una!
Espaa grande!
Espaa libre!
Arriba Espaa!
Translation
Facing the sun in my new shirt
that you embroidered in red yesterday,
that's how death will find me if it takes me
and I won't see you again.
I'll take my place alongside my companions
who stand on guard in the heavens,
with a hard countenance,
they are alive in our effort.
If they say to you that I fell,
know that I'm gone to my post up there.
Victorious flags will return
at the merry step of Peace
and they'll bring five roses:
the arrows of my quiver.
Spring will laugh again,
which we await by air, land and sea.

18
Aritten b# a group of falangist intellectuals including 2os3 *ntonio$ t"e music is a marc".
LA FALANGE | 74

Onwards, squadrons, to victory,
that a new day dawns on Spain!
Spain united!
Spain (the) great!
Spain (the) free!
Onwards Spain!

Address for correspondence: English Department, U-4025, 215 Glenbrook Road, University of
Connecticut, Storrs, CT, 06269-4025, USA; email: patrick.hogan@uconn.edu.
Patrick Colm Hogan
Department of English and Program in Cognitive Science, University of Connecticut
World Literature, lo!ali"ation,
and #he Loss $f Stories%
$n the Political Economy of &arrative #oday

______________________________________________________________________________
World literature has several distinct meanings. Most important for the present study, it may refer to the
products of increased interaction across literary traditions in a globalized political economy. The resulting
global literature involves extensive convergence in narrative practices. The result is a diminishing of cultural
diversity in storytelling. lobalization may also lead to certain sorts of divergence. This may seem to partially
counterbalance the convergence. !o"ever, in an une#ual, global economy, divergence is most often guided by
hegemonic cultural practices, even if this occurs negatively. $pecifically, such divergence commonly operates
through identity%based repudiation of global standardization "ith a conse#uent simplification and distortion
of putatively indigenous traditions. Thus, in une#ual global conditions, both convergence and divergence have
the effect of reducing the diversity of narrative cultures. &n conse#uence, the globalization of literature may
have deleterious effects on the aesthetics ' and indeed the ethics and politics ' of narrative. The essay ends
"ith some possibilities for reversing this trend.

'ey(ords( "orld literature, globalization, universals, diversity, cultural extinction, hegemony.
_____________________________________________________________________________________

A few years ago, I was watching a Hindi movie, Akele Hum Akele Tum (Us Alone, You Alone). A little
bit into the movie, I began to think: this is not entirely unlike Kramer vs. Kramer. The feeling became
stronger as the film progressed. At one point, the father is preparing breakfast for his son and himself.
Watching this, I remembered a scene in Kramer vs. Kramer where the son complains about the father
getting shells into the eggs. The father replies, pretending he intentionally added eggshell as an ingredient,
that this is actually good because it makes the eggs crunchy. Just then, the boy in Akele Hum Akele Tum
complained that his father had gotten shells into the eggs. The father replied, pretending he intentionally
added eggshell as an ingredient, that this is actually good because it makes the eggs crunchy.
No doubt, many people have had the experience of having seen a particular movie or having read a
particular story before not only within, but also across traditions. I am not referring to the sorts of cross-
cultural patterns that arise spontaneously in different literatures. (I will return to these in a moment.) I am
referring, rather, to a sort of literary or cinematic bandwagon effect. Something is successful, so other
authors begin to imitate it or, more accurately, something is successful, so publishers and film producers
begin to pour money into projects (novels, screenplays) that seem to share the crucial, profit-generating
quality.

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 12
Remakes and partial remakes, such as Akele Hum Akele Tum, are cases of this sort, but somewhat
unusual ones. Most often, the resulting uniformity is a matter of topic, theme, style, narrative structure
not a specific plot or particular moments of dialogue. For example, it is commonplace to remark that the
financial and critical success of Midnights Children prompted publishers to recruit Indian authors,
prompted Indian authors to write in English, fostered the spread of certain stylistic techniques and
postmodern approaches to writing postcolonial novels, and so on. Indeed, even Midnights Children is
a peculiar example. Homogenization is rarely the result of a single work. For instance, the spread of
Hollywood-style cinematic and narrative techniques is well known. Certainly some films were more
important than others in producing this result; but no single movie, nor even a small set of movies, was
primarily responsible.
The general point here is, of course, well known. The globalization of political economy tends to
foster a sort of global literature and culture: a world literature, in one sense of the phrase. In the bulk of
this essay, I will consider what this means. I will also consider, more briefly, what problems it might pose,
and, very briefly indeed, what one might do in response to such problems.
)* WH+# ,S W$-LD L,#E-+#U-E.
In order to begin this consideration, it is useful to contrast world literature with something that might seem
to be its equivalent: literary universals. Though only a handful of scholars have been actively engaged in
research on literary universals, interest in the topic has grown considerably in the past decade or so. It may
seem that this sort of research and interest are inseparable from the idea of world literature. Certainly,
there are senses of world literature that do go hand in hand with the study of literary universals; but there
are also forms of world literature that are actually incompatible with such study.
Literary universals are properties or relations that recur across genetically and areally unrelated
literary traditions with a frequency that is greater than chance, at a statistically significant level.
1

Genetically unrelated traditions are traditions that do not have a common source. Areally unrelated
traditions are traditions that did not influence one another, at least with respect to the putative universal.
Universals may result from shared biological predispositions, but also from spontaneously convergent
patterns in group dynamics, cross-culturally recurring tendencies in child development that are not
genetically determined as such, trans-historical propensities in the trajectories of interpersonal relations,
and so on.
What about world literature, then? One may distinguish at least three distinct senses of the phrase.
The first is simply the expansion of comparative literary study beyond Europhone literatures to traditions
of verbal art from all areas of the world. In this sense, world literature is not something separate from all

1
For a fuller discussion, see (Hogan 2003).

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 23
the literature that is already available. It is not a selection from that literature or a new sort of literature. It
is simply a new, encompassing categorization designed in opposition to other, restrictive categorizations.
It has consequences for literary study, but not necessarily for literature itself. (The point of this will
become clear when I consider other senses of the phrase.) One of the prime critical areas in which it has
productive consequences is the study of literary universals. It provides the only basis on which one can
hope to isolate cross-cultural and trans-historical literary patterns. Indeed, the point is consequential
outside literary study per se. Literature is in some respects an irreplaceable source of information on
certain aspects of the human mind, human society, human relations, and related matters. As such, world
literature in this sense is, or should be, of central importance not only for criticism and interpretation, but
also for cognitive and affective science, anthropology, and other fields. One may use literature of the
world to refer to this sense of world literature.
A second meaning of world literature is narrower. It refers to that set of literary works that have
importance across traditions.
2
For example, the Rmyana has passed across languages and cultures,
assuming significance in different literary traditions not only the various language traditions of India
(comparable to the various national traditions of Europe), but non-Indian traditions (e.g., Indonesian) as
well. As such, it is a part of world literature in this second sense. The same point could be made about
Tales of the 1001 Nights or Hamlet. In order to distinguish it from other ideas of world literature, one may
refer to this as transnational literature.
Transnational literature is certainly a valid object of study. Indeed, one potentially has a great deal to
learn about literary reputation, the dissemination of literary works, literary influence, and other topics, by
studying cross-cultural reception. However, the very things that make this a valuable field of study also
make it a problematic category, if one tries to give it normative or even the wrong sort of intellectual
weight. Almost all major Hollywood films are transnational cinema in this sense, but brilliant works of
Malayalam cinema are not. Discrepancies such as this are just the sorts of thing that one can come to
understand by research on transnational art. But it is important to recognize that the greater
transnationality of a particular work or tradition is not necessarily an indicator of, so to speak, greater
universality in either the descriptive sense of universal or in the normative sense. Works of literature
and film become transnational in part due to what languages are known across cultures, what publication
outlets and distribution circuits there are for different works, what groups have higher prestige, who
controls education policy, and so on.
Beyond the creation of a transnational canon, discrepancies in economic power, social hegemony,
and other factors produce further effects. In the proper circumstances, one of these effects may be the
increasing assimilation of one literary tradition to another. For example, as more Hollywood films become
transnationally canonical, the films of other traditions become increasingly similar to Hollywood films.

2
This is, for example, David Damroschs (2003) usage.

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 24
This is likely to occur for the simple reason that each new non-American filmmaker makes films in
relation to a set of prior works. That set is not limited by the filmmakers nationality. Rather, it is affected
by the salience or prominence of different films in the authors memory, the prototypes that have been
formed in that authors mind by watching films (national and transnational), etc. (I will consider this
process in greater detail below.) As such, the works of any new filmmaker are likely to be highly
influenced by Hollywood. Moreover, these new films will contribute to the further Hollywoodization of
cinema through their own subsequent influence.
This leads to the third sense of world literature: literature that is the product of intertraditional
influence. This is the sense alluded to at the outset of this essay. In order to keep this sense distinct, one
may refer to it as global literature. Global literature is a body of literature that represents the
convergence of different traditions. However, it does not represent spontaneous convergence. Rather, it is
results from what one might call contact convergence.
One should consider these forms of convergence in greater detail.
/* C$0,& #$E#HE-% SP$&#+&E$US C$&1E-E&CE +&D C$&#+C#
C$&1E-E&CE
Spontaneous convergence is the result of processes that occur in each tradition separately. It begins with
cycles of practice within a tradition. Those cycles lead to innovations that are retained because they fulfill
certain purposes of verbal art that recur cross-culturally. For example, our emotion systems appear to be
structured such that emotional effects are, in part, contrastive. If Jones anticipates winning a big prize,
then does not win it, he may feel sad even though his objective situation is precisely the same as before.
Indeed his situation is the same as when he anticipated some harm then felt happy when that harm did not
occur. Given this emotional propensity, and given our enjoyment of certain sorts of emotional experience,
one might expect different cultures to develop narratives for emotional engagement. Moreover, one might
expect those cultures to develop those narratives in such a way as to begin with some sort of default
emotional normalcy, move to some degree of emotional pain, then conclude with some sort of emotional
pleasure. In a narrative trajectory of this sort, the pain is enhanced by contrast with the initial normalcy,
and the final pleasure is enhanced by contrast with the intervening pain. Thus, one might expect a
structure of this sort to recur across cultures. At the same time, this structure is clearly not innate. If it
comes to be standard in different traditions, that probably results from the separate development of the
practice in different places, as people improved their storytelling through cycles of production and
revision.

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 25
In contrast with such spontaneous convergence, other forms of similarity development result from the
influence of one tradition on the other. This is contact convergence. This occurs most obviously through
the transmission of particular literary works across traditions.
In order to understand contact convergence, one needs to consider the general processes by which
people create works of art. Storytellers, for example, draw on multiple levels of cognitive structures to
make stories. These levels include broad schemas, prototypes, and instances or exempla. The broad
schemas are the sorts of things that can be affected by general ideas (e.g., aspects of normative aesthetic
theories, such as the Neoclassical unities of time, place, and action). However, both schemas and
prototypes are usually abstracted from instances: which is to say, particular works. Specifically,
prototypes result from a process of weighted averaging across instances. The averaging is weighted in
the sense that some features are usually more prominent in the prototypes than in the instances themselves.
These features may be more emotionally consequential or more distinctive of the category. To take an
ordinary example, the prototypical man is probably more masculine than the statistically average man.
3

Schemas are more abstract than prototypes; but they are not, in general, quite so minimal as
dictionary definitions. First of all, schemas give one the features of the central distribution of the category.
They then delimit specific alternatives that fall outside the central distribution, but include all or many of
the remaining cases. Consider, for example, the central distribution of birds fly. In keeping with this, our
schema for birds includes can fly as a default value. However, some birds are injured and some types of
bird cannot fly. These are included as non-default alternatives in schemas.
4

Our thoughts about birds, our expectations of birds, and so on, are guided by complex interactions of
prototypes with schemas and with the constantly shifting sets of instances or exempla from which they
derive. The same point holds for the events, characters, scenes, styles, and other features of literary works.
Our understanding and imagination of any story we read or write is also guided by prototypes, schemas,
and exempla. Within this list, exempla are particularly important, for they are the primary source of the
other two structures. Moreover, not all exempla are equal. Some works have drawn our prolonged and
repeated attention, while others have not. Individually, the former are more cognitively consequential than
the latter. The distinction here is roughly equivalent to that between canonical and non-canonical
literature. On the other hand, there is never a perfect alignment between the works that someone has
studied, re-read, etc., and the canon of literary works taught in schools or studied individually by other
people. Indeed, ones idiolectal canon the set of works that one has studied, discussed, reviewed, and
so forth will never encompass the entire official canon of ones society. Even if Smith somehow
manages to read the entire official canon, she will give most works only passing attention. In this way,

3
!ee ("ahneman and #iller 1$%&' 1(3) on )he case of le))uce as a pro)o)*pical die) food. +learl*, le))uce has far
fe,er calories )han )he s)a)is)icall* average die) food.
(
!ee (Holland, Hol*oa-, .is/e)) 0 Thagard 1$%&) on schemas and defaul)s.

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 26
they will have no greater effect on her prototypes and schemas than will episodes of television programs
that she saw once and never reconsidered. Moreover, there are going to be other stories to which she has
devoted such attention for example, television programs that she taught in class stories that are,
therefore, part of her idiolectal canon, but that do not have social canonical status.
Related to this, ones understanding and imagination of verbal art has an important normative or
evaluative component; but this is not a matter of ones entire idiolectal canon. Rather, there is a further,
still more restricted set of works that define literary excellence for any given person. This is not simply the
set of works that one would say define literary excellence. (That is largely a matter of what one believes
other people think are the best works.) These are the works that actually have a place of high esteem in
ones experience, works that are readily activated as evaluative standards in ones representational and
emotional memory. These are not works that one has judged primarily in terms of some list of qualities.
They are, rather, works that have given one the sort of experience one wants from literature. One may
refer to these as paradigms.
More exactly, then, one may say that each of us has a hierarchy of exempla, ranging from a limited
set of idiolectal paradigms, through a broader idiolectal canon, down to a set of increasingly peripheral
instances of various literary categories. To some extent, different people in a given society will share such
paradigms, canons, and peripheral instances. One may refer to these as the social paradigms, etc., of a
given group. Note that even these will only partially overlap with the official or publically acknowledged
paradigms, canon, and so forth, which therefore form a further category.
Authors, again, draw on schemas, prototypes, and exempla in producing new works. These include
schemas, etc., from a range of non-literary areas, such as the routines of daily life. They also, very
importantly, include the schemas, prototypes, and exempla of literature: narrative, character, and so forth.
The production of works of verbal art includes at least two complexes of principles that guide this
process.
5
The first is the complex of principles that generate the characters, events, and larger narrative
trajectories initially. The second is the complex of principles that allow the author to judge the success of
that generation. The former may be called development principles; the latter, evaluation principles.
6

The evaluation principles make particular reference to paradigms and to the authors experience of
paradigms. Put simply, the authors relation to paradigmatic works sets a sort of standard for that authors
own evaluation of the effectiveness of the new work.

I can now give a more technical statement regarding contact convergence. Contact convergence in
verbal art becomes possible when there is an influx of exempla from one tradition to another. Of course,
these new exempla produce only a minimal, passive alteration unless they affect the production of new

1
!ee (Hogan 200&).
&
Though )he* are concep)uall* and even )o some ex)en) )emporall* dis)inc), )he processes of genera)ion (or
developmen)) and evalua)ion are, of course, )igh)l* in)egra)ed in prac)ice. 2n o)her ,ords, evalua)ion /egins almos)
)he momen) )ha) genera)ion /egins and i) has con)inuous effec)s on genera)ion.

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 27
works in the recipient tradition. Thus they have a significant convergence effect only if they alter the
cognitive structures that produce works of verbal art: which is to say, only if they alter the development
and evaluation principles that govern such production, as well as the related structures that guide
understanding and response on the part of readers. This suggests that the exempla will be more
consequential to the extent that they are established as canonical or, beyond that, paradigmatic. On the
other hand, a very large number of peripheral works may collectively have significant consequences as
well.
In recent years, globalization has had just these effects. Specifically, there has been an enormous
influx of Europhone and particularly English-language works into the paradigmatic (at least the official
paradigmatic), canonical, and peripheral bodies of exempla in virtually every tradition.
2* C$&#+C# C$&1E-E&CE, E1+LU+#,$&, +&D HEE0$&3
This brings me to a consequential point about varieties of contact convergence. Contact convergence
comes in at least two types. One may refer to them as exchange convergence and hegemonic
convergence. In exchange convergence, the contact is limited and the status of the source and
recipient societies is roughly equal in terms of political economy, cultural prestige, and so on. In these
cases, it seems reasonable to assume that the transmitted literary work, form, or idea appeals to some
interest already present in the recipient tradition. For example, it may be that Sanskrit drama, particularly
Abhijnakuntalam, provided some impetus for the development of romantic dramas in China (see Liu
1972: 13 and Dolby 1976: 4), though the literary contact was limited and not economically or culturally
hegemonic. If so, this suggests a prior propensity for, or openness toward, relevant sorts of aesthetic
practice in Chinese society: not necessarily romantic drama per se, but romantic story creation and
something along the lines of dramatic performance.
7
In contrast, there is a clear influence of English
poetry on Indian poetry in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. This influence resulted from extensive
contact including political and economic domination and cultural hegemony, ranging from diffuse matters
of prestige to particular curricular programs in educational institutions.
8
This suggests nothing about the
prior interests or needs of the recipient culture and of course nothing about the quality of the particulars
that influenced that recipient culture.
9

3
4s #ac-erras pu)s i), 5)ha) )here is influence from 2ndia need no) /e dou/)ed. 6u) )o ascri/e )his influence as )he
reason for )he rise of +hinese drama a) )his )ime and place is 7ui)e ano)her ma))er (1$$0' 30).
%
8n colonialism, hegemon*, and 9nglish li)erar* s)ud* in 2ndia, see, for example, (:is,ana)han 1$%$).
$
;hen 2 have presen)ed )hese ideas pu/licl*, 2 have invaria/l* /een as-ed if )he curren)l* popular no)ion of
h*/ridi)* does no) pose a challenge )o ,ha) 2 am sa*ing. The idea appears )o /e ),o<fold. Firs), )here is a
descrip)ive poin). 9ver* cul)ure = )hus ever* li)erar* )radi)ion = is al,a*s alread* h*/rid. 2n conse7uence, )here is
no poin) in longing nos)algicall* for a condi)ion of cul)ural puri)*. The second poin) is norma)ive. 4n a))emp) )o
achieve cul)ural puri)* is al,a*s a ma))er of purging h*/rid cul)ural forma)ions of pu)a)ivel* foreign elemen)s in an
a))emp) )o limi) and con)rol a cul)ural mixing )ha) one should cele/ra)e ra)her )han condemn.

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 28
Globalization has clearly led to such hegemonic contact convergence. It is widely recognized that the
direction of transmission of cultural items through globalization has been disproportionately from Euro-
American culture to other cultures and from Europhone particularly English-language literature to
other traditions of verbal art. Most of us have anecdotal evidence of this discrepancy. One expects
professors from India, Japan, or China to be familiar with Euro-American cultural products, from the
paradigmatic works of literary canons to blockbusters of popular culture; but the reverse is not the case.
For example, one expects an Indian professor to recognize the name Homer, and perhaps even Homer
Simpson; but an Indian professor would not expect an American colleague to recognize the name
Vysa. Statistics are available and they are consistent with the anecdotes. A 2005 study from the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) points out that developing
countries account for less than 1% share of exports of cultural goods (International 9). Consider the
book trade: the U.S. exports almost 2 billion dollars worth of books every year, as does the U.K. In
contrast, China exports only about 35% of that, Japan under 6%, India about 2%, South Africa less than
1%, and the exports of countries such as Turkey, Kenya, and Ethiopia are almost insignificant (e.g.,
Ethiopia exported only $13,000 in books during the year covered by the study). A more recent UNESCO
document reports that Europe and North America account for 84% of all printed media export; East Asia
accounts for 10.7%; Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 0.35% (Kutukdjian and Corbett 2009: 131). The
point is not confined to books. The UNESCO study International Flows notes that Africa as a whole has
produced only 600 movies in its history: roughly the number produced by the U.S. in 18 months.
Moreover, more than one-third of all countries in the world do not produce any films at all (47); indeed,
the percentage is closer to one-half (88 out of 185, according to the more recent report: Kutukdjian and

The descrip)ive poin) presen)s 5h*/ridi)* as if i) is = or is a) leas) par) of = a ,ell<developed )heor* of cul)ural
in)erac)ion> /u) i) is no). Homi 6ha/ha in)roduced )he )erm in)o curren) )heore)ical discourse. He presen)ed i) as an
al)erna)ive )o 5a ,orld conceived in /inar* )erms (1$$(' 1()> /u), as a )heore)ical concep), i) hardl* goes /e*ond a
vague, approving ges)ure in )he direc)ion of s*ncre)ism (se) in /inar* opposi)ion )o ever*)hing else, ,hich is
reduc)ivel* charac)eri?ed as /inaris)ic). @iven )his vagueness, )he fundamen)al descrip)ive claim (of universal
cul)ural h*/ridi)*) is undou/)edl* )rue' ever* cul)ure develops in some in)erac)ion ,i)h o)her cul)ures. 6u) )ha) )ells
no)hing a/ou) )he na)ure, propor)ions, or processes of 5h*/ridi?a)ion. #oreover, )he al)erna)ives are ,rongl*
framed. The poin) of cri)ici?ing cul)ural hegemon* is no) )o asser) )he impor)ance of a/solu)e cul)ural puri)*.
2ndeed, ra)her )han suppor)ing or simpl* dismissing affirma)ions of puri)*, par) of )he poin) is )o unders)and Aus)
ho, such affirma)ions come a/ou) in reac)ion agains) largel* coercive forms of s*ncre)ism.
This /rings me )o )he norma)ive poin). Benopho/ia undou/)edl* leads )o in)ellec)ual desicca)ion and cul)ural
rigidi)*> /u) )ha) is hardl* )he resul) of someone affirming )he value of non<hegemonic )radi)ions and opposing )heir
increased a))enua)ion> i) is hardl* )he resul) of someone sa*ing )ha), for ins)ance, par)icular languages should /e
cul)iva)ed so )ha) )he* do no) /ecome ex)inc). #oreover, a general presump)ion in favor of )he h*/rid seems
misplaced. For example, )he his)or* of colonialism a))es)s )ha) h*/rid cul)ural forma)ions ma* )a-e, no) )he /es),
/u) )he ,ors) of /o)h ,orlds. Thus one of)en finds )ha) ,omen in coloni?ed socie)ies )oo- on )he disa/ili)ies of
man* 9uropean ,omen (e.g., economic dependenc*)> /u) )heir h*/rid cul)ure did no) relieve )hem of indigenous
disa/ili)ies (e.g., )hose associa)ed ,i)h pol*gam*). (8n )his poin), see 4madiume 1$%3 and :an 4llen 1$32, 1$3&, as
,ell as Hogan 2000' 133<212.)

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 29
Corbett 2009: 132-133). In keeping with this, a list of the 398 top grossing films in the world (All-Time)
includes only four non-English language works. The first of these comes in at number 268.
10

In the case of many very small language communities and associated traditions of verbal art, these
discrepancies have contributed to the actual extinction of the indigenous tradition.
11
In other cases, they
have involved the reconfiguration of the disproportionately recipient traditions to such an extent that their
new products are perhaps better understood as variants on a global literary discourse than as developments
of local traditions. Indeed, even earlier works of the tradition come to be understood in terms set by the
hegemonic culture as in the recent fad of arguing that such-and-such a non-Western tradition was always
already fully in keeping with the ideas of Jacques Derrida.
To a great extent, this discrepancy is due to concrete political, economic, and social factors:
ownership of publishing and media, language domination, and the legacy of colonial schooling practices.
It is also involved with prestige (what Bourdieu 1993 referred to as symbolic capital). This, too, can be
spelled out in cognitive terms. An authors evaluation processes include placing him- or herself in the
position of potential readers and altering features of the work that would be likely to be idiosyncratic:
features that would be unlikely to have the desired effect on a reader. Part of the communicative skill of an
author is in consciously or unconsciously recognizing such features and revising them as needed.
Suppose, for example, that a given author happens to find dark hair and dark eyes particularly contributory
toward beauty in women. That author is perfectly free to give a character dark hair and dark eyes and to
make her beautiful, even connecting these features with the beauty. However, such an author could not
expect a reader to infer beauty because of these features. Contrast the suggestions of there she was, all
blonde haired and blue eyed and those of there she was, all black haired and brown eyed.
As this example suggests, one component of such an evaluation process concerns not individual
idiosyncrasy, but rather socially recognized values: prominently, prestige. Once a given property or
practice becomes prestigious, it tends to be identified with other values as well. For example, if light skin
is prestigious (i.e., if it is socially prized), it will tend to come to be thought of as beautiful, in contrast
with alternatives. The same points hold for cultural prestige and literary evaluation. This then enters into
both the development and evaluation principles by which writers judge and revise their works. At least
initially, the prestige-based evaluation principles will be separate from, and perhaps opposed to, the
authors own spontaneous aesthetic response.
Thus, contact leads to convergence by altering literary prototypes, schemas, and so on. Moreover,
insofar as contact alters prestige standards in the direction of the hegemonic society (and that is commonly
part of hegemony), it is likely to produce convergence in output that goes beyond convergence in attitudes

10
There are, of course, par)ial excep)ions )o )hese )rends (see "u)u-dAian and +or/e)) 200$' 131<131)> /u) )hese do
no) significan)l* affec) )he overall pic)ure.
11
8n effor)s )o preserve a) leas) some ,or-s of ver/al ar) in d*ing )radi)ions, see (!pols-* 200(' 21().

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 2:
(i.e., the resulting works are likely to be more similar than the aesthetic feelings of their authors). Put
somewhat crudely: authors may, in a sense, come to deface their works relative to their own evaluative
responses. They may do this in order to make those works conform more fully with what they take to be
common evaluative responses or they may simply be aiming for increased sales. In any case, this occurs
even in cases where actual general evaluative responses are not in keeping with the prestige standard:
cases in which that standard is, rather, solely part of hegemonic ideology.
When hegemonic contact convergence occurs, prestige standards spread from the hegemonic society
to recipient societies. This is part of the broader spread of hegemonic ideologies. But there is a
complication here, already suggested in the example of hair color. Hegemonic ideologies tend to involve
denigrating evaluations of at least certain aspects of subordinated or non-hegemonic cultures. Indeed, it is
difficult to see how this could be avoided, given that hegemonic ideology, by its nature, affirms the
superiority of the hegemonic culture. That said, ideology does not automatically crush the pride of
subordinated peoples. Indeed, quite the contrary: it is likely to lead at least some members of a subordinate
group to an enhanced sense of their group identity and an enhanced pride in that identity. One result of
this is that hegemonic works may come to serve as negative models, rather than (or in addition to) being
positive models.
To get an idea of how negative models operate, consider the following simple case. Suppose Jones is
very concerned with being manly. He notices a woman checking her fingernails by opening her hand and
holding it palm outward. Later, he catches himself doing the same thing then quickly shifts to the more
manly method of making a fist and turning the palm inward. Jones is using a negative model based on
gender categorization.
12
Less trivial instances are ubiquitous in literature. One case may be found in
Rabindranath Tagores short story, Housewife. A young boy, Ashu, is discovered playing at dolls with
his younger sister. As a result, he is given the humiliating nickname Housewife. The point of the
nickname is to hold up such behavior as a negative model for masculinity.
13
Negative modeling not only
guides characters and events in stories; it may have consequences for the production and reception of
literary works themselves. If strong sorrowful emotions (e.g., in melodrama) come to be associated with
female writers for example, such emotions may be avoided by male writers, or by publishers of male
writers. When this sort of thing occurs across literary traditions, it may give rise to forms of contact
divergence.

12
The example is no) ,holl* fanciful. 4s a /o*, 2 remem/er a schoolma)e poin)ing ou) )his difference )o me. 2)
seems 2 had inadver)en)l* loo-ed a) m* nails in )he ,rong ,a*. He ,as providing /ro)herl* advice so )ha) 2 could
avoid fu)ure em/arrassmen).
13
2 should no)e )ha) Tagore is no) suppor)ing /u) cri)ici?ing )his use of nega)ive modeling )o enforce norms of
gender ideolog*.

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 21
4* 0$1,& +P+-#% SP$&#+&E$US D,1E-E&CE +&D C$&#+C#
D,1E-E&CE
Just as one may distinguish between spontaneous and contact convergence, one may distinguish between
spontaneous and contact divergence. Spontaneous divergence is the ordinary way that traditions become
different. Certain biological, cultural, group dynamic, and other universals give verbal art common initial
conditions. Other universals foster convergence through the historical changes that occur in literary
traditions, as already noted. However, not all aspects of the initial conditions are identical, and certainly
not all aspects of historical change are subject to convergent pressures. Even slight differences in the
initial canon of works accepted by two groups, or slight differences in environment or population, may
accumulate to quite significant differences over generations.
Spontaneous divergence is important for a number of reasons. Among other things, it is probably not
too much of an exaggeration to say that, without spontaneous divergence both across and within traditions,
art is likely to stagnate. For example, one crucial spur to creativity has been contact following divergence.
The European discovery of Indian literature and philosophy at the end of the Eighteenth Century
provided one important impetus for the development of philosophical idealism and literary romanticism.
European contact with African and East Asian visual art in the early Twentieth Century contributed
significantly to the development of Modernism. Going in another direction, in the Tenth and Eleventh
centuries the influence of Greek thought gave new vitality to Arabic philosophy and literary theory. Such
examples could easily be multiplied.
This is unsurprising, given cognitive accounts of creativity. Traditions develop and become
crystallized in shared canons. This process tends to produce a strong set of widely shared proximate
associations for any given literary topic, genre, etc. For example, in Petrarchan love poetry, the beloved
came to be linked with a highly stereotyped set of features, famously parodied by Shakespeare in sonnet
130 (My mistress eyes are nothing like the sun). According to writers in creative cognition theory,
14

creativity is a matter of accessing more remote associations that are also fitting for the task at hand: e.g.,
writing love poetry. Creativity becomes increasingly difficult as proximate associations become
entrenched, both individually and socially. Contact with other traditions alters this situation. First, due to
spontaneous divergence, it is likely to present authors with quite different complexes of association.
Second, due to universal constraints on such divergence (e.g., due to the way our emotion systems
operate), these new associations are likely to be apt for the recipient poets purposes.
In contrast with spontaneous divergence, contact divergence is usually less a matter of chance than
choice. It may result from prestige and ideology, as mentioned earlier; but, in each case, including cases of
prestige and ideology, it commonly results most fundamentally from identity categorization or in social

1(
!ee, for example, )he essa*s in (!)ern/erg 1$$$) and (!mi)h, ;ard 0 Fin-e 1$$1).

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 22
psychological terminology in-group/out-group division. Here one may return to the example of looking
at ones fingernails. Why did Jones feel the need to change from one method of fingernail observation to
another? The fundamental reason was that Jones assigned people, including himself, a categorial identity
based on sex. He then encoded certain aspects of their and his behavior in terms of that categorial identity
and its associated norms. The same point holds for Ashus humiliation at the nickname Housewife and
his resulting sense that to play with your little sister on a school holiday was the most shameful thing in
the world (Tagore 1994: 57).
The same general point holds for literary production and reception. People categorize literary works
in terms of in-groups and out-groups: most obviously but not only nations. In a short essay, one cannot
go into the dynamics of hegemonic denigration and counter-hegemonic response in any detail; but here is
a simplified outline of one common scenario. The development of hegemonic contact relations between
two cultures produces a situation in which many members of the dominated society are likely to feel
oppressed by the prestige relations defined in the hegemonic tradition. In connection with this, they are
likely to fear that continued erosion of indigenous traditions will produce a particular sort of convergent
development: what one might call reduction. Reduction refers to a form of convergent development with
two main features. First, it leads to a more or less common culture in the two societies, with relatively
limited differences. Second, this common culture has conserved overwhelmingly more of one culture than
the other.
A growing possibility of cultural reduction tends to elicit a specifiable range of responses.
15
Some of
these foster convergence: reductive or non-reductive. However, some varieties reject convergence. One
recurrent response of the latter sort is reactionary traditionalism. Reactionary traditionalism is, roughly,
an attempt to re-establish a declining indigenous tradition (e.g., Igbo tradition) on the basis of a
repudiation of the alien, hegemonic tradition (say, English Christian tradition). Of course, the result is not
as pure as the traditionalist claims. Indeed, the indigenous tradition in these cases is often understood
only in relation to, or by way of, the hegemonic tradition. Thus, the indigenous tradition may be
reductively understood as a sort of negation of the hegemonic tradition. For example, if the hegemonic
tradition is seen as free in sexual relations, true indigenous tradition may be viewed as tightly and
inflexibly chaste. Alternatively, indigenous tradition may be understood in terms of ideologies taken over
from the hegemonic culture. For example, reactionary traditionalists may draw on colonialist stereotypes
to characterize their culture as ubiquitously religious without any secular tendencies. In the case of
reactionary traditionalism, then, the divergence of the dominated culture from the hegemonic culture is
largely guided by the principles and practices of the hegemonic culture. In this way, contact divergence is
often a part of or a stage in the larger, reductive collapse of different traditions into a global culture with a
global literature.

11
!ee (Hogan 2000' $<23).

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 433

5* #HE 6U#U-E $6 C-E+#,1,#3 +&D 0$-+LS
I take it that reductive convergence including forms of convergence masquerading as divergence is the
predominant cultural tendency of globalization. Small languages and their traditions of verbal art are
disappearing quite rapidly. At the same time, the healthy traditions (including traditions in English,
French, German, Japanese, and so on) are converging through contact: largely hegemonic contact from
America and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe toward other regions. As this suggests, the growing
homogenization is not the result of uniform or proportionate contributions from different traditions.
16

Euro-American cultural hegemony is, of course, bound up with economic, political, and military
domination. It is unsurprising that this entire complex is associated with violence: both the violence of
reactionary counter-hegemonic practices (such as religious fundamentalism: a form of reactionary
traditionalism) and the much greater (direct and indirect) violence of the hegemonic powers.
I do not wish to be an alarmist. There is still considerable diversity out there, and not everyone is
engaged in shooting and bombing. Moreover, it is important to note that some forms of contact
convergence, including forms that have occurred within globalization (such as global activism for peace),
are clearly salutary. However, if the current trend in contact convergence continues, it is likely to have
deleterious consequences in a number of areas. For example, an increasing loss of diversity in verbal art,
both within and across traditions, would be almost certain to have a degrading impact on creativity
throughout the growing global literary monoculture. Even more importantly, diversity in narrative
situations and themes often presents people with challenges to their moral assumptions, just as diversity in
literary techniques presents them with challenges to their aesthetic assumptions. A decline in the breadth
of moral and political alternatives could have practical human costs of a sort that one might not ordinarily
associate with a decline in the diversity of verbal art.
Unfortunately, I do not have much to say by way of indicating a solution to these problems. The most
important responses obviously concern global economic and information relations. The fundamental
change that is needed in this context is something along the lines of what was formerly called a New
World Information Order (see New World), though with changes in those aspects of the original
program that might have led toward censorship. In such a new order, the flows of information
including literary ephemera, canons, and paradigms would, in principle, be balanced, and the contact
situation would be shifted from hegemony to equality of exchange. Complete realization of this goal may
not be possible; but it seems likely that consistent effort in this direction might at least partially ameliorate

1&
2n Heri)iana Canaivosons (2003) )erms, )here is a reduc)ion in )he 5varie)* or num/er of )radi)ions and in )he
degree of 5dissimilari)* across )radi)ions. #oreover, )he (increasingl* similar) )radi)ions )ha) remain are no)
5/alanced or propor)iona)el* represen)ed glo/all*.

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 434
the current condition. For example, we are unlikely to make any progress if we are not able to diversify
ownership relations and distribution practices in literary, artistic, and other information industries. The
ideal of democratically owned and controlled media may be utopian. However, as active citizens of our
various countries particularly those of us who are citizens of the hegemonic countries we are, in
principle, able to place at least some democratic limits on the control of media by a few mega-
corporations.
17

There are also things we can do in our capacity as teachers and scholars. First, and most obviously,
we can continue our efforts to expand comparative literary study so that it is genuinely a study of
literature of the world. This is a project that has begun in earnest and has made great progress in recent
years. As this project continues, it is important that it be integrated with a second task: cultivating
recognition of the diversity in cultural practices that characterizes both hegemonic and non-hegemonic
societies. In small but hopefully incremental ways, teaching this diversity might help to limit tendencies
toward expecting uniformity within ones own tradition and (falsely) imputing uniformity to other
traditions. We can do this in part through (complex, diversity-enhancing) interpretation of individual
works and in part by challenging the development of canons that tend to reduce traditions to uniformity. (I
think here, for example, of the reduction of Indian fiction to Anglophone fiction particularly post-
Rushdie Anglophone fiction or the reduction of Indian cinema to Bollywood films made after economic
liberalization.) The general idea of internal group diversity seems to be fairly widely accepted in principle.
However, it does not seem to be nearly as widely accepted in practice. Indeed, the tendency to make
generalizations about group propensities appears to be part of a cognitive predisposition toward
categorization. If anything, the tendency is enhanced in in-group/out-group identity categorization. As a
result, imputations of group uniformity are highly robust, even in the face of self-conscious beliefs that
oppose such generalizations. Teaching against this tendency requires a further, also self-conscious
decision and constantly renewed effort.
Finally, one might think back to the Sandinista attempt to involve increasing numbers of ordinary
people in imaginative writing. Networks of influence and interaction tend to develop and diverge
spontaneously, once people begin to produce literary works. The multiplication of creative writers and the
multiplication of creative outlets should tend to generate diverging clusters of so to speak mini-
traditions, even within the same encompassing culture. This has the potential to compensate for the loss
of diversity elsewhere, at least partially, by functionally recapitulating the relative canonical separation of
culturally distinct traditions. This is increasingly possible because literary networks form readily through
the Internet and related digital media, generating their own local social canons.
Indeed, there may be a potential for even greater internal diversity within the growing global
monoculture than there was in earlier, separate cultural traditions. After all, those separate traditions

13
For discussions of )hese issues, see (6agdi-ian 200(), (#c+hesne* 200%), and (#c+hesne* 0 !chiller 2003).

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 435
included their own hegemonies and reductions. Some critics have viewed the post-modern period as an
era of repetition, as Umberto Eco put it in his semiotic analysis of seriality (1990: 84). However, Eco
rightly points out that each of the types of repetition found in post-modernity belongs by right to the
entire history of artistic creativity (1990: 95). Throughout the world, narratives may be increasingly
guided by global hegemonies, but formerly they were often guided by regional hegemonies. Even more
importantly, in the past, the vast majority of people were excluded from literary production, or even from
forms of literary reception that had consequences for canon formation. New media may loosen some of
these constraints.
I do not wish to overstate the possibilities here. Even in small, Internet-based communities, not
everyone has the same opportunities for an open reception or general appreciation, whatever the quality of
their work. Indeed, not everyone has access to the Internet.
18
Moreover, digital media are no less available
as tools for homogenization than for diversity. Nonetheless, there are real possibilities in this direction.
In sum, world literature can mean different things. Most crucially, it can mean the study of literary
works from all world traditions or the increasing convergence of literary traditions into a global literature
that is part of a reductive monoculture. The study of literary universals is, of course, compatible only with
the former sense of world literature: a sense in which there is great diversity and divergence across
traditions, if always diversity and divergence constrained by shared human propensities biological,
group dynamical, developmental, and so on. Indeed, the rise of global literature places a historical limit on
the study of literary universals and thus on the insights such study can give into the human mind, human
society, and so forth. More importantly, the rise of global literature may produce conditions that are
deleterious for the development, or even maintenance, of human aesthetic and ethical creativity.
There are, however, things we can do. As citizens and political agents, we can follow writers and
activists such as Sean MacBride in supporting a New World Information Order and a New World
Economic Order. As teachers and scholars, we can cultivate our students and our readers sense of
diversity: not only across but within traditions. Finally, we can help to foster the expansion of imaginative
writing not its professionalization in degree programs, but its de-professionalization in networks of
ordinary people creating and sharing their own poems and stories. In this way, we can cultivate internal
diversity even in the very heart of the monoculture.
19

1%
8n economic class, educa)ion, and o)her fac)ors /earing on access )o ne, )echnologies, see ;ilhelm 2000' (%<
%1.
1$
4n earlier version of )his essa* ,as delivered as )he -e*no)e presen)a)ion of )he 200% !ou)hern +ompara)ive
Di)era)ure 4ssocia)ion in 4u/urn, 4D. 2 am gra)eful )o Don ;ehrs and )he par)icipan)s for )heir s)imula)ing 7ues)ions
and commen)s.

W)*+, +&T-*.T/*- 0 436
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Cognitive Narratology of Politics

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