1

Cayetano vs Monsod

201 SCRA 210, 1991
FACTS
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April
25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsods
nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation
and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for
the last ten years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
HELD:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be
in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to
settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act
or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
BGen. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, as Justice of the Sandiganbayan; 4TH DIVISION,
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facts: Petitioner, Retired BGen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), signed several deeds of sale
for the acquisition of parcels of land for the development of housing projects and for other
concerns. However, it appears that the landowners from whom the AFP-RSBS acquired the lots
executed unilateral deeds of sale providing for a lesser consideration apparently to evade the
payment of correct taxes. Hence, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an extensive
investigation in 1998 on the alleged anomaly.
It concluded that there were irregularities committed by the officials of the AFP-RSBS and
recommended the prosecution of those responsible, including petitioner, who had signed the
unregistered deeds of sale as AFP-RSBS President. Fourteen (14) informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents as defined under paragraph 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
2
On July 27, 2003, junior officers and enlisted men from elite units of the AFP took over the
Oakwood Premier Apartments at Ayala Center in Makati City to air their grievances about graft and
corruption in the military. In response to the incident, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo created a
Fact-Finding Commission (Feliciano Commission) wherein respondents wife, Professor Carolina G.
Hernandez, was appointed as one of the Commissioners.
Feliciano Commission submitted its Report recommending, the prosecution of petitioner. President
Arroyo then issued Executive Order No. 255 on December 5, 2003, creating the Office of a
Presidential Adviser under the Office of the President to implement the recommendations of the
Feliciano Commission. Professor Carolina G. Hernandez was appointed as Presidential Adviser in
the newly created office. Shortly thereafter, respondent Justice Hernandez was appointed as
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan and assigned to its Fourth Division.
Then so, petitioner argued that it was erroneous for Justice Hernandez to deny the motions to
inhibit himself under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, when in
fact the basis for his disqualification was the latters spousal relationship with Professor Hernandez,
which situation was governed by the first paragraph of the said section. According to petitioner,
while Professor Hernandez was not directly "pecuniarily interested" in the case, she was more than
so interested in them because as an appointee of President Arroyo, she was receiving emoluments
to monitor the progress of the cases and to see to it that the recommendations of the Feliciano
Commission are fulfilled.
Issue: Did Justice Hernandez commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in not inhibiting himself from the cases against petitioner pending before the
Sandiganbayan?
Held: The petition wherefore denied. The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid
down in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first
paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially
sit in the instances mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves
to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid
reasons, with only their conscience as guide.
An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the
"just or valid reasons" contemplated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court for which a judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the
judges partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in
accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be
considered valid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough.
And even if we were to assume that petitioner indeed invoked the first paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 137 in his motions to inhibit, we should stress that marital relationship by itself is not a
ground to disqualify a judge from hearing a case. Under the first paragraph of the rule on
3
inhibition, "No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise...." The relationship mentioned therein
becomes relevant only when such spouse or child of the judge is "pecuniarily interested" as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to show that Professor
Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases before the
Sandiganbayan to justify the inhibition of Justice Hernandez under the first paragraph of Section 1
of Rule 137.


KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION
and BANTAY KATARUNGAN
FOUNDATION, as represented
by JOVITO R. SALONGA,
Petitioners,


- versus -


LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR.,
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC,
BRANCH 264, PASIG CITY;
GREGORY S. ONG,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE,
SANDIGANBAYAN; and THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 180543

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 18, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong (Ong), following the promulgation of the
Courts Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,
[1]
filed a petition
[2]
under Rule 108 of the
Rules Court for the amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of the entry on
citizenship in his Certificate of Birth, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 11767-SJ and raffled to Branch 264
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City over which public respondent Leoncio Janolo, Jr.
presided.

Via the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition, petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation
and Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four Orders and the Decision emanating from the
proceedings in the RTC case.

4
As Ongs petition was set for hearing by the RTC on August 7, 14, 21 and 28,
2007,
[3]
petitioners-therein oppositors
[4]
filed on August 6, 2007 a motion for voluntary inhibition,
which the RTC denied by Order of August 7, 2007, a day after it was filed and prior to the hearing
on the motion.
[5]
Despite the pendency of petitioners motion for reconsideration, the RTC
proceeded to hear Ongs petition on August 14 and 21, 2007. It was only by Order of September
17, 2007
[6]
that the motion for reconsideration was resolved, a copy of which was received by
petitioners on October 4, 2007.

Meanwhile, by Order of August 21, 2007,
[7]
the RTC declared petitioners in
default. Petitioners motion to vacate the order of default was likewise denied by Order of October
4, 2007,
[8]
a copy of which was received by petitioners on October 17, 2007. Subsequently, the
RTC granted Ongs petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
by Decision of October 24, 2007.
[9]


In the present petition filed on December 3, 2007, petitioners assert that public respondent
erred and committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) [i]n not voluntarily inhibiting himself from
presiding over the case; (b) [i]n declaring herein [p]etitioners as having defaulted; and (c) in
granting the Petition of [r]espondent Gregory S. Ong.
[10]


The Court, by Resolution of February 19, 2008, required respondents to comment on the
petition, with which Ong and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) complied on March 14,
2008 and June 5, 2008, respectively. Petitioners submitted their Consolidated Reply on December
10, 2008.

The Court shall first resolve the preliminary objections raised by respondents. Both Ong and
the OSG claim that petitioners availed themselves of an improper remedy and disregarded the
hierarchy of courts. Ong adds that the defective verification renders the petition as unsigned
pleading, and the lack of service of the petition on all adverse parties violates basic rules.

The question on the propriety of the remedy availed of by petitioners is resolved in Cerezo v.
Tuazon,
[11]
where the Court discussed the various remedies available to a party declared in default,
including a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default if the trial court
improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default,
if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. A party declared in default may thus
alternatively file a petition for certiorari assailing both the order of default and the judgment of
default.
[12]
On the choice of remedy, the Court finds petitioners recourse procedurally
allowable. The same, however, cannot be said as to the choice of court forum.

The hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs.
[13]
The rule on hierarchy of courts is not absolute,
and the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it. A
direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and
important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
[14]


The present petition is bereft of even a single allegation of exceptional and compelling
circumstance to warrant an exception to the rule. In fact, this valid objection elicited no response
from petitioners, who glossed over all procedural issues in their Consolidated Reply. If petitioners
5
themselves do not provide the Court some basis for the direct recourse, the Court is not minded to
search for one.

Further, the petition carries a defective verification since it was verified without stating the
basis thereof. In the Verification/ Certification of the Petition, the affiant states that he has read
the same and all the facts contained therein are true and correct.
[15]
The Rules clearly state that a
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records, and a
pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
[16]
Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never
be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter
of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.
[17]


Moreover, this Court observes that the affiant failed to present competent evidence of his
identity before the notary public, as required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
[18]
The
Court cannot assume that affiant, being a public figure, is personally known to the notary public,
for the jurat does not contain astatement to that effect.

Records also show that petitioners failed to furnish public respondent with a copy of the
petition. The Rules require that the petition should be filed with proof of service on all adverse
parties, and that the failure to comply with the requirement shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
[19]


On procedural grounds alone then, the petition is susceptible to dismissal. The Court deems
it best, however, to resolve the substantial issues in the interest of justice.

In their motion for voluntary inhibition, petitioners cite that Ong, his counsel, and public
respondent are members of the San Beda Law Alumni Association which, along with the schools
Benedictine community, publicly endorsed and supported Ongs petition through newspaper
advertisements. Moreover, from the account of the proceedings, petitioners point out that issuing
the order of default without resolving the motion for reconsideration of the order denying the
motion for inhibition exhibits blatant bias for being unduly precipitate and wholly unwarranted.

The rule on compulsory disqualification and voluntary inhibition of judges is provided under
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:

No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or
in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
6
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
(underscoring supplied)


In keeping with the tenet that judges should not only act with fairness, independence,
impartiality and honesty but should also be perceived to be the embodiment of such qualities, the
Court added the rule on voluntary inhibition in 1964. In outlining the genesis of the provision, the
Court narrated:

In Umale v. Villaluz, the Court traced the history of the second paragraph of
the above-quoted provision, which had been added only as an amendment to the
Rules of Court in 1964. Prior to that year, the question on whether to take
cognizance of the case did not depend upon the discretion of the judges not legally
disqualified to sit in a given case. If those concerned were not disqualified, it was
their official duty to proceed with the case or else risk being called upon to account
for their dereliction. They could not voluntarily inhibit themselves on grounds of
prejudice or bias, extreme delicacy, or even if they themselves took great interest and
an active part in the filing of the case. Gutierrez v. Santos and Del Castillo v.
Javelona paved the way for the recognition of other circumstances for
disqualification those that depended upon the exercise of discretion of the judges
concerned.
[20]



While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition
and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just or valid
reasons. The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on
whether to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge based on his rational
and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes
clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous
participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could
conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of
realism, for the factors that lead to preferences and predilections are many and varied.
[21]


In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the inhibition of
judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar
circumstances.

The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing
tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and
whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that they are in
a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with
the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.
[22]


Impartiality being a state of mind, there is thus a need for some kind of manifestation of its
reality, in order to provide good, sound or ethical grounds or just and valid reasons for
inhibition.
[23]
Bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to
7
dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor.
[24]
In Gochan v.
Gochan,
[25]
the Court elucidated further:

Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges
the unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The
inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality
is not enough ground for them to inhibit, especially when the charge is without
basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.

In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to
be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved
with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not
suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of
office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably both to
the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-
connected.
[26]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)


The Court applied the same precept in Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning, Inc.
[27]
where
the judges right to inhibit was weighed against his duty to decide the case without fear of
repression. Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition would open the
floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge
more sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical to the speedy and fair administration
of justice.
[28]


A judge must decide based on a rational and logical assessment of the circumstances
prevailing in a case brought before him.
[29]
In the present case, petitioners cite public respondents
affiliation with an alumni association as the sole ground to which they anchor their motion for the
voluntary inhibition of public respondent.

Before the trial court, petitioners alleged that the law school ties among public respondent,
Ong and his counsel, they having graduated from San Beda College of Law, albeit years apart, spell
partiality.

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears before
the judge as counsel for one of the parties, however.
[30]
In one case,
[31]
the Court ruled that
organizational affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition.

Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a ground to
disqualify an investigator, prosecutor or judge from acting on the case of a
respondent who happens to be a member of the same fraternity. A trial Judge,
appellate Justice, or member of this Court who is or was a member of a college
fraternity, a university alumni association, a socio-civic association like Jaycees or
Rotary, a religion-oriented organization like Knights of Columbus or Methodist Men,
and various other fraternal organizations is not expected to automatically inhibit
himself or herself from acting whenever a case involving a member of his or her
group happens to come before him or her for action.
8

A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected all the
more to maintain the highest standards of probity, integrity, and honor and to
faithfully comply with the ethics of the legal profession.
[32]
(underscoring supplied)


The added fact that the law schools alumni association published statements in support of
Ongs application cannot lend credence to the imputation of bias on the part of pubic
respondent. No clear and convincing evidence was shown to indicate that public respondent
actively sponsored and participated in the adoption and publication of the alumni associations
stand. It is inconceivable to suppose that the alumni associations statement obliged all its
members to earnestly embrace the manifesto as a matter of creed.

Arbitrariness cannot be inferred either from the fact that public respondent resolved the
motion for voluntary inhibition one day after it was filed. Since the personal process of careful
self-examination
[33]
is essentially a matter of conscience, the judge may decide as soon as the
factual basis of the motions has been clearly laid before the court because from there on the
resolution of the motion enters the subjective phase.

That public respondent, Ong and his counsel former Senator Rene Saguisag are all
graduates of San Beda College of Law was clearly and early on established. Hence,
this sole ground relied upon by petitioners in their motion, it bears repeating, no longer required a
hearing or called for the submission of a comment or opposition, and the absence thereof did not
prejudice petitioners.

In one case,
[34]
it was held that the Rules of Court does not direct the court to order the
filing of comments or oppositions to the motion before the motion is resolved. The parties may
orally argue and ventilate their positions and, thereafter, the court may rule on the motion.

The Court notes that when petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion (for reconsideration and
deferment) which basically reiterated their previous arguments, they no longer set the motion for
hearing and simply submitted their motion ex parte without further arguments, thereby recognizing
the non-litigious nature of their allegations.

Even assuming that Ong interposed no objection to the motion, it was still up to public
respondent to discern, for a qualified judge cannot be ousted from sitting in a case by sheer
agreement of the parties.

Petitioners further complain that public respondent proceeded to hear the case and declared
them in default without first resolving their pending motion. Records show that petitioners filed
on August 13, 2007 an Omnibus Motion
[35]
for reconsideration of the August 7, 2007 Order and for
deferment of the hearings set on August 14, 21 and 28, 2007. Petitioners, thereafter, did not
appear in the various settings, they alleging that the question of voluntary inhibition, which they
deem to be an overriding consideration partaking of a highly prejudicial matter, had yet to be
resolved by the trial court.
[36]


9
While there is no specific rule providing for a definite period of time within which to resolve
a motion for reconsideration of an order denying inhibition, judges must endeavor to act promptly
on it within the mandatory 90-day period so as not to interrupt the course of trial.
[37]


The trial court narrated what transpired on August 14, 2007 as confirmed by the entry of
the nunc pro tunc Order of September 17, 2007 making on record the denial of the Omnibus
Motion.


During the hearing on August 14, 2007, the Court, after considering the
arguments and counter-arguments from petitioner [Ong] and the Office of the
Solicitor General, and finding no cogent reasons to reconsider its earlier position,
denied in open court the motion seeking a reconsideration of the Order dated August
7, 2007 which denied movants Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of Presiding
Judge. Corollarily, for lack of merit, the motion to defer the proceedings in the
instant case was similarly denied. (see TSN, August 14, 2007, pp. 13). (citation in the
original)
[38]



The cited record of the proceedings validates the disposition made by the trial court on the
given date, during which time petitioners failed to appear. After hearing the arguments, the trial
court ruled as follows, quoted verbatim:


COURT: Thats right, so theres no basis to overturn our previous Order denying the
motion to voluntary inhibition filed by Atty. Capulong Now, theres another
matter being raised here, counsel could not have a valid argument here to
delay the proceedings What the Supreme Court wanted is to have an Order
summary of the proceeding because Kilos Bayan did sought at their
level. Supreme Court was expecting that they will do so again in our level,
but in since theres seems to be no good idea waiting for the adversary
arguments, so, it will, when it reaches the Supreme Court, it will repeat the
purpose to which they were directed to litigate. Theyre supposed to
litigate because if they believe theyre for the denial of the petition, unless
the application for declaration of natural born citizen, they should do so
without any delay, so, use Bayan as a very an active group and Bantay
Katarungan, they should be a party to expeditious resolution of cases, not
to a delay. How many are we here from government. We are here to
litigate. So, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied, and Motion to Defer
Further Proceedings is also denied. The settings for August were all placed
in the Order which was published in the newspaper of general
circulation. We have previously agreed that we will proceed to cross of
petitioner and witnesses. Are you ready or would you agree to the
suggestion by the Court that we conduct pre-trial?
[39]
(underscoring
supplied)


10
The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order is recognized where an order actually rendered by a
court at a former time had not been entered of record as rendered.
[40]
The phrase nunc pro
tunc signifies now for then, or that a thing is done now that shall have the same legal force and
effect as if done at the time it ought to have been done.
[41]
The purpose of an order nunc pro
tunc is to make a present record of an order that the court made in a previous term, but which
was not then recorded. It can only be made when the thing ordered has previously been made,
but, by inadvertence, has not been entered.
[42]


In the case at bar, the trial court actually took judicial action which was, however, by
mistake or inadvertence, not placed in proper form on record. In any event, petitioners neither
seriously contest the veracity of the transcript used as basis for such confirmatory order nor claim
any unwarranted prejudice from the fact of its resolution during their non-appearance in the
scheduled hearing.

The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness and
partiality of the trial court.
[43]
For one, the grant of such is not a matter of right for it is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.
[44]
Parties have absolutely no right to assume that their
motion for deferment would be granted, hence, they should prepare for the hearing, lest they pass
the blame to no one but themselves.

Further, in considering such motions, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for
the postponement and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.
[45]
In this case, the requested
postponement was premised on the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. The Omnibus
Motion was, however, submittedex parte and without further arguments from
Oppositors,
[46]
drawing public respondent to promptly resolve it by denying it.

As to the merits of the case of petitioners, the trial court was left with nothing to assess
since they did not file any Opposition to Ongs Petition despite the grant to them of extension of
time for the purpose and their various submissions to the trial court all related to peripheral issues.

No trace of bias can be found at that juncture when the court proceeded to declare
petitioners in default after resolving the pending incidents. It is an equally important doctrine that
bias and prejudice must be shown to have resulted in an opinion on the merits on the basis of an
extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned from participating in the case. As long as
opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the
conduct observed by the magistrate, such opinion even if later found to be erroneous will not
prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. While palpable error may be inferred
from the decision or the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith,
malice or corrupt purpose.
[47]


Divergence of opinion as to applicable laws and jurisprudence between counsel and the
judge is not a proper ground for disqualification. Opinions framed in the course of judicial
proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct
observed by the judge, do not prove bias or prejudice. Repeated rulings against a litigant no
matter how erroneous are not bases for disqualification.
[48]


11
As for the allegation of undue haste, the Court cannot appreciate it, considering that the trial
court even granted petitioners additional period within which to file an Opposition and in view of
the nature of the case, which empowers the trial court to make orders expediting proceedings.
[49]


In the absence then of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge, a ruling not to
inhibit oneself cannot just be overturned.
[50]
In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate such
acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice as to thaw the attributes of the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the hand of
prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness moves the judge in the performance of his functions are
patently weak to parry the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an
unclouded vision of its facts.

In fine, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when public respondent did not inhibit
himself from hearing the case.

On the second issue, petitioners assail the Orders of August 21, 2007 and October 4,
2007 declaring them in default and denying their motion to vacate order, respectively.

Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to
the orderly and speedy discharge of business.
[51]
Section 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides
that [t]he civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. Records show that the
notice was last published on July 26, 2007.
[52]


The trial court pointed out that petitioners filed their entry of appearance
[53]
without any
attached Opposition to Ongs petition and that, despite the grant to them of additional five days
from August 7, 2007, they still failed to make a submission. Petitioners do not contest the trial
courts earlier observation that at theAugust 7, 2007 hearing, petitioners counsel undertook to
submit the Opposition within the extended period and to appear at the next hearing,
[54]
where
eventually both their pleading and presence turned up unforthcoming.

Petitioners thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Vacate the August 21, 2007
Order, insisting that the Omnibus Motion presented a prejudicial issue that should have been
resolved first before the trial court proceeded with the case. Notably, in both the Motion to Vacate
Order and the Memorandum and/or Submission, petitioners relied only on this ground and impliedly
waived other defenses or grounds for the lifting of the default order.

For a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1)
it must be made by motion under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be
shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence;
and (3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of meritorious defense.
[55]


As the trial court observed, the motion to vacate or set aside the order of default failed to
comply with paragraph (b), Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
[56]
it noting, inter alia, that the
motion was not under oath, it failed to explain or justify why movants have not filed any
opposition to the petition, and it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit.
[57]

12

Indeed, a trial court has no authority to consider a motion to lift the order of default where
such motion was not made under oath.
[58]
Moreover, a motion to lift an order of default must
allege with particularity the facts constituting the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect
which caused the failure to answer.
[59]


In this case, petitioners unverified motion does not contain any justifiable reason for their
failure to file an appropriate responsive pleading. Petitioners persistent stance on the pendency of
their Omnibus Motion deserves scant consideration in view of the recognition of the nunc pro
tunc order confirming theAugust 14, 2007 denial of such motion.

Moreover, the filing of a motion for inhibition could not toll the running of the reglementary
period to file a responsive pleading, for where a period is to be suspended by the filing of a
pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such a suspension.
[60]
Despite the grant of an
extension of time, petitioners did not file an Opposition to Ongs Petition, even one ex abundante
ad cautelam that would have sufficiently dealt with their concern over the alleged pending incident.

Further, petitioners failed to allege, much less demonstrate, a meritorious defense or any
argument to protect whatever interest they may have under the entry which they resist to be
corrected, either embodied in a separate affidavit of merit or embedded in the verified motion
itself.
[61]
Petitioners would later admit that they are not real adversarial litigants in the juridical
sense as they are acting as judicial monitors and observers.
[62]


Velayo-Fong v. Velayo
[63]
discusses the meaning of meritorious defense:

Moreover, when a party files a motion to lift order of default, she must also
show that she has a meritorious defense or that something would be gained by
having the order of default set aside. The term meritorious defense implies that the
applicant has the burden of proving such a defense in order to have the judgment set
aside. The cases usually do not require such a strong showing. The test employed
appears to be essentially the same as used in considering summary judgment, that
is, whether there is enough evidence to present an issue for submission to
the trier of fact, or a showing that on the undisputed facts it is not clear that the
judgment is warranted as a matter of law. The defendant must show that she has a
meritorious defense otherwise the grant of her motion will prove to be a useless
exercise. Thus, her motion must be accompanied by a statement of the
evidence which she intends to present if the motion is granted and which is
such as to warrant a reasonable belief that the result of the case would
probably be otherwise if a new trial is granted.
[64]
(emphasis in the original)


Conjunctively, the glaring deficiencies negate the posture that petitioners had no intention to
delay the case and that their defenses, if any, deserve to see the light of day in court. David v.
Gutierrez-Fruelda
[65]
did not countenance the failure to comply with the basic requirements of a
motion to lift an order of default. Accordingly, public respondent did not arbitrarily declare them in
default and deny their motion to lift the order of default.

13
Respecting the trial courts Decision of October 24, 2007, petitioners recapitulate their
arguments against the inhibition and default orders to conclude that the assailed decision is
insupportable.
[66]
As lone ground, petitioners posit that the special proceedings under Rule 108
do not fall under the juridical concept of adversarial proceedings in the absence of effective
adversaries since the Office of the Civil Registrar is a formal party while the Office of the Solicitor
General sided with Ongs legal position. Petitioners admit that they, while being parties in interest
in their capacity as judicial monitors and observers, are not real adversarial litigants in the juridical
sense.
[67]


The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,
[68]
stated that substantial corrections to the
nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry are effected through a petition filed
in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Jurisprudence has settled that such proceedings are
adversarial in nature or [o]ne having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex
parte application, one which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
[69]
In this case, impleaded as defendants were the
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other person having or claiming an interest under
the entry sought to be corrected. The interest of the State was amply represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, while petitioners interest was deemed waived when they failed to appear
and file a responsive pleading.

Petitioners raise no additional ground to substantiate their imputation of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondent insofar as the issuance of the October 24, 2007 Decision
is concerned. Since no further issues were raised, the Court is precluded from making a definitive
pronouncement on thesubstantial aspect of the assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.








PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL G.R. No. 171137
INTERNATIONAL BANK,
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

SPOUSES WILSON DY HONG
14
PI and LOLITA DY and Promulgated:
SPOUSES PRIMO CHUYACO,
JR. and LILIA CHUYACO,
Respondents. June 5, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, C.J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision
[1]
dated July 18,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP. No. 85282, and its Resolution
[2]
dated January 10,
2006, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Spouses Damian and Tessie Amadeo are indebted to petitioner Philippine Commercial
International Bank, a domestic uni-banking corporation, as sureties for Streamline Cotton
Development Corporation. The promissory notes became due and demandable, but the Amadeo
spouses failed to pay their outstanding obligations despite repeated demands. As of February 15,
1994, these obligations stood at Ten Million, Six Hundred Seventy-One Thousand, Seven Hundred
Twenty-Six Pesos and Sixty-One Centavos (P10,671,726.61).

Petitioner subsequently discovered that roughly a month before the due date of the
promissory notes, the Amadeo spouses (i) sold three (3) or nearly all of their real properties to
respondents, Spouses Wilson and Lolita Dy and Spouses Primo and Lilia Chuyaco, and (ii)
immediately caused the transfer of the titles covering the parcels of land in favor of the latter. The
consideration for these sales was further alleged to have been grossly insufficient or inadequate.

Believing that the transfers were done in fraud of creditors, petitioner instituted an action
for rescission and damages on April 22, 1994. In its Complaint
[3]
in Civil Case No. 94-1585 against
Spouses Amadeo, Dy and Chuyaco, petitioner asked the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the
following reliefs:
1. Annulling the Deeds of Absolute Sale both dated September 16, 1993 and
thereafter, direct the Registries of Deeds of Sultan Kudarat and Davao City to cancel
the Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. (sic) T-27628, T-202868, and T-202869 issued
in the name of Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita G. Dy AND Primo Chuyaco, Jr. and Lilia
O. Chuyaco, respectively, and in lieu thereof, issue new ones under the name of
Damian and Tessie Amadeo.

2. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum
of P200,000.00; exemplary damages in the sum of P200,000.00; and P100,000.00
as[,] and for[,] attorneys fees.
[4]


The case was then raffled to Branch 133, presided over by Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan.


Upon service of summons on the Amadeo spouses, the latter filed a Motion to Dismiss
[5]
on
the ground that the Complaint violated the explicit terms of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94, as
15
the Verification was executed by petitioners legal counsel.
[6]
Petitioner filed its Opposition to
the Motion to Dismiss,
[7]
where it argued that (i) the rule cited by the Amadeo spouses should not
be applied literally, and (ii) at any rate, petitioners legal counsel was authorized by petitioner to
institute the Complaint.
[8]
On February 4, 1995, the trial court issued an Order
[9]
denying the
Motion to Dismiss.

The Amadeo spouses subsequently filed an Answer
[10]
where they alleged that petitioner
failed to release the loans to Streamline Cotton Development Corporation on the agreed date,
thereby constraining them to incur loans from third parties at high interest rates to keep the
company afloat. These loans were covered by postdated checks which had to be funded once the
obligations fell due, lest the Amadeo spouses face criminal prosecution. In order to pay the said
loans, they thus had to sell the properties subject of this case. The Amadeo spouses further
claimed that the purchase price for the three (3) parcels of land was the fair market value, and
that they had other personal and real properties which may be availed of to answer for their
obligations. In their Counterclaim, they prayed for moral damages of P200,000.00, attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation.

Petitioner filed its Reply and Answer to Counterclaim
[11]
on March 8, 1995.

On September 13, 1995, petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by
Publication
[12]
on Spouses Dy and Chuyaco. However, this was denied in an Order
[13]
dated
September 14, 1995 on the ground that summons by publication cannot be availed of in an
action in personam.

Accordingly, on March 4, 1996, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint
[14]
to include
allegations in support of, and a prayer for, a writ of preliminary attachment. Petitioner then
presented evidence in relation thereto, and on February 25, 1997, the trial court issued an
Order
[15]
for the issuance of the writ. Upon petitioners ex-parte motion, the trial court likewise
directed the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to designate a Special Sheriff
to implement the writ of preliminary attachment.
[16]


In Orders
[17]
dated January 12, 1998 and February 20, 1998, respectively, petitioner was
directed to inform the court whether it still intended to pursue the case. This appears to have been
motivated by the fact that no property of the defendants had been attached as of yet. Petitioner
did not comply with the said Orders; consequently, the case was dismissed without prejudice on
June 26, 1998 for failure to prosecute.
[18]
By this time, petitioner had already caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the titles of the properties subject of this case
(i.e., TCT Nos. T-27628, T-202868, and T-202869).

On August 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 26, 1998
Order, alleging that its failure to notify the trial court of its intention to pursue the case was
prompted solely by the difficulty of locating properties against which the writ of attachment could
be enforced. In the interest of justice, the trial court granted the motion.
[19]


Defendant Spouses Amadeo, Dy and Chuyaco then filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and
to Annul All the Proceedings Taken Against the Defendants
[20]
on December 11, 1998, in which
motion they questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over their persons. Petitioner filed its
Opposition
[21]
thereto on February 15, 1999. Defendants filed their Reply
[22]
on March 10, 1999,
16
while petitioner filed its Rejoinder
[23]
on June 9, 1999. Said motion, however, was merely noted
without action in an August 2, 2001 Order
[24]
since its notice of hearing was addressed only to the
Clerk of Court, viz.:
It appears from the Motion that its Notice of Hearing is not addressed to any
of the parties concerned as otherwise required by Rule 15[,] Section 5 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Such being the case, the Motion is deemed a mere scrap of
paper as held in Provident International Resources Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
259 SCRA 510.

In any event, the record shows that defendants Sps. Amadeo have been
duly served with summons as early as November 11, 1994 per Sheriffs Return of
Service dated November 14, 1994, and they are therefore within the jurisdiction of
the Court. However, defendants Spouses Dy and Chuyaco have not been served with
summons as evidenced by Officers Return dated May 24, 1994 and Return of Service
dated June 10, 1994, respectively, and so the Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction
over them. Since aforesaid Motion is deemed a scrap of paper, it cannot be
construed to manifest a (sic) voluntary appearance on their part.

Wherefore, the Omnibus Motion is noted without action. Let alias summons
be issued to defendants-spouses Dy and Chuyaco. For plaintiffs guidance, it may
avail itself of Rule 14[,] Section 14 on summons by publication if it so desires, upon
proper motion.

SO ORDERED. (underscoring in the original)

Spouses Dy and Chuyaco subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of
Jurisdiction)
[25]
on February 18, 2002, in which motion they essentially accused petitioner of not
causing summons to be served upon them and losing interest in the case. Petitioner filed its
Opposition
[26]
thereto, and in an April 23, 2002 Order,
[27]
the trial court denied the Motion to
Dismiss on account of (i) petitioners Compliance and Manifestation
[28]
that it had not lost interest
in pursuing the case, and (ii) the Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication that
petitioner filed simultaneously with its Opposition. On April 24, 2002, the Motion for Leave of Court
to Serve Summons by Publication was submitted for resolution.
[29]


Respondent Spouses Dy and Chuyaco next filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute
[30]
on June 17, 2003. The significant portions of the motion state:
2. That based on the order of this Honorable Court dated April 23,
2003 (sic), the Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication was
submitted for resolution, but the movants-defendants would like to remind the
Honorable Court that a Motion of the same nature was already filed on September
13, 1995 and was DENIED on September 14, 1995. xxx;

3. That therefore, the order dated August 21, 2001 of this Honorable Court
which advised the complainant to avail of Rule 14 Section 14 of the Rules is contrary
to its order dated September 14, 1995;

4. That up to this date, the complainant has not lifted a finger to pursue this
case against movants-defendants, hence, this Motion to Dismiss.
17

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that this case
be dismissed against the movants-defendants and to order the deletion of the Notice
of Lis Pendens at the back of the subject title (sic).

This was opposed by petitioner, arguing that it had already filed a motion for the service of
summons by publication, but the trial court had yet to act on it.
[31]
On July 25, 2003, this Motion
was submitted for resolution.
[32]


On November 4, 2003, Spouses Dy and Chuyaco personally, and not through their counsel,
filed a Motion for Inhibition without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
[33]
the relevant portions of which state:
1. That since 1998, the defendants-movants have been moving for the
dismissal of this case as far as the movants are concerned and to nullify the
proceedings taken against them since the Honorable Court has not yet acquired
jurisdiction over their persons when the plaintiff presented its evidence against
defendants (sic) Sps. Damian and Tessie Amadeo and even thereafter;

2. That, however only on (sic) August 2, 2001 or after more than three (3)
years, that this Honorable Court denied the said Motion to Dismiss due to
technicality (sic) and merely require (sic) the plaintiff to serve the summons either
personally or thru publication;

3. That, however in the order of this Honorable Court dated September 14,
1995, it already denied the Ex-Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by
Publication considering that the action herein is in personam, hence, this order is
contrary to its latest order dated August 2, 2001;

4. That another Motion to Dismiss was filed last June 11, 2003
[34]
on the
ground of lack of interest to pursue the case but up to this date, the Honorable Court
has done nothing that delays (sic) the proceedings to the prejudice of the
defendants-movants;

5. That this continuous delay in the proceedings shows that the Honorable
Court may not be competent enough to further hear this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed for the
inhibition of this Honorable Court (sic) from further hearing this case.

This was submitted for resolution on November 13, 2003.

The motion for inhibition was adopted by their counsel on record, Clarissa Castro, through a
Motion to Adopt Motion for Inhibition and Manifestation, which was filed on February 11,
2004
[35]
and noted by the trial court in a February 20, 2004 Order.
[36]
On June 23, 2004, however,
the trial court (i) denied the motion for inhibition for lack of merit, (ii) ruled that Spouses Dy and
Chuyaco have voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, and (iii) gave
them fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order within which to file their respective answers, as
follows:
18
Acting on the Motion for Inhibition, the Court hereby denies the same for lack
of legal basis.

In any event, the fact that defendants Wilson Dy and Primo Chuyaco, Jr.
signed said Motion themselves and in behalf of their respective spouses undoubtedly
indicates their voluntary appearance in this case and their submission to the
jurisdiction of this Court. The phrase without submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court in the heading of said Motion can not qualify the
clear import of Rule 14 section 20 which states:

Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance
in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in
a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. (23a)

It may be noted that subject Motion for Inhibition is not a Motion to Dismiss.

Wherefore, defendants-spouses Dy and Chuyaco are given fifteen (15) days
from receipt hereof within which to file their respective answers.

All pending incidents are deemed resolved.
[37]


Unsatisfied with the Order, respondent Spouses Dy and Chuyaco filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65
[38]
before the CA, alleging that the public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion when he considered the Motion to Inhibit (without submitting to the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court) which they had filed to question his impartiality and competence due to
the delay in resolving the Motion to Dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, as voluntary appearance,
and wherein he required the respondents to file their Answer within the required period. The CA
granted the petition in this wise:
The old provision under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court
provided that:

Section 23. What is equivalent to service. The defendants
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service.

Under Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
provision now reads as follows:

Sec. 20. Voluntary Appearance. The defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.
The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance.

What remains the same, carry (sic) over from the old doctrine, is that the
issue of jurisdiction must be raised seasonably.

19
But everything else changed.

What changed is that: if a motion is filed, whatever kind it is, it need no longer
be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court
because the motion may raise myriad issues in that one motion of special appearance
as long as the objection to the jurisdiction of the court is included. xxx

What necessarily changed also is that the medium of special appearance is
no longer restricted to a motion to dismiss because one could now file any type of
motion provided you included the issue of lack of jurisdiction due to defective service
of summons.

Thus, in this case at bar, the two motions to dismiss and the motion to
inhibit may be treated as special appearance since they all included the issue of
lack of jurisdiction due to non-service of summons. They did not constitute as
submitting the movant to the jurisdiction of the court.

xxx xxx xxx

There being no proper service of summons on petitioners and there being no
voluntary appearance by petitioners, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendants, the herein petitioners. Any proceeding undertaken by
the trial court against them would consequently be null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed June 23, 2004 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, is hereby DECLARED NULL AND
VOID as against herein petitioners. The April 22, 1994 complaint filed by Philippine
Commercial International Bank is hereby DISMISSED as against herein petitioners DY
and CHUYACO only, no jurisdiction over their persons having been acquired.

SO ORDERED.
[39]


Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court.
[40]


Hence this appeal, where petitioner argues that:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE JUNE 23, 2004 ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT NULL AND VOID AND IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AS AGAINST
RESPONDENTS DY AND CHUYACO AND RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION
AND RESOLUTION IN A WAY THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE FACTS AND
APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE, WHICH HOLD THAT BY THEIR
SUCCESSIVE FILING OF MOTIONS WITH THE CONVENIENT CAVEAT THAT THEY
ARE NOT SUBMITTING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO, THEY HAVE
VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURTS JURISDICTION.

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CASE
AS AGAINST DY AND CHUYACO.
20

B. THE SPOUSES DY AND CHUYACO HAVE LOST THEIR RIGHT TO QUESTION
THE TRIAL COURTS JURISDICTION OVER THEM WHEN THEY DID NOT RAISE
THE DENIAL OF THEIR APRIL 22, 2002 MOTION TO DISMISS TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS.

C. THE SPOUSES DY AND CHUYACO HAVE MISERABLY FAILED TO SHOW BASIS
IN SEEKING THE TRIAL COURTS JURISDICTION.

D. THE SPOUSES DY AND CHUYACO HAVE VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED
THEMSELVES TO THE TRIAL COURTS JURISDICTION.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN A WAY THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE DY AND CHUYACO SPOUSES FAILED
TO SHOW THAT THERE IS NO APPEAL, OR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE
REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW AVAILABLE TO THEM.
[41]


Simply stated, the issues are: (1) Was the petition for certiorari prematurely filed? (2) Has
there been voluntary appearance on the part of respondent Spouses Dy and Chuyaco as to confer
the trial court with jurisdiction over their persons? and (3) Did the trial court correctly deny the
motion for inhibition?

We shall discuss these issues in seriatim.

First Issue: Propriety of Certiorari

Petitioner contends that respondents subverted the settled rule that a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 is available only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
[42]
It asserts that respondents failure to move for
reconsideration of the June 23, 2004 Order of the trial court, denying the latters motion for
inhibition, provides sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the instant petition.

We disagree.

Petitioner is correct that a motion for reconsideration, as a general rule, must have first
been filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is
sought.
[43]
This is intended to afford the latter an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error
attributed to it.
[44]
However, there are several exceptions where the special civil action for certiorari
will lie even without the filing of a motion for reconsideration, namely:

a. where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
b. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court;
21
c. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or the petitioner, or
the subject matter of the action is perishable;
d. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
e. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief;
f. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
g. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
h. where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.
[45]


Otherwise stated, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with only if there are concrete,
compelling, and valid reasons for doing so.
[46]


We find that respondents non-filing of a motion for reconsideration is justifiable under the
circumstances of this case. It is not disputed that the trial court, rightly or wrongly, considered
them to have voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction by virtue of their motion for inhibition. Thus,
respondents apprehension that the motion for reconsideration might be construed as further
manifesting their voluntary appearance is certainly well-grounded. They may not, therefore, be
faulted for having resorted immediately to a special civil action for certiorari.

Second Issue: Voluntary Appearance

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive
power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court.
[47]
As a
general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court.
[48]
It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that
the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction.
[49]
This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among
others, the courts jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its
authority.
[50]


Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant
must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution.

22
Measured against these standards, it is readily apparent that respondents have acquiesced
to the jurisdiction of the trial court as early as June 17, 2003, when they filed their Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. Significantly, the motion did not categorically and expressly raise
the jurisdiction of the court over their persons as an issue. It merely (i) reminded the court of its
purportedly conflicting Orders in respect of summons by publication, (ii) alleged that because
petitioner has not lifted a finger to pursue this case against movants-defendants, the case may
be dismissed for failure to prosecute, and (iii) prayed additionally for the deletion of the Notice
of Lis Pendens indicated at the back of the transfer certificates of title covering the subject
properties. We note, furthermore, that the motion failed to qualify the capacity in which
respondents were appearing and seeking recourse.
[51]
It is in this light that the Courts
pronouncement in Busuego v. Court of Appeals
[52]
finds cogent application:
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An
appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person.
While the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts
is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of
the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a formal
motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of appearance is not necessary. He
may appear without such formal appearance and thus submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and
unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he
thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
[53]
(emphasis
supplied)

Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance dissipate when the
respondents motion for inhibition is considered. This motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition of Judge
Napoleon Inoturan from further hearing the case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative relief other
than dismissal of the case, respondents manifested their voluntary submission to the courts
jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the active participation of a party in the proceedings is
tantamount to an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution
of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the courts jurisdiction.
[54]


To be sure, the convenient caveat in the title of the motion for inhibition (i.e., without
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court) does not detract from this
conclusion. It would suffice to say that the allegations in a pleading or motion are determinative of
its nature; the designation or caption thereof is not controlling.
[55]
Furthermore, no amount of
caveat can change the fact that respondents tellingly signed the motion to inhibit in their own
behalf and not through counsel, let alone through a counsel making a special appearance.

Third Issue: Inhibition

Respondents argue that the trial courts so-called continuous delay in the proceedings is
indicative of the fact that it is incompetent to continue hearing the case. Respondents therefore
assert that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied their motion to inhibit and required them to file their Answer.

We are not convinced.

23
Under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, a judge or judicial
officer shall be mandatorily disqualified to sit in any case in which:

(a) he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise;
or
(b) he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law; or
(c) he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel; or
(d) he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.
[56]


Paragraph two of the same provision meanwhile provides for the rule on voluntary
inhibition and states: [a] judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. That discretion
is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to the judges sense of fairness and
justice.
[57]
We have elucidated on this point in Pimentel v. Salanga,
[58]
as follows:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or
with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably
capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-
examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability
that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge
had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part
of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him
by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the
frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before
making up his mind to act in or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is
involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by
another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others
involved therein. On the result of his decision to sit or not to sit may depend to a
great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after
reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his
motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as
giving meaning and substances to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He
serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.

The present case not being covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition, the issue thus
turns on whether Judge Napoleon Inoturan should have voluntarily inhibited himself.

At the outset, we underscore that while a party has the right to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case, this right must be weighed with the duty of a judge to decide
cases without fear of repression.
[59]
Respondents consequently have no vested right to the issuance
of an Order granting the motion to inhibit, given its discretionary nature.
[60]


24
However, the second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1 does not give judges unfettered
discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case.
[61]
The inhibition must be for just and
valid causes, and in this regard, we have noted that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not
enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis.
[62]
This Court has to be
shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with
the stigma of bias or partiality.
[63]
Moreover, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad
faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself.
[64]
The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent
as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.
[65]


We do not find any abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying respondents motion to
inhibit. Our pronouncement in Webb, et al. v. People of thePhilippines, et al.
[66]
is apropos:
A perusal of the records will reveal that petitioners failed to adduce any
extrinsic evidence to prove that respondent judge was motivated by malice or bad
faith in issuing the assailed rulings. Petitioners simply lean on the alleged series of
adverse rulings of the respondent judge which they characterized as palpable errors.
This is not enough. We note that respondent judge's rulings resolving the various
motions filed by petitioners were all made after considering the arguments raised by
all the parties. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

We hasten to stress that a party aggrieved by erroneous interlocutory rulings
in the course of a trial is not without remedy. The range of remedy is provided in our
Rules of Court and we need not make an elongated discourse on the subject. But
certainly, the remedy for erroneous rulings, absent any extrinsic evidence of malice
or bad faith, is not the outright disqualification of the judge. For there is yet to come
a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always infallible. The courts will
close shop if we disqualify judges who err for we all err. (emphasis supplied)

Truth be told, respondents are not entirely blameless for any perceived delay in the
resolution of the various incidents of the case. For instance, they make much of the fact that close
to three years passed before their Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and to Annul All the Proceedings
Taken Against the Defendants, filed on December 11, 1998, was noted by the trial court. But the
fact remains that the said motion, not having a notice of hearing addressed to the adverse party,
is legally a mere scrap of paper.
[67]
It presents no question which merits the attention and
consideration of the court, and is not entitled to judicial cognizance.
[68]


Considering the foregoing, we rule that respondents accusations of delay, incompetence,
and bias on the part of the trial court are unfounded. Hence, they are not entitled to the inhibition
of Judge Inoturan as a relief.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2005
of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated January 10, 2006 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another in their stead is hereby rendered ORDERING respondent Spouses Dy and
Chuyaco to answer the Complaint in Civil Case No. 94-1585 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
this Decision.

25
The trial court is directed to proceed hearing the case, and to resolve the same with
dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.



IN RE PACTOLIN

In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455 (Pactolin vs Sandiganbayan), affirmed the
conviction of Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
(Falsification by a Private Individual). It was duly proved that Pactolin falsified a letter, and
presented said letter as evidence in a court of law, in order to make it appear that his fellow
councilor acting as OIC-Mayor illegally caused the disbursement of public funds. In said decisions,
the Supreme Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for appropriate
administrative actions against Pactolin.
ISSUE: What administrative sanctions can be imposed upon Atty. Pactolin considering his
conviction?
HELD: Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime of falsification of public
document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral
turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.
As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most
severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear
cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar. But it has always been held that it is appropriate to disbar a lawyer
if he is convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Further, Pactolins
situation is aggravated by the fact that although his conviction has been affirmed, he has not
served his sentence yet.



A.M. No. 2490 FULGENCIO A. NGAYAN, TOMASA K. NGAYAN and BELLA AURORA
NGAYAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FAUSTINO F. TUGADE, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
, J.:
p
This case refers to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the herein complainants Fulgencio A.
Ngayan, Tomasa K. Ngayan and Bella Aurora Ngayan in a letter-complaint dated November 16,
1982 against respondent lawyer for violation of sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court of the Philippines.
26
It appears that respondent lawyer was formerly a counsel for complainants either as defense
counsel or private prosecutor in the following cases:
(a) People v. Fulgencio A. Ngayan, City Court of Manila, Branch Criminal Case No. 053773-CR for
light threat;
(b) People v. Tomasa Ngayan and Bella Aurora Ngayan, City Court of Manila, Branch VIII, Criminal
Case No. 053594-CR, for unjust vexation;
(c) People v. Bella Aurora Ngayan, City Court of Manila, Branch II, Criminal Case No. 053599-CR,
for grave threats;
(d) People v. Roberto Leonido, City Court of Manila, Branch XIV, Criminal Case No. 053649-CR, for
trespass to dwelling; and People v. Nestor Campo, Branch XIV, Criminal Case No. 053650-CR, for
threats;
(e) Fulgencio A. Ngayan and Tomasa K. Ngayan v. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido for grave
threats and trespass; Fulgencio A. Ngayan and Tomasa K. Ngayan v. Rowena Soriano, for grave
defamation, Office of the City Fiscal of Manila before Assistant City Fiscal Elmer K. Calledo, I.S. No.
82-8564. (pp. 1-2, Rollo)
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
Complainants alleged that they asked respondent to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis for a
complaint to be filed against Mrs. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido as a consequence of the
latter's unauthorized entry into complainants' dwelling. Without thoroughly reading the same, Mrs.
Tomasa A. Ngayan allegedly signed it because she was rushed to do the same. After signing, Mrs.
Ngayan noted a paragraph which did not mention that Robert Leonido was with Rowena Soriano
when both suddenly barged into complainants' residence. Mrs. Ngayan allegedly told respondent
about his omission and in front of her, respondent crossed out the paragraph she complained
about and promised to make another affidavit. In the meantime, complainants filed motions to
discharge the respondent as their counsel.
Complainants allegedly made a follow up after discharging respondent and found that the name of
Robert Leonido was not included in the charge. Since the omission was remedied by their new
counsel and the case was subsequently filed in court, the adverse parties filed a motion for
reinvestigation and attached thereto the first affidavit of complainants which was crossed out.
Complainants averred that the motion was filed by Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, a former classmate of
respondent. They further said that respondent was also a lawyer of the brother of Robert Leonido
in an insurance company. Complainants further alleged that the motion for reinvestigation was set
for hearing before Assistant City Fiscal Milagros F. Garcia-Beza where respondent himself executed
and submitted an affidavit as exhibit for Robert Leonido and Rowena Soriano controverting the
affidavit of complainants notwithstanding the fact that he prepared the latter's affidavit when he
was still their counsel.
They further alleged that before he executed and submitted his affidavit, respondent sent a
personal letter to Fiscal Beza denouncing complainants and stating that he is filing criminal and
civil cases against them.
Complainants charged respondent for violation of paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138,
Rules of Court, which provide:
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of
his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him
or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witnesses, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged;
27
Complainants claim that paragraph (e) above was violated by respondent when the affidavit he
prepared for complainants but subsequently crossed-out was submitted as evidence against
complainants in the motion for reinvestigation. As to paragraph (f), complainants averred that
respondent violated it when he sent a letter to the fiscal saying that his name was being adversely
affected by the false affidavits of complainants and for that reason, respondent was contemplating
to file a criminal and civil action for damages against them.
In a resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated January 19, 1983, respondent was
required to answer the complaint against him but respondent failed. Thus, on May 25, 1983, for
failure of the respondent to file an answer, this Court resolved to refer this case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereupon, the Solicitor General set the
complaint for hearing on September 26, 1983, October 17 and 18,1983 and November 24,1983, all
of which dates, respondent was duly notified. However, respondent never appeared on any date.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General made findings of facts based on the aforesaid claims of
complainants and said:
Consistent with respondent's failure to file an answer to the complaint herein filed against him, he
also did not appear, despite due notice on the four occasions when the hearing of the present
complaint was set at the Office of the Solicitor General. Neither has respondent shown concern or
interest about the status of the complaint filed against him. The inaction of respondent to the
resolutions of this Honorable Court requiring him to file his Answer to the Complaint filed against
him and his subsequent failure to attend the hearings on the said complaint indicate that
respondent has not obeyed the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and he has not
conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients (Sec. 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Further, lawyers
are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes. They should stand foremost in
complying with the court's directives or instructions being themselves officers of the court (p. 75,
Legal Ethics, Ruben Agpalo, 2nd Ed.). This lack of concern shown by respondent regarding the
matter that involved the very foundation of his right to engage in the practice of law would show
how much less he would regard the interest of Ms clients. 1
He thus recommended that the respondent lawyer be disbarred and his name dropped from
attorney's roll. In this report, he averred that the conduct of respondent as above-shown
constitutes unprofessional conduct and an outright violation of the provisions of Section 3 and
paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof (Santos v. Dichoso, Adm. Case No. 1825, August 22, 1978, 84
SCRA 622).
In the case at bar, complainants claim that respondent furnished the adverse parties in a certain
criminal case with a copy of their discarded affidavit, thus enabling them to use it as evidence
against complainants. This actuation constitutes betrayal of trust and confidence of his former
clients in violation of paragraph (e), Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Inasmuch as
respondent failed to answer the complaint filed against him and despite due notice on four
occasions, he consistently did not appear on the scheduled hearing set by the Office of the
Solicitor General, this claim remained uncontroverted. Besides, We tend to believe the said claim of
complainants when it is taken together with their other claim that respondent's actuations from the
beginning tend to show that he was partial to the adverse parties as he even tried to dissuade
complainants from filing charges against Robert Leonido. This partiality could be explained by the
fact that respondent is the former classmate of Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, the adverse parties'
28
counsel and the fact that respondent is the lawyer of the brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance
company.
Respondent's act of executing and submitting an affidavit as exhibit for Robert Leonido and
Rowena Soriano advancing facts prejudicial to the case of his former clients such as the fact that
the crime charged in complainants' affidavit had prescribed and that he was asked to prepare an
affidavit to make the offense more grave so as to prevent the offense from prescribing
demonstrates clearly an act of offensive personality against complainants, violative of the first part
of paragraph (f), Section 20, Rule 138, Rules of Court. Likewise, respondent's act of joining the
adverse parties in celebrating their victory over the dismissal of the case against them shows not
only his bias against the complainants but also constitutes a degrading act on the part of a lawyer.
It was meant only to titillate the anger of complainants.
Additionally, respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at
the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate
his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
We have fully scrutinized and evaluated the records of this case and We cannot but find that
strong and unassailable reasons exist to render it Our irremissible duty to impose a disciplinary
sanction on respondent. But We feel that disbarment is too harsh considering the circumstances of
the case. We hold that suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year should be
imposed on respondent for the aforestated misconduct.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Faustino F. Tugade is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year, effective from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 188051 : November 22, 2010
ASIA UNITED BANK, Petitioner, v. GOODLAND COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner assails the February 16, 2009 Decisioncralaw
1
and the May 18, 2009
Resolutioncralaw
2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103304, annulling the August 23,
2007cralaw
3
and February 15, 2008cralaw
4
Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 150, which in turn denied due course to respondent Goodland Company, Inc.'s
(GOODLAND) notice of appeal for invalid substitution of counsel.
The antecedents:
An Ex-Parte Application/Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possessioncralaw
5
was filed by Asia
United Bank (AUB) over a 5,801-square- meter lot located in Makati City and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 223120 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati in AUB's name. The
property was previously registered in the name of GOODLAND under TCT No. 192674 (114645).
The petition alleged that, on February 20, 2000, GOODLAND executed a Third Party Real Estate
Mortgage on the property in favor of AUB to secure the P202 million credit accommodation
extended by the latter to Radiomarine Network (Smartnet) Inc. (Radiomarine).
When Radiomarine defaulted in the payment of its obligation, AUB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings against the real estate mortgage. At the public auction sale held on
December 4, 2006, AUB was declared the highest bidder. On the same date, a Certificate of Sale
was issued in its name and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
29
With the expiration of the redemption period, AUB proceeded to execute an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, through its First Vice-President, Florante del Mundo. AUB thereafter
secured a Certificate Authorizing Registration from the Bureau of Internal Revenue to facilitate the
transfer of the title.
On December 8, 2006, TCT No. 192674 (114645) was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No.
223120 was issued in the name of AUB.
GOODLAND, through its counsel, Atty. Antonio Bautista (Atty. Bautista), opposed the petition,
denying that it executed the real estate mortgage. GOODLAND further averred that the signature
of the notary public appearing on the deed was a forgery, and that no technical description of the
property supposedly mortgaged was indicated therein. Concluding that AUB's title was derived
from the foreclosure of a fake mortgage, GOODLAND prayed for the petition's denial.cralaw
6

On March 1, 2007, the RTC issued the writ of possession sought by AUB. It ratiocinated that, as
the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale and as the new title holder thereof, AUB's
right of possession and enjoyment of the same had become absolute.cralaw
7

GOODLAND, through its counsel on record, Atty. Bautista, filed a motion for
reconsiderationcralaw
8
and a supplemental motion for reconsideration,cralaw
9
but both were
denied in the Ordercralaw
10
dated April 25, 2007, which was received by Atty. Bautista on June 15,
2007.cralaw
11

Relentless, GOODLAND sought recourse with the CA by initially filing a Notice of
Appealcralaw
12
with the RTC, through a certain Atty. Lito Mondragon (Atty. Mondragon) of the
Mondragon & Montoya Law Offices. On August 23, 2007, the RTC issued an Ordercralaw
13
denying
due course to GOODLAND's notice of appeal for being legally inutile due to Atty. Mondragon's
failure to properly effect the substitution of former counsel on record, Atty. Bautista. GOODLAND
moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in the Order dated February 15,
2008.cralaw
14

GOODLAND elevated the incident to the CA by way of a special civil acton for certiorari. In its
February 16, 2009 Decision, the CA granted the petition and directed the RTC to give due course
to the notice of appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated August 23, 2007 and
February 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The trial court is DIRECTED to give due course to petitioner's Notice of Appeal.
SO ORDERED.cralaw
15

Aggrieved, AUB moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated
May 18, 2009. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, cralaw
16
praying for the
reinstatement of the RTC Order.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, for a substitution of attorney to be effectual, the
following essential requisites must concur: (1) there must be a written application for substitution;
(2) it must be filed with the written consent of the client; (3) it must be with the written consent of
the attorney substituted; and (4) in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be
obtained, there must at least be proof of notice that the motion for substitution was served on him
in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. cralaw
17

The courts a quo were uniform and correct in finding that Atty. Mondragon failed to observe the
prescribed procedure and, thus, no valid substitution of counsel was actualized. However, they
took divergent postures as to the repercussion of such non-compliance, thereby igniting the herein
controversy.
The RTC strictly imposed the rule on substitution of counsel and held that the notice of appeal filed
by Atty. Mondragon was a mere scrap of paper.
30
However, relying on our pronouncement in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan
Development Co.,cralaw
18
the CA brushed aside the procedural lapse and took a liberal stance on
considerations of substantial justice, viz.:
It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose
of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of
speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
Thus, substantial justice would be better served by giving due course to petitioner's notice of
appeal.cralaw
19

AUB argues that the liberality applied by the Court in Land Bank is incompatible with the herein
controversy, and that Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. De Dios Transportation Co.,
Inc., cralaw
20
which espouses the same view adopted by the RTC,ismore appropriate.
GOODLAND, on the other hand, insists that the CA committed no reversible error in ordering that
the notice of appeal be allowed in order not to frustrate the ends of substantial justice.
We agree with AUB. A revisit of our pronouncements in Land Bank and Pioneer is in order.
In Land Bank, we held that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board gravely abused
its discretion when it denied due course to the Notice of Appeal and Notice of Entry of Appearance
filed by petitioner's new counsel for failure to effect a valid substitution of the former counsel on
record.
We clarified that the new counsel never intended to replace the counsel of record because,
although not so specified in the notice, they entered their appearance as collaborating counsel.
Absent a formal notice of substitution, all lawyers who appear before the court or file pleadings in
behalf of a client are considered counsel of the latter. We pursued a liberal application of the rule
in order not to frustrate the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the controversy.
In Pioneer, we adopted a strict posture and declared the notice of withdrawal of appeal filed by
appellant's new counsel as a mere scrap of paper for his failure to file beforehand a motion for the
substitution of the counsel on record.
Provoking such deportment was the absence of a special power of attorney authorizing the
withdrawal of the appeal in addition to the lack of a proper substitution of counsel. More
importantly, we found that the withdrawal of the appeal was calculated to frustrate the satisfaction
of the judgment debt rendered against appellant, thereby necessitating a rigid application of the
rules in order to deter appellant from benefiting from its own deleterious manipulation thereof.
The emerging trend of jurisprudence is more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of the
Rules of Court. However, we have not been remiss in reminding the bench and the bar that
zealous compliance with the rules is still the general course of action. Rules of procedure are in
place to ensure the orderly, just, and speedy dispensation of cases;cralaw
21
to this end, inflexibility
or liberality must be weighed. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of
a case from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice
requires it.cralaw
22

As early as 1998, in Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona,cralaw
23
we expounded on these guiding
principles:
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they
are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in
the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The requirement is in pursuance
to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that 'all persons shall have a
right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies.' The adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the
rules. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every
31
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice. There have been some instances wherein this Court allowed a
relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was 'never intended to forge a bastion
for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.' A liberal interpretation and application of the
rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.
In Sebastian v. Hon. Morales, cralaw
24
we straightened out the misconception that the
enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it would prejudice the substantive
rights of litigants:
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the
controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not mean, however, that procedural
rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has
its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective
enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice,
despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that
substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants.
x x x. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure
to comply with the prescribed procedure. x x x.
Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful observance of the Rules of Court, and their relaxation or
suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a litigant
of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.cralaw
25
Further, a bare invocation of 'the interest of substantial justice' will
not suffice to override a stringent implementation of the rules.cralaw
26

A reading of the CA's Decision readily shows that the leniency it granted GOODLAND was merely
anchored on substantial justice. The CA overlooked GOODLAND's failure to advance meritorious
reasons to support its plea for the relaxation of Rule 138, Section 26. The fact that GOODLAND
stands to lose a valuable property is inadequate to dispense with the exacting imposition of a
rather basic rule.
More importantly, the CA failed to realize that the ultimate consequences that will come about
should GOODLAND's appeal proceed would in fact contravene substantial justice. The CA and,
eventually, this Court will just re-litigate an otherwise non-litigious matter and thereby compound
the delay GOODLAND attempts to perpetrate in order to prevent AUB from rightfully taking
possession of the property.
It is a time-honored legal precept that after the consolidation of titles in the buyer's name, for
failure of the mortgagor to redeem, entitlement to a writ of possession becomes a matter of
right.cralaw
27
As the confirmed owner, the purchaser's right to possession becomes
absolute.cralaw
28
There is even no need for him to post a bond,cralaw
29
and it is the ministerial
duty of the courts to issue the same upon proper application and proof of title.cralaw
30
To
accentuate the writ's ministerial character, the Court has consistently disallowed injunction to
prohibit its issuance despite a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure
itself.cralaw
31

The nature of an ex parte petition for issuance of the possessory writ under Act No. 3135 has been
described as a non-litigious proceeding and summary in nature.cralaw
32
As an ex parte proceeding,
32
it is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to or consent by any person
adversely interested.cralaw
33

Subsequent proceedings in the appellate courts would merely involve a reiteration of the foregoing
settled doctrines. The issue involved in the assailed RTC issuances is conclusively determined by
the above cited legal dictum, and it would be unnecessarily vexatious and unjust to allow the
present controversy to undergo protracted litigation.
AUB's right of possession is founded on its right of ownership over the property which it purchased
at the auction sale. Upon expiration of the redemption period and consolidation of the title to the
property, its possessory rights over the same became absolute. We quote with approval the
pronouncement of the RTC, viz.:
As the purchaser of the property in the foreclosure sale to which new title has already been issued,
petitioner's right over the property has become absolute, vesting upon it the right of possession
and enjoyment of the property which this Court must aid in effecting its delivery. Under the
circumstances, and following established doctrine, the issuance of a writ of possession is a
ministerial function whereby the court exercises neither discretion nor judgment x x x. Said writ of
possession must be enforced without delay x x x.cralaw
34

The law does not require that a petition for a writ of possession be granted only after documentary
and testimonial evidence shall have been offered to and admitted by the court.cralaw
35
As long as
a verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle petitioner to the relief requested, the court
shall issue the writ prayed for.cralaw
36

Given the foregoing, we are bound to deny a liberal application of the rules on substitution of
counsel and resolve definitively that GOODLAND's notice of appeal merits a denial, for the failure
of Atty. Mondragon to effect a valid substitution of the counsel on record. Substantial justice would
be better served if the notice of appeal is disallowed. In the same way that the appellant
in Pioneer was not permitted to profit from its own manipulation of the rules on substitution of
counsel, so too can GOODLAND be not tolerated to foster vexatious delay by allowing its notice of
appeal to carry on.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The February 16, 2009 Decision
and the May 18, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE;
and the August 23, 2007 and February 15, 2008 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 150, are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.



JUVY P. CIOCON-REER, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ
ANGELINA P. CIOCON,
MARIVIT P. CIOCON- Present:
HERNANDEZ, and
REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR., CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Complainants, BRION,
PERALTA,
*

SERENO, and
- versus - REYES, JJ.


JUDGE ANTONIO C. LUBAO,
33
Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
General Santos City, Promulgated:
Respondent. June 20, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, Angelina P. Ciocon, Marivit P. Ciocon-Hernandez, and Remberto C.
Karaan, Sr. (complainants) filed an administrative complaint against Judge Antonio C. Lubao
(Judge Lubao) of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22, for gross ignorance of
the law, rules or procedures; gross incompetence and inefficiency; violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019; violations of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code; violations of
pertinent provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, The New Code of Judicial Conduct per A.M.
No. 03-05-01-SC, and Canons of Judicial Ethics; and dishonesty and grave misconduct.

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7819 (Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al. v. Gaspar
Mayo, et al.) for Unlawful Detainer, Damages, Injunction, etc., an appealed case from the
Municipal Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 3. Complainants alleged that on 12 September
2008, Judge Lubao issued an Order directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda
within 30 days from receipt of the order. Complainants further alleged that on 30 September 2008,
a copy of the order was sent by registered mail to the defendants, which they should have
received within one week or on 7 October 2008. Complainants alleged that the 30-day period
within which to submit memoranda expired on 6 November 2008. Since the defendants failed to
submit their memorandum on 6 November 2008, complainants alleged that they should be
deemed to have waived their right to adduce evidence and Judge Lubao should have decided the
case. Yet, four months passed from 6 November 2008 and Judge Lubao still failed to make his
decision.

In his Comment, Judge Lubao explained that the parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda on 12 September 2008. The Order was sent to the parties through
registered mail on 30 September 2008. Judge Lubao alleged that the plaintiffs submitted their
memorandum on 10 November 2008 but the court did not receive the registry return
card on the notice to the defendants. On 10 December 2008, the branch clerk of court sent a
letter-request to the Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order
of 12 September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants.
However, the court did not receive any reply from the Post Office.

Judge Lubao further explained that on 20 May 2009, for the greater interest of substantial
justice, the defendants were given their last chance to submit their memorandum within 30 days
from receipt of the order. In the same order, he directed the plaintiffs to coordinate with the
branch sheriff for personal delivery of the order to the defendants. However, the plaintiffs failed to
34
coordinate with the branch sheriff and the order was sent to the defendants, again by registered
mail, only on 17 June 2009.

Judge Lubao informed the Court that complainant Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (Karaan) is
engaging in the practice of law even though he is not a lawyer. Judge Lubao asked this Court to
require Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for unauthorized practice of
law.

Karaan filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Judge Lubaos failure to submit his
comment on time to complainants administrative complaint is a violation of the existing rules and
procedure and amounts to gross ignorance of the law. As regards his alleged unauthorized practice
of law, Karaan alleged that Judge Lubao was merely trying to evade the issues at hand.

The Findings of the OCA

In its Memorandum dated 13 April 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
reported that a verification from the Docket and Clearance Division of its Office revealed that
Karaan also filed numerous administrative complaints
[1]
against judges from different courts, all of
which were dismissed by this Court.

In its evaluation of the case, the OCA found that there was no evidence to show that the
orders issued by Judge Lubao were tainted with fraud, dishonesty or bad faith. The OCA stated
that the matters raised by complainants could only be questioned through judicial remedies under
the Rules of Court and not by way of an administrative complaint. The OCA stated that Karaan
could not simply assume that the order of 12 September 2008 had been received by the
defendants without the registry return card which was not returned to the trial court.

The OCA found that based on the pleadings attached to the records, it would appear that
Karaan was engaged in the practice of law. The OCA also noted the numerous frivolous and
administrative complaints filed by Karaan against several judges which tend to mock the judicial
system.

The OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Lubao for lack of merit.
The OCA further recommended that Karaan be required to show cause why he should not be cited
for contempt of court for violation of Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In its Resolution dated 24 November 2010, this Court dismissed the complaint against Judge
Lubao for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit. This Court likewise directed Karaan to show
cause why he should not be cited for contempt for violating Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court.


Karaan filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint against Judge
Lubao. Karaan denied that he had been assuming to be an attorney or an officer of the court and
acting as such without authority. He alleged that he did not indicate any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or
MCLE Compliance Number in his documents. He further stated that A.M. No. 07-1674 filed against
Judge Lindo was not actually dismissed as reported by the OCA.

35
Karaan thereafter filed Supplemental Arguments to the motion for reconsideration and
compliance to the show cause order. Karaan reiterated that he never represented himself to
anyone as a lawyer or officer of the court and that his paralegal services, rendered free of
charge, were all for the public good. He stated that he assists organizations which represent the
interests of senior citizens, the indigents, and members of the community with limited means.

In a Memorandum dated 8 November 2011, the OCA found no merit in the motion for
reconsideration. The OCA noted Judge Lubaos explanation that the case was summarily dismissed
by the municipal trial court without service of summons on the defendants. Thus, Judge Lubao
deemed it proper to issue the order requiring all parties to submit their memorandum to give all
concerned the opportunity to be heard. The OCA stated that the remedy against Judge Lubaos
action was judicial in nature. The OCA found that the claim of Karaan that he could prove the
receipt of the order by one Mr. Mayo is immaterial because it was not in the records of the case
where Judge Karaan based his order.

The OCA noted that Karaan, through the use of intemperate and slanderous language,
continually attributed all sorts of malicious motives and nefarious schemes to Judge Lubao
regarding the conduct of his official function but failed to substantiate his allegations. The OCA
further noted that this case is just one of the many cases Karaan filed against various judges in
other courts where the same pattern of accusations could be observed.

The OCA found Karaans explanation on the show cause order unsatisfactory. The OCA
noted Karaans modus operandi of offering free paralegal advice and then making the parties
execute a special power of attorney that would make him an agent of the litigants and would allow
him to file suits, pleadings and motions with himself as one of the plaintiffs acting on behalf of his
clients. The OCA noted that Karaans services, on behalf of the underprivileged he claimed to be
helping, fall within the practice of law. The OCA recommended that Karaan be declared liable for
indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment for 10 days at the Manila
City Jail and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a warning that a repetition of any of the offenses, or any
similar or other offense, against the courts, judges or court employees will merit more serious
sanctions.

The Ruling of this Court

We agree with the OCAs recommendation that the motion for reconsideration of the Courts
24 November 2010 Resolution dismissing the complaint against Judge Lubao has no merit.

Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a corresponding penalty. In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action.
[2]
We agree with the OCA that the remedy of the complainants in this
case is judicial in nature. Hence, the denial of their motion for reconsideration of this Courts 24
November 2010 Resolution dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao is in order. As
the OCA stated, Karaan could not make assumptions as to when the defendants received the copy
of Judge Lubaos order without the registry return receipt. While Karaan claimed that he knew
when one of the parties received a copy of the order, this claim was unsupported by evidence and
was not in the records of the case when Judge Lubao issued his 20 May 2009 Order giving the
defendants their last chance to submit their memorandum. The records would also show that
Judge Lubao had been very careful in his actions on the case, as his branch clerk of court even
36
wrote the Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order of 12
September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants. There
was no evidence that Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao could not
be faulted for trying to give all the parties an opportunity to be heard considering that the records
of the case would show that the court a quo summarily dismissed the case without issuing
summons to the defendants.

We likewise agree with the OCA that Karaan was engaged in unauthorized practice of law.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,
[3]
the Court ruled that practice of law means any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession.
[4]
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
[5]
Here, the OCA was able to establish the pattern in
Karaans unauthorized practice of law. He would require the parties to execute a special power of
attorney in his favor to allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact.
Then, he would file the necessary complaint and other pleadings acting for and in his own behalf
and as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative of the parties. The fact that Karaan did not
indicate in the pleadings that he was a member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE
Compliance Number does not detract from the fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in
the practice of law.

Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person [a]ssuming to
be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority, is liable for indirect
contempt of court. Under Section 7 of the same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank may be
punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months, or both. If a respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court,
he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding
one (1) month, or both.

Following the ruling of this Court in In re: Joaquin T. Borromeo,
[6]
the OCA recommended
that Karaan be cited for indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve an imprisonment of ten days
at the Manila City Jail, and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a warning that a repetition of any of the
offenses, or any similar or other offense against the courts, judges or court employees will merit
further and more serious sanctions. The OCA further recommended that a memorandum be issued
to all courts of the land to notify the judges and court employees of Karaans unauthorized practice
of law and to report to the OCA any further appearance to be made by Karaan. However, the
records would show that Karaan is already 71 years old. In consideration of his old age and his
state of health, we deem it proper to remove the penalty of imprisonment as recommended by the
OCA and instead increase the recommended fine to P10,000.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration of the Courts Resolution dated 24
November 2010 dismissing the complaint against Judge Antonio C. Lubao for being judicial in
nature. We find REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR. GUILTY of indirect contempt under Section 3(e),
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and impose on him a Fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000).

37
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land for their guidance and
information. The courts and court employees are further directed to report to the Office of the
Court Administrator any further appearance by Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. before their sala.

SO ORDERED.


People v Castaneda
Facts:
Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document. The complaint
was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of
Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a deed of sale the house and lot belonging to the
conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, making it appear that his spouse gave her
marital consent to said sale.

At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to
disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution stated that it is a "criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition,
respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria.

Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may be considered as a
criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to
the rule on marital disqualification.

Held:
No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY
ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN
THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.

In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the
wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime
could have been charged against said husband. It is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence
which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the
wife to make the necessary complaint.

With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and
the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the
wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with
the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from testifying against her
husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial
and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there
is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In
38
such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life
which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home.



A.C. No. 9608 November 27, 2012
MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of the
legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but
also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful
public eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and
private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly
penalized.
1

Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint
2
for Disbarment or
Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against
respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly immoral conduct."
In her complaint, complainant alleged that
2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement
dated 19 April 2002 and a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating therein that
the crime of RAPE was committed against her person sometime in December, 2001 and on
19 March 2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by herein Respondent
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years old, married to Teresita B. Samson,
Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines.
3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that
sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B.
VENTURA and himself.
4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the
charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the crime of QUALIFIED
SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on
04 July 2002.
5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated 26
August 2002 which was denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur.
6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to the Department of
Justice, by way of a PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the Department
of Justice.
x x x x
8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the herein
Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly constitute
"grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the
39
Philippines which provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION of an Attorney by
the SUPREME COURT."
Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement
3
that sometime in December 2001, at around
midnight, she was sleeping in the maids room at respondents house when respondent entered
and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her panty. She stated that
another incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondents poultry farm in Alegria, San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an
old shanty where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and
warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.
In her Supplemental-Complaint,
4
complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his
house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan National High
School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened when
respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted, but respondent covered
her mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that on
March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When
they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She
resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.
Respondent alleged in his Answer
5
that
2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that
Maria Victoria Ventura filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial Prosecutors
Office with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed. Respondent,
however, has no knowledge or information as to the truth of the allegation that she was 13
years.
x x x x
5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the
complaint to the effect that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant constitute
grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in having sex with
complainant was done with mutual agreement after respondent gave money to
complainant. Respondent respectfully submits that his act of having sex with complainant
once does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.
There is no human law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with mutual
agreement and complainant accepts compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant
once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct.
x x x x
6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law Office
of respondent herein. The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a grudge
against the herein respondent who terminated her services due to misunderstanding.
7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative Case is a
well orchestrated and planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against respondent as
a result of her separation from the employment in the Law Office of the respondent. This
claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the former Office Clerk at the Law
Office of respondent.
8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at respondent, she demanded from
respondent to settle with her and demanded the payment of the amount of P2,000,000.00;
otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for disbarment. Respondent
did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good her threats and filed the
criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case for rape did not prosper because the Prosecutor
40
dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura sent word to respondent that she is amenable for
the amount of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent
so that she can get even with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;
9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit of
Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura can
afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in putting down the respondent
herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and she knows before
hand that her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact that Corazon Ventura is not the
biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case
No. 5414.
x x x x
Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully submits
that his having sex with complainant with just compensation once does not amount to immoral
conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation when a woman shall invite him for sex?
Attached to respondents Answer is his Counter-Affidavit
6
which he submitted to the Provincial
Prosecutor. He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night with her male friends
when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard rumors that complainant had
sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw
complainant with some of her classmates near their rented house. Complainant told him that they
wanted to go out to swim but they did not have money. When she asked if he could spare some
amount, he gave her money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go
to a place where they could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought that
for complainant, sex is a common thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched
complainant at her house. She casually walked towards the car and boarded it. He told her that
they will not check in a lodging house because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his
poultry farm, respondent met his farm worker and asked him if he could use the latters hut. The
farm worker agreed and they went straight to the hut.
Inside the farm workers hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent did
not notice any involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He asserted that they had
sexual intercourse based on their mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant dressed up
and walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about
what had happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay motug-an" meaning, shes not crazy
as to tell anyone. He alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she needed to buy
some things but her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what
happened between them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he was able to
confirm that complainant is no longer a virgin.
It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for
respondent to stand trial for qualified seduction.
7
The charge of rape, however, was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan
del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge,
filed a motion for reconsideration. When said motion was denied, complainant filed a petition for
review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained the findings of the
prosecutor.
Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor
and executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance.
8
Complainant stated that what happened
between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was
withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed
41
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent
was dismissed.
9

In its Report and Recommendation
10
dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one year from the practice
of law for immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more
severe penalty.
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237,
to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is a minor, respondent and his wife was
victims guardians and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or similar
act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
11

Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty imposed by
the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. She contends that
respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to have sexual intercourse with
a young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took advantage of his moral ascendancy
over complainant considering that she was then staying at respondents residence. Moreover, there
was a betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity considering that respondent was a married man. She
insists that this detestable behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and
privilege which his license confers upon him.Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of
disbarment be imposed.
12

Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration
13
of the IBP Resolution. He asserts
that complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. Likewise, during the sexual
encounter, complainant was not under their custody. He contends that complainants mother even
testified that her daughter stayed at respondents house only until February 2002. He further
stresses that because of his admission and remorse, and since this is the first time he has been
found administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the penalty to one year suspension
from the practice of law.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
x x x x
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
x x x x
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,
14
the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the
highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.
15
Consequently, any
errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public or private activities, which
42
tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is
sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.
16
Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.
17

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself,
we find that respondents act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former
employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only
admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever
when he asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her
money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover,
the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost
moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his
profession.
In Cordova v. Cordova,
18
we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member
of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-year-
old minor,
19
who for a time was under respondents care. Whether the sexual encounter between
the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latters consent is of no moment.
Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such
conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should
be disciplined accordingly.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership
in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the
essential qualifications required of lawyers.
20

Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting
21
that a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya,
22
the Court pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the
rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing
of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no
moment. Complainants Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant
proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui
generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse
the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
43
courts.1wphi1 A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his
conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
23

Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite
suspension, depending on the circumstances.
24
In this case, respondents gross misbehavior and
unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to
sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not
but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in
peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
25

The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such
as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed.
26
However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield
its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
27

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral
Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of
the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.



A.C. No. 6760 January 30, 2013
ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for the forum shopping he allegedly committed.
In his complaint,
1
Anastacio N. Teodoro Ill related that Atty. Gonzales acted as counsel of Araceli
Teodoro-Marcial in two civil cases that the latter filed against him. The first ccise, Special
Proceeding No. 99-95587,
2
involved the settlement of the intestate estate of Manuela Teodoro.
While the settlement proceeding was pending, Atty. Gonzales assisted
Teodord-Marcial in filing Civil Case No. 00-99207,
3
for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and
Damages, without indicating the special proceeding earlier tiled. The tiling of the civil cases,
according to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum shopping that warrants the disbarment of
Atty. Gonzales.
Atty. Gonzales admitted that he assisted Teodoro-Marcial in tiling the two cases. He asserted,
however,, that he did not violate the forum shopping rule as the cases were not identical in terms
of parties, subject matter and remedies. Atty. Gonzales also opined that the complainant only filed
the disbarment case to harass him.
4

The Investigating Commissioners Findings
44
In our Resolution
5
dated March 13, 2006, we referred the disbarment complaint to the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation
6
dated July 5, 2010, Commissioner Caesar R.
Dulay found Atty. Gonzales administratively liable for forum shopping.
According to Commissioner Dulay, both Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No. 00-
99207 hinged on the same substantial issue, i.e., on whether Manuela held the Malate property in
trust for Carmen Teodoro-Reyes, Donato T. Teodoro, Jorge I. Teodoro and Teodoro-Marcial.
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, Carmen, Donato, Jorge I. Teodoro, Jorge T. Teodoro and
Teodoro-Marcial claimed that they are the heirs of Manuela. During her lifetime, Manuela was the
registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate, Manila. According to the heirs, Manuela held
the lot in trust for them, but she sold it to Anastacio and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the heirs prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration so that Manuelas properties could be inventoried and settled
in accordance with law.
In Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela claimed to be the beneficiaries of a trust held by
Manuela over the same parcel of land contested in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587. They alleged
that during her lifetime, Manuela sold a portion of this land to Anastacio. They asked the trial court
to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Manuela; to cancel the resulting Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of Anastacio; and to issue a new one in their names.
The commissioner found that a ruling in either case would result in res judicata over the other.
Thus, Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he instituted Civil Case No. 00-99207
without indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending. In committing forum
shopping, Atty. Gonzales disregarded the Supreme Court Circular prohibiting forum shopping and
thus violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Dulay recommended that Atty. Gonzales be suspended for one month from the
practice of law, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense would merit a more severe
penalty.
The Board of Governors of the IBP reversed the commissioners recommendation. In a
resolution
7
dated December 10, 2011, the Board of Governors dismissed the case against Atty.
Gonzales for lack of merit.
The Issue
The case directly poses to us the question of whether Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping
and thereby violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings of the commissioner and accordingly reverse the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors, but we modify the commissioners recommended penalty to censure and a
warning that another violation would merit a more severe penalty.
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation
thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or
certiorari.
8

There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of
rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of relief sought.
9

Under this test, we find that Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No.
00-99207 while Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending.
Identity of Parties
An identity of parties exists in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No. 00-99207. In
both cases, the initiating parties are the same, to wit: Carmen, Donato, Teodoro-Marcial, Jorge I.
45
Teodoro, Rowena Teodoro, Abigail Teodoro and Jorge T. Teodoro. They represented the same
interest in both cases. All claimed to be the legitimate heirs of Manuela and co-owners of the land
that she held in trust for them.
Meanwhile, Anastacio, the oppositor in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, is also the sole defendant
in Civil Case No. 00-99207. In both cases, he espoused the same interest, as transferee-owner of
the lot allegedly held in trust by Manuela.
Identity of causes of action
The test of identity of causes of action does not depend on the form of an action taken, but on
whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of
action.
10
The heirs of Manuela cannot avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the
form of their action or by adopting a different method of presenting it.
11

In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the trial court held that it had no jurisdiction over the case, as
Manuela left no properties at the time of her death. The lot in Malate, Manila, which was the sole
property that the heirs of Manuela claim should be included in her estate, has been sold to Rogelio
and Anastacio when Manuela was still alive. The trial court did not give credence to their claim that
Manuela held the property in trust for them.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the trial court issued an order granting Anastacios Motion
for Demurrer to Evidence. It held that the heirs of Manuela had been unable to prove their claim
that Manuela held the lot in trust for their benefit. Neither were they able to prove that the sale of
a portion of the lot to Anastacio was void.
In both cases, the issue of whether Manuela held the lot in Malate, Manila in trust had to be
decided by the trial court. The initiating parties claim in the two cases depended on the existence
of the trust Manuela allegedly held in their favor. Thus, the evidence necessary to prove their claim
was the same.
Identity of relief sought
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the heirs of Manuela prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration, the liquidation of Manuelas estate, and its distribution among her legal heirs.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela asked for the annulment of the deed
of absolute sale Manuela executed in favor of Anastacio. They likewise asked the court to cancel
the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of the latter, and to issue a new one in
their names.
While the reliefs prayed for in the initiatory pleadings of the two cases are different in form, a
ruling in one case would have resolved the other, and vice versa. To illustrate, had the lot been
declared as part of the estate of Manuela in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, there would have
been no need for a decision annulling the sale in Civil Case No. 00-99207. Conversely, had the sale
in Civil Case No. 00-99207 been annulled, then the property would go back to the hands of the
heirs of Manuela. Placing the property under administration, as prayed for in Special Proceeding
No. 99-95587, would have been unnecessary.
Thus, the relief prayed for, the facts upon which it is based, and the parties are substantially
similar in the two cases. Since the elements of litis pendentia and res judicata are present, Atty.
Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-99207 without indicating that
Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending.
As Commissioner Dulay observed:
Respondent was fully aware, since he was the counsel for both cases, that he raised the issue of
trust with respect to the Malate property in the 1999 Letters of Administration case and that he
was raising the same similar issue of trust in the 2000 annulment case xxx
To advise his client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum shopping for the second case
(annulment case) and state that there is no pending case involving the same or similar issue would
46
constitute misconduct which should be subject to disciplinary action. It was his duty to advise his
client properly, and his failure to do so, in fact his deliberate assertion that there was no falsity in
the affidavit is indicative of a predisposition to take lightly his duty as a lawyer to promote respect
and obedience to the law.
12

"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of
justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes this obligation."
13

The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the practice
clogs the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings.
14
Willful and deliberate forum shopping
has been made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court in SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994.
15

In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law
and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice,
16
and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court
processes.
17

To our mind, however, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh in light of all the
circumstances of this case. Neither is the commissioners recommended penalty of suspension
consistent with prior rulings of the Court.
In Guanzon, Vda. de, etc. v. Judge Yrad, Jr., etc., et al.
18
we severely censured Renecio Espiritu,
the counsel who filed a petition in the Court of Appeals thirty-three days after a similar petition had
been filed with the Supreme Court. We also found him guilty of direct contempt.
The present case finds favorable comparison with Guanzon. Like Espiritu, Atty. Gonzales misused
court processes in contravention of the express rule against forum shopping. We held then that
Espiritu should be penalized and we imposed the penalty of censure the penalty usually imposed
for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature.
19

Lawyers are also censured for minor infractions against the lawyers duty to the Court or the
client.
20
As earlier stated, Atty. Gonzales act of forum shopping disregarded his duty to obey and
promote respect for the law and legal processes, as well as the prohibition against unduly delaying
a case by misusing court processes.
21
It also violated his duty as an officer of the court to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
22

WHEREFORE, we find the basis for the complaint meritorious and accordingly CENSURE Atty.
Romeo S. Gonzales for resorting to forum shopping. He is WARNED that any future violation of his
duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. A copy of this reprimand should be attached to
Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales personal file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9387 June 20, 2012
(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)
EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
SERENO, J.:
47
This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty.
Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence
in the handling of her case.
The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case
filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
In a Decision
1
dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang),
the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the
latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorneys fees and moral damages.
Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of
Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants Brief. They chose respondent to represent them
in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants Brief.
Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a
Resolution
2
dated 16 December 2003.
No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the
couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with "deceit,
unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law."
3
Complainant and her husband failed to file an
appeal, because respondent never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further
claims that she asked respondent "several times" about the status of the appeal, but "despite
inquiries he deliberately withheld response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.
4

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was informed of the
Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed
her of the Resolution.
On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint
5
with the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on
the following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral
damages in the amount of P 350,000.
Through an Order
6
dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered
respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer,
7
respondent
prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint.
Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior to the
mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had never met complainant,
because it was her husband who had personally transacted with him. According to respondent, the
husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to
him the period given by the CA was to lapse within two or three days."
8
Thus, respondent claims
that he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is this pleading which
was required."
9

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainants husband to settle the case. The
latter allegedly "gestured approval of the advice."
10

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or
heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled the case.
When respondent received an Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available
means of communication, but to no avail."
11
Thus, when complainants husband went to the office
of respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the CAs
Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO
BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."
12

48
In his 5 January 2009 Report,
13
IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found that
respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He
recommended that respondent be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.
The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August 2010.
Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
14
He prayed for the relaxation of the application of
the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No.
XX-2012-17
15
partly granting his Motion and reducing the penalty imposed to one-month
suspension from the practice of law.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa,
through a letter
16
addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted the documents
pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against respondent.
We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees
with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month
suspension the Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.
Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory conference set for
the disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal
filed in the appellate court revealed that he had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants
therein, including complainant and her husband.
17
The pleading starts with the following sentence:
"DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum
and further allege that: x x x."
18
Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on behalf of
complainants husband.
It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainants
husband cannot be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz:
It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for a fee.
Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a client entrusted to a lawyer
handling and prosecution of his case that calls for the strict application of the Code; x x x
19

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he also alleges
that complainants husband never contacted him after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal.
According to respondent, this behavior was "very unusual if he really believed that he engaged"
the formers services.
20

Complainant pointed out in her Reply
21
that respondent was her lawyer, because he accepted her
case and an acceptance fee in the amount of P 7,000.
According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the complainants claim that he charged P 7,000
as acceptance fee," "the fee was only for the preparation of the pleading which is even low for a
Memorandum of Appeal: x x x."
22

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the
duty of fidelity to the clients cause.
23
Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyers
duty to serve the client with competence and diligence.
24
Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.
According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainants husband asked from
him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because he "honestly
believed" that this was the pleading required, based on what complainants husband said.
The IBP Investigating Commissioners observation on this matter, in the 5 January 2009 Report, is
correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was
respondents duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:
Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should have known
that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal under
49
Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such cases, Rule 44 of the
said Rules applies.
25

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal.
Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellants brief be filed after the records of the case
have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure.
Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been expounded in
Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz,
26
to wit:
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the
observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-
informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.
In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason for his
failure to file the proper pleading was that he "did not have enough time to acquaint himself
thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case." The IBP reconsidered and thereafter significantly
reduced the penalty originally imposed.
Respondents plea for leniency should not have been granted.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does
not excuse his negligence.
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainants lawyer from the trial to the
appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had
agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved,
as he was approached by complainants husband only two days before the expiration of the period
for filing the Appellants Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file
the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to "beat the deadline
set by the Court of Appeals."
27

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong
pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate
court, he chose to ignore the CAs Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that
complainant and her husband had already settled the case, because he had not heard from the
husband since the filing of the latters Memorandum of Appeal.
This explanation does not excuse respondents actions.
First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of, from the
moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment Complaint
filed against him. But because of his negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.
Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His
failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:
50
18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.
If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have
done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could
have thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the
case and informed the court that he could no longer contact them.
28
His failure to take this
measure proves his negligence.
Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigans Motion to
Dismiss is negligence on his part.1wphi1 Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for
negligence in handling the clients case, viz:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling
their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.
29

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his
client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held
accountable.
30

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03,
18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of
the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.









A.C. No. 6732 October 22, 2013
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN
PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE,
ANTIQUE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the
gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
51
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty.
Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in existent
decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by
Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written
communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter
requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in
Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.
1

On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for
a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration
of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.
2

Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then
discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was
the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando
Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,
3
Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated
October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No.
084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been
presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.
4

After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October
12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the
situation.
5

The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation
in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.
6

In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,
2005,
7
wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the
falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the respondent
were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit
dated March 20, 2005.
8

The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,
9
but he invoked his constitutional right to
remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter
appeared and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas
the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for
falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for
violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
10
The NBI
likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be
commenced against the respondent.
11
Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a
Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar Confidant.
12

Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,
13
whereby he
denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on
52
Shirleys petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws
involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo
had gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision;
14
that Dy Quioyo
had then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised
Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an
overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in Manila to
solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles
Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had
executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty.
Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the
falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.
15

Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution
16
treating the respondents counter-affidavit as his
comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,
17
Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of
the Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported
decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a
petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner,
when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of presumptive
death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner;
18
and that the respondent
had received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions
thusly:
Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa
(deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of
the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the
decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the
authentic decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch except for the names and dates? Respondent
failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely
invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made this
known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally,
there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely
implicate him in this incident.
19

In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,
20
the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
709
21
denying the respondents motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-
063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with Section
12(b), Rule 139-B
22
of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents comment/opposition as his
appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainants reply as his comment on the
petition for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainants comment
within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case
within 15 days from notice.
Ruling
53
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.
The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he
had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of
Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in
Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a
history of employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of
the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical declaration on the respondents
personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not
overcome by the respondents blanket denial, which by nature was negative evidence.
23

Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not
command credence.1wphi1It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit
only after the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to
comment.
24
The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than an
after thought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared
that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But
such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered
unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn
statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately exposed and
betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision
penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having
authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can
justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
25
Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this
country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the
personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing
that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and
integrity.
26
The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them
who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorneys Oath for them to:
x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent
to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct themselves as lawyers
according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to their clients x x x.
54
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a
privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny
the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons of ethical
conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional
dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that
reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to
practice law confers upon him.
27
Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the
Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either
in a professional or private capacity.
28
The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct
renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.
29
WHEREFORE, the Court
FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated
against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.



A.C. No. 1900 June 13, 2012
RODRIGO A. MOLINA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CEFERINO R. MAGAT, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is the undated Resolution
1
of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines(IBP) finding Atty. Ceferino R. Magat (Atty. Magat) liable for unethical conduct and
recommending that he be reprimanded.
The Facts:
The case stemmed from a complaint for disbarment
2
filed by Rodrigo A.
Molina (complainant) against Atty. Magat before the Court on May 5, 1978. The complaint alleged,
among others, that complainant filed cases of Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority and
Breach of the Peace and Resisting Arrest against one Pascual de Leon (de Leon) before the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Manila; that the counsel of record for accused de Leon in both cases was
Atty. Magat; that a case for slight physical injuries was filed against him (Molina) by de Leon as a
counter-charge and Atty. Magat was also the private prosecutor; that Atty. Magat subsequently
filed a motion to quash the information on Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority on the
sole ground of double jeopardy claiming that a similar case for slight physical injuries was filed in
court by a certain Pat. Molina (Molina); that based on the record, no case of slight physical injuries
was filed by Molina against de Leon; that Atty. Magat was very much aware of such fact as he was
55
the counsel and private prosecutor on record of de Leon from the very start of the case way back
on May 24, 1974; that Atty. Magats act of filing the Motion to Quash was a malicious act done in
bad faith to mislead the court, thus, a betrayal of the confidence of the court of which he is an
officer; and that Atty. Magat likewise committed willful disobedience of the court order when he
appeared as counsel for de Leon on two (2) occasions despite the fact that he was suspended
from the practice of law.
In his Answer,
3
Atty. Magat averred that in so far as the filing of the motion to quash was
concerned, he was really under the impression that a criminal case in lieu of the two (2) charges
was indeed filed and that the said motion was opposed by the other party and was denied by the
court. He admitted his appearances in court while under suspension. He explained that his
appearance in the December 21, 1977 hearing was to inform the court that the accused was sick
and to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused. In the January 9, 1978
hearing, he appeared because the accused had no money and pleaded that his testimony be
finished. Atty. Magat begged for the indulgence of the court and conveyed his repentance and
apology and promised that the same would not happen again.
The complaint was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
4
Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records of the case to the IBP for
proper disposition.
In his Report and Recommendation
5
dated March 20, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
found merit in the complaint and recommended that Atty. Magat be reprimanded and
fined P50,000.00. It stated that:
This Commission finds it hard to believe that respondent would have mistakenly been under the
impression that a case for physical injuries was filed against his client when there was no such
case filed. Respondent was either negligently reckless or he had mischievous intentions to deceive
the trial court. In any case, he committed a transgression for which he should be punished.
However, the graver sin of respondent is, and this he admits, that he appeared as counsel before a
trial court on at least two (2) occasions notwithstanding the fact that he had been suspended by
the Supreme Court from the practice of law. Despite professing his contrition in his Answer, this
Commission is not convinced. Otherwise, respondent should have had, at the onset of the
proceedings, admitted to his misdeeds and put his fate squarely with the disciplinary body. Yet, he
proceeded to fight the charges against him.
Moreover, if respondent was indeed moved by altruistic intentions when he made those
appearances before the trial court despite having been suspended, he could have so informed the
Presiding Judge of his plight and explained why the party he was representing could not attend.
Yet, what he proceeded to do was to enter his appearance as counsel. Indeed, it is beyond doubt
he trifled with the suspension order handed by the Supreme Court.
If there is one thing going for respondent, it is that the passage of time with which this case
remains pending makes it difficult to impose a penalty of suspension on him. Under normal
circumstances, this Commission would not have thought twice of suspending respondent.
However, the acts committed by respondent occurred over TWENTY (20) YEARS ago. It would not
be fair to now impose a suspension on respondent, more so considering that he is, in all likelihood,
in the twilight of his career.
On the other hand, there is still a need to discipline respondent if only to set an example to other
lawyers that suspension orders of the Supreme Court cannot simply be ignored. Thus, it is the
recommendation of the undersigned that respondent be meted a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P 50,000.00) and that he be heavily reprimanded for his actions, the passage of time
notwithstanding.
6

56
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed its Resolution
7
adopting the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner. It, however, deleted the imposition of fine.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but not with respect to the penalty.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must
perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
8

Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 10.01, which provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, the Court agrees with the observation of the IBP that there was a deliberate intent on
the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal
charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and untruthful
statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight physical injuries
that was really filed in court, all he had to do was to secure a certification from that court that,
indeed, a case was filed.
Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly admitted appearing in court on two occasions despite having
been suspended from the practice of law by the Court. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court and/or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney without authority to do so.1wphi1 It provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. [Underlining supplied]
As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved by altruistic intentions when he appeared before the trial
court despite having been suspended, he could have informed the Presiding Judge of his plight and
explained why the party he was representing could not attend. On the contrary, Atty. Magat kept
his silence and proceeded to represent his client as counsel.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ceferino R. Magat is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar
offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.




Non suspension from practice of law for using intemperate languages in pleadings
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San
Mateo, Rizal vs. ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES
[A.C. No. 8954. November 13, 2013.]
57
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
Facts:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo,
Rizal. Respondent Atty. Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant. He filed his Pre-Trial
Brief without proof of MCLE compliance hence; it was expunged from the records without
prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance.
The preliminary conference was reset several times for failure of respondent to appear and
submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo gave
respondent last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so
shall be considered a waiver on his part. Respondent later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an
MCLE number which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of
compliance. During the preliminary conference, respondent manifested that he will submit
proof of compliance of his MCLE on the following day. The Investigating Judge found
Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by
failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating
Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Issue:
Whether respondent should be suspended from practice of law for using intemperate
language in his pleadings
Held:
NO. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court's order to submit proof of his
MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. Atty. Flores also employed
intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be
circumspect in his language.
However, the court found the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the
infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by
respondent. Also, the court is not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year
suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in
the practice of law for half a century. Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the
foregoing, the court deem it proper to fine respondent and to remind him to be more circumspect
in his acts and to obey and respect court processes.


SAMSON vs. ERA

Ferdinand A. Samson brought complaint for disbarment charging respondent Atty. Edgardo O. Era
with violation of trust and confidence of a client by representing the interest of Emilia C. Sison, his
present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his interest.

Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam
perpetrated by ICS Exports led by Sison and other officers.
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the criminal prosecution
of Sison and her group.
After an amicable settlement and several negotiations with Sison and her cohorts, Atty. Era
expressed that he already accomplished his professional responsibility towards Samson. They also
later found out that they could not liquidate the property subject to the amicable settlement.
58

During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group. They
found out that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her
other criminal cases involving the same pyramiding scam.


iSSUE:
Is atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests of his clients?
Is there a formal termination of the lawyer-client relationship with Samson?
RULING:
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty.
Era guilty.
It is recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act would merit a more severe
penalty.
SC affirmed the findings of the IBP.
The lawyer-client relationship did not terminate, for the fact remained that he still needed to
oversee the implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases until
they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court.

In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests of his clients.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating
Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of the
decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.



DHALIWAL VS. DUMAGUING

Emilia Dhaliwal was having some legal issues in purchasing a parcel of land from Fil-Estate
Development, Inc. Their case reached the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). She
then engaged the services of Atty. Abelardo Dumaguing in the year 2000. Atty. Dumaguing was
given P342,000.00 for him to consign with the HLURB. With the consignment, he filed a petition
with the HLURB to compel Fil-Estate to deliver the title to Dhaliwal. However, a week later, Atty.
Dumaguing withdrew from the HLURB the amount of P311,819.94.
In 2003, Dhaliwal terminated the services of Atty. Dumaguing. In the same year, Dhaliwal lost in
the HLURB case. She then demanded Atty. Dumaguing to return her the P311,819.94 he earlier
withdrew. Atty. Dumaguing refused to return said amount. Dhaliwal filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Dumaguing.
59
In his defense, Atty. Dumaguing said that the reason why he deemed it not proper to return the
said amount to Dhaliwal is that he filed a motion for reconsideration with the HLURB but the latter
had not yet acted on it. Atty. Dumaguing attached a copy of the said motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dumaguing should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. It was established that the attached motion for reconsideration was a mere fabrication
because it did not contain proof that the same was filed with the HLURB nor was there proof that
the other party was notified.
Atty. Dumaguing is in violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states,
among others, that: A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment. Atty. Dumaguing was suspended for 6 months.


A.C. No. 9091 December 11, 2013
CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS, SOLEDAD A.
FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A. FERNANDEZ, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN B. BAEZ, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
SERENO, CJ.:
Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land located in Dinalupihan, Bataan.
1
n 4
September 2002, they entered into an agreement, they stood to be paid P35,000.000 for all the
lots that would be sold in the subdivision.
2
For that purpose, they executed a Pecial Power of
Attorney authorizing Fevidal to enter into all agreements concerning the parcels of land and to sign
those agreements on their behalf.
3

Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and failed to
accout for the titles to the subdivided land.
4
Complainants also found that he had sold a number of
parcels to third parties, but that he did not turn the proceeds over to them. Neither were
complainants invited to the ceremonial opening of the subdivision project.
5

Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had previously
executed in his favor.
6

Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal for the amount of P10,000,000, but the
latter again failed to pay them.
7

Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of assisting them in
the preparation of a settlement agreement.
8

Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute actions against
Fevidal in order to recover their properties. Complainants then signed a contract of legal
services,
9
in which it was agreed that they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to
respondent, but that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract,
complainants would pay respondent 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. In
preparation for the filing of an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared and notarized an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to annotate the claim of complainants to at least 195 titles in
the possession of Fevidal.
10

A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to submit the Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the
Register of Deeds of Bataan.
11

60
The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were paid by respondent. Unknown to him, the
adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got wind of it and convinced complainants to
agree to another settlement.
12

Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending Fevidal a demand letter dated 10 July
2006, respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and revalidation of titles, and
damages against Fevidal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan on 13 October 2006.
13

Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they terminated the
services of respondent on 8 June 2007, withdrew their complaint against Fevidal on 9 June 2007,
and finalized their amicable settlement with him on 5 July 2007.
14

Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition
15
dated 20 July 2007 before the RTC, alleging that
the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint had been done with the intent of
defrauding counsel. On the same date, he filed a Motion for Recording of Attorneys Charging Lien
in the Records of the Above-Captioned Cases.
16

When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the complaint,
17
he filed a Manifestation and Motion for
Reconsideration.
18

After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter denying the
formers allegation of collusion,
19
complainants sought the suspension/disbarment of respondent
through a Complaint
20
filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 14 November
2007. Complainants alleged that they were uneducated and underprivileged, and could not taste
the fruits of their properties because the disposition thereof was "now clothed with legal problems"
brought about by respondent.
21

In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons
1.01,
22
1.03,
23
1.04,
24
12.02,
25
15.05,
26
18.04,
27
and 20.04
28
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On 14 August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation
29
of the investigating commissioner. It suspended respondent
from the practice of law for a period of one year for entering into a champertous agreement.
30

On 26 June 2011, it denied his motion for reconsideration. On 26 November 2012, this Court noted
the Indorsement of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as well as respondents second motion
for reconsideration. We find that respondent did not violate any of the canons cited by
complainants. In fact, we have reason to believe that complainants only filed the instant complaint
against him at the prodding of Fevidal.
Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against Fevidal to recover
their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of P10,000,000 a measly amount compared
to that in the original agreement, under which Fevidal undertook to pay complainants the amount
of P35,000,000. Lawyers have a sworn duty and responsibility to protect the interest of any
prospective client and pursue the ends of justice.
31

Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal under the
circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint against a lawyer only
because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath. The claim of complainants that they
were not informed of the status of the case is more appropriately laid at their door rather than at
that of respondent. He was never informed that they had held in abeyance the filing of the adverse
claim. Neither was he informed of the brewing amicable settlement between complainants and
Fevidal. We also find it very hard to believe that while complainants received various amounts as
loans from respondent from August 2006 to June 2007,
32
they could not spare even a few minutes
to ask about the status of the case. We shall discuss this more below. As regards the claim that
respondent refused to "patch up" with Fevidal despite the pleas of complainants, we note the
latters Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 24 September 2007, in which they admitted that they could
not convince Fevidal to meet with respondent to agree to a settlement.
33

61
Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the recording of his
attorneys charging lien as the "legal problem" preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their
property. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to
protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of the
court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a
case in which his services have been retained by the client. We recently upheld the right of counsel
to intervene in proceedings for the recording of their charging lien. In Malvar v. KFPI,
34
we granted
counsels motion to intervene in the case after petitioner therein terminated his services without
justifiable cause. Furthermore, after finding that petitioner and respondent had colluded in order to
deprive counsel of his fees, we ordered the parties to jointly and severally pay counsel the
stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the determination of whether respondent is entitled to the
charging lien is based on the discretion of the court before which the lien is presented. The
compensation of lawyers for professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the
court, not only to guarantee that the fees they charge remain reasonable and commensurate with
the services they have actually rendered, but to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession as well.
35

In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his services.
36

That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate venue does not make him liable for
disciplinary action. Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not without fault. Indeed, we find
that the contract for legal services he has executed with complainants is in the nature of a
champertous contract an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the
proceedings to enforce the clients rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing
in dispute.
37

Such contracts are contrary to public policy
38
and are thus void or inexistent.
39

They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that
lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. A reading of the
contract for legal services
40
shows that respondent agreed to pay for at least half of the expense
for the docket fees. He also paid for the whole amount needed for the recording of complainants
adverse claim. While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they are
handling in order to safeguard their clients rights, it is imperative that the advances be subject to
reimbrusement.
41
The purpose is to avoid a situation in which a lawyer acquires a personal stake in
the clients cause. Regrettably, nowhere in the contract for legal services is it stated that the
expenses of litigation advanced by respondents shall be subject to reimbursement by
complainants.
In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and transportation
allowance to them for the duration of their attorney-client relationship. In fact, he admits that the
cash advances were in the nature of personal loans that he extended to complainants.
42

Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the clients interests with
the ethical standards of his profession. Considering the surrounding circumstances in this case, an
admonition shall suffice to remind him that however dire the needs of the clients, a lawyer must
always avoid any appearance of impropriety to preserve the integrity of the profession.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Baez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing the litigation
expenses in a legal matter her handled for a client without providing for terms of reimbursement
and lending money to his client, in violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He us sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
with more severly.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Baez, Jr.
62
SO ORDERED.



Mercado vs. Vitriolo

Facts: Rosa Mercado is seeking for the disbarment of Atty. Julito Vitriolo as he allegedly
maliciously filed a criminal case for falsification of public documents against her thereby violating
the attoyrney client privilege. It appears that Vitriolo filed a case against complainant as
she apparently made false entries in the certificate of live birth of her children. More specifically
she allegedly indicated that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact her real
husband is Ruben Mercado. Mercado claims that by filing the complaint the attorney client privilege
has been violated. Mercado filed a case for Vitriolos disbarment.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between
attorney-client when he filed the criminal case for falsification

Held: No. The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants allegations. Complainant did
not even specify the alleged communication disclosed by the respondents. All her claims were
couched in general terms and lacked specificity. Indeed the complaint failed to attend the hearings
at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information
allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it would be difficult if not impossible to
determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such information is a
crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney client privilege. The burden of proving that
the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.




A.C. No. 9532 October 8, 2013
MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court s resolution is an administrative complaint
1
filed by Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui
Pitcher (complainant) against Atty. Rustico B. Gagate (respondent), . charging him for gross
ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law.
The facts
Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David),
2
a British national who
passed away on June 18, 2004.
3
Prior to his death, David was engaged in business in the
Philippines and owned, among others, 40% of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge,
Inc.
4
(Consulting Edge), a domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her deceased
husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent.
5

On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with Katherine Moscoso Bantegui
Bantegui),
6
a major stockholder of Consulting Edge,
7
in order to discuss the settlement of Davids
interest in the company.
8
They agreed to another meeting which was, however, postponed by
63
Bantegui. Suspecting that the latter was merely stalling for time in order to hide something,
respondent insisted that the appointment proceed as scheduled.
9

Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company premises on June 28, 2004. However, prior
to the scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by respondent to put a paper seal on
the door of the said premises, assuring her that the same was legal.
10

On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of complainant
and respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for the court to settle. She then asked
them to leave, locked the office and refused to give them a duplicate key.
11

Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, caused the change in the
lock of the Consulting Edge office door,
12
which prevented the employees thereof from entering
and carrying on the operations of the company. This prompted Bantegui to file before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati (Prosecutors Office) a complaint for grave coercion against
complainant and respondent.
13
In turn, respondent advised complainant that criminal and civil
cases should be initiated against Bantegui for the recovery of David's personal records/business
interests in Consulting Edge.
14
Thus, on January 17, 2005, the two entered in Memorandum of
Agreement,
15
whereby respondent undertook the filing of the cases against Bantegui, for which
complainant paid the amount of P150,000.00 as acceptance fee and committed herself to pay
respondentP1,000.00 for every court hearing.
16

On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutors Office issued a Resolution
17
dated October 13, 2004,
finding probable cause to charge complainant and respondent for grave coercion. The
corresponding Information was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 337985 (grave coercion case), and, as a matter of course, warrants
of arrest were issued against them.
18
Due to the foregoing, respondent advised complainant to go
into hiding until he had filed the necessary motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent
abandoned the grave coercion case and stopped communicating with complainant.
19
Failing to
reach respondent despite diligent efforts,
20
complainant filed the instant administrative case before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD
Case No. 06-1689.
Despite a directive
21
from the IBP-CBD, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint. The
case was set for mandatory conference on November 24, 2006,
22
which was reset twice,
23
on
January 12, 2007 and February 2, 2007, due to the absence of respondent. The last notice sent to
respondent, however, was returned unserved for the reason "moved out."
24
In view thereof,
Investigating Commissioner Tranquil S. Salvador III declared the mandatory conference terminated
and required the parties to submit their position papers, supporting documents, and affidavits.
25

The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On March 18, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo)
issued a Report and Recommendation,
26
observing that respondent failed to safeguard
complainant's legitimate interest and abandoned her in the grave coercion case. Commissioner
Magpayo pointed out that Bantegui is not legally obliged to honor complainant as subrogee of
David because complainant has yet to establish her kinship with David and, consequently, her
interest in Consulting Edge.
27
Hence, the actions taken by respondent, such as the placing of paper
seal on the door of the company premises and the changing of its lock, were all uncalled for.
Worse, when faced with the counter legal measures to his actions, he abandoned his client's
cause.
28
Commissioner Magpayo found that respondents acts evinced a lack of adequate
preparation and mastery of the applicable laws on his part, in violation of Canon 5
29
of the Code of
Professional Responsibity (Code), warranting his suspension from the practice of law for a period
of six months.
30

64
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforementioned Report and
Recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-261 dated November 19, 2011 (November 19, 2011
Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules.
31

In a Resolution
32
dated October 8, 2012, the Court noted the Notice of the IBPs November 19,
2011 Resolution, and referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
33

The OBC's Report and Recommendation
On February 11, 2013, the OBC submitted a Report and Recommendation
34
dated February 6,
2013, concluding that respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client and failed to safeguard
the latter's rights and interests in wanton disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
35
It deemed that the
six-month suspension from the practice of law as suggested by the IBP was an insufficient penalty
and, in lieu thereof, recommended that respondent be suspended for three years.
36
Likewise, it
ordered respondent to return the P150,000.00 he received from complainant as acceptance fee.
37

The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and
conclusions of the OBC.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers
would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard
of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless
of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
38
To this end, he is enjoined to
employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives.
39
These principles are embodied in
Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code which respectively
state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
x x x x
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
x x x x
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
x x x x
Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required
diligence in handling complainants cause since he: first, failed to represent her competently and
diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and,
second, abandoned his clients cause while the grave coercion case against them was pending.
Anent the first infraction, it bears emphasis that complainant's right over the properties of her
deceased husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established. As such, the high-handed action
taken by respondent to enforce complainant's claim of ownership over the latters interest in
Consulting Edge i.e., causing the change of the office door lock which thereby prevented the free
ingress and egress of the employees of the said company was highly improper. Verily, a person
cannot take the law into his own hands, regardless of the merits of his theory. In the same light,
65
respondent's act of advising complainant to go into hiding in order to evade arrest in the criminal
case can hardly be maintained as proper legal advice since the same constitutes transgression of
the ordinary processes of law. By virtue of the foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty to his
client to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice,
40
in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19
of the Code as above-quoted. To note further, since such courses of action were not only improper
but also erroneous, respondent equally failed to serve his client with competence and diligence in
violation of Canon 18 of the Code. In the same regard, he also remained unmindful of his clients
trust in him in particular, her trust that respondent would only provide her with the proper legal
advice in pursuing her interests thereby violating Canon 17 of the Code.
With respect to the second infraction, records definitively bear out that respondent completely
abandoned complainant during the pendency of the grave coercion case against them; this
notwithstanding petitioners efforts to reach him as well as his receipt of the P150,000.00
acceptance fee. It is hornbook principle that a lawyers duty of competence and diligence includes
not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists
of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without prodding from the client or the
court.
41
Hence, considering respondents gross and inexcusable neglect by leaving his client totally
unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be doubted that he violated Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code.
In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint
despite due notice.1wphi1This demonstrates not only his lack of responsibility but also his lack of
interest in clearing his name, which, as case law directs, is constitutive of an implied admission of
the charges leveled against him.
42
In fine, respondent should be held administratively liable for his
infractions as herein discussed. That said, the Court now proceeds to determine the appropriate
penalty to be imposed against respondent.
Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions
similar to those committed by respondent were suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two years. In Jinon v. Jiz,
43
a lawyer who neglected his client's case, misappropriated the client's
funds and disobeyed the IBPs directives to submit his pleadings and attend the hearings was
suspended from the practice of law for two years. In Small v. Banares,
44
the Court meted a similar
penalty against a lawyer who failed to render any legal service even after receiving money from
the complainant; to return the money and documents he received despite demand; to update his
client on the status of her case and respond to her requests for information; and to file an answer
and attend the mandatory conference before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Gonzales,
45
a lawyer
who neglected complainants cause; refused to immediately account for his clients money and to
return the documents received; failed to update his client on the status of her case and to respond
to her requests for information; and failed to submit his answer and to attend the mandatory
conference before the IBP was suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, the
Court observes that, in the present case, complainant was subjected to a graver injury as she was
prosecuted for the crime of grave coercion largely due to the improper and erroneous advice of
respondent. Were it not for respondents imprudent counseling, not to mention his act of
abandoning his client during the proceedings, complainant would not have unduly suffered the
harbors of a criminal prosecution. Thus, considering the superior degree of the prejudice caused to
complainant, the Court finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of three years as recommended by the OBC.
In the same light, the Court sustains the OBCs recommendation for the return of the P150,000.00
acceptance fee received by respondent from complainant since the same is intrinsically linked to
66
his professional engagement. While the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings
should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyers administrative and not his
civil liability,
46
it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which
are purely civil in nature for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer
from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement (such as the acceptance fee in this case). Hence, considering further that the fact of
respondents receipt of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee from complainant remains
undisputed,
47
the Court finds the return of the said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to be in
order.
WHEREFORE respondent Atty. Rustico B. Gagate is found guilty of violating Canon 17 Rule 18.03
of Canon 18 and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three 3) years, effective upon the
finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher
the P150,000.00 acceptance fee he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the
finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of
a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.



A.C. No. 4945 October 8, 2013
MA. JENNIFER TRIA-SAMONTE, Complainant,
vs.
EPIFANIA "FANNY" OBIAS, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint-affidavit
1
filed by Ma. Jennifer Tria-
Samonte (complainant) against Epifania "Fanny"Obias (respondent) charging her for grave
misconduct and/or gross malpractice.
The facts
In 1997, spouses Prudencio and Loreta Jeremias (Sps. Jeremias),through respondent, offered for
sale a parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 597 (subject property)
to the late Nestor Tria (Nestor) and Pura S. Tria (Sps. Tria), for a consideration of P2,800,000.00
and payable in installments.
2
Respondent, who was to receive the payment from Sps. Tria and
transmit the same to Sps. Jeremias, undertook to deliver the deed of sale and owners copy of the
title to her clients (Sps. Tria) upon full payment of the purchase price.
3
She further undertook to
cause the conversion of the subject property from agricultural to residential, and the transfer of
the title to the names of Sps. Tria as part of the package agreement.
4
Respondent received all the
installment payments made by Sps. Tria and issued receipts therefor.
5
After full payment of the
purchase price on July 11, 1997,
6
and after giving an additional P115,000.00for capital gains tax
and other expenses,
7
Sps. Tria requested from respondent the delivery of the deed of sale and the
owners copy of the title to them but respondent failed to comply explaining that the Department
of Agrarian Reform clearance for conversion of the subject property from agricultural to residential
67
was taking time.
8
Despite several subsequent demands, respondent still failed to fulfill her
undertakings under the package agreement.
9

On May 22, 1998, Nestor was fatally shot and died.
10
Thereafter, complainant, daughter of Sps.
Tria, again demanded from respondent and Sps. Jeremias the delivery of the deed of sale and the
certificate of title of the subject property to them, but to no avail. For their part, Sps. Jeremias
informed complainant that they had received the consideration of P2,200,000.00 and they had
executed and turned-over the sale documents to respondent.
11

Complainant later discovered that a deed of sale over the subject property was executed by Sps.
Jeremias and notarized by respondent favor of someone else, a certain Dennis Tan, on May 26,
1998 for a consideration ofP200,000.00.
12

In defense, respondent, in her Comment,
13
claimed that Nestor instructed her in November 1997
not to proceed with the processing of the deed of sale and, instead, to just look for another
buyer.
14
She further averred that Nestor also demanded from her the return of the purchase price,
and that she complied with the said demand and returned the P2,800,000.00 in cash to Nestor
sometime during the latter part of January 1998.
15
However, she did not ask for a written receipt
therefor. In fact, Nestor told her not to return the P115,000.00 intended for capital gains taxes and
other expenses, and to just apply the said sum as attorneys fees for the other legal services that
she rendered for him.
16

In the Courts Resolution
17
dated August 30, 1999, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. After numerous
postponements, mostly at the instance of respondent,
18
only the complainant and her witnesses
testified before the IBP. Eventually, respondents right to present evidence was considered
waived.
19

The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On September 25, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes (Investigating
Commissioner), issued his Report and Recommendation,
20
finding respondent to have violated her
oath as a lawyer due to her participation in the second sale of the subject property despite the lack
of any lawful termination of the prior sale of the same property to Sps.Tria. The Investigating
Commissioner observed that respondent received, and admitted to have received, from Sps. Tria
the P2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount ofP115,000.00 for expenses. He further found
the second sale of the same property to Dennis Tan as a clear indication that respondent: (a)
employed serious deceit or fraud against Sps. Tria and their family; (b) violated their proprietary
rights; and (c) violated the trust and confidence reposed in her.
21
On the other hand, the
Investigating Commissioner did not give credence to respondents defense that she returned
the P2,800,000.00 purchase price given by Sps. Tria and that the latter caused the cancellation of
the sale of the subject property in their favor, absent any receipt or documentation to prove the
same.
22
As counsel for Sps. Tria, respondent failed in her obligation to observe honesty and
diligence in their transaction and, as such, she was found guilty of grave misconduct and gross
malpractice in violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code).
23
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.
24

Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondents violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-185
25
dated October 19,2007 but reduced the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law from five years to one year.
68
Both complainant and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration
26
which were,
however, denied in the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XX-2012-109 dated March 10,
2012.
27

The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should beheld administratively liable
for violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the IBP. Indeed, respondent, in her
Comment, already admitted that she rendered legal services to Sps. Tria,
28
which necessarily gave
rise to a lawyer-client relationship between them. The complete turnaround made by respondent in
her motion for reconsideration from the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XX-2012-109,
where she contended that there was no lawyer-client relationship between her and Sps.
Tria,
29
cannot thus be given any credence.
Since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she also donned the hat of
a real estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to the legal profession. In
this regard, the legal advice and/or legal documentation that she offered and/or rendered
regarding the real estate transaction subject of this case should not be deemed removed from the
category of legal services.
30
Case law instructs that if a person, in respect to business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance,
and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employment is established.
31
Thus, in view of the fact that Sps. Tria knew respondent to be, and
transacted with her as, a lawyer, her belated and unilateral classification of her own acts as being
limited to those of a real estate broker cannot be upheld. In any case, the lawyer-client
relationship between Sps. Tria and respondent was confirmed by the latters admission that she
rendered legal services to the former. With this relationship having been established, the Court
proceeds to apply the ethical principles pertinent to this case.
It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
32
They are duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness, and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients.
33
Irrefragably, the legal
profession demands of attorneys an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in
any way, directly or indirectly, with the interests of their clients.
34
As enshrined in Canons 17 and
18 of the Code:
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.1wphi1
In the present case, respondent clearly transgressed the above-mentioned rules as her actions
were evidently prejudicial to her clients interests. Records disclose that instead of delivering the
deed of sale covering the subject property to her clients, she willfully notarized a deed of sale over
the same property in favor of another person. Accordingly, far removed from protecting the
interest of her clients, Sps. Tria, who had, in fact, already fully paid the purchase price of the
subject property, respondent participated and was even instrumental in bringing about the defeat
of their rights over the said property. Hence, respondent grossly violated the trust and confidence
reposed in her by her clients, in contravention of Canons 17and 18 of the Code. To add, by turning
against her own clients, respondent also violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which provides
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Lest it be
forgotten, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
35
These unyielding standards respondent evidently
failed to adhere to.
69
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, records bear out that the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was decreased from a period of
five years to just one year by the IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-185.
However, the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the
bases for such modification in contravention of Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
which mandates that "the decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based." Verily, the Court frowns
on the unexplained change made by the IBP Board of Governors in the recommended penalty. Be
that as it may, the Court proceeds to correct the same.
Jurisprudence reveals that in similar cases where lawyers abused the trust and confidence reposed
in them by their clients as well as committed unlawful, dishonest, and immoral or deceitful
conduct, as in this case, the Court found them guilty of gross misconduct and disbarred them. In
Chuav. Mesina, Jr.,
36
the Court disbarred the lawyer who, upon his misrepresentations, breached
his promise to his clients to transfer to them the property subject of that case, but instead, offered
the same for sale to the public. Also, in Tabang v. Gacott,
37
the penalty of disbarment was meted
out against the lawyer who, among others, actively sought to sell the properties subject of that
case contrary to the interests of his own clients. As the infractions in the foregoing cases are akin
to those committed by respondent in the case at bar, the Court deems that the same penalty of
disbarment be imposed against her. Clearly, as herein discussed, respondent committed deliberate
violations of the Code as she dishonestly dealt with her own clients and advanced the interests of
another against them resulting to their loss. For such violations, respondent deserves the ultimate
punishment of disbarment consistent with existing jurisprudence.
As a final point, it bears to note that the foregoing resolution does not-as it should not -include an
order for the return of the P2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of P115,000.00 for
expenses allegedly received by respondent, albeit the Investigating Commissioner's findings on the
same. In Roa v. Moreno,
38
it has been held that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are only
confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar and that the only concern is his administrative liability.
39
Thus, the Court's
findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities of the
parties involved which are purely civil in nature -meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic
link to the lawyer's professional engagement
40
as the same should be threshed out in a proper
proceeding of such nature.
WHEREFORE, respondent Epifania "Fanny" Obias is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
accordingly DISBARRED.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.




Adm. Case No. 6475 January 30, 2013
FE A. YLAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
70
For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint
1
tiled by Fe A. Ylaya (complainant)
against Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott (respondent) who allegedly deceived the complainant and her
late husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a "preparatory" Deed of Sale that the respondent
converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.
After the submission of the respondent's comment to the complaint, the Court referred the
complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, evaluation and recommendation.
The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two (2)
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title ( TCT) Nos. 162632 and 162633 located at
Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. Prior to the acquisition of these properties, TCT No.
162632 (property) was already the subject of expropriation proceedings filed by the City
Government of Puerto Princesa (City Government) on May 23, 1996 against its former registered
owner, Cirilo Arellano. The expropriation case was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2902. The RTC
already fixed the price and issued an order for the City Government to deposit P6,000,000.00 as
just compensation for the property.
2

The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the expropriation case
as intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property. The complainant alleged that
the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property,
but he left blank the space for the name of the buyer and for the amount of consideration. The
respondent further alleged that the deed would be used in the sale to the City Government when
the RTC issues the order to transfer the titles.
3
The respondent then fraudulently without their
knowledge and consent, and contrary to their understanding converted the "preparatory deed of
sale" into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001,
4
selling the subject property to Reynold So
and Sylvia Carlos So for P200,000.00.
5

The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid the P200,000.00 purchase price or that
they would sell the property "for such a measly sum" when they stood to get at
least P6,000,000.00 as just compensation.
6

The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June
4, 2001 even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mothers sister) are his uncle and his aunt,
respectively.
7

The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint.
8

The respondent argued that the complainants greed to get the just Compensation
9
caused her to
file this "baseless, unfounded and malicious" disbarment case.
10
He claimed that the sale was their
voluntary transaction and that he "simply ratified the document."
11
He also claimed that Reynold
and Laurentino had originally jointly purchased the properties from Cirilo Arellano on July 10, 2000;
that they were co-owners for some time; and that Laurentino subsequently sold his share to
Reynold under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001.
12

The respondent specifically denied asking the complainant and her late husband to execute any
"preparatory deed of sale" in favor of the City Government.
13
He also denied that the Deed of
Absolute Sale contained blanks when they signed it.
14
That he filed for the spouses Ylaya and
Reynold an opposition to the just compensation the RTC fixed proved that there was no agreement
to use the document for the expropriation case.
15
He also argued that it was clear from the
document that the intended buyer was a natural person, not a juridical person, because there were
spaces for the buyers legal age, marital status, and citizenship,
16
and he was even constrained to
file a subsequent Motion to Intervene on behalf of Reynold because the complainant "maliciously
retained" the TCTs to the subject properties after borrowing them from his office.
17
Lastly, he
denied violating the Rules on Notarial Practice.
18

71
On September 4, 2006, the respondent filed a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August
24, 2006 praying for the early resolution of the complaint.
19

On December 5, 2006, the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified
Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006.
20

On February 28, 2008, the complainant executed an Affidavit
21
affirming and confirming the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6,
2000;
22
the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated April 19, 2000;
23
and the Deed of Absolute
Sale notarized in 2001.
24
The respondent submitted this Affidavit to the IBP as an attachment to
his Motion for Reconsideration of April 21, 2008.
25

The IBPs Findings
In her Report and Recommendation dated November 19, 2007, IBP Commissioner Anna Caridad
Sazon-Dupaya found the respondent administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 (A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and Canon 16 ("A
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession)
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004
Rules on Notarial Practice).
26
She recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months.
27

In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302
28
dated December 14, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted the IBP Commissioners finding, but increased the penalty imposed to two (2) years
suspension and a warning:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner [in] the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondents violations of Canon 1, [Rule] 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule IV, Sec. 39(c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice),
Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott is hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for two (2) years with a
Warning that commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. [emphases
supplied]
On May 8, 2008, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 21, 2008, attaching,
among others, a copy of the complainants Affidavit dated February 27, 2008, admitting the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Cirilo and
Laurentino; the MOA between Laurentino and Reynold; the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Laurentino and Reynold; and the Compromise Agreement between Reynold and the complainant
dated November 14, 2006 for the expropriation case.
29

On September 4, 2008, the respondent filed a Manifestation with the Supreme Court, requesting
that the IBP be directed to resolve his Motion for Reconsideration.
30

By Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,
31
the IBP Board of Governors denied the
respondents Motion for Reconsideration for failing to raise any new substantial matter or any
cogent reason to warrant a reversal or even a modification of its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302.
32

On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed a Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the IBPs
findings, as follows:
33

a) In conveniently concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was pre-signed and
fraudulently notarized without requiring Fe Ylaya to adduce evidence in a formal hearing
thus, violated the respondents right to due process as he was not able to cross-examine
her. This is not to mention that the complainant failed to offer corroborative proof to prove
her bare allegations;
72
b) In sweepingly and arbitrarily disregarded/skirted (sic) the public documents (MOA and 2
other DOAS) duly executed by the parties therein and notarized by the respondent;
c) In totally ignoring the complainants Affidavit admitting the genuineness and due
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in issue;
d) In arbitrarily concluding the absence of co-ownership by Reynold So and Fe Ylaya of the
subject lots despite the existence of a notarized MOA clearly showing the co-ownership of
Ylaya and So; and
e) In finding the respondent/appellants act of notarizing the DOAS as contrary to the
notarial rules.
The Issues
From the assigned errors, the complainant poses the following issues:
(1) whether the IBP violated the respondents right to due process; and
(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
The Courts Ruling
We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of the IBP
Board of Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section
3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
34

We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his clients properties. We likewise
find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting interests
without the written consent of the represented parties, thus, violating the rule on conflict of
interests; and (2) Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
a. Due process violation
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process means the total
lack of opportunity to be heard or to have ones day in court. As a rule, no denial of due process
takes place where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his
case;
35
what is prohibited is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
The respondent claims that the IBP violated his right to due process because he was not given the
"amplest opportunity to defend himself, to cross examine the witness complainant, to object to the
admissibility of documents or present controverting evidence"
36
when the IBP rendered its
conclusion without requiring the complainant to adduce evidence in a formal hearing and despite
the absence of corroborative proof. He insists that these defects rendered the complainants
allegations as hearsay, and the IBPs report, recommendation or resolution null and void.
Although the respondent failed to have a face-to-face confrontation with the complainant when
she failed to appear at the required mandatory conference on October 6, 2005,
37
the records
reveal that the respondent fully participated during the entire proceedings and submitted
numerous pleadings, including evidence, before the IBP. He was even allowed to file a motion for
reconsideration supported by his submitted evidence, which motion the IBP considered and ruled
upon in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010.
38

In Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma,
39
we held that due process, as
applied to administrative proceedings, is the opportunity to explain ones side. In Samalio v. Court
of Appeals,
40
due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in courts of justice. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or through pleadings, is accorded, no denial of procedural due process takes place. The
requirements of due process are satisfied where the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
73
Similarly, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President,
41
we held that "due process, as a
constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding.
Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or
oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a
certain degree of latitude[, provided that] fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process, for an administrative agency to resolve a case
based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties."
42

In this case, the respondents failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a sufficient ground to
support the claim that he had not been afforded due process. The respondent was heard through
his pleadings, his submission of alleged controverting evidence, and his oral testimony during the
October 6, 2005 mandatory conference. These pleadings, evidence and testimony were received
and considered by the IBP Commissioner when she arrived at her findings and recommendation,
and were the bases for the IBP Boards Resolution.
Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion
for reconsideration. A denia of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had
the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. Undoubtedly in this case, the
requirement of the law was afforded to the respondent."
43

We also note that the respondent, on a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August 24,
2006, submitted his case to the IBP for its resolution without any further hearings. The motion,
filed almost one year after the mandatory conference on October 6, 2005, significantly did not
contain any statement regarding a denial of due process. In effect, the respondent himself waived
his cross-examination of the complainant when he asked the IBP Board of Governors to resolve the
case based on the pleadings and the evidence on record. To quote his own submission:
1. On June 30, 2004, a complaint was filed in this case;
2. On October 19, 2004, the respondent filed his comment with all its attachments denying
all the allegations in the complaint;
3. On June 23, 2005, the respondent filed his position paper. On April 28, 2006, the
respondent also filed his supplemental position paper. By contrast, up to this date, the
complainant/petitioner has not filed her verified position paper thus, waived her right to file
the same;
4. There being no other genuine issues to be heard in this case as all the defenses and
counter-arguments are supported by documentary evidence, it is most respectfully prayed
that the instant case be resolved on its merits or be ordered dismissed for lack of merit
without further hearing;
5. Further, considering that there is an on-going case in Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan in Civil Case No. 2902 for Expropriation involving the same property, and
such fact was deliberately omitted by the complainant in her Verified Complaint as shown in
the certification of non-forum shopping, the outright dismissal of this case is warranted,
hence, this motion; and
6. This is meant to expedite the termination of this case.
44
(underscore ours; italics
supplied)
Finally, we note Section 11, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that:
No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be
considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds
that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the
Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of
the entire proceedings.
74
In this case, the IBP Commissioners findings were twice reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors
the first review resulted in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302
45
dated December 14, 2007, affirming
the IBP Commissioners findings, but modifying the penalty; the second review resulted in
Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,
46
denying the respondents motion for
reconsideration. In both instances, the IBP Board of Governors found no defect or miscarriage of
justice warranting a remedial action or the invalidation of the proceedings.
We emphasize that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that they are neither
purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers,
47
not the trial of an action or a suit.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by
the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. [emphases
deleted]
The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness who brought
the matter to the attention of the Court.
48
Flowing from its sui generis character, it is not
mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant must adduce evidence.
From all these, we find it clear that the complainant is not indispensable to the disciplinary
proceedings and her failure to appear for cross-examination or to provide corroborative evidence
of her allegations is of no merit. What is important is whether, upon due investigation, the IBP
Board of Governors finds sufficient evidence of the respondents misconduct to warrant the
exercise of its disciplinary powers.
b. Merits of the Complaint
"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge."
49
Preponderance of evidence means
that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that
of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
compared to the presented contrary evidence.
Under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in determining whether preponderance of
evidence exists, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the
case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, and
the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the
number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.
50
By law, a lawyer enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against
him until the contrary is proven, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have
performed his duties in accordance with his oath.
51

The IBP Commissioner set out her findings as follows:
75
The undersigned, after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, finds that
the charges of the complainant against the respondent are worthy of belief based on the following:
First, the allegation of the respondent that Reynold So was actually co-owner of spouses Ylanas
(sic) in the properties subject of the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic)
is hard to believe despite the presentation of the Memorandum of Agreement.
It is elementary in Rules of Evidence that when the contents of a written document are put in
issue, the best evidence would be the document itself. In the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano
and Spouses Ylanas (sic), the buyer of the subject properties is only Laurentino L. Ylaya married to
Fe A. Ylaya. The document does not state that Reynold So was likewise a buyer together with
Laurentino Ylaya, or that the former paid half of the purchase price.
Also, it is hard for this Commission to believe that Reynold So, assisted by a lawyer at that and
who allegedly paid half of the purchase price, would not insist for the inclusion of his name in the
Deed of Sale as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title subsequently issued.
The Memorandum of Agreement between the spouses Ylaya and Reynold So produced by the
respondent cannot overturn the belief of this Commission considering that the Memorandum of
Agreement was executed more than a month AFTER the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and
the Ylayas was notarized. This is not to mention the fact that the complainant denied ever having
executed the Memorandum of Agreement. A close examination of the signatories in the said
Memorandum of Agreement would reveal that indeed, the alleged signatures of the complainant
and her husband are not the same with their signatures in other documents.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Memorandum of Agreement is valid, thereby making
Laurentino Ylaya and co-owner Reynold So co-owners of the subject properties (Please see Annex
"B" of respondents Comment), this Commission finds it hard to believe Laurentino Ylaya would sell
it to Reynold So for P200,000 x x x when his minimum expenses for the purchase thereof is
already P225,000.00 and he was expecting to receiveP7,000,000.00, more or less. That would
mean that if Reynold So and the complainant were co-owners, theP7,000,000.00 would then be
equally divided among them at P3,500,000.00 each, far above the P200,000.00 selling price
reflected in the pre-signed Deed of Sale.
As to the second issue, this Commission believes that the respondent committed serious error in
notarizing the Deed of Sale and the Memorandum of Agreement between his uncle Reynold So and
Laurentino Ylaya based on Rule IV, Section 3 (c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC which provides as follows:
"Sec. 3. Disqualifications a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
(a) x x x.
(b) x x x.
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree."
The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the aforementioned Rule
becausehis uncle Reynold So, the buyer is not the principal in the Subject Deed of Sale but the
seller Laurentino Ylaya (please see page 3 of the respondents Supplemental Position Paper) is
misplaced. Clearly, both the buyer and the seller in the instant case are considered principals in the
contract entered into.
Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent that his uncle was not a
principal so as to apply the afore-quoted provision of the Rules, the respondent still violated the
Rules when he notarized the subject Memorandum of Agreement between Laurentino Ylaya and
his uncle Reynold So. Clearly, both complainant and Reynold So were principal parties in the said
Memorandum of Agreement.
52

The respondent argues that the IBP Commissioners findings are contrary to the presented
evidence, specifically to the MOA executed by Laurentino and Reynold acknowledging the
76
existence of a co-ownership;
53
to the complainants Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified
Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006 where she stated that the parties
have entered into a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 2902, and that the disbarment
complaint arose from a misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper appreciation of
facts;
54
to her Affidavit dated February 27, 2008
55
affirming and confirming the existence,
genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000;
56
and to
the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.
57

In all, the respondent claims that these cited pieces of evidence prove that this administrative
complaint against him is fabricated, false and untrue. He also points to Atty. Robert Peneyra, the
complainants counsel in this administrative case, as the hand behind the complaint.
58
According to
the respondent, Atty. Peneyra harbors ill-will against him and his family after his father filed
several administrative cases against Atty. Peneyra, one of which resulted in the imposition of a
warning and a reprimand on Atty. Peneyra.
59

Reynold, in his Affidavit dated October 11, 2004, confirms that there was a co-ownership between
him and Laurentino; that Laurentino decided to sell his half of the property to Reynold because he
(Laurentino) had been sickly and in dire need of money to pay for his medical bills; that Laurentino
agreed to the price of P200,000.00 as this was almost the same value of his investment when he
and Reynold jointly acquired the property; and that the sale to Reynold was with the agreement
and consent of the complainant who voluntarily signed the Deed of Sale.
60

After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with the respondent and find the evidence
insufficient to prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1) the evidence
against the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he has taken to
mislead the complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale" and the
conversion into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold; and (2) no
prohibition exists against the notarization of a document in which any of the parties interested is
the notarys relative within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at that time the
respondent notarized the documents.
In her Report and Recommendation,
61
the IBP Commissioner concluded that the respondent is
liable for deceit and fraud because he failed to prove the existence of a co-ownership between
Laurentino and Reynold; in her opinion, the signatures of the complainant and of her husband on
the MOA "are not the same with their signatures in other documents."
62

We do not agree with this finding. While the facts of this case may raise some questions regarding
the respondents legal practice, we nevertheless found nothing constituting clear evidence of the
respondents specific acts of fraud and deceit. His failure to prove the existence of a co-ownership
does not lead us to the conclusion that the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001
are spurious and that the respondent was responsible for creating these spurious documents. We
are further persuaded, after noting that in disregarding the MOA, the IBP Commissioner failed to
specify what differences she observed in the spouses Ylayas signatures in the MOA and what
documents were used in comparison.
Apart from her allegations, the complainants pieces of evidence consist of TCT Nos. 162632 and
162633;
63
her Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. 2902 dated May 17, 2000;
64
the RTC
order in Civil Case No. 2902 dated November 6, 2000 fixing the price of just compensation;
65
the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001;
66
the spouses Ylayas Verified Manifestation dated
September 2, 2002, filed with the RTC in Civil Case No. 2902, assailing the Motion to Deposit Just
Compensation filed by the respondent on behalf of Reynold and manifesting the sale between
Laurentino and Reynold;
67
the Provincial Prosecutors Subpoena to the complainant in connection
with the respondents complaint for libel;
68
the respondents complaint for libel against the
77
complainant dated August 27, 2003;
69
the complainants Counter Affidavit dated March 26, 2004
against the charge of libel;
70
and the respondents letter to the Provincial Attorney of Palawan
dated April 5, 2004, requesting for "official information regarding the actual attendance of Atty.
ROBERT Y. PENEYRA" at an MCLE seminar.
71

We do not see these documentary pieces of evidence as proof of specific acts constituting deceit or
fraud on the respondents part. The documents by themselves are neutral and, at the most, show
the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship between the respondent and the complainant. It
is one thing to allege deceit and misconduct, and it is another to demonstrate by evidence the
specific acts constituting these allegations.
72

We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the complainant; the Court
exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes her case by clear, convincing,
and satisfactory evidence.
73
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other party. When the
pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on the preponderance
of evidence, the equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the party carrying the burden
of proof.
74

In this case, we find that the complainants evidence and the records of the case do not show the
respondents deliberate fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such proof, the complaint
for fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility must
perforce be dismissed.
We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his relationship with Reynold,
whom the complainant alleges to be the respondents uncle because Reynold is married to the
respondents maternal aunt.
75
However, this is of no moment as the respondent cannot be held
liable for violating Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 4, 2001
76
and the MOA dated April 19, 2000
77
were notarized by the respondent prior
to the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC on July 6, 2004. The notarial law in force in the years
2000 - 2001 was Chapter 11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised Administrative Code of 1917) which did
not contain the present prohibition against notarizing documents where the parties are related to
the notary public within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity. Thus, we must likewise
dismiss the charge for violation of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
c. Liability under Canons 15, 16 and 18 We find the respondent liable under Canon 15, Rule 15.03
for representing conflicting interests without the written consent of all concerned, particularly the
complainant; under Canon 16 for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his clients
properties; and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 states:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. [emphasis ours]
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of
trust and confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be so. Part of the lawyers duty
to his client is to avoid representing conflicting interests. He is duty bound to decline professional
employment, no matter how attractive the fee offered may be, if its acceptance involves a violation
of the proscription against conflict of interest, or any of the rules of professional conduct. Thus, a
lawyer may not accept a retainer from a defendant after he has given professional advice to the
plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept employment from another in a matter adversely
affecting any interest of his former client. It is his duty to decline employment in any of these and
similar circumstances in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.
78

The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies "even if the lawyer would not
be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other, or that
78
there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated."
79
The sole exception is
provided in Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility if there is a written
consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
Based on the records, we find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for violating
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The facts of this case show that
the respondent retained clients who had close dealings with each other. The respondent admits to
acting as legal counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the spouses Ylaya and Reynold at one point during the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 2902.
80
Subsequently, he represented only Reynold in the same
proceedings,
81
asserting Reynolds ownership over the property against all other claims, including
that of the spouses Ylaya.
82

We find no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved and we cannot give the
respondent the benefit of the doubt in this regard. We find it clear from the facts of this case that
the respondent retained Reynold as his client and actively opposed the interests of his former
client, the complainant. He thus violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
We affirm the IBP Commissioners finding that the respondent violated Canon 16. The respondent
admits to losing certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his care by Reynold.
83
According to
the respondent, the complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs over the properties sold by
Laurentino to Reynold after she borrowed them from his office.
84
Reynold confirms that the TCTs
were taken by the complainant from the respondents law office.
85

The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to "hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession." Allowing a party to take the original
TCTs of properties owned by another an act that could result in damage should merit a finding
of legal malpractice. While we note that it was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to
borrow the TCTs and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or present when the
complainant borrowed the TCTs,
86
we nevertheless hold the respondent liable, as the TCTs were
entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence in caring for his clients
properties that were in his custody.
We likewise find the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal
matter entrusted to him. Despite the respondents admission that he represented the complainant
and her late husband in Civil Case No. 2902 and that he purportedly filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene in their behalf, the records show that he never filed such a motion for the spouses Ylaya.
The complainant herself states that she and her late husband were forced to file the Motion for
Leave to Intervene on their own behalf. The records of the case, which include the Motion for
Leave to Intervene filed by the spouses Ylaya, support this conclusion.
87

Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable." What amounts to carelessness or
negligence in a lawyers discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact formulation, but
the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his
client is per se a violation.
88

In Canoy v. Ortiz,
89
we held that a lawyers failure to file a position paper was per se a violation of
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent clearly
failed in this case in his duty to his client when, without any explanation, he failed to file the
Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Under the circumstances, we find
that there was want of diligence; without sufficient justification, this is sufficient to hold the
respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
79
d. The Complainants Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the Case
and her Affidavit
We are aware of the complainants Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To
Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006
90
and her Affidavit
91
affirming and confirming the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6,
2000.
92
The complainant explains that the parties have entered into a compromise agreement in
Civil Case No. 2902, and that this disbarment complaint was filed because of a "misunderstanding,
miscommunication and improper appreciation of facts";
93
she erroneously accused the respondent
of ill motives and bad intentions, but after being enlightened, she is convinced that he has no
personal or pecuniary interests over the properties in Civil Case No. 2902; that such
misunderstanding was due to her unfamiliarity with the transactions of her late husband during his
lifetime.
94
The complainant now pleads for the respondents forgiveness, stating that he has been
her and her late husbands lawyer for over a decade and affirms her trust and confidence in
him.
95
We take note that under their Compromise Agreement dated November 14, 2006 for the
expropriation case,
96
the complainant and Reynold equally share the just compensation, which
have since increased to P10,000,000.00.
While the submitted Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the Case
and the Affidavit appear to exonerate the respondent, complete exoneration is not the necessary
legal effect as the submitted motion and affidavit are immaterial for purposes of the present
proceedings. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, "No investigation shall be
interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."
In Angalan v. Delante,
97
despite the Affidavit of Desistance, we disbarred the respondent therein
for taking advantage of his clients and for transferring the title of their property to his name. In
Bautista v. Bernabe,
98
we revoked the lawyers notarial commission, disqualified him from
reappointment as a notary public for two years, and suspended him from the practice of law for
one year for notarizing a document without requiring the affiant to personally appear before him.
In this cited case, we said:
Complainants desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an
end to the administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless
of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This
rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken
for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
99

In sum, in administrative proceedings against lawyers, the complainants desistance or withdrawal
does not terminate the proceedings. This is particularly true in the present case where pecuniary
consideration has been given to the complainant as a consideration for her desistance. We note in
this regard that she would receiveP5,000,000.00, or half of the just compensation under the
Compromise Agreement,
100
and thus agreed to withdraw all charges against the
respondent.
101
From this perspective, we consider the complainants desistance to be suspect; it is
not grounded on the fact that the respondent did not commit any actual misconduct; rather,
80
because of the consideration, the complainant is now amenable to the position of the respondent
and/or Reynold.
e. Procedural aspect
We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors are merely
recommendatory and do not attain finality without a final action from this Court. Section 12, Rule
139-B is clear on this point that:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
x x x x
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.1wphi1
The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.
102
It exercises
such disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form its own
judgment. Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
and the IBPs recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the practice of law or
disbarment are always subject to this Courts review and approval.
The Penalty
In Solidon v. Macalalad,
103
we imposed the penalty of suspension of six ( 6) months from the
practice of law on the respondent therein for his violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and Canon 16,
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Josefina M. Anion v. Atty. Clemencio
Sabitsana, Jr.,
104
we suspended the respondent therein from the practice of law for one (1) year,
for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under the
circumstances, we find a one (1) year suspension to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction
against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we set aside Resolution No. XVIII-.2007-302 dated December
14, 2007 and Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010 of the IBP Board of Governors,
and find respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, Canon
16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a penalty, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.


IPI No. 12205CAJ, December 10, 2013
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF TOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E.
VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP
No. 119461.

[A.C. No. 10300]

RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12205CAJ AGAINST
ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.
R E S O L U T I O N
BRION, J.:
On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution
1
dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas S.
Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same Resolution,
we also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegias counsel, to show cause why he should not
81
be cited for contempt.

After considering Atty. Adazas explanation,
2
we find his account insufficient, and find
him guilty of indirect contempt.

According to Atty. Adaza, he should not be punished for indirect contempt as he was merely
performing his duty as Merdegias counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed Justice
Velosos partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of immediately filing an administrative
complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from
the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated
his request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza
acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially
when he also believes in the merits of his clients case.

Atty. Adazas explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to convince
us of his innocence from the contempt charge.

As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso
refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition
were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral
arguments of Merdegias case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should
have disposed of the issue of Justice Velosos bias. While we do not discount the fact that it
was Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note that he
was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.
3
Had Merdegia and
Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper remedy would have been
to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The
settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for
appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling.
4


While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds
provided by law.
5
He is also dutybound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action
the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes.
6


A reading of Merdegias administrative complaint
7
shows an apparent failure to understand that
cases are not always decided in ones favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an
extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the case.
8
In
this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his client the features
of our adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system,
and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court
demand of him in acting for his client before our courts.

To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task. We have to
strike a balance between the need for accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one
hand, with the need to protect the independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive and
enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should not be made to bow down to the wiles of
litigants who bully judges into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither
should we shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people
82
who decide the outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious and
corrupt acts of erring judges and officials should not be punished for filing administrative cases
against them; neither should these litigants be unjustly deterred from doing so by a wrong signal
from this Court that they would be made to explain why they should not be cited for contempt
when the complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.

What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of the case
that, when read together with the administrative complaint he prepared, shows that his complaint
is merely an attempt to malign the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adazas penchant for
filing motions for inhibition throughout the case: first, against Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C.
Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order unfavorable to his
client; andsecond, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal, for
alleged bias during the oral arguments on his case. These indicators, taken together with the
baseless administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he penned an order adverse to Atty.
Adazas client, disclose that there was more to the administrative complaint than the report of
legitimate grievances against members of the Judiciary.

In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc.,
9
we cited a litigant in indirect contempt
of court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of
the Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court.
Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adazas acts constitute an improper
conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus punishable for indirect
contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

As a final note, Atty. Adazas contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary sanction as
a member of the bar.
10
If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we
are prevented from doing so by our concern for his due process rights. Our Resolution of October
8, 2013 only asked him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt, and not why he
should not be administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against
Atty. Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a
disciplinary action is independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A person charged
of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding, must be informed of the nature
of the charge against him, and given ample opportunity to explain his side.
11
cralawred

While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other,
12
a contempt proceeding
cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers,
13
and vice versa. There can be
no substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt proceedings against lawyers, as officers
of the Court, are different in nature and purpose from the discipline of lawyers as legal
professionals. The two proceedings spring from two different powers of the Court.

The Court, in exercising its power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power granted to
courts in general.
14
Its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to
the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and, consequently, in the
administration of justice;
15
thus, it may be instituted against any person guilty of acts that
constitute contempt of court.
16
Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal
and summary in nature; hence, legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply to
contempt proceedings. A judgment dismissing the charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer
83
be appealed in the same manner that the prohibition against double jeopardy bars the appeal of
an accuseds acquittal.
17


In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is neither
purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding is not
intended to inflict punishment, but to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the
privilege of practicing law. It involves an investigation by the Court of the conduct of its officers,
and has, for its primary objective, public interest.
18
Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the
acquittal of the lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking
reconsideration of the ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt operate as res
judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct.
19


Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures.
Contempt of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas
disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.
20


IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E.
Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation
of this judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that further similar
misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.

SO ORDERED.













A.M. No. RTJ-09-2198
*
January 18, 2011
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO L. LEONIDA, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27,
STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case at bench stemmed from a judicial audit and inventory of pending cases
conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna (Branch 27, Sta. Cruz), and in Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City (Branch
74, Malabon).
84
The audits were conducted because respondent Judge Leonardo L. Leonida (Judge
Leonida) applied for Optional Retirement effective July 5, 2008. Judge Leonida was the presiding
judge of Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, from October 1997 until his retirement and was detailed as assisting
judge of Branch 74, Malabon.
On May 21, 2009, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez issued a Memorandum
1
on the audit
teams findings, among which are:
1) As of audit date, March 5 and 6, 2009, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz had a total caseload of 507
cases consisting of 280 criminal cases and 227 civil cases based on the records actually
presented to, and examined by, the audit team.
2) Out of the total number of pending criminal cases, no further action was taken after
varying considerable periods of time in 14 cases.
2

3) Pending incidents and motions filed by parties in 8 criminal cases
3
were left unresolved
for more than one (1) year in 3 cases, and three months in 2 cases.
4) Twenty-nine (29) criminal cases
4
submitted for decision, the earliest in 2001, were
undecided.
5) Of the 227 civil cases lodged in the court, no setting for hearing and no further action
was taken on 46 cases.
5

6) Twenty-four (24) civil cases
6
have pending motions/incidents awaiting resolution, the
earliest since 2002.
7) Fifty-seven (57) civil cases
7
submitted for decision from 2000 to 2009 were undecided at
the time of the audit.
8) In the course of the audit in Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, several records of criminal cases were
found to be incomplete. The records were not paginated. Certificates of arraignment,
minutes of hearings and notices of hearing were missing from the files.
9) The record of one case, Criminal Case No. 12178,
8
an appealed case submitted for
resolution, is missing and is in the possession of Judge Leonida as per certification issued by
Atty. Bernadette Platon, the Branch Clerk of Court.
9

Regarding Branch 74, Malabon City, the OCA also looked into the Monthly Report of Cases
submitted by said branch for August-October 2008 and January-March 2008 and noted that 95
criminal cases and 18 civil cases were submitted for decision.
10
Considering that Judge Leonida
applied for Optional Retirement effective July 5, 2008, he should have decided 91 of the 95
submitted criminal cases and 16 of the 18 submitted civil cases.
In sum, Judge Leonida failed to decide 102 criminal cases and 43 civil cases both in Branch 27 and
Branch 74, and failed to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases in Branch 27.
The same report bears the recommendations of the OCA that were eventually adopted by the
Court in a Resolution dated July 29, 2009,
11
to wit:
(1) RE-DOCKET the judicial audit report as an administrative complaint against former
Judge Leonardo L. Leonida for gross incompetence and inefficiency;
(2) REQUIRE Judge Leonida to MANIFEST whether he is willing to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted, within ten (10)
days from notice;
(3) DIRECT:
(a) Hon. Jaime C. Blancaflor, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna to:
(1) TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on Criminal Case Nos. xxx which are
without further action for a considerable length of time;
85
(2) RESOLVE with dispatch the pending incidents/motions in Criminal Case
Nos. xxx and furnish the Court, through the OCA, a copy of the
resolution/order within ten (10) days from issuance/resolution thereof; and
(3) DECIDE with dispatch Criminal Case Nos. xxx and Furnish the Court,
through the OCA, a copy of the decision within ten (10) days from its
promulgation; and
(b) Atty. Bernadette Platon, Branch Clerk of Court, to:
(1) APPRISE the Acting Presiding Judge, from time to time, of cases
submitted for resolution/decision and those cases that require immediate
action;
(2) ORDER the stitching of all orders issued, minutes taken, notices of
hearing issued, certificates of arraignment in all appropriate case folders
especially those jointly tried, including their chronological arrangement and
pagination as well as the proofreading of all orders and notices; and
(3) SUBMIT report of compliance therewith to this Court within fifteen (15)
days from notice.
On October 4, 2009, Judge Leonida filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Manifest
and Memorandum.
12
He cited the short period compounded by the typhoons and floods which
ravaged Manila as his reason for requesting an additional period of twenty (20) days within which
to file the same. In its October 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court noted Judge Leonidas motion.
On October 22, 2009, Judge Leonida filed a Manifest and Memorandum
13
expressing his
willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings. He explained that he failed to
finalize and promulgate cases pending in his sala because of the severely clogged docket of Branch
74. With an overwhelming number of more than 1,000 cases, he calendared an average of 30
cases daily in order to "keep all the cases moving." According to Judge Leonida, "the court
sessions together with the preparation/correction/review of the orders in the cases set for hearing
almost ate up" his time as a judge. The fact that Branch 74, a commercial court, was still included
in the raffle of regular cases exacerbated the situation. Voluminous pleadings requiring extensive
dissection and research, and cases involving numerous intervenors who raised different and
complex issues, made matters much more difficult that he even had to conduct hearings on
applications for search and seizures until nighttime. Judge Leonida further claimed that his work
encroached upon the time he had to devote to his wife and eight children. Finally, the
reconstruction and review of case records submerged in flood waters added up to his struggle to
expedite the disposition of cases assigned to his court.
Anent the missing record in Branch 27, Judge Leonida alleged that the case was raffled to said
branch long after he assumed the position of Assisting Judge of Branch 74; that he neither saw nor
had possession of the said record; and that there was no reason for him to take the record
anywhere. He pleaded for compassion and leniency from the Court, invoking his unblemished
record in government service for twenty-three (23) years. He likewise offered his sincere apologies
to those who were prejudiced.
In its evaluation of the charges against Judge Leonida, the OCA recommended that for his failure
to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases; decide eleven (11) criminal cases, and twenty-
seven (27) civil cases in Branch 27, and to decide ninety-one (91) criminal cases and
sixteen (16) civil cases in Branch 74, he be found guilty of gross incompetency and inefficiency,
and fined the amount of P50,000.00 pesos to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
The recommendations of the OCA are well-taken.
Precedents have shown that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period
warrants administrative sanction. The Court treats such cases with utmost rigor for any delay in
86
the administration of justice; no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy
disposition of his case.
14
Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice; it undermines the
peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
15

No less than Section 15 (1), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that all cases or matters
filed before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within three (3) months from the date of
submission. The prescribed period is a firm mandatory rule for the efficient administration of
justice and not merely one for indulgent tweaking.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays
and for the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.
16
In the same vein, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
emphatic in enjoining judges to administer justice without delay by disposing of the courts
business promptly and deciding cases within the period prescribed by law.
Corollary to this, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, requires all judges to
scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, because failure
to comply therewith violates the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of the
cases.
17
Only in certain meritorious cases, that is, those involving difficult questions of law or
complex issues, may a longer period to decide the case be allowed but only upon proper
application for extension of the period has been made by the concerned judge.
18

Judge Leonida was clearly remiss in his duties as a judge for he did not take the above
constitutional command to heart. Neither did he observe the above rules which have encapsulated
the Courts strict message: "the need and the imperative" for judges to promptly and expeditiously
decide cases including all incidents therein.
19
In this case, the findings of the OCA showed that
Judge Leonida failed to decide a considerable number of cases: (102) criminal cases and forty-
three (43) civil cases. Judge Leonida openly admitted his culpability in the delay of disposition of
cases.
His proffered explanation is unacceptable given the ample period that he had. He cannot take
refuge behind the common excuse of heavy caseload to justify his failure to decide and resolve
cases promptly. He could have asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to dipose of
the cases but did not.
Due to his inefficiency, the constitutional right of parties to a speedy trial was violated out of
neglect. Instead of justice wrought by efficient and competent handling of judicial business, the
lower courts handled and assisted by Judge Leonida produced unnecessary financial strain, not to
mention physical and emotional anxiety, to litigants. Delay derails the administration of justice. It
postpones the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly prosecuted. It crowds the
dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to take short cuts,
interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of those cases in which all parties are
diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall of disorganization
and insolubility. More than these, possibilities for error in fact-finding multiply rapidly between the
original fact and its judicial determination as time elapses. If the facts are not fully and accurately
determined, even the wisest judge cannot distinguish between merit and demerit. If courts do not
get the facts right, there is little chance for their judgment to be right.
20

The Court has always considered a judges delay in deciding cases within the prescribed period of
three months as gross inefficiency.
21
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/am_03-7-
170-mctc_2009.html - fntUndue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the
court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary. The raison d' etre of courts lies not only in properly
dispensing justice but also in being able to do so seasonably.
22

87
Aside from the delay in deciding the reported cases, the audit findings likewise show that the case
records/rollo in Branch 27 were not chronologically arranged. Certificates of arraignment, minutes
of hearings and notices of hearing were unsigned by the accused and his/her counsel, or worse,
missing from the files. Judge Leonida was asked to explain the whereabouts of the case records of
Criminal Case No. 12178. His bare denial however, does not overcome the fair conclusion that
Section 14 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court
23
was not observed. The expectation directed at
judges to exercise utmost diligence and care in handling the records of cases was certainly not
met, or at least approximated.
The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be able to comply fully
and faithfully with the task set before them.
24
As frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should,
at all times, act with efficiency and with probity. They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to the
law, but likewise to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence must be their
guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the
public reposed on them and the institution they represent.
25

Therefore, as recommended by the OCA after a thorough judicial audit and considering the
unrebutted audit reports on record, proper sanctions must be imposed. The penalty imposed for
undue delay in deciding cases varies in each case: from fine, suspension, suspension and fine, and
even dismissal, depending mainly on the number of cases left undecided within the reglementary
period, and other factors, such as the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the
health and the age of the judge.
26

The Court agrees with the OCA that the total number of cases which Judge Leonida failed to timely
decide or act on warrants a fine higher than that prescribed by the rules. In Lugares v. Judge
Gutierrez-Torres,
27
the defaulting judge who was found guilty of gross inefficiency for her undue
delay in resolving cases submitted for decision for a number of years was dismissed from the
service.
In view of Judge Leonidas retirement on July 5, 2008, the only penalty that the Court can impose
against him is a fine, pursuant to the rule that the retirement of a judge does not release him from
liability incurred while in the active service.lavvphil
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Leonardo Leonida, former Presiding Judge of
Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and Assisting Judge in Branch 74, Regional
Trial Court, Malabon City,GUILTY of gross incompetence and gross inefficiency for failure to
decide one hundred two (102) criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases for which he
is FINED P50,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits.
Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and Atty.
Bernadette Platon, Branch Clerk of Court, are hereby ordered to report on their respective
compliance with the orders of the Court contained in its July 29, 2009 Order, within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof. The Court notes that, in its February 10, 2010 Resolution, Judge Blancaflor
was granted a non-extendible period of sixty (60) to comply with its July 29, 2009 Order.
Judge Blancaflor is hereby ordered to cause the reconstitution of Criminal Case No. 12178 within
three (3) months from receipt hereof and to report his compliance thereon within ten (10) days
from completion.
Atty. Bernadette Platon is hereby ordered to include the status of said case in her Monthly Report
of Cases.
SO ORDERED.




88
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189 January 18, 2011
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2837-RTJ)
VICTORIANO SY, Complainant,
vs.
Judge OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal City, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
We resolve in this Decision the Verified Complaint, dated March 11, 2008,
1
filed by Victoriano Sy
against Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato, for Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary and for Gross Ignorance of the Law,
in relation to Civil Case No. 1403-24, entitled Sps. Victoriano Sy and Loreta Sy v. Metrobank, for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage, and Misc. Case No. 1440-
24, entitled Metrobank v. Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
The Antecedents Facts
The facts are set out in the memorandum/report, dated May 25, 2009,
2
of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), and are summarized below.
The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) was the mortgagee in good faith and for
value of twenty-three (23) parcels of land all located in Koronadal City. The mortgagors were
Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. and/or Sps. Victoriano Sy
and Loreta Cabaies-Sy and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas.
Metrobank foreclosed the mortgage for violation of the terms and conditions of the mortgage
agreement. At the public auction on August 31, 1998, the mortgaged parcels of land were sold to
Metrobank as the highest bidder. Metrobank was issued a certificate of sale which was registered
on September 18, 1998 with the Register of Deeds of South Cotabato. The mortgagors failed to
redeem the 23 parcels of land within the redemption period.
Thereafter, Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc.
filed with the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided over by Judge Dinopol, a complaint against
Metrobank for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage, Extrajudicial
Foreclosure Proceedings and Certificate of Sale, with Damages and Attorneys Fees and with prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, docketed as
Civil Case No. 1403-24.
On April 16, 2004, Judge Dinopol inhibited himself from further acting on the case
3
on the ground
that he received a call, on April 12, 2004, from a ranking officer of the Philippine Judicial Academy,
interceding in behalf of the defendant bank and an earlier call (July 2003) from a ranking
personnel of the OCA, appealing in behalf of the plaintiffs. He claimed he wanted to avoid being
charged with partiality either way he acted on the case.
On September 15, 2005, Metrobank filed with the RTC, South Cotabato, a Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Possession over the parcels of land subject of the foreclosed mortgage against
Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc., and/or Sps. Victoriano and
Loreta Sy, and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas, docketed as Misc. Case No. 1440-24,
4
and
assigned to the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided by Judge Dinopol.
On July 13, 2006, Judge Dinopol issued an Order granting the petition,
5
and issued the writ of
possession on July 21, 2006.
6

Meanwhile, or on May 22, 2006, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. filed with the
RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, a petition, entitled In the Matter of: Petition for the Declaration of
State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan, docketed as Corp.
Case No. 1585-06.
7

89
On June 26, 2006, the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, issued an Order
8
staying the enforcement of all
claims against the debtor, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable with the debtor. The
same court subsequently approved the rehabilitation plan.
In the meantime, Sheriff Conrado B. Dapulang, Jr. proceeded to implement the writ of possession
issued by Judge Dinopol, but it was returned unsatisfied in view of the stay order issued by the
RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, in Corp. Case No. 1585-06.
9

Consequently, the respondents in Misc. Case No. 1440-24 filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
due to the issuance of the stay order and the approval of the rehabilitation plan by the
Rehabilitation Court, and a motion for inhibition on grounds of bias and partiality on the part of
Judge Dinopol. Judge Dinopol denied the motions in an Order dated February 11, 2008, and
directed Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Publico to re-implement the writ of execution of July 31, 2006.
10

Shortly thereafter, Sy filed the present administrative complaint
11
charging Judge Dinopol of gross
ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Sy alleged in his complaint that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 (in which he and his wife sought the
declaration of nullity of the foreclosure proceedings against Metrobank) was pending before Judge
Dinopols sala, the judge inhibited himself from acting on the case. This notwithstanding, and to
Sys surprise, Judge Dinopol still handled Misc. Case No. 1440-24, a petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession filed by Metrobank, a matter closely intertwined with Civil Case No. 1403-24.
Judge Dinopol then issued an order granting Metrobank the right to possess the foreclosed
properties.
12

Sy further alleged that despite the issuance by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, of a stay
order
13
and the approval of the rehabilitation plan, as well as the pendency of Metrobanks petition
before the Court of Appeals (CA) Twenty-Third Division in Cagayan De Oro City (CA G.R. SP No.
01824) assailing the validity of the stay order, Judge Dinopol ordered that the writ of possession
be implemented.
14

Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
Sy claimed in relation with his charge that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 was pending in Judge
Dinopols sala, the judge asked him for commodity loans in the form of construction materials to
be used in the construction of the judges house. The transaction was evidenced by delivery
receipt no. 15178 (March 8, 2005),
15
and charge invoices no. 9817 (March 8, 2005)
for P16,000.00,
16
no. 9826 (March 9, 2005) for P850.00,
17
and no. 9838 (March 10, 2005)
for P780.00.
18

Sy further claimed that aside from the commodity loans, Judge Dinopol obtained cash loans from
him on various occasions between December 2, 2005 to July 14, 2006, in the total amount
of P121,000.00, and Judge Dinopol borrowed from him his Suzuki Multi-cab and returned it after
the judge was suspended in September 2007. Sy presented disbursement vouchers, official
receipts and an acknowledgement to prove his claim.
19

Judge Dinopols Comment
In a 1st indorsement dated March 18, 2008,
20
the OCA required Judge Dinopol to comment on the
complaint, which he did on April 21, 2008.
21

Judge Dinopol denied Sys accusations. He stressed that he inhibited himself from Civil Case No.
1403-24 on April 16, 2004 and had not acted on the case since then; nobody intervened and
pleaded in behalf of Metrobank after Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed. He was not aware nor had
he been given notice that Metrobank filed a petition before the CA (CA G.R. SP No. 01824), nor did
he receive any order from the appellate tribunal enjoining him to desist from performing or acting
on the incidents pending in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
90
Judge Dinopol denied that he committed any breach of procedural rules that could be
characterized as gross ignorance of the basic rules of civil procedures. He maintained that Sy did
not allege any specific actuations of deceit, malice or intent to cause injury to Sy, and that he had
acted fairly and objectively. He added that he observed the requirements of the Code of
Professional Responsibility as a lawyer, relative to his handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
With respect to the alleged accommodations he received from Sy at the time his house was under
construction, Judge Dinopol claimed that when he obtained the commodity loans from Sy in March
2005, he had already inhibited himself from handling Civil Case No. 1403-24; he did so on April 16,
2004. He explained that Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed only on September 15, 2005, and was
assigned to his sala on September 22, 2005. He denied that he received from Sy cash loans in the
amount of P121,000.00. He also denied borrowing Sys Suzuki Multi-cab and claimed that it was
Rogelio Villanueva who borrowed it.
Judge Dinopol countered that it was Sy who acted with sinister design and employed deceit and
cunning to frustrate the administration of justice in the cases he handled.
In a Resolution dated July 15, 2009, the Court resolved to: (1) note Sys complaint and Judge
Dinopols answer/comment; (2) re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative matter; and
(3) require the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the matter for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings. The Court also noted the OCA Report dated May 25, 2009,
22
which
found no basis for the charge of ignorance of the law on the part of Judge Dinopol, but found him
liable for conduct unbecoming a judge.
The Courts Ruling
The OCA evaluation is well-founded. Judge Dinopol cannot be disciplined for ignorance of the law
and of procedure in his handling of Civil Case No. 1403-24 (for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage) filed by Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy against Metrobank, as he
inhibited himself from the case, nor in his handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-24 (Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession) filed by Metrobank against Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., because of
the essential nature of the proceeding itself.
In issuing the writ of possession and in directing its re-implementation when it was returned
unsatisfied the first time it was enforced, Judge Dinopol acted in accordance with the rules and
jurisprudence on the matter.
As the Court held in Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera, Inc.,
23
the proceeding in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary in nature. It is brought
for the benefit of one party only and may be granted even without notice to the mortgagor, in this
case, complainant Sy. Moreover, the duty of the court to grant a writ of possession is a ministerial
function. The court does not exercise its official discretion or judgment.
24
Judge Dinopol, before
whom the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed, had no discretion on whether
to issue the writ of possession or not. It cannot be said, therefore, that Judge Dinopol exposed
himself or exhibited bias in favor of Metrobank when he issued the writ of possession.
Further, regardless of whether there is a pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to
the eventual outcome of the annulment case. Once the writ of possession is issued, the trial court
has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay.
25

From another perspective, a stay order only affects claims filed against the assets and properties
belonging to a debtor. Properties that have already been foreclosed, and those whose titles have
already passed on to the winning bidder are no longer considered properties of the debtor.
26
In
such case, it is a ministerial duty on the part of the trial court to grant a possessory writ over the
foreclosed properties.
27

91
Clearly, Judge Dinopol was well within his authority and committed no impropriety in directing the
re-implementation of the writ of execution in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
On the other hand, we cannot say the same thing with regard to Sys charge of conduct
unbecoming against Judge Dinopol. The latters denial of having committed the acts complained of
flies in the face of indications in the records and documentary evidence that he obtained
commodity loans from Sy in the form of building materials for the construction of his house in
Koronadal City. There was also Sys claim of cash loans to Judge Dinopol on various occasions,
between December 2, 2005 and July 14, 2006, amounting to P121,000.00, as well as the loan of
Sys Suzuki Multi-cab to the Judge.
The commodity loans were evidenced by receipts
28
indicating delivery of construction materials to
Judge Dinopols residence. The cash loans appear to have been covered by disbursement
vouchers,
29
and the borrowed multicab is the subject of an "acknowledgement"
30
from Judge
Dinopols driver Rogelio Villanueva.
There is substantial evidence showing that Judge Dinopol obtained the commodity loans from Sy.
The judge himself admitted that he wrote Sy, on March 4, 2005, regarding the purchase of
materials for his house which was then under construction, although he claimed that it was his
wife who transacted with Sy and it was Sy himself who offered to deliver the materials to his
residence.
31
Judge Dinopol pleaded innocence regarding the commodity loans or even the cash
loans saying that the transaction with Sy regarding the construction materials occurred when there
was no case pending in his sala where Sy was a party.
The above disclaimer notwithstanding, we find Judge Dinopol to have committed a serious
impropriety in his or his familys financial or business dealings with Sy.
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to a judges impartiality provides, inter
alia, as follows:
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and the judiciary.
Sec. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions
on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
Judge Dinopol violated the above provisions when he received accommodations from Sy for the
building materials he needed for the construction of his house. He compromised his position as a
judge. Although at the time he and his family had business dealings with Sy there was no pending
case involving the businessman, he should have been more circumspect in securing the
construction materials. The sphere of Sys business operations was within his territorial jurisdiction.
As the OCA aptly noted, "it is neither impossible nor remote that a case might be filed in his court
with complainant as a party. In such a case, his (respondent) business and financial dealings with
complainant would create a doubt about his fairness and impartiality in deciding the case and
would tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the court."
32

In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol also violated Section 1 of Canon 1, Canon 2 and Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 1 of Canon 1 highlights the independence of a judge in performing his official duties, thus:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment
of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any
extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any
quarter or for any reason.
Canon 2 requires a judge to promote integrity in the discharge of his official functions:
Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
92
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Moreover, Canon 4 mandates a judge to observe and maintain proper decorum and its appearance
in his public office:
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
By his own admissions, Judge Dinopol failed to observe these ethical standards. In his
Answer/Comment, Judge Dinopol admitted that he talked with Sy on several occasions to discuss
Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
33
Judge Dinopol also admitted that Sy, in at least two instances,
requested him to delay the resolution of the writ of possession.
34
Judge Dinopols actions no doubt
created the inference that at some point, he acceded to Sys requests to delay the proceedings.
This conclusion, is in fact, bolstered by Judge Dinopols knowledge that the counsel for Metrobank
was instructed to immediately secure the order for the issuance of the writ of
possession.
35
Regardless of the representations allegedly made to him by Sy, Judge Dinopol should
have immediately issued the writ of possession in Metrobanks favor.
From these inappropriate actions, we find that Judge Dinopol compromised not only his impartiality
in handling Misc. Case No. 1440-24 but also his independence and integrity as a judge. His actions
no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge. His actions gave the
public the impression and the appearance that he can be influenced by extraneous factors - other
than the legal arguments and the court evidence in discharging his judicial functions.
In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol committed impropriety in talking with litigants outside court
proceedings. His improper conduct was further aggravated by the fact that these conversations
took place in the absence of the opposing litigants and/or the opposing counsel. In Agustin v.
Mercado,
36
we declared that employees of the court have no business meeting with litigants or
their representatives under any circumstance. In Re: Affidavit of Frankie N. Calabines,
37
the Court
minced no words in explaining that such unethical conduct constitutes "a brazen and outrageous
betrayal of public trust."
38
The Court further declared in the said case:
x x x The Court cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those
who are in the service of the judiciary. x x x
The image of a court as a bastion of justice depends to a large extent on the personal and official
conduct of its employees. Thus, from the judge to the lowest clerk, judicial personnel have the
sacred duty to maintain the good name of the Judiciary.
All employees in the judiciary should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency. As
officers of the court and agents of the law, they must discharge their duties with due care and
utmost diligence. Any conduct they exhibit tending to diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary will not be condoned.
39

Certainly, these responsibilities become more exacting when one occupies the position of a judge.
Time and again, we have emphasized that judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner
that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system.
40
The New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or
partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the Judiciary.
41
These standards apply not only to
the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.
42

Without a doubt, Judge Dinopol is liable for gross misconduct in office and deserves to be
sanctioned under the above findings. His track record as a judge, in this regard, is far from
93
exemplary.1wphi1 He is a repeat offender, as demonstrated by the following cases where we
penalized him for questionable conduct:
First, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969 decided on June 15, 2006, Judge Dinopol was found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and was fined P20,000.00.
43

Second, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2020 decided on September 20, 2006, he was found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and abuse of authority, and was fined P20,000.00.
44

Third, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2003 decided on August 23, 2007, he was found liable for undue delay
in rendering a decision or order and for violating the clear provisions of A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC, and
was fined P11,000.00.
45

Fourth, in A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2173-RTJ decided on August 28, 2006, he was strongly
admonished, even as the complainant desisted from pursuing the complaint against the judge for
gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and discretion.
46

And more recently, in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2052 decided on March 30, 2009, Judge Dinopol had been
reminded and warned against entertaining litigants outside court premises.
47

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct constituting a violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious charge. Under Section 11 of the same Rule, the respondent
found guilty of a serious charge may be meted any of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to any public office;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering his repeated infractions and numerous breaches of the standard ethical conduct
demanded of judges, we find Judge Dinopol unfit to discharge the functions of a judge. We impose
upon him the severest penalty of dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
48

Lastly, as we sanction Judge Dinopol, we remind the members of the bench that:
[a]lthough every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the [J]udiciary. A
magistrate of the law must compose himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official
and otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the
epitome of integrity and justice.
49

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
Koronadal City, is declared GUILTY OF GROSS MISCONDUCT and is hereby DISMISSED from
the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
his re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.




A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734 January 19, 2011
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-1933-MTJ]
FLORENDA V. TOBIAS, Complainant,
vs.
94
JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by complainant Florenda V. Tobias
against respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. Complainant charged
respondent with corruption for allegedly offering "package deals" to litigants who plan to file cases
in his court.
In her verified Complaint
1
dated June 6, 2007, complainant alleged that respondent Judge
Limsiaco, Jr. offers "package deals" for cases filed in the court where he presides. She stated that
sometime in June 2006, she requested her sister, Lorna V. Vollmer, to inquire from the Fourth
MCTC of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental about the requirements needed in
filing an ejectment case. Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero
2
allegedly proposed to Vollmer
that for the sum of P30,000.00, respondent would provide the lawyer, prepare the necessary
pleadings, and ensure a favorable decision in the ejectment case which they contemplated to file
against the spouses Raymundo and Francisca Batalla. Fegidero allegedly required them to pay the
initial amount of P10,000.00 and the remaining balance would be paid in the course of the
proceedings. It was made clear that they would not get any judicial relief from their squatter
problem unless they accepted the package deal.
Further, complainant alleged that on June 23, 2006, Lorna Vollmer, accompanied by Salvacion
Fegidero, delivered the amount of P10,000.00 to respondent at his residence. Subsequently, an
ejectment case was filed in respondents court, entitled Reynold V. Tobias, represented by his
Attorneyin-fact Lorna V. Vollmer v. Spouses Raymundo Batalla and Francisca Batalla, docketed as
Civil Case No. 06-007-V.
3
Respondent allegedly assigned a certain Atty. Robert G. Juanillo to
represent the complainant in the ejectment case. Complainant stated that respondent, however,
immediately demanded for an additional payment of P10,000.00. She allegedly refused to give the
additional amount and earned the ire of respondent. She asked her sister, Lorna Vollmer, to
request Atty. Robert Juanillo to voluntarily withdraw as counsel,
4
which he did on April 16, 2007.
Complainant also asked Vollmer to withdraw the case.
5
Respondent granted the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel on April 23, 2007 and the Motion to Withdraw Case on May 3, 2007.
6

In his Comment,
7
respondent denounced the allegation that he offers "package deals" to
prospective litigants as malicious, baseless and a lie. He denied that he demanded from
complainant the additional payment ofP10,000.00. He alleged that he does not know complainant
and she is a total stranger to him.
Respondent attached to his Comment the Affidavit
8
dated September 29, 2007 of Atty. Robert G.
Juanillo, who stated therein that he received as counsel of the complainant in the ejectment case
the sum of P10,000.00 from complainants sister, Lorna Vollmer. From the P10,000.00, he paid
filing fees and miscellaneous fees in the amount of P3,707.00, while the remaining balance
of P6,293.00 was paid to him for his services, consisting of the preparation and filing of the
complaint for ejectment, including acceptance fee.
Respondent also attached to his Comment the Affidavit
9
dated September 29, 2007 of Court
Stenographer Salvacion B. Fegidero, denying the allegation that she offered a "package deal" to
complainants sister, Lorna Vollmer. She declared that the allegations of complainant were
malicious and unfair, and that complainant and her sister could have been misled by some people
who lost cases in the said court.
Meanwhile, the ejectment case was assigned to Judge Herminigildo S. Octaviano, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Bago City, Negros Occidental, in view of respondents inhibition on July 30, 2007.
10

95
On February 20, 2008, the Court issued a Resolution,
11
which noted the Report of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) on the complaint against respondent. Due to the conflicting allegations
of the parties, the OCA opined that a formal investigation was necessary to afford the parties
opportunity to substantiate their respective claims and to determine the alleged participation of
court employee Salvacion Fegidero. Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the
complaint to Executive Judge Frances V. Guanzon, Regional Trial Court, Bago City, Negros
Occidental for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt thereof.
On May 20, 2008, the parties were summoned for a formal investigation before Investigating
Judge Frances V. Guanzon. Those who appeared before the Investigating Judge were complainant
Florenda V. Tobias, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., Court Stenographer Salvacion
Fegidero and respondents witness, Atty. Robert Juanillo. Complainants witness, Lorna Vollmer, did
not attend the investigation, because per information of complainant, Vollmer was in Germany and
she was expected to be back in the country in December 2008.
In his Report dated June 2, 2008, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that complainant testified
that it was her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who informed her about the alleged "package deal" through
long distance telephone call. Complainant testified that she met Salvacion Fegidero only after the
filing of the instant administrative complaint and that she did not talk with her even
once.
12
Complainant further claimed that she had no personal dealings with respondent or with
Salvacion Fegidero, and that she met respondent only after the filing of the ejectment case.
13

Moreover, complainant testified that respondent neither personally received from her the initial
payment ofP10,000.00 for the alleged package deal nor personally asked from her for an additional
payment ofP10,000.00.
14
It was her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who told her through telephone about
the demand for an additional P10,000.00, but she (complainant) did not send the money.
15

Complainant testified that she was the one who went to the house of Atty. Robert Juanillo,
bringing with her the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel prepared by respondent for Atty. Juanillo to
sign.
16

Respondent and Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero categorically denied the accusation that
they had a package deal with Lorna Vollmer. Respondent testified that he met and talked with
Vollmer when she went to his court to inquire about the filing of an ejectment case against the
spouses Raymundo and Francisca Batalla. Respondent advised Vollmer that since there was no
lawyer in Valladolid, Negros Occidental, she had to choose the nearest town lawyer as it would
lessen expenses in transportation and appearance fee, and respondent mentioned the name of
Atty. Robert Juanillo.
17
Moreover, respondent testified that Vollmer, together with her husband and
Salvacion Fegidero, went to his house once to ask him for the direction to the house of Atty.
Robert Juanillo. Respondent denied that he received the amount of P10,000.00 from Vollmer.
18

Further, respondent testified that he met with complainant after the ejectment case was filed,
when she went to his court and told him that she was withdrawing the services of Atty. Robert
Juanillo. Respondent admitted that he prepared the motion for the withdrawal of appearance of
Atty. Juanillo, since respondent wanted to help complainant as she said it was urgent, but
respondent did not charge her.
19

Atty. Robert Juanillo testified that he received the amount of P10,000.00 from Lorna Vollmer at the
Municipal Court of Valladolid, Negros Occidental. From the amount, he paid filing fees amounting
to P3,707.00 to the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Court of Valladolid-Pulupandan and San
Enrique, which payment was evidenced by five official receipts. Atty. Juanillo testified that the
balance of P6,293.00 was payment for his legal services.
Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero denied that she was involved in the alleged package deal
complained of by Florenda Tobias. She testified that she met Lorna Vollmer for the first time when
Vollmer went to the court in Villadolid and asked if there was a lawyer in Valladolid, because she
96
was intending to file an ejectment suit. She referred Vollmer to respondent Judge Limsiaco, since
there was no lawyer in the Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental. The courtroom of
Valladolid, Negros Occidental consists only of one room where everybody holds office, including
respondent. She saw respondent talk with Vollmer for 15 minutes, but she did not hear what they
were talking about.
20

Investigating Judge Guanzon found that the complainant did not have personal knowledge of the
alleged "package deals" to litigants who file cases in the court of respondent. The allegations in the
Complaint were all based on the information relayed to complainant though telephone by her
sister, Lorna Vollmer. During the investigation, complainant admitted that respondent did not
personally receive from her the amount of P10,000.00 as payment for the alleged package deal,
and respondent did not ask from her an additional P10,000.00.
According to Investigating Judge Guanzon, the only person who could have shed light on the
alleged offer of package deals to litigants was Lorna Vollmer, complainants sister. Unfortunately,
Vollmer was not present during the investigation. Per manifestation of complainant, Vollmer was
then in Germany and she was expected to return to the Philippines in December 2008. Hence, the
complaint of corruption was unsubstantiated.
Nevertheless, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that although the alleged offer of package deals
by respondent to litigants was unsubstantiated, it was improper for respondent to talk to
prospective litigants in his court and to recommend lawyers to handle cases. Likewise, Judge
Guanzon found respondents act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert
Juanillo to be improper and unethical.
Investigating Judge Guanzon recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against
respondent as regards the alleged offer of package deals to litigants who plan to file cases in his
court. However, Judge Guanzon recommended that respondent be reprimanded for talking to a
prospective litigant in his court, recommending the counsel to handle the case, and preparing the
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which pleading was filed in respondents
court and was acted upon by him.
In a Resolution dated August 4, 2008, the Court referred the Report of Investigating Judge
Guanzon to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation within 30 days from notice.
The OCA found respondents acts, consisting of (1) advising Lorna Vollmer about the ejectment
case she was about to file before his court; (2) recommending Atty. Robert Juanillo as counsel of
the complainant in the ejectment case; and (3) helping complainant to prepare the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel, to be violative of the rules on integrity,
21
impartiality,
22
and
propriety
23
contained in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA
recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent
be found guilty of gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and
be fined in the amount of P20,000.00.
In a Resolution dated February 25, 2009, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they
were willing to submit the case for decision, on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and
submitted, within 10 days from notice.
On August 18, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution resolving to inform the parties that they are
deemed to have submitted the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records already
filed and submitted, considering that they have not submitted their respective manifestations
required in the Resolution dated February 25, 2009, despite receipt thereof on April 1, 2010.
The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Judge Guanzon that complainant failed to
prove by substantial evidence her allegation that respondent offers "package deals" to prospective
litigants in his court.
97
However, the investigation revealed that respondent committed acts unbecoming of a judge, in
particular, talking to a prospective litigant in his court, recommending a lawyer to the litigant, and
preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which pleading was filed in
his court and was acted upon by him. The conduct of a judge should be beyond reproach and
reflective of the integrity of his office. Indeed, as stated by the OCA, the said acts of respondent
violate Section 1 of Canon 2 (Integrity), Section 2 of Canon 3 (Impartiality), and Section 1 of
Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
24
thus:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
x x x x
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
x x x x
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.
The aforementioned acts of respondent constitute gross misconduct. "Misconduct" means a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or
wrong behavior.
25
"Gross" has been defined as "out of all measure, beyond allowance; flagrant;
shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."
26
Respondents act of preparing the Motion to
Withdraw the Appearance of Atty. Juanillo as counsel of complainant is inexcusable. In so doing,
respondent exhibited improper conduct that tarnished the integrity and impartiality of his court,
considering that the said motion was filed in his own sala and was acted upon by him.1avvphi1
Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious charge under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
27
Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the
sanctions against a respondent guilty of a serious charge may be any of the following:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided, however, That the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
98
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In imposing the proper sanction against respondent, the Court takes note that respondent had
been found guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. MTJ-03-1509
28
and was fined P20,000.00, with
a warning against repetition of the same or similar act. Moreover, per verification from court
records, respondent compulsorily retired from the service on May 17, 2009.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., former Presiding Judge of the Fourth
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, is found
GUILTY of gross misconduct for which he is FINED in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00). The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to deduct the fine of P25,000.00
from the retirement benefits due to Judge Limsiaco, Jr.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.












A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139 August 9, 2010
MICHAEL B. BELEN, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, Branch
36, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge
filed by Michael B. Belen against Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch 36.
The Facts
Complainant Michael B. Belen filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court, charging Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen with
grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. According to complainant,
1
sometime
in March 2004, respondent judge filed a case for Estafa against complainants father, Nezer D.
Belen, but the same was dismissed for lack of probable cause by Assistant City Prosecutor Ma.
Victoria Sunega-Lagman in a Resolution dated 28 July 2004. Respondent judge filed an Omnibus
Motion (For Reconsideration and Disqualif[ication]) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San
Pablo City, alleging, inter alia, that Sunega-Lagman was always absent during the hearings in the
preliminary investigation in the estafa case. Respondent judge likewise filed a complaint for
disciplinary action against Sunega-Lagman before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline, docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1700. To refute the allegations of respondent
judge against Sunega-Lagman, complainant executed an Affidavit dated 19 May 2006, which was
99
submitted by Sunega-Lagman as evidence in the CBD case. Complainants Affidavit stated that the
allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman were "false"; that Sunega-Lagman was
present during the preliminary investigation hearings dated 14, 21 and 29 April 2004, and that she
was absent only once, on 6 May 2004, when she was already on maternity leave; and that it was
respondent judge who was absent during the hearings.
2

Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the
filing of several cases against the latter. On 11 January 2007, at 10:00 in the morning, complainant
received a mobile phone text message from the caretaker of his piggery, informing him that
respondent judge arrived and was taking pictures of the piggery. Complainant rushed to the area
and saw respondent judge, accompanied by the Municipal Agriculturist and Sanitary Inspector and
the Barangay Chairman, inspecting complainants piggery.
Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government authorities and
employees, requesting information on complainants piggery and poultry business; advising them
of the alleged violations by the complainant of the National Building Code and certain
environmental laws; and reminding the local government authorities of their duty to forestall the
issuance of municipal clearance and license to complainants business establishment. We
enumerate these letters below.
3

1. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of Alaminos, Laguna,
requesting confirmation of the issuance by said office of construction, building and
occupancy permits to "Michael B. Belens Piggery and Poultry in Brgy. IV and House in Sta.
Rosa," and stating that non-compliance with, or violation of the National Building Code is a
criminal offense;
4

2. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of
Alaminos, Laguna, referring to respondent judges previous letter dated 15 January 2007;
citing provisions of the National Building Code on Building Use Affecting Health and Safety
(Sec. 1.01.05), Building Permits (Sec. 1.02.03), and Inspection and Certificates of
Occupancy (Sec. 1.02.05); and stating: "These statutory provisions are mandatory and any
violation thereof is subject to appropriate legal sanctions. Thus, in accordance with the
National Building Code and Code of Conduct of Public Officers that mandates action and
reply to any complaint within 15 days from receipt, may I know your official action and reply
on the matter";
5

3. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna,
expressing his appreciation of the "immediate action" taken by the mayor in relation to the
inspection of the piggery and poultry business establishment of complainant; enumerating
the environmental laws violated by the complainant, i.e., Sec. 8 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 984, Section 3 of PD 953, Section 48 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9003, Section 49 of PD
1152, and Section 27 of Resolution No. 33, Series of 1996; stating that "With the violations
of the owner and his farm workers, appropriate criminal actions shall be instituted against
them;" and reminding the mayor that municipal officers are mandated by environmental
laws not to issue municipal clearance and permits, and to close business enterprises within
its jurisdiction, specifically complainants piggery and poultry, violating environmental laws;
6

4. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel Bueser of
Alaminos, Laguna, inquiring on the official action taken by the mayor in relation to
respondent judges earlier letters and complainants alleged violation of environmental laws,
and emphasizing the responsibility of the mayor to withhold clearances and permits from
business establishments violating environmental laws;
7

100
5. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to Ms. Gladys D. Apostol, the Municipal
Agriculturist of Alaminos, Laguna, requesting a copy of the Inspection report dated 11
January 2007;
8
and
6. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of Alaminos, Laguna,
requesting for prompt action on respondent judges previous letters dated 15 and 23
January 2007, with a warning that the failure of the said office to reply to respondent
judges inquiries will compel the latter to file administrative and criminal complaints before
the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Section 5 of RA 6713, otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
9

All of the letters enumerated above bore a letterhead indicating respondent judges official
government position,viz:
From the Chamber of:
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 36
4th Judicial region, Calamba City
Respondent judge also filed a criminal case against complainant for violations of Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 953, docketed as I.S. No. 07-
246/07-247, before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna.
10

In his Comment,
11
respondent judge alleged that he never neglected his duties as a judge; that as
a landowner and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, he had the right to file criminal
complaints against violators of environmental laws to protect the environment; and that he had the
right, under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6173, to secure public information from
government offices, especially about the complainant who was violating numerous laws.
Respondent judge also claimed that he did not use the courts official stationery or letterhead in his
correspondence with government authorities and employees of Alaminos, Laguna. He emphasized
that the courts official letterhead should appear as:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
4TH JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 36
CALAMBA CITY
Respondent judge claimed that he used his personal stationery or letterhead, and signed the same
in his private, not judicial, capacity.
The OCAs Report and Recommendation
On 11 March 2008, the OCA submitted its Report
12
finding respondent judge guilty of violating
Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA
stated that while respondent judge did not actually use the courts official letterhead but his own
personal stationery, his letters indicated that he is the presiding judge of an RTC in Calamba City,
and even stated that his letters were "from the chambers of" the presiding judge. It is apparent
from the acts of respondent judge that he intended to use the prestige of his judicial position to
promote his personal interest.
The OCA recommended that (a) the administrative case against respondent judge be re-docketed
as a regular administrative matter; and (b) that respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen be fined
in the amount of P11,000 for violation of Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
13

In a Resolution dated 13 August 2008, the Supreme Court resolved, among others, to re-docket
the administrative complaint against respondent judge as a regular administrative
101
matter.
14
Subsequently, the OCA, in compliance with the Courts Resolution,
15
designated Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia as the investigating justice of the administrative case.
The Findings and Recommendation
of the Investigating Justice
Investigating Justice Ramon R. Garcia found respondent judge to have violated Section 4 of Canon
1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary when
he used a letterhead indicating his position as the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Calamba City,
Branch 36. According to Justice Garcia, while the computer-printed letterhead of respondent judge
is not the official letterhead of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, the use of the same reflects
respondent judges designation and position in the judiciary, and indicates that the letters came
from the "chambers" of the presiding judge of Branch 36. Undoubtedly, respondent judge was
trying to use the prestige of his judicial office for his own personal interest.
Justice Garcia agreed with the OCA in recommending the imposition of the administrative penalty
of fine in the amount of P11,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
The Courts Ruling
The findings and recommendations of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA are well-taken.
Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public
information regarding complainants piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the
laws allegedly being violated by complainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as
government officials or employees and warn them of the possible legal effects of neglect of public
duties. In writing these letters, respondent judges use of his personal stationery with letterhead
indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and stating that the
letter was "from [his] chambers," clearly manifests that respondent judge was trying to use the
prestige of his office to influence said government officials and employees, and to achieve with
prompt and ease the purpose for which those letters were written. In other words, respondent
judge used said letterhead to promote his personal interest. This is violative of Section 4 of Canon
1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. We
quote these sections below:
CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE
x x x
SECTION. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
x x x
In Oktubre v. Velasco,
16
this Court held that respondent judges act of sending several letters
bearing his salas letterhead, in connection with an apparent dispute in the administration of the
estates of his relatives, clearly showed the judges intent to use the prestige of his judicial office,
and hence, violative of Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
17
The Court considered
respondent Judge Velascos excuse for using his salas letterhead, i.e., that he wanted to protect
102
the interest of his maternal co-heirs in the subject properties, as flimsy, and emphasized that
respondent judge had no business using his salas letterhead for private matters, as the same
should be used only for official correspondence.
18

Similarly, in Rosauro v. Kallos,
19
it was held that respondent judges use of his salas official
stationery in his private correspondence with complainant and his counsel constitutes violation of
Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court concluded that: "By using his salas stationery
other than for official purposes, respondent Judge evidently used the prestige of his office to
benefit Guerrero (and himself) in violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code."
20
1avvphi1
In Ladignon v. Garong,
21
respondent judges act of using the official letterhead of his court and
signing the same using the word "judge" in his letter-complaint to the First United Methodist
Church in Michigan, USA, was held to be violative of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics and
Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court held, thus:
We agree with the Report that what is involved here is the rule that "Judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities". (Canon 4, Section 1, New
Code of Judicial Conduct) Indeed, members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and
suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge
of their official duties as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life. No position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness on the individual than a seat in the
Judiciary. x x x
x x x
x x x As the Report stated, [repondent judges] use of the letterhead and his designation as a
Judge in a situation of potential dispute gave "the appearance that there is an implied or assured
consent of the court to his cause." This circumstance, to our mind, was what marked the
respondent Judges use of his letterhead and title as improper. In other words, the respondent
Judges transgression was not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being very careful and
discerning in considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title. x x
x
x x x the use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding
circumstances of the use - the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of
"impropriety" or "appearance of impropriety". In the present case, the respondent Judge crossed
the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint involving an alleged
violation of church rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with the letter
addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the impression of official
recognition or notice of the reported violation.
The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title of "Judge" or
"Justice" in the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary. While the use of the title is an
official designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a line still has to be drawn
based on the circumstances of the use of the appellation. While the title can be used for social and
other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use the prestige of his judicial
office to gainfully advance his personal, family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the prestige of
a judicial office be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, or to convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. (Canon
2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct) To do any of these is to cross into the prohibited field
of impropriety.
22

In view of the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and
Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
103
Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC,
23
provides that violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a less-serious charge punishable by
any of the following sanctions:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating justice and the OCA that respondent
judge, for his transgression, be meted a penalty of fine amounting to P11,000, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba City, Branch 36, GUILTY of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, and FINE him P11,000, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.



A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J April 12, 2011
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-
RODRIGUEZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA,
SANDIGANBAYAN,Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
We resolve: (a) the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 filed by
respondents Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong) and Associate Justice
Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable
Courts Decision Dated 1 September) dated September 15, 2010 of the complainant.
Both motions seek the reconsideration of the Decision rendered on August 24, 2010, albeit on
different grounds.
Through the Decision, we found and held Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez liable for simple
misconduct, and disposed against them and Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice
Ponferrada), as follows:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of 15,000.00, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely;
2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and
3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be more cautious about
the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.
1

A brief account of the factual antecedents is first given.
The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
filed an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 charging Justice Ong, Justice Hernandez and
Justice Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan with: (a) grave
misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the
service (grounded on their failing to hear cases as a collegial body during the scheduled sessions
of the Fourth Division held in Davao City on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by
104
himself and Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases together; and on their
having unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle when she objected to the procedure); (b)
falsification of public documents (grounded on their issuance of orders relative to the hearings in
Davao City, signed by all three of them, that made it appear as if all of them had been present
during the particular hearing acting as a collegial body, when in truth they were not); (c)
improprieties in the hearing of cases that amounted to gross abuse of judicial authority and grave
misconduct (grounded on Justice Ong and Justice Hernandezs making the following intemperate
and discriminatory utterances during the hearings of their Division in Cebu City sometime in
September 2006), to wit:
(a) We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is already
out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that time I will be
there, Justice of the Supreme Court.
2
;
(b) You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are you here
to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor who is doing
nothing.
3
;
(c) Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacaang, you are acting
like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of their (sic) mother
4
; and
(d) Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated, and
frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied and
from which he had graduated was better than his (Justice Ongs) own alma mater.
and (d) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law (grounded on the fact that Criminal Case
No. 25801, entitled People v. Puno, was dismissed upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused upon a finding that the assailed contracts subject of the criminal case had never been
perfected contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution, the dismissal order being signed by all three
respondents).
In the Decision of August 24, 2010, we explained as follows:
A.
Respondents Violation of the Provisions of PD 1606 and
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
x x x x x x x x x
We find that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in
blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a
hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants,
including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to
serious challenge on the ground that a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the
Sandiganbayan was of the very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of
law.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets. They are
expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.
For this reason alone, respondent Justices adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed
as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as
simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of
the law. The respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct defined as the
transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal
rules considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the complainant did not
refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings
105
within sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of
the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was ill-
motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules; on the contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the
respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated or inspired by an
intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been
seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces.
Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their proceedings
accorded with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their insistence that they adopted the
procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to entirely
exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the procedure. They
could have seen that their procedure was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not promote,
the expeditious disposition of the cases by precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying
taint of the irregularity. They knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit
recommended, was not the chief objective of judicial trials. As the Court has reminded judges
in State Prosecutors v. Muro, viz:
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be
borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration
for the administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial. A genuine respect
for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration before ruling on important questions, and a
zealous regard for the just administration of law are some of the qualities of a good trial judge,
which are more important than a reputation for hasty disposal of cases.
x x x x x x x x x
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that
judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit
limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the
explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not
a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his
inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and
unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social
life."
Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices signing of the orders issued during the
flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty, in that they thereby made it appear
that they had all been physically present when the truth was different. Such act merely ensued
from the flawed proceedings and cannot be treated as a separate offense.
B.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
The Court approves the Court Administrators finding and recommendation that no evidence
supported the complainants charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had uttered the
improper and intemperate statements attributed to them.
A review of the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in which the offensive
statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed to substantiate the complainants charge.
In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the Court must accept such transcripts as the
faithful and true record of the proceedings, because they bear the certification of correctness
executed by the stenographers who had prepared them.
106
Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing
before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings
in casual conversation about their respective law schools. They thereby publicized their
professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public
magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking their
lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no judge worthy of the judicial robes should
avoid especially during their performance of judicial functions. They should not exchange banter or
engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter how good-natured or
even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they
behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their court.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary clearly
enjoins that:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives,
court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and
graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the
part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct
was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual
members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties,
they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or group on
irrelevant grounds. It is very essential that they should live up to the high standards their noble
position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and measured, lest the best of
intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial
colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance
of such duties.
In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct,
which is defined as improper performance. Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or
prescribed method."
C.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to evidence of
the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court upheld the
assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have "failed to sufficiently show that the
Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction."
In their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez make it clear that
they:
[A]ccept with all humility, and therefore, will no longer contest the Honorable Courts finding that
the proceedings they had adopted in their provincial hearings fell short of what the provisions of
107
the law and rules require. For such shortcoming, respondents Ong and Hernandez can only
express their regret and apology.
Nonetheless, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pray for exoneration, contending that they are not
liable for simple misconduct despite the irregularity of their conduct for the simple reason that, as
the Decision has indicated, they "have not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate
any law or legal rules in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to
thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces;" their actions were not willful in
character or motivated by a "premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose;" or even if their
actions might be "irregular, wrongful, or improper," such could not be characterized as simple
misconduct necessitating administrative sanction.
Also, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez posit that they cannot be made accountable for
unbecoming conduct because they admittedly posed questions on the law schools of origin of the
counsel appearing before them; that their propounding the queries, per se, did not justify a finding
of unbecoming conduct on their part considering that they thereby never derided any law school or
belittled the capabilities of lawyers on the basis of their school affiliations, nor exhibited bias for or
against any lawyer based on their alma mater.1avvphi1
In the alternative, Justice Ong prays that the sanction imposed upon him be made equal to that
meted on Justice Hernandez. He "implores the Honorable Court to re-examine the propriety of
imposing a different and heavier penalty against him and take into due consideration its own
pronouncement in its decision that the Sandiganbayan is a collegial court, and in a collegial court,
the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule."
For her part, the complainant insists that respondent Justices be found guilty of all administrative
charges made against them; and that the penalties or chastisement be increased to be
commensurate to their infractions.
Ruling
Finding the arguments of the complainant to be matters that the Court fully dealt with and
discussed in the Decision, and there being no other substantial matters raised by her, we deny her
Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts Decision Dated 1 September).
We deny the plea of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez for complete exoneration, considering
what we held in the Decision, which we reiterate hereunder, as follows:
Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit together as
members of the Fourth Division "in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned
thereto." The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any decisions
or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available to each and
every one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full participation
of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that
the three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one
another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those
circumstances not all of them sat together in session.
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became impossible when
not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The internal rules of the
Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings on oral motions made or
objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings are be made by the Chairman of
the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did
not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other
respondents properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before
him.
108
Moreover, the respondents non-observance of collegiality contravened the very purpose of trying
criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three Justices. Although there
are criminal cases involving public officials and employees triable before single-judge courts, PD
1606, as amended, has always required a Division of three Justices (not one or two) to try the
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such cases holding
higher rank or office than those charged in the former cases. The three Justices of a Division,
rather than a single judge, are naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply
broader circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The tighter standard is due in part to the
fact that the review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme Court generally via the discretionary
mode of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, which eliminates issues of
fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the convictions still
undergo intermediate review before ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all).
In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., the Court delved on the nature of a
collegial body, and how the act of a single member, though he may be its head, done without the
participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the collegial body itself. There, the
question presented was whether Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, as chairman of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC), could alone act in behalf of and bind the NTC, given that
the NTC had two other commissioners as members. The Court ruled:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the
three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident
therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case,
the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from
the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision,
is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone
does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the
three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation
concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the
NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial
agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man
commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of
the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a
collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man
regime.
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of respondent Justices as
members of the Fourth Division. It is of no consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive
impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible judicial officers,
they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of
their trial proceedings.
As to the argument of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez against this Courts finding of
unbecoming conduct on their part, the matter has been fully addressed in the Decision of August
24, 2010.
We hold to be not well taken the urging of Justice Ong that the penalty imposed upon him be
similar to that meted upon Justice Hernandez.
The variance in the responsibilities of respondent Justices as Members of their Division compel the
differentiation of their individual liabilities. Justice Ong, as the Chairperson, was the head of the
Division under the Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, being the most senior Member, and, as
such, he possessed and wielded powers of supervision, direction, and control over the conduct of
109
the proceedings of the Division. This circumstance alone provided sufficient justification to treat
Justice Ong differently from the other respondents.
Moreover, we have noted in the Decision that in the exercise of his powers as Chairman of the
Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an
unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the complainant, and steered his
Division into the path of procedural irregularity; and wittingly failed to guarantee that proceedings
of the Division that he chaired came within the bounds of substantive and procedural rules. To be
sure, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada did not direct and control how the proceedings of
the Division were to be conducted. Their not being responsible for the direction and control of the
running of the Division and their having relied without malice on the Justice Ongs direction and
control should not be reproved as much as Justice Ongs misconduct. Hence, their responsibility
and liability as Members of the Division were properly diminished.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts Decision Dated 1
September) dated September 15, 2010 of complainant Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J.
Jamsani-Rodriguez; and the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 of
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez are denied for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.




A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC February 8, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, seek
reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated October 12, 2010 that dismissed their charges of
plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano Del Castillo in
connection with the decision he wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v.
Romulo.
1

Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or approved of the commission
of plagiarism in the Philippines. This claim is absurd. The Court, like everyone else, condemns
plagiarism as the world in general understands and uses the term.
Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common definition. To plagiarize, says
Webster, is "to steal and pass off as ones own" the ideas or words of another. Stealing implies
malicious taking. Blacks Law Dictionary, the worlds leading English law dictionary quoted by the
Court in its decision, defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing presentation of another
person's original ideas or creative expressions as ones own."
2
The presentation of another
persons ideas as ones own must be deliberate or premeditateda taking with ill intent.
There is no commonly-used dictionary in the world that embraces in the meaning of plagiarism
errors in attribution by mere accident or in good faith.
Certain educational institutions of course assume different norms in its application. For instance,
the Loyola Schools Code of Academic Integrity ordains that "plagiarism is identified not through
intent but through the act itself. The objective act of falsely attributing to ones self what is not
ones work, whether intentional or out of neglect, is sufficient to conclude that plagiarism has
occurred. Students who plead ignorance or appeal to lack of malice are not excused."
3

110
But the Courts decision in the present case does not set aside such norm. The decision makes this
clear, thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is based on the originality
of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which
encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions.
The judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a
decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal
opinions it draws from.
4

Original scholarship is highly valued in the academe and rightly so. A college thesis, for instance,
should contain dissertations embodying results of original research, substantiating a specific
view.
5
This must be so since the writing is intended to earn for the student an academic degree,
honor, or distinction. He earns no credit nor deserves it who takes the research of others, copies
their dissertations, and proclaims these as his own. There should be no question that a cheat
deserves neither reward nor sympathy.
But the policy adopted by schools of disregarding the element of malicious intent found in
dictionaries is evidently more in the nature of establishing what evidence is sufficient to prove the
commission of such dishonest conduct than in rewriting the meaning of plagiarism. Since it would
be easy enough for a student to plead ignorance or lack of malice even as he has copied the work
of others, certain schools have adopted the policy of treating the mere presence of such copied
work in his paper sufficient objective evidence of plagiarism. Surely, however, if on its face the
students work shows as a whole that he has but committed an obvious mistake or a clerical error
in one of hundreds of citations in his thesis, the school will not be so unreasonable as to cancel his
diploma.
In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an original piece
of work or art. Deciding disputes is a service rendered by the government for the public good.
Judges issue decisions to resolve everyday conflicts involving people of flesh and blood who ache
for speedy justice or juridical beings which have rights and obligations in law that need to be
protected. The interest of society in written decisions is not that they are originally crafted but that
they are fair and correct in the context of the particular disputes involved. Justice, not originality,
form, and style, is the object of every decision of a court of law.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the Supreme
Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws involved in the cases they
decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are written. But laws include, under the doctrine of
stare decisis, judicial interpretations of such laws as are applied to specific situations. Under this
doctrine, Courts are "to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point." Once the Court has
"laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle,
and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the
parties or property are the same."
6

And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite often entangled
in apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting experts in the law to build up
regarding such matters a large body of commentaries or annotations that, in themselves, often
become part of legal writings upon which lawyers and judges draw materials for their theories or
solutions in particular cases. And, because of the need to be precise and correct, judges and
practitioners alike, by practice and tradition, usually lift passages from such precedents and
writings, at times omitting, without malicious intent, attributions to the originators.
Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International Bar Association puts it succinctly.
When practicing lawyers (which include judges) write about the law, they effectively place their
ideas, their language, and their work in the public domain, to be affirmed, adopted, criticized, or
111
rejected. Being in the public domain, other lawyers can thus freely use these without fear of
committing some wrong or incurring some liability. Thus:
The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of words is everything. Legal
disputes often centre round the way in which obligations have been expressed in legal documents
and how the facts of the real world fit the meaning of the words in which the obligation is
contained. This, in conjunction with the risk-aversion of lawyers means that refuge will often be
sought in articulations that have been tried and tested. In a sense therefore the community of
lawyers have together contributed to this body of knowledge, language, and expression which is
common property and may be utilized, developed and bettered by anyone.
7

The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the public domain is not
unique to the Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno cites in her
dissenting opinion, observed in her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of
plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a
legal periodical or language from a partys brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges
are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them,
without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two
reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing
is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal
plagiarism.
8

If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from the time
of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has not on
occasion acknowledged the originators of passages and views found in its decisions. These
omissions are true for many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by
magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never
in the judiciarys more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and
demeaned as plagiarism.
This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere copycats. They are not. Their
decisions analyze the often conflicting facts of each case and sort out the relevant from the
irrelevant. They identify and formulate the issue or issues that need to be resolved and evaluate
each of the laws, rulings, principles, or authorities that the parties to the case invoke. The
decisions then draw their apt conclusions regarding whether or not such laws, rulings, principles,
or authorities apply to the particular cases before the Court. These efforts, reduced in writing, are
the product of the judges creativity. It is hereactually the substance of their decisionsthat their
genius, originality, and honest labor can be found, of which they should be proud.
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by the opposing sides in
a way that no one has ever done. He identified and formulated the core of the issues that the
parties raised. And when he had done this, he discussed the state of the law relevant to their
resolution. It was here that he drew materials from various sources, including the three foreign
authors cited in the charges against him. He compared the divergent views these present as they
developed in history. He then explained why the Court must reject some views in light of the
peculiar facts of the case and applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his
discussions of the facts and the law the right solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole, his
work was original. He had but done an honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and elsewhere,
dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or expose them
to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.
112
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the petitioners, like all lawyers
handling cases before courts and administrative tribunals, cannot object to this. Although as a rule
they receive compensation for every pleading or paper they file in court or for every opinion they
render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in their writings. They should
not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long as they do not depart, as
officers of the court, from the objective of assisting the Court in the administration of justice.
As Duncan Webb said:
In presenting legal argument most lawyers will have recourse to either previous decisions of the
courts, frequently lifting whole sections of a judges words to lend weight to a particular point
either with or without attribution. The words of scholars are also sometimes given weight,
depending on reputation. Some encyclopaedic works are given particular authority. In England this
place is given to Halsburys Laws of England which is widely considered authoritative. A lawyer can
do little better than to frame an argument or claim to fit with the articulation of the law in
Halsburys. While in many cases the very purpose of the citation is to claim the authority of the
author, this is not always the case. Frequently commentary or dicta of lesser standing will be
adopted by legal authors, largely without attribution.
x x x x
The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with skepticism. It is only the arrogant
fool or the truly gifted who will depart entirely from the established template and reformulate an
existing idea in the belief that in doing so they will improve it. While over time incremental changes
occur, the wholesale abandonment of established expression is generally considered foolhardy.
9

The Court probably should not have entertained at all the charges of plagiarism against Justice Del
Castillo, coming from the losing party. But it is a case of first impression and petitioners, joined by
some faculty members of the University of the Philippines school of law, have unfairly maligned
him with the charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect for failing to
attribute lifted passages from three foreign authors. These charges as already stated are false,
applying the meaning of plagiarism as the world in general knows it.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that he lifted from their
works and used in writing the decision for the Court in the Vinuya case. But, as the Court said, the
evidence as found by its Ethics Committee shows that the attribution to these authors appeared in
the beginning drafts of the decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly qualified and
experienced court-employed researcher, she accidentally deleted the same at the time she was
cleaning up the final draft. The Court believed her since, among other reasons, she had no motive
for omitting the attribution. The foreign authors concerned, like the dozens of other sources she
cited in her research, had high reputations in international law.1awphi1
Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the controversial passages found in their works
to earlier writings by others. The authors concerned were not themselves the originators. As it
happened, although the ponencia of Justice Del Castillo accidentally deleted the attribution to
them, there remained in the final draft of the decision attributions of the same passages to the
earlier writings from which those authors borrowed their ideas in the first place. In short, with the
remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-up, the passages as it finally appeared in the
Vinuya decision still showed on their face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo
but to others. He did not pass them off as his own.
With our ruling, the Court need not dwell long on petitioners allegations that Justice Del Castillo
had also committed plagiarism in writing for the Court his decision in another case, Ang Ladlad v.
Commission on Elections.
10
Petitioners are nit-picking. Upon close examination and as Justice Del
Castillo amply demonstrated in his comment to the motion for reconsideration, he in fact made
113
attributions to passages in such decision that he borrowed from his sources although they at times
suffered in formatting lapses.
Considering its above ruling, the Court sees no point in further passing upon the motion of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for leave to file and admit motion for reconsideration-in-
intervention dated January 5, 2011 and Dr. Peter Payoyos claim of other instances of alleged
plagiarism in the Vinuya decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.



A.C. No. 6258 August 24, 2010
LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
For consideration is the disbarment complaint filed by Luzviminda R. Lustestica (complainant)
against Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe (respondent) for notarizing a falsified or forged Deed of Donation
of real property despite the non-appearance of the donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica (complainants
father) and his first wife, Cornelia P. Rivero, both of whom were already dead at the time of
execution of the said document.
In his Answer,
1
the respondent admitted the fact of death of Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia
P. Rivero, considering their death certificates attached to the complaint. The respondent claimed,
however, that he had no knowledge that the real Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero
were already dead at the time he notarized the Deed of Donation.
2
He also claimed that he exerted
efforts to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him and represented
themselves as the donors under the Deed of Donation.
3

After the submission of the respondents Answer to the complaint, the Court referred the matter to
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline) for investigation, evaluation and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline made the following findings:
The core issue is whether or not Respondent committed a falsehood in violation of his oath as a
lawyer and his duties as Notary Public when he notarized the Deed of Donation purportedly
executed by Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero as the donors and Cecilio R. Lustestica
and Juliana Lustestica as the donees on 5 August 1994.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2013, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:
x x x The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. x x x.
As correctly observed by Complainant, Respondents Acknowledgment is the best evidence that NO
RESIDENCE CERTIFICATES were presented by the alleged donors and the donees. Had the parties
presented their residence certificates to Respondent, it was his duty and responsibility under the
Notarial Law to enter, as part of his certification, the number, place of issue and date of each
residence certificate presented by the parties to the Deed of Donation. Respondent, however,
failed to make the required entries. Respondents claim that the persons who allegedly appeared
before him and represented themselves to be the parties to the Deed of Donation showed their
114
residence certificates and that he instructed his secretary to indicate the details of the residence
certificates of the parties is self-serving and not supported by the evidence on record.
x x x x
The fact that Respondent notarized a forged/falsified document is also undisputed not only by
[the] strength of Complainants documentary evidence but more importantly, by Respondents own
judicial admission. x x x. In view of Respondents judicial admission that the alleged donors,
BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA and his first wife, CORNELIA P. RIVERO, died on 7 September 1987
and 24 September 1984, respectively, it is beyond reasonable doubt that said donors could not
have personally appeared before him on 5 August 1994 to [acknowledge] to him that they freely
and voluntary executed the Deed of Donation. Moreover, x x x quasi-judicial notice of the Decision
of the Municipal Trial Court finding accused CECILIO LUSTESTICA and JULIANA LUSTESTICA
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principals of the crime of falsification of public
document.
4

In his Report dated August 15, 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found the
respondent grossly negligent in the performance of his duties as notary public and recommended
that the respondents notarial commission be suspended for a period of one (1) year. The IBP
Commissioner also recommended that a penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension be imposed
against the respondent, with a warning that a similar conduct in the future will warrant an
imposition of a more severe penalty.
5

By Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the Report of the IBP Commissioner. The
pertinent portion of this Resolution reads:
[C]onsidering Respondents gross negligence in the performance of his duties as Notary Public,
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public
for two (2) years with a notification that this suspension of one year must be served in succession
to the initial recommendation of the IBP Board of Suspension of one year in CBD Case No. 04-
1371.
6

From these undisputed facts, supervening events occurred that must be taken into consideration of
the present case.
First, CBD Case No. 04-1371, entitled Victorina Bautista, complainant, v. Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe,
respondent, which was the case referred to in Resolution No. XVII-2005-116, was docketed as A.C.
No. 6963
7
before the Court. In a decision dated February 9, 2006, the Court revoked the
respondents notarial commission and disqualified him from reappointment as Notary Public for a
period of two (2) years, for his failure to properly perform his duties as notary public when he
notarized a document in the absence of one of the affiants. In addition, the Court suspended him
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that a repetition of the same
or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Second, on January 6, 2006, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No.
XVII-2005-116 before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The respondent moved to reconsider
the IBP Resolution, claiming that the penalty imposed for the infraction committed was too harsh.
The motion was denied in Resolution No. XVII-2006-81, dated January 28, 2006,
8
for lack of
jurisdiction of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, since the administrative matter had then been
endorsed to the Court.
Third, on January 4, 2006, a motion for reconsideration (the same as the one filed with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline) was filed by the respondent before the Court. In a Minute
Resolution dated March 22, 2006, the Court noted the findings and recommendations in Resolution
No. XVII-2005-116 and required the complainant to file her Comment to the respondents motion
115
for reconsideration. On April 28, 2006, the complainant filed her Comment praying for the denial of
the motion.
On July 5, 2006, the Court issued a Minute Resolution noting the denial of the respondents motion
for reconsideration, by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, and the complainants Comment to
the respondents motion before the Court.
Subsequently, on January 26, 2009, the Court declared the case closed and terminated after
considering that no motion for reconsideration or petition for review, assailing both IBP resolutions,
had been filed by the respondent.
9

On October 8, 2009, the respondent, through a letter addressed to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
requested that he be given clearance to resume the practice of law and to allow him to be
commissioned as a notary public. In his letter, the respondent alleged that he has already served
the penalties imposed against him in A.C. No. 6963 and the present case. He claimed that after the
receipt of the IBP Resolutions in both cases, he did not practice his profession and had not been
appointed or commissioned as a notary public.
The Office of the Bar Confidant
Acting on the respondents letter, the Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a Report and
Recommendation, which states:
1. The EFFECTIVITY of the respondents suspension and disqualification should have been
COMMENCED on the date of receipt of the Decision of the Court and not from the date of
receipt of the Resolution of the IBP recommending the respondents suspension from the
practice of law and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public, it being
recommendatory in nature;
2. The prayer of the respondent to resume his practice of law in Adm. Case No. 6963 be
denied;
3. The respondent be REQUIRED to submit certification from competent courts and IBP that
he has fully served the entire period of suspension and disqualification in Adm. Case No.
6963;
4. The Court may now FINALLY RESOLVE the findings and recommendation of the IBP in its
Resolution No. XVII-2005-16, dated October 2005, in Adm. Case No. 6258, for final
disposition of the case and for proper determination whether the order of suspension and
disqualification in Adm. Case No. 6963 should be lifted after the respondent has
satisfactorily shown that he has fully served the suspension and disqualification.
10

The Courts Ruling
The findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline are well-taken. We
cannot overemphasize the important role a notary public performs. In Gonzales v. Ramos,
11
we
stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with
substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.
12
A
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
13
It is for this reason
that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.
14

The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the respondent in discharging his
duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him and failed
to comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties
presentation of their residence certificates or any other document to prove their identities. Given
the respondents admission in his pleading that the donors were already dead when he notarized
116
the Deed of Donation, we have no doubt that he failed in his duty to ascertain the identities of the
persons who appeared before him as donors in the Deed of Donation.
Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103), but also
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 (Old Notarial Law)
15
states:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law
of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is
done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be
made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall
so state.
In turn, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." At
the same time, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this regard, a reading of the respondents Acknowledgment in the Deed of Donation shows how
these provisions were violated by the respondent:
BEFORE ME, Notary Public for and in Bulacan this AUG 05 1994 day of August, 1994,
personally appeared:
BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA: C.T.C. # _______:________:________
CORNELIA RIVERO : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
CECILIO LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
JULIANA LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument
and acknowledged to me that the same are their free act and voluntary deed.
16

The respondent engaged in dishonest conduct because he falsely represented in his
Acknowledgment that the persons who appeared before him were "known to him" to be the same
persons who executed the Deed of Donation, despite the fact that he did not know them and did
not ascertain their identities as he attested.
17

Moreover, the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct when he did not observe the requirements
under Section 1 of the Old Notarial Law that requires notaries public to certify that the party to the
instrument has acknowledged and presented, before the notaries public, the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter the residence certificates
number, place, and date of issue as part of the certification.
18
The unfilled spaces in the
Acknowledgment where the residence certificate numbers should have been clearly established
that the respondent did not perform this legal duty.
With these considerations, we find that the imposition of administrative sanctions for the above
infractions committed is in order.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the penalty of suspension, for a period of one
(1) year, from the practice of law and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for a
period of two (2) years. Considering that this is already Atty. Bernabes second infraction, we find
the IBPs recommendation to be very light; it is not commensurate with his demonstrated
predisposition to undertake the duties of a notary public and a lawyer lightly.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting,
19
we disbarred a lawyer for failing to subscribe to the sacred duties
imposed upon a notary public. In imposing the penalty of disbarment, the Court considered the
117
lawyers prior misconduct where he was suspended for a period of six (6) months and warned that
a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
20

In Flores v. Chua,
21
we disbarred the lawyer after finding that he deliberately made false
representations that the vendor appeared before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. We
took into account that he was previously found administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (for bribing a judge) and sternly warned that a repetition of
similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the future would be dealt with more severely.
22

In Traya v. Villamor,
23
we found the respondent notary public guilty of gross misconduct in his
notarial practice for failing to observe the proper procedure in determining that the person
appearing before him is the same person who executed the document presented for notarization.
Taking into account that it was his second offense, he was perpetually disqualified from being
commissioned as a notary public.
24

In Social Security Commission v. Coral,
25
we suspended indefinitely the notarial commission of the
respondent lawyer who was found to have prepared, notarized and filed two complaints that were
allegedly executed and verified by people who have long been dead. We also directed him to show
cause why he should not be disbarred.
26

Considering these established rulings, read in light of the circumstances in the present case, we
find that Atty. Bernabe should be disbarred from the practice of law and perpetually disqualified
from being commissioned as a notary public. We emphasize that this is respondents second
offense and while he does not appear to have any participation in the falsification of the Deed of
Donation, his contribution was his gross negligence for failing to ascertain the identity of the
persons who appeared before him as the donors. This is highlighted by his admission
27
in his
Answer that he did not personally know the parties and was not acquainted with them. The blank
spaces in the Acknowledgment indicate that he did not even require these parties to produce
documents that would prove that they are the same persons they claim to be. As we emphasized
in Maligsa:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings
honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act
which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession.
28

In light of the above findings and penalties, the respondents request to be given clearance to
resume the practice of law and to apply for a notarial commission, after serving the administrative
sanctions in A.C. No. 6963, is now moot and academic. We, accordingly, deny the request for
clearance to practice law and to apply for notarial commission.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) NOTE the letter dated October 8, 2009 of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe to the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
(2) ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline with
MODIFICATION on the administrative penalty imposed.
(3) DECLARE respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe liable for gross negligence, in the
performance of his duties as notary public, and for his deceitful and dishonest attestation, in
the course of administering the oath taken before him. Respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe
is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. He is also PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as
a notary public.
118
(4) DENY the request for clearance to practice law and to apply for notarial commission of
respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Sergio E. Bernabes record, as a member of the
bar, and copies furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts.
In view of the notarization of a falsified deed whose purported parties were already dead at the
time of notarization, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Prosecutor General,
Department of Justice for whatever action, within its jurisdiction, it may deem appropriate to bring
against Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe.
SO ORDERED.




A.C. No. 9385 November 11, 2013
MARIANO AGADAN, EDEN MOLLEJON, ARSENIO IGME, JOSE NUMBAR, CECILIA
LANGAWAN, PABLO PALMA, JOSELITO CLAVERIA, MIGUEL FLORES, and ALBERT
GAYDOWEN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RICHARD BALTAZAR KILAAN, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On September 12, 2005, complainants Mariano Agadan, Eden Mollejon, Arsenio Igme, Jose
Numbar, Cecilia Langawan, Pablo Palma, Joselito Claveria, Miguel Flores and Albert Gaydowen filed
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Baguio Benguet Chapter (IBP-Baguio-Benguet
Chapter) a Complaint
1
against respondent Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan (Atty. Kilaan) for
falsification of documents, dishonesty and deceit. They alleged that Atty. Kilaan intercalated certain
entries in the application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate public
utility jeepney filed before the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board Cordillera
Administrative Region (LTFRB-CAR) and docketed as Case No. 2003-CAR-688 by substituting the
name of the applicant from Gary Adasing (Adasing)
2
to that of Joseph Batingwed
(Batingwed);
3
that Atty. Kilaan submitted false and/or insufficient documentary requirements in
support of Batingwed s application for CPC; that Atty. Kilaan prepared a Decision based on the
Resolution of the LTFRB Central Office which dismissed the Opposition filed by the complainants;
and that the said Decision granted the application of Batingwed which was adopted by the LTFRB-
CAR.
On February 27, 2006, the IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter formally endorsed the Complaint to the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) for appropriate action.
4
Acting on the Complaint, the IBP-
CBD directed Atty. Kilaan to submit his Answer.
5

In his Answer
6
dated April 8, 2006, Atty. Kilaan denied violating the Lawyer s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He disclaimed any pat1icipation in the preparation of the Decision with
respect to the application of Batingwed for CPC. He explained that it is the Regional Director of the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)-CAR who approves the application and
who drafts the Decision after the LTFRB-CAR signifies its favorable recommendation. He denied
exercising any influence over the DOTC-CAR or the LTFRB. He claimed that Batingwed had decided
to abandon his application hence he no longer submitted the necessary requirements therefor. He
also disavowed any knowledge that Batingwed s application had been forwarded to the LTFRB
Central Office for approval. Atty. Kilaan claimed that he knew about the favorable Decision only
119
when Batingwed showed him the same. He narratted that considering the incomplete documents,
the LTFRB mistakenly approved Batingwed s application. Thus, when it discovered its error, the
LTFRB immediately revoked the grant of CPC to Batingwed.
He denied intercalating the entries in the application for CPC of Batingwed. He averred that once
an application has been filed, the application and all accompanying records remain with the LTFRB
and could no longer be retrieved by the applicant or his counsel; as such, it is highly improbable
for him to intercalate the entries therein. Atty. Kilaan further explained that it was Adasing who
paid the filing fee in behalf of Batingwed but the cashier erroneously indicated Adasing instead of
Batingwed as payor. Atty. Kilaan lamented that Adasing who is not in the Philippines could not
corroborate his explanation. Finaliy, Atty. Kilaan noted that complainants filed the instant suit in
retaliation for the dismissal of their Opposition to the application for CPCs which he filed on behalf
of his other clients.
The case was set for mandatory conference
7
after which the parties submitted their respective
Position Papers.
8
In their Position Paper, complainants further alleged that the Verification in
Batingwed's application for CPC was notarized by Atty. Kilaan as Doc. No: 253, Page No. 51, Book
No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon verification of Atty. Kilaan's Notarial Registry submitted to
the Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court in Baguio City, the said notarial entry actually refers to a
Deed of Sale and not the Verification of Batingwed's application. Also, complainants belied Atty.
Kilaan's allegation that Adasing is 'presently abroad by presenting the Affidavit of Adasing claiming
that he never left the country.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner
9
found complainants to have
miserably failed to prove that Atty. Kilaan intercalated the entries in the application for CPC of
Batingwed. Their allegation was based on mere suspicion devoid of any credible proof, viz:
At the onset, it is very difficult to prove that it was respondent himself who was responsible for any
intercalation, particularly the substitution of Joseph Batingwed's application folder in lieu of Gary
Odasing's. Indeed, that is a grave charge, and based on the evidence presented by complainants,
all that they can muster is a suspicion that cannot be confirmed. Of course, this has to be pointed
out - anyone who had access to the case folder could have possibly been responsible for whatever
intercalation that may have occurred. That being said, this Office is not prepared to make that leap
into conjecture and conclude that it was respondent's doing.
Besides, the Certification of the Receiving Clerk of the DOTC CAR dated 18 October 2006 -which
notably was submitted by complainants -stated that the application of Gary Odasing was continued
by Joseph Batingwed. Complainants have not alleged that the same constitutes a violation of the
rules and procedures of LTFRB. Thus, it may be presumed to have been done in the regular course
of business.
10

However, the Investigating Commissioner did not totally absolve Atty. Kilaan as he found him liable
for violating the Notarial Law considering that the Verification of Batingwed's application which he
notarized and denominated as Doc. No. 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003 was
actually recorded as a Deed of Sale in his Notarial Register. In addition, the Investigating
Commissioner noted that Atty. Kilaan lied under oath when he alleged that Adasing was abroad as
this was squarely belied by Adasing in his Affidavit. The Investigating Commissioner held thus:
Respondent must be punished for making it appear that he notarized a document the Verification-
when in truth and in fact, the entry in his Notatial Registry shows a different document. Thus, it is
but proper to suspend respondent s privilege of being commissioned as a Notary Public.
Not only that. Despite knowing that the Verification was not properly notarized, respondent, as
counsel for the applicant, proceeded to file the defectively verified Petition with the LTFRB-Baguio
City. Clearly, there was falsehood committed by him, as there can be no other conclusion except
that respondent antedated the Verification.
120
x x x x
Lastly, this cannot end without this being said. Respondent made matters worse by alleging in his
Answer to the instant administrative complaint that Gary Odasing was abroad -which seemingly
was drawn up more out of convenience than for truth. Now, that allegation had been completely
rebuffed and found to be untrue by the execution of an Affidavit by Gary Odasing himself. x x x It
is therefore an affront to this Office that respondent would attempt to defend himself by pleading
allegations, which were seemingly made deliberately, and which were later found to be untrue.
Clearly, respondent tried, albeit vainly, to deceive even this Office.
11

The Investigating Commissioner recommended, viz:
WHEREFORE, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that respondent s notarial commission,
if still existing, be REVOKED immediately and that he be further PROHIBITED from being
commissioned as a notary public for TWO (2) YEARS.
Moreover, it is likewise recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of TWO (2) MONTHS.
12

In its September 19, 2007 Resolution No. XVIII-2007-82, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification
that Atty. Kilaans Notarial Commission be revoked and that he be disqualified from being
appointed as Notary Public for two years, thereby deleting the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law. Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XX-2012-41 dated January 15, 2012.
After a careful review of the records, we find that Atty. Kilaan committed the following infractions:
1) violation of the Notarial Law; 2) violation of the Lawyer s Oath; and 3) violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In his Motion for Reconsideration tiled before the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Kilaan passed on
the blame to his secretary for the inaccuracies in the entries in his Notarial Register. He asserted
that being a private practitioner, he is burdened with cases thus he delegated to his secretary the
job of recording the documents which he notarized in his Notarial Register. He argued that the
revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification for two years is too harsh. a penalty
considering that he is a first-time offender; he prayed for leniency considering that his family
depended on his income for their collective needs.
It is settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable for the accuracy of the entries
in his Notarial Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondent s explanation that he is
burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of his notarial acts in his
Notarial Register to his secretary. In tact, this argument has already been rebuffed by this Court in
Lingan v. Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga,
13
viz:
Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:
SEC. 245. Notarial Register.--Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial
register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a
ce1tified copy of such record, or any part thereof: to any person applying for it and paying the
legal fees therefore. (emphasis supplied)
x x x x x x x x x
SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him, the person executing, swearing to or acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any to
the signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees
collected by him for his services as notary in connection therewith, and, when the instrument is a
contract, he shall keep a connect copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in
said records a brief description of the substance thereof and shall give to each entry a consecutive
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number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. The notary shall give to each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in
his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the
same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
x x x x x x x x x
In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:
SEC. 249. Grounds fix revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the part of
a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for
the revocation of his commission:
x x x x x x x x x
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his
notatial acts in the manner required by law.
x x x x x x x x x
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally
accountable for all entries in his notarial register. Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility
for the violation of the aforesaid sections by passing the buck to their secretaries, a reprehensible
practice which to this day persists despite our open condemnation. Respondents. especially
Calubaquib. a self-proclaimed "prominent legal practitioner should have known better than to give
us such a simple-minded excuse.
We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act
but one invested with substantive public interest such that only those who are qualified or
authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires
that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from inflicting themselves upon the
public the courts and the administrative offices in general.
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Notaries public must therefore
observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements of their duties.
In Gemina v. Atty. Madamba,
14
we have also ruled that
x x x The inaccuracies in his Notarial Register entitles and his failure to enter the documents that
he admittedly notarized constitute dereliction of duty as a notary public. He cannot escape liability
by putting the blame on his secretary. The lawyer himself, not merely his secretary, should be held
accountable for these misdeeds.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the
acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these
notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on
documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after
which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due
execution.1wphi1 Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary
act. A notary public exercises duties calling for caretl1lness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform
themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take pmt or allow
themselves to be pmt of illegal transactions.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a duly commissioned
notary public to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing
any dereliction or any act which may serve as cause for the revocation of his commission or the
imposition of administrative sanctions.
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Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondent s failure to make the proper entry or
entries in his Notarial Register of his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a principal
at the time of the notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal on the basis of personal
knowledge by competent evidence are grounds for the revocation of a lawyer s commission as a
notary public.
Indeed, Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary public to
keep and maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his every notarial act. His failure to
make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts is a ground for
revocation of his notarial commission.
15
As mentioned, respondent failed to make the proper entries
in his Notarial Register; as such, his notarial commission may be properly revoked.
Aside from violating the Notarial Law, respondent also violated his Lawyers Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility by committing falsehood in the pleadings he submitted before the IBP.
His claim that Adasing was abroad hence could not corroborate the explanation made by
Batingwed was proved to be untruthful when complainants submitted the Affidavit of Adasing
insisting that he never left the country. Canon 10,
Rule 10.0 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides that a lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice. In the same vein, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 mandates that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent failed to observe these
Rules and hence must be sanctioned.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Kilaan s suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months and the revocation and disqualification of his notarial commission for a period of one (1)
year appropriate.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, if still existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period
of one (1) year. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective
immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with more
severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this Court to
determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the
Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.