GWRC BuiIding WakefieId Street: Seismic Status Peer Review of Reporting to Date
Firstly, apologies for the delay in formalising our review report. We confirm we have completed our review as per the scope of work defined in our proposal dated 1 st November 2013, including meeting Spencer Holmes on the 19 th December 2013. We have not carried out a walkthrough inspection of the building, and do not believe it necessary based on our conclusions below.
Current Assessment: n general we concur with the findings of the reports relating to the current seismic strength and the scope of this issues that are of concern. ndeed we have also identified another three issues of primary concern with the current expected seismic performance, though note that these are as, but not more critical than the items considered to date. As such this detailed review should not significantly affect the conclusion that has informed GWRC's thinking to date. Our issue by issue review is detailed in the body of our report below.
Retrofit Options: With respect to the seismic retrofit, the means proposed are pragmatic, conventional means of achieving better performance. However, given the scope of the issues and the extent of the intervention required throughout the building, we are not surprised that the 100% NBS strengthening option has significant structural and non-structural cost (approaching that of a new building). n effect, you are providing a complete new bracing system for the building, the majority of the facades, and almost complete disruption of the fitout/ceiling/services, all of which needs to be constructed within the existing fabric which attracts a premium on cost. Similarly matching the existing building stiffness, and constructing new foundation in poor ground inside the structure add to difficulty. We believe the overall scope/budget proposed should cover the additional three GWRC Wakefield St: Peer Review of Seismic Reporting to Date, Page 2
issues we have identified. Unfortunately at the conclusion of this you have a building that is almost as good as new, but there will still be compromises and unknowns associated with retrofitting. From our commercial experience in this field, we are not surprised that the 100% Strengthening option is undesirable. Although we believe there may be alternatives which may be more economic with respect to those proposed, we believe these would only slightly trim the cost, rather than provide any significant shift in budget.
Strengthening to a lower level does not provide many alternatives. A retrofit to >67%NBS will still require intervention of the same order of scope as the 100% scheme, albeit the structural sizes will be smaller. This is because almost all issues become critical at 30-50%NBS deflections. As a result it is likely that the retrofit may cost more than 67% of the 100% scheme cost.
nterim securing to 40% does provide this change of scope, and we generally concur with the items identified on the Spencer Holmes reports. However this would need to be seen as an interim measure for two reasons: 1. Relative risk: at 5-10 times the risk relative to a new building over its 50 year design life, on a risk basis this would suggest that the solution should be considered as something like a 10 year lifespan. 2. Nature of the failures: the term %NBS implies the level at which likely strength of the building is exceeded. There is an implication in the code, which was clarified by the Royal Commission into the Canterbury Earthquakes, that a building should have a resilience to withstand 1.5-1.8 times this shaking before collapse. An example of this resilience was the Hotel Grand Chancellor, which even though it crushed a major wall and two columns due to a design flaw, did not collapse. We do not believe the Wakefield St building has this type of inherent resilience, and it would only be augmented to some degree by the 40% scheme. Proper augmentation would begin to look like the >67% scheme discussed above. Given the height of the building and this nature of failure, we believe it prudent only considering the 40% scheme as an interim measure.
Re-occupying the building as earthquake prone could only be considered a stop- gap measure, and as a minimum the stairs would require retrofit. Although there are other buildings that have lower %NBS scores, point 2 above should be considered with respect to consequence, as well as risk.
Other Strengthening Options: Because of the nature of the structure (fairly stiff and brittle, on liquefiable ground) it is our opinion that there are no conventional strengthening options that would significantly change the scope of intervention proposed in the 100% scheme.
The only possible alternative could be to consider Base solation. Typically this would not be done in such a tall existing structure, nor with one confined by surrounding existing buildings (a Base solated building requires a significant rattle space around it to allow it to move sideways on its bearings). However we believe the following could be considered: GWRC Wakefield St: Peer Review of Seismic Reporting to Date, Page 3
Creating a transfer grillage throughout first and second floors to connect the shear walls and columns together. This space would only likely be usable for storage. For the rear building this would only be at Level 1 Locating the base isolators at ground floor, meaning they will end up a predominant feature at this level Creating new foundations to the west of the existing ones Moving the building 500mm to the west onto the new isolators and foundations. This creates rattle space to the east, adding to the existing road frontages to the north and west. Demolishing and re-building either: o The rear of the rear building to create the rattle space here if the buildings were to be joined and isolated together. o The front of the rear building if only the office tower were to be isolated.
While this is an unconventional solution, it would have the benefits that: 1. The significance of the base isolation would help restore the confidence of building users in its seismic performance 2. The majority of the work would be confined to the lower three floors. n this way, much of the existing fabric could be left intact (assuming it has a reasonable residual value).
n conclusion we agree that the building is a difficult proposition, and that we generally concur with the assessments to date by Spencer Holmes. We agree that a retrofit greater than 67%NBS is likely to involve significant intervention throughout the building, and as such the cost be a significant proportion of re-build cost. The only alternative to this could be base isolation: itself still costly however with careful placement of the majority of the work in the lower floors of the building it could provide a more economic solution both in cost and in completed value.
We trust this provides you with the information you require.
Yours faithfully,
Alistair Cattanach DRECTOR 140218AGC
Encl.
Detailed Review of Damage Mechanisms (3 pages) GWRC Wakefield St: Peer Review of Seismic Reporting to Date, Page 4
(As per summary reporting not in order of criticality)
Liquefaction of the Upper 3-4m zone below the building's foundations Fragility of Dycore system to take building inter-storey drifts, especially at seating Non-ductile nature of 665 mesh floor topping reinforcement Vertically over-reinforced nature of the shear walls Off-set columns/transfers in front gravity beam system nadequate separation from Carpark nadequate movement provision in stairs nadequate tension capacity of existing concrete piles nadequate connection between shear walls and adjacent floor structure around stairs High nterstorey drift due to flexible lateral load resisting system (predominantly from piles) nadequate Fixings of Precast Panel Cladding to structure nadequate bracing of existing ceiling grid Non-ductile gravity frame detailing Floor seating issues related to gravity frame dilation GWRC Wakefield St: Peer Review of Seismic Reporting to Date, Page 5
Damage Mechanisms in order of CriticaIity - dTC Interpretation
(Additional mechanisms identified by DTC shown bold)
nadequate movement provision in stairs* Vertically over-reinforced nature of the shear walls Construction risks of poor embedment of reinforcement at the base of the concrete ("Franki") piIes causing significant drop in theoreticaI tension capacity Shear faiIure of stair/Iift shearwaII supporting foundation beam each end nadequate tension capacity of existing concrete piles nadequate connection between shear walls and adjacent floor structure around stairs Fragility of Dycore system to take building inter-storey drifts, especially at seating VerticaI coupIing of Grid D13 coIumn through the foundation beam to the adjacent shearwaII, causing verticaI movements that damage Grid C-D gravity structures. Off-set columns/transfers in front gravity beam system Non-ductile nature of 665 mesh floor topping reinforcement Non-ductile gravity frame detailing Liquefaction of the Upper 3-4m zone below the building's foundations Floor seating issues related to gravity frame dilation High nterstorey drift due to flexible lateral load resisting system (predominantly from piles) nadequate Fixings of Precast Panel Cladding to structure nadequate bracing of existing ceiling grid** nadequate separation from Carpark
* Serviceability/perception issue, also associated with DBH advisory on stairs. Lower priority in terms of pure life safety if managed with the appropriate evacuation plan **Although this damage can onset at low levels of load the life safety (as opposed to injury) risks are seen as minimal
GWRC Wakefield St: Peer Review of Seismic Reporting to Date, Page 6
Effect ResuIt CriticaIity Loss of uplift capacity via pile shaft friction as materials liquefy Shear wall rocking at lower levels of acceleration. Overturning risk in large event Limiting factor for %NBS at the onset of significant liquefaction. Surface settlement due to ejected material Cracking through uplift/settlement of ground floor slab. Down drag of non-liquefied soil on piles. Reduction in slab tying walls/piles together (lurch more critical, see below). Shallow crust therefore down-drag effects low. Ground Lurch unliquefied crust moving over liquefied material. Cyclic horizontal translation of building with the surface crust. Causes shearing of the piles when displacements large Requires complete liquefaction, so onset later than other liquefaction issues. Pile shear critical for collapse risk Lateral spreading Net unrecoverable horizontal translation of the crust toward the harbour Effect low relative to buildings seaward of this. Lurch likely more critical
Damage comparison
The accelerations felt at the site would be estimated to be 10-20%NBS based upon interpolation between records (which is not generally applicable as soil conditions can vary greatly). The shaking contained a large proportion of medium frequency wave excitations, with few high and fewer low frequency accelerations. The natural period of the building was on the low frequency-end of this medium band.
Some movement would be expected, significant enough to crack some plasterboard partitions and potentially displace some ceiling tiles, especially on upper floors. Poor faade seals may have torn but the majority would be expected to be intact. The stairs, with little-no movement tolerances would show some cracking, but no instability. The shaking levels would be below the yield level of any critical structural mechanisms.
We believe the above concurs generally with the damage observed, except in the case of the stairs. We understand a construction detail where reinforcement in a critical zone has exacerbated a poor/sensitive design, and that immediate propping was actioned.