Republic vs.

Encelan
G.R. No. 170022
January 9, 2013

The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations not merely the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.Article 36 of the Family Code
governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration
of nullity of marriage. It provides that [a] marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. In interpreting this provision, the Court has
repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical
antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the
celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the
condition of the errant spouse.

Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation.Sexual infidelity and
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are
simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring
spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. No
evidence on record exists to support Cesars allegation that
Lolitas infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of
any psychological illness.

Aside from the time element involved, a wifes
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be
equated with her professional/work relationship;
workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles
apart from their marital counterparts.Cesar
mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores psychological evaluation
report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological
incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established
that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.
Dr. Flores observation on Lolitas interpersonal problems
with co-workers, to our mind, does not suffice as a
consideration for the conclusion that she wasat the time of
her marriagepsychologically incapacitated to enter into a
marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element
involved, a wifes psychological fitness as a spouse cannot
simply be equated with her professional/work relationship;
workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart
from their marital counterparts. While both spring from
human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one
another should be fully established for them to be compared
or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To
be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and
submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores further
belief that Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a
reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere
generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash
conclusion that this Court cannot support.

Marriage is an inviolable social institution
protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of its existence and continuation and against
its dissolution and nullity.Once again, we stress that
marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the
State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence
and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. It
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by
transgressions made by one party to the other during the
marriage.

Mendoza vs. Republic
G.R. No. 157649
November 12, 2012

The Supreme Court is mindful of the policy of the
1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.In Hernandez, 320 SCRA 76 (1999), we
ruminated that: xxx expert testimony should have been
presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests
upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the
1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage.

By the very nature of cases involving the
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, it is
logical and understandable to give weight to the
expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding
the psychological temperament of parties in order to
determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity.The totality of the evidence proving such
incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the
crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v.
Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694 (2009): By the very nature of
cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root
cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while
highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given
case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any
other given case presented before it, must always base its
decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the
parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the
course of the proceedings.

It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all
the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented
by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced
in the course of their proceedings.Even if the expert
opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in
the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to
be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented
was enough to support a finding of his psychological
incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any
form of medical or psychological evidence to show the
psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured
the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein,
was the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the partys psychological condition, as the Court said in
Marcos. But where, like here, the parties had the full
opportunity to present the professional and expert opinions
of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and
incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity, then the
opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trial
courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to
declare the nullity of the marriages. It bears repeating that
the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must
always base their judgments not solely on the expert
opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage that, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, to observe
love, respect and fidelity, and to render help and
support.We have time and again held that psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not
physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must
concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to render
help and support. We have also held that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. To qualify as
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of
marriage, a persons psychological affliction must be grave
and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend
and comply with the essential objects of marriage, including
the rights and obligations between husband and wife. The
affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage,
and must be incurable.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 159594
November 12, 2012

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
will.Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and
is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help,
and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility
and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential
that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological illness.

Psychological incapacity should refer to a mental
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants such as those
enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must
be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability.In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20
(1995), we decreed that psychological incapacity should
refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those
enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability.

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factoran adverse
integral element in the respondents personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligationsmust
be shown.We held in Suazo v. Suazo, 615 SCRA 154
(2010), that there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent
spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations,
viz.: It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factoran adverse integral element in the respondents
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligationsmust be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Abandonment is not one of the grounds for the
nullity of marriage under the Family Code; Sexual
infidelity is not a valid ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.The
only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in
her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to
live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the
grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It
did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being
instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of
the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity
was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there should
be a showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation
of a disordered personality that made her completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

Kalaw vs. Fernandez
G.R. No. 166357
September 19, 2011

Psychological incapacity is the downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; The burden of
proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff;
The psychological problem must be grave, must have
existed at the time of marriage, and must be
incurable.Psychological incapacity is the downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving
psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must
prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her
actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder
that completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.
The psychological problem must be grave, must have
existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of
sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive
need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is
a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity.

Republic vs. Galang
G.R. No. 168335
June 6, 2011

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability.In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Court first declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
The defect should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. We laid down more definitive guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Roridel Olaviano Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), whose
salient points are footnoted below. These guidelines
incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos.

Ting v. Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694 (2009), laid to
rest any question regarding the continued
applicability of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997).Our 2009 ruling in
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,
579 SCRA 193 (2009), placed some cloud in the continued
applicability of the time-tested Molina guidelines. We stated
in this case that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina
unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by
it. This is contrary to the intention of the law, since no
psychological incapacity case can be considered as
completely on all fours with another. Benjamin G. Ting v.
Carmen M. Velez-Ting and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito
Suazo, 582 SCRA 694 (2009), however, laid to rest any
question regarding the continued applicability of Molina. In
these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon
Molina. Far from abandoning Molina, Ngo Te simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We
also explained that Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a
more flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance
of some marital obligationsit is essential that the
spouse must be shown to be incapable of doing so
because of some psychological, not physical, illness.
The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a)
refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their
child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the
house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00
that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the
respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the
money deposited in his account; (e) falsified the
respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made
up false stories in order to borrow money from their
relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling. These acts, to our
mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that the law requires. We stress that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma
Cuison-Melgar, et al., 486 SCRA 177 (2006), we ruled that it
is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so
because of some psychological, not physical, illness.
In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the personan adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriagehad to be shown. A cause
has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the
psychological incapacity.

If the incapacity can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof
cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of
psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologists examination and report.To begin with,
the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her
conclusions exclusively from the information given her by
the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description of
Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a
psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description
alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient. We
are of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos that
the person sought to be declared psychologically
incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as a
condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the
incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to
support a conclusion of psychological incapacity,
independently of a psychologists examination and report. In
this case, however, no such independent evidence has ever
been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from
independent sources who intimately knew Juvy before and
after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot
of difference and could have added weight to the
psychologists report.

The psychologists report that the spouse lacks
the initiative to change and that her mental
incapacity appears incorrigible are insufficient to
prove that her mental condition could not be treated,
or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her
means to undertake.In the end, the psychologist
opinedwithout stating the psychological basis for her
conclusionthat there is sufficient reason to believe that
the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to
perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only
son. We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly
inadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did not even
identify the types of psychological tests which she
administered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys
psychological condition. We also stress that the acts alleged
to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the
marriage; there was no showing that any mental disorder
existed at the inception of the marriage. Second, the report
failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged
condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder
is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her
marital duties. Significantly, the report did not even
categorically state the particular type of personality disorder
found. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability
of Juvys condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy
lacks the initiative to change and that her mental
incapacity appears incorrigible are insufficient to prove
that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to
undertake.

To be declared clinically or medically incurable is
one thingto refuse or be reluctant to change is
another.The psychologists court testimony fared no
better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or
incurability of Juvys alleged psychological defect as she
merely reiterated what she wrote in her reporti.e., that
Juvy was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and
kuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent;
deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her child
without linking these to an underlying psychological cause.
Again, these allegations, even if true, all occurred during the
marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any
information or insight into Juvys early life and associations,
how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and
how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed.
Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of
Juvys psychological condition and to relate it to an existing
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of
gravity and incurability. In these respects, she merely stated
that despite the respondents efforts to show love and
affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this premise,
she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be
incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure.
These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity
or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. To
be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to
refuse or be reluctant to change is another. To hark back to
what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers
only to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties, or one of them, could not
have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a
grave and serious psychological illness existing at the
time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.The
Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and
strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the
evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a
marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological
illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

Aurelio vs. Aurelio
G.R. No. 175367
June 6, 2011

Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-
10 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions
for annulment of marriage.Before anything else, it
bears to point out that had respondents complaint been
filed after March 15, 2003, this present petition would have
been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No.
02-11-10 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in
actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a
circumspect review of the arguments raised by petitioner
herein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.

Guidelines in the Disposition of Cases Involving
Psychological Incapacity (Molina Guidelines).In
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 639 (1997), this
Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the
disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to
wit: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (4) Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential
marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-
10, has modified the Molina Guidelines, particularly
Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of
the Solicitor General is dispensed with to avoid
delay.This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court
Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above
pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating
that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the
Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48
of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to be on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.

Whether or not the spouses are psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations is a
matter for the trial court to decide at the first
instance.It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner
and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at
the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would
show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the
parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have
testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court
after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from
guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by
the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too
burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance
whether the allegations contained in the petition are
sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity.
Let it be remembered that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals. It would thus be more prudent
for this Court to remand he case to the RTC, as it would be
in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear
and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the
ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the
parties.

Marable vs. Marable
G.R. No. 178741
January 17, 2011

Psychological incapacity must refer to no less
than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage.The term psychological
incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. These are the disorders that
result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted
party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or
she has contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.

The psychological illness and its root cause must
be proven to exist from the inception of the
marriage.In cases of annulment of marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological
illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the
inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly
ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root
cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The
evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion
that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality
Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding
that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious,
impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.

Personal differences do not reflect a personality
disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity.The
spouses frequent marital squabbles and differences in
handling finances and managing their business affairs, as
well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are not
manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a
ground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner even
admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had
happy moments together. Also, the records would show that
the petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and in
fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most
especially his children. Their personal differences do not
reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological
incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations.It bears stressing that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned
party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

Ochosa vs. Olano
G.R. No. 167459
January 26, 2011

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of
Appeals, we observed that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Article 36 of the Family Code does not really
dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there
never was any marriage in the first place.It is also
established in jurisprudence that from these requirements
arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not
really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there
never was any marriage in the first place because the
afflictionalready then existingwas so grave and
permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or
she was to assume or had assumed.

Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves.We have stressed time and again that Article
36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage.

Yambao vs. Republic
G.R. No. 184063
January 24, 2011

Court should interpret Article 36 of the Family
Code on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent
pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity
under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals. Judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case,
current trends in psychological and even canonical thought,
and experience.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability; These guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated; The root cause may be
medically or clinically identified.In Santos v. Court
of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Court held that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be medically or clinically identified.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. If
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.

For a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of
the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated
spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.The
intendment of the law has been to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. Thus, for a
marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code,
the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to
suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
will; It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person;
it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness.Article
36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the
following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself
must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering
of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring;
and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed
to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological illness.

Agraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviador
G.R. No. 170729
December 8, 2010

The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was
that it did not involve a species of vice of consent.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored
on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that [a]
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization. It introduced the concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage,
although this concept eludes exact definition. The initial
common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code was that it did not involve a species of
vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both
members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted
the Code, conceded that the spouse may have given free
and voluntary consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless,
incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Dr. Arturo
Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations
does not affect the consent to the marriage.

It is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established.In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20
(1995), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. We laid down more definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals (the
Molina case) x x x These guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements we established in Santos. A later case, Marcos
v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000), further clarified that there
is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration
of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if
the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability
can be duly established.

Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 579 SCRA 193 (2009), did not
abandon Molina (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268
SCRA 198 [1997])far from abandoning Molina, it
simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements Ngo Te merely stands for a more
flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity.A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,
579 SCRA 193 (2009), declared that it may have been
inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as
the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a guideline,
Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all
cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be
bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the
law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to
psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on
all fours with another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into question
the applicability of time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina.
Ting v. Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694 (2009), and the fairly
recent case of Suazo v. Suazo, 615 SCRA 154 (2010),
squarely met the issue and laid to rest any question
regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we
clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far from
abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its
stringent requirements. We also explained in Suazo that Ngo
Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity.

The intent of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disordersexisting at the
time of the marriageclearly demonstrating an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.These exchanges during
trial significantly constituted the totality of the petitioners
testimony on the respondents supposed psychological or
mental malady. We glean from these exchanges the
petitioners theory that the respondents psychological
incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to
perform certain marital obligations, and a number of
unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity,
irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view,
do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the
law requires, and should be distinguished from the
difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in the
performance of some marital obligations that characterize
some marriages. The intent of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disordersexisting at the time of the
marriageclearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at
the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is
about to assume.

If a psychological disorder can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such
independent proof cannot be admitted and given
credit.We do not suggest that a personal examination of
the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the
person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated
must be personally examined by a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. If a
psychological disorder can be proven by independent means,
no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence
appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this
case.

Insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional
immaturity, and irresponsibility, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.Dr. Patacs Psychiatric
Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or
seriousness of the respondents condition. He simply made
an enumeration of the respondents purported behavioral
defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this
basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from
mixed personality disorder. In the Background History
portion of his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac
mentioned that the respondent employed one of her siblings
to do the household chores; did not help in augmenting the
familys earnings; belittled the petitioners income;
continued her studies despite the petitioners disapproval;
seldom stayed at home; became close to a male border;
had an affair with a lesbian; did not disclose the actual date
of her departure to Taiwan; threatened to poison the
petitioner and their children; neglected and ignored their
children; used her maiden name at work; and consulted a
witch doctor to bring bad fate to the petitioner. Except for
the isolated and unfounded statement that Erlindas lack of
motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to
render love, respect and support to the family, there was
no other statement regarding the degree of severity of the
respondents condition, why and to what extent the disorder
is grave, and how it incapacitated her to comply with the
duties required in marriage. There was likewise no showing
of a supervening disabling factor or debilitating psychological
condition that effectively incapacitated the respondent from
complying with the essential marital obligations. At any rate,
the personality flaws mentioned above, even if true, could
only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional
immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.

Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in
assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation
reports may be deemed very strict, but these are
proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage
and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.
Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing the
sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be
deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the
principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum. Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the
State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties,
especially where the prices of evidence presented are
grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity
and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the
essential marital duties.

Baccay vs. Baccay
G.R. No. 173138
December 1, 2010

The phrase psychological incapacity is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychosesit refers to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support.The Court held in
Santos v. Court of Appeals that the phrase psychological
incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most
serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.

Guidelines in Resolving Petitions for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage.In Republic of the Phils. v. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), the Court laid down the
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit: (1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state. The
Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36
of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,
not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x x x x x (8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the
performance of some marital obligationsan
unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
marriage.The Court emphasizes that the burden falls
upon petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent
suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders her truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a
null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos,
343 SCRA 755 (2000): Article 36 of the Family Code, we
stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

Toring vs. Toring
G.R. No. 162025
August 3, 2010

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be
sufficient basis to annul a marriage.In the leading
case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., 240 SCRA 20
(1995), we held that psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be
sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage.

The psychological illness and its root cause must
have been there from the inception of the marriage.
Sub-sequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity
applied these basic guidelines to varying factual situations,
thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos.
In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, what
should not be lost in reading and applying our established
rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of
Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of
personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in
the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give
meaning and significance to the marriage he or she
contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and its
root cause must have been there from the inception of the
marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that
Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a
marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any
marriage in the first place because the afflictionalready
then existingwas so grave and permanent as to deprive
the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to
assume or had assumed.

Court has long been negatively critical in
considering psychological evaluations, presented in
evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources,
particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the
marriage.We are in no way convinced that a mere
narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson,
coupled with the results of the psychological tests
administered only on Ricardo, without more, already
constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita
suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court
has long been negatively critical in considering psychological
evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-
sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the
nullity of the marriage.

The law does not require that the allegedly
incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a
physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua
non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.To be sure, we have
recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly
incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a physician
or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. This recognition, however, does not signify
that the evidence, we shall favorably appreciate, should be
any less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its
nature, requires.

Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the
part of the spouse is different from incapacity
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness.Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a
squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however, find
Ricardos characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations.
Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.

In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as
psychological incapacity, the respondents
unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation
of a disordered personality completely preventing the
respondent from discharging the essential obligations
of the marital state; There must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated her from complying with the obligation
to be faithful to her spouse.Teresitas alleged infidelity,
even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In order for
sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the
respondents unfaithfulness must be established as a
manifestation of a disordered personality, completely
preventing the respondent from discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be
faithful to her spouse.

Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Ricardo failed to prove that Teresitas alleged character
traits already existed at the inception of their marriage.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological
incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization. In the absence of this element, a
marriage cannot be annulled under Article 36.

Ruling in Barcelona does not do away with the
root cause requirement; the ruling simply means
that the statement of the root cause does not need to
be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the
root causes of many psychological disorders are still
unknown to science.Contrary to Ricardos position,
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 412 SCRA 41 (2003), does
not do away with the root cause requirement. The ruling
simply means that the statement of the root cause does not
need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the
root causes of many psychological disorders are still
unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the
physical manifestations constituting the root cause of the
psychological incapacity.

What the Rules really eliminated was the need for
an expert opinion to prove the root cause of the
psychological incapacity.As we explained in Barcelona,
the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was not
dispensed with by the adoption of the Rules. What the Rules
really eliminated was the need for an expert opinion to
prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. The
Court further held that the Rules, being procedural in
nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the
time of their adoption.

Camacho-Reyes vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 185286
August 18, 2010

Courts should be extra careful before making a
finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously
diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where
there are none; Blind adherence by the courts to the
exhortation in the Constitution and in our statutes
that marriage is an inviolable social institution, and
validating a marriage that is null and void despite
convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches
on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed
from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon
its hapless partners for life.This case is, again, an
instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra
careful before making a finding of psychological incapacity or
vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses
where there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence
by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution and in
our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social institution,
and validating a marriage that is null and void despite
convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the
very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its
inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless
partners for life.

The factors characterizing psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations
are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3)
incurability.Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20
(1995), solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the
principle that the factors characterizing psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are:
(1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability.
We explained: The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

The lack of personal examination and interview of
the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with
personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the
testimonies of the doctors, and neither do their
findings automatically constitute hearsay that would
result in their exclusion as evidence.Notwithstanding
these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the
testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay
since they never personally examined and interviewed the
respondent. We do not agree with the CA. The lack of
personal examination and interview of the respondent, or
any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does
not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither
do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would
result in their exclusion as evidence. For one, marriage, by
its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons.
The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely
witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts
testified on their individual assessment of the present state
of the parties marriage from the perception of one of the
parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their
marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience,
respondents pattern of behavior which she could then
validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the
psychiatrist. For another, the clinical psychologists and
psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on the
narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other
informants such as respondents own son, siblings and in-
laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on
their own observations of respondents behavior and
interactions with them, spanning the period of time they
knew him. These were also used as the basis of the doctors
assessments.

Within their acknowledged field of expertise,
doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a
person based on a number of factors culled from
various sources.Within their acknowledged field of
expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up
of a person based on a number of factors culled from various
sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will
not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this
case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in
a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent
consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot
trump the clinical findings of experts.

A recommendation for therapy does not
automatically imply curability.The CA declared that,
based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the
psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable. The
appellate court is mistaken. A recommendation for therapy
does not automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by clinical
psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In
Kaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled Synopsis of
Psychiatry, treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to
pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality
disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans
recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy
does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents
psychological incapacity is incurable.

In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on all fours with another casethe
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.All told, it is wise to be reminded of the
caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his
separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997): x x x Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on
all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains
in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must,
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court.

Ligeralde vs. Patalinghug
G.R. No. 168796
April 15, 2010

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage.Psychological
incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.

Guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity.The Court likewise laid down the guidelines in
resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 603 SCRA 604 (2009), Relevant to this petition
are the following: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

Private respondents act of living an adulterous
life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait
already existing at the inception of marriage.The acts
of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the
psychological incapacity that the law requires. Private
respondents act of living an adulterous life cannot
automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of
marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that
respondents unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which makes her completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

Suazo vs. Suazo
G.R. No. 164493
March 12, 2010

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability; It must be confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995) declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be
confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.

There is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity.A later
case, Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000), further
clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine
qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence
shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established.