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The journal of philosophy, Vol. 38, no. 17 (aug. 14, 1941), pp. 449-465. For the logical positivist, "ethics, as a branch of knowledge, is nothing more than a department of psychology and sociology" for the dionysian, ethics is 'a bit of science but a bit of art'
The journal of philosophy, Vol. 38, no. 17 (aug. 14, 1941), pp. 449-465. For the logical positivist, "ethics, as a branch of knowledge, is nothing more than a department of psychology and sociology" for the dionysian, ethics is 'a bit of science but a bit of art'
The journal of philosophy, Vol. 38, no. 17 (aug. 14, 1941), pp. 449-465. For the logical positivist, "ethics, as a branch of knowledge, is nothing more than a department of psychology and sociology" for the dionysian, ethics is 'a bit of science but a bit of art'
Author(s): Mary L. Coolidge Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 17 (Aug. 14, 1941), pp. 449-465 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2018260 . Accessed: 06/03/2014 11:46 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Philosophy. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VOLUME XXXVIII, No. 17 AUGUST 14, 1941 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY ETHICS-APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN I FOR the logical positivist, ". . . ethics, as a branch of knowledge, is nothing more than a department of psychology and sociol- ogy." ' By such statements as this the logical positivists mean, of course, that to the social sciences belongs the task of assembling and sorting the facts concerning what human beings have thought and felt, and do think and feel, about what are ordinarily called moral problems, and concerning human behavior in making moral choices. And they mean also that anything to be found in ethical discus- sions and theories over and above such tabulation of facts can be allowed no standing as science, or as philosophy in the traditional sense-i.e., it can make no valid claim to be or to yield truth or knowledge-but must be accepted as mere "expressions and exci- tants of feeling." 2 Now when language is used not to convey information but to ex- press or excite feeling the result is commonly accepted as being not a bit of science but a bit of art. Thus ethics, in so far as it is any- thing more than a statement of the facts about thinking, feeling, and behavior, becomes, according to the analysis of the logical posi- tivists, an art. Various members of this group have suggested that this is the case, and the conclusion is an obvious one if the prior conclusions concerning the nature of knowledge, the meaningless- ness of the propositions of traditional metaphysics and value theory, etc., are accepted. That the traditional philosophical view of the nature of ethics differs sharply from that just described would not, I believe, be doubted by anyone. The difference lies not in any denial in the traditional accounts that an ethical theory is in some sense a work of art but in the positive claim made in these accounts that it is also something more. The reinterpretations of ethics which have been important in the history of thought have always been ex- pressions of the fused thought and feeling of one person or of a group of persons, and they have always had in greater or less degree 1 Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936), p. 168. A similar account of ethical statements may be found in Rudolf Carnap 's Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935). See Chapter I, Section 4. 2 Op. cit., p. 163. 449 This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 450 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY the power to arouse similar fusions of thought and feeling in other persons. No reasonably sensitive student of Socratic, or Aris- totelian, or Spinozistic, or Kalntian, or Spencerian ethical systems -however unsympathetic or even antagonistic his own response to one or all of these systems may be-can fail to recognize that each is the embodiment of a certain emotional attitude on the part of its author and that each has been the means of transmit- ting the emotion expressed to countless other individuals and of persuading them to adopt the attitude recommended. But it is clear that neither Socrates, nor Aristotle, nor Spinoza, nor Kant, nor Spencer thought of himself as merely transmitting an emotion or bringing about the duplication of an attitude. On the contrary each believed that he was offering a true account of the nature of moral values and of the basis of moral judgments. And each also undertook to relate his ethical conclusions to the general conclu- sions of a wider philosophical system which dealt with metaphysical and epistemological matters as well as with ethical ones. The historically important interpretations of Christianity have a like character. In them also the ethical teachings are presented as authoritative. And while one can not extract from the Gos- pels statements on metaphysical and epistemological matters so phrased that they are readily matched with the statements of Greek or later European philosophers, yet assumptions and asser- tions concerning the nature of God, the nature of man, and man's ability to know good and evil are essential parts of New Testa- ment teachings; and these doctrines are accepted as having a very definite relationship to the ethical conclusions. Thus the orthodox, traditional view of philosophers and theo- logians has been one according to which an ethical theory gives a knowledge of values and is accepted as being logically allied to, if not explicitly deduced from, a metaphysical theory or a theol- ogy. If one looks in the past for exemplifications of a point of view towards ethics not unlike that of the logical positivists, one finds them at times when older interpretations of the tradition have come to seem inadequate and newer ones are not yet available. In such periods men have wearied of metaphysical and theological speculations and have been content to accept their ethical beliefs as relatively detached accounts of human wishes and hopes, often as more or less moving and more or less persuasive descriptions of the life that "our fathers" or "the wise" have led and that we suppose it might be well for us and our children to lead. The writings of some of the Latin authors of Cicero's time and later, when the ideals of the Stoics and the Epicureans were being merged and the original metaphysical bases of the two systems were for- This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ETHICS-APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN 451 gotten or deliberately rejected, have this character. And Chris- tian ethical theory has also at times slipped its metaphysical or theological moorings and drifted with the tide of inherited senti- ment. There is, however, nothing that suggests weariness or drift in the writings of the contemporary logical positivists. On the con- trary there is a crisp and positive incisiveness about them. They suggest that the writers have little interest in the conclusions of the past and appeal to the thinking of the present and the future -a thinking envisaged as essentially scientific and logical-for confirmation of the rightness and fruitfulness of their contentions. And it is clear that this is the proper, and indeed the inevitable, testing ground. Fundamental criticism-either sympathetic or adverse-of their theories must in the end concern itself with the logical assumptions on which the theories are based and the argu- ments by which they are supported. It is not such criticism, however, that will be presented in this paper. There is room and need, also, I believe, for another sort of investigation, i.e., for an examination of the implications of the assumptions made and the conclusions drawn. And the task to be undertaken here is that of an inquiry as to what ethical discussion is likely to be if it is understood to have the character and the limitations that the log- ical positivists ascribe to it. We shall, in other words, accept pro- visionally the logical positivists' summary account of what ethics can be and then attempt to make clear to ourselves how, within the bounds prescribed, it might be expected to develop. I shall assume that there is no need to consider what may, and should, be done by psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, etc., in col- lecting facts about moral beliefs and the feelings, emotions, and reactions connected with them. The methods to be used, and the limitation of the ends that can be reached by these methods, are clear and generally recognized. What will be considered is the residual talk about ethical matters, and specifically such talk as purports to be not about facts but about values and ultimate ends. I understand that the logical positivists agree that such talk is bound to go on, and that they have no wish to discourage it so long as it is recognized as laying no claim to be asserting truths or extending knowledge. As an "emotive" use of language it is held to have the character of art; and it is as such that I propose to consider it. II If we are to expect ethical discussion to have the character not of theory purporting to give knowledge but of art, an obvious first step in inquiry is to ask what character is to be ascribed to art and This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 452 THE JOURNAL OPF PHILOSOPHY what has been found to be the most generally useful classification of the arts. Historically, of course, all sorts of answers have been given to the question, "What is art?" But most of these answers we need not in our present discussion consider. We need not, for example, consider interpretations in which a claim is made that art reveals Ideal beauty, or the character of the universe as a whole, or the Absolute, or the nature of Spirit, etc. We can disregard such interpretations because we are attempting to confine our discus- sion within the bounds set by the logical positivists, and since they assert that we can never know anything about Platonic Ideas, or the universe as a whole, or the Absolute, or Spirit, etc., we can not be expected to entertain theories of art according to which art is said to yield such knowledge. This means that we can disre- gard all the generally idealistic theories of art from that of Plato to those of Bosanquet and Croce-and their number is very large. Other theories which might not ordinarily be regarded as ideal- istic but in which similar claims are made that art gives a "vision of reality" or reinforces ultimate ethical or religious truths-those of Bergson and Tolstoi, for example-may be eliminated on much the same ground; they presuppose that we can have a sort of knowledge which the logical positivists deny that anyone can ever have. One may put the matter in a somewhat different way by point- ing out that the logical positivists deny the validity of a normative esthetics just as they deny that of a normative ethics. And the interpretations of the nature of art which we have just said that we can disregard are ones in which the claim is made that esthetic norms do exist and that good art is good in so far as it exemplifies them. Since we are attempting to ascertain what ethical discus- sion can be within the limits prescribed by logical positivist doc- trine, we can-and indeed must-refrain from translating it into the terms of an esthetic theory which the upholders of such a doc- trine would regard as itself invalid. The interpretations of the nature of art which we have left to consider, after the eliminations of which we have spoken have been made, are ones in which art is accepted as the expression of hu- man feeling and emotion in some form by means of which this feeling or emotion can, under favorable conditions, be transmitted to others. There are variations in the formulation of interpreta- tions having this general character. In some accounts emphasis falls on the expression itself, in others on the transmission of it. In some accounts works of art are thought of as reflecting the emotions of an individual, in others as expressions of a social or This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ETHICS-APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN 453 group consciousness. But the accounts are alike in differentiating art from science and from strictly utilitarian activities as being immediately "expressive." The sciences of psychology, sociology, etc., give us knowledge about human wishes, feelings, and emotions. The practical, utilitarian crafts procure for us things that satisfy them. The arts express them directly in some "emotive" language -for example, in sound, line, color, words, etc.3 The commonest and most generally accepted classification of the arts is that based on the differences in the media used in the different arts. Croce has denied that these differences have any real significance. But the fact remains that artists, critics, and members of the general public do constantly take for granted that there is an obvious and significant distinction between the art of the painter who uses color and line, that of the sculptor who uses three dimensional forms, that of the musician who uses tones in temporal sequences, that of the writer who uses words, etc. There would seem to be no doubt that "ethical emotions"-i.e., the emo- tions experienced in connection with situations involving moral choices or moral judgments-are more often and more clearly ex- pressed in words than in the fine arts or music. Thus ethical dis- course as art is more nearly related to literature than to other forms of art. Both can manage to convey incidentally a good deal of information and to include an examination and analysis of ideas; but neither has as its chief function the giving of knowledge or the analysis of ideas. As a matter of fact it is difficult to see how if ethical discussion is developed and accepted as an art any sharp distinction can be drawn between it and "pure" literature except on some arbitrary basis. Since ethical writers are in general willing to be more directly hortatory than literary ones, we might find it convenient to rule that a work is to be considered ethical if it has a given degree of hortatoriness, and literary if it has not. It is clear that on the basis of any such distinction there would be doubt- ful, borderline cases; but there were, for that matter, doubtful, borderline cases in the past when ethical writers who believed their proper task was to deal with norms made use in formulating them of literary techniques, and men of letters incorporated in their works-and that quite without apology-the normative and meta- physical conclusions of philosophers. Thus a brief preliminary consideration as to what according to the view of the logical positivists ethical discourse will be leads to the conclusion that it will resemble literature in being an expres- sion of human wishes, feelings, and desires, but that it will be in 3 Carnap's acceptance of a theory about art such as that outlined is shown on pages 28 and 29 of Philosophy and Logical Syntax. This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 454 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY typical cases distinguishable from "pure" literature in being more directly hortatory. It will doubtless exhibit the influence of the times and places in which it is produced; and it will be the task of the historians to note, and in so far as possible to explain in terms of psychological, social, economic, political, and other causal factors, the differences between given examples. This will, of course, be no new task for critics and historians to undertake, since any history of ideas has always offered some analysis of this sort. There remains one general classification of the arts-over and above those already noted-the importance of which has been stressed in countless critical and historical treatments of the arts which would seem to be quite applicable, although not heretofore very often actually applied, in an analysis of types of ethical theory. This is the classification of art as classic or romantic, or in Nietzschean terms as Apollonian or Dionysian. For this is a classification that cuts across and beneath the distinction between one literary form and another, and across and beneath the distinc- tion between one form of art and another, and deals with funda- mental differences in human wishes, desires, and feelings. It ex- hibits the latter as springing from two different sources and as pressing for expression in two widely diverging directions. It is, of course, possible to treat the cont-rast between the classic and the romantic in art in various ways. One may define classic art literally and historically as that produced at a certain time or times in the Graeco-Roman world. Or one may, widening the con- cept to some extent, accept as "classics' all art whenever and wherever produced which appears to be like that of Greece and Rome in spirit or in execution. When such characterizations of "classic'" art are adopted, the term "romantic 'is left to cover, often rather vaguely, the art of other places and periods in which there are signs of a revolt against the established classic tradition. Or some such formula as that of "unity in variety" may be used to define art; and one may distinguish classic forms of drama or sculpture as those in which the emphasis is placed on the unity of the whole from romantic forms in which the emphasis is placed on the variety of interests displayed or details elaborated. But while all these distinctions have some usefulness, there is a deeper and more significant one; and it is this distinction that Nietzsche has made clear in his account of the difference between the Apol- lonian and the Dionysian sources of artistic expressioii. Nietzsche, it will be remembered, speaks of Apollonian art as that of the dream. It is an art of "fair appearance," of fantasy and image; and it has always its "measured limitation" and "free- dom from the wilder emotions. " It is a shaped and individualized This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ETHICS-APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN 455 art with "all the joy and wisdom of 'appearance' together with its beauty." Dionysian art on the other hand is that of drunken- ness. It is an art of enchantment, of self-forgetfulness, of ecstatic revelry; it celebrates a breaking of bonds and forms, a limitless and exuberant vitality. It rejoices in the expression of mysterious depths of primitive, non-individualized feeling, feeling that belongs to many men together or to man and nature when the two are felt to be one.4 There is, of course, exaggeration in Nietzsche's vivid description of the classic-romantic antithesis. But his description has haunted the imagination of the critics ever since The Birth of Tragedy was published. It is true, their attention to his theory goes to show that there are two very different drives or sets of impulses at work in man, the one seeking expression that is orderly, beautiful, serene, the other finding its only possible outlet in the mysterious, the passionate, and the tumultuous. The development of romantic art is not for Nietzsche simply a pleasant excursion into new coun- try, an experimenting with new forms by those who have become somewhat tired of the old. It is an expression of forces at work in the depths of human nature. And in these depths one finds not only the traditionally recognized desire for pleasure and se- curity but "the longing for the ugly, the good resolute desire . . . for pessimism, for tragic myth, for the picture of all that is terrible, evil, enigmatical, destructive, fatal at the basis of existence. . . . 5 If with this description of the two sources of art in mind we turn, not as Nietzsche himself did to an interpretation of literature and music, but to an examination of ethical writings, we shall find the clearest examples of an Apollonian treatment of the good for man in the Utopias. For these are descriptive not of any world that does exist or that has existed but of an ideal world. Some accounts of Utopia have been fantastic in the extreme, and even the communities described by such relatively sober thinkers as Plato and Bacon belong clearly among the dream worlds. They differ from the real world in being more orderly, more beautiful, and more cheerful. If the beings who inhabit them are like enough to ourselves to be recognizably human-and this is usually the case, -they are generally healthier, wiser, more virtuous, and happier. Plato, whose interests were moral and political, implied in his two descriptions of Utopian communities, The Reputblic and The Laws, that their superiority had been brought about by education and by the use of the right legal, political, and economic organization. 4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (3rd ed. of Eng. translation; N. Y.: Macmillan, 1924), pp. 22-28. 5 Ibid., p. 7. This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 456 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Bacon, whose interests were scientific, put more stress upon the ad- vantages to be obtained by an increase of scientific knowledge and invention. The Utopias of other writers have usually been built upon one or the other of these models. A curious modern version of a conspicuously Apollonian Utopia is to be found in the forecasts of those Marxist thinkers who look forward to a time when, after class struggles have ended and classes have been abolished, the millennium of a peaceful anarchy will at last pervade the earth. (Of course a description of Utopia-as The Republic-may be more than an artistic description of a dream world. It may include a complete metaphysics or a theology. But as a description-and it is as such that we are interested in it here-it is a bit of Apol- lonian art.) During the latter half of the last century and the first decades of this one, a wide-spread acceptance of doctrines of evolution made the projection of Utopian dreams into a not-too-distant "real" future a common habit of mind with many men of the western world. Bacon's faith that when man understood nature he could use her to make his own life continually safer, fuller, and richer seemed to be rapidly justifying itself. And had not Nature her- self been discovered to be furthering man's highest hopes in a man- ner which Bacon himself had not anticipated but which Spencer confidently explained to a countless number of attentive readers? This optimistic belief in progress was found particularly congenial by persons living in the United States. The wealth of an undevel- oped country made the prophecies of unprecedented abundance of material goods to be enjoyed in the near future seem far more possible of fulfillment in America than in the poorer countries of the old world. And Plato's faith in the power of education to re- make human society and to improve human nature itself has been widely and continuously preached in this country from Jefferson's day to that of John Dewey. If descriptions of Utopia, labelled as such, have not been especially numerous among American literary and ethical writings, the general temper of many of the most im- portant works on ethical and social theory produced here has been without question optimistic and Apollonian. The ideal worlds of different writers are, of course, different- Apollonian art is an individualized art. But these worlds are alike in exhibiting order, harmony, and "fair appearance." And the lives that men lead in them are lives of order, peace, and pleasant- ness, although the necessity for discipline and for self-sacrifice in certain cases need not be denied. If these descriptions are accepted -as ethical discourse on the logical positivist premises must be accepted-as expressive only and without reference to any norma- This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ETHICS-APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN 457 tive or absolute presuppositions, they can be judged solely on the basis of their persuasiveness. Since the Apollonian artist is char- acteristically optimistic, he seldom lacks confidence in his own powers of persuasion. "This is the world of my dreams. Can anyone fail to find it beautiful ?" He waits for no negative reply. If he heard one he could do nothing about it. He has not pre- sented an argument but has attempted to move mankind by the portrayal of what is pleasant to himself. The sketch of the good life presented by the logical positivist, Moritz Schlick, in Problems of Ethics seems to me typical of the kind of Apollonian ethical discourse just described. Much of this volume is devoted to an exposition of the general position of logical positivism and to a criticism of older ethical theories. The rest of it consists of an account of the satisfactoriness of a life of kindly happiness. This is a sort of life to secure, we are told, for it is a way of life in harmony with natural desires for what is pleasant. Thus one has a description running true to the pattern of tradi- tional egoistical hedonism, a description which when offered as without metaphysical or theological implications and when advo- cated by a person of a naturally optimistic temperament yields a typically Apollonian picture of man and society. Dionysian ethical theories are less easily recognized than are Apollonian ones. This is the case because they express impulses that are more primitive and chaotic and hence less readily organ- ized and made articulate. Nietzsche suggests that in the realm of pure art the most natural outlet for Dionysian emotion is music, while the most natural embodiment of Apollonian dreams is in pic- tures. And music is less readily translated into verbal descrip- tion than are pictures. We can not, therefore, expect to find as systematic a working-out of the romantic view of life in ethical discourse as we did of the classic view in the case of the Utopias. Fragmentary expressions of the Dionysian view can, however, be found in many places. If, for example, we turn to the Old Testament writings, the existence of a great variety of teachings, and the contradictions that are easily pointed out between the teachings of one book and that of another, will suggest that we have in the Old Testament neither the systematic development of a single line of philosophical-ethical argument nor the unified presentation of a world-dream. And an outpouring of primitive desires and feelings similar to that which, as Nietzsche pointed out, appear in the Greek choruses is to be found in many parts of many books. There are romantic stories, as that of Belshazzar's feast; passionate bursts of oratory, as Ezekiel's discourse on the sword of the Lord; mysterious references to the Strange Woman even in the midst of This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 458 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY advice to be wise; and countless vivid descriptions of battles, of plagues, and of doomed cities. The emotion displayed is not that of an individual but that of a people whose ties are the deep and at times the secret ones of a common blood and a common devotion to special rites and special holy places. Exhortation is sometimes for one and sometimes for another sort of action: for courage in battle, for rejection of alien customs, for expiatory suffering, for participation in national repentance or national rejoicing. But in each case the presupposition is that the action will be the result of feelings and hopes that belong to the deep under-currents of a common life. No one could, of course, wish to deny that there is a great deal more in the ethical teaching of the Old Testament than an expression of the romantic side of human nature. There are books, or at least parts of books, which show something like a classi- cal serenity and love of order. And in the chronologically later writings "righteousness" has an absolute and eternal validity and the account of it yields a normative ethics logically bound up with a theology. Even in the earlier books it is probably true that one could always trace some connection between the ethical teaching and a taken-for-granted-theology. But in so far as one can sort out the non-normative and non-theological elements they would appear to be more often Dionysian than Apollonian. The more important interpretations of Christian ethics have been, as we have already noted, essentially normative. Specifically it is the concept of sin-really a theological concept but one with- out which an ethical system is not Christian-that can not be re- duced to purely esthetic or expressive terms. But Christian ethical theories have not infrequently shown the influence of classic or ro- mantic ideals. In accounts of either the Garden of Eden or the King- dom of Heaven it has always been easy to incorporate Utopian-Apol- lonian elements. St. Augustine, Dante, and Milton are among those who have seized and exploited this opportunity. When writers have been impressed by the importance in human nature of its Dionysian elements, they have been called upon to use somewhat more ingenuity to make this fact apparent within the framework of a Christian theology or metaphysics. But it has proved quite possible to give romantic passions in the shape of vices to the Devil or the damned, and romantic passions in the shape of heroic virtues to the saints in their struggle against the forces of evil. On the whole the influence on Christian teaching of the Aristo- telian doctrine that man is a rational being-and the influence has been a strong one-has tended to an emphasis on an Apollonian rather than a Dionysian interpretation of the good life. A Utopian dream appears more rational than ecstasy. The result has been This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ETHICS-APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN 459 that writers who have recognized most strongly the non-rational, romantic impulses at work in human nature, and who did not wish to break entirely with the Christian tradition, have often produced ethical theories exhibiting strange compromises between conflict- ing ideals. In this group I should include Hobbes, Rousseau, and Schopenhauer. Another example of compromise-in this instance one between the Apollonian ideal of Greek rationalism and a deeply inherent sense of the dark and mysterious forces in nature and in man-can be found in the writings of Lucretius. In the case of the writers just mentioned, as well as in that of the more orthodox upholders of a Christian interpretation of ethics, the ethical theories are parts of wider metaphysical or theological systems and offer definite, normative accounts of ethical good. I have referred to them here because they illustrate the fact that even when the general current of thought and feeling runs strongly in the direction of a normative or an Apollonian ethics there are those who see life and human nature as Dionysian or romantic. And it has also seemed to me important to note the fact that the combined influence of Greek rationalism and Christian dogma upon European thought tended to make any open expression of a thor- oughly Dionysian ethics difficult, if not impossible, before the time of Nietzsche. Before taking up Nietzsche's case, however, it may be as well to look briefly at that of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer did not break entirely with traditional Christian ethics but his reinterpre- tation of this ethics is unorthodox in the extreme. His doctrine of the existence of an underlying blind will would seem entirely com- patible with a Dionysian ethics, but his ethical ideal of complete and final asceticism is not. Some of the ideas borrowed by him from eastern philosophies show his own strong inclination to ac- cept life as a Dionysian phenomenon. But in the end he aligns himself with those in the group of eastern thinkers who reject all positive, earthly values. It is for this refusal to accept life that Nietzsche, who in his youth was strongly influenced by Schopen- hauer, in the end denounces him. Nietzsche also interprets human life in terms of will. But unlike Schopenhauer he rejoices in the multifold manifestations of this will. And this secret spoke Life herself unto me. "Behold," said she, "I am that which must ever surpass itself. "To be sure, ye call it will to procreation, or impulse towards a goal, towards the higher, remoter, more manifold: but all that is one and the same 8ecret. This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 460 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY "That I have to be struggle, and be coming, and purpose, and cross pur- pose-ah, he who divineth my will, divineth well also on the crooked paths it bath to tread! "Whatever I create, and however much I love it,-soon must I be adverse to it, and to my love: so willeth my will. "Thus did Life once teach me: and thereby, ye wisest ones, do I solve you the riddle of your hearts. "Verily, I say unto you: good and evil which would be everlasting-it doth not exist! Of its own accord must it ever surpass itself anew. " 6 The exultantly romantic character of Nietzsche 's ethics is so well recognized that it needs no stressing or elaboration. There is no attempt to compromise with Christian or rational presuppositions. The ethical theory has little connection with any metaphysical or epistemological doctrine. It is offered as a call to a new attitude toward life and makes little pretense at being based on argument or defended by other than a poetic and oratorical logic. Those who refuse to acknowledge its importance do so on the ground that it is the expression of the abnormal feeling and imagination of a man of unbalanced mind. If we are to accept it as an outstanding ex- ample of ethical discourse regarded as romantic art-and I believe it must be so accepted,-it is necessary to give some consideration to this criticism. The point of the criticism seems to be that Nietzsche's feeling and thinking was as a result of his ill health so a-typical that (1) the study of it yields little useful information about how ordinary-and healthier-people feel and think, and (2) that few persons are likely to be interested in or influenced by it. My own view is that neither of these conclusions is legitimate. As for the first contention, the very principle implied in it can easily be seen to be false. There is no field of natural or social science in which we have not learned much about usual occurrences from a study of unusual ones. The astronomer does not refuse to take eclipses seriously because they are unusual, nor the political scientist revolutions. In Nietzsche's case the very peculiarities of his physical and mental make-up render him and his work an especially useful subject for study. It is certainly no accident that it was he who interpreted the antithesis between the classic and the romantic in such a way as to throw new light on an old and much discussed theme. He was temperamentally sensitive to some of the factors involved in the artistic expression of emotion that had escaped the attention of other critics. If in expressing his views on life in general this sensitiveness makes his reactions seem 6 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra (3rd ed. of Eng. transla- tion; N. Y.: Macmillan, 1911), pp. 136, 137. This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ETHICS-APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN 461 exaggerated in comparison with those of others, can one not say the same of the reactions of many romantic artists? And if one is engaged in an examination of romantic art as such, is it not clear that the most romantic examples are especially worthy of study? Moreover the anti-rationalism that underlies Nietzsche's repu- diation first of orthodox normative ethics and secondly of the Apol- lonian ideal of the good life, is no isolated phenomenon. On the contrary his insistence that all life and all human conduct can be nothing but an expression of will, either free and exultant or thwarted and perverted, is only one instance of an anti-rationalism that is typical of much European thinking in the last one hundred years. Schopenhauer 's preceded it, and Bergson 's followed it. And the anti-rationalism of the psychologists and the psycho- analysts who have explored the phenomena of the unconscious is especially interesting in its connection with contemporary discussions of ethical problems. The conclusions of this group of writers are complex, and not infrequently conflicting. But there is general agreement among them that much of man's thinking, feeling, and conduct is the result of strong, primitive, im- pulses and emotions the expression of which is varied, highly charged, and often characterized by a mysterious symbolism of its own. In other words, they are at one with Nietzsche in giving us a Dionysian rather than an Apollonian picture of human nature. And it would seem to me impossible for anyone who has examined this picture with care to assert dogmatically that the picture drawn earlier by Nietzsche is too exaggerated to be worth attention. I may add that while I spoke earlier of the generally Apollonian temper of most American thinking on ethical matters, I also believe that the Dionysian point of view of the psycho-analysts represents a cross current in thought and feeling of no little significance. In commenting upon the first of the criticisms which we noted as having been made by Nietzsche's critics, some points have been suggested that are relevant also to the second criticism-that, namely, that few persons are likely to be interested in it or influ- enced by it. But it is when we approach this second criticism from another side that its weakness becomes most obvious. The thinking of the contemporary upholders of Nazi and Fascist doc- trines has been influenced by it. Just how extensive and how di- rect the influence has been is a matter of dispute among the inter- preters of the movements in question. All that I wish to make clear is the falseness of the contention that the extravagance and so-called "abnormality" of Nietzsche's teaching is such that it is unlikely to be accepted or reproduced. In the light of the events This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 462 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY of the last two decades it seems unnecessary to labor this point. There are no extravagances about the supremacy of the will to power in any of Nietzsche's statements that can not be matched by similar extravagances in the utterances of men of standing in Nazi and Fascist circles. In the philosophies of these men we have the assumption that the assertion of the will is itself a good of the highest order. The point is not argued; we are presented with accounts of strong men asserting their wills and told to admire them. (When there is argument it centers around the question of the relation of the individual to the state and is, of course, Hegelian rather than Nietzschean in character.) The qualities which it is taken for granted we will admire in a Nazi leader are those which Nietzsche gave to his Supermen-loyalty to those to whom one is bound by ties of race, native habitation, and shared desires for overlordship, and a passion to live dangerously and heroically rather than safely and pleasantly. That we have here a Dionysian ideal is evident; and that this romantic ideal is different from other romantic ideals-for example, from that of Rousseau- is also clear. It has seemed to me that only by the citation of a number of ethical theories could one expect to establish directly the fact that when ideals of conduct and of life are presented to individuals to be judged on expressive principles only, that is, as persuasive or compelling simply as presented, some of these individuals will find an Apollonian ideal more sympathetic and some a Dionysian. But this result is what we might well have expected in advance from observations of different people's attitudes towards works of art. There are those whose emotional response to classic art is much stronger and more favorable than their response to romantic art, and vice versa. It is also, of course, true that as one may prefer one or another type of either classic or romantic art so one may prefer one or another interpretation of either an Apollonian or a Dionysian account of the good life. However, differences within the two groups seem to me far less important in the case of ethical ideals than the differences between them. III The thesis of The Birth of Tragedy is that the highest form of tragedy was the result of the synthesis of Apollonian and Dionysian elements. And a question that naturally presents itself to anyone following the outline of Nietzsche's argument is to what extent simi- lar syntheses may be supposed to have existed in the past, and may be expected in the future. If one's interest is in the expression This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ETHICS-APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN 463 of ethical ideals it is clearly especially necessary to inquire whether anything like a stable synthesis of the classical and the romantic is to be hoped for. For a continuing conflict in ethical ideals is ob- viously more likely to lead to confusion and ineffectiveness in the life of an individual or to the disruption of a society than is such a conflict in the realm of esthetics. The evidence available would seem to imply that synthesis is likely to be temporary and-even when temporarily prevailing-more apparent than real. If the feelings and emotions that underlie the expression, either in art or in interpretations of life, of Apollonian and Dionysian ideals are as different from one another as Nietzsche himself suggests- and the exposition of the preceding section of this paper has given us reason to suppose that this is the case-the a priori presumption against the possibility of a stable and lasting synthesis is great. It is moreover a commonplace of art history that there is a cycle in esthetic preferences. The flowering of a period of classic art is followed-often after a period of artistic confusion and decay -by a renewal of interest in romantic art; and this interest again, in due course of time, exhausts itself and is replaced by a swing back to the ideals of classicism. It is very generally assumed that this cycle will continue; it is supposed by many critics to be the result of a precarious balance characteristic of life in all its mani- festations, a balance involving a continuous alternation of periods of relaxation and of tension. If ethical interpretations of life are accepted and judged as expressive phenomena, it would seem only reasonable to suppose that the appreciation of them will exhibit the same alternations found in the history of artistic expression. Furthermore it would seem clear that the constantly recurring attempts which countless philosophers through the centuries have made to establish a normative ethics is evidence that they have believed that any ethics that was not normative was bound to be unstable. The distrust which such philosophers have shown of the relativistic tendencies in the thought of their contemporaries is usually made very plain. Thus Socrates considered the ideals of the sophists unstable and Kant held the same view of those of the "anthropologists." On the other hand, there have, of course, been and there now are philosophers and others who believe that a non-normative ethics can be a reasonably stable one. So far as I have been able to dis- cover those who hold this view are themselves upholders of an Apol- lonian interpretation of the good life. And a little reflection sug- gests that this must be the case. A disciple of Dionysius is not inclined to view stability as natural or desirable. It is the classicist This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 464 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY who finds such balance and harmony as make for permanence and peace good. The romanticist, on the contrary, is wearied rather than pleased by them. An individual who like Schopenhauer feels at one and the same time that life is essentially Dionysian and that it is as such distasteful, would seem to be driven as he was to preach annihilation as the ultimate good. But such a view is a perverse and inverted romanticism and can not be regarded as typical. One may put the whole matter in a somewhat different way by point- ing out that whereas the strong defender of classical principles in art or life may claim to be able to assimilate and preserve-albeit usually in some transmuted form-the values dear to the roman- ticist, the romanticist himself has only a passing interest-all his interests being indeed passing-in the values of the classicist. A balanced satisfaction of man 's instincts and interests-in- cluding the sympathetic ones because man is by nature a social animal-resulting in an orderly and pleasant life, is the general ideal of an Apollonian ethics. The ideal is presented and the presenter of it assumes that if his account is sufficiently vivid his hearers will see that it is without question the most persuasive of all possible ideals and will decide to act in accordance with it. A follower of Apollo is naturally optimistic. The upholder of such an ethics argues that since the ideal presents each individual with a portrait of himself leading an orderly life in which he enjoys the maximum number of satisfactions that could be obtained by him, it will appeal to everyone. This seems to me to be the tenor of the argument of the book by Schlick referred to above. That ex- amples of it could be found among the traditional theories of ego- istical hedonism is clear. It is quite possible to include in the account given-as Schlick does in his exposition-explanations tending to show that even lives conspicuous for heroism and self- sacrifice can be interpreted as conforming to the pattern described. It would seem as if in such a theory everything that could be done has been done to give an account of the good life that offers all things to all men. But can such an account ever really be given? The answer would seem to me to be an unquestionable "No." In the first place no one account ever has proved so universally persuasive-both advocates of a different and more romantic ideal, and persons not willing to be satisfied with anything less than a genuinely normative ethics, having constantly revolted against it. And, in the second place,-to repeat what has been said above-if the Dionysian elements in human nature are as deep seated and as stubbornly untransmutable as our examination of them has sug- gested, no single account ever can be universally persuasive. This content downloaded from 92.87.204.90 on Thu, 6 Mar 2014 11:46:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ETHICS-APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN 465 The inevitable conclusion would seem to be that any attempt at a synthesis of Apollonian and Dionysian ideals resolves itself into an attempt on the part of the upholders of the Apollonian ideal to incorporate in it the alien elements of the Dionysian ideal, and that such an enterprise can never be more than partially and tem- porarily successful. Was not the synthesis in literature which Nietzsche recognized in the greatest Greek tragedies just such an attempted incorporation of romantic ideals within an essentially classic pattern? And is not Nietzsche's lament a lament for the lack of stability in the synthesis? If ethical discourse is expres- sive only, it seems bound to exhibit the characteristics of esthetic creation and appreciation, i.e., a continuous replacement of one ideal by the other with intervals of active strife between the two whenever the forces supporting them are more or less evenly matched. Nietzsche complained that the perfection and harmony of Greek tragedy was broken in upon and destroyed by Socratic moralizing. What seems likely to break in upon all attempts to develop a purely persuasive ethics is the conviction held strongly by many persons -some learned and some very simple-that ethics must be more than persuasive. Such individuals will be content with nothing less than an ethical theory which is an integral part of a meta- physical or theological system, one in which the good for man is interpreted in connection with an account of the nature of man and of the universe. At least some members of the human race refuse to be content either with an Apollonian dream, be it ever so charm- ing, or with a Dionysian revel, be it ever so exuberant, or even with an alternation between the one and the other. They insist upon asking what in real life is really good. The logical positivist's answer is, of course, that they can never know. Scientific knowledge about facts is possible, artistic crea- tion and esthetic enjoyment are possible, but any further knowl- edge as to what is good in itself is impossible. I have not in this paper attempted in any way either to expound or to criticize these fundamental logical positivist doctrines. The single task under- taken has been that of pointing out some of the consequences that seem to follow in the field of ethics if the doctrines are true. No doubt an attentive reader, who reads between the lines, would be aware that the writer's conviction is that they are not true. MARY L. COOLIDGE. WELLESLEY COLLEGE. 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