PADERANGA vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Miguel P. Paderanga was included in an amended information for the crime of multiple
murder as the mastermind.
Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bail before a Warrant of
Arrest could be issued by the lower court. Copies of the motion were furnished to the
State Prosecutor, the Regional Prosecutors office and the Private Prosecutor.
The lower court proceeded to hear the application for bail, four of the petitioners
counsels appeared before the court but only Erlindo Abejo, the Assistant Prosecutor of
the Regional State Prosecutions Office appeared.
Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment that needed medical
attention. His counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of
their client to the local chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
that, for purposes of said hearing, he considered being in the custody of the law.
Prosecutor Abejo, in accordance to the stand of the Regional State prosecutor informed
the court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for
bail, and that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the court. He
also waived the presentation of evidence in the prosecutions behalf, leading to the
grant of bail with P200,000.00 as bail bond.
Later, a motion for reconsideration was filed by Henrick Guingoyon, the State
Prosecutor, who alleged that he received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on
the day after the hearing but his motion was denied. With this, he elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals through the special civil action of certiorari.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Paderanga was granted bail when was not in the
custody of the law, thus not eligible for the grant of the petition. Then, it annulled the
order granting Paderanga bail. The latter challenged the judgment of the Appellate
court, hence the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Paderangas petition for bail is admissible.
RULING:
YES. An arrest of the second kind exists, that is by submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest. It is enough that the person, although not physically
restrained, has surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Other procedures in
this case are followed.


RATIONALE:
In the case, it may be conceded that Paderanga had indeed filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may,
however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance
which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the
hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter
granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the
arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called house arrest or, in case of
military offenders, by being confined to quarters or restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it
known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could
not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College
General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance
to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit
knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the
arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest
effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then
incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by
simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they
never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly
submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application
for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual
whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the
said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had
been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the
clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he
was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and until the day of the
hearing thereof.

MANOTOC v. CA
Facts:
Criminal complaints were filed by some clients of the Manotoc Securities, Inc., to which
petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. is a principal stockholder, after the torrens title submitted
to and accepted by the same were suspected to be fake. The cases were assigned to
different trial courts. In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail, with FGU Instance
Corporation as Surety.
Petitioner then filed motion for permission to leave the country in each trial courts
stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities.". His motion was denied thus he elevated his petition to
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter
of right, the courts which granted him bail could not prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.The same was denied hence this petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue:
Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail, has an
unrestricted right to travel?

Held:
Petitioner's contention is untenable. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted
to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates
as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right.
Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states that The liberty of abode and of
travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in
the interest of national security, public safety or public health. The order of the trial
court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the
said constitutional provision.

COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were
directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged
participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there
was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion
for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due
process.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application
was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge
of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately.
The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can
avail the right to bail.

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on
the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition
was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed
against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered
their release.


Issues:

(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.


Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present
their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12,
1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they
were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed
instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in
writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit
counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit
controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to
challenge validity of members of G/SCM)

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused
of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their
release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit.
* The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior
courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their
arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the
right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete
the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and
thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No.
96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners
to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the
respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and
set aside. No costs.

People v. Donato
rebellion is a bailable offense; bail as a matter of right Right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended;
Prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the
instances where bail is a matter of right, such is required only bail is discretionary;
Waiver of the right
1) the right exists;
2) voluntary relinquishment;

Right to bail may be waived.

de la Camara v. Enage
excessive bail Where the right to bail exists, is should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring a sum
that is so excessive;
Guidelines in fixing the bail:
1) ability of the accused to give bail;
2) nature of the offense;
3) penalty for the offense charged;
4) character and reputation of the accused;
5) health of the accused;
6) character and strength of evidence;
7) probability of the accused appearing in trial;
8) forfeiture of other bonds;
9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested;
10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.

ENRILE vs SALAZAR
Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion SC Cannot Change Law

In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs.
Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder which allegedly occurred during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then
brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime
being charged against him is nonexistent. That he was charged with a criminal offense
in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation
was conducted, hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested
and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first
having personally determined the existence of probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling.
HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a
charge of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him
however is complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders the intention of the
prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty
thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be
Simple Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be
necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitiled for
bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper
remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for
Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts
before petitioning for habeas corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes
committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed. The SC noted, however, that
there may be a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the essence of
rebellion has been lost and that it is being used by a lo t of opportunists to attempt to
grab power.