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IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT


No. 14-2037

MARILYN RAE BASKIN, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,

v.

PENNY BOGAN, in her official capacity as Boone County Clerk, et al.,
Defendants/Appellants.


On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, No. 1:14-cv-355-RLY-TAB
The Honorable Richard L. Young, Judge


APPELLANTS APPENDIX






ROBERT V. CLUTTER
Kirtley, Taylor, Sims, Chadd &
Minnette, P.C.
117 W. Main Street
Lebanon, IN 46052
(765) 483-8549
bclutter@kirtleytaylorlaw.com
Counsel for Penny Bogan

DARREN J. MURPHY
Assistant Hamilton County Attorney
694 Logan St.
Noblesville, IN 46060
(317) 773-4212
dmurphy@ori.net
Counsel for Peggy Beaver
GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Attorney General of Indiana
THOMAS M. FISHER
Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
IGC South, Fifth Floor
302 W. Washington Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204
(317) 232-6255
Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov
Counsel for Greg Zoeller and William
C. VanNess II, M.D.

NANCY MOORE TILLER
Nancy Moore Tiller & Associates
11035 Broadway, Suite A
Crown Point, IN 46307
(219) 662-2300
nmt@tillerlegal.com
Counsel for Michael A. Brown

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APPENDIX

Pursuant to Circuit Rule 30, Appellants submit the following as their
Appendix. Appellants Appendix contains all of the materials required under
Circuit Rule 30(b).

By: s/ Thomas M. Fisher
Thomas M. Fisher
Solicitor General

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ............................... 1
Declaration of Amy Melissa Sandler .......................................................................... 36
Declaration of Nikole Rai Quasney ............................................................................. 46
Entry on Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order ............................... 57
Declaration of Hilari A. Sautbine ............................................................................... 68
Jurisdictional Statement, Baker v. Nelson ................................................................. 71
Excerpt from Transcript of Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Summary Judgment Oral Argument (pages 60 to 63) ................ 84



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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

MARILYN RAE BASKIN and ESTHER
FULLER; BONNIE EVERLY and LINDA
JUDKINS; DAWN CARVER and PAMELA
EANES; HENRY GREENE and GLENN
FUNKHOUSER, individually and as parents
and next friends of C.A.G.; NIKOLE
QUASNEY and AMY SANDLER,
individually and as parents and next friends of
A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PENNY BOGAN, in her official capacity as
BOONE COUNTY CLERK; KAREN M.
MARTIN, in her official capacity as
PORTER COUNTY CLERK; MICHAEL
A. BROWN, in his official capacity as LAKE
COUNTY CLERK; PEGGY BEAVER, in her
official capacity as HAMILTON COUNTY
CLERK; WILLIAM C. VANNESS II, M.D.,
in his official capacity as the
COMMISSIONER, INDIANA STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and GREG
ZOELLER, in his official capacity as
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendants.
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Civil Action No.:
1:14-cv-00355-RLY-TAB


FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiffs Marilyn Rae Baskin and Esther Fuller, Bonnie Everly and Linda Judkins, Dawn
Carver and Pamela Eanes, Henry Greene and Glenn Funkhouser, individually and as parents and
next friends of C.A.G., and Nikole Quasney and Amy Sandler, individually and as parents and
next friends of A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S. (collectively Plaintiffs), by and through their attorneys,
file this First Amended Complaint against Defendants Boone County Clerk Penny Bogan, Porter
County Clerk Karen M. Martin, Lake County Clerk Michael A. Brown, Hamilton County Clerk
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APPELLANTS' APPENDIX 1
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Peggy Beaver, Indiana State Department of Health Commissioner VanNess, and Indiana
Attorney General Greg Zoeller (collectively Defendants), and allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. Plaintiffs, all Indiana residents, comprise five loving, committed same-sex
couples (adult Plaintiffs or Plaintiff couples) and three minor children of two of the couples.
All Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking declaratory and preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief for Defendants violation of Plaintiffs rights the guarantees
of liberty and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution caused by the discriminatory exclusion of same-sex couples from the freedom to
marry and the discriminatory denial of recognition of marriages lawfully entered by same-sex
couples in other jurisdictions pursuant to the laws of the State of Indiana (State). See Indiana
Code 31-11-1-1.
2. Marriage plays a unique role in society as the universally recognized and
celebrated hallmark of a couples commitment to build family life together. It confers upon
couples a dignity and status of immense import. The adult Plaintiffs have formed committed,
enduring bonds equally worthy of the respect afforded by the State to different-sex couples
through marriage. Yet, the State, without any adequate justification, has enacted, interpreted,
and enforced its laws in ways that single out lesbian and gay couples in Indiana by excluding
them from the freedom to marry and by refusing to recognize and respect lawful marriages from
other jurisdictions, based solely on their sexual orientation and their sex.
3. Through Defendants adherence to and enforcement of Indiana Code Section 31-
11-1-1 and their interpretation and enforcement of the States other laws to preclude same-sex
couples from marrying or having their marriages lawfully entered into other jurisdictions
recognized in Indiana, the State and Defendants send a message that lesbians, gay men, and their
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children are second-class citizens who are undeserving of the legal sanction, respect, protections,
and support that different-sex couples and their children receive automatically through marriage.
This discrimination (referred to herein as the States marriage ban) is established in the States
statutes, which prevent same sex couples from entering into a civil marriage in the State and
prohibits the State from honoring a civil marriage validly entered by a same-sex couple in
another jurisdiction.
4. The marriage ban inflicts serious and irreparable harm on same-sex couples and
their children. Plaintiffs Marilyn Rae (Rae) Baskin and Esther Fuller, Bonnie Everly and
Linda (Lyn) Judkins, Dawn Carver and Pamela (Pam) Eanes, and Henry Greene and Glenn
Funkhouser are not married. They seek the freedom to marry the one unique and irreplaceable
person each loves, and thereby to assume the responsibilities and obtain the myriad protections,
obligations, and benefits conferred upon married couples under state and federal law. Plaintiffs
Nikole Quasney and Amy Sandler married in another jurisdiction, but are treated as legal
strangers in the state they call home a hurtful invalidation of their relationship, which deprives
them of the protections that a legally-recognized marriage most securely provides. Plaintiffs
C.A.G., A.Q.-S., and M.Q.-S. (child Plaintiffs) seek the protections, security, support, and
benefits conferred upon the children of married parents, and to end the stigma, shame, and
humiliation imposed upon children of lesbian and gay parents by the laws refusal to permit them
to belong to families with married parents and designation of their families as inferior to others
and unworthy of marriage.
5. The right to marry the person of ones choice and to direct the course of ones life
in this intimate realm without undue government interference is one of the fundamental liberty
interests protected for all by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
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States Constitution. The States exclusion of the Plaintiff couples and other same-sex couples
from marriage violates their fundamental right to marry. The State also interferes with the
constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interest in familial association and integrity of the
child Plaintiffs and other children of same-sex couples without any compelling, important, or
even legitimate justification.
6. The State also has deprived Plaintiffs of their guarantee of equality under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
denying Plaintiff couples and other lesbian and gay Indiana residents the right to marry the
person of their choice based solely on their sexual orientation and sex. Likewise, the State
denies the child Plaintiffs and other children of same-sex couples equal access to dignity,
legitimacy, protections, benefits, support, and security conferred on children of married parents
under state and federal law. The marriage ban penalizes the Plaintiff couples self-determination
in the most intimate sphere of their lives. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
marriage is the most important relation in life, as well as an expression of emotional support and
public commitment, and a far-reaching legal acknowledgement of the intimate relationship
between two people. The marriage ban deprives Plaintiff couples and other same-sex couples of
dignity, and humiliates children of same-sex couples by branding their families as inferior and
unworthy of the legitimacy, recognition, and respect accorded to other families.
7. Because the freedom to marry is one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men and women, adult Plaintiffs seek equal access to the
freedom to marry for same-sex couples and recognition of legal marriages performed in other
states as the only means to secure their rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and
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to eliminate the myriad serious harms inflicted on Plaintiffs by the marriage ban and Defendants
enforcement of it.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8. Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 to redress the
deprivation under color of state law of rights secured by the United States Constitution.
9. This Court has original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343 because the matters in controversy arise under the Constitution
and laws of the United States.
10. This Court has the authority to enter a declaratory judgment and to provide
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202.
11. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they are domiciled
in the State and/or have otherwise made and established contacts with the State sufficient to
permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them.
12. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) because all Defendants
reside within the State of Indiana, Defendant Boone County Clerk Penny Bogan, Defendant
Hamilton County Clerk Peggy Beaver, Defendant VanNess, and Defendant Greg Zoeller reside
and have offices within the district, and/or because a substantial part of the events that gave rise
to Plaintiffs Rae Baskin, Esther Fuller, Henry Greene, Glenn Funkhouser, and C.A.G.s claims
occurred, and will occur, in this district.
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APPELLANTS' APPENDIX 5
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PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs
Rae Baskin and Esther Fuller
13. Plaintiffs RAE, 60, and ESTHER, 78, are a lesbian couple living in Whitestown,
Boone County, Indiana, within the Indianapolis Division of the Southern District of
Indiana. Rae and Esther have been in a loving and committed relationship for nearly twenty-four
years. Rae and Esther would marry in Indiana but for the marriage ban.
14. Esther was born in Indianapolis, Indiana and has lived in Indiana her whole life,
except for a year attending college in Missouri. Rae has been a resident of Indiana for twenty-
four years. Esther holds a degree from Purdue University Krannert School of Management,
worked as a pharmacist for many years, and is currently retired. Rae graduated from Syracuse
University in 1975, where she majored in Poverty & Urban Affairs, and New York Law School
in 1978. After graduating from law school, Rae owned her own company for twenty years.
15. The marriage ban frustrates Rae and Esthers dream of being able to marry. Rae
wishes to marry Esther because absent marriage, their relationship is viewed as having less
dignity and legitimacy by the State and in the eyes of others. Esther wants to ensure that Rae is
protected and secure, even if Esther should pass away, and that Rae receives spousal protections
including Social Security benefits for surviving spouses. Esther had breast cancer in 2008 and
broke her hip in 2009. Regarding Esther, Rae said Shes the worlds biggest mush, she loves
me unconditionally, and . . . I cant imagine life without her.
Bonnie Everly and Lyn J udkins
16. Plaintiffs BONNIE, 56, and LYN, 58, are a lesbian couple living in Chesterton,
Porter County, Indiana. Bonnie and Lyn have been in a loving and committed relationship for
more than thirteen years. Bonnie and Lyn would marry in Indiana but for the marriage ban.
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17. Bonnie was born in Gary, Indiana, and raised in Michigan City, Indiana. Bonnie
and Lyn are both divorced from prior marriages they entered into long ago before they were able
to acknowledge their sexual orientation to themselves or others. Bonnie and Lyn each have a
child, and they live with Bonnies son, David, age twenty-one. David is supportive of their
relationship. Bonnie was employed at a factory where she operated machines and later became
an independent driver for the news dispatch in Michigan City, Indiana. Lyn was a secretary and
a school bus driver. In 2002, Bonnie and Lyn were struck by a drunk driver and both suffer from
mobility-related disabilities.
18. The marriage ban frustrates Bonnies and Lyns dreams of being able to
marry. Unable to marry in Indiana, Bonnie and Lyn held a private religious ceremony on a
beach in Michigan City in April 2002. Lyn describes Bonnie as her rock and
security. [Bonnie] keeps me laughing and she is the reason I get up in the morning. To be
able to be legally wed to her would be a dream come true. I would do anything for
Bonnie. Bonnie describes Lyn as a breath of fresh air. [Lyn] is what keeps me going. I
want to make her my wife because Ive never had that feeling for anyone else. I want to make
my life complete by putting a ring on her finger knowing it will be there forever.
Dawn Carver and Pam Eanes
19. Plaintiffs DAWN, 41, and PAM, 50, are a lesbian couple living in Munster, Lake
County, Indiana. They have been in a loving and committed relationship for seventeen years.
Dawn and Pam would marry in Indiana but for the marriage ban.
20. Dawn was born in Griffith, Indiana and has lived in Indiana most of her life.
Dawn is a patrol officer for the Oak Park Police Department and has worked there for ten years.
Pam is a Captain in the Calumet City Fire Department and has worked there for twenty-six
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years. Pam and Dawn are active in their local community. Pam has two children from prior
relationships, and both children view both Pam and Dawn as their mothers. The children are
supportive of their relationship.
21. The marriage ban frustrates Pam and Dawns dream of being able to marry. Pam
and Dawn have an Illinois Civil Union. But this civil union is not recognized in Indiana.
Because Indianas marriage ban has prevented them from marrying, they are not fully protected
in the event that either of them is seriously injured from the inherent dangers of their work.
22. Pam and Dawn want to express the love and commitment to each other that only
marriage can convey. They want to grow old with one another; they mean everything to each
other. Pam states, Dawn is everything to me, shes my world, shes my best friend, shes my
partner, shes my confidante, shes my everything. My life is so much better because I have
Dawn in it, I really look forward to going into old age together.
Henry Greene and Glenn Funkhouser with minor son, C.A.G.
23. Plaintiffs HENRY, 48, and GLENN, 51, are a gay male couple living in Carmel,
Hamilton County, Indiana, within the Indianapolis Division of the Southern District of Indiana.
Henry and Glenn have been in a committed relationship for twenty-two years. Henry and Glenn
would marry in Indiana but for the marriage ban.
24. Glenn was born and raised in Indiana and moved back to his home state to be
closer to family in 2001. Henry and Glenn have lived together in Indiana for almost thirteen
years, and consider Indiana their home. Henry has four years of college training in computer
science and works as a project manager. Glenn holds a Bachelors Degree in Business
Management and Personnel Administration & Management Information Systems from Ball State
University. Glenn works as an account manager.
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25. Henry and Glenn have a twelve year old-son, Plaintiff C.A.G. Henry adopted
C.A.G. initially and Glenn later obtained a second parent adoption to establish a legal parent-
child relationship with their son. They are very involved in their sons school and in their
church. Because of the marriage ban, Henry and Glenn fear that their son will internalize the
message he receives from his government that his family is not as worthy as others, and that he
will face discrimination because his family is deemed less legitimate, and less deserving of
respect by the State.
26. The marriage ban frustrates Henry and Glenns dream of being married. Henry
says that he cant imagine his life without Glenn. Glenn says that he and Henry are partners
in life, and that they knew they could give [their son] a better life, a second chance. The
marriage ban interferes with their ability to protect their son and help him to grow up with
dignity and pride in his family, makes Henry and Glenns family status and financial security
uncertain, and causes them stress and anxiety.
Nikole (Niki) Quasney and Amy Sandler with minor daughters, A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S.
27. Plaintiffs NIKI, 37, and AMY, 37, are a lesbian couple living in Munster, Lake
County, Indiana. They have been in a loving and committed relationship for over thirteen years.
Niki and Amy were married in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on August 29, 2013.
28. Niki was born in East Chicago, Indiana, and raised in Munster, Indiana. Niki and
Amy own a home in Indiana, where they are raising their two minor daughters, Plaintiffs A.Q.-S.
(age 2) and M.Q.-S. (age 1), who were conceived through assisted reproductive technology and
an anonymous donor. After Amy gave birth to A.Q.-S., Niki and Amy were required to incur the
cost and expense of obtaining a second parent adoption to establish a legal parent-child
relationship between Niki and A.Q.-S. Amy and Niki secured an Illinois civil union on June 7,
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2011. When Amy gave birth to their second daughter, M.Q.-S., even though they then were
living in Indiana, Amy and Niki selected a hospital in Illinois so that they could give birth in a
state that would respect Nikis parental relationship to M.Q.-S. from birth and accordingly issue
her a two-parent birth certificate in reliance on their Illinois civil union. Amy and Niki
performed a second parent adoption for M.Q.-S as well, to ensure that Nikis parent-child
relationship would be secure in Indiana.
29. Niki holds a Bachelor of Science in Restaurant Hotel Institutional Tourism
Management from Purdue University, West Lafayette, and a Bachelor of Arts degree in
Education from the University of Missouri at St. Louis. Niki worked for several years as a
physical education teacher in Nevada. Amy holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Journalism and
Master of Arts degree in Counseling and Personnel Services from the University of Maryland.
Amy also holds a Ph. D. in Educational Leadership from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
Amy has worked as an adjunct professor and is currently pursuing a Master of Arts degree in
Social Service Administration from the University of Chicago, to which she commutes for
classes from the familys home in Indiana. After Amy obtains her degree, she would prefer to
seek licensure and employment in Indiana to be close to Niki. However, because school districts
in Indiana will not recognize Amys marriage to Niki for the purpose of providing Amy with
spousal health insurance, Amy must seek a job in Illinois.
30. Nikis family history put her at high risk for breast and ovarian cancer. In 2007,
Niki made the difficult decision to proceed with a prophylactic double mastectomy after two
siblings developed breast cancer. Despite her best effort to manage her cancer risk, Niki was
diagnosed with Stage IV ovarian cancer in June 2009, which required surgery days later to
remove more than 100 tumors in her abdominal cavity and on critical organs, such as her liver,
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kidneys, and bladder, and which required removal of her entire omentum. At the time of Nikis
diagnosis almost five years ago, the physician who performed her surgery informed her that the
median survival rate for her cancer is five years.
31. Since her diagnosis in 2009, Niki has undergone three surgeries, countless
hospital visits and aggressive chemotherapy treatment, including her most recent six-cycle
course of chemotherapy (11 infusions) over the last few months. The States refusal to recognize
Nikis marriage to Amy encourages and invites private bias and discrimination, including in
medical settings. Niki and Amy fear that their marriage will not be respected in Indiana, and that
medical personnel may treat them as legal strangers to each other. For example, when Niki and
Amy attempted to obtain a family membership with a fitness center operated by a local hospital,
the hospital denied them such a membership on the ground that the hospitals definition of
spouse matches the state of Indianas definition of marriage. Even though this hospital is
approximately two miles from where Niki, Amy, and their daughters live, Niki chooses not to go
to this hospital for regular chemotherapy treatments or even certain emergency care because the
hospital may not respect her legal relationship to Amy. Instead, Niki travels to Chicago.
Recently, when Niki experienced chest pain, she traveled 40 minutes to the University of
Chicago Medical Center for treatment for what was later identified as a pulmonary embolism.
Thus, the States refusal to recognize her marriage impedes her ability to secure emergency care
or treatment from her local community hospital. Niki also fears that when she passes away, the
States refusal to recognize Amy as a spouse on her death certificate will adversely affect her
familys ability to secure insurance, and access federal and state protections and safety nets, such
as Social Security benefits available to surviving spouses. Because Amy and Niki have two
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young children, and Niki continues to suffer from terminal ovarian cancer, their need to have
their marriage recognized by Indiana is urgent.
32. Niki describes Amy as her rock saying, she is the most amazing person I have
ever met and an amazing role model for their two daughters. Amy says Niki is the most
kind and generous person and that she picks up where I leave off. Amy loves Niki and will
forever be grateful for every moment [their] kids have with herand that I have with her.
B. Defendants
33. DEFENDANT PENNY BOGAN is sued in her official capacity as the Boone
County Clerk. Bogans duties include accepting marriage applications, issuing marriage
licenses, and maintaining records relating to marriage licenses. Bogan must ensure compliance
through all of these functions with relevant Indiana laws, including those that exclude same-sex
couples from marriage, and forbid the filing of records relating to marriages of same-sex couples
that take place in other states. Bogan is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and
was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
34. DEFENDANT KAREN M. MARTIN is sued in her official capacity as the Porter
County Clerk. Martins duties include accepting marriage applications, issuing marriage
licenses, and maintaining records relating to marriage licenses. Martin must ensure compliance
through all of these functions with relevant Indiana laws, including those that exclude same-sex
couples from marriage, and forbid the filing of records relating to marriages of same-sex couples
that take place in other states. Martin is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and
was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
35. DEFENDANT MICHAEL A. BROWN is sued in his official capacity as the Lake
County Clerk. Browns duties include accepting marriage applications, issuing marriage
licenses, and maintaining records relating to marriage licenses. Brown must ensure compliance
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through all of these functions with relevant Indiana laws, including those that exclude same-sex
couples from marriage, and forbid the filing of records relating to marriages of same-sex couples
that take place in other states. Brown is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and
was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
36. DEFENDANT PEGGY BEAVER is sued in her official capacity as the Hamilton
County Clerk. Beavers duties include accepting marriage applications, issuing marriage
licenses, and maintaining records relating to marriage licenses. Beaver must ensure compliance
through all of these functions with relevant Indiana laws, including those that exclude same-sex
couples from marriage, and forbid the filing of records relating to marriages of same-sex couples
that take place in other states. Beaver is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and
was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint. Collectively,
DEFENDANTS BOGAN, MARTIN, BROWN, and BEAVER are referred herein as the
DEFENDANT CLERKS.
37. DEFENDANT WILLIAM C. VANNESS II, M.D., is sued in his official capacity
as the COMMISSIONER, INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. VanNess is a
person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and was acting under color of state law at all
times relevant to this Complaint. The Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) is required
to develop the form for applications for marriage licenses, including the requirement to list one
Male Applicant and one Female Applicant. The ISDH also prescribes the information to be
contained on state certificates, including death certificates.
38. DEFENDANT GREG ZOELLER is sued in his official capacity as the
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA. Zoeller is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
1983 and was acting under color of state law at all times relevant to this Complaint. In his
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capacity as Attorney General, Zoeller has the authority to enforce the statutes of the State of
Indiana, including its provisions related to the marriage ban, and has the duty to defend the
constitutionality of the enactments of the Indiana Legislature.
39. All of the above Defendants, and those subject to their supervision, direction, and
control, intentionally performed, participated in, aided and/or abetted in some manner the acts
alleged herein, proximately caused the harm alleged herein, and will continue to injure Plaintiffs
irreparably if not enjoined.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
40. Adult Plaintiffs are all residents of Indiana who experience the same joys and
shoulder the same challenges of family life as their heterosexual neighbors, co-workers, and
other community members who are free to marry. Adult Plaintiffs are contributing members of
society who support their committed partners and nurture their children, but must do so without
the same dignity and respect afforded by the State to other families through access to the
universally understood and celebrated status of marriage. The States exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage, and from recognition of their lawful out-of-state marriages, subjects adult
Plaintiffs to legal vulnerability and related stress, while depriving them and their children of
equal dignity and security. Through its marriage ban, the State send a purposeful message that
the State views lesbian and gay men and their children as second-class members of society who
are undeserving of the legal sanction, respect, and support that different-sex spouses and their
families enjoy.
A. Adult Plaintiffs Attempts to Marry and Marriage in Other Jurisdictions.
41. But for the fact that they are of the same sex, each unmarried Plaintiff couple is
legally qualified to marry under the laws of Indiana and wishes to marry in the State. Each adult
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Plaintiff is over the age of eighteen, and no adult Plaintiff is precluded from marriage as a result
of having another spouse or being closely related to his or her life partner.
42. Because of Indianas statutory prohibition on marriage for same-sex couples, the
DEFENDANT CLERKS are required to refuse to issue a marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
See I.C. 31-11-1-1(a) (Only a female may marry a male. Only a male may marry a female.),
31-11-4-12 (If it appears that two (2) individuals do not have a right to a marriage license, the
clerk of the circuit court shall refuse to issue the license.). Each Plaintiff couple has applied for
a marriage license with the County Clerk of their respective counties. Each of their applications
was refused because Plaintiff couples are same-sex couples.
43. On March 10, 2014, Rae Baskin and Esther Fuller appeared in person at the
Boone County Clerks Office to seek a marriage license. When the couple requested a marriage
license, they were denied by three different employees of Defendant Bogan. At one point, the
employees referred the couple to another state to marry and suggested they might consider a civil
union from another state. Ultimately, Rae and Esther were told, No, we really cant do it.
44. On March 10, 2014, Bonnie Everly and Lyn Judkins appeared in person at the
Porter County Clerks Office to seek a marriage license. When the couple requested a marriage
license, they were denied by a female employee of Defendant Martin who shared Ive been
reading a lot about this, but I dont think its legal here in Indiana. When they asked again, the
employee denied their request for a marriage license.
45. On March 12, 2014, Dawn Carver and Pam Eanes appeared in person at the Lake
County Clerks Office to seek a marriage license. When the couple requested a marriage license,
they were denied by a female employee of Defendant Brown. They were told two women cant
get married here.
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46. On March 20, 2014, Henry Greene and Glenn Funkhouser appeared in person at
Hamilton County Clerks Office to seek a marriage license. When the couple requested a
marriage license, they were denied by Defendant Beaver herself. They were told we are not
able to issue you a marriage license because you are of the same gender.
47. Niki Quasney and Amy Sandler were validly married in Massachusetts and seek
through this suit to end the States current denial of recognition of their marriage on the ground
that it is a marriage entered by two individuals of the same sex.
B. Indianas Marriage Ban Singles Out Same-Sex Couples and Excludes Them
from Marriage.
48. Indiana has enacted a statute that excludes same-sex couples from marriage.
See I.C. 31-11-1-1. This statute cannot be explained by reference to legitimate public policies
that could justify the disadvantages the marriage bans impose on same-sex couples who wish to
marry. Rather, the history of its enactment and its own text demonstrates that interference with
the equal dignity of same-sex couples was more than a mere side effect of this enactment it
was its essence.
C. Plaintiffs Are Injured by the Marriage Ban.
49. Barring same-sex couples from marriage and marriage recognition disqualifies
them from critically important rights and responsibilities under state law that different-sex
couples rely upon to secure their commitment to each other and to safeguard their families. By
way of example only, same-sex couples are denied:
a. The benefit of the presumption that both spouses are parents to a child born
during the marriage, and the ability of a couple to confer legitimacy on their
children by marrying;
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b. Family health insurance coverage, including spousal health benefits, retirement
benefits, and surviving spouse benefits for public employees;
c. Family leave for an employee to care for a spouse;
d. The ability to safeguard family resources under an array of laws that protect
spousal finances;
e. The ability to make caretaking decisions for one another in times of death and
serious illness, including the priority to make medical decisions for an
incapacitated spouse, the automatic right to make burial decisions, and other
decisions concerning disposition and handling of remains of deceased spouses.
f. The right to inheritance under the laws of intestacy and the right of a surviving
spouse to an elective share;
g. Benefits for spouses and dependent children of members of the military and
veterans;
h. In the event that a couple separates, access to an orderly dissolution process for
terminating the relationship, assuring an equitable division of the couples assets
and debts, and adjudication of issues relating to custody, visitation, and support
with respect to any children the couple may have.
50. The marriage ban not only denies Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples and their
children access to protections, benefits, rights, and responsibilities afforded to married persons
and their children under state law, it also denies them eligibility for a host of federal rights and
responsibilities that span the entire United States Code and federal regulations. Unmarried
couples are denied recognition for virtually all purposes throughout the more than 1,000 statutes
and numerous federal regulations relating to marriage including laws that pertain to Social
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Security benefits, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyrights, and veterans benefits. Couples
validly married in another jurisdiction and living in Indiana may qualify for some federal
benefits and protections, but the language of certain statutes and regulations, such as veterans
spousal benefits and Social Security survivor benefits, references couples married under the law
of their state of residence or domicile. Many of these deprivations drain family economic
resources, causing financial harm not only to same-sex couples but to their children as well.
51. In addition to causing the tangible harms listed above, Plaintiffs are denied the
unique social recognition that marriage conveys. Without access to the familiar language and
legal label of marriage, Plaintiffs are unable instantly or adequately to communicate to others the
depth and permanence of their commitment or to obtain respect for that commitment as others do
simply by invoking their married status.
52. Although the Plaintiff couples are in committed relationships, they and other
same-sex couples are denied the stabilizing effects of marriage, which help keep couples together
during times of crisis or conflict.
53. The substantive and dignitary inequities imposed on committed same-sex couples
include particular harms for same-sex couples children, who are equally deserving of the
stability, permanence, and legitimacy that children of different-sex spouses enjoy. The marriage
ban denies children of same-sex couples the dignity, legitimacy, rights, benefits, support,
security, and obligations conferred on children whose parents are married. Children of same-sex
couples must combat the common assumption, reinforced by Indiana law, that as members of a
family headed by an unmarried couple, their bonds are impermanent, insubstantial, and unworthy
of equal dignity and legitimacy because the couple has not made a marital commitment and
taken on the obligations of marriage. Civil marriage affords official sanctuary to the family unit,
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offering parents and children a familiar and public means of demonstrating to third parties a legal
basis for the parent-child relationship. By denying same-sex couples access to marriage, the
State reinforces the view, held by some, that the family bonds that tie same-sex parents and their
children are less consequential, enduring, and meaningful than those of different-sex parents and
their children. Same-sex parents raising children in Indiana cannot invoke their status as married
in order to communicate to their own children and others the depth and permanence of their
commitment to each other in terms that society, and even young children, readily understand.
Consequently, the child Plaintiffs and other children of same-sex couples are left to grow up with
the message that their parents and families are inferior to others and that they and their parents
do not deserve the same societal recognition and respect.
54. Because same-sex parents and their children thus are deprived of the family
security that inheres in a ready and familiar method of communicating to others the significance
and permanence of their familial relationships, they must live with the vulnerability and stress
inflicted by the ever-present possibility that others may question their familial relationships in
social, educational, and medical settings and in moments of crisis in a way that spouses and
their children can avoid by simple reference to being married.
55. Children of same-sex couples are less legally secure and economically situated
than children whose parents are able to marry, including because of expenses incurred in
attempting to create legal protections that approximate some of those that are automatic through
marriage, protections that are far inferior to the legal protections afforded through marriage, and
because their families are denied the strengthening effect that marriage can provide to their
parents relationships.
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56. Children from a young age understand that marriage signifies an enduring family
unit and, likewise, understand when the State has deemed a class of families as less worthy than
other families, undeserving of marriage, and not entitled to the same societal recognition and
support as other families. The State has no adequate interest to justify marking the children of
same-sex couples with a badge of inferiority that invites disrespect in school, on the playground,
and in every other sphere of their lives.
57. The government is a powerful teacher of discrimination to others. By decreeing
that the relationships of same-sex couples must be ignored in Indiana and enforcing that policy,
the State and Defendants inform all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including
those couples own children, that their relationships are less worthy than others. Bearing the
imprimatur of the government, the States marriage ban, which relegates same-sex couples and
their children to a lesser status, encourages others to follow the governments example in
discriminating against them.
58. The States marriage ban, and Defendants enforcement of it, causes many private
entities such as banks, insurers, and even health clubs to define family for purposes of an array
of benefits and protections in ways that exclude same-sex couples and their children from
important safety nets, such as private employer-provided health insurance for family members.
The State also encourages disrespect of committed same-sex couples and their children,
including Plaintiffs, by others in workplaces, schools, businesses, and other major arenas of life
in ways that would be less likely to occur and more readily corrected if marriage were available
to same-sex couples.
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D. The Marriage Ban Is Not Even Rationally Related to a Legitimate
Government Purpose, Let Alone Substantially Related to an Important
Government Purpose or Narrowly Tailored to a Compelling Governmental
Purpose.
59. No legitimate let alone important or compelling interest exists to exclude
same-sex couples from marriage. An individuals capacity to establish a loving and enduring
relationship does not depend upon sexual orientation or his or her sex in relation to his or her
committed life partner, nor is there any legitimate interest in preventing same-sex couples and
their children from belonging to families headed by a married couple or in denying them the
spousal protections marriage provides.
60. Neither history nor tradition can justify the marriage ban. Marriage has remained
a vital and enduring institution despite undergoing significant changes over time to meet
changing social and ethical needs, including by the elimination of many former requirements of
marriage that we now recognize as discriminatory or otherwise impermissible such as race-
based entry requirements and gendered restrictions that historically were considered integral
aspects of marriage. Indiana is not confined to historic notions of equality, and no excuse for the
States discriminatory restriction can be found in the pedigree of such discrimination.
61. The Supreme Court has made clear that the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
effect to private biases, and expressly rejected moral disapproval of lesbian and gay relationships
as a legitimate justification for a law.
62. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage does nothing to protect or enhance the
rights of different-sex couples. Different-sex couples will continue to enjoy the same rights and
status conferred by marriage regardless of whether same-sex couples may marry.
63. Although the State has a valid interest in protecting the public fiscally, it may not
pursue that interest by making invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens without
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adequate justification. Moreover, the State has no fiscal justification here for denying same-sex
couples the freedom to marry because the State would generate additional revenues by allowing
same-sex couples to marry and to be recognized as married.
64. The States interest in child welfare is affirmatively harmed not furthered
by the marriage ban. The marriage ban injures same-sex couples children without offering any
benefit to other children.
65. Barring same-sex couples from marriage does not prevent same-sex couples from
raising children together. Same-sex couples in Indiana can and do bear children through use of
reproductive technology that is available to same-sex couples and different-sex couples alike,
and bring children into their families through foster care and adoption. Procreation is not a
requirement of marriage, and many married people choose not to have children while many
unmarried people procreate. Indiana has never restricted marriage to those capable of or
intending to procreate, nor would it be constitutionally permissible to do so.
66. There is no valid basis for the State to assert a preference for parenting by
different-sex couples over same-sex couples. Based on more than thirty years of research, the
scientific community has reached consensus that children raised by same-sex couples are just as
well-adjusted as children raised by different-sex couples. This consensus has been recognized by
every major professional organization dedicated to childrens health and welfare, including the
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychological Association, the American
Medical Association, the National Association of Social Workers, and the Child Welfare League
of America.
67. There is not even a rational basis for favoring parenting by heterosexual couples
over gay and lesbian couples. See, e.g., De Boer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-10285, slip op. at 24
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(E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014) (finding no logical connection between banning same-sex marriage
and providing children with an optimal environment or achieving optimal outcomes ); De
Leon v. Perry, F. Supp. 2d, 2014 WL 715741, at *14 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014) (finding no
evidentiary support for [defendants] assertion that denying marriage to same-sex couples
positively affects childrearing, and agree[ing] with other district courts that have recently
reviewed this issue and conclud[ing] that there is no rational connection between Defendants
assertion and the legitimate interest of successful childrearing); see also id. (concluding that
Texass same-sex marriage ban causes needless stigmatization and humiliation for children
being raised by the loving same-sex couples being targeted); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that the research supporting the conclusion that
[c]hildren raised by gay or lesbian parents are as likely as children raised by heterosexual
parents to be healthy, successful and well-adjusted is accepted beyond serious debate in the
field of developmental psychology), affd sub nom, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.
2012), vacated for lack of standing sub nom, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2013 WL
3196927 (U.S. June 26, 2013); In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *20 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 25, 2008) ([B]ased on the robust nature of the evidence available in the field, this Court is
satisfied that the issue is so far beyond dispute that it would be irrational to hold otherwise; the
best interests of children are not preserved by prohibiting homosexual adoption.), affd sub nom,
Florida Dept of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010); Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., Nos. 1999-9881, 2004 WL 3154530, at *9
and 2004 WL 3200916, at *3-4 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004) (holding based on factual findings
regarding the well-being of children of gay parents that there was no rational relationship
between the [exclusion of gay people from becoming foster parents] and the health, safety, and
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welfare of the foster children), affd sub nom, Dept of Human Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d 1
(Ark. 2006).
68. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage harms their children, including by
branding their families as inferior and less deserving of respect and by encouraging private bias
and discrimination. Denying same-sex couples the equal dignity and status of marriage
humiliates the children now being raised by same-sex couples, and makes it more difficult for the
children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other
families in their community and in their daily lives.
69. Excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage will not make the children of
different-sex spouses more secure. Different-sex spouses children will continue to enjoy the
benefits that flow from their parents marriage, regardless of whether same-sex couples are
permitted to marry. The marriage ban has no effect on the choices different-sex couples make
about such profound issues as whether to marry, whether to have children, or whether to raise
their children within marriage.
70. The States interest in the welfare of children parented by same-sex couples is as
great as its interest in the welfare of any other children. The family security that comes from the
States official recognition and support is no less important for same-sex parents and their
children than it is for different-sex parents and their children.
71. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage does nothing to protect or enhance the
rights of different-sex spouses. Different-sex spouses will continue to enjoy the same rights and
status conferred by marriage, regardless of whether same-sex couples may marry, unimpaired by
the acknowledgment that this freedom belongs equally to lesbians and gay men.
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E. Niki Quasney and Amy Sandlers Need for a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction.
72. Niki Quasney and Amy Sandler have been in a long-term committed relationship
for over thirteen years. They were married in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on August
29, 2013.
73. Niki has Stage IV ovarian cancer that she has battled for over four years,
including suffering the pain and experience of three surgeries, countless hospital visits, and
aggressive chemotherapy treatment. Indeed, Niki most recently completed a six-cycle course of
chemotherapy (11 infusions) over the last few months. Unless this Court acts, Niki and Amy
will likely be permanently denied the benefits both tangible and dignitary of recognition of
their legal marriage. For example, unless their marriage is recognized, they may face
discrimination in hospital settings, denial of a death certificate listing Amy as Nikis spouse,
challenges accessing safety nets for a surviving spouse, and other harms, including difficulty
establishing eligibility for Social Security benefits as a surviving spouse. In addition, Niki and
Amy have two young children. If this Court does not act, Niki and Amys family will never be
recognized where they live as formally united under State law, and the financial security of their
two children will remain uncertain.
74. The Indiana marriage ban is unconstitutional. Defendants should be immediately
enjoined from enforcing the ban as applied to Niki and Amy because they have an urgent need to
have their marriage recognized due to extraordinary circumstances: Nikis life-threatening
illness.
75. Niki and Amy are suffering irreparable harm as a result of the State failing to
recognize their legal marriage, and there is thus no adequate remedy at law. There is no harm to
the State of Indiana from granting a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction
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prohibiting enforcement of the marriage ban as applied to Niki and Amy; conversely, as detailed
above, the harm to Niki and Amy is severe. Prompt action by this Court ordering Defendants
immediately to stop enforcing the Indiana marriage ban as applied to Niki and Amy will serve
the public interest.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I:
Deprivation of Due Process
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV
(42 U.S.C. 1983)
76. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this
Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
77. Plaintiffs state this cause of action against Defendants in their official capacities
for purposes of seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
78. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, enforceable
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1.
79. The right to marry the unique and irreplaceable person of ones choice and to
direct the course of ones life in this intimate realm without undue government restriction is one
of the fundamental liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, the essence of the fundamental right to marry is freedom of personal
choice in selecting ones spouse.
80. Indiana Code Sections 31-11-1-1(a), 31-11-1-1-(b), and all other sources of
Indiana law that preclude marriage for same-sex couples or prevent recognition of their
marriages violate the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, both facially and as
applied. Defendants actions to enforce the marriage ban directly and impermissibly infringe on
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adult Plaintiffs choice of whom to marry, interfering with a core, life-altering, and intimate
personal choice.
81. The Due Process Clause also protects choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, including each individuals rights to family integrity and association. Defendants
actions to enforce the marriage ban directly and impermissibly infringe on adult Plaintiffs
deeply intimate, personal, and private decisions regarding family life and preclude adult
Plaintiffs from obtaining full liberty, dignity, and security for themselves and their families.
82. The DEFENDANT CLERKS and DEFENDANT VANNESS duties and actions
to ensure compliance with Indianas discriminatory marriage ban by, for example, denying same-
sex couples marriage licenses, violate adult Plaintiffs fundamental right to marry and the rights
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to liberty, dignity,
autonomy, family integrity, association, and due process. As the Indiana Attorney General,
DEFENDANT GREG ZOELLER is responsible for enforcing and/or defending Indianas laws,
including Indianas discriminatory marriage ban. Enforcement and/or defense of the marriage
ban violates adult Plaintiffs fundamental right to marry and the rights protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to liberty, dignity, autonomy, family
integrity, association, and due process of Plaintiffs.
83. Defendants cannot satisfy the Due Process Clauses decree that governments
denial of a fundamental right or substantial infringement of a liberty interest may be sustained
only upon a showing that the burden is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling, or even
important governmental interest, as the marriage ban is not even tailored to further any legitimate
interest at all.
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84. Thus, Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of
rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.
COUNT II:
Deprivation of Equal Protection
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV
(42 U.S.C. 1983)
85. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs of
this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
86. Plaintiffs state this cause of action against Defendants in their official capacities
for purposes of seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
87. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, enforceable
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, provides that no state shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1.
88. Indiana Code Sections 31-11-1-1(a), 31-11-1-1(b), and all other sources of
Indiana law that preclude marriage for same-sex couples or prevent recognition of marriages
violate the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment both facially and as applied
to Plaintiffs.
89. THE DEFENDANT CLERKS and DEFENDANT VANNESS duties and
actions to ensure compliance with Indianas discriminatory marriage ban by, for example,
denying same-sex couples marriage licenses, violates the right of Plaintiffs to equal protection by
discriminating impermissibly on the basis of adult Plaintiffs sexual orientation and sex, and on
the bases of the child Plaintiffs parents sex, sexual orientation, and marital status, denying such
children the dignity, legitimacy, security, support, and protections available to children whose
parents can marry. Indiana Attorney General DEFENDANT GREG ZOELLERs duties and
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actions to enforce and defend Indianas discriminatory marriage ban violates the right of
Plaintiffs to equal protection by discriminating impermissibly on the basis of adult Plaintiffs
sexual orientation and sex, and on the bases of the child Plaintiffs parents sex, sexual
orientation, and marital status.
90. Same-sex couples, such as the Plaintiff couples, are identical to different-sex
couples in all of the characteristics relevant to marriage.
91. Same-sex couples make the same commitment to one another as different-sex
couples. Like different-sex couples, same-sex couples fall in love, build their lives together, plan
their futures together, and hope to grow old together. Like different-sex couples, same-sex
couples support one another emotionally and financially and take care of one another physically
when faced with injury or illness. Plaintiff couples seek to marry for the same emotional,
romantic, and dignitary reasons and to provide the same legal shelter to their families as
different-sex spouses.
92. Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation. The marriage ban targets lesbian
and gay Indiana residents as a class for exclusion from marriage and discriminates against each
adult Plaintiff based on his or her sexual orientation, both facially and as applied.
93. The exclusion of Plaintiffs from marriage based on adult Plaintiffs sexual
orientation subjects Defendants conduct to strict or at least heightened scrutiny, which
Defendants conduct cannot withstand because the exclusion does not even serve any legitimate
governmental interests, let alone any important or compelling interests, nor does it serve any
such interests in an adequately tailored manner.
94. Lesbians and gay men have suffered a long and painful history of discrimination
in Indiana and the United States.
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95. Sexual orientation bears no relation to an individuals ability to contribute to
society.
96. Sexual orientation is a core, defining trait that is so fundamental to ones identity
and conscience that a person may not legitimately be required to abandon it (even if that were
possible) as a condition of equal treatment.
97. Sexual orientation generally is fixed at an early age and highly resistant to change
through intervention. No credible evidence supports the notion that such interventions are either
effective or safe; indeed, they often are harmful and damaging. No mainstream mental health
professional organization approves interventions that attempt to change sexual orientation, and
virtually all of them have adopted policy statements cautioning professionals and the public
about these treatments.
98. Lesbians and gay men are a discrete and insular minority, and ongoing prejudice
against them continues seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes that might
ordinarily be relied upon to protect minorities.
99. Lesbians and gay men lack express statutory protection against discrimination in
employment, public accommodation, and housing at the federal level and in more than half the
states, including Indiana; are systematically underrepresented in federal, state, and local
democratic bodies; have been stripped of the right to marry through numerous state
constitutional amendments and are currently not permitted to marry in more than 30 states; and
have been targeted across the nation through the voter initiative process more than any other
group.
100. Discrimination Based on Sex. Indianas marriage ban discriminates against
adult Plaintiffs on the basis of their sex, both facially and as applied, barring Plaintiffs from
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marriage or from being recognized as validly married solely because each of the adult Plaintiffs
wishes to marry a life partner of the same sex. The sex-based restriction is plain on the face of
Indianas laws, which stipulate that [o]nly a female may marry a male. Only a male may marry
a female, I.C. 31-11-1-1(a), and prohibit recognition of marriages in other states between
persons of the same gender, I.C. 31-11-1-1(b).
101. Because of these sex-based classifications, Marilyn Rae Baskin, for example, is
precluded from marrying Esther Fuller because Rae is a woman and not a man; were Rae a man,
she could marry Esther.
102. Indianas marriage ban also impermissibly enforces conformity with sex
stereotypes by excluding adult Plaintiffs from marrying the one person each adult Plaintiff loves
because adult Plaintiffs have failed to conform to the sex-based stereotypes that men should
marry women and that women should marry men.
103. The exclusion of adult Plaintiffs from marriage based on their sex, and the
marriage bans requirement that adult Plaintiffs behave in conformity with sex-based stereotypes
as a condition of being able to marry, cannot survive the heightened scrutiny required for sex-
based classifications.
104. Discrimination Based on Parental Status. The marriage ban impermissibly
classifies children, including the child Plaintiffs, on the bases of their parents sex, sexual
orientation, and marital status, denying such children the dignity, legitimacy, security, support,
and protections available to children whose parents can marry. The States differential treatment
of children based upon their parents sex, sexual orientation, and marital status cannot survive
the heightened scrutiny required for classifications based on parental status.
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105. Discrimination With Respect to Fundamental Rights and Liberty Interests
Secured by the Due Process Clause. The marriage ban discriminates against adult Plaintiffs
based on sexual orientation and sex with respect to access to the fundamental right to marry and
against all Plaintiffs with respect to their liberty interests in dignity, autonomy, and family
integrity and association. Differential treatment with respect to exercise of fundamental rights
and liberty interests subjects Defendants conduct to strict or at least heightened scrutiny, which
Defendants conduct cannot withstand.
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 65
106. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs of
this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
107. This case presents an actual controversy because Defendants present and ongoing
denial of equal treatment and liberty to Plaintiffs subjects them to serious and immediate harms,
warranting the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
108. Plaintiffs seek preliminary and/or permanent injunctive relief to protect their
constitutional rights and avoid the injuries described above. In addition, Plaintiffs Niki Quasney
and Amy Sandler seek a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction against the
Defendants. A favorable decision enjoining Defendants would redress and prevent the
irreparable injuries to Plaintiffs identified herein, for which Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy
at law.
109. The State will incur little to no burden in allowing same-sex couples to marry and
recognizing out-of-state marriages, whereas the hardship for Plaintiffs of being denied equal
protection and liberty is severe, subjecting them to an irreparable denial of their constitutional
rights. The balance of hardships thus tips strongly in favor of Plaintiffs.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment:
A. Declaring that the provisions and enforcement by Defendants of Indiana Code
Sections 31-11-1-1(a), 31-11-1-1(b), and any other sources of Indiana law that exclude same-sex
couples from marriage or from recognition of marriages entered into in another jurisdiction
violate Plaintiffs rights under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
B. Preliminarily and permanently enjoining enforcement by Defendants of Indiana
Code Sections 31-11-1-1(a), 31-11-1-1(b), and any other sources of state law that exclude same-
sex couples from marriage or refuse recognition to the marriages of same-sex couples entered
into in another jurisdiction;
C. Requiring the DEFENDANT CLERKS in their official capacities to accept
applications and issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples on the same terms as different-sex
couples;
D. Requiring the DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER OF INDIANA STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH to change all appropriate forms, certificates, policies, and
instructions in order to recognize marriage applications and marriages of same-sex couples.
E. Issuing a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against
Defendants for the benefit of Plaintiffs Niki Quasney and Amy Sandler:
i. enjoining Defendants and all those acting in concert from enforcing Indianas
laws prohibiting recognition of Plaintiffs Niki Quasney and Amy Sandlers legal
out-of-state marriage;
ii. should Plaintiff Niki Quasney pass away in Indiana, ordering DEFENDANT
COMMISSIONER OF INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH and all
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those acting in concert to issue to Plaintiff Amy Sandler a death certificate that
records her marital status as married or widowed and that lists her as the
surviving spouse; said order shall include a requirement that Defendant VanNess
issue directives to local health departments, funeral homes, physicians, coroners,
medical examiners, and others who assist with the completing of Indiana death
certificates explaining their duties under the order of this Court;
F. Awarding Plaintiffs their costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys fees pursuant
to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. 1988 and other applicable laws; and,
G. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
H. The declaratory and injunctive relief requested in this action is sought against
each Defendant; each Defendants officers, employees, and agents; and against all persons acting
in cooperation with any Defendant or under a Defendants supervision, direction, or control.

DATED: March 31, 2014
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Barbara J. Baird_____________
Barbara J. Baird
LAW OFFICE OF BARBARA J. BAIRD
445 North Pennsylvania Street, Suite 401
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204-0000
(317) 637-2345
bjbaird@bjbairdlaw.com

Paul D. Castillo
LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC.
3500 Oak Lawn Ave., Suite 500
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 219-8585
pcastillo@lambdalegal.org

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Camilla B. Taylor
LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC.
105 West Adams, Suite 2600
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 663-4413
ctaylor@lambdalegal.org

Jordan M. Heinz
Brent P. Ray
Dmitriy G. Tishyevich
Melanie MacKay
Robyn R. English
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
300 North LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60654
(312) 862-2000
jordan.heinz@kirkland.com
brent.ray@kirkland.com
dmitriy.tishyevich@kirkland.com
melanie.mackay@kirkland.com
robyn.english@kirkland.com
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

MARILYN RAE BASKIN and ESTHER
FULLER; BONNIE EVERLY and LINDA
JUDKINS; DAWN CARVER and PAMELA
EANES; HENRY GREENE and GLENN
FUNKHOUSER, individually and as parents
and next friends of C.A.G.; NIKOLE
QUASNEY and AMY SANDLER,
individually and as parents and next friends of
A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PENNY BOGAN, in her official capacity as
BOONE COUNTY CLERK; KAREN M.
MARTIN, in her official capacity as
PORTER COUNTY CLERK; MICHAEL A.
BROWN, in his official capacity as LAKE
COUNTY CLERK; PEGGY BEAVER, in her
official capacity as HAMILTON COUNTY
CLERK; WILLIAM C. VANNESS II, M.D.,
in his official capacity as the
COMMISSIONER, INDIANA STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and GREG
ZOELLER, in his official capacity as
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-00355-RLY-
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DECLARATION OF AMY MELISSA SANDLER
I, Amy Melissa Sandler (Amy), declare and state as follows:
1. The testimony set forth in this declaration is based on first-hand knowledge,
about which I could and would testify competently in open court if called upon to do so.
2. I am one of the Plaintiffs in the above-captioned lawsuit.
3. I live in Munster, Indiana, with Nikole Rai Quasney (Niki) and our two
daughters, A.Q.-S., who is almost 3 years old, and M.Q.-S., who is 1 year old.
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4. Niki and I have been in a loving and committed relationship for more than 13
years. We entered into a civil union in Illinois on June 7, 2011. We married each other in
a civil ceremony within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on August 29, 2013. We
would like the State of Indiana to recognize and respect our marriage as valid in Indiana.
5. I am 37 years old and am in the process of a career change in an effort to align
my schedule to be more flexible with my familys needs as Niki battles stage IV ovarian
cancer. I am currently a full-time student in the school social work masters program, in
the Social Services Administration Department at the University of Chicago to become a
licensed social worker. I commute for classes from our home in Indiana. I also work an
unpaid internship at a Chicago Public Schools High School in the Hyde Park
neighborhood, assisting students with disabilities and students who need support services,
guidance, or crisis intervention. After I obtain my degree, I would prefer to seek licensure
and employment at a school in Indiana to be close to my family and home. However,
because school districts in Indiana will not recognize my marriage to Niki for the purpose
of providing me with spousal health insurance, I must seek licensure and a job in Illinois.
6. I met Niki in Washington, D.C. in August of 2000. I was not the kind of
person that went out a lot, let alone to bars, but one night I went out with a friend and I
saw Niki. I wanted to go up to her and talk with her, but I didnt. We went out again
several nights later and I saw her again. This time, I approached her and talked to her. We
hit it off really well from the beginning and exchanged telephone numbers. I called her
the next day and so began our relationship.
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7. Niki and I have a lot in common. We both are physically active, enjoy outdoor
activity and traveling together, and we support each others different interests as well. We
both also love children and dreamed of starting our own family one day.
8. When I met Niki, I had not yet come out to my parents, so I did not
immediately tell them about my relationship with Niki. After some time and fear that
they wouldnt accept me if I disclosed my love for Niki, I worked up the courage to talk
with them. I informed my parents about my commitment to and love for Niki. Initially,
they refused to accept our relationship and it took them some time to finally accept me
for who I am and my relationship with Niki.
9. Niki and I made plans for our future together. We moved in together in
December of 2002. As our lives and careers moved us to different cities, we never moved
alone. Being together was important for us, so the other person would follow; usually it
was Niki following me. We always, however, chose a location that would meet Nikis
career needs as well. I knew that I wanted to be with Niki from the very beginning, and I
am thankful that she has always been at my side, no matter what happened or what city
we were living in.
10. When Nikis routine bloodwork screening came back worrisome for ovarian
cancer at the end of May 2009, we were living in Las Vegas, Nevada. Niki was teaching
elementary physical education and I had just completed a Ph.D program and a semester
of teaching at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I was really looking forward to
getting on with our life together after having been so consumed by school. Our plan was
always that I would complete school, then we would build our family. In fact, in my
dissertation, I wrote an acknowledgement to Niki that included, Now, lets begin the rest
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of our lives together. Several months later, just as we were preparing to conceive our
first child, Nikis blood tests indicated a likelihood of cancer.
11. The next few days were some of the scariest and most difficult days of my
entire life. Medical tests had to be done and thus, there was a lot of uncertainty and
questions about how serious Nikis condition was. After several medical tests in Las
Vegas again showed a likelihood of cancer, Niki and I almost immediately left for
Chicago and consulted with two gynecologic oncologists there within a few days. Both
doctors recommended that Niki have the most aggressive surgery as soon as possible.
12. Niki was incredibly scared and so was I, but I knew that I needed to be strong
for the two of us because Niki wasnt herself. She was afraid that she was going to die
before getting to Chicago. I talked her through her anxiety and got us to Chicago because
she and I both knew that was where we needed to be. Once in Chicago and surgery was
scheduled, Niki was scared that she wouldnt survive to make it to the day of surgery. On
the day of surgery, she was worried that she would not survive through the surgery. In
fact, her fear of death almost prevented her from going through with the surgery on the
day of it. I talked her through that too. I will never forget the moment, several hours into
Nikis surgery, when I was called to the phone for the mid-surgery report from the
operating room. The nurse confirmed to me that Niki did, in fact, have ovarian cancer. I
was surrounded by two of her sisters and her mother and we were devastated. But we
vowed that we would all get through it together.
13. Niki chose to undergo a very aggressive treatment plan because she wants to
beat cancer so badly and survive. The chemotherapy where patients lose their hair, Niki
has exhausted that option. She has utilized the most aggressive chemotherapy drugs as
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well as many of the other standard second, third, fourth, and fifth lines of recommended
chemotherapy drugs. She has also been on two clinical trial treatment protocols for
ovarian cancer. But the cancer is still in her body. Chemotherapy takes its toll on her
body. Every treatment is tougher on her organs, her metabolism, her overall functioning,
and therefore on me as well. I wake up every morning not knowing what the day will
bring. In the last month alone, Niki has made trips to the emergency room at the
University of Chicago (and was diagnosed with a pulmonary embolism and admitted to
the hospital) and to urgent care (just last week, when she tested positive for the flu and
mononucleosis). There are very good days and there are very hard days. Since the end of
May 2009, not a single day has gone by when I have not thought about cancer. In my
deepest reflective moments, I fear what will happen to our family if time runs out for
Niki despite her and her doctors best efforts.
14. The uncertainty about Nikis health made me more concerned about the
security of our relationship and our family. The need for our marriage to be recognized so
that we can safeguard our family has become incredibly urgent for all of us.
15. My family has a home in Massachusetts and this home has been in my family
for generations, it is a very special place. We go there on vacation every summer. Last
summer, I was afraid that Nikis health was deteriorating and I didnt know if that trip
was going to be our last trip together. I became especially concerned in the midst of our
trip when Niki told me that a friend of ours who also has ovarian cancer and carries the
same BRCA1 mutation that Niki carries, was told by her doctors that chemotherapy could
no longer extend her life. This friend passed away weeks later. There is no ban on
marriage for same-sex couples in Massachusetts and I worried that this trip could be our
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last opportunity to get legally married. Before traveling, and without telling her that I was
scared about her health (because I did not want her to think that I was giving up), I asked
Niki to marry me before we left for our vacation. On August 29, 2013 Niki and I were
married.
16. Getting married was an amazing feeling. It was magical because I was finally
marrying the love of my life the person who gave me the strength to be who I am -- it
was a dream come true. We had a small ceremony before a Justice of the Peace at the
town hall in Newburyport, Massachusetts. My sister and even my parents were there.
17. When Niki was diagnosed with ovarian cancer, we moved to Chicago. Niki
and I moved from Chicago to Munster, Indiana in 2011 to be closer to Nikis family.
When I delivered our youngest daughter, M.Q.-S., we were already living in Indiana. But
because the state of Indiana did not recognize our Illinois civil union, when it was time to
deliver M.Q.-S., we drove almost an hour to a hospital in Chicago because we needed to
ensure that Niki would be treated as our babys parent from birth, by immediately being
listed as a parent on M.Q.-S.s birth certificate. We knew that even in the middle of
winter, we had to make the drive to Chicago for M.Q-S.s birth. Niki would not have
been listed as a parent on the birth certificate had M.Q.-S. been born in Indiana. Having
this important document, with Nikis name on it as the second parent, was very important
to us, especially while Nikis second parent adoption proceeding was pending in Indiana.
NIki was undergoing aggressive chemotherapy while we were going through her
adoption of M.Q-S. There were days when she was bed-ridden from the chemotherapy
side effects; but we had no choice but to have to a notary public witness Niki and I
signing specific forms. I remember having to physically support Niki to the car and into
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the store for the notary public to witness our signatures. She should never have had to go
through this. We should have just been able to enjoy our first weeks as a family with
me recovering from giving birth and Niki from chemotherapy. Legally recognized
married couples are granted immediate parental rights in Indiana when a child is
conceived during a marriage. Even with our legal marriage today, we would still have to
go through another adoption process if we were to expand our family, because Indiana
views Niki and I as legal strangers.
18. Niki and I are legally married, and when I spend time in Chicago, Illinois
while in school or while working at my internship, I am recognized as a married person.
However, less than an hour drive away, just over the border, Niki and I are both single
persons as defined by the laws of Indiana. Almost every day, there is this discordance in
the legal recognition of our marital status. It makes our family feel less secure at home,
and it hurts us deeply.
19. Niki is the stay-at-home parent for our two daughters. She is an amazing
parent. It doesnt matter how bad a day Niki is having or how sick she feels from regular
and aggressive chemotherapy, she never lets on to the girls that she doesnt feel well. Our
oldest daughter, A.Q.-S. is three now and notices when Niki is away at chemotherapy.
Right now, we feel she is too young to understand the gravity of Nikis condition and
treatment, especially because she doesnt notice that Niki is sick and she wouldnt know
it unless we told her. Right now, she knows that Niki has to get her medicine at the
hospital. We also dont want to scare her because she is a very caring, perceptive, and
sweet child. If I even mention that I have a headache, she gets concerned and asks me if I
am okay and will try to make me feel better by kissing my head.
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20. A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S. are very happy children and are very loved. Nikis
immediate family, many of whom live just down the block from us, right here in
Munster, are an important source of love and support for us and for A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S.
They love them dearly. We celebrate Christmas with Nikis family and Jewish holidays
with my extended family when we visit them. A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S. have many cousins
and aunts and uncles with whom they interact regularly, and holidays are a joyful time for
all of us. Nikis family, as they are local, and Nikis mother in particular, has made our
family and our children a priority. Since Indiana is where Nikis family members live,
Indiana is where we live and where we plan to live permanently. To be able to have
recognition as a married couple here would be wonderful.
21. Niki is sometimes concerned that people will judge her for deciding to have
children knowing that she had been diagnosed with metastatic ovarian cancer. But, what
people might not understand is that while there is a strong chance that cancer will cut her
life short, cancer does not and should not prevent us from living our lives and pursuing
our dreams while we can. Niki is an incredible partner and a wonderful parent. She is a
beautiful example of grace, humor, and strength to our girls, even during the most
difficult times. From the day we decided to move forward with building a family when
Niki was in remission, I have firmly believed that if our children could spend even one
hour, one day, one month, or one year with Niki, the quality of time that they have with
her is a blessing. As dire as Nikis health may seem sometimes, I have never once
regretted our decision to have our children. Every day she is with us is a day for her to
impress her incredible personality and values upon them. She could have decided not to
have children with me after her diagnosis, but she did and for that I will always be
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thankful to her. Without Niki, we would not have our family. I will forever be grateful for
every moment our kids have with her and that I have with her, I dont know how she does
it. Even on the days when I know she is really sick and really tired, and I have left the
countertops a mess, I wake up in the morning and the house is spotless. She doesnt slow
down and she doesnt miss a beat. She picks up where I leave off. I love her. I want her to
be recognized as my legal spouse.
22. Niki is my wife. It is more hurtful than I can describe that our government
refuses to acknowledge that. And there are no words for how I would feel if Niki were to
pass away and I received an official record of her death that had the box single checked
off, and the space for a surviving spouse left blank. Not only would that be a denial of my
love and my grief, but it would be grievously unfair to our children, who deserve to have
their mothers respected, in life and in death, as married to each other.
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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

MARILYN RAE BASKIN and ESTHER
FULLER; BONNIE EVERLY and LINDA
JUDKINS; DAWN CARVER and PAMELA
EANES; HENRY GREENE and GLENN
FUNKHOUSER, individually and as parents
and next friends of C.A.G.; NIKOLE
QUASNEY and AMY SANDLER,
individually and as parents and next friends of
A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PENNY BOGAN, in her official capacity as
BOONE COUNTY CLERK; KAREN M.
MARTIN, in her official capacity as
PORTER COUNTY CLERK; MICHAEL
A. BROWN, in his official capacity as LAKE
COUNTY CLERK; PEGGY BEAVER, in her
official capacity as HAMILTON COUNTY
CLERK; WILLIAM C. VANNESS II, M.D.,
in his official capacity as the
COMMISSIONER, INDIANA STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; and GREG
ZOELLER, in his official capacity as
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-00355-RLY-
TAB



DECLARATION OF NIKOLE RAI QUASNEY
I, Nikole Rai Quasney (Niki), declare and state as follows:
1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit. The testimony set forth in this
Declaration is based on first-hand knowledge, about which I could and would testify
competently in open court if called upon to do so.
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2. I live in Munster, Indiana with Amy Melissa Sandler (Amy) and our two
daughters, A.Q.-S., age 2 and M.Q.-S., age 1. Amy and I have been in a loving and
committed relationship for more than thirteen years.
3. Amy and I entered into a civil union in Illinois on June 7, 2011. We married
each other in a civil ceremony within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on August 29,
2013. A true and correct copy of our marriage license is attached as Exhibit A. We would
like the State of Indiana to recognize and respect our marriage as valid in Indiana.
4. I was born in East Chicago, Indiana and raised in Munster, Indiana. Indiana is
my home state; this is where my family lives and this is where I plan to live the rest of
my life.
5. I am 37 years old and am a stay-at-home mom. I spend most of my time with
A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S. and I cherish every second that I get to spend with them. I am
currently living with and just completed six cycles of chemotherapy for for Stage IV
ovarian cancer, which means that the cancer has metastasized and spread beyond my
pelvic region and throughout my abdominal cavity. My gynecologic-oncologist told Amy
and I when I was diagnosed almost 5 years ago, that there is a 5-year median survival rate
for people diagnosed with the kind of ovarian cancer that I have. June 2014 will mark my
5
th
anniversary of battling this disease.
6. My time is precious and I cannot imagine a better way to spend my days than
to be with the people most dear to me, my family: Amy, A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S. It is an
absolute joy to be able to help form A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S. as people and give them what I
hope are memories that they will have with them for the rest of their lives.
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7. I have chosen very difficult and aggressive treatment plans, including multiple
abdominal surgeries and chemotherapy infusions to prolong my life expectancy; because,
doing so could mean a longer life with Amy and our daughters. When I am dealing with
the worst side effects of this disease, I try to tell myself that I go through the worst days
so that I can get back to the good days. As long as I can keep doing what Im doing,
spend time with my family, and enjoy life like I am doing now, then fighting this disease
is completely worth it. I also, however, cannot deny the importance of having quality of
life. For example, approximately six weeks after M.Q.-S. was born, I had to stop a certain
chemotherapy regimen that appeared to be working because I had no quality of life on
this particular drug. I switched to a different treatment plan, which kept the cancer stable
for a short time. In my most recent six-cycle course of chemotherapy, I had 11 infusions
(we skipped the final infusion because my platelets were too low to get chemotherapy).
8. Having children was a dream that both Amy and I cherished well before
meeting one another. I come from a very large family; I have five siblings and our
daughters have 15 first cousins. My and Amys decision to have children together was a
given and we began to pursue that dream in 2007, before my diagnosis. That year we
tried to adopt a child from Vietnam, but sadly due to political issues between the United
States and Vietnam, it didnt become a reality. After that experience we still had plans to
try to get pregnant and agreed that Amy would carry our child. Although I had not been
diagnosed with cancer yet, I knew that I was a carrier of the BRCA1 gene mutation,
which significantly increases the risk of developing breast or ovarian cancer. Therefore,
just after my 31
st
birthday, I had a prophylactic double mastectomy, which significantly
decreased my risk of developing breast cancer, the most common manifestation of the
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BRCA1 gene mutation. I continued to follow the recommended ovarian cancer screening
protocol for high-risk patients and every six-months my tests results were normal.
Doctors recommended ovary removal between 35-40 years old. but they also were
willing to perform a full hysterectomy, including ovary and fallopian tube removal, when
I was ready.
9. The late spring/summer of 2009 was one of the most difficult times of my
entire life. In late May, 2009, just after my 33
rd
birthday, my biannual blood level
screening came back suspicious for ovarian cancer. At the time, Amy had just finished
her Ph.D. in Las Vegas and I was teaching at a Las Vegas elementary school. I followed
up the concerning blood results with a CT scan, which showed a 7 cm mass and other
tumor implants. Amy and I immediately dropped everything in Las Vegas to travel to
Chicago so that I could get the best care and be close to my family members (who lived
in northwest Indiana and Chicago). When I received this news my father was very sick
with pancreatic cancer. It weighed heavily on me to know that my father was dying and
now I had to share this news with my parents.
10. When we arrived in Chicago, we consulted with two gynecologic oncologists,
scheduled my surgery, and then went to see my dad in the hospital. During my fathers
final days, he asked to meet with Amy and I together. He told us that he was very proud
of us. When I told him that I would fight this cancer like he did, he simply said, fight
hard. He told me that if he had to go to battle with someone, he would pick me. I believe
that if he saw what we are going through now in Indiana, he would be behind us 100
percent. My dad would be so proud to know that Amy and I are continuing to stand up
for what we believe in.
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11. Just a couple of days later, in early June of 2009 I had surgery to remove more
than 100 tumors throughout my abdomen, including on my liver, kidneys, diaphragm,
and bladder. My entire omentum was removed and the surgeon also stripped my
diaphragm and inserted a port directly into my abdominal cavity The following month, I
began chemotherapy. In August, my dad passed away.
12. Amys grandmother, to whom she was very close, also passed away during
that summer. Several weeks after my surgery, Amy returned to Las Vegas alone to pack
up all of our things and rent out the home we purchased there.
13. A year after my diagnosis, I was in remission, and Amy and I decided to go
forward with our plans of starting a family together. We chose an anonymous sperm
donor together and through the use of assisted reproductive technology, A.Q.-S. was
conceived in July of 2010.
14. I clearly remember the day we learned that Amy was pregnant. Amy took a
home pregnancy test, and we both waited anxiously for the results. It felt like such a long
time for the result to appear. Finally, the test turned out positive! A life-long dream of
being parents was coming true for us. It was one of the happiest moments of my life. I
literally ran around and practically bounced off the walls because I was so excited. As a
matter of fact, I have a picture of myself with the pregnancy test showing that it is
positive, and the smile on my face is bigger than ever.
15. Although I had been in remission, in late February of 2011, during Amys
third trimester, I began to experience severe stomach pain and my doctors were afraid
that the cancer had returned. I was hospitalized for approximately 20 days and Amy was
with me every day. There came a point during my hospitalization when Amys
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obstetrician at Northwestern Memorial Hospital (NMH) was concerned that I might be
hospitalized at the University of Chicago Medical Center (UCMC) when Amy went into
labor. She emphasized to Amy that the most important thing was not who delivered our
baby, but that Amy and I were together when our baby was born. So Amys obstetrician
arranged for Amy to consult with an obstetrician at the UCMC, who agreed to care for
Amy and our baby if I was hospitalized when Amy went into labor. When my symptoms
recurred after being released from the hospital, surgery became my only option. My
doctor believed she would discover cancer, but instead she spent seven hours breaking
down scar tissue and adhesions which developed as a result of my first surgery. Although
this second surgery was very difficult, the cancer had not returned, I was still in
remission, and Amys due date was still several weeks away. As Amys due date
approached, we again took precautionary measures in the event that I became sick while
Amy and our baby were hospitalized. A gynecologic oncologist who I had seen several
times for second opinions at NMH agreed that if anything happened to me while Amy
and our baby were hospitalized, that she would admit and care for me at NMH so that our
family could be together. It gave us both tremendous relief to know that both Amy and I
had our medical teams supporting our journey together.
16. In April of 2011 A.Q.-S. was born. She was 9 pounds, 4 ounces, and
absolutely perfect.
17. Holding my daughter for the first time was amazing. I was weak from the
surgery a few weeks before A.Q.-S. was born, but when I held her, I felt no pain. A.Q.-
Ss birth was an incredible moment in our lives. We were both so happy and felt so lucky
and thankful that we had come such a long way together.
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18. In September of 2011, when A.Q.-S. was about 5 months old, I had routine
blood work performed, including the CA-125 test, which detects a protein that can
increase when cancer is present in the body. There was a subtle increase in the level of
this protein. Although I didnt feel any symptoms, the tumor marker was slowly rising.
After further tests, my doctors wanted performed an exploratory surgery. Almost seven
hours later, I woke up and learned that doctors had taken more tumors out of my
abdomen. One of the tumors was on my small bowel, requiring a bowel resection.
19. Any time that blood tests or scans or anything isnt normal, it is very stressful,
but I feel very lucky that I had that last surgery because I went into remission again. My
second remission lasted 11 months.
20. Both Amy and I grew up with siblings so there was never really a question
about whether to have a second child, but rather a question about when. When I was in
remission again in May of 2012, Amy became pregnant with our second daughter, M.Q.-
S.
21. M.Q.-S. was born in February of 2013. Again, she was perfect and we were so
thankful. At this point, both Amy and I felt lucky and blessed that we were able to move
forward with our lives. We were still living our lives in spite of cancer. Together, we
brought two amazing children into the world and our family was complete.
22. Protecting my family is critically important. As hopeful as I am that I can
continue to keep the cancer stable or even get into remission again, my doctor has told
me that eventually the standard medications will stop working. Although my treatment
plans have always been very aggressive, the cancer cells eventually become resistant to
the differently chemotherapies and this is often the challenge of keeping the cancer from
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spreading more. Despite having this knowledge, Amy and I continue to be optimistic that
every day I am here is an opportunity for new discoveries. But regardless of what
happens, I need to ensure that my family is protected and will be taken care of if I run out
of time. Although Amy and I married in the state of Massachusetts, the state of Indiana
treats us as if we are legal strangers to each other. This is very scary and makes me feel
unsafe for myself and my family.
23. I have a real fear of not being treated and respected as a spouse and equal
parent in my home state, even though Amy and I have taken every possible step we could
take to protect our family. When civil unions became available in Illinois, we became
civil union partners. We legally married in Massachusetts. We have performed second
parent adoptions for both of our daughters to secure my parent-child relationships to
them. We have drawn up wills and durable health care powers of attorney. However,
Amy and I know that this is not enough. We are still treated as legal strangers in our
home state, and because our government denies our marriage any respect, our
government invites and encourages private bias and discrimination against us.
24. When Amy and I first moved to Indiana together, we inquired about a family
gym membership at Fitness Pointe, a fitness center owned and operated by The
Community Hospital here in Munster. Both the hospital and the fitness center are within
2 miles from our home. An employee at the fitness center told us in person that we could
not apply for the family membership because we were not married. A hospital
spokesperson said that the hospitals definition of spouse matches the state of Indianas
definition of marriage, and that therefore we did not qualify as a family.
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25. Even though I understand that The Community Hospital in Munster makes
available many of the medical services I need, including tests and treatments, I travel to
Chicago instead for chemotherapy treatments and even emergency medical care because
my family is not recognized as a family at The Community Hospital. The Community
Hospitals steadfast adherence to the States definition of a marriage and refusal to
respect my marriage to Amy sends the message to me that my family is not seen as equal.
Therefore I do not have confidence that Amy and I, as well as our children, will be
respected there in emergency situations that could result in hospitalizations. I am terrified
that the hospital may not let us be together in an emergency or permit Amy to make
medical decisions on my behalf.
26. On March 4, 2014, I felt pain in my rib cage. My oncologist told me to go to
the emergency room because she wanted to rule out a pulmonary embolism Instead of
making the short drive from my home to The Community Hospital, I drove more than 40
minutes to the University of Chicago Medical Center in Illinois. It turned out that I was
suffering from a pulmonary embolism and was admitted to the hospital overnight. The
physicians at the hospital shared with me that people living with cancer are at greater risk
for an embolism, and that an embolism is a serious emergency.
27. My life with cancer has been challenging, and it certainly hasnt been easy on
Amy. When I was scared to the point of paralysis about what was going to happen after
my diagnosis, Amy stayed calm, held my hand, and supported me every step of the way.
For a very long time, she didnt leave my side. When everything felt like it was falling
apart, Amy was scared, too, but she kept everything together. She has been my rock and I
dont know where I would be without her. She is always there for me, for anything. Amy
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is everything to me and we have been through more than most young couples. She is an
amazing partner and has been there every step of the way since my diagnosis.
28. By denying respect to our marriage, the State denies respect both to me and to
the most important relationship in my life. Amy is my life partner. She is the one special
person in the world with whom I have chosen to build a life, to have children, and spend
the rest of my life. She is the love of my life.
29. I want to know that no matter what happens to me, my family will be safe and
taken care of. I want my marriage to Amy to be recognized and treated like any other
marriage in the state of Indiana. Without that recognition, I feel vulnerable. Worse, I feel
that Amy and our daughters are vulnerable.
30. If something were to happen to me, I fear that Amy wouldnt receive the
protections and benefits afforded to surviving spouses whose marriages are legally
recognized. Like any person who loses their spouse, it would be hard enough for Amy to
have to pick up the pieces of our life and be strong for our children. It pains me to think
that she could even have to go through that part without me. But to know that the state of
Indiana would make her life even more difficult adds a separate layer of emotional pain.
To know that Indianas disregard for our marriage would jeopardize the security and
well-being, not only of Amy, but of our daughters as well, adds a level of anxiety that no
one deserves.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION


MARILYN RAE BASKIN and ESTHER
FULLER; BONNIE EVERLY and
LINDA JUDKINS; DAWN LYNN
CARVER and PAMELA RUTH ELEASE
EANES; HENRY GREENE and GLENN
FUNKHOUSER, individually and as
parents and next friends of C.A.G.; and
AMY SANDLER and NIKOLE
QUASNEY,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

PENNY BOGAN, in her official capacity
as BOONE COUNTY CLERK; KAREN
M. MARTIN, in her official capacity as
PORTER COUNTY CLERK; MICHAEL
A. BROWN, in his official capacity as
LAKE COUNTY CLERK; PEGGY
BEAVER, in her official capacity as
HAMILTON COUNTY CLERK;
WILLIAM C. VANNESS, in his official
capacity as the COMMISSIONER,
INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH; and GREG ZOELLER, in his
official capacity as INDIANA
ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendants.

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1:14-cv-00355-RLY-TAB



ENTRY ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER
Plaintiffs, Amy Sandler and Nikole (Niki) Quasney, ask this court to grant a
temporary restraining order requiring the state of Indiana to recognize their out-of-state
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marriage. The court held a hearing on April 10, 2014, and issued a bench ruling
GRANTING the temporary restraining order, which expires 28 days from that date, on
May 8, 2014. Consistent with that ruling, the court issues the following written order.
I. Background
Plaintiffs, Niki Quasney and Amy Sandler, have been in a loving and committed
relationship for more than thirteen years. (Declaration of Nikole Quasney (Quasney
Dec.) 2, Filing No. 32-2). They have two very young children, A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S.
(Id. at 2). On June 7, 2011, Amy and Niki entered into a civil union in Illinois. (Id. at
3). Then, on August 29, 2013, they were married in Massachusetts.
1
(Id.).
In late May of 2009, Niki was diagnosed with Stage IV Ovarian cancer. (Id. at
9). She and Amy immediately flew to Chicago for treatment, and just a couple of days
later in June 2009, surgeons removed over 100 tumors throughout Nikis abdomen,
including her liver, kidneys, diaphragm, and bladder. (Id. at 11). At that time, the
median survival rate for her cancer was five years. (Id. at 5). Ever since, Niki has been
battling her cancer with the most aggressive treatments she can endure while maintaining
some quality of life.
2
(Id. at 7). Every three weeks, Nikis doctor performs a CA-125
test, which is a blood test to check the tumor marker for ovarian cancer. (Supplemental
Declaration of Nikole Quasney (Quasney Supp. Dec.) 1; Hearing Exhibit C). Three
weeks ago, the test showed Nikis level was near normal at 37. (Id.). Unfortunately, on

1
Massachusetts allows for same-sex couples to marry.
2
Niki went into remission in July 2010. (Quasney Dec. 13). She had more tumors removed in
September of 2011. (Id. at 18). In May of 2012, Niki again was in remission. (Id. at 20).
She completed her most recent treatment of chemotherapy approximately four weeks ago.
(Quasney Supp. Dec. 4).
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April 9, 2014, that level soared to 106. (Id. at 2). On Wednesday, April 16, 2014, Niki
will begin a new chemotherapy treatment. (Id. at 4).
Because Niki is fighting a fatal disease and is nearing the five year survival rate,
she and Amy requested that the court issue a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction preventing Indiana from enforcing Indiana Code 31-11-1-1(b) as
applied against them and requiring the state, through the Defendants, to recognize Niki as
married to Amy on her death certificate.
II. Standard
The court has the power to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. The court may grant a TRO if the movant: (1) has
some likelihood of succeeding on the merits, (2) has no adequate remedy at law, and (3)
will suffer irreparable harm if the order is denied. See Abott Labs. v. Mead Johnson &
Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992). If these three elements are met, the court will
consider any irreparable harm to the non-movant and balance it against the harm to the
movant. See id. at 12. The Seventh Circuit evaluates the balance on a sliding scale so
that the more likely it is the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, the less balance of
irreparable harm need weigh towards its side. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker
Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 2013).
III. Discussion
A. Standing for Temporary Restraining Order
Defendants first argued that the Plaintiffs are in actuality seeking a declaratory
judgment rather than a TRO. According to Defendants, the court cannot grant a TRO
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here because the Plaintiffs suffer no cognizable Article III harm that a restraining order
can remedy. The court disagrees with Defendants. To satisfy Article III, the injuries
alleged may be slight. As the United States Supreme Court said, [a]n identifiable trifle
is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for
standing and the principle supplies the motivation. Harris, 927 F.2d at 1406 (finding a
cognizable injury when plaintiff mightily strives to avoid any visible contact with the
Rolling Meadows seal by utilizing alternative travel routes) (quoting United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n. 14 (1972). The Plaintiffs here have shown cognizable
injuries that a TRO can remedy because Niki drives across state lines to receive treatment
from a hospital that will recognize her marriage, Niki and Amy have been denied a
family fitness membership, and they suffer anxiety, sadness, and stress about the non-
recognition of their marriage and what that means if and when Niki succumbs to her
disease. (Quasney Dec. 24, 25, 26, 30; Quasney Supp. Dec. 7).
Additionally, Defendants argue that the dignitary harm suffered by Plaintiffs is not
cognizable under Article III of the United States Constitution, and therefore an adequate
remedy at law need not exist for that harm and it cannot qualify as irreparable. See
Harris v. City of Zion, Lake County, Ill., 927 F.2d 1401, 1405 (7th Cir. 1991) (the
requirement that the plaintiff allege an injury-in-fact, whether economic or non-
economic, excludes simple indignation as a basis for Article III standing.). The court
again disagrees and finds that the deprivation of the dignity of a state sanctioned marriage
is a cognizable injury under Article III. See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2694. In Windsor,
Justice Kennedy emphasized the dignitary harms suffered as a result of the Defense of
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Marriage Act (DOMA). For example, he noted that [t]he differentiation demeans the
couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects. . . . And it humiliates
tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. Id. (citing Texas v.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). He stressed the fact that the states wished to confer
dignity on certain marriages that the federal government, through DOMA, was taking
away by not recognizing the marriages. See id. Thus, the court finds that Windsor
recognized and remedied a dignitary injury. Finding that a TRO is an appropriate
remedy, the court now turns to the criteria for a TRO.
B. Temporary Restraining Order
i. Some Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To satisfy the first requirement, the Plaintiffs chance of success must be more
than negligible. See Brunswick Corp. v. Jones, 784 F.2d 271, 275 (7th Cir. 1986). In
support of their position that Indiana Code 31-11-1-1(b) is unconstitutional, Plaintiffs rely
on the wave of recent cases finding that similar state statutes and state constitutional
amendments violate the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. See Tanco
v. Haslam, No. 3:13-cv-01159, 2014 WL 997525 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014); De Leon
v. Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982, 2014 WL 715741 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014); Lee v. Orr,
No. 1:13-cv-08719, 2014 WL 683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, No.
2:13cv0395, 2014 WL 561978 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, No.3:13-cv-
750-H, 2014 W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014); Kitchen v. Hubert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah
2013); Bishop v. United States ex. rel. Holder, No. 04-cv-848, 2014 WL 116013 (N.D.
Okla. Jan. 14, 2014). In particular, Plaintiffs rely on two cases where temporary relief
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was granted when one of the spouses was suffering from a fatal disease. See Obergefell
v. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 3814262 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 22, 2103) (granting TRO
ordering Ohio to recognize the marriage of a same-sex couple where one spouse was
terminally ill); see also Gray v. Orr, No. 13C8449, 2013 WL 6355918 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5,
2013) (granting a TRO to allow same-sex couple to marry before the effective date of
newly enacted statute authorizing same-sex marriages because one partner was terminally
ill). The court finds these decisions to be particularly persuasive.
Defendants counter that the authority of the states to define marriage can be traced
back to this nations founding, and that the district court opinions favoring Plaintiffs
position have misunderstood United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
According to Defendants, there is no right to have ones marriage recognized; rather,
recognition is merely a matter of comity that is left to the states. In support, Defendants
rely on a case where Indiana did not recognize the marriage between an uncle and niece
from Russia; however, the court notes that the parties did not contest that their marriage
was void on appeal. See Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 41 N.E.2d 801 (Ind. 1942).
Defendants concede that Indiana will recognize marriages between first cousins, even
though such a marriage is generally prohibited within the state. Therefore, the court finds
that as a general rule, Indiana recognizes valid marriages performed in other states.
The court agrees with Defendants that marriage and domestic relations are generally
left to the states. Nevertheless, the restrictions put in place by the state must comply with
the United States Constitutions guarantees of equal protection of the laws and due
process. See Windsor at 2691 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating
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Virginias statute banning marriages based on race). The Equal Protection Clause
requires states to treat people equally under the law; if the state wishes to differentiate
between people and make them unequal, then it must have at least a legitimate purpose.
According to Defendants the state of Indiana does not recognize same-sex marriages
performed elsewhere because:
it calls into question the States own philosophical understanding of the
nature of government-recognized marriage, the States traditional marriage
definition being predicated on the idea that we want to attract and then
regulate couples that may unintentionally procreate for the sake of the
children.
Additionally, [i]t creates a social norm and relieves burdens on the State that may occur
in the event that unwanted children are uncared for. . . . Its the idea of ameliorating the
consequences of unintended children. This philosophy on marriage, however, does not
distinguish Indiana from the wave of recent cases finding similar statutes to be
unconstitutional. See Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla.
2014)(finding there is no rational link between excluding same-sex marriages and
steering naturally procreative relationships into marriage, in order to reduce the
number of children born out of wedlock and reduce economic burdens on the State); see
also DeBoer v. Snyder, No.1:12-cv-10285, 2014 WL 1100794, *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21,
2014) (noting that prohibiting same-sex marriages does not stop [gay men and lesbian
women] from forming families and raising children).
The court finds that this cannot be the entire rationale underlying the traditional
marriage. Additionally, this philosophy is problematic in that the state of Indiana
generally recognizes marriages of individuals who cannot procreate. For example,
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Indiana recognizes the marriages of opposite-sex couples that occurred in Florida that are
well past their procreative years.
3
This philosophy does not apply to them, so under the
states philosophy, their marriage should not be recognized here. Further, before
recognizing an out-of-state marriage on a death certificate, the state of Indiana does not
inquire whether the couple had the ability to procreate unintentionally.
Therefore, on this record, the court finds there will likely be insufficient evidence
of a legitimate state interest to justify the singling out of same-sex married couples for
non-recognition. The court thus finds that Plaintiffs have at least some likelihood of
success on the merits because the principal effect of Indianas statute is to identify a
subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at
2694.
ii. Availability of an Adequate Remedy at Law
Defendants argue that adequate remedies at law exist for Plaintiffs. For example,
assuming arguendo the state eventually does recognize same-sex marriages, if Niki
should pass away prior to the state recognizing their marriage, Amy could receive an
amended death certificate. Additionally, Amy and Niki can create a health care directive,
which the hospitals must honor, and a last will and testament, which the courts will
enforce. The court finds that these are not adequate remedies because they do not address
survivor benefits and the dignitary harm Plaintiffs suffer. Additionally, state recognition

3
On the other hand, the state of Indiana did not recognize the marriage of an uncle and niece
who had two children together. This marriage had the potential for unintentional procreation, yet
it was a void marriage. See Sclamberg, 41 N.E.2d at 802.
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of their marriage brings financial benefits, health care decision benefits, and death
benefits.
4

iii. Irreparable Harm if the Order is Denied
The court finds Plaintiffs suffer a cognizable and irreparable harm stemming from
the violation of their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection. As the
Seventh Circuit noted, [t]he existence of a continuing constitutional violation constitutes
proof of an irreparable harm. Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 303 n. 3 (7th Cir.
1978); see also Does v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:06-cv-865-RLY-WTL, 2006 WL
2927598, *11 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2006) (quoting Cohen v. Coahoma Cnty., Miss., 805 F.
Supp. 398, 406 (N.D. Miss. 1992) for the proposition that [i]t has been repeatedly
recognized by federal courts at all levels that violation of constitutional rights constitutes
irreparable harm as a matter of law.). A further showing of irreparable harm often is not
required when monetary damages are not at stake. See Back v. Carter, 933 F. Supp. 738,
754 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The rule that courts do
not require a further showing of irreparable harm is based on the belief that equal
protection rights are so fundamental to our society that any violation of these rules causes
irreparable harm. Id.
iv. Balancing of Harms
Finding that the Plaintiffs have met the criteria for a temporary restraining order, the
court must balance the irreparable harm that Defendants may suffer against Plaintiffs

4
These death benefits include an elective share of Nikis estate regardless of her will and
possibly the ability to receive Social Security benefits. See Ind. Code 29-1-3-1 and 20 C.F.R.
404.345. These are benefits that Niki and/or Amy cannot receive via contractual agreements, but
only through Indianas recognition of their marriage.
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irreparable harm. Defendants did not allege that they or the state would suffer irreparable
harm if the court granted the TRO. Additionally, as this court and others have previously
held, the state experiences no harm when it is prevented from enforcing an
unconstitutional statute. Therefore, the court finds that the balance weighs in favor of
Niki and Amy.
C. Length of the TRO
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2), a TRO may last up to 14 days
or be extended for another 14 days to a total of 28 days for good cause. The court finds
that good cause exists here to extend the expiration of this ruling to twenty-eight days
from today. These reasons include judicial economy (the court is adjudicating four other
cases challenging Indiana Code 31-11-1-1) and fairness to those four other cases whose
dispositive motions are due on April 21, 2014.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order. (Filing No. 31). Defendants and all those acting in
concert are ENJOINED from enforcing Indiana statute 31-11-1-1(b) against
recognition of Plaintiffs Niki Quasneys and Amy Sandlers valid out-of-state marriage,
and therefore, the state of Indiana must recognize only their marriage. In addition, should
Ms. Quasney pass away in Indiana, the court orders William C. VanNess II, M.D., in his
official capacity as the Commissioner of the Indiana State Department of Health and all
those acting in concert, to issue a death certificate that records her marital status as
married and lists Plaintiff Amy Sandler as the surviving spouse. This order shall
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require that Defendant VanNess issue directives to local health departments, funeral
homes, physicians, coroners, medical examiners, and others who may assist with the
completion of said death certificate explaining their duties under the order of this court.
This order is set to EXPIRE on May 8, 2014.

SO ORDERED this 18th day of April 2014.

_________________________________
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana


Distributed Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record.

__________________________________
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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Judy Farris Mason, CSR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

MARILYN RAE BASKIN and ESTHER )
FULLER; BONNIE EVERLY and LINDA )
JUDKINS; DAWN LYNN CARVER and )
PAMELA RUTH ELEASE EANES; )
HENRY GREENE and GLENN )
FUNKHOUSER, individually and )
as parents and next friends of )
C.A.G.; and NIKOLE QUASNEY and )
AMY SANDLER, individually and )
as parents and next friends of )
A.Q.-S. and M.Q.-S., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. ) 1:14-cv-00355-RLY-TAB
) Evansville, Indiana
PENNY BOGAN, in her official )
capacity as BOONE COUNTY )
CLERK; KAREN M. MARTIN, in her )
official capacity as PORTER )
COUNTY CLERK; MICHAEL A. BROWN, )
in his official capacity as )
LAKE COUNTY CLERK; PEGGY )
BEAVER, in her official )
capacity as HAMILTON COUNTY )
CLERK; WILLIAM C. VANNESS II, )
M.D., in his official capacity )
as the COMMISSIONER, INDIANA )
STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; )
and GREG ZOELLER, in his )
official capacity as INDIANA )
ATTORNEY GENERAL, )
) May 2, 2014
Defendants. )

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORAL ARGUMENT

BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD L. YOUNG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CHIEF JUDGE
APPELLANTS' APPENDIX 84
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Judy Farris Mason, CSR
Court Reporter: Judy Farris Mason, CSR
Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
318 Federal Building
Evansville, Indiana 47708
Tel. (812) 459-9805
Email: Judy_Mason@insd.uscourts.gov


Proceedings reported by stenotype.
Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.
APPELLANTS' APPENDIX 85
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Judy Farris Mason, CSR
A P P E A R A N C E S:

FOR PLAINTIFFS NIKOLE QUASNEY AND AMY SANDLER:

Camilla B. Taylor, Esquire
Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund
3500 Oak Lawn Avenue
Suite 500
Dallas, Texas 75219
Telephone: (214)219-4455

Jordan Heinz, Esquire
Dimitri Tishyevich, Esquire
Kirkland & Ellis LLP - Chicago
300 North LaSalle
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Telephone: (312)663-4413

FOR DEFENDANTS GREG ZOELLER
and WILLIAM C. VANNESS II, M.D.:

Thomas M. Fisher, Esquire
Office of the Attorney General
302 West Washington Street
IGCS - 5th Floor
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
Telephone: (317)232-6255

FOR PEGGY BEAVER, HAMILTON COUNTY CLERK:

Darren J. Murphy, Esquire
Howard & Associates
694 Logan Street
Noblesville, Indiana 46060
Telephone: (317)773-4212

FOR PENNY BOGAN, BOONE COUNTY CLERK:

Robert V. Clutter, Esquire
Clark Quinn Moses & Clark
One Indiana Square
Suite 2200
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
Telephone: (317)637-1321

APPELLANTS' APPENDIX 86
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Judy Farris Mason, CSR
example, intestacy when there are many spouses? All of these
things would be very different in a polygamy challenge.
The State says that the sole purpose of the ban is to
connect biology with legal reality, I believe. I'm sorry if
I'm misquoting that. I might have been writing too fast and
missed it.
MR. FISHER: Responsible procreation.
MS. TAYLOR: Responsible procreation. Excuse me.
THE COURT: Mr. Fisher says there's been no
alternative to the responsible procreation as a rationale for
marriage, not by you, not by any Court that has looked at this
issue. Is there an alternative rationale?
MS. TAYLOR: We do, Your Honor. We do posit what we
think is an alternative with respect to what motivated the
marriage ban. That alternative is that the sole purpose is, to
quote Windsor, to impose a disadvantage, a separate status and
a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages.
With respect to the alternative with what constitutes
rationale for marriage --
THE COURT: I read in a brief somewhere that -- I
believe it was one of your briefs, plaintiffs' briefs -- that
quoted Justice Shepard in his book that he edited on the law of
Indiana, history of the law of Indiana, that he stated that the
purpose of the statute was to ban homosexual marriage. I may
be getting the quote wrong, but do you know what I'm talking
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Judy Farris Mason, CSR
about?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I looked that up or I had someone look
that up for me, and that's really not what he said, is it?
Were you paraphrasing?
MS. TAYLOR: I'm not sure that was in our brief, Your
Honor, so I'm not sure I can completely recollect the exact
quote.
THE COURT: Well, it could have been in another brief,
as well, but are you familiar with that?
MS. TAYLOR: Our position, Your Honor, is that the
marriage ban was passed in the wake of litigation in Hawaii,
which is something that the defendant agrees with us about, in
order to make sure that same-sex couples who marry in Hawaii
would not be respected in Indiana as having entered into valid
marriages and that the entire purpose of the ban is evident on
its face as a purpose of excluding lesbian and gay couples from
marriage. And you can infer what a purpose is from the absence
of any legitimate rationale for the marriage ban. That's Romer
and Windsor. And you can also tell what the purpose is --
THE COURT: If you have multiple rationales, could we
have responsible procreation and exclusion?
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, the ban doesn't actually
serve the purpose of responsible procreation in any way, and
when defendants were asked, "Well, what about the" --
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Judy Farris Mason, CSR
THE COURT: In any way?
MS. TAYLOR: In any way. There's no connection
between any type of incentive to rear children well or to
procreate and excluding lesbian and gay couples from marriage.
And when defendants were asked specifically about married
couples who choose not to procreate, the defendants said,
"Well, they provide good role models for the optimal socially
expected behavior for parents and spouses so that those who do
unintentionally procreate will be better off from observing
them."
Well, Your Honor, we believe that Glenn and Henry here
provide very good role models and that the State of Indiana
agreed with us when they first determined that they should be
licensed as foster parents and then placed a child in their
home to fulfill their dreams of being fathers and then granted
an adoption decree determining that their home was in their
child's best interest. They are wonderful role models for
optimal behavior for parents and spouses.
With respect, I guess, to Your Honor's question about what
is the rationale for marriage if it's not about caring for
unintentionally procreated children, I would actually defer to
one of our clients who explained what marriage means to her, as
I think that probably says it best. She writes, "Without Niki
we would not have our family. I will forever be grateful for
every moment our kids have with her and that I have with her.
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I don't know how she does it. Even on the days when I know she
is really sick and really tired and I have left the countertops
a mess, I wake up in the morning, and the house is spotless.
She doesn't slow down, and she doesn't miss a beat. She picks
up where I leave off. I love her. I want her to be recognized
as my legal spouse."
And while all of us who are married might put it slightly
differently, we might have different examples to use to show
what marriage means to us and why it is so important to us, I
think that there's something timeless and universal about our
experience in choosing to marry that one unique and
irreplaceable person who completes us. And I think that's what
the Courts have recognized in their liberty jurisprudence.
So if there are no further questions, thank you, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Okay. We'll do our best to get something out here in short
order. The arguments today were very's helpful to the Court,
very well presented. Thank you, and I compliment you on your
presentations.
THE CLERK: All rise. Court is adjourned.
(Court adjourned at 11:26 a.m.)
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Judy Farris Mason, CSR
CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Judy Farris Mason, Official Reporter for the United
States District Court, Southern District of Indiana, 318
Federal Building, Evansville, Indiana 47708, hereby certify
that the foregoing transcript constitutes a true, full, and
correct transcript of my shorthand notes taken of the
proceedings hereinbefore entitled and reduced to typewriting by
computer to the best of my ability.

s/Judy Farris Mason____________ May 8, 2014
Judy Farris Mason, CSR
APPELLANTS' APPENDIX 91
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 18, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit by using the CM/ECF system, which sent notification of such filing to the
following:

Barbara J. Baird
The Law Office Of Barbara J Baird
bjbaird@bjbairdlaw.com

Paul D. Castillo
Camilla B. Taylor
Christopher R. Clark
Lambda Legal Defense & Education
Fund, Inc.
pcastillo@lambdalegal.org
ctaylor@lambdalegal.org
cclark@lambdalegal.org

Robert V. Clutter
Kirtley, Taylor, Sims, Chadd & Minnette, P.C.
bclutter@kirtleytaylorlaw.com

Darren J. Murphy
Assistant Hamilton County Attorney
dmurphy@ori.net

Jordan Heinz
Brent Phillip Ray
Kirkland & Ellis LLP
jordan.heinz@kirkland.com
brent.ray@kirkland.com

Nancy Moore Tiller
Nancy Moore Tiller & Associates
nmt@tillerlegal.com

Elizabeth A. Knight
Porter County Administrative
Center
eknight@porterco.org




s/ Thomas M. Fisher
Thomas M. Fisher
Solicitor General


Office of the Attorney General
Indiana Government Center South 5th Floor
302 W. Washington St.
Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770
Phone: (317) 232-6255
Fax: (317) 232-7979
Email: Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov
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