Angela ALLS BLLLO

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!58/<&9/= In the study o the soul between psychology and phenomenology in Ldith
Stein works it becomes clearer that it is only phenomenology that really comes to grips
with the question o psychic causality by correlating the two moments and it is
thereore only phenomenology that can respond to lume`s objections while yet
remaining on his selsame terrain. It is ery important to distinguish between
psychology and phenomenology and also to clariy the relationship between psyche and
consciousness, there is thus reproposed the distinction already made by lusserl, who
stressed that when one sets out to look or the causes that determine psychic lie, they
must not be sought in lie eelings ,ebev.gefvbte, but rather in the modes` o a lie
orce ,ebev./raft, that is announced in them. All this is indicated here within limits
because psychology in itsel is undoubtedly not a science o the spirit, though the
psychic states, on the other hand, will not be alidly understood unless and until one
arries, as is demonstrated in the essay under consideration, at the motiation and
thereore the spiritual sphere. \e would say that our body is animated by a psyche and
urther enliened by the spirit.

>$263<18? lied experiences, lie eelings, tension o lied experience`, causal law,
antipositiist attitude, prescientiic` causality, empiric alue, essential structure,
intentional lied experiences, spiritual lie, motiation`, apperception.


Inquiry into the human being in all its complexity and maniestations
plays a part o particular importance in the phenomenological analyses
carried out by lusserl`s disciple and assistant, Ldith Stein. She dedicated
a great deal o attention to the relationship between body and soul and
took position with respect to the results o a science - experimental
psychology - that at the beginning o the twentieth century was still in its
ormation process.

Pontiical Lateran Uniersity, Piazza S. Gioanni in Laterano, 400120, 1he Vatican

City. L-mail address: alecalashnet.it
Cultura. International Journal o Philosophy o Culture and Axiology, 8,200

91
In the ith olume o the ]abrbvcb fvr Pbito.obie vva bavovevotogi.cbe
or.cbvvg ,1922,, directed by lusserl, Ldith Stein published a long essay,
eitrage vr bito.obi.cbev egrvvavvg aer P.,cbotogie vva aer Cei.te.ri..ev
.cbaftev, that has to be seen against the background o liely discussions
about the signiicance o psychology as a science, discussions in which
lusserl - under the inluence o his teachers, l. Brentano and \.
\undt - had taken part eer since the days o his youthul studies.
1he relationships between phenomenology and psychology are complex,
subtle and in some case een ambiguous, and the diiculty o throwing
light upon them deries essentially rom the contrast between logicism
and psychologism that characterized the philosophical enironment in
which lusserl began his relections: irst and oremost, indeed, lusserl
wanted to come to grips with the problem o the genesis o mathematics,
the ormation o numbers, and the dilemma resided in the need or
either analyzing purely objectie` logic processes as such or inquiring
into its genesis, that is to say, the operations perormed by the subjects in
elaborating this discipline.
1he latter type o inquiry constitutes the connecting moment between
phenomenology and psychology, since both are concerned with the
analysis o the subject, but it is precisely in connection with the
modalities o the description o the subject, the assumption o the
methodological iewpoint, that the two disciplines dier prooundly
rom each other. Notwithstanding all the oscillations and diiculties
1

lusserl`s position can be delineated more or less as ollows: he held that
the two inquiries were dierent, because phenomenology presents itsel
as a gnoseology, an r/evvtvi.tbeorie, and thereore a research o the
philosophical type, but precisely or this reason it is altogether
undamental or clariying the basic concepts o psychology, so
that it was both possible and desirable or the latter to accept the
results suggested by phenomenology and to conigure itsel as a
phenomenological psychology
2
.

1
I examined this question in v..ert e te .cieve, La Goliardica, Rome 1962
2
, Chapter 4,
and `oggettirita cve regivaiio - .vati.i ai iveaiti bv..ertiavi .vtta .cieva. La Goliardica
Lditrice, Rome 1982, Chapter I, 3c, Chapter II, 3.
2
L. lusserl, Pavovevotogi.cbe P.,cbotogie - 1orte.vvgev ovver.eve.ter 12:. lusserliana,
Vol. IX.
Angela ALLS BLLLO

92
loweer, lusserl was not concerned solely with psychology, but rather
with examining the signiicance o the sciences as they had organized
themseles at the end o the nineteenth century. In all his relections he
strenuously deended the separation between what the usages o his day
called the ^atvrri..ev.cbaftev ,i.e. natural sciences, and the Cei.te.ri..ev
.cbaftev ,i.e. sciences o the spirit or human sciences, against the
absorption o the latter by the ormer, or their subordination, as was
then being sustained by positiism and neopositiism.
On the other hand, he always underscored the autonomy o
philosophical inquiry with respect to the sciences, and, as ar as the
natural sciences are concerned, deemed it essential that there should be a
critical and thereore philosophical examination o the structures and the
cognitie alency that characterize them. In much the same way, or the
human sciences he had highlighted the need or a philosophical
oundation, this in the sense that the undamental concepts and notions
employed within these disciplines had to be sieed and understood by an
analysis that, as ar as he was concerned, had to hae a pheno-
menological coniguration.
It is against this background that one has to read Ldith Stein`s essay on
the philosophical oundation o psychology and the human sciences
3
in
which she phenomenologically examines the structures on which
psychology claims to ound a scientiic inquiry, albeit without grasping
them in their essential signiicance. 1he essay represented the realization
o lusserl`s aorementioned project and, in conormity with Ldith
Stein`s style, came to grips with the matter with great clarity and
analytical systematicity. 1his does not mean that she ailed to recognize
her debt to her teacher, quite the contrary: notwithstanding the act that
she undoubtedly made an autonomous and personal contribution to the
inquiry, she rankly declared to hae completely assimilated lusserl`s

3
L. Stein, eitrage vr bito.obi.cbev egrvvavvg aer P.,cbotogie vva aer Cei.te.ri..ev.cbaftev,
]abrbvcb fvr Pbito.obie vva bavovevotogi.cbe or.cbvvg. Vol. V, 1922, republished by Max
Niemeyer Verlag, 190, p. 2. \hat is examined here is the irst part o the essay entitled
P.,cbi.cbe Kav.atitat, the annex to the irst part, i.e. . |ber aie Mgticb/eit eiver Deav/tiov aer
.,cbi.cbev Kategoriev av. aer aee eiver eactev P.,cbotogie. and the conclusion: Die riviiette
cbeiavvg rov .,cbi.cbev vva gei.tigev eiv, P.,cbotogie vva Cei.te.ri..ev.cbaftev. 1he essay also
contains a second part dedicated to: vairiavvv vva Ceveiv.cbaft.
Cultura. International Journal o Philosophy o Culture and Axiology, 8,200

93
methodological indications thanks to her work o reising the second
olume o aeev
4
.

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Ldith Stein begins with a question that recurs in philosophical
speculation, but became particularly important in the age o positiism:
whether the human being is subject to the bonds o causality that
characterize nature. 1he question is clearly underlain by a classical`
ision o the physical sciences, ounded on the causality principle, the
dominion o which the human sciences - and, more generally, the global
interpretation o the human being - were trying to shake o. Since the
treatment o this theme takes the orm o opposing determinist theses
and their indeterminist counterparts, and thereore the counterposition
o reedom and necessity, the physical and the psychic, the resolution o
these contrasts calls or a systematic analysis o psychic causality and one
thereore has to ask onesel, assuming a phenomenological attitude -
starting right rom the beginning by going back to things themseles` -
what one understands by psyche` and causality`
5
. 1he link between
the two moments can be grasped ater haing perormed an analysis o
which, as usual, we can here do no more than indicate the results.
She begins by discussing the alidity o lume`s critique o the concept
o causality
6
and underscores that the theoretical needs that represent the
starting point o the Lnglish empiricist, namely the examination o the
phenomenon o causality`, hae to be considered alid, and yet, een
though he has correctly identiied the terrain on which to commence his
inquiry, his objections are not by any means conincing. Reproposing an
attitude that lusserl had suggested on seeral occasions and eentually
thematized in Kri.i.

, Ldith Stein holds that the objection put orward by

lume cannot simply be liquidated as Kant had claimed to do, indeed,
Kant had moed in an entirely dierent direction that took no account
whatsoeer o the spirit o lume`s critique. It was not a matter o

4
L. lusserl, aeev v eiver reivev Pbavovevotogie vva bavovevotogi.cbev Pbito.obie.
lusserliana, Vol. IV.
5
L. Stein, eitrage, etc., o.cit., p. 3.
6
bia., pp. 3-4.

L. lusserl, Die Kri.i. aer evroai.cbev !i..ev.cbaftev vva aie trav.evaevtate Pbavovevotogie.
lusserliana, Vol. IV.
Angela ALLS BLLLO

94
deducing the orm o causality rom physical science as already
constituted, according to Ldith Stein, Kant`s transcendental deduction
only tells us that there is a bond or link, but does not bring out the type
o link |with which we are concerned|. A proicuous discussion with
lume would hae required one to remain on the plane o the
phenomenon that was the object o the inquiry - the phenomenon o
causality - and that had subsequently been done by lusserl. It is only
phenomenology that really comes to grips with the question o psychic
causality by correlating the two moments and it is thereore only
phenomenology that can respond to lume`s objections while yet
remaining on his selsame terrain.
Ldith Stein proposes to begin the inquiry by examining a common and
daily experience: I eel cold, but can deceie mysel as to the contents o
this sensation, which I describe as cold` and be deceied by my
consciousness o this lied experience. Certainly, I eel, when I am aware
o the sensation, and eel cold and nothing else, when I hae this
sensation, but it is possible that I eel cold without there really being a
condition o cold and I may subsequently realize this. Both in the case o
eelings regarding mysel ,Cefvbte,, eeling cold or example, or those
regarding the properties o external things ,vfivavvgev,, or example
sensations o colour regarding some coloured thing, there is announced
an external condition ,cold, and an internal property or capacity, in the
case o the Cefvbte, we can speak o a lie orce ,ebev./raft, that
neertheless must not be conused with the pure I as low o lied
experiences ,rtebvi..e,
8
.
1his is a ery important point o distinction between psychology and
phenomenology and also a point o clariication o the relationship
between psyche and consciousness, there is thus reproposed the
distinction already made by lusserl, who stressed that when one sets out
to look or the causes that determine psychic lie, they must not be
sought in lie eelings ,ebev.gefvbte, but rather in the modes` o a lie
orce ,ebev./raft, that is announced in them
9
.
1he changes in lie conditions relect a greater or lesser lie orce, this
means that causality has nothing to do with the sphere o lied

8
L. Stein, eitrage etc., o.cit., pp. 19-20.
9
bia., p. 20.
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95
experiences - no pure lied experience can orm part o a causal eent -,
but rather concerns, as has already been said, the lie orce, so that both
the lie eelings and the lied experiences maniest only the real causality
o the psyche and the eects consist o a change o the other psychic
properties
10
.
On the other hand, it is important to note that psychic causality is
dierent rom its physical counterpart and the psyche o an indiidual is
a world o its own, just like material nature
11
, een orce maniests itsel
dierently in the two cases: whereas in physical nature orce can be
obsered as the result o a happening, an eent, in the psychic
sphere it can be grasped only through its lied modes, but a
distinction has to be made between the sphere o lied experiences
,rtebvi..e, and that o lie eelings, which constitutes a lower leel
o the low o lied experiences
12
.
1he relationship between the two spheres can be better understood i
one notes that consciousness and the lux o its lied experiences can be
imagines as deoid o lie eelings, in this case we ind ourseles aced
with a data low o a dierent kind, quality and intensity, but without a
colouring`, and a tension, namely the tension peculiar o the lie sphere,
in actual act, one has to note the presence o lie eelings, o a ield`
that has its characteristics, but which colours` all the data o the low
and this low cannot be brought to a halt
13
.
At this point Ldith Stein cannot but come to grips with the analyses o
l. Bergson. Lxamining the mechanism o the psyche, she deems the
latter to be a qualitatie continuum and declares hersel to be in
agreement with the lrench philosopher as regards the aluation o the
moment o psychic lie that hae to be traced back to dierences o
intensity, what Ldith Stein does not accept o Bergson`s analysis
contained in ..ai .vr te. aovvee. ivveaiate. ae ta cov.cievce ,1889, is the iew
that it is not possible to identiy the parts o this continuum and the
place they occupy: een though it is quite true that the arious shades o
red are diicult to distinguish, it is neertheless possible to distinguish
red rom blue and thereore indicate the lie eeling o one or the other

10
bia., p. 21.
11
bia., p. 22.
12
bia., p. 23.
13
bia., p. 30.
Angela ALLS BLLLO

96
quality and also the degrees o tension ,avvvvg, and, urther, know the
species lie eeling` and grasp its peculiarity as compared with the
species tension o lied experience` that characterizes all the degrees o
tension
14
.
It is precisely in this distinction between the qualities that there resides
the possibility o tracing a causal law, thus getting away rom Bergson`s
point o iew. In actual act, howeer, the type o causality that is thus
identiied is dierent rom the one that underlies scientiic research,
Bergson's antipositiist attitude is thus maintained, or the causality that
Ldith Stein has in mind is not the exact` causality that orms the basis
o the physical sciences, but a prescientiic` causality o the kind that
sometimes presents itsel also in |our| experience o the physical world.
1he ollowing can be examples o causal connections in psychic lie and
experience o nature: I am so tired that I cannot read a book that makes
intellectual demands on me` and, again, today the air is so limpid as to
assure good isibility`, these connections can certainly not be
determined in a rigid manner, rather, they are somewhat ague, though
this does not mean that they do not express some kind o necessity`.
1he cases just mentioned concern connections between eents that
occur simultaneously. But is it possible to oresee what is going to
happen At this point Ldith Stein seems to come closer to Bergson
again, holding that the conditions o the lie orce can be oreseen only
in a ague and general manner, because the lie orce is dierent in each
indiidual, and a orecast can be hazarded only i one knows the
indiidual concerned, and een then it is only o empiric alue
15
.
According to Ldith Stein, thereore, there does not exist any kind o
determinism in psychic lie, een though we can there note some
connections and thereore causal relationships, indeed, these enable us to
note the presence in psychic lie o a causality that is completely dierent
rom the exact causality characteristic o scientiic thought, in the same
way, a quantitatie determination o the psychic states is altogether out
o the question, because we are here concerned with a low o qualitatie
states that can be recognized |only| in their essential structure, this is
ultimately the real discriminant between the phenomenological reading

14
bia., p. 31.
15
bia.
Cultura. International Journal o Philosophy o Culture and Axiology, 8,200

9
o the psyche proposed by Ldith Stein and the analysis o lenri
Bergson
16
.
In the I there is present also another series o phenomena that are
characterized by their representing an intentional moing towards
something, these are the acts` ,./te, or intentional lied experiences
,ivtevtiovate rtebvi..e, with which spiritual lie commences. Len in
psychic lie it is possible to trace a irst orm o intentionality, but this is
no more than outlined, i we examine some acts that we perorm in
eeryday lie, we shall realize the meaning o intentionality. \ith the
meticulousness and clarity that distinguish her, Ldith Stein gies us ery
precise indications to pinpoint them. Our eyes may be turned inwards to
discoer the acts present there and this, in its turn, is ery important,
because it enables us to understand all the others and also ourseles: here
we hae the act o relection. Assuming a relectie or meditatie
attitude, we can commence the description o the acts: i we are
concerned with an external object that presents itsel as transcendent`,
we hae an act that places us in relationship with what is outside
ourseles - one could describe it, een though Ldith Stein does not use
this term, as an act o perception`, in the case o external objects,
moreoer, we can relate arious aspects o them in such a manner that
they will no longer be merely one beside the other, but orm part o a
connection, beore and ater or example - as is the case o apperception
- or we can put them all together - and here we hae a synthesis` - or,
again, we can concern ourseles with the particular act that is
represented by the setting in motion o what comes ater through what
there is beore` ,iveregvvgge.ettreraev aer .aterev avrcb aie frvberev,,
which is motiation` ,Motiratiov,
1
.
Ldith Stein then continues with a sober and clear description o some
lied experiences o consciousness, which - as we know - lusserl had
already analyzed in a ery pregnant manner in aeev
1
. She reproposes
them here to suggest an approach to what is indicated as spiritual lie.

16
lusserl was well aware o the ainities between his problematics and those
considered by Bergon, to the point o airming \e are the true Bergsonians`, by
which he wanted to underscore that the phenomenological analyses clariied the
questions posed by the lrench philosopher.
1
L. Stein, eitrage etc., op.cit., pp. 34-35.
18
L. lusserl, aeev v eiver reivev Pbavovevotogie vva bavovevotogi.cbev Pbito.obie .
lusserliana, Vol.III, p.55 and p. 56.
Angela ALLS BLLLO

98
1hese particularly signiicant acts include the one o motiation, which -
in her opinion - must not be limited to the ambit o the ree acts, the
acts o the will, but represents the structure o the entire dimension o
intentional lied experiences.

@3/;A&/;3"

Motiation, in act, presents itsel as the type o link that exists between
acts. \e are not here concerned with a compenetration o simultaneous
or successie phases o the low o lied experiences and not een with
an associatie connection o lied experiences, but rather with an issuing
o the one rom the other, a manner in which the one completes itsel or
is so completed by irtue o the other. Gien this relationship, the
structure o the lied experiences among which there becomes
established a relationship o motiation is such that they become
conigured as acts that hae their origin in the pure I: the I perorms one
act because it has already perormed the other. 1his can happen either
consciously or unconsciously, an explicit motiation exists in the case in
which one proceeds rom the premises to the consequences, while an
implicit motiation exists when in a mathematical demonstration we
make use o a theorem without demonstrating it e voro, it is clear that
eery explicit motiation becomes sedimented as implicit and that eery
implicit motiation is capable o being explicited
19
.
Implicit motiations occur in the ambit o perception, when we examine
the knowledge o a thing that can be sensed, it becomes clear that haing
sensations is a irst orm o motiation, but we hae a motiation
relationship in the proper sense o the term when, ace to ace with some
physical thing o which wee can see only a part, we deem the existence
o the other parts to be equally true, and this comprehension can
eentually motiate a ree moement that dries us to a eriication
through real perception. In the same way, something that is perceptiely
gien may be the motie or belieing in the existence o a thing and the
belie in its existence may be what motiates our judgment regarding its
existence, and in the ethical sphere, similarly, grasping a alue may be the
motie or the will and or acting
20
.

19
L. Stein, eitrage etc., op.cit., pp. 35-36.
20
Ibid., p. 36.
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99
1he relationship between act and motiation can be exempliied as
ollows: when consciousness turns to an object, it does not intend a oid
X, but something that has a content o determinate sense, as harbinger
o a unitary consistency o being that is enclosed within it and, little by
little, arries at being gien by illings, and this is true not only o
physical things, but also o our knowledge o propositions and the state
o things. In the latter case, a state o things may orm part o dierent
logical connections - or that is what rational motiation consists o -
but the ambit o the possibilities is limited and when the knowing subject
oersteps this ambit, we come ace to ace with the irrational
21
.
In conclusion, we may note that the passage rom one act to another
takes place thanks to motiation and it is or the same reason that in the
low o the lied experiences there becomes conigured the sum total o
the acts and the motiations that underlie them, the motiation thereore
seres to justiy a series o acts that in the cognitie ambit regard the
turning to`, the taking o position and, consequently, accepting and
negating as ree` acts.
1he analysis made by Ldith Stein, ery subtle and limpid in its passages,
which explains some essential connections and is well coordinated in the
succession o these connections, cannot here be reproposed in its
entirety, what merits being mentioned here is the justiication she gies
or ranking among the ree` acts the important act that is constituted by
the epoch, which, as we know, constitutes the starting point o all
phenomenological inquiry, its motiation is to be sought in the act that
something is not worthy o being belieed when there is a contrast
between moties and reasons that induce us to sustain it, or example, i
somebody who brings us an item o news is not trustworthy, we would
hae a reasonable` motie or epoch, suspension o judgment, because
there are reasons that preent us rom considering the messenger as a
credible person, and there is also the case in which we do not want to
beliee the news simply because it is unpleasant or in which our
behaiour is not determined by objectie` reasons
22
.
In general, one may sustain than when motie ,Motir, and reason ,Crvva,
concord, the motiation is reasonable ,rervvvftig,, just as non-credibility

21
bia., pp. 3-38.
22
bia., p. 45.
Angela ALLS BLLLO

100
in the example is a reasonable motie o epoch. It is thereore ery
important grasping the connection between credibility, reasonability and
acceptance, that is to say, recognition and then airmation. lrom the
theoretical point o iew, in act, airmation concerns the state o things
,acbrerbatt,, and in this case we are ace to ace with a ree act in which
we recognize` a state o things and thereore we beliee - and the belie
in this case is wholly intellectual - that the state o things is thus`.
lree acts always presuppose a motie, but do not determine an action,
which needs an impulse that is not motiated, and in this way we enter
the sphere o willing. Ldith Stein makes us understand quite clearly why
epoch as the initial moment o the phenomenological attitude - but,
more generally, we could also speak o philosophical attitude - is a
theoretical and practical act, recognition o something that is
problematical, a lack o clarity o the state o things and decision to
change the attitude o belieing, that is to say, a oluntary act o
suspending the erstwhile belie to assume a possibility o really seeing the
thing, the acbe, to go to things themseles, v aev acbev .etb.t, as lusserl
put it, or to understand the acbrerbatt, as Ldith Stein stressed in the
wake o A. Reinach.
Concentrating attention to the sphere o willing and acting, the inquiry
tends to indicate the acts that can properly be said to be ree acts: they
are such i they proceed rom an intention ,1or.at, and are guided by a
iat`, by a decision taken in an appropriate moment, naturally, eery
intention calls or a oluntary taking o position, but not eery taking o
position is o itsel a ree act, because one may want without really
proposing to do something. Consequently, one should note that, in
accordance with the indications o D. on lildebrand, a proposal is a
willing` that has a capacity, a being able to`, as its necessary condition,
the ambit o ree acts is limited to those - and only those - that can
proceed rom an intention and are guided by a iat`
23
.
Only in the case o ree acts does the motiation maniest itsel in a
pregnant manner, this had been sustained by A. Pnder, who deemed it
to be really present only in the case in which there is a relationship
between a motie required by the will and an act o the will ounded

23
bia., pp. 49-52.
Cultura. International Journal o Philosophy o Culture and Axiology, 8,200

101
thereon, that is to say, when the I does not just eel a need, but lies this
need within it and thus ills` it, realizes it with an act o the will
24
.
But this does not mean that the motiation is not to a certain extent
present also in straining or tending towards something ,trebev,, albeit in
a manner dierent rom the way it is present in willing, where it is
associated with a ree impulse, an intention
25
.
In spite o the distinction between causality and motiation, there is a
connection between the two moments. Proposing an example that is
particularly dear to her, Ldith Stein shows how causal actors and
motiations can come into play together: the joy that somebody procures
me will motiate me to orm the intention to procure him joy in turn,
but a eeling that suddenly gets the better o me preents me carrying
out something that would be motiated in a reasonable manner
26
.
1wo leels can thereore be identiied in the lie sphere, one o which is
sensual ,.ivvticb, and the other spiritual ,gei.tig,, on the one hand, they are
connected in such a way that the spiritual orce is conditioned by the
sensual one, as a general rule, in act, reshness o the spirit disappears as
the body tires, but one can also note the independence o the two
moments, or example, I can recognize the alue o a work o art
without being able to become enthusiastic about it
2
.
1he lie o the psyche thereore seems to be the combined action o
seeral orces: the sensual orce, which presents itsel in relation to the
learning o sensual data and in sensual impulses, and the spiritual orce,
which is a orce that is wholly new and dierent rom the sensual orce
and maniests itsel in spiritual actiities and capacities, but it can unold
only with the collaboration o the sensual orce, the latter has its roots in
nature and this justiies the psychophysical connection, that is to say, the
link between psyche, body and material nature. 1hrough the spiritual
orce the psyche opens to the objectie world and can acquire new
impulses, the nourishment o the spiritual orce o the indiidual psyche
may derie rom an objectie` spiritual world, a world o alues, or
rom the spiritual orce o other subjects and rom the diine spirit. In

24
bia., p. 53.
25
bia., p. 66.
26
bia., p. 69.
2
bia., pp. 3-4.
Angela ALLS BLLLO

102
any case, it is necessary to pinpoint a nucleus ,Kerv) subtracted rom all
physical and psychic conditioning and constituted by the capacity o
willing, the sphere o ree acts
28
.

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1he analysis so ar made enables Ldith Stein to establish the link that
exists between psychology and the spiritual sciences. 1aking position
with respect to the principal German theoreticians o her time, i.e.
Mnsterberg, Natorp, \indelband and Rickert
29
, she irst o all justiies
the inquiry into the psyche on the two ronts o empirical psychology
and pure psychology. 1hough the latter does not wholly coincide with
phenomenology, it makes use o the essential description proposed by
phenomenology to identiy the undamental concepts and highlight the
peculiar sphere o the psyche, so that research into pure rtebvi..e is a
preliminary condition or understanding what is psychic
30
. Secondly, the
analyses carried out enable her to describe the peculiar ield o the spirit
and are thus in their turn preliminary to an understanding o the human
sciences. 1his makes it possible to distinguish the two ambits, i.e. o
psychology and the human sciences, and within these it is also possible
to separate the empirical dimension rom the pure dimension. \e
thereore hae to clariy why at the end o the essay we are here
considering, in a paragraph entitled Die riviiette cbeiavvg rov .,cbi
.cbev vva gei.tigev eiv, P.,cbotogie vva Cei.te.ri..ev.cbaftev
31
, Ldith Stein
places the analyses she has made under the title o gei.te.ri..ev.cbaftticbe
P.,cbotogie`, which seems to coincide with ariori.cbe P.,cbotogie
32
. 1he
justiication o these deinitions is ound in the act that the lie o the
psyche is the result o the combined action o the sensual orce and the
spiritual orce , so that it is possible to identiy the dimension o the eete

28
bia., p. 106.
29
Apart rom Bergson, the principal thinkers with whom Ldith Stein took issue were
Mnsterberg, Rickert and \indelband, to whom she dedicated long paragraphs, acutely
analyzing their position with respect to psychology and the human sciences.
30
1his motie present in the text had already between proposed by Ldith Stein in her
doctorate thesis, Zvv Probtev aer ivfvbtvvg. lalle 191, and in the book that was
recently published on the basis o a long text she had written in the period 191-1932,
now consered in the Brussels archies, ivfvbrvvg iv aie Pbito.obie, !er/e. Vol.XIII.
31
L. Stein, eitrage etc., o.cit., p. 26 et seq.
32
bia., p. 24.
Cultura. International Journal o Philosophy o Culture and Axiology, 8,200

103
,soul, and that o the Cei.t ,spirit,. It is clear that the bond between
body, psyche and spirit is ery strong in the human being and one simply
cannot do without any one o these elements. Another problem that
comes to the ore is the one concerning the sphere in which theoretical
elaboration is carried out. \hen examining the operation o putting
between parentheses ,epoch,, we hae already noted that the actiity o
rational motiation is peculiar o the spirit, and one can thereore sustain
that that theoretical relection occurs at this leel. I the human sciences
concern the indiidual human expressions in the spiritual sense, thus
giing rise to speciic inquiry sectors - such as history, the social
sciences, law - philosophico-phenomenological research, een though it
deles more deeply, always inoles a substantially spiritual actiity. In
this sense, i we here hae an analysis that grasps the a priori structures
o spiritual reality and cannot do without considering the totality o the
human being and his psychic lie, this justiies a research that sel-deines
itsel psychology as science o the spirit`. But all this within the limits
here indicated, because psychology in itsel is undoubtedly not a
science o the spirit, though the psychic states, on the other hand, will
not be alidly understood unless and until one arries, as is
demonstrated in the essay under consideration, at the motiation and
thereore the spiritual sphere.
laing thus delineated the ambit o the psyche and that o the spirit, and
haing established the relationship between the disciplines that study
these sectors and stand in need o an essential justiication o the
phenomenological type, it seems clear in Ldith Stein that she is aware
not only o the alidity o some o the results attained, but also o the
inexhaustibility o the search. 1hough the object has been identiied,
one cannot conclude to hae completed its description, this is the
undamental argument she adopts to conute the possibility o a
transcendental deduction rom the idea o psychology as an exact science
o all the laws concerning the ambit o the psyche.
Polemizing, aboe all, with the positiist claim o delineating a theory
that proides all the conditions o possibility o a science in such a
manner that, ater haing identiied a part and the structure o that part,
one may proceed to grasp the totality o uture eents by extension,
Ldith Stein attains arious objecties. lirst o all, the impossibility o
ounding psychology as an exact science in conormity with a scientiic
model bound up with physics, and secondly the impossibility o moing
rom a constitutie science to deduce its internal components and this in
Angela ALLS BLLLO

104
opposition, albeit not explicitly so, to Kant`s deduction and the con-
nection between Kant`s position and the positiist mentality with its
proclaimed scientism
33
. One might say that just as Kant thought that he
could justiy time and space by moing rom arithmetic and geometry, in
the same way psychology as an exact science could moe rom psychic
causality and seek to trace this causality in a determinist manner in all
lied experiences, in association as in motiation, and rom these causal
connections it is held that one could recognize the entire structure o
psychic lie, reducing it to laws, so that it would become possible to
construct a concrete psychology.
In this manner o proceeding there is present a double moement that
sets out rom the assumptions o a theory and then seek to justiy this
selsame theory with elements that hae been obtained within that
theory, thus proposing a deductie extension to the whole o a rigidly
structured ambit. As ar as Ldith Stein is concerned, it is not just a
question o subtracting psychology and, more generally, the human
sciences rom the exemplarity o this model, but to conute the model
also in relation to the natural sciences themseles, according to her, the
diiculty o exhausting a search by imprisoning it in a theory should be
made clear to the physicist by the ery conlict o the theories. It is
thereore essential to turn the inquiry attitude upside down and, rather
than proceeding rom the method to the structure o an object, one
should allow the method to be indicated by the structure o the object.
lere we come ace to ace with a ery clear delineation o
phenomenological inquiry, which lets itsel be guided by things - and
thereore by the object - rather than by theory and thereore puts
analysis in the place o deduction. lere we hae a undamental critique
o the structures o \estern thought, at least as it has become
concretized in scientiic inquiry and in the philosophies that moe rom
aboe, rov obev, a critique that in this speciic sector was undoubtedly
commenced by lusserl, but then continued by Ldith Stein in a direction
in which, een more strongly than in lusserl`s case, there is no
separation o analysis, intuition and essential research. 1his leads to a
reading o reality that grasps it in its totality, but this totality is not a
circle that encloses eerything, identiying a point o unitary theoretical
orce, as could be history, the economy, reason, the unconscious, but a

33
More particularly, this objection was leelled against Mnsterberg in Annex II:
Mvv.terberg`. rer.vcb aer egrvvavvg eiver ea/tev P.,cbotogie.
Cultura. International Journal o Philosophy o Culture and Axiology, 8,200

105
totality that becomes delineated by expansion in a twoold direction o
urther deling and gradual deinition rom the part - analyzed eer
more accurately and constituted by nature, by human beings, both as
indiiduals and as community
34
- to the whole that it reeals within itsel
and to which it reers in order to be comprehended.
In the series o these reerences nothing is either exhausted or
concluded, the beyond to which each moment alludes cannot be
theorized beorehand, it is not a question o dominating with thought in
order to grasp and close, but rather patiently searching and ollowing
roads that lead aar. 1his is the new manner o proceeding that has let
its imprint in twentieth-century philosophic search precisely thanks to
the presence o phenomenological inquiry, to which Ldith Stein made a
alid contribution, attaining original results.

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Phenomenological analysis o the soul orms part o the essential
description o the human being that Ldith Stein had already delineated in
her graduation dissertation dedicated to empathy, Zvv Probtev aer
ivfvbtvvg, and was urther deeloped, as we hae just seen, by means o
inquiries that concentrically tend to dele urther into the lie o the
psyche and o the spirit in P.,cbotog, ava tbe .iritvat .cievce. - Covtribvtiov.
for a bito.obic fovvaatiov. 1hough the realities taken into consideration are
the psyche and the spirit, Ldith Stein is well aware that they are the
object o inquiry o a number o disciplines that became delineated in the
course o the nineteenth century, namely psychology and the sciences
that concern themseles with human spiritual productions, including -
or example - historiography, cultural anthropology, law, sociology. All
these are conigured as partial searches that hae their alue, but hae to
be ounded on an accurate examination o the signiicance o the human
being that can be urnished only by philosophical inquiry or, better,
phenomenological inquiry, the latter, in act, tends to highlight what is
essential in the examined phenomena and thereore what is essential in
the lie o the psyche and the spirit.

34
1his is clearly brought out in some o her works, some o which hae already been
cited, rom her dissertation on empathy right through to the text entitled |ber aev taat
,in ]abrbvcb fvr Pbito.obie vva bavovevotogi.cbe or.cbvvg. VII, 1925, and ivfvbrvvg iv aie
Pbito.obie.
Angela ALLS BLLLO

106
In this way one can understand the reerences to psychology as science
that are to be ound at the end o the comment made by Ldith Stein on
a work that would seem wholly extraneous to philosophical reasoning,
being a work o mysticism, namely Die eetevbvrg ,1he Interior Castle, by
Saint 1heresa o Aila
35
and one can readily understand also the warning
regarding the risk that psychology is running in describing psychic
phenomena without making reerence to the soul, that is to say, to a well
conigured structure that can be highlighted only by a serious
philosophical inquiry.
\hat the text about Saint 1heresa seeks to underscore is that it is not
only philosophical search that can indicate a road or entering in
interiority and understanding it, but this can be done also - and one
might een say aboe all - along the road traelled and proposed by the
mystics, and thereore by Saint 1heresa.
Saint 1heresa acts as a guide along a road rom which she is seemingly
ar remoed, a stranger, namely the road o an intellectual search, but
what Ldith Stein seeks to sustain is that there are many roads that can
lead to truth, including also partial truths, like that relating to the
structure o human interiority and its possible apertures
36
.
1his approach is already present in her work vaticbe. vva rige. eiv
,linite and Lternal Being, and, more particularly, in the part dedicated to
the Image o the 1rinity in Creation. Analyzing the personal being o
man, Ldith Stein reproposes the results o her preious inquiries,
underscoring that man`s being is teibticb - .eeticb gei.tig ,corporeal,
psychic, spiritual,`
3

\e can take this irst description as our essential guiding thread, trying
to ind urther clariications in her texts.

35
L. Stein, Die eetevbvrg - Dar.tettvvg aer bt. 1ere.ia rov ]e.v.. \orks VI, Nauwelaerts-
lerder, Louain-lreiburg 1962. 1he essay was intended to constitute an appendix to
vaticbe. vva erige. eiv.
36
Cr. A. Ales Bello, aitb teiv - a a..iove er ta rerita. Ldizioni Messaggero di
Padoa, Padua 1999
2
.
3
L. Stein, vaticbe. vva erige. eiv - 1er.vcb eive. .vf.tieg. vv ivv ae. eiv., !or/. .
Nauwelaerts-lerder, Louain-lreiburg 1950, p. 336. As regards the treatment o the
soul, see also the ollowing texts by Ldith Stein: Die ovti.cbe trv/tvr aer Per.ov vva ibre
er/evvtvi.tbeoreti.cbe Probtevati/. \orks VI, ivfvbrvvg iv aie Pbito.obie. \orks XIII,
lerder, lreiburg 1991.
Cultura. International Journal o Philosophy o Culture and Axiology, 8,200

10
\e hae already noted that, contrary to the tendency o psychological
science to do without the soul, Ldith Stein deemed it urgent that it
should be taken into consideration. It is quite true that the term soul
,eete, is used in a luctuating and not always uniocal manner in her
writings and creates some diiculty o comprehension, but we shall see
that her intentions are ery clear. Indeed, in the aorementioned analyses
it is said that the human being possesses psyche ,P.,cbe, and spirit ,Cei.t,,
now, the term eete is sometimes reerred to the union o psyche and
spirit, at others only to one o these moments. 1his linguistic oscillation
is justiied by the act that phenomenological analyses tend to consider
the soul not as a monolithic unit, but as a complex terrain o acts and
operations that hae also dierent qualities, some o these constitute the
psyche, which has to be reerred to eerything that we ind within
ourseles by way o impulses, tendencies and spontaneous assumptions
o position that cannot be eliminated, though they can eentually be
controlled by a series o ree and oluntary acts, since the latter enable us
to take decisions, they hae peculiar characteristics and thereore orm
part o a dierent sphere that is deined as spirit. 1he psychic and
spiritual complex is dierent rom corporeity ,bodiliness, and, wanting
to use a unitary term, can be called soul.
\hile the bodily and psychic spheres make us similar to the world o the
higher animals, the spiritual sphere characterizes us in a peculiar manner
and one can thereore understand the deinition cited aboe, namely that
man`s being is teibticb, .eeticb, gei.tig`, which seeks to tell us that our body
is animated by a psyche and urther enliened by the spirit. 1his also
justiies the airmation that immediately ollows the indicated deinition:
Inasmuch as man`s soul is spirit, it rises aboe itsel in his spiritual lie`,
but een though man distinguishes himsel rom the animals, he is not a
pure spirit, and thereore: . man`s spirit is conditioned rom aboe
and below: it has its roots in his material structure, which it animates and
orms, giing it its bodily orm. 1he human person carries and comprises
his` body and his` soul, but at the same time is carried and comprised
within them. lis spiritual lie rises rom a dark depth, like the lame o a
candle that shines orth, but is sustained by a material that o itsel does
not shine. It shines without being wholly light: the human spirit is isible
o itsel, but is not completely transparent, it is capable o illuminating
other things, but not o perectly penetrating them`
38
.

38
L. Stein, vaticbe. vva erige. .eiv, op.cit., p. 33.
Angela ALLS BLLLO

108
Gien its intermediate nature, one might say in the wake o the humanist
Pico della Mirandola that the human being has the possibility o
eleating himsel or regressing and it is his soul that decides which it is
going to be. Continuing with her analysis o the soul, Ldith Stein
proides us with a ery exhaustie description, indicating it as the
space` at the centre o the totality made up o body, psyche and spirit,
consequently, it has a sensual aspect and acts in the body, a spiritual
aspect that enables it to issue rom within itsel and establish an
intelligent contact with the external world, but inasmuch as it is soul in
the strictest sense, it dwells within itsel and the I dwells within it. 1he
deinition thus becomes larger and englobes a new element: the I, which
can moe reely within the soul, sometimes tending outwards, sometimes
inwards. One can thus understand that, since the soul is a space and the I
has this possibility o traersing it rom the outside inwards or iceersa,
the comparison with the interior castle is possible and een ineitable, it
is a castle that comprises many dwellings
39
. 1he image proposed by Saint
1heresa illuminates` the essential description gien on the philoso-
phical leel with a new light and it is thereore easy to establish a kind o
circularity between the two moments.
Certainly, Saint 1heresa was not interested in urther philosophical
deling, in analyzing the structure o the soul, the possibility o entering
it and understanding it also by means o rational research, she simply
described the experience o a calling: . as the Lord calls the soul that
has lost itsel in the external world, attracts it increasingly to limsel,
until le can unite limsel with it at its centre`
40
. But it does interest
Ldith Stein, because she neer ceases to be a philosopher or to want to
understand to what extent experience o the aith and een mystic
experience can be instruments or understanding the human being.
\e may thereore conclude by obsering that the study o the soul,
subtracted rom the dominion o psychology and carried out on the
phenomenological terrain, seres as an indispensable basis or returning
to this selsame psychology with greater insight or delineating a
conincing philosophical anthropology and understanding the religious -
and more particularly the mystic - experience lied by the soul.


39
bia., p. 344.
40
bia., p. 344, Note 33.