EN BANC

G.R. No. 150792 March 3, 2004

HON. REMEDIOS L. PETILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Thirteenth Division), CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and
JERIEL L. ARDIENTE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari
1
to nullify the Court of Appeals Resolutions
2
in CA-
G.R. SP No. 65192 dated 22 June 2001 ("First Resolution") and 29 October 2001 ("Second
Resolution"). The First Resolution denied due course and dismissed the petition for review
3
of
petitioner Governor Remedios L. Petilla ("petitioner") while the Second Resolution denied the
motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
On 1 July 1999, respondent Jeriel L. Ardiente ("respondent"), Nurse I of the Hilongos District
Hospital, Hilongos, Leyte, filed a letter-protest before the Civil Service Commission ("CSC"),
Region 8 Office. Respondent assailed his transfers to the Provincial Health Office, Government
Center, Palo, Leyte, effective 6 May 1999, and to the Northwestern Leyte District Hospital,
Calubian, Leyte, effective 21 May 1999.
Meanwhile, respondent applied for sick and vacation leave from 1 June to 31 August 1999. In a
letter dated 7 September 1999,
4
the Provincial Health Office returned and disapproved
respondents leave applications based on Section 23(q), Rule XIV of the CSC Rules.
5
During
the same period until 4 October 1999, respondent continuously failed to report to his new
workstation at the Northwestern Leyte District Hospital.
On 4 October 1999, petitioner issued Memorandum No. 99-255 dropping respondent from the
roll of employees of the Leyte Provincial Government for unauthorized absences. Petitioner
based her action on Section 35, Rule XVI
6
of the CSC Rules.
On 8 October 1999, respondent received Memorandum No. 99-255. Respondent did not appeal
or challenge the memorandum in the appropriate forum.
On 14 February 2000, the CSC
7
issued Resolution No. 00-0441 declaring respondents
reassignments void. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by Governor Remedios L. Petilla, Province of Leyte,
reassigning Jeriel L. Ardiente are hereby declared void. Accordingly, Governor Petilla is
hereby directed to restore Ardiente to his former workstation at the Hilongos District
Hospital, Hilongos, Leyte.
8

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 00-0441.
9
The
CSC
10
denied the motion for lack of merit in its Resolution No. 01-0726 dated 2 April 2001.
11

Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review dated 29 May 2001 to question CSC Resolutions Nos. 00-0441 and 01-
0726. Petitioner attached to her motion for extension the joint affidavit of Celia Maria dela Cruz
("Celia") and Ruth A. Loreto ("Ruth").
12
At the time, Celia was the Executive Assistant while
Ruth was the Receiving Clerk of the Governors Office. In their joint affidavit, Ruth stated that
she received CSC Resolution No. 01-0726 on 24 April 2001 and forwarded the same to Celia on
the same date. Celia did not give CSC Resolution No. 01-0726 to petitioner because the latter
was then in the west coast of Leyte attending to election matters. Meanwhile, Celia kept CSC
Resolution No. 01-0726 inside the offices filing cabinet. It was only on 29 May 2001 that Celia
and Ruth gave CSC Resolution No. 01-0726 to petitioner.
On 31 May 2001, without awaiting the Court of Appeals resolution of the motion for extension,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review assailing CSC Resolutions Nos.
00-0441 and 01-0726, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65192.
On 22 June 2001, the Court of Appeals issued the First Resolution denying due course and
dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 65192 for petitioners failure to comply with the requirements of
Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On 19 September 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Execution
13
of CSC Resolution No. 00-
0441 with the Court of Appeals to which petitioner filed a Comment on 21 October 2001.
On 12 October 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Resolution
attaching the certified true copies of the documents enumerated in the First Resolution.
The appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration in the Second Resolution dated 29
October 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The First Resolution denied due course and dismissed petitioners petition for review for failure
to append clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the following:
(a) CSC Resolution No. 00-0441 declaring respondents transfer and reassignment as
void;
(b) Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 00-0441;
(c) Respondents letter-protest with the CSC, Region 8 Office, protesting his
reassignments; and
(d) Petitioners answer, if any, to respondents letter-protest.
The Court of Appeals stated that this failure violates Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
SEC. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) xxx (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; xxx
Citing Section 7 of Rule 43,
14
the appellate court held that petitioners failure to comply with any
of the requirements under Section 6, Rule 43 justifies dismissal of the petition for review.
The Second Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on the ground that
petitioner filed the motion beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. The pertinent portion of
the Second Resolution reads:
Contrary to petitioners claim, as purportedly shown in her Annex A, that it was allegedly
only on Sept. 28, 2001 that she received a copy of this Courts Resolution of June 22,
2001, outrightly dismissing her petition for review for the reasons therein stated: Registry
Return Receipt No. 89778, dated June 22, 2001, clearly shows that a copy of our June
22, 2001 Resolution addressed to the Hon. Remedios L. Petilla, petitioner in CA-G.R.
SP No. 65192, was sent to Purisima Street, Palo, Leyte, which could either be the
petitioners official residence or her private abode, and was received thereat on the
same date by a certain Jaime Santos. This means that the last day of the 15-day
reglementary period within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
resolution under Sec. 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, or to appeal therefrom to the
Supreme Court expired on July 14, 2001. Inexorably, therefore, the Motion for
Reconsideration which was filed (posted) at the Hilongos, Leyte Post Office on Sept. 20,
2001, was filed more than two (2) months after the expiry date of the reglementary
period within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Resolution of June
22, 2001, xxx
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in issuing the assailed
resolutions. The First Resolution denied due course and dismissed outright the petition for
review for failure to comply with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The Second
Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The Court of Appeals correctly denied due course and dismissed the petition for review but the
denial should be on an entirely different ground.
The Court of Appeals should have denied due course and dismissed outright the petition for
review for being filed out of time. Petitioner herself admits that the petition for review was "filed
after the lapse of the 15-day period to appeal."
15
Petitioner reasons that her employees, namely
Ruth and Celia, gave her a copy of CSC Resolution No. 01-0726 only on 29 May 2001 because
before that she was "at the West Coast of Leyte busy on election matters."
Petitioners justification for the late filing of the petition for review is not meritorious. Indisputably,
Ruth and Celia received on 24 April 2001 a copy of CSC Resolution No. 01-0726 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 00-0441. There is also no
question that Celia as Executive Assistant and Ruth as Receiving Clerk of the Office of the
Governor had authority to receive on behalf of petitioner notices or court processes including
CSC Resolution No. 01-0726. While petitioner physically received CSC Resolution No. 01-0726
only on 29 May 2001, or 35 days from 24 April 2001,
16
the date of receipt of CSC Resolution
No. 01-0726 should be 24 April 2001 for computing the period to appeal. This is precisely
because Ruth and Celia, absent any showing that petitioner did not authorize them to receive
CSC Resolution No. 01-0726, received the resolution on 24 April 2001. In short, receipt by Ruth
and Celia of CSC Resolution No. 01-0726 on 24 April 2001 is deemed receipt by petitioner.
In Laza v. Court of Appeals,
17
where the petitioners claimed that the person who received the
trial courts decision had no authority to receive mails for Laza, we ruled:
xxx As to Leticia Ramos who had signed for the receipt of the said copy caused to be
delivered by the Postmaster at Benjamins given address, there was no showing, at all,
from the records of the case, that Leticia was not a person of sufficient discretion to
receive the mail at the proper address appearing on the envelope which contained the
registered mail. Petitioners claim was that she was not Benjamins agent or
authorized representative to receive mails in his behalf. To follow petitioners
stand would render nugatory the provisions on service by registered mail. Every
house maid or house boy or any other person other than the addressee of
registered mail would have to have a special power-of-attorney to receive such
mail in behalf of the addressee. We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals
finding that petitioners excuse for the late filing of their motion for reconsideration was
rather flimsy and unrealistic. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner does not even claim that she did not authorize Ruth and Celia to
receive CSC Resolution No. 01-0726. Moreover, the record is barren as to any explanation why
Ruth and Celia did not immediately inform petitioner about the resolution. There is also
absolutely no evidence showing that petitioner could not be reached or located when Ruth and
Celia received the resolution. Furthermore, there is no showing that petitioner could not possibly
have a copy of CSC Resolution No. 01-0726 before the period to appeal expired. Absent in the
record is any proof that petitioner did not report for work or drop by her office for 35 days, from
24 April to 29 May 2001. Thus, petitioners excuse for the late filing of the petition for review is
clearly flimsy.
Perfecting an appeal within the prescribed period is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional as held inVideogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,
18
thus:
xxx There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those setting the
periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally
entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that
right must comply with the statute or rules. The rules, particularly the requirements for
perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and
for orderly discharge of judicial business. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the
court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within
the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality
of the resolution of his/her case.
These periods are carefully guarded and lawyers are well-advised to keep track of their
applications. After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is a decision on the
merits. (Emphasis supplied)
Since petitioner received CSC Resolution No. 01-0726 on 24 April 2001, she had until 9 May
2001 to file with the Court of Appeals her appeal or motion for extension.
19
However, the motion
for extension to file petition for review and petition for review were both filed only on 31 May
2001. Clearly, petitioner filed the motion for extension and the petition for review beyond the
prescribed period. In Ditching v. Court of Appeals,
20
we ruled that if a motion for extension is
filed after the lapse of the period sought to be extended, then there is no longer any period to
extend. In such event, the judgment or order is already final and executory.
Petitioner cannot correctly argue that "the Court of Appeals accepted the reasons and
explanations on the circumstances why the Petition for Review was filed only on May 31,
2001."
21
Otherwise, petitioner continues, the appellate court would have stated the late filing as
another ground for dismissing the petition for review.
22

To reiterate, perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional.
23
Failure to interpose a timely appeal renders the assailed decision
or order final and executory and deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the final
judgment.
24
The appellate court has power only to dismiss the appeal.
25
To rule that the
appellate court accepted petitioners reason for the late filing of the petition for review, absent
any exceptional circumstances to warrant such delay, is patently against settled jurisprudential
rules.
26

Thus, we hold that petitioner clearly failed to perfect her appeal in the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals correctly denied due course and dismissed the petition for review.
At any rate, petitioner contends that respondents unchallenged dismissal from the roll of
employees on 4 October 1999 rendered the CSC resolutions moot and academic. Petitioner
also maintains that it is impossible to reinstate respondent to his former workstation because he
is "no longer a bona fide employee of the Provincial Government of Leyte."
27

Petitioner issued the memorandum dismissing respondent while respondents protest was
pending with the CSC and before the CSC declared his transfers illegal. Further, petitioner did
not manifest before the CSC about her action, which would certainly affect the result of the
case. Petitioner manifested about respondents dismissal for the first time in the Court of
Appeals.
28
Petitioner believes that she had no obligation to inform the CSC about her action.
Petitioner insists that it is respondent as the aggrieved party who should have manifested before
the CSC about his dismissal. Petitioner further argues that she can even raise this issue for the
first time before this Court because the instant petition is an original action for certiorari.
On the other hand, respondent did not challenge the validity of his dismissal in the appropriate
forum and within the prescribed period. Respondent questioned the legality of his dismissal for
the first time before this Court.
Evidently, both parties are at fault. Petitioner raised for the first time before this Court the issue
of whether the respondents dismissal rendered the CSC resolutions moot.
29
Petitioner could
have manifested about her action or moved for the dismissal of respondents protest when it
was pending in the CSC. Had petitioner moved for the dismissal of respondents protest in the
CSC on the ground that it was already moot, the CSC could have acted on it and properly
decided the case. Moreover, petitioners action in dismissing respondent while the latters
protest was pending in the CSC gives the impression that it was designed to render the CSC
resolutions moot. On the other hand, respondent did not question the legality of his dismissal in
the appropriate forum and within the prescribed period. However, this Court believes
respondent deserves under the circumstances one last chance to defend his side and assail the
legality of his dismissal in the interest of substantial justice.
Petitioner failed to show clearly that respondent openly defied the reassignment orders. A
careful review of the records discloses that respondents absence from work from 1 June to 31
August 1999 was based on his applications for sick and vacation leave. The records also show
that it was only on 9 September 1999 that the Provincial Health Office notified respondent of the
disapproval of his leave applications. Therefore, it is safe to state that prior to 9 September 1999
respondent did not know that the Provincial Health Office had denied his leave applications.
Since respondent was not aware of the denial of his leave applications, respondent cannot
automatically be considered to be on absence without leave ("AWOL") for that period.
AWOL means that the employee is leaving or abandoning his post without justifiable reason and
without notifying his employer.
30
In this case, petitioner gravely failed to show that respondent
had the least intention to go on AWOL. Otherwise, respondent would not even have bothered to
file his applications for sick and vacation leave. Moreover, had respondent intended to go on
AWOL, respondent would not even have protested his reassignments in the first place, and
seek his reinstatement to his former workstation. Respondents protest of his reassignments
clearly contradicts petitioners claim that respondent was on AWOL. We apply by analogy the
ruling in Cario v. Daoas
31
where we held that petitioner is "justified in not heeding her
reassignment order because her basis was xxx the legal opinion of a regional office of the Civil
Service Commission" that the reassignment is illegal. In that case, we ordered the reinstatement
of petitioner who was dropped from the rolls for her absence without leave for more than thirty
days. In this case, respondents absence was based on his leave applications, albeit denied,
and not on his deliberate refusal to heed the reassignment orders.
However, no leave application supported respondents continuous absence from 1 September
to 4 October 1999. Furthermore, respondent had already exhausted his leave credits.
Nevertheless, the records do not show that respondent intended to leave or abandon his post.
On the contrary, respondent contested the validity of the reassignment order. We cannot
consider respondent on AWOL to justify petitioners act of dropping respondent from the rolls
considering that the CSC declared void petitioners reassignment order. We consider
respondent on leave without pay from 1 September to 4 October 1999.
32
While respondent did
not obtain a clearance from the Provincial Health Office, which is required for leave without pay
in excess of one month,
33
this omission does notipso facto amount to being on AWOL
considering the circumstances of this case. Respondents absence from 1 September to 4
October 1999 was due principally to the pendency of his case with the CSC on the validity of his
reassignment, which the CSC subsequently declared void.
The absence of notice to respondent before his dismissal is no longer an issue since
respondent was not on AWOL. Nevertheless, for clarity, we shall state the rule on notice.
Section 35, Rule XVI of the CSC Rules, which expressly states that an employee who is on
AWOL
34
shall be dropped from the service after due notice, has been amended. Section 63 of
CSC Resolution No. 983142 already allows the dismissal of a government employee who is on
AWOL without prior notice.
35
However, the government official or employee who is on AWOL
shall be informed of his separation from the service not later than five days from its effectivity.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on leave.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.
Callejo, Sr., J., no part.

Footnotes
1
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao with Associate Justices Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr. (now Associate Justice of this Court) and Sergio L. Pestao concurring.
3
Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
4
Signed by Gemiliano V. Retulla, Provincial Health Officer II; and noted by Catalino B.
Petilla, Provincial Government Assistant Department Head, and petitioner.
5
Section 23 (q), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 and
Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws provides:
(q) xxx
An officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be considered habitually absent if
he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly
leave credit under the Leave Law for at least 3 months in a semester or at least 3
consecutive months during the year.
xxx In case of claim of ill-health, heads of departments of agencies are
encouraged to verify the validity of such claim, and if not satisfied with the reason
given, should disapprove the application for sick leave. On the other hand, cases
of employees who absent themselves from work before approval of the
application should be disapproved outright.
6
Section 35, Rule XVI of the CSC Omnibus Rules provides:
Section 35. Officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days
without approved leave are considered on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) and
shall be dropped from the service after due notice. However, when the
exigencies of the service require his immediate presence and he fails/refuses to
return to the service, the head of office may drop him from the service even prior
to the expiration of the thirty (30) day period abovestated. (Emphasis supplied)
7
Composed of Chairman Corazon Alma G. De Leon and Commissioner Jose F.
Erestain, Jr.
8
Rollo, p. 29.
9
Ibid., pp. 30-38.
10
Composed of Commissioners Jose F. Erestain, Jr. and J. Waldemar V. Valmores.
11
Rollo, pp. 40-42. On 7 July 2000, the CSC already issued Resolution No. 001550
denying the motion for reconsideration. This Court will consider CSC Resolution No. 01-
0726 only.
12
Rollo, pp. 43-47.
13
CA Rollo, p. 110. The motion for execution was denied in the Second Resolution.
14
Section 7, Rule 43 provides:
SEC. 7. Effect of failure to compl with requirements. The failure of the petitioner
to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition,
and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
15
CA Rollo, p. 2.
16
Rollo, p. 43.
17
G.R. No. 122427, 13 March 1997, 269 SCRA 654.
18
G.R. No. 106564, 28 November 1996, 265 SCRA 50.
19
Section 4 of Rule 43 provides:
SEC. 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, xxx or of the denial
of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with
the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case
to exceed fifteen (15) days.
20
G.R. No. 109834, 18 October 1996, 263 SCRA 343.
21
Rollo, p. 111.
22
Ibid., p. 112.
23
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132425, 31 August 1999, 313 SCRA
376; Demata v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127697, 25 February 1999, 303 SCRA
690; United Placement International v. NLRC, G.R. No. 103370, 17 June 1996, 257
SCRA 404; Aguilar v. Blanco, No. L-32392, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 180.
24
Paramount Vinyl Products Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. 81200, 17 October 1990, 190 SCRA
525. See alsoCeniza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95296, 3 February 1993, 218 SCRA
390.
25
Ceniza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95296, 3 February 1993, 218 SCRA 390.
26
Trans International v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128421, 12 October 1998, 297
SCRA 718.
27
Rollo, p. 144.
28
Ibid., p. 117.
29
While she manifested about respondents dismissal before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner raised this issue for the first time before this court.
30
City Government of Makati v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 131392, 6 February
2002, 376 SCRA 248.
31
G.R. No. 144493, 9 April 2002, 380 SCRA 355.
32
Section 56 of CSC Resolution No. 983142 provides:
Sec. 56. Leave without pay. All absences of an official or employee in excess
of his accumulated vacation or sick leave credits earned shall be without pay.
xxx
33
Section 57 of CSC Resolution No. 983142 provides:
Sec. 57. Limit of leave without pay. Leave without pay not exceeding one year
may be granted, in addition to the vacation and/or sick leave earned. Leave
without pay in excess of one month shall require the clearance of the proper
head of department or agency.
34
Absent for at least thirty days without approved leave.
35
Section 63 of CSC Resolution No. 983142 provides:
Sec. 63. Effect of absence without approved leave. An official or an employee
who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30)
calendar days shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and
shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice.
He shall, however, be informed, at his address appearing on his 201 files of his
separation from the service, not later than five (5) days from its effectivity.
xxx (Emphasis supplied)











































EN BANC
G.R. No. 172623 March 3, 2010
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, represented herein by its Secretary HON. ARTURO L.
TIU, Petitioner,
vs.
CELSO M. PALER,
1
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision
2
dated
December 20, 2005 and resolution dated April 27, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 90360.
The facts are undisputed.
Respondent Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II (SG-24)
3
with the Technical
Support Service of the Commission on Appointments.
4
On April 8, 2003, he submitted a request for
vacation leave for 74 working days from August 1, 2003 to November 14, 2003.
5
In a
memorandum dated April 22, 2003, Ramon C. Nghuatco, Director III of Technical Support Service,
submitted to the Commission Secretary his comments/recommendation on Paler's application:
"1. The request to go on leave of Mr. Paler is contingent upon the completion of his various
Committee assignments.
2. We have already acted favorably on his Leave Applications for 09 June 2003 - 30 July
2003, which may already cover his reasons enumerated under items 1-5.
3. Mr. Paler's Sick Leave Application shall require a medical certificate from the attending
physician advising him of the need to undergo medical operation and the treatment and
recuperation period therefor.
Mr. Paler's Application for Leave may be acted upon depending on the completion of his
work load and submission of the medical certificate."
6
(Emphasis supplied)
Since he already had an approved leave from June 9 to July 30, 2003, Paler left for the United
States on June 8, 2003, without verifying whether his application for leave (for August 1 November
14, 2003) was approved or denied.
In a letter dated September 16, 2003, the Commission Chairman informed Paler that he was being
dropped from the roll of employees effective said date, due to his continuous 30-day absence
without leave and in accordance with Section 63, Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum
Circular No. 14, s. 1999.
7
Paler's son received the letter on September 23, 2003.
8

Paler moved for reconsideration but this was denied on February 20, 2004, on the ground that it was
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
9
The denial was received by Paler's son on March 18,
2004.
On appeal, the CSC reversed and set aside the Commission Chairman's decision dated September
16, 2003 per resolution 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004.
10
The dispositive portion of the resolution
read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Celso M. Paler is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated
September 16, 2003 of Commission on Appointments Chairman Franklin M. Drilon dropping Celso
M. Paler from the rolls; and the decision dated February 20, 2004 denying his motion for
reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It is directed that Celso M. Paler be immediately
reinstated as Committee Secretary of the Commission on Appointments and shall be considered to
be on leave with pay until the exhaustion of his vacation leave credits.
Quezon City, Nov. 09, 2004.
11

The Commission filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CSC per resolution
No. 050833 dated June 23, 2005.
This constrained petitioner to file with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.
Since Paler had in the meantime already reached the compulsory age of retirement on July 28, 2005
and was no longer entitled to reinstatement, the CA affirmed with modification CSC resolution 04-
1214 dated November 9, 2004 and resolution No. 050833 dated June 23, 2005. The dispositive
portion of the assailed decision dated December 20, 2005 provided:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the order of reinstatement is DELETED. In lieu thereof, Paler should be
awarded backwages, retirement benefits and other privileges that accrued to him from the time of his
dismissal up to the date of his retirement.
SO ORDERED.
12

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in the assailed resolution
dated April 27, 2005.
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO
THE APPEAL OF RESPONDENT PALER WITH THE RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LEAVE
APPLICATIONS OF RESPONDENT PALER WAS DEEMED APPROVED ON A MISTAKEN
INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 49, RULE XVI OF THE OMNIBUS RULE ON LEAVE AS AMENDED.
13

Petitioner's contentions are basically the same as those it presented to the CSC
14
and the CA,
15
viz.:
(1) the CSC should not have entertained Paler's appeal since it was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period; there were no meritorious reasons to relax the procedural rules, specially since
there was bad faith and misrepresentation on Paler's part in filing staggered applications for leave;
(2) the Commission Chairman's decision to drop Paler from the roll of employees was in accord with
Section 63 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 14, series of 1999 and (3) Paler's application for leave
was not "deemed approved" as petitioner acted on his application by holding it in abeyance in view
of the contingencies of his work and the submission of a medical certificate.
16

In his comment, Paler, aside from arguing that the CA did not commit any error in sustaining the
CSC resolutions, also assails Atty. Arturo L. Tiu's authority to file the petition and sign the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping on behalf of the Commission Chairman.
17

The CSC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains the correctness of the
CSC and CA judgments.
Issues
This petition involves both procedural and substantive issues.
On the procedural aspect, Paler questions the authority of the Commission Secretary to file the
petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of the Commission
Chairman. On the other hand, the Commission disputes the CSC's grant of Paler's appeal despite
having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
On the substantive aspect, was Paler's application for leave "deemed approved" within the purview
of Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave?
Authority to File Petition
First, we tackle Atty. Tiu's authority to file the petition and sign the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping.
The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity created by the
Constitution, and headed by its Chairman.
18
There was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the
verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts
alleged in the petition could sign the verification.
19
With regard, however, to the certification of non-
forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal
parties and not by counsel.
20
In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized
by the Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his
behalf. There is nothing on record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert
Palers allegation of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.
21

Furthermore, the petition is bereft of merit as it merely restates the arguments presented before the
CSC and CA. It does not advance any cogent reason that will convince this Court to deviate from the
rulings of both tribunals.
The Issue of Late Filing
Section 72 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999,
22
provides for the period of appeal for
non-disciplinary actions, to wit:
Section 72. When and Where to File. - A decision or ruling of a department or agency may be
appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by the party adversely affected to the Civil
Service Regional Office and finally, to the Commission Proper within the same period.
x x x
Paler's son received the letter from the Commission Chairman denying Palers motion for
reconsideration on March 18, 2004. Thus, Palers had until April 2, 2004 within which to file his
appeal with the CSC. It was filed, however, only on April 5, 2004.
23
Nevertheless, the CSC
entertained the appeal in the interest of substantial justice.
24

We agree with the CSC. We uphold its decision to relax the procedural rules because Paler's appeal
was meritorious. This is not the first time that the Court has upheld such exercise of discretion.
In Rosales, Jr. v. Mijares
25
involving Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure, the Court
ruled:
On the contention of the petitioner that the appeal of the respondent to the CSC was made beyond
the period therefor under Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure, the CSC correctly
ruled that:
Movant claims that Mijares appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period for filing appeals.
He, thus, contends that the Commission should not have given due course to said appeal.
The Commission need not delve much on the dates when Mijares was separated from the service
and when he assailed his separation. Suffice it to state that the Commission found his appeal
meritorious.1avvphi1 This being the case, procedural rules need not be strictly observed. This
principle was explained by in the case of Mauna vs. CSC, 232 SCRA 388, where the Supreme Court
ruled, to wit:
"Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioners appeal was filed out of time, it is within the
power of this Court to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable
that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so
strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If
the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher
objective they seek which is the protection of substantive rights of the parties. As held by the
Court in a number of cases:
x x x
It bears stressing that the case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of a public officer
sacrosanctly protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a resolution of the merits of the
appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a strained and inordinate application of Section
49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure.
26
(Emphasis supplied)
Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania
27
likewise sustained the CSC when it modified an
otherwise final and executory resolution and awarded backwages to the respondent, in the interest
of justice and fair play. The Court stated
No doubt, the Civil Service Commission was in the legitimate exercise of its mandate under Sec. 3,
Rule I, of theRevised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service that
"[a]dministrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the
technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings." This authority is
consistent with its powers and functions to "[p]rescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for
carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws" being the central
personnel agency of the Government.
Furthermore, there are special circumstances in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play
that warrant such liberal attitude on the part of the CSC and a compassionate like-minded
discernment by this Court. x x x
28

When substantial justice dictates it, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to arrive at a just
disposition of a case. The purpose behind limiting the period of appeal is to avoid unreasonable
delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. A one-day delay, as in this
case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to delay
justice on the part of Paler
29
and the pleading is meritorious on its face.
Petitioner harps on Paler's alleged bad faith and misrepresentation in filing his previous applications
for leave. However, as correctly found by the CSC and CA, the basis for Paler's dismissal was his
continuous absence without leave, not bad faith and misrepresentation. The CSC even noted that
Paler never misrepresented or misled petitioner as to where he was spending his vacation leave. He
clearly stated in his application for leave dated April 17, 2003 that he was spending it not only in the
Philippines but also in the U.S.
30
According to the CA, "to utilize Paler's alleged misrepresentation in
his previously approved applications for leave as basis for his separation from work, even in the
absence of opportunity for him to controvert the matter, would constitute a violation of the
fundamental requirements of fairness and equity and the constitutional guarantee of due
process."
31
The Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of both the CSC and CA, given
that they concur with each other and should be accorded great weight and respect.
32

The CSC and CA were also correct in ruling that Paler could not be considered absent without leave
(AWOL) for the period of August 1, 2003 to November 14, 2003.
Paler was dropped from the roll of employees pursuant to Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus
Rules on Leave:
An official or an employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty
(30) calendar days shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be
separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. He shall, however, be
informed, at his address appearing on his 201 files of his separation from the service, not later than
five (5) days from its effectivity. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
AWOL means that the employee has left or abandoned his post for a continuous period of thirty (30)
calendar days or more without any justifiable reason and notice to his employer.
33

The bone of contention in this case is whether or not Paler had an approved leave.
Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave requires that an application for leave should be
acted upon within 5 working days from receipt, otherwise, such application is deemed
approved.
34
The CSC interpreted said provision in this wise
It is explicit from the aforequoted rule that an application for leave of absence which had not been
acted upon either by approving or disapproving by the head of agency or his/her authorized
representative within five (5) working days from the date of its filing shall be deemed
approved.
35
(Italics supplied)
The CSC also ruled that "Section 49 calls for a specific action to be done by the head of the agency
or his duly authorized representative on the application for leave filed which is either to approve or to
deny the same."
36

Being the central agency mandated to "prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for
carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws," the CSC has the
power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them, with its interpretation significantly
becoming part of the rules themselves.
37
The Court has consistently yielded and accorded great
respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error of
law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter
and spirit of the law.
38

The CA added its own reading of Section 49 which the Court now sustains:
x x x The action contemplated therein connotes a clear and explicit exercise of discretion. It pertains
to an absolute and unequivocal "approval" or "disapproval" of the request for leave and not one
which is merely "recommendatory" in nature. If the rule were otherwise, the authority to act on the
application for leave would not have been vested on the head of the agency or the CA [Commission
on Appointments] Chairman's authorized representative. Needless to state, the purpose of the
provision is for the applicant to be immediately informed of the status of his application, whether it
has been approved or denied, so that he can act accordingly. x x x
39

Clearly, Atty. Nghuatco's memorandum did not cover the action contemplated by Section 49. For
one, it did not bear the imprimatur of the Commission Chairman (or his duly authorized
representative) who was the proper party to grant or deny the application, as dictated by Section 52
of the Omnibus Rules on Leave.
40
For another, it only submitted to the Commission Secretary Atty.
Nghuatco's comments and/or recommendations on Paler's application. It was merely preliminary and
did not propose any definitive action (i.e., approval or disapproval) on Paler's application, and simply
recommended what action to take. It was obviously not controlling and the Chairman could have
agreed or disagreed with the recommended action. In fact, the memorandum clearly provided that
Paler's request was still to be referred to the Legal Service for comment,
41
and that the application
"(could) be acted upon depending on the completion of his work load and submission of the medical
certificate."
42
These circumstances plainly meant that further action was yet to be made on the
application. And since there was no final approval or disapproval of Paler's application within 5
working days from receipt as required by Section 49, the application was deemed approved. Paler,
therefore, could not be considered on AWOL.
All told, the CA committed no error in affirming, with modification, CSC Resolution Nos. 04-1214
dated November 9, 2004 and 050833 dated June 23, 2005.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
(No part)
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
*

Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
(On official leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
**

Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
*
No part.
**
On official leave.
1
The Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission were impleaded as respondents but their
exclusion is proper under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Presiding Justice
Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired Member of this Court) and Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-
Lagman (retired).
3
The Civil Service Commission erroneously denominated Palers position as "Committee Secretary."
4
The Commission on Appointments shall be hereafter referred to as the "Commission."
5
Rollo, p. 132.
6
Id., p. 135.
7
Id., p. 123.
8
Ibid.
9
Id., p. 124, Resolution/Letter dated February 20, 2004 of the Chairman of the Commission.
10
Penned by Civil Service Commission Chairman Karina Constantino-David, and concurred in by
Commissioner J. Waldemar V. Valmores. Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor inhibited himself from
the case.
11
Rollo, p. 113.
12
Id., p. 43.
13
Id., pp. 21-22.
14
Id., pp. 50-56, 59-63.
15
Id., pp. 71-80.
16
Id., pp. 22-27.
17
Id., pp. 181-183.
18
Section 18, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
19
LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, G.R. No. 159653, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA 137, 141.
20
Gutierrez v. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 142248, 16
December 2004, 447 SCRA 107, 117.
21
Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) v. Adala, G.R. No. 168914, 4 July 2007, 526 SCRA
465, 474.
22
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
23
April 2, 2004 was a Friday; the appeal was filed on April 5, 2004, a Monday.
24
Rollo, p. 111.
25
G.R. No. 154095, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 532.
26
Id., pp. 547-549.
27
G.R. No. 156039, 14 August 2003, 409 SCRA 80.
28
Id, p. 88; see also Bunsay v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. NO. 153188, 14 August 2007, 530
SCRA 68.
29
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Angara, G.R. NO. 142937, 15 November 2005,
475 SCRA 41, 52.
30
Rollo, p. 118; CSC Resolution No. 05-8333 dated June 23, 2005, p. 4.
31
Id., p. 42; CA Decision dated December 20, 2005, p. 12.
32
Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 589,
605-606.
33
Binay v. Odea, G.R. No. 163683, 8 June 2007, 524 SCRA 248, 258.
34
Sec. 49. Period within which to act on leave application. - Whenever the application for leave of
absence, including terminal leave, is not acted upon by the head of agency or his duly authorized
representative within five (5) working days after receipt thereof, the application for leave of absence
shall be deemed approved.
35
Rollo, p. 112; CSC Resolution 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004, p. 9.
36
Id, p. 118; CSC Resolution No. 05-8333 dated June 23, 2005, p. 4.
37
City Government of Makati v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 131392, 6 February 2002, 376
SCRA 248, 264.
38
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. International Communication Corporation, G.R.
No. 135992, 31 January 2006, 481 SCRA 163, 167.
39
Rollo, p. 39; CA Decision dated December 20, 2005, p. 9.
40
Section 52 states, "[L]eave of absence for any reason other than illness of an official or employee
or of any member of his immediate family must be contingent upon the needs of the service. Hence,
the grant of vacation leave shall be at the discretion of the head of department/agency."
41
Rollo, p. 134.
42
Id., p. 135.









SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. P-08-2523 April 7, 2009
(Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-2872-P)
ATTY. MARLYDS L. ESTARDO-TEODORO, Complainant,
vs.
CARLOS S. SEGISMUNDO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J .:
This resolves the administrative case initiated through a Complaint-Memorandum dated June 21,
2007 filed by Atty. Marlyds L. Estardo-Teodoro
1
(complainant) with the Office of the Court
Administrator-Legal Office (OCA) against Mr. Carlos S. Segismun
2
(respondent) for dishonesty,
violations of reasonable office rules and regulations, and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
The ANTECEDENTS
The complaint-memorandum cites the following incidents:
A. The Respondents Encashment of a Postal Money Order
It appears that the standing office procedure in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City
for the implementation of all summons, orders, executions and other processes accompanied by
money orders from other RTCs and MTCs, is to indorse these processes to the Clerk of Court/OIC-
Clerk of Court for recording; money orders must be signed by the latter prior to encashment.
Despite this standing procedure, the respondent appears to have encashed a postal money order
without the requisite endorsement. When confronted by Atty. Jose Elmer Y. Teodoro, Officer in
Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court, the respondent claimed that he did so based on the
endorsement of Ms. Florenda S. Ordoez (Ms. Ordoez), Administrative Officer I of the Office of the
Clerk of Court. Upon learning of the respondents representation with Atty. Teodoro, Ms. Ordoez
issued a Memorandum dated November 11, 2005 directing the respondent to explain the
incident.
3
The memorandum states:
It has been our procedure that all summons, orders, executions and other proceedings coming from
other RTCs and MTCs accompanied by money orders to be implemented in our office must be
indorsed to the Clerk of Court/OIC-Clerk of Court for notification. Money orders must be signed by
our Clerk of Court /OIC-Clerk of Court before encashment.
However, it has come to my knowledge that you told the OIC-Clerk of Court that a certain money
order (re: Civil Case No. 05-56366) was endorsed by me for encashment when the truth was I did
not do so, aside from the fact that I do not have such authority. Your actuation may constitute
misconduct which is penalized by suspension to dismissal from service.
x x x x
In his Answer/Explanation
4
the respondent said that:
1) Undersigned has to admit that he has knowledge of the office policy as stated in the 1st
paragraph of the memorandum;
2) Undersigned also admits the contents of the 2nd paragraph of said memorandum.
xxx xxx xxx
Without much ado, the undersigned hereby ADMITS having made a clear violation of the office
policy as explained in the 1st paragraph of the memorandum to him and also OWNS UP to what was
explained in paragraph two of the same memorandum.
Undersigned pleads no contest to the charge/accusation against him with the honest belief that what
he did was not to commit so grave a wrong but it was only his honest desire to expedite matters
relative to the service of the processes, which had bearing in Civil Case No. 05-56366.
In his Supplement to the Answer/Explanation dated November 18, 2005,
5
the respondent admitted
that the money order was endorsed and encashed in his own name, thus:
In compliance therewith, the undersigned hereby DECLARES that the postal money order was
encashed and endorsed in his own name. This was made possible after the undersigned had
inquired from the post office concerned personnel if he could endorse it with his own name and he
was given the go signal. So, to expedite the service of the processes to be served, undersigned took
the initiative to sign the postal money order.
B. The Respondents Act of Leaving the Office During Official Hours without Permission
Without asking permission from his superiors, the respondent left the court premises during official
hours on February 9, 2007, prompting Ms. Ordoez to issue Memorandum No. 03-2007 dated
February 12, 2007
6
requiring the respondent to explain the incident. In his letter-explanation dated
February 13, 2007, the respondent clarified that on or about 2:00 in the afternoon of February 9,
2007, he had stomach pain subsequently coupled with loose bowel movement; he hurriedly left the
office for home without asking permission from his immediate supervisor since he could no longer
control his bowel movement and that he has already soiled his pants.
7

Via Memorandum No. 05-07, Ordoez gave the respondent a stern warning that a repetition of the
infraction would be dealt with more severely.
C. The May 9, 2007 Incident
The complainant alleged in her Complaint-Memorandum that on May 9, 2007, respondent went to
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 15, Manila to obtain a copy of the summons in Civil Case
No. 183183 (summons) without securing either a travel order or a directive from her to do so, in
violation of the Memorandum dated June 6, 2005
8
(the Memorandum on Travel Orders).
9
This office
memorandum requires all court personnel to secure the written approval of the Clerk of Court or
OIC-Clerk of Court on travel orders.
In relation with this incident, the complainant issued Memorandum No. 13-2007 dated June 5, 2007,
requiring the respondent to explain his actions, specifically, that of providing false information on the
status of the summons and purported violation of office rules and regulations.
10

The complainant noted in her memorandum that the respondent made her believe that Clerk of
Court Abelardo T. Pongyan (Clerk of Court Pongyan), of MTC, Branch 15, Manila informed the
respondent that the summons would be mailed to the RTC as soon as possible; in truth, per Clerk of
Court Pongyans Manifestation dated May 17, 2007, the respondent appeared in the MTC, Manila,
and acknowledged receipt of the summons. The complainant noted, too, that the respondent notified
her on May 23, 2007 that Clerk of Court Pongyan personally delivered to him a copy of the
summons at the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC, San Fernando City, after office hours; upon
verification with Clerk of Court Pongyan, the complainant was told that no one from their office
travelled all the way from Manila to Pampanga to deliver the summons. On the same date, the
complainant claimed that she had been informed by Deputy Sheriff Redentor Villanueva that the
respondent already visited the residence of the summoned defendants in Civil Case No. 183183 in
Matamo, Arayat, Pampanga, without any travel order or instructions from complainant, in violation of
the Memorandum on Travel Orders.
The complainant further noted that when she confronted the respondent about the incident, the
respondent replied that he failed to inform the former because he had so many things on his mind,
and that a copy of the summons was personally delivered to the respondent by the driver of the
plaintiffs counsel in Civil Case No. 183183.
On June 7, 2007, the respondent submitted his written Explanation
11
stating that his actions were
done purely out of inadvertence and without intent to gain. He averred that when asked about the
summons, it dwelt on his mind that a different summons was referred to. He explained that he made
it appear that the summons was delivered to him personally by the driver of plaintiffs counsel
because he feared that a greater sanction would be imposed upon him if he would insist that he
forgot to inform the complainant that the summons had been with him since May 9, 2007. He further
explained that due to workload and personal problems, he failed to report to the complainant that he
had already visited the defendants place in Civil Case No. 183183 for service of the summons.
Still in relation with the May 9, 2007 incident, the complainant again issued on June 8, 2007 a
Memorandum directing the respondent to explain why he failed to punch out his time card in the
afternoon of May 9, 2007.
12
In his response-letter dated June 12, 2007,
13
the respondent countered
that he failed to punch out his time card on the aforementioned date because it was already late
when he returned to Pampanga from the MTC, Branch 15, Manila; at any rate, he stated that he was
more than willing to claim a half-day leave for that day.
Action on the Complaint-Memorandum and the OCA Recommendation
Acting on the complaint-memorandum, Executive Judge Adelaida Ala Medina of the RTC, Branch
45, San Fernando City, directed the respondent to file his verified answer. The respondent filed his
Verified Answer
14
as directed, reiterating his previous explanations to the various memoranda issued
by the complainant. He echoed that his actions were due to pure inadvertence and lapse of
judgment, and that he did not intend to gain from any of his actions. He also asked the Court to
consider his long (33 years) service to the judiciary.
On August 31, 2007, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock directed the respondent to file his
comment. In his Comment dated October 5, 2007,
15
the respondent asked the Court Administrator to
consider his explanations on the various memoranda previously issued against him as his comment
to the complaint-memorandum. He reiterated his excuse of inadvertence and lack of intent to gain.
He claimed that no malice can be inferred from his transgressions and that he had no intent of
making a mockery of the office rules and regulations. He likewise claimed that he had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong. He asked for forgiveness and implored the Court to take into account his
thirty-three (33) years in government service.
On July 2, 2008, the OCA, through then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, submitted a report
and recommendation.
16
The OCA recommended that: (1) the case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; and (2) respondent be found liable for repeated Violations of Reasonable
Office Rules and Regulations and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, and be suspended
without pay for one (1) month, and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. The OCA said that respondents admission that he committed the
acts complained of, albeit inadvertently and without intent to gain, does not in any way exculpate him
from administrative sanction; the mere general denial of the respondent is unavailing on the face of
the categorical assertions of the complainant. The OCA noted with significance that the respondent
was duly warned by his superiors for every infraction committed, but still failed to change his ways.
On August 13, 2008, this Court issued a Resolution re-docketing the case as a regular
administrative matter and requiring the parties to manifest whether they are willing to submit the
matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed and the records submitted, within ten (10)
days from notice. On October 13, 2008, both parties submitted their respective Manifestations of
their willingness to submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed and the
records already submitted.1avvphi 1.zw+
THE COURTS RULING
We agree with the finding of the OCA that the respondent is guilty of repeated violations of
reasonable office rules and regulations and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. We, however,
additionally find the respondent guilty of dishonesty.
In administrative disciplinary cases, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence, the allegations in her complaint.
17
The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt
is substantial evidencedefined as evidence that a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. The complainant had successfully discharged this burden as our evaluation of
the facts of the case and the pleadings submitted by the parties below will show.
The respondent never denied, and in fact admitted, that he violated standing office procedure on the
encashment of money orders. The respondents proffered excuse that he endorsed and encashed
the money order upon permission from a post office personnel in order to expedite the service of
processes does not exonerate him from liability given that he was fully aware of the standing office
policy or procedure. As he was aware of the policy whose validity and lawfulness he never
contested, his first instinctive reaction should be to abide by it. The policy was precisely put in place
to properly account for money orders; the respondent should not therefore be allowed to simply
brush it aside on mere expediency.
Also, that the respondent left the office on official hours without permission from his superiors on
February 9, 2007 is clearly established by the records of the present case. The respondent though
justified his act, claiming that he had stomach pain and loose bowel movement and had already
soiled his pants at the time (2 P.M.) he hurriedly left the court premises.
We closely looked at the surrounding circumstances of this incident and find the respondents act to
be unjustified. The respondent timed in at 12:03 in the afternoon of February 9, 2007. If he is to be
believed, i.e., that he had stomach pain and loose bowel movement on or about 2:00 p.m., it is
highly doubtful under the circumstances that he could not have had the remotest chance to ask
permission from or inform his immediate supervisor of his condition and ultimately, his intention to go
home. Instead, what we can reasonably infer from this situation is that the respondent really
intended to leave the office without asking permission; this can easily be deduced, too, from the
respondents statement in his letter-explanation that he thought it "implied that he had a half-day
leave."
We cannot agree with the respondents theory that a half-day leave is implied from an employees
unceremonious act of leaving his post or station. Under Civil Service Rules, the taking and the
approval of leaves of absence follow a formal process, viz., a leave must be duly approved by the
authorized officer.
18
This is true even for sick leaves (in order that an official or employee may not be
considered absent without an approved leave), although a subsequent filing of an application for sick
leave after the sick employee has reported for work is allowed, as sickness may suddenly occur and
may not be reasonably predicted. As respondents stomachache and loose bowel movement
occurred at a time when he was already in the office, we cannot find any justification for his
unceremonious departure. The respondent could have easily left word, a message perhaps, to his
superior that he would be taking the rest of the day off because of his affliction (or file a leave right
there and then), or he could have subsequently filed an application for a half day sick leave as
required by Civil Service Rules. For reasons only he knows, he never did any of these. His theory of
implied half-day leave is therefore a mere afterthought to cover up his infraction.
As in the office standing procedure on the encashment of postal money orders, the respondent
never contested the validity of the Memorandum on Travel Orders and, rightly so, as this
Memorandum appears to us to be reasonable. Also, as the respondent never denied the
complainants allegation that he did not secure permission for his Manila trip, we find it established
that he violated the reasonable office rule and regulation on travel orders when he went to the MTC,
Branch 15, Manila on May 9, 2007 to procure the summons in Civil Case No. 183183. This holds
true for his initial visit of the residence of defendants in this civil case.
To justify his act, the respondent alluded to heavy workload and personal problems. These reasons
are insufficient; they are, at best unacceptable lame excuses when considered with the reasonable
expectations and demands of professionalism in the public service.
19

That the respondent purportedly committed all these acts inadvertently and without intent to gain will
not also exculpate him from appropriate administrative sanctions, as these do not negate the now
duly proven misfeasance he committed in office.
Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
20
requires that all [c]ourt personnel
shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves
exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours. The evidence on
record clearly established the respondents violation of this provision when he committed repeated
violations of reasonable office rules and regulations.1avvphi1
Additionally, unalleged in the complaint but underlying the money order and false representation
incidents is the matter of the respondents dishonesty. We have defined dishonesty as the
"(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray."
21
We find that the respondent in this case has demonstrated a propensity to
fabricate lies to explain away his infractions.
First, with respect to the encashment of the money order, the respondent categorically admitted that
he told the OIC-Clerk of Court that the money order was endorsed by Ms. Ordoez for encashment,
when in truth, she did not do so. Why he would also give this excuse despite knowledge of Ms.
Ordoez lack of authority to endorse the postal money order escapes us. Significantly, the
respondent made this false statement to the OIC-Clerk of Court after he had violated office rules and
regulation by endorsing and encashing the money order in his own name.
Second, the respondent gave the complainant false information on the status of the summons in
Civil Case No. 183183. The respondent admitted that he made it appear on May 23, 2007 that the
summons was delivered to him by counsel for plaintiffs driver on that date, when in fact, the
summons had been with him already since May 9, 2007 the very same date when he went to the
MTC Branch 15, Manila. He nevertheless justified, as stated above, his action because of fear of
greater sanctions if he would insist on his forgetfulness.
Instead of exonerating him, the respondents justifications only serve to highlight his mendacious
nature. Worse, this Court cannot accept as justification, much less sanction, the respondents resort
to fabrications of falsehood to cover up his misdeeds under the pretext of fear of a greater sanction.
In sum, the respondents conduct clearly shows lack of forthrightness and straightforwardness in his
dealings with his superiors amounting to dishonesty. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no
place in the judiciary.
22
The Court had repeatedly held that everyone in the judiciary, from the
presiding judge to the clerk, must always be beyond reproach; they carry this heavy burden to
ensure that the institution we save the judiciary is always kept above suspicion.
This conclusion necessarily leads us to the imposition of the correct penalty. Section 22, Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
23
as amended by CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999,
24
provides:
The following are grave offenses with corresponding penalties:
(a) Dishonesty
1st Offense Dismissal [Emphasis supplied]
x x x x
The following are light offenses with their corresponding penalties:
x x x x
(c) Violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
1st Offense - Reprimand
2nd Offense - Suspension 1-30 days
3rd Offense - Dismissal [Emphasis supplied]
As a grave offense, dishonesty warrants the most severe penalty of dismissal from the service upon
the commission of even the first offense.
25
On the other hand, violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations for the third time also merits the most severe penalty of dismissal from the service.
The presence of mitigating factors may however affect the imposition of the correct penalty, as we
have in fact refrained from imposing the actual penalties in past several administrative cases.
26
The
compassion granted in those cases is not without legal basis, as Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, grants the disciplining authority and the
discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty.
27
Factors such
as the respondents length of service in the judiciary, the respondents acknowledgment of his or her
infractions and feeling of remorse, and family circumstances, among others things, have had varying
significance in the Courts determination of the imposable penalty.
28

In In Re: Irregularities in the Use of Logbook and Daily Time Records by Clerk of Court Raquel D.J.
Razon, Cash Clerk Joel M. Magtuloy and Utility Worker Tiburcio O. Morales, MTC-OCC, Guagua
Pampanga,
29
Utility Worker Tiburcio O. Morales (Mr. Morales) and Cash Clerk Joel M. Magtuloy (Mr.
Magtuloy) who were found guilty of dishonesty together with the Branch Clerk of Court, Raquel D.J.
Razon (Mrs. Razon); the former for accommodating Mrs. Razon, and the latter for actually punching
following the request of Mr. Morales to log-in and log-out Mrs. Razons timecard were merely
imposed a penalty of a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with a
more severe sanction from the Court. The Court ruled that as to the respondents Mr. Morales and
Mr. Magtuloy, the case being their first administrative offense in their 37 years and 9 years,
respectively, in government service, a stern warning will suffice.
We significantly note that the present administrative case is the respondents first in his thirty-three
(33) years of government service. We note, too, that the respondent readily acknowledged his
offense and expressed contrition. Taken together, all these show that the extreme penalty or
prejudice of dismissal for his dishonesty is inappropriate; a stern warning, as imposed in the cited
logbook case, will suffice. With regard to the respondents repeated violations of reasonable office
rules and regulations and Code of Conduct for Court Personnel at varying dates although
consolidated in the present administrative case, we similarly consider the same mitigating
circumstances and also the fact that his employment with the judiciary is his only means of
livelihood. Accordingly and for humanitarian reasons, we impose upon the respondent, not the
extreme penalty of dismissal, but six (6) months suspension without pay.
WHEREFORE, we find the respondent Carlos S. Segismundo GUILTY of dishonesty and of
repeated violations of reasonable office rules and regulation and Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. We hereby impose on him the penalty of SUSPENSION for six (6) months without pay
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of these acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1
Acting Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City,
Pampanga.
2
Process Server, id.
3
Annex "G," Complaint-Memorandum; emphasis supplied.
4
Annex "G-1," id.; emphasis supplied.
5
Annex "G-2," id.; emphasis supplied.
6
Annex "F," id.; emphasis supplied.
7
Annex "F-1," id.
8
Annex "E," id.
9
Issued by the then OIC Clerk of Court, Atty. Jose Elmer Y. Teodoro, and noted by Executive Judge
Adelaida Ala Medina. The Memorandum states:
All personnel are directed to secure the initials of the Administrative Officer or, in her absence, that
of the next ranking personnel in the office before Travel Orders, application for bail, periodic reports
(monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, etc.). certifications, and other similar documents are brought to
the undersigned, if required, for his signature and approval.
This is necessitated by the need to constantly monitor as well as to verify the flow and veracity of
documents coming out from the office, and to maximize personnel efficiency brought about by
outside office premises official business.
Also, all Travel Orders must be prepared at least two (2) days before the stated date of
implementation and submitted to the undersigned not later that at the close of office hours of every
Tuesdays and Thursdays. This two-day allowance period does not cover travel orders for
deposits/withdrawals and other similar bank transactions.
10
Annex "A," Complaint-Memorandum.
11
Annex "B," id.
12
Annex "C," id.
13
Annex "D," id.
14
Consisting of three (3) pages attached to the Record of the Present Case.
15
Single Page Comment attached to the Record of the present case.
16
OCA IPI No. 08-2872-P.
17
Ebero v. Camposano, A.M. No. P-04-1792, March 12, 2004, 425 SCRA 420, 425.
18
Omnibus Rules on Leave, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998; See:
Sections 50-54 of the Omnibus Rules.
19
See: Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
20
A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, June 1, 2004.
21
In Re Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Secretary I, and Angelita
C. Esmerio, Clerk III, Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, A.M. No. 2001-7-SC & No.
2001-8-SC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 1,13, citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Ibay, 393
SCRA 212 (2002).
22
In Re Irregularities in the Use of Logbook and Daily Time Records by Clerk of Court Raquel D.J.
Razon, Cash Clerk Joel M. Magtuloy and Utility Worker Tiburcio O. Morales, MTC-OCC, Guagua,
Pampanga, A.M. No. P-06-2243, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 52, 61, citing Cabanata v. Molina,
421 Phil. 664, 674 (2001); Lacurom v. Magbanua, 443 Phil. 711, 718 (2003), citing Pizzaro v.
Villegas, 398 Phil. 837, 838 (2000).
23
The Administrative Code of 1987.
24
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases In the Civil Service.
25
Supra note 22.
26
Id., p. 62. See also In Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court
Secretary I, and Angelita C. Esmerio, Clerk III, Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division,
supra note 4; Geocadin v. Hon. Remigio Pea, 195 Phil. 344 (1981); In Re: Delayed Remittance of
Collections of Teresita Lydia Odtuhan, 445 Phil. 220 (2003); Sarenas-Ochagabia v. Atty. Balmes
Ocampos, A.C. No. 4401, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 286; In Re: Misappropriation of the Judiciary
Fund Collections by Ms. Juliet C. Banag, A.M. No. P-02-1641, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 150; In
Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties For Habitual Tardiness Committed During the First and
Second Semester of 2002 by the Following Employees of this Court: Gerardo H. Alumbro, et al.,
A.M. No. 00-06-09-SC, March 16, 2004, 425 SCRA 509.
27
Re: Failure of Jose Dante E. Guerrero To Register His Time In and Out In the Chronolog Time
Recorder Machine On Several Dates, A.M. No. 2005-07-SC, April 19, 2006 ,487 SCRA 352, 367.
28
Supra note 22 citing Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the First Semester of 2005,
494 SCRA 422 (2006).
29
Id.
EN BANC
A.M. No. P-01-1529 January 23, 2002
ATTY. GISELLE G. TALION, Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Panabo, Davao del Norte, complainant,
vs.
ESTEBAN P. AYUPAN, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Davao del
Norte,respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Giselle G. Talion, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Panabo,
Davao Province, against Esteban Ayupan, Sheriff IV of the same court, alleging failure of the latter to
serve summons assigned to him, to act on petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure, and to enforce writs
of execution and absenteeism.
The facts show the following:
On July 20, 1999, respondent Esteban Ayupan, then Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court, Panabo,
Davao, was absent from work. As he continued to be absent for several days, the Clerk of Court,
Atty. Giselle G. Talion, issued Memorandum 01-99 on July 29, 1999, requiring him to explain his
absence from work.
1
In reply, respondent, in a letter dated August 3, 1999, wrote:
"I am submitting herewith my narrative explanations in compliance to your memorandum order 01-99
dated July 29, 1999.
"That on July 21, 1999 I did not report for work because of a stomach pain up to Friday 23 day of
July 1999. I have been feeling this long ago. In fact, I had this consulted with the internests (sic) but
they only gave me medicines which made me feel temporarily relieved.
"That on the early morning of Monday 26 day of July 1999, me and my wife discovered that our
eldest daughter who had just celebrated her 15th birthday on July 25, 1999 disappeared. We
immediately exerted all efforts to locate all possibilities of her whereabouts. All of these efforts were
in vain.
"Incidentally, on the 27th day of July 1999, one of our neighbors in the province of Cotabato arrived.
We were informed that our missing daughter was at her grandfathers house. So, immediately, in the
early morning of the 28th of July, I took the first bus trip bound for Cotabato City. I was able to locate
my daughter who transferred from my father to her aunties house. I convinced her without any
investigation to go home and back in school.
"On the 30th day of July, I reported to the office and happened to receive said memorandum order.
"During those days I had sleepless nights and even forgot to take regular meals because of worries.
"I will submit to any action against me by my superiors if I violated existing Rules of the Civil Service.
However, I suggest for any possibility that I will be given ample time to go on leave for a thorough
medical check up."
2

On the same day, respondent submitted his daily time record (DTR) and an application for leave
stating that he was indisposed. Atty. Talion refused to sign the DTR an application for leave as she
received earlier information that respondent was simply staying at home. Respondents wife, who
worked as an interpreter at RTC, branch 34, would not say nor deny if he was sick.
From August 23 until several days thereafter, respondent again did not report for work. Neither did
he file his daily time record for the month of August 1999. For this reason, Atty. Talion issued
Memorandum No. 02-99 on August 31, 1999, calling respondents attention to his absences for the
period of August 23-31 and ordering him to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him. Respondent did not make any explanation even after he had reported back for work on
September 2, 1999. Instead, on September 10, respondent was again absent from work without
leave, prompting Atty. Talion to issue another memorandum on September 21, 1999, again ordering
him to explain his absences from September 10 to the date of the memoranda issued. A copy of the
memorandum, together with the three previous memoranda issued to respondent, was furnished
Executive Judge Gregorio A. Palabrica, RTC, Panabo and the Office of the Court Administrator. On
September 28, 1999, the Office of Administrative Services, Office of the OCA, directed respondent
to explain in writing why he should not be dealt with administratively for his unexplained absences
and to return to work within five days from receipt of the same. Again, however, respondent did not
offer any explanation for his absences and simply reported back for work on October 19, 1999.
Hence, on October 25, 1999, Executive Judge Palabrica issued Memorandum No. 06-99, ordering
that no cases for service of summons, execution of judgments, and/or petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure be assigned to respondent. When respondent applied for an indefinite leave of absence
effective November 18, 1999, Judge Palabrica refused to approve respondents application.
3

Atty. Talion found that from 1997 until 1999, respondent failed to serve a number of summonses and
to act upon petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure assigned to him. On September 1, 1999, Atty.
Talion asked Jonathan Fajardo, Clerk IV of the OCC-RTC, to make an inventory of cases assigned
to respondent. The inventory of the cases showed that summonses assigned to respondent for
enforcement were either served but unreturned or they remained unserved, petitions for extra-
judicial foreclosure remained either unserved upon the mortgagors or mortgagees or unpublished in
newspapers of general circulation, or no provisional or final certificates of sale were issued, while
several writs of execution remained unenforced. The summonses were dated as early as October
27, 1997 while the petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure were filed as early as November 13, 1997.
On the other hand, respondent received the writs of execution as early as July 10, 1997.1wphi1 The details
of the inventory are as follows:
4

1wphi1
Inventory conducted
on
Status Number of
cases

Summons Unserved 45
Served but unreturned 18
Status undetermined 18
Total

81
=========
Extrajudicial
Foreclosure
Sheriffs notice of
foreclosure unsent /
no proof of mailing
For Issuance of final
or provisional
106


36

certificates of sale
Notice of foreclosure
not on file
No publication /
Notice of foreclosure
unsent
Unacted upon/ for re-raffling
Petition withdrawn
Not included in the
Raffling of legal
notices
No status indicated
20


15


8
4
4


3
Total

196
=========
Inventory conducted
on
Status
Number of
cases

Writs of Execution Unimplemented / No
Sheriffs return
Served
Partial Return
52

13
3
Total

68
========
On October 22, 1999, Atty. Talion submitted a report to Executive Judge Palabrica, who endorsed
the same to the Office of the Court Administrator on October 29, 1999. The OCA directed Judge
Palabrica to investigate the matter. In compliance with the directive of the OCA, Judge Palabrica
scheduled a hearing on December 28, 1999, notifying respondent of the same. However,
respondent ignored the notice. Only Atty. Talion appeared to testify on respondents alleged
inefficiency.
After hearing, on January 14, 2000, Judge Palabrica made the following findings and
recommendation:
"FINDINGS:
The undersigned finds that Mr. Ayupan has been absent without official leave for more than 30 days.
Moreover, he also failed to properly accomplish the extrajudicial foreclosure totalling 197 cases
assigned to him. Likewise he has not acted properly on the writ of executions and summons coming
from several courts.
"RECOMMENDATION
"On the bases of the above facts, the undersigned recommends that Mr. Esteban Ayupan be
removed from service."
5

On October 19, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted Judge Palabricas report to the
Court, recommending that respondent Esteban Ayupan be dismissed from the service for
abandonment of office, with prejudice to reinstatement in any government instrumentality or
government owned or controlled corporation.
6

We agree with the findings of the Executive Judge. The sheriff has the primary responsibility of
ensuring the speedy and efficient service of court processes and orders.
7
In the discharge of his duty
a high degree of professionalism is demanded.
8
For it cannot be overemphasized that a decision or
process that is left unexecuted or unserved because of the inefficiency, negligence, misconduct, or
ignorance of the law of those charged with their execution inevitably delays the administration of
justice and rightly deserves the condemnation of the parties who are prejudiced thereby.
9

First. Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the service of summons may be entrusted
to the sheriff.
10
He is required, within five days after service, to make a return, personally or by
registered mail, to the plaintiffs counsel, and to return the summons to the clerk who issued it,
together with the proof of service.
11
The sheriff has the duty to serve the process promptly and to
make a return of his service within a reasonable time. This is necessary in order for the court to
determine if the period for filing an answer has not yet expired.
12

In the present case, respondent failed to serve approximately 45 summonses and failed to make a
return on 18 summonses served as of October 22, 1999 (date of report of Atty. Talion). These
summonses were dated as early as October 27, 1997, with the latest ones bearing the date April 15,
1999. Although respondents absences started in July, 1999, it appears that he had been neglecting
his duties for nearly two years before that date. The Clerk of Court became aware of respondents
neglect when complaints started coming from litigants and two judges who threatened to cite her
(the Clerk of Court) for contempt of court.
Second. With respect to the petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, although Act No.
3135 does not provide the period during which the executing sheriff must act upon them, it
nevertheless behooved respondent as an officer of the court to act with reasonable dispatch on all
matters entrusted to him in order not to unduly delay the administration of justice.
13
Respondents
failure to perform his duty resulted in 196 petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure remaining pending for
so long that respondents inaction clearly constitutes gross neglect of duty.
Third. As for writs of execution, Rule 39, sec. 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
"Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be
satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court
and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the
judgment shall be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30)
days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires."
Although a writ of execution is effective for five years from the date of entry of the judgment,
14
the
sheriff tasked with its implementation must proceed with reasonable dispatch to execute it and to
make a return immediately. If it is not satisfied, he must make a report to the court stating the reason
for the failure of execution within thirty days after his receipt of the writ and make a report every 30
days thereafter until the judgment is satisfied.
15

In the case at bar, no return on a writ of execution received by respondent as early as July 10, 1997
has been made by him. About 18 of the writs he received in 1998 alone either remained unreturned
or unimplemented. His failure to implement or make a return of writs of execution he received in a
span of nearly two years constitutes gross neglect of duty which is likewise subject to disciplinary
action.
Fourth. With regard to respondents unauthorized absences, the Civil Service Law provides that
frequent or habitual unauthorized absences shall be ground for disciplinary action.
16
Any civil service
employee who incurs unauthorized absences in excess of the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave
credit under the Leave Law for at least three months in a semester or at least three consecutive
months during the year is considered habitually absent.
17

For absence to be considered authorized , the following general rules apply: (1) an application for
leave of absence of court personnel for one full day or more shall be submitted for action to the
proper head of agency five days in advance, whenever possible, of the effective date of such
leave;
18
(2) Sick leaves taken by court personnel in excess of five days must be accompanied by
medical certificates and the head of department or agency may determine whether the granting of
sick leave is proper under the circumstances;
19
and (3) Leaves of absence for any reason other than
serious illness of an officer or employee or any member of his immediate family must be contingent
upon the needs of the service.
20

Respondent complied with none of these requirements.1wphi1 During the first period of his absence in July
1999, when he incurred absences of 11 working days, he never submitted any medical certificate to
support his claim of illness. In August 1999, when he was absent for six working days, and from
September to October, when he did not report for work for 27 working days, he neither filed for an
application for leave nor gave any explanation for his absences in spite of orders issued by Atty.
Talion for him to do so. Thus, for four consecutive months in 1999, respondent exceeded the
allowable 2.5 days monthly authorized leave credits granted, which, under the Civil Service Rules, is
subject to disciplinary action.
Moreover, civil service employees who are absent for at least 30 days without leave are considered
absent without leave (AWOL) and shall be dropped from the service after due notice.
21
The notice
contemplated by this rule is not jurisdictional in nature and failure to give such notice by the
appropriate government office does not prevent the dropping of the employee concerned from the
government service. Staying away from ones regular employment in the government or remaining
on leave without proper approval is something that an employee can hardly be unaware of.
22

Here, after having incurred unauthorized absences of 44 working days from July to October 1999,
respondent filed an application for indefinite leave on November 18, 1999, which was not approved
by Judge Palabrica. Nevertheless, respondent stopped reporting for work from that date to the
present. Counting the number of days from November 18, 1999 to at least the date of the
submission by the OCA of the case to this Court for consideration on October 19, 2001, respondent
has been absent for more than one year and 10 months from the date of his application for indefinite
leave up to the present without attempting to return to work.
Respondents failure to serve 45 summonses and make a return on 18 served by him; to act upon
196 petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure; and to act upon 68 writs of execution in a span of
approximately a period of two years constitutes gross neglect of duty. This offense is punishable by
dismissal.
23
His unauthorized absences in excess of the allowable 2.5 monthly leave credits for four
consecutive months in 1999 is punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one year for
the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
24
As this is his first offense, a suspension of
six months and one day is proper. In addition, respondent is considered AWOL for being absent
from work for more than 30 days without leave and should be automatically dropped from the
service.
Under the Civil Service Rules, the penalty that should be imposed on an employee who, like
respondent, is guilty of two or more offenses is that corresponding to the most serious offense. The
rest of the offenses shall be considered as aggravating circumstances only.
25
Gross neglect of duty
is the most serious charge of which respondent is guilty. Hence, dismissal from the service is the
appropriate penalty to be imposed on him. The penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment
in government service.
26

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Esteban P. Ayupan is hereby found guilty of
gross neglect of duty, aggravated by unauthorized absences and absence without leave, and is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with the forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits
and with prejudice to his reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, including government owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Exh. A.
2
Exh. C.
3
TSN (Atty. Giselle G. Talion), December 28, 1999, pp. 6-13; Exhs. D, E, and F.
4
Exhs. G, G-1 to G-26, I, I-1 to I-25, K, K-1 to K-16.
5
Findings and Recommendations of Judge Palabrica, dated January 14, 2000, p. 4.
6
Administrative Matter for Agenda, dated October 19, 2001, p. 2.
7
De Castro vs. Santos, 198 SCRA 245 (1991).
8
Chan vs. Castillo, 238 SCRA 359 (1994).
9
Portes vs. Tepace, 267 SCRA 185 (1997).
10
RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, sec. 3.
11
Id., sec. 4.
12
De la Cruz vs. Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, 54 SCRA 398 (1973).
13
Cf. Casaje vs. Gatbalite, 331 SCRA 508 (2000); Viray vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA
468 (1998); Jumiovs. Egay-Eviota, 231 SCRA 551 (1994).
14
RULES OF COURT, rule 39, sec. 14, in relation to sec. 6 thereof.
15
See Casaje vs. Gatbalite, 331 SCRA 508 (2000); Viray vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA
468 (1998); Jumio vs. Egay-Eviota, 231 SCRA 551 (1994).
16
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, sec. 46(b)(14).
17
RULES IMPLEMENTING BOOK V OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292, Rule XIV, sec. 23
(q), par. 2.
18
MANUAL FOR CLERKS OF COURT, Chapter XIII, sec. C (1).
19
Id., sec. C (2).
20
Id., sec. C(3).
21
Id., Rule XVI, sec. 35.
22
Cf. Quezon vs. Borromeo, 149 SCRA 205 (1987).
23
RULES IMPLEMENTING BOOK V OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292, Rule XIV, sec.
23(b).
24
Id., Rule XIV, sec. 23(q).
25
Id., Rule XIV, sec. 17.
26
Id., Rule XIV, sec. 9.



EN BANC
G.R. No. 131392 February 6, 2002
CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI CITY represented herein by JEJOMAR C. BINAY in his
capacity as Mayor of Makati City, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and EUSEBIA R. GALZOTE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J .:
Is a government employee who has been ordered arrested and detained for a non-bailable offense
and for which he was suspended for his inability to report for work until the termination of his case,
still required to file a formal application for leave of absence to ensure his reinstatement upon his
acquittal and thus protect his security of tenure? Concomitantly, will his prolonged absence from
office for more than one (1) year automatically justify his being dropped from the rolls without prior
notice despite his being already placed under suspension by his employer until the termination of his
case, which finally resulted in his acquittal for lack of evidence?
EUSEBIA R. GALZOTE was employed as a lowly clerk in the service of the City Government of
Makati City. With her meager income she was the lone provider for her children. But her simple life
was disrupted abruptly when she was arrested without warrant and detained for more than three (3)
years for a crime she did not commit. Throughout her ordeal in detention she trusted the city
government that the suspension imposed on her was onlyuntil the final disposition of her case. As
she drew near her vindication she never did expect the worst to come to her. On the third year of her
detention the city government lifted her suspension, dropped her from the rolls without prior notice
and without her knowledge, much less gave her an opportunity to forthwith correct the omission of
an application for leave of absence belatedly laid on her.
Upon her acquittal for lack of evidence and her release from detention she was denied reinstatement
to her position. She was forced to seek recourse in the Civil Service Commission which ordered her
immediate reinstatement with back wages from 19 October 1994, the date when she presented
herself for reassumption of duties but was turned back by the city government, up to the time of her
actual reinstatement.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals, but private respondent was sustained and the petition was
dismissed. In other words, in both the Civil Service Commission
1
and the Court of Appeals,
2
private
respondent obtained favorable relief.
Plainly, the case of petitioner City Government of Makati City revolves around a rotunda of doubt, a
dilemma concerning the legal status and implication of its suspension of private respondent Eusebia
R. Galzote and theautomatic leave of absence espoused by the Civil Service Commission. Against
this concern is the punctilious adherence to technicality, the requirement that private respondent
should have filed an application for leave of absence in proper form. The instant case is therefore a
dispute between, at its worst, private respondent's substantial compliance with the standing rules,
and the City Government's insistence that the lowly clerk should have still gone through the
formalities of applying for leave despite her detention, of which petitioner had actual notice, and the
suspension order couched in simple language that she was being suspended until the final
disposition of her criminal case.
The meaning of her suspension until the final disposition of her case is that should her case be
dismissed she should be reinstated to her position with payment of back wages. She did not have to
apply for leave of absence since she was already suspended by her employer until her case would
be terminated. We have done justice to the workingman in the past; today we will do no less by
resolving all doubts in favor of the humble employee in faithful obeisance to the constitutional
mandate to afford full protection to labor.
3

What follows is the pathetic story of private respondent Eusebia R. Galzote as recorded by the Civil
Service Commission, adopted and sustained by the Court of Appeals: Private respondent was
employed as a clerk in the Department of Engineering and Public Works of Makati City.
4
On 6
September 1991 she was arrested without warrant and detained allegedly for kidnapping for ransom
with physical injuries, and thereafter subjected to inquest proceedings
5
with the criminal case
eventually docketed as Crim. Case No. 88357 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila.
6
Incarcerated from then on, she could not report for work as a result of which she was
suspended from office by petitioner City Government starting 9 September 1991 until the final
disposition of her case.
7
Unfortunately, however, the City Government thereafter changed its policy.
Without informing private respondent who was then already detained at the Rizal Provincial
Jail,
8
and even as her trial for the criminal case was going on, she was dropped from the rolls of
municipal employees effective 21 January 1993 for having been absent from work for more than one
(1) year without official leave.
9

Three (3) years later, or on 22 September 1994, private respondent Galzote was acquitted of the
crime charged. The trial court strongly noted the failure of the prosecution to prove any act
establishing her complicity in the crime, and thus ordered her immediate release from detention.
10

On 19 October 1994 she requested the Municipal Personnel Officer as well as Mayor Jejomar Binay,
both of petitioner city government, for the lifting of her suspension and for her reinstatement to her
position in accordance with the 9 September 1991 memorandum.
11
On 4 August 1995, or nearly a
year after she made her request for reinstatement from petitioner City Government and no action
was taken thereon, private respondent filed a letter-request with the CSC for the same
cause.
12
Consequently, in Resolution No. 960153 the CSC found merit in her submissions and
ordered her immediate reinstatement to the position of Clerk III with back wages from 19 October
1994, which was the day she presented herself as reporting for work after her detention, until her
actual resumption of duty.
13

The City Government of Makati City filed a Petition for Review of the Resolution of the CSC but the
same was denied by the Court of Appeals, thus sustaining the assailed Resolution of the CSC.
As may be gleaned from the pleadings of the parties, the issues are: (a) whether private respondent
Eusebia R. Galzote may be considered absent without leave; (b) whether due process had been
observed before she was dropped from the rolls; and, (c) whether she may be deemed to have
abandoned her position, hence, not entitled to reinstatement with back salaries for not having filed a
formal application for leave. Encapsulated, the issues may be reduced to whether private
respondent may be considered absent without leave or whether she abandoned her job as to justify
being dropped from the service for not filing a formal application for leave.
Petitioner would have private respondent declared on AWOL and faults her for failing to file an
application for leave of absence under Secs. 20
14
and 35
15
of the CSC Rules and rejects the CSC's
ruling of an "automatic leave of absence for the period of her detention" since the "current Civil
Service Law and Rules do not contain any specific provision on automatic leave of absence."
The Court believes that private respondent cannot be faulted for failing to file prior to her detention
an application for leave and obtain approval thereof. The records clearly show that she had been
advised three (3) days after her arrest, or on 9 September 1991, that petitioner City Government of
Makati City had placed her under suspension until the final disposition of her criminal case.
16
This act
of petitioner indubitably recognized private respondent's predicament and thus allowed her to forego
reporting for work during the pendency of her criminal case without the needless exercise of strict
formalities. At the very least, this official communication should be taken as an equivalent of a prior
approved leave of absence since it was her employer itself which placed her under suspension and
thus excused her from further formalities in applying for such leave. Moreover, the arrangement
bound the City Government to allow private respondent to return to her work after the termination of
her case, i.e., if acquitted of the criminal charge. This pledge sufficiently served as legitimate reason
for her to altogether dispense with the formal application for leave; there was no reason to, as in fact
it was not required, since she was for all practical purposes incapacitated or disabled to do so.
Indeed, private respondent did not have the least intention to go on AWOL from her post as Clerk III
of petitioner, for AWOL means the employee leaving or abandoning his post without justifiable
reason and without notifying his employer. In the instant case, private respondent had a valid reason
for failing to report for work as she was detained without bail. Hence, right after her release from
detention, and when finally able to do so, she presented herself to the Municipal Personnel Officer of
petitioner City Government to report for work. Certainly, had she been told that it was still necessary
for her to file an application for leave despite the 9 September 1991 assurance from petitioner,
private respondent would have lost no time in filing such piece of document. But the situation
momentarily suspending her from work persisted: petitioner City Government did not alter the modus
vivendi with private respondent and lulled her into believing that its commitment that her suspension
was only until the termination of her case was true and reliable. Under the circumstances private
respondent was in, prudence would have dictated petitioner, more particularly the incumbent city
executive, in patria potestas, to advise her that it was still necessary - although indeed unnecessary
and a useless ceremony - to file such application despite the suspension order, before depriving her
of her legitimate right to return to her position. Patria potestas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate,
consistere. Paternal power should consist or be exercised in affection, not in atrocity.
It is clear from the records that private respondent Galzote was arrested and detained without a
warrant on 6 September 1991 for which reason she and her co-accused were subjected immediately
to inquest proceedings. This fact is evident from the instant petition itself
17
and its attachments,
namely, the Information filed against them on 17 September 1991 as well as the Decision of the trial
court acquitting private respondent of kidnapping and physical injuries. Hence, her ordeal in jail
began on 6 September 1991 and ended only after her acquittal, thus leaving her no time to to attend
to the formality of filing a leave application.
But petitioner City Government would unceremoniously set aside its 9 September 1991 suspension
order claiming that it was superseded three (3) years later by a memorandum dropping her from the
rolls effective 21 January 1993 for absence "for more than one (1) year without official
leave."
18
Hence, the suspension order was void since there was no pending administrative charge
against private respondent so that she was not excused from filing an application for leave.
We do not agree. In placing private respondent under suspension until the final disposition of her
criminal case, the Municipal Personnel Officer acted with competence, so he presumably knew that
his order of suspension was not akin to either suspension as penalty or preventive suspension since
there was no administrative case against private respondent. As competence on the part of the MPO
is presumed, any error on his part should not prejudice private respondent, and that what he had in
mind was to consider her as being on leave of absence without pay and their employer-employee
relationship being merely deemed suspended, not severed, in the meanwhile. This construction of
the order of suspension is actually more consistent with logic as well as fairness and kindness to its
author, the MPO. Significantly, the idea of a suspended employer-employee relationship is widely
accepted in labor law to account for situations wherein laborers would have no work to perform for
causes not attributable to them.
19
We find no basis for denying the application of this principle to the
instant case which also involves a lowly worker in the public service.
Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Government's order of suspension, as we have no
reason to do so, much less retroactively apply such nullification to deprive private respondent of a
compelling and valid reason for not filing the leave application. For as we have held, a void act
though in law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless confers legitimacy upon past acts or omissions
done in reliance thereof.
20
Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its
being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.
21
It would indeed
be ghastly unfair to prevent private respondent from relying upon the order of suspension in lieu of a
formal leave application.
At any rate, statements are, or should be, construed against the one responsible for the confusion;
otherwise stated, petitioner must assume full responsibility for the consequences of its own act,
hence, should be made to answer for the mix-up of private respondent as regards the leave
application. At the very least, it should be considered estopped from claiming that its order of
suspension is void or that it did not excuse private respondent from filing an application for leave on
account of her incarceration. It is a fact that she relied upon this order, issued barely three (3) days
from the date of her arrest, and assumed that when the criminal case would be settled she could
return to work without need of any other prior act.
22
In Laurel v. Civil Service Commission we held -
The sole ground invoked by him for exemption from the rule on nepotism is, as above indicated: the
rule does not apply to designation - only to appointment. He changed his mind only after the public
respondent, in its Resolution No. 83-358, ruled that the "prohibitive mantle on nepotism would
include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly" and, more
specifically, only when he filed his motion to reconsider said resolution. Strictly speaking, estoppel
has bound petitioner to his prior admission. Per Article 1431 of the Civil Code, through estoppel an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
23

If it is true that the City Government of Makati City wanted to change its stance and consider the
suspension memorandum as an error, it should have required private respondent to file an
application for leave as it was its obligation to inform her of such requirement. In particular, the
subsequent memorandum dropping Galzote from the rolls effective 21 January 1993 should have
been sent to her at the Rizal Provincial Jail where she had been detained and where she could have
received it. This Court will not confer validity upon the later memorandum which violates due
process. As we ruled in Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission
24
-
It is the ruling of the respondent Civil Service Commission that the sending of the said notice to the
residence of petitioner constitutes "substantial" compliance with the demands of due process. The
ruling would have some allure if the address of petitioner in the United States was not known to the
officials of ATI and if his Philippine address was his last known address. But as stressed above, they
knew of petitioner's exact address in the United States and there appears no impediment for them to
send the notice in this correct address x x x x The disputed ruling cuts too deeply on petitioner's right
to continue his employment in the government and unduly dilutes the protection of due process. x x
x x Nothing less than strict compliance with the demands of due process should have been
demanded by the respondent Commission from the officials of ATI in light of the equities of the case.
Nor can we give our concurrence to the further ruling of the respondent Commission that the denial
of due process to the petitioner was cured by the publication of said notice in three (3) issues of the
Philippine Journal. Notice by publication might have been proper if the address of petitioner were
unknown. Since the officials of ATI knew the whereabouts of petitioner, they have no legal warrant to
notify him thru the newspapers.
We find no relevance to the reference of petitioner City Government to the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties as regards the service of the memorandum upon private respondent
which dropped her from the rolls. In the first place, the presumption would only cover the proposition
that the City Government did serve the memorandum at the house of private respondent. It does not
prove however that she received the memorandum or was sufficiently informed that she had been
dropped from the rolls. Still and all, the presumption stands on shaky foundation since, as noted by
the Court of Appeals, even the delivery of the memorandum to private respondent's house is of
doubtful veracity "in light of the non-submission by the petitioner of the corresponding proof of
service, i.e., the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and
manner of service."
25
Besides, petitioner City Government of Makati City had actual and official
knowledge of private respondent's incarceration by virtue of a valid process of detention (beginning
September 1991 until she was declared innocent of the charges in 1994) as obvious from the
admissions in the instant petition that left her no choice but to follow and obey, and even suffer in
silence, a lawful order of the court, although actually unjust to her. Petitioner's knowledge thereof,
which obliges it to send the notice to where private respondent was detained, cannot be denied.
Thus -
x x x x 2.02 On September 11, 1991, she was arrested on a charge of kidnapping with serious
physical injuries and consequently Criminal Case No. 88357 was filed against her at the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 166 x x x x 2.03 During the pendency of the criminal
case, Galzote remained in jail without filing any application for leave with the then Municipality of
Makati. On January 21, 1993 she was dropped from the rolls for her continued absence without
official leave for more than a year.
26

The attention of the Court is invited to the cases of Ramo v. Elefao
27
and Quezon v.
Borromeo,
28
which dwell on the immateriality of sending the notice to drop the employees concerned
from the rolls. But these cases, sadly, are not in point.
In Ramo the Dean of the Graduate Studies of the Leyte Normal School abandoned the deanship of
the school and transferred to the National Manpower and Youth Council from where she was
deriving her salary from the time she went on leave from the school. It must be stressed that it was
the Dean herself who by desire and choice refused to report for work at the Leyte Normal School,
her former employer.
The case of Quezon involved an erring Chief Nurse of the Iligan City Hospital who went on an
extended study leave despite the clear instructions for her to return to work immediately, and the
absence of any legal impediment to her prompt compliance with the order. Besides the voluntary act
of the Chief Nurse to refuse the employment, her employer did not also excuse her from filing a
leave application.
In other words, what the Ramo and Quezon cases resolved was the adamant refusal of the
employees concerned to return to work by their own choosing and the consistent demand of their
respective employers to immediately resume their duties.
In contrast, the instant case involves the technicality of private respondent's failure to file a leave
application on account of the representation of petitioner City Government to suspend her from
work until her criminal case was terminated. It also refers to the legal and physical impediment of a
pending criminal case that prevented her from reporting for work, a situation she did not wish for,
much less cherish. Being the sole provider of her children, the employment could not have but
meant so much to her and her family.
Clearly, therefore, Ramo and Quezon cases do not apply to the case before us. What should indeed
apply is our ruling in Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission
29
where we held that due process
demands serving upon the employee himself the notice dropping him from the rolls. In Gonzales, the
government sat on the application for leave for an unreasonable period of time and the only time it
acted on the application was to drop the employee unceremoniously from the rolls. This factual
setting in Gonzales fits snugly into the instant case where the City Government of Makati City slept
on the request of private respondent to reinstate her on the basis of the condition in the order
suspending her, i.e., her reinstatement upon her acquittal; instead, after three (3) long years, without
prior warning and out of the blue, petitioner acted adversely by dropping her from the service for not
filing an application for leave. The action of herein petitioner cuts too deeply into private respondent's
right to continue her employment in the government and unduly dilutes the constitutional guarantees
of security of tenure and due process.
The holding of the Civil Service Commission that private respondent was on automatic leave of
absence during the period of her detention must be sustained. The CSC is the constitutionally
mandated central personnel agency of the Government tasked to "establish a career service and
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and
courtesy in the civil service"
30
and "strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability."
31
Besides, the Administrative Code of 1987 further empowers the
CSC to "prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of
the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws,"
32
and for matters concerning leaves of absence, the
Code specifically vests the CSC to ordain -
Sec. 60. Leave of Absence. - Officers and employees in the Civil Service shall be entitled to leave of
absence, with or without pay, as may be provided by law and the rules and regulations of the Civil
Service Commission in the interest of the service.
Pursuant thereto the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 91-1631 dated 27 December 1991 entitled
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws
which it has several times amended through memorandum circulars. It devotes Rule XVI to leaves of
absence. Petitioner City Government relies upon Secs. 20 and 35 to debunk the CSC ruling of an
automatic leave of absence. Significantly, these provisions have been amended so that Sec. 20 of
the Civil Service Rules is now Sec. 52 of Rule XVI, on Leave of Absence, of Resolution No. 91-1631
dated 27 December 1991 as amended by CSC MC No. 41, s. 1998, and Sec. 35 is now Sec. 63 as
amended by CSC MC Nos. 41, s. 1998 and 14, s. 1999.
While Sec. 20 or Sec. 52 still reads -
Approval of vacation leave. - Leave of absence for any reason other than illness of an official or
employee or of any member of his immediate family must be contingent upon the needs of the
service. Hence, the grant of vacation leave shall be at the discretion of the head of
department/agency,
Sec. 35 or Sec. 63 now provides -
Effect of absences without approved leave. - An official or an employee who is continuously absent
without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on absence without
official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior
notice. He shall, however, be informed, at his address appearing on his 201 files or at his last known
written address, of his separation from the service, not later than five (5) days from its effectivity x x x
x
As a general rule Secs. 20 and 52, as well as Secs. 35 and 63, require an approved leave of
absence to avoid being on AWOL.
33
However, these provisions cannot be interpreted as exclusive
and referring only to one mode of securing the approval of a leave of absence which would require
an employee to apply for it, formalities and all, before exceeding thirty (30) days of absence in order
to avoid being dropped from the rolls.
34
There are, after all, other means of seeking and granting an
approved leave of absence, one of which is the CSC recognized rule ofautomatic leave of absence
under specified circumstances. As the CSC states in its assailed Resolution -
In a similar case (Cenon Vargas, CSC Resolution Nos. 94-2795 and 95-5559), the Commission said
-
When Mr. Vargas was in jail, his services were considered automatically suspended. He could not
be expected to file his corresponding application for leave of absence, because whether he likes it or
not he could not possibly report to work. He is considered on automatic leave of absence for the
period of his detention in jail.
Finally, Vargas had been acquitted of the criminal charges levelled against him. Since no separate
administrative case was filed against him, there is no basis to separate him from the service.
Based on the abovementioned decision, Galzote is excused from filing her leave of absence
because she could not report to work. She is therefore on automatic leave of absence for the period
of her detention there being no evidence to show that Galzote deliberately absented herself from
work. Besides, her act of requesting the Municipal Personnel Officer for reinstatement after she was
released from jail shows that she had no intention to go on AWOL.
35

As properly noted, CSC was only interpreting its own rules on leave of absence and not a statutory
provision
36
in coming up with this uniform rule. Undoubtedly, the CSC like any other agency has the
power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them
37
with its interpretation significantly
becoming part of the rules themselves. As observed in West Texas Compress & Warehouse Co. v.
Panhandle & S.F. Railing Co. -
In construing the above and similar antecedent rules bearing on the same subject, the railroad
commission of this state has, for many years, uniformly officially construed it to give to the railroad
company the right to designate and select the compress at which the cotton is to be compressed
either at origin, in transit or at destination. Since the commission is an instrumentality of the state,
exercising delegated powers, its orders are of the same force as would be a like enactment by the
Legislature. It therefore follows that the interpretation officially placed on the order or rule by the
commission becomes a part of the rule. Further, the rule is susceptible of no other
interpretation (underscoring supplied).
38

This principle is not new to us. In Geukeko v. Araneta
39
this Court upheld the interpretation of the
Department of Agriculture and Commerce of its own rules of procedure in suspending the period of
appeal even if such action was nowhere stated therein. We said -
The main question at issue hinges on the interpretation of Section 2 of the Lands Administrative
Order No. 6, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on May 1, 1934, providing
for the filing of appeals from decisions or orders of the Director of Lands to the said Department
Secretary, which reads as follows:
SEC. 2. APPEAL FROM DECISION OR ORDER OF THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION. An appeal shall lie from a decision of the Director of Lands to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce within a period of sixty (60) days to be counted from the
date the interested party received notice thereof unless a motion for reconsideration is filed within
the said period, in which case, appeal shall be made within sixty (60) days from his receipt of notice
of the order or decision of the Director of Lands disposing of the motion for reconsideration x x x x
This Lands Administrative Order No. 6 governing the promulgation of decisions and orders of the
Director of Lands and providing for the prescriptive period within which appeals may be interposed
was issued pursuant to the provisions of section 79(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, section 5
of Act No. 2874 and Act No. 3038. x x x x Looking at the question at issue in this case independently
of the aforecited authorities, it may be asked: After the civil cases filed by the sub-lessees were
thrown out of court, could they still invoke administrative relief by appealing to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources? Said Administrative official answers in the affirmative,
maintaining that the period of 60 days provided for by section 2 of the Lands Administrative Order
No. 6 aforequoted has not yet prescribed, it being the adopted policy of their office to consider the
filing of civil actions in court as suspending the running of said period. It must be remembered that
Lands Administrative Order No. 6 is in the nature of procedural rules promulgated by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the power bestowed on said administrative agency
to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the proper discharge and management of the
functions imposed by law upon said office. x x x x Recognizing the existence of such rule-making
authority, what is the weight of an interpretation given by an administrative agency to its own rules or
regulations? Authorities sustain the doctrine that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by
those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the Court construing such rule
or regulation, and such interpretation will be followed unless it appears to be clearly unreasonable or
arbitrary (42 Am. Jur. 431). It has also been said that:
An administrative body has power to interpret its own rules which have the force and effect of law,
and such an interpretation becomes part of the rule (Foley vs. Benedict, 122 Tex 193, 55 SW [2d]
805, 86 ALR 477). x x x x The contemporaneous construction of a statute (and similarly of rules and
regulations) by the executive officers of the government whose duty it is to execute it is entitled to
great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts (United
States vs. Philbrick, 120 U.S. 52, 30 L Ed. 559).
x x x x In this connection, We can also say that the interpretation given by the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the provisions of section 2 of Lands Administrative Order No. 6
appears to be reasonable for it merely reflects the intent of the law in placing the disposition of lands
within the Tambobong Estate in the hands of the officials of the Land Department (Executive Order
No. 376; Commonwealth Act No. 539; Lands Administrative Order No. R-3). The underlying idea
seems to be that those officials are considered in a better position to decide controversies regarding
the disposition of said Estate (underscoring supplied).
The same precept was enunciated in Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization
40
where we upheld the
action of the Commission on Audit (COA) in validating the sale of Petron Corporation to Aramco
Overseas Corporation on the basis of COA's interpretation of its own circular that set bidding and
audit guidelines on the disposal of government assets -
The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by
government offices and corporations, had upheld the validity and legality of the questioned
bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the
interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer (underscoring supplied).
Given the greater weight accorded to an agency's interpretation of its own rules than to its
understanding of the statute it seeks to implement, we simply cannot set aside the former on the
same grounds as we would overturn the latter. More specifically, in cases where the dispute
concerns the interpretation by an agency of its own rules, we should apply only these standards:
"Whether the delegation of power was valid; whether the regulation was within that delegation; and if
so, whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due process test."
41
An affirmative answer in
each of these questions should caution us from discarding the agency's interpretation of its own
rules.
To set aside the CSC ruling will not be consistent with the established principle above stated.
Rejecting the CSC ruling on an automatic leave of absence solely for want of a provision expressly
and specifically allowing such leave would erroneously repudiate the difference between the
agency's own understanding of its rules and its interpretation of a statute. The difference is important
and should not be glossed over to avoid compromising the authority of the CSC as the
constitutionally mandated central personnel agency of the Government. In this regard, the rule
of automatic leave of absence clearly falls within the constitutionally delegated power of the CSC
and is reasonable under the circumstances to address absences from work which are not
attributable to the concerned government employee. Verily, if petitioner City Government plainly
applied the proper standards, it would have easily implemented the CSCs institution of
an automatic leave of absence, and consequently avoided declaring private respondent on AWOL.
It is hinted that the purported automatic leave of absence is a non-existent rule hence CSC has no
power to interpret such non-existent provision; further, that the CSC has no power to provide for
exemptions since none is stated in the CSC rules.
If the rule on automatic leave of absence were already written in the CSC rules or truly
an existing provision therein, then there would have been no reason for the instant case to ensue
and be vigorously disputed. In fact, if such legal concept were already in place, the CSC would have
no basis for interpreting its rules since all it had to do was to implement them. Actually, what the
CSC interpreted in the case at bar were Secs. 20, 35 and other related provisions of the CSC rules
on the requirement of an approved leave of absence.
Section 20 of the CSC Rules allows absences even without prior approved leave, e.g., in case of
illness. Thus, "[l]eave of absence for any reason other than illness of an official or employee or of
any member of his immediate family must be contingent upon the needs of the service. Hence, the
grant of vacation leave shall be at the discretion of the head of department/agency." Obviously,
illness cannot be scheduled and is beyond the control of the absent employee so that contingency
upon the needs of the service would be irrelevant. It is enough that the employer be informed of the
absent employee's illness, which information is the effective substitute for a prior leave application.
But situations of illness are not the only instances of force majeure; other events beyond the control
of the employee may also force him to be absent from work, such as when the employee himself is
kidnapped or arrested and detained for alleged crimes. It is the latter cases, akin to predicaments of
illness, that the CSC sought to address in interpreting the CSC rules on leave of absence as
including or contemplating anautomatic leave of absence. In these items of force majeure, the
employee is excused from filing an application for leave of absence provided that he informs the
employer of the unfortunate event underlying his absence.
In the instant case, we believe that private respondent has sufficiently informed petitioner City
Government of her predicament for which no logical purpose arises for a prior leave application.
Significantly, the rule on automatic leave of absence is part and parcel of the authority to drop
employees from the rolls under Sec. 35 or Sec. 63 of the CSC Rules for it tempers the exercise of
such authority where the absences are beyond the control of the concerned employee. As explained
by CSC -
Dropping from the rolls of an employee who fails to file an application for leave during her absence is
a non-disciplinary measure provided for under Section 35, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 x x x x Be it noted that the main concept of
"dropping from the rolls" is the refusal of an employee to report for work or to go on absence without
official leave (AWOL) despite the employers notice to report. Such refusal to be a ground therefor is,
of course, anchored on the fact that there is no other impedimenton the part of the employee
concerned which would prevent him from filing said leave application (underscoring supplied).
42

Indeed no tinge of arbitrariness can be ascribed to the concept of automatic leave of absence. This
kind of leave of absence is the substantial equivalent in the public sector of our ruling in Magtoto v.
NLRC
43
where we considered a worker to have been on leave of absence without pay pending
resolution of a criminal complaint for rebellion against him. We ruled -
The employer tries to distance itself from the detention by stressing that the petitioner was dismissed
due to prolonged absence. However, Mr. Magtoto could not report for work because he was in a
prison cell. The detention cannot be divorced from prolonged absence. One caused the other. Since
the causes for the detention, which in turn gave the employer a ground to dismiss the petitioner,
proved to be non-existent, we rule that the termination was illegal and reinstatement is warranted x x
x x It was beyond the petitioner's power to limit the duration of his unfounded detention. It was a
matter purely within the discretion of the military authorities. It was then the contention of the military
that not even the courts of justice should inquire into the causes and the duration of detentions for
rebellion-related offenses x x x x Equitable considerations favor the petitioner. The employer is a
stable company with a large work force x x x. The petitioner is a mere clerk. It should not be difficult
to find another item for him. As between the employee and the employer, the latter is in a singularly
better position to shoulder the unfortunate consequences of the unfounded detention. Thus, the
remedy left for the petitioner is reinstatement to a substantially equivalent position x x x x"
(underscoring supplied).
44

The same concept may also be found in Sec. 677 of The Revised Manual Instructions to
Treasurers
45
-
The attendance of a witness in his own behalf, to secure his exoneration of charges or matter
alleged against him is attendance for his own benefit. If he is not under suspension, the time
consumed in such attendance shall be charged to his leave, if he has any. Otherwise he shall be
considered on leave without pay x x x x When the criminal charges filed are not the direct result of
an act performed by him in connection with his official duties, his forced absences from duty
resulting from his arrest and required attendance in court may not be considered official. He shall not
in such case be entitled to salary (underscoring supplied).
Neither do we doubt that the CSC has the power to allow exemptions from prior filing of leave
applications.1wphi 1 This power logically flows from the task of the CSC to regulate civil service in the
country as ordained in theConstitution and mandated in the Administrative Code of 1987. The CSC
Rules themselves (Sec. 20 or Sec. 35) do not limit the powers of the CSC in this regard to cases of
illness only. With reasonableness as the standard, the CSC is far from being presumptuous when it
states that other instances of force majeure (such as the arrest and detention of a civil servant for a
crime she did not commit) may excuse the prior filing of an approved leave of absence. This
determination is an exercise of the CSC's constitutional mandates - certainly these mandates are not
matters of mere excuses.
The case of private respondent Galzote is not the first time that this Court has done away with the
requirement of an approved leave of absence. In University of the Philippines v. Civil Service
Commission
46
we disregarded the literal import of Sec. 33
47
(equivalent of Secs. 35 and 63 above-
quoted) of Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules in recognition of UP's constitutionally
guaranteed academic freedom to allow the university to continue employing a teacher-employee
who had been on AWOL. UP teaches that although academic freedom is not written in the CSC
Rules on leave of absence, we can factor such freedom in establishing the validity of UP's action to
override it.1wphi 1 We therefore advocate equal treatment for CSC's reasonable implementation of its own
rules in the specific and actual case of private respondent, an exercise which like UP's academic
freedom also has theConstitution as its basis. Truly, if we could accept the exemption of UP from the
CSC Rules on grounds not stated therein, i.e. academic freedom, then equally, if not with more
reason, must we recognize the CSC's accepted authority to incorporate as part of the CSC Rules its
own interpretations thereof.
In two (2) other decisions of this Court, we treated with compassion an absence although without
prior leave for causes beyond the control of the absent employee. In Re: Pedro P. Tiongson,
48
we
ruled that "the misfortunes that were visited upon his family and which prevented him from attending
office were not of his own making and were beyond his control. It was but natural for him to move his
family in the face of danger from his son's enemies and when he was in the province, even if he
wanted to return, he could not do so on account of the floods."
49
InMakabuhay v. Manuel
50
we
recognized that an employee may be forced to go on leave even if he no longer has any leave
credits because of the administrative case that was filed against him.
Lastly, petitioner City Government cannot pin the blame on private respondent Galzote for her failure
to assume her work. Clearly, she reported for work as soon as she was free to do so, but was
unfortunately turned back by petitioner City Government. In locking her out of her job, the City
Government illegally deprived her of the opportunity to work and so must be held liable for such
unlawful action. All in all, we hold that private respondent must be reinstated as Clerk III or a position
of equivalent rank and compensation in the City Government. She must also be paid back wages
and other benefits lawfully due her counted from 19 October 1994 when she presented herself for
resumption of duties but was refused. This is very much consistent with the elementary rule that a
government official or employee who had been illegally dismissed and whose reinstatement had
later been ordered is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights
and privileges that should accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held.1wphi1
Needless to stress, if private respondent's request for reinstatement with back wages is granted, the
benefits she will derived will not even be enough to compensate her for the untold sufferings and
privations she went through while in jail, away from her growing children. Perhaps only a miracle
could have provided for them in her forced absence. Now we say, enough should be enough.
Under RA 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in
the Implementation of Government Reorganization) and RA 7160 (The Local Government Code of
1991), civil servants who are found illegally dismissed or retrenched are entitled to full pay for the
period of their separation.
Our final point. An efficient and honest bureaucracy is never inconsistent with the emphasis on and
the recognition of the basic rights and privileges of our civil servants or, for that matter, the
constitutional mandates of the Civil Service Commission. In fact only from an enlightened corps of
government workers and an effective CSC grows the professionalization of the bureaucracy. Indeed
the government cannot be left in the lurch; but neither could we decree that government personnel
be separated from their jobs indiscriminately regardless of fault. The fine line between these
concerns may be difficult to clearly draw but if we only exerted extra effort to rebel against the allure
of legal over-simplification, justice would have been done where it is truly due.
WHEREFORE, the petition of the City Government of Makati City is DENIED and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming Resolution No. 960153 of the Civil Service Commission ordering the
immediate reinstatement of private respondent EUSEBIA R. GALZOTE as Clerk III or a position of
equivalent rank and compensation in the rank and file service of petitioner City Government of
Makati City with back wages from 19 October 1994 up to the time of her actual reinstatement is
likewise AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Carpio, JJ., join the dissent of J. Panganiban.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J., see dissenting opinion.
Footnotes
1
Resolution No. 960153, 9 January 1996, penned by CSC Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon,
concurred in by Commissioners Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr. and Thelma P. Gaminde; Rollo, pp. 57-60
2
Decision penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., concurred in by Associate Justices
Gloria C. Paras and Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, CA-G.R. SP No. 40195, Rollo, pp. 8-16.
3
Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par. 1; Art. II, Sec. 18.
4
Rollo, p. 24.
5
Docketed as I.S. No. 7429; Id., p. 39-40
6
Crim. Case No. 88357 was raffled to RTC-Br. 166, Pasig, Metro Manila; id., pp. 39-40, 45.
7
Id., p. 50.
8
Id., p. 68.
9
Id., pp. 63-64.
10
Id., pp. 47-48.
11
Id., pp. 49, 50-51.
12
Id., pp. 52-53.
13
Id., pp. 57, 59-60.
14
Now Sec. 52 of Rule XVI, Leave of Absence, of Res. No. 91-1631 dated 27 December 1991, as
amended by CSC MC No. 41, s. 1998.
15
Now Sec. 63 of Rule XVI, Leave of Absence, of Res. No. 91-1631 dated 27 December 1991, as
amended by CSC MC Nos. 41, s. 1998 and 14, s. 1999.
16
Rollo, p. 50.
17
In par. 2.02 of the Petition, the City Government avers that "On September 11, 1991, she was
arrested on a charge of kidnapping with serious physical injuries and consequently Criminal Case
No. 88357 was filed against her at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 166." But
cross-referred to the fact that private respondent was arrested sans an arrest warrant and later
subjected to inquest proceedings, the arrest could not have been made on 11 September 1991, the
date of the Information, but certainly earlier or on 6 September 1991.
18
Rollo, pp. 63-64.
19
See e.g., Visayan Stevedore Transportation Company v. Court of Industrial Relation, No. L-21696,
25 February 1967, 19 SCRA 426; Tomas Lao Construction v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116781, 5 September
1997, 278 SCRA 716.
20
De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 231127, 29 April 1971, 38 SCRA 429;
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, G.R. No. 28113, 28 March 1969, 27 SCRA 545.
21
De Agbayani, supra, p. 435.
22
Rollo, p. 49.
23
G.R. No. 71562, 28 October 1991, 203 SCRA 195, 203-204.
24
G.R. No. 105752, 2 September 1993, 226 SCRA 66, 71.
25
Rollo, pp. 68-69.
26
Id., p. 25.
27
G.R. No. 556293, 30 July 1981, 106 SCRA 221, 234.
28
G.R. No. 70953, 9 April 1987, 149 SCRA 205, 216.
29
See Note 24.
30
Const., Art. IX-B, Sec. 3.
31
Ibid.
32
Bk. V, I (A), Ch. 3, Sec. 12.
33
Decision, p. 8.
34
Id., p. 7.
35
Rollo, pp. 58-59.
36
As a matter of fact, Sec. 60 of the Administrative Code does not provide for any rule on leave of
absence other than that civil servants are entitled to leaves of absence.
37
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States of America, 288 U.S. 294, 325, 77 L.ed. 796,
812 (1933).
38
15 S.W. (2d) 558, 560 (1929); Folley v. Benedict, 55 S.W. (2d) 805, 808 (1932). "Since the board
of regents exercises delegated powers, its rules are of the Legislature, and its official interpretation
placed upon the rule so enacted becomes a part of the rule."
39
No. L-10182, 24 December 1957.
40
G.R. No. 112399, 14 July 1995, 246 SCRA 334, 352 - 353.
41
Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Com., 151 P2d 467, 472 (1944).
42
Rollo, p. 80.
43
G.R. No. 63370, 18 November 1985, 140 SCRA 58.
44
Id., pp. 64-66.
45
Cited in R.G. Martin, II The Revised Administrative Code with Annotations (1961), pp. 19-20.
46
G.R. No. 132860, 3 April 2001; Decision penned by Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban.
47
This provision states: "Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than
one year. If an employee who is on leave without pay for any reason

fails to return to duty at the
expiration of one year from the effective date of such leave, he shall be considered automatically
separated from the service; Provided, that he shall, within a reasonable time before the expiration of
his one year leave of absence without pay, be notified in writing of the expiration thereof with a
warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date, he will be dropped from the service."
48
A.M. No. T-344, 22 July 1975, 65 SCRA 181.
49
Id., p. 184.
50
No. L-40872, 29 December 1980, 101 SCRA 834, 840.
















G.R. No. 131392 February 6, 2002
CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI CITY represented herein by JEJOMAR C. BINAY in his
capacity as Mayor of Makati City, Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and EUSEBIA R. GALZOTE, Respondents.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J .:
I concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, in finding for private
respondent Eusebia R. Galzote; however, I would limit the award of back salaries to five years
conformably with the pronouncement of this court in a long line of cases (Cristobal vs. Melchor, 78
SCRA 175; Gementiza vs. CA, 113 SCRA 477; Ginzon vs. Municipality of Murcia, 158 SCRA 1;
Laganapan vs. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377; San Luis vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258; Tan, Jr. vs. Office of the
President, 229 SCRA 677; Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 619; Jacinto vs. Court of
Appeals, 281 SCRA 657; Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, 306 SCRA 287; and Caniete vs. Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, 333 SCRA 849, as opposed to Garcia vs. Chairman, Commission on
Audit, 226 SCRA 356).


CONCURRING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J .:
I join Justice Bellosillo in his well-crafted and logically compelling ponencia. It is a consecrated legal
axiom that the reason of the law is the life of the law. Ratio legis est anima, which means the reason
of the law is its soul.
1
The reason of a law may cease in a given situation. This may happen when the
purpose of the law sought to be achieved is accomplished, or the mischief sought to be repressed is
prevented, by an act or event independent of the statute itself. The law, in such a case, though
remaining in force and effect, finds no application in the given situation.
2
This truism hold true in the
case at bar.
Petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Civil Service Commission
which directed petitioner to reinstate private respondent. Petitioner maintains that the dismissal of
private respondent was justified as it insists on the strict application of the civil service rules on
Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL):
Sec. 15. Applications for vacation leave of absence for one full day or more shall be submitted on
the prescribed form for action by the proper chief agency in advance, whenever possible, of the
effective date of such leave.
Sec. 20. Leave of absence for any reason other than illness of an officer or employee or of any
member of his family must be contingent upon the need of the service. Hence, the grant of vacation
leave shall be at the discretion of the head of department/agency.
Sec. 21. Any violation of the leave laws, rules or regulations, or any misrepresentation or deception
in connection with an application for leave, shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
Sec. 35. Officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave
are considered on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) and shall be dropped from the service after due
notice. However, when the exigencies of the service require the immediate presence and he
fails/refuses to return to the service, the head of office may drop him for the service even prior to the
expiration of the 30-day period abovestated.
3

Invoking Sections 20 and 35 quoted above, petitioner argues that any absence without leave, for
whatever cause or reason, is a ground for dropping of the officer or employee from the service.
Petitioners contention is untenable. The requirement for leave application contemplated in Sections
20 and 35 cannot apply to extraordinary or abnormal situations such as the one private respondent
was confronted with. Private respondents failure to apply for leave was not because of her "whim,"
"defiance" or "impertinence," as petitioner put it, but due to circumstances beyond her control. Her
absence from work was clearly involuntary. It is undisputed that she was incarcerated and was not
allowed to post bail. The criminal charge against her, kidnapping with serious physical injuries, was
grave and carried with it the capital penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Her life and liberty were
then at stake. During that time, private respondent could not obviously be expected to think of the
formality of filing an application for leave, which would have been absurd if she did in the first place!
In the situation she was in, she was not in the position to apply for leave of absence, nor for her
superiors to grant it.
These were the circumstances that were taken into account by the CSC when it held that private
respondent cannot be considered on AWOL as she was considered on "automatic" leave of
absence. The CSC recognized that the policy on absence without leave is not a hard and fast rule
and admits of some exceptions such as the case of private respondent. Accordingly, the CSC found
in favor of private respondent as it cited its previous ruling in a case involving substantially similar
facts:
In a similar case (Cenon A. Vargas, CSC Resolution Nos. 94-2795; 95-5559), the Commission said:
When Mr. Vargas was in jail, his services were considered automatically suspended. He could not
be expected to file his corresponding application for leave of absence, because whether he likes it or
not he could not possibly report to work. He is considered on automatic leave of absence for the
period of his detention on jail.
Finally, Vargas had been acquitted of the criminal charges leveled against him. Since no separate
administrative case was filed against him, there is no basis to separate him from the service.
Based on the abovementioned decision, Galzote is excused from filing her leave of absence
because she could not report to work. She is therefore, on automatic leave of absence for the period
of her detention there being no evidence to show that Galzote deliberately absented herself from
work. Besides, her act of requesting the Municipal Personnel Officer for reinstatement after she was
released from jail show the she had no intention to go on AWOL.
4

This interpretation of the CSC of the pertinent civil service rules is entitled to great weight and
respect.
5

Likewise, I agree with the CA that petitioners act of suspending private respondent is incongruous to
its position that private respondent went on AWOL. As the CA rhetorically asked, "For how can one
who is suspended go on leave?"
6

Petitioner, tried to downplay this inconsistency by stating that private respondents suspension was
lifted on December 8, 1991 as indicated in her employment record. It does not appear from the
records, however, that private respondent was even informed of the purported lifting of her
suspension. Private respondents ignorance thereof is evident from her letter-request for
reinstatement, dated October 19, 1994, which is quoted below in part:
In view thereof, may I respectfully request that the suspension issued on 9 September 1991 be lifted
and that the undersigned be allowed to resume position as Clerk III, in the Department of
Engineering and Public Works in this municipality.
7

However, petitioner now advances the view that the suspension was erroneous and void as there
was then no administrative charge against private respondent. In other words, the suspension was
without basis. Hence, according to petitioner, private respondent should have filed an application for
leave as she was not excused therefrom under the law. To my mind, this ratiocination is quite unfair.
How would private respondent, not being well versed in the fine points of the law, to know that her
suspension was invalid? Since she was already under suspension, why would she still file an
application for leave for the duration thereof? Her letter to Hon. Jejomar Binay is revealing:
On the second ground cited by Atty. NERY,
8
the undersigned, in view of the suspension order,
assumed that there is no need on her part to file an application for leave of absence.
It is very illogical on the part of an individual who is suspended from work to file a leave of absence
during the duration of the suspension.
9

On the other hand, the manner by which she was dropped from the roll violated due process. The
fundamental rule of due process requires that a person be accorded notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
10
These requisites were not observed in private respondents case. Private respondent was
neither notified of the charge against her nor given the opportunity to present her side.
Even the service of termination, dated January 21, 1993, was defective. The same was served at the
home address of private respondent, when petitioner fully knew that at that time private respondent
was still in prison. The CA aptly applied our ruling in Gonzales vs. Civil Service Commission
11
on this
point:
It is the ruling of the respondent Civil Service Commission that the sending of the said notice to the
residence of the petitioner constitutes "substantial" compliance with the demands of due process.
The ruling would have some allure if the address of petitioner in the United States was not known to
the officials of ATI and if his Philippine address was his last known address. But as stressed above,
they knew of petitioners exact address in the United States and there appears no impediment for
them to send the notice in this correct address. Petitioner, be it noted, was not moving from one
residence to another, to avoid service of legal notices. They were aware that petitioner was not
momentarily staying in his address in Quezon City where he could receive said notice. Under the
circumstances, it is grave abuse of discretion for the respondent Commission to hold that there was
"substantial" compliance with the notice requirement of the due process. The disputed ruling cuts too
deeply on petitioners right to continue his employment in the government and unduly dilutes the
protection of due process.
12

Finally, petitioners allegation that private respondent abandoned her position cannot hold water. The
rule on abandonment by a public employee is explained in this manner:
Abandonment of the duties of a position is generally regarded as a form of resignation, having all the
consequences of a voluntary resignation. The rule is: A position is held upon the implied condition
that the employee will diligently and faithfully perform the duties assigned to him. Where it appears
that the employee refuses or neglects to perform the duties of his position for so long a period of
time and under such circumstances as to reasonably warrant the presumption that he does not
desire or intend to perform the duties of his position he will be held to have abandoned it, not only
where his refusal to perform was willful but also where, though not intending to vacate the position,
he in good faith but mistakenly supposed he had no right to it. While an abandonment of a position
by an employee must be total and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate its absolute
relinquishment, whether or not a position has been abandoned is dependent on his acts and conduct
rather than his declared intention. The law will infer an abandonment where the acts and conduct of
the employee indicate that he has completely relinquished the duties of his position.
13

In other words, in order to constitute abandonment, it is necessary to show that the incumbent has
manifested a clear intention to abandon the office and its duties, although such intention may be
inferred from conduct.
14
Further, an office cannot be abandoned without the intention by the officer to
relinquish the same.
15
Private respondents absence from work, albeit prolonged, was certainly not
due to any intention to relinquish her duties. Rather, as earlier explained, she was wrongfully
implicated and imprisoned for a crime that she did not commit. Upon her acquittal, private
respondents act of immediately requesting that she be reinstated to her position negates any claim
that she abandoned the same.
Private respondent had been unjustifiably dismissed from the service due to petitioners rigid and
unreasonable application of the civil service rules. Faced with a choice between a decision that will
serve justice and another that will deny it because of a too-strict interpretation of the law, the Court,
as in this case, will resolve in favor of the former, for the ultimate end of the law is justice.
16
Indeed,
"[a]s judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence."
17

For the foregoing reasons, I concur with the majority opinion and vote to DENY the petition.


Footnotes
1
Concurring opinion of Justice Perfecto in Ocampo Vda. De Gomez vs. Government
Insurance Board, 78 Phil. 217 (1947) citing Bocobo, Cult of Legalism.
2
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. (1990).
3
Rule XVI, omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
4
CSC Resolution No. 960153, January 6, 1996, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 58-59.
5
Divinagracia vs. Sto. Tomas, 244 SCRA 595 (1995).
6
CA Decision, October 27, 1997, p. 5.; Rollo, p. 66.
7
Records, p. 13.
8
One of the legal officers in petitioners Office of the Municipal Attorney and Chief of Legal
Division.
9
See Note 3, p. 15.
10
Rubenecia vs. Civil Service Commission, 244 SCRA 640 (1995).
11
226 SCRA 66 (1993).
12
Ibid., p. 71.
13
State of Nebraska v. City of Scottsbluff, 100 N.W. 2d 202 (1960) citing Mechem on Public
Officers, 435, p. 278.
14
State v. Green, 175 S.W.2d 575 (1943).
15
Ibid.
16
Pangan vs. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 375 (1988).
17
Alonzo vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 259 (1987).

DISSENTING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J .:
With due respect, I dissent from the ponencia penned by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo. I believe
that, on the basis of applicable laws and rules, the Makati City government is correct in contending
(1) that Respondent Eusebia R. Galzote should be deemed absent without leave (AWOL) and
dropped from the roll of employees, and (2) that she was not deprived of due process.
1. Galzote Was AWOL
The ponencia of Justice Bellosillo upholds the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission
which considered Galzote "excused from filing her application for leave of absence because she
could not report [for] work. She is therefore on automatic leave of absence for the period of her
detention xxx."
1

I respectfully submit that this holding will not stand scrutiny and analysis.
No Automatic
Leave of Absence
To begin with, the current Civil Service Law and Rules do not contain any provision on automatic
leaves of absence. This is not disputed. The Rules, inter alia, unmistakably state that government
employees who are AWOL for at least 30 days shall be dropped from the service:
"Sec. 35. Officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave
are considered on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) and shall be dropped from the service after due
notice. However, when the exigencies of the service require his immediate presence and he
fails/refuses to return to the service, the head of office may drop him from the service even prior to
the expiration of the thirty (30) day period abovestated."
In providing for absence without approved leave, the above regulation makes no distinction or
qualification. It gives no regard for the reason for the absence. It simply states that an employee who
fails to report continuously for at least thirty days without an approved leave is considered absent
without leave.
Moreover, Section 20 of the Rules states that the approval of a leave of absence is "contingent on
the needs of the service."
"Sec. 20. Leave of absence for any reason other than illness of an officer or employee or of any
member of his immediate family must be contingent upon the needs of the service. Hence, the grant
of vacation leave shall be at the discretion of the head of department/agency."
Clearly, the approval of a leave for any reason other than the illness of an officer or employee, or of
any member of that employees immediate family, cannot be presumed. To stress, it is granted only
after evaluation of the "needs of the service." Thus to secure such approval, it becomes necessary
for one to file an application for it before exceeding 30 days of absence in order to avoid being
dropped from the rolls. There being no specific or clear-cut provision allowing an automatic leave of
absence, the above-quoted rule forecloses the possibility of such leave, even on the ground of
incarceration. After all, an incarcerated person is not prevented from communicating with the outside
world.
In this case, since Galzote did not file an application for any type of leave -- whether sick leave,
vacation leave or leave without pay -- she cannot be said to have an approved leave.
True, she could not have physically reported for work during her incarceration. However, there was
nothing to stop her from writing to petitioner, informing it of her plight and applying for leave. Even if
she was deprived of her liberty, she retained the capacity to inform petitioner that she was still
interested in her job. That information was necessary to enable the government to take appropriate
measures to ensure the smooth delivery of its services to the public.
The government cannot be left in the lurch. Public service would suffer if the position of a
government employee, who just disappears without a word, were be left vacant for an indefinite
period of time. "Public office requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. x x x. A public office is
a public trust; and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency."
2
Every public employee is
bound to xxx act primarily for the benefit of the public.
3
Consequently, private respondents
nonchalance with respect to her duties as a government employee should not be countenanced.
Over and above the Civil Service Rules, the law -- EO 292
4
-- provides:
"Sec. 60. Leave of Absence. Officers and employees in the Civil Service shall be entitled to leave
of absence, with or without pay, as may be provided by law and the rules and regulations of the Civil
Service Commission in the interest of the service.
The law is crystal clear. The only leave of absence that a civil service employee like Galzote is
entitled to is that which may be provided by law, rules and regulations. Neither the law nor the rules
and regulations of the CSC provide for automatic leaves of absence.
More important, the law itself, while granting leaves of absence, still considers the grant subservient
to the "interest of the service." Thus, as between the ponencias interpretation that would prejudice
the government service and an interpretation that would promote and enhance it, surely the latter
should be upheld.
As can be seen from the legal provisions on leaves, it was the duty of Galzote to appraise the
government of her inability to report for work. Having been absent for more than 30 days without an
approved leave, she was clearly AWOL. Pursuant to the Civil Service Law and Rules, she should be
dropped from the service. The rule of law requires no less.
The majority faults the Makati government for its "punctilious adherence to technicality" in requiring
observance of the rule on leaves of absence. I respectfully submit that an application for leave is not
a mere formality; it is not a "useless ceremony" as the majority calls it. It is essential to the proper
delivery of service to the public. If the government employees are given absolute discretion to be
absent on their mere say-so, without an approved leave, then the efficiency of public service will
depend on the whim of the individual employee.
Much is also being argued about the acquittal of Galzote -- that because she was released from
detention, then she should ipso facto be returned to her old job and given back pay. This is clearly
untenable. Respondents entanglement in the crime of kidnapping was not instigated by petitioner.
The criminal charge was not the reason for the loss of her employment. She was not dropped from
the rolls because of the pending criminal case. She lost her job because of her unexplained absence
for several years -- her absence without an approved leave. In short, she was dropped from the rolls
because she was AWOL.
Interpretation Refers Only
to Extant Laws and Rules
The ponencia also contends that the Civil Service Commission is granted sufficient residual authority
via its power of "interpreting" its own rules, to allow "automatic" leaves of absence. I disagree. How
can the Commission "interpret" a nonexisting provision? It is undisputed that the CSC Law and
Rules do not provide for an "automatic" leave. Construction or interpretation is resorted to only in
case of doubt on how to understand an existing legal provision. In the present case however, there
is no room for doubt: very clearly, the law and the rules do not provide for "automatic" leaves of
absences. What is there to interpret?
The Court, in a number of cases, has always adhered to the well-settled rule that "when the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but
only for application."
5
Indeed, "a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected to appear
in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein."
6
Verily, "[o]urs is not the duty nor the
power to amend the statute, which by the way, presents no interstitial space wherein to insert, in the
words of Cardozo, judge-made innovations."
7

In People v. Maceran,
8
the Court through then Justice (later Chief Justice) Ramon C. Aquino
explained the limitations of administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority, as follows:
"Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general supervisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs.
Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs.
Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30,
1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA
660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
"The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry
into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376,
382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor, 69
Phil. 319; Wise & Co., vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar vs. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-
27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349)."
9

This principle has been reiterated by the Court in Shell Philippines v. Central Bank of the
Philippines
10
and Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA.
11

Applying this principle to the instant case, I believe that the CSC has no power to interpret an
inexistent rule, especially if such "interpretation" takes away the provision of Section 60 of EO 292
which mandates that leaves of absence shall be allowed only "in the interest of the service" --
meaning, approval cannot be presumed but may be granted only after considering "the exigencies of
government service."
Incongruent Citations
The ponencia rules that Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission
12
"fits snugly into the instant case." I
disagree. Gonzales involves the failure of the officials of the Agriculture Training Institute to act on
the request for leave of absence without pay of therein petitioner, a government employee who has
rendered 36 years of his life to public service and who received two merit awards for his continuous,
dedicated, and faithful service in the government. In the present case, respondent who was charged
with the heinous crime of kidnapping with serious physical injuries and who was acquitted "on
reasonable doubt," did not apply for a leave of absence. This is precisely the problem here --
respondent did not apply for any leave, whether with or without pay. On the other hand, the issue in
Gonzales involved the refusal of his superiors to approve his application. Gonzales did not pass
upon the critical issue of automatic leaves. How then can Gonzales "fits snugly" in the present one?
The majority also insists that in University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,
13
-- a
Decision I had the honor of writing -- this court allowed UP to continue employing a teacher who had
gone AWOL; thus, the ponencia opines that the same token, we should also allow herein private
respondent -- who was also AWOL -- to resume her employment.
Again, I disagree. The cited case was decided on the basis of UPs academic freedom to select its
own teaching faculty. Hence, it should be exempted from the scope of CSC Rules. In the present
case, academic freedom is NOT involved at all. Herein Petition refers to an ordinary employee of the
Makati government -- not to a teaching personnel of the State University, who has been the recipient
of scholarship grants and whose continuation in UPs faculty roster is thus "in the interest of the
service." I stress that it was UP, the employer, which wanted to retain the teacher; here, it is the
unwanted employee who is insisting on her employment. At bottom, the facts of the present
proceedings are simply incongruent with those of the cited case.
Galzotes Suspension
Was Not Valid
The ponencia also asserts that there was no need for Galzote to file an application for leave, since
the "city government of Makati had placed her under suspension."
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals,
14
this Court has ruled that preventive suspension is valid only as
an incident in a pending administrative investigation.
"Section 51 of Executive Order No. 292 provides that [t]he proper disciplining authority may
preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the
respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
"Under the aforesaid provision, it is the nature of the charge against an officer or employee which
determined whether he may be placed under preventive suspension."
In the present case, there is no pending administrative investigation involving dishonesty, oppression
or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty. Neither was there, on September 9,
1991, any charge against Galzote that would warrant her removal for the service. Accordingly, the
"suspension" imposed on her was clearly erroneous and void. Consequently, she was not excused
from filing an application for leave.
The majority claims that to attribute to Galzote knowledge of the nullity of her suspension is "too
harsh" on a "lowly clerk." Suffice it to say that "ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith."
15

Assuming for the sake of argument that Galzotes preventive suspension was valid or that the Makati
government is, as argued by the majority, "estopped from claiming that its order of suspension is
void," still it is hornbook doctrine under Section 52 of the Administrative Code that a preventive
suspension is valid only for "a period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension."
At best then, Galzote can seek shelter in this void suspension order only for 90 days. Thereafter, she
should have applied for the required leave of absence. Since her suspension was only from
September 9, 1991 to December 8, 1991, she could indeed be dropped from the service thirty days
after that date for being AWOL.
Finally, the appealed CA Decision requires the government to give back pay to respondent for the
many years she did not work, the years she was unheard from, the years during which another
employee performed what she should have done. This is most unfair. The Makati government is
being made to pay for the absent employees rank negligence or failure in applying for a leave of
absence.
2. Galzote Was Accorded Due Process
Section 35 of the Civil Service Rules provides that an employee who is on AWOL "shall be dropped
from the service after due notice."
In this case, petitioner sent Galzote a letter dated January 21, 1993, informing her that she had been
reported absent without leave for over a year, for which reason she was dropped from the rolls. That
letter was delivered to her house. She did not respond to, much less contest, this letter.
The Court of Appeals assumed that petitioner knew of the continued incarceration of Galzote and
thus opined that it knew her address to be the Rizal Provincial Jail, Pasig, Metro Manila, as of
January 21, 1993. An examination of the records, however, shows a total absence of support for
such assumption. It is undisputed that she had not filed any application for leave of absence. It
therefore follows that petitioner had no record of the reason for her continued absence.
It should be considered further that petitioner is a public corporation. Thus, to expect it -- specially its
many officials -- to take a special interest in, know, and keep track of the whereabouts of Galzote,
would be unreasonable and unjustly burdensome on its part, when she herself did not bother to
inform it of her situation. She was merely one of its many thousand employees. For it to rely on its
records in ascertaining where to address notices to its numerous employees would be more in
accord with reason and the exigencies of the public service. Consequently, the letter addressed to
private respondent and delivered to her house, informing her that she was considered AWOL was
due notice to her.
Finally, in Quezon v. Borromeo,
16
this Court en banc -- speaking through the learned Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano -- has unanimously ruled that the notice contemplated by the Civil Service
Rules is not jurisdictional in nature and the failure to give such notice does not prevent the dropping
of the employee concerned from the government service.1wphi1 Said the Court:
"We read Isberto and Ramo to have held, and in any case we now so hold, that the written notice
contemplated in Rule XVI, Section 33 is not jurisdictional in nature and that the failure to give such
notice by the appropriate government office does not prevent the dropping of the employee
concerned from the government service. In the nature of things, staying away from ones regular
employment in the government or remaining on leave without pay is something that an employee
can scarcely be unaware of."
EPILOGUE
OVER AND ABOVE the legalisms debated in the ponencia and in this opinion is the judicial policy of
upholding public service. Our Ethical Standards Law requires public officials and employees to
observe "utmost integrity and strictest discipline." They cannot be allowed to just "disappear" from
their jobs and then, after many years, claim that their absence was "due to circumstances beyond
their control."
Indeed, government service would greatly suffer if public servants are allowed unbridled liberty in
finding excuses for the violation of simple rules. In the present case, respondent was not prevented
by the alleged "circumstances beyond her control" from writing her superiors and advising them of
her desire to resume work after her incarceration.
Why should public service be prejudiced by her unexcused failure to apply for a legally required
leave of absence? It must be stressed that approval of a leave application is not automatic, but is
subject to the discretion of competent authorities, depending on the exigencies of the service. So,
how can a leave be ever automatic, especially here where no application was even filed? Approved
cannot be presumed.
What is more, the appealed CA Decision requires the government to give back pay to respondent for
the many years she did not work, the years she was unheard from and the years that another person
performed what she should have done.
The ponencia holds that the "back pay and benefits she would receive will not even be enough to
compensate her for the untold sufferings and privations she went through while in jail." This tear-
jerking rhetoric, with all due respect, is misplaced. I stress that the Makati government had
absolutely nothing to do with her incarceration. Why should it pay for such alleged "untold
sufferings"? Let it be remembered that she was acquitted "on reasonable doubt," not because of any
finding that she did not participate in the crime. If compensation is due her, then it should come from
those who caused her alleged "privations" -- from those who "maliciously prosecuted" her if any --
not from her clearly innocent employer. This is just and fair.
I believe that the better policy is to uphold public service, discipline and integrity. No work, no pay.
No application, no approval. No leave, no benefits. The rule of law requires no less.


Footnotes
1
CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 13.
2
Makati Movement Against Graft and Corruption v. Dumlao, 247 SCRA 108, August 9, 1995,
Kapunan, J.
3
Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright and Segado, 53 Phil 613, 625, September 28, 1929,
Villamor, J.
4
Section 60, ibid.
5
Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 258 SCRA 404, 407, July 5, 1996, per Francisco, J.; Shell
Philippines, Inc. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 162 SCRA 628, 633, June 27, 1998.
6
Mankiad v. Tanodbayan, 127 SCRA 724, 728, February 20, 1984, per Escolin, J., citing Chang
Yung Fa et al. v. Ganzon, 97 Phil. 913, November 25, 1955.
7
Crisolo v. Macadaeg, et al., 94 Phil. 862, 864, April 29, 1954, per Bengzon, J (later CJ).
8
79 SCRA 450, October 18, 1977.
9
Ibid., p. 458.
10
Supra, p. 633.
11
Supra, p. 407.
12
226 SCRA 66, September 2, 1993.
13
GR No. 132860, April 3, 2001, per Panganiban, J.
14
276 SCRA 619, July 31, 1997, per Regalado, J. See also Jacinto v. Court of Appeals.
15
Art. 3. Civil Code; Espino v. Salubre, AM MTJ-00-1255, February 26, 2001.
16
149 SCRA 205, 216, April 9, 1987, per Feliciano, J., citing Ramo v. Elefao, 106 SCRA 221, 234,
July 30, 1981.