Carlos Superdrug Corp. v.

DSWD, 526 SCRA 130 (2007)

Post under case digests, Political Law at Wednesday, February
08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors
operating drugstores in the Philippines. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as
the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a) of RA
9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the
Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of
private property.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional
Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of
police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined
by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.

Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil 726
Post under case digests, labor law at Wednesday, February 08,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature,
the Director of Public Works promulgated rules and regulations
pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to
traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against
respondent-public officers. Among others, the petitioners aver
that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon
constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to
insure the well being and economic security of all people.

Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social
justice.

Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic force by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insureeconomic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
Equal Protection
These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality
of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and
Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA
3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted
by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially
superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was
promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide
for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits
for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring
full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the
decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was
followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the
mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment
of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which
Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing
the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them
suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the
executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property
rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause
is also violated because the order places the burden of solving
the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands.
No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other
properties.
The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under
PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228
ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse,
the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even
the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of
the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to
show that they belong to a different class and should be
differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of
Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and
scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later.
From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be
premature.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal
protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the
small farmers that they have been denied equal protection
because of the absence of retention limits has also become
academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have
not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the
complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of
agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on
the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular
interests of their own. However, no evidence has been
submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification
have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the
measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly
situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred
and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a different
treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also
owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that
is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no
need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights.

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998
FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting
authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake
and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging,
filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them,
and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper
and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities
and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the
Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the
city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their
jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real
Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among
others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay
was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce
of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in
question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives
a broader meaning on the term foreshore land than that in the
definition provided by the dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and
the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the
submerged area.
II. Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is
within the commerce of man.
HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable
to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term
foreshore land includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the
term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream);
the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the
seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave
wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or
berm.(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In
so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the
coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include
submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That
Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of
submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance
No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement
under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and
scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void

CRUZ vs DENR
Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA
8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that
the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural
resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of
private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation
they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and
the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote,
Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained.
Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow
against the regalian doctrine

CHAVEZ vs PEA AMARI
Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain
The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency
tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took
over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as
reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are
concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also
sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
Bay to AMARI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a
private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks
to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.

Disomangcop v. Datumanong (Tinga, 2004)
1

Facts:
On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed (Organic Act of
ARMM). Four provinces voted for inclusion in ARMM,
namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-
Tawi.

1 Angelica Paglicawan
In accordance with it, EO 426 was issued by Pres. Cory
Aquino on Oct. 12, 1990. The same devolved to the
ARMM the power of the DPWH.
On May 20, 1999, DO 119 was issued by DPWH Sec.
Vigilar. It created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all
national infrastructure projects and facilities under the
DPWH within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur.
On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which created a new
Engineering District in the first district of Lanao del Sur
was passed by Pres. Estrada.
On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 which amended RA 6734
was passed. The province of Basilan and the City of
Marawi voted to join ARMM through said law.
Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang in their
capacity as OIC and Enginer II respectively of the First
Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur
filed a petition questioning the constitutionality and
validity of DO 119 and RA 8999 on the ground that they
contravene the constitution and the organic acts of the
ARMM.
Issue: WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and
constitutionally infirm.
Held and Ratio:
On RA 8999
RA 8999 never became operative and was superseded
or repealed by a RA 9054. By creating an office with
previously devolved functions, RA 8999, in essence
sought to amend RA 6074, which is an organic act
which enjoys affirmation through a plebiscite. Hence,
the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an
ordinary statute such as RA 8999. The amendatory law
needs to be submitted also to a plebiscite which is
lacking in the case of RA 8999. RA 6734 devolved the
functions of the DPWH to ARMM which includes Lanao
del Sur.
Moreover, RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA
9054 which is a later law. RA 9054, which is anchored
on the 1987 Constitution advances the constitutional
grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the
ARMM which covers among others Lanao del Sur.
However, RA 8999 ventures to reestablisht he National
Government's jurisdiction over the infrastructure
programs in Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 is patently
inconsistent with RA 9054, and it destroys the latter
law's objective of devolution of the functions of DPWH
in line with the policy of the Constitution to grant LGUs
meaningful and authentic regional autonomy.
On DO 119
- DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi
City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO 426
which implements the transfer of control and supervision of the
DPWH to the ARMM in line with RA 6734. The office created
under DO 119 having essentially the same powers with the
District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur as created under EO
426, is a duplication. The DO in effect takes back powers which
have been previoulsy devolved under EO 426. RA 9054 however
has repealed DO 119 because the former seeks to transfer
control and supervision of DPWH offices to ARMM.

Espina vs. Zamora
The Supreme Court recently upheld the
constitutionality of RA 8762 (Retail Trade Liberalization
Act of 2000), which expressly repealed the law
prohibiting foreign nationals from engaging in retail
trade (RA 1180). RA 8762 also allows natural-born
Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now
reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade
business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.
In a unanimous 11-page decision penned by Justice
Roberto A. Abad, the Court En Banc dismissed for lack
of merit the petition filed a decade ago assailing RA
8762. It found no showing that the law has contravened
any constitutional mandate and that it would
eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade
business.
The Court noted that while the Constitution mandates
a bias in favor Filipino goods, services, labor, and local
enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the basis of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. The Court also pointed out
that Congress has the discretion under Article XIII, sec.
10 of the Constitution to reserve to Filipinos certain
areas of investment upon recommendation of the
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and
when the national interest requires; and that in this
case Congress has decided, without opposition from
NEDA, to open certain areas of the retail trade business
to foreign investments.

The Court also found that RA 8762 has provided for
strict safeguards on foreign participation in retail
trade.
Tawag Multi-PurposeCooperative v. La Trinidad Water District,
G.R. No. 166471,
Q Tawag Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a duly
registered cooperative organized to provide domestic water
services in Barangay Tawag, La Trinidad, Benguet. It applied for
a certificate of public convenience with the National Water
Resources Board to operate and maintain a waterworks
system, but La Trinidad Water District opposed contending that
it has an exclusive franchise as a local water utility created
under PD 198. The application was approved where the NWRB
held that the exclusive franchise is not valid and
unconstitutional. On appeal to the RTC, it held that the
exclusive franchise is valid. Is the ruling correct? Why?
Answer: No, because exclusive franchise is void and
unconstitutional. Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution
prohibits that exclusive nature or character of a franchise when
it says nor shall such franchise x x be exclusive in character.
There is no exception. Section 47 of PD 198 which states that no
franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency unless
and except to the extent that the board of directors consents
thereto is patently unconstitutional. In case of conflict between
the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails
because the Constitution is the basic Law to which all laws must
conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution
and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.

Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines [G.R. No.
164195. April 5, 2011]
03SEP
FACTS:
Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the
government under Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Government took
petitioners lands on December 9, 1996. Land Bank valued the
properties atP165,484.47 per hectare, but AFC-HPI rejected the
offer of that amount. Consequently, on instruction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Land Bank deposited for
AFC and HPI P26,409,549.86 and P45,481,706.76, respectively,
or a total of P71,891,256.62. Upon revaluation of the
expropriated properties, Land Bank eventually made additional
deposits, placing the total amount paid at P411,769,168.32
(P71,891,256.62 + P339,877,911.70), an increase of nearly five
times. Both petitioners withdrew the amounts. Still, they filed
separate complaints for just compensation with the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB), where it was dismissed, after three
years, for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a case with the RTC
for the proper determination of just compensation. The RTC
ruled in favor of petitioners fixing the valuation of petitioners
properties at P103.33/sq.m with 12% interest plus attorneys
fees. Respondents appealed to the Third Division of the Supreme
Court where the RTC ruling was upheld. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Third Division deleted the award of interest
and attorneys fees and entry of judgment was issued. The just
compensation of which was only settled on May 9, 2008.
Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration with
respect to denial of award of legal interest and attorneys fees
and a motion to refer the second motion to the Court En Banc
and was granted accordingly, restoring in toto the ruling of the
RTC. Respondent filed their second motion for reconsideration
as well for holding of oral arguments with the Motion for Leave
to Intervene and to admit for Reconsideration in-Intervention by
the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the transcendental importance does not
apply to the present case.
(2) Whether or not the standard of transcendental importance
cannot justify the negation of the doctrine of immutability of a
final judgment and the abrogation of a vested right in favor of
the Government that respondent LBP represents.
(3) Whether or not the Honorable Court ignored the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission showing
that just compensation for expropriated agricultural property
must be viewed in the context of social justice.
RULINGS:

Political Law (Constitutional Law)
(1) No. The present case goes beyond the private interests
involved; it involves a matter of public interest the proper
application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely,
the right of a landowner to receive just compensation when the
government exercises the power of eminent domain in its
agrarian reform program.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the
constitutional rule on eminent domain Private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation. While
confirming the States inherent power and right to take private
property for public use, this provision at the same time lays
down the limitation in the exercise of this power. When it takes
property pursuant to its inherent right and power, the State has
the corresponding obligation to pay the owner just
compensation for the property taken. For compensation to be
considered just, it must not only be the full and fair equivalent
of the property taken; it must also be paid to the landowner
without delay.
(2) No. The doctrine transcendental importance, contrary to
the assertion it is applicable only to legal standing questions, is
justified in negating the doctrine of immutability of judgment. It
will be a very myopic reading of the ruling as the context clearly
shows that the phrase transcendental importance was used
only to emphasize the overriding public interest involved in this
case. The Supreme Court said in their resolution:
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental
importance is not hard to discern from these discussions. A
constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-
important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can
compensation in an eminent domain case be just when the
payment for the compensation for property already taken has
been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution
does, that only private interest is involved in this case is to forget
that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary
actor. It forgets, too, that under eminent domain, the
constitutional limits or standards apply to government who
carries the burden of showing that these standards have been
met. Thus, to simply dismiss the case as a private interest matter
is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court should not
leave uncorrected.
x x x x
More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before
us is of transcendental importance to the nation because of the
subject matter involved agrarian reform, a societal objective of
that the government has unceasingly sought to achieve in the
past half century.
From this perspective, the court demonstrated that the higher
interests of justice are duly served.
(3) Yes. In fact, while a proposal was made during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to give a
lower market price per square meter for larger tracts of land, the
Commission never intended to give agricultural landowners less
than just compensation in the expropriation of property for
agrarian reform purposes.
[N]othing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of
land reform and the right of landowners to receive just
compensation for the expropriation by the State of their
properties. That the petitioners are corporations that used to
own large tracts of land should not be taken against them. As
Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz eloquently put it:
[S]ocial justice or any justice for that matter is for the
deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a
pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt,
we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to
whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply
because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they
are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich
alike, according to the mandate of the law.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs Severino Listana, Sr.
A summary of a decision of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines

Although this appears to be an agrarian reform related case but
it is actually one that rules on the power, or lack of it, of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to
issue contempt orders and consequently order the arrest of
persons cited for contempt, as provided for in R.A. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)

Here is the case:
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO
LISTANA, SR., respondent. G.R. No. 152611 August 5, 2003
Facts of the case:
Private respondent Listana voluntarily offered to sell his land of
246.0561 ha. in Sorsogon to the government, through the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). DAR valued the property at
P5,871,689.03 but Listana refused to sell at that price, so the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in
an administrative proceeding determined the just compensation
of the land at P10,956,963.25 and ordered the Land Bank of the
Philippines to pay the same to Listana. A writ of execution was
issued by PARAD to that effect but it was apparently not
complied with by LBP so a Motion for Contempt was filed by
Listana with the PARAD against petitioner LBP. PARAD granted
the Motion for Contempt and cited for indirect contempt and
ordered the arrest of ALEX A. LORAYES, the Manager of LBP. LBP
obtained a preliminary injunction from the Regional Trial Court
of Sorsogon enjoining DARAB from enforcing the arrest order
against Lorayes. Listana filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. CA nullified the order of the RTC.
Consequently, petitioner LBP filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the order for the arrest of petitioner's manager,
Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid.
Ruling:

The arrest order issued by PARAD against Lorayes was not valid
because the contempt proceedings initiated through an
unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with
the PARAD were themselves invalid. Said proceedings were
invalid for the following reasons:

First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified
petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied
with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD
motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent.

Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to
decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The
issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the
PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that
stemmed from respondent?s "Motion for Contempt," specifically
the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3,
2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.

MCIAA v. Inocian, G.R. No. 168812
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), as the
predecessor of MCIAA sought to acquire several lots in Lahug,
Cebu for the proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport. Some of
the owners of these lots refused to sell their properties because
the proposed price was unacceptably way below the market
value of the lands at that time.
As an incentive for the other owners to cede their lots adjoining
the then existing Lahug Airport, NAC guaranteed them or their
successors-in-interest the right to repurchase their properties for
the same price paid by the government in the event that these
properties were no longer used for purposes of the airport.
Some landowners executed deeds of conveyance while others
who refused to cede their properties became defendants in an
action for expropriation filed by the Republic of the Philippines
before the CFI of Cebu docketed as Civil Case R-1881 entitled RP
vs. Damian Ouano.
The trial court declared the expropriated lots along with the
other adjoining lands, condemned for public use after payment
of just compensation. The subject lands were transferred in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently turned
over to MCIAA under Republic Act 6958 in 1990.
Subsequently, when the Lahug Airport was abandoned and all its
functions and operations were transferred to the Mactan Airport
at the end of 1991, some of the heirs of the original owners
wrote to the President and the MCIAA General Manager,
requesting for the exercise of their right to repurchase the lot.
Written and verbal demands were ignored by the MCIAA.
Hence, the heirs of original owners filed complaint for
reconveyance and damages with the RTC of Cebu City against
MCIAA.
The Ouanos here are the heirs of the original owner of Lot 763-A,
while the Inocians' claimed rights to Lots 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747,
761-A, 762-A, and the Suicos' claim pertained to 942, and 947, all
of which were expropriated under CC R-1881.
Main Issue: Whether or not the former owners of lots acquired
for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City have the right
to repurchase or secure reconveyance of their respective
properties.
Specific issues:
I. Whether abandonment of the pubic purpose for which the
subject properties were expropriated entitles petitioners Ouanos
and Inocians to reacquire them;
II. Whether the Ouanos and Inocians are entitled to
reconveyance of the subject properties simply on the basis of an
alleged verbal promise of NAC officials that the properties will be
returned if the airport project would be abandoned.
RULING:
Yes. The former owners of the expropriated lots have the right to
repurchase their properties.
The Supreme Court emphasized the undisputed facts upon which
the decision was premised:
First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not
actually used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation
in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally
taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and
development of Lahug Airport.
Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned.
A significant portion of it had, in fact, been purchased by a
private corporation for development as a commercial complex.
Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence
that the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given
assurance to the affected landowners that they would be
entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are
no longer used for airport purposes.
The Supreme Court adhered to the precedents set in the
previous cases of Heirs of Moreno vs. MCIAA and MCIAA vs.
Tudtud whose disputed lots are also part of Civil Case R-1881,
because in all respects, the present petition revolved around the
same milieu as that of the aforecited case.
The Supreme Court maintained that the title of the MCIAA over
the expropriated lots is not absolute as it is subject to the
condition of using the lot for public purpose. Thus, "the
government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of
land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the
properties."
"While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply
acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the exercise of
eminent domain regardless of the survival of the Lahug Airport,
the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead
prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that
Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation'. Verily, these
meaningful statements in the body of the Decision contemplated
a return of the property taken if the airport expansion project
were abandoned."
It must be pointed out that nothing in this jurisprudence that
bespeaks that there should foremost be an express condition in
the dispositive portion of the decision before the condemned
property can be returned to its former owner after the purpose
for its taking has been abandoned or ended.
The indisputable certainty in the present case is that there was a
prior promise by the predecessor of the respondent that the
expropriated properties may be recovered by the former owners
once the airport is transferred to Mactan, Cebu. In fact, the
witness for the respondent testified that 15 lots were already
reconveyed to their previous owners. This belated news further
bolsters the fact that the purpose for which the properties were
condemned has been abandoned.
As to the contention that the Ouano and the Inocians cannot lay
claim on the verbal promise as barred by the Statute of Frauds,
the Supreme Court held that the Statue of Frauds applies only to
executory and not to completed, executed, or partially
consummated contracts. Records tend to support the conclusion
that MCIAA did not either object to the introduction of parol
evidence to prove its commitment to allow the former
landowners to repurchase their respective properties upon the
occurrence of certain events. Notably, objection on the
admissibility of evidence on the basis of the Statute of Frauds
may be waived if not timely raised.
It was reiterated that the old Fery doctrine was revisited in the
fairly recent case of Lozada in that "the fee simple concept
underpinning it is no longer compelling, considering the ensuing
inequity such application entails."
The predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real
property condemned for public purpose, the party who originally
condemned the property recovers control of the land if the
condemning party would continues to use the property for
public purpose; however, if the condemning authority ceases to
use the property for a public purpose, property reverts to the
owner in fee simple. The government's taking of private
property, and then transferring it to private persons under the
guise of public use or purpose is the despotism found in the
immense power of eminent domain. Moreover, the direct and
unconstitutional state's power to oblige a landowner to
renounce his productive and invaluable possession to another
citizen, who will use it predominantly for his own private gain, is
offensive to our laws.
Thus, the MCIAA was ordered to reconvey the subject properties
with a right to retain the fruits thereof, and the Inocians, Ouano,
Suicos are ordered to reimburse MCIAA of the amount of just
compensation with a right to retain the interest therefrom.


Merlin Magallona vs Secretary Eduardo Ermita
655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is
Constitutional
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the
archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted the law is
also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply
with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in
February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA
9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the
national territory of the Philippines hence the law is
unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as
follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris
and other ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion
of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters
a archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our
waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all
vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the
countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as
the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of
islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are
tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or
UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The
treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the
acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine
territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of
territory is the international law principle on occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact
it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA
3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the
Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 nautical miles
2
.
But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic
zone, the extent of our maritime are increased to 586,210
nautical miles
2
. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on
the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of
the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial
sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo,
over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and
that we may term it as our internal waters, but the bottom line
is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and
UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance
of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right
of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
exercised in accordance with customary international law
without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our
maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since
they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime
zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines
of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group).
This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger
area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS
that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the
archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of
maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where
we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines;
jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal, immigration,
and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the
baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and non-
living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental
shelf this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.