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A GEOPOLITICS OF IDENTITY: DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN
RUSSIA AND ESTONIA
Martha Merritt
To cite this Article Merritt, Martha(2000) 'A GEOPOLITICS OF IDENTITY: DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN RUSSIA
AND ESTONIA', Nationalities Papers, 28: 2, 243 262
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/713687468
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Nationalities Papers, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2000
A GEOPOLITICS OF IDENTITY: DRAWING THE LINE
BETWEEN RUSSIA AND ESTONIA
Martha Merritt*
Although narratives of national identity feature territory, myths, and historical
memories presumably shared by members,
1
national identity formation is an ongoing
process with changeable membership and boundaries.
2
One of the more complex
challenges to a national imagined community has been the signicant presence in
Estonia of cultural Russians
3
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, at that
time one-third and now some 28% of the small countrys population. The often
grudging accommodation of cultural Russians by the titular nationality continues to
draw attention from international organizations, scholars, and policymakers alike.
Undoubtedly the commentary least welcome to Estonian governments in the last
decade, however, has been the thunder of denunciation from Russia. In a great
spillover from domestic concerns about Slavic identity to international relations,
Estonia has been ranked as Russias greatest enemy, and political gures across the
spectrum have condemned Estonian citizenship and language policies.
4
Estonian politicians frequently denounce this linkage between cultural Russians
and Russia.
5
Russian belligerence in insisting upon her rights in the near abroad
regarding cultural Russians is, understandably, seen as an effort to re-establish
inuence in an area only just recovering from Soviet domination.
6
But within
Estonian domestic discourse other linkages exist that connect the cultural Russian
population with Russia, chiey negative images of Russian politics which seep into
discussion of cultural Russians in Estonia.
7
Although the portrayal of cultural
Russians in the Estonian press became more varied as the 1990s progressed
8
and
important recent work by Estonian scholars demonstrates common ground between
Estonians and cultural Russians,
9
these ndings still compete with stereotypical
images and ethnic polarization.
10
A tendency to blur foreign affairs and domestic
issues from both sides of the EstonianRussian divide exacerbates what are probably
inevitable tensions between Russia, Estonia, and the cultural Russians in Estonia.
This article considers the border between Estonia and Russia as a marker for the
larger issue of Estonias desire to draw the line against Russian interference,
domestic and international. Of great relevance to this exercise is how one imagines
the cultural Russians in Estonia, not as an exercise of imagination versus reality, but
as an exploration of the ways in which perception shapes comprehension and
subsequent behaviour.
11
Renans two facets of nationhooda rich legacy of memor-
ISSN 0090-5992 print; 1465-3923 online/00/020243-20 2000 Association for the Study of Nationalities
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M. MERRITT
ies and present-day consent, the desire to live together
12
suggest the challenges for
inclusive nation building in Estonia. Cultural Russians could come to share the fact
of having suffered, enjoyed and hoped together
13
if the will were sufcient on both
sides, given that 78% of the cultural Russians in Estonia have lived there for 21 or
more years.
14
But historical memories tend to divide at present rather than provide
a source of unity. Estonian policy choices affect the delicate process of domestic
identity building even as her economic success propels her to membership in
multinational associations.
15
The Border, Boundaries, and Historical Continuity
One of Estonias top priorities since independence has been to face westward, to
make the border with Russia as rm as possible while the other borders become more
permeable: in the words of Estonian President Lennart Meri, to head west and
relate with the east.
16
This process is impaired by the as yet unratied border
between Russia and Estonia, despite strenuous Estonian efforts to resolve it in the
last few years. In fact, when border negotiations began, it was an initial Estonian
desire to set limits on her eastern neighbour that led her to demand restitution for
past injustice in tandem with border negotiations; this linkage was subsequentl y
dropped as determining the border became relevant to membership in international
organizations. Russia chose to highlight a different and more enduring linkage, that
between border negotiations and the treatment of cultural Russians who live in
Estonia. There is every expectation that before ratifying the border agreement the
Russian parliament will seek concessions regarding the treatment of cultural Rus-
sian,
17
a stance galling to Estonian ofcials who fail to see the relevance of Russian
pronouncements on Estonian affairs.
Nine years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relatively peaceful and
busy border between Russia and Estonia still exacts an emotional toll on both sides.
Although chief negotiators Ludvig Chizhov and Raul Malk nally initialed a border
agreement in March 1999, the issues that prevented a quick settlement continue to
loom large. When the Russian parliament will ratify the agreement is uncertain.
18
For
Estonia, the border is perceived as a nal obstacle to establishing her rightful place
in Europe; for Russia, national pride and increasing concern about a NATO-
dominated Europe make negotiations with the Baltic states, and Estonia in particular,
a continual irritant. Even when this particular line is drawn, the borders between
Russia and the Baltic countries have been sensitive historically and will remain so.
19
The tale of the Estonian border with Russia illuminates struggles both ideological
and geopolitical between the two countries. Rebuilding the Estonian national state
includes an evocation of a golden period of Estonian independence between the world
wars, with carefully chosen aspects of that period featured in contemporary politics. On
the Estonian ve-kroon note, for example, the sun shines on what is now the Estonian
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A GEOPOLITICS OF IDENTITY
bank of the river Narva; once the bridge crosses to the post-1945 Russian city of
Ivangorod, grey tones predominate. Mart Laar, leader of the nationalist Isamaa
(Fatherland) Party and prime minister of Estonia from 1992 to 1994 (and now head
of the Pro Patria Union and again prime minister since March 1999), is the author
of a groundbreaking but romanticized study of the Estonian forest brothers who
fought Soviet forces after occupation.
20
The Estonian negotiating position in talks on
the border with Russia under Laars rst government emphasized that the Tartu
Peace Treaty of 1920 had to be recognized as the starting point.
The Tartu Peace Treaty, signed by a humbled Soviet Union in the aftermath of
World War I, for some 20 years allotted to independent Estonia an additional 2,334
square kilometres of territory that before and since have been considered part of
Russia. In contrast to both Western and Russian maps, ofcial materials for the
Estonian republic showed the border demarcation as that recognized under the peace
treaty, not the Soviet-era boundary, and ofcial representation of the land area of
Estonia included these contested square kilometres. Estonias negotiating posture,
considered peculiar even by seasoned Baltic observers, included at rst private and
later public assurances that territorial concessions were not part of the package. If the
Tartu Peace Treaty were to be recognized by Russia, Estonia claimed no desire to
seek additional territory despite the expanded territorial boundaries indicated there.
Both the border negotiations and the status of cultural Russians in Estonia are
inuenced by a policy of historical continuity, a doctrine claiming not only to have
extended the policies of the Estonian republic of 19181940 to the present day, but
also that the contemporary Republic of Estonia is identical to the interwar republic.
Thus, Estonia celebrated her 75th anniversary as a republic in 1993 as if the Soviet
years had never occurred. What in fact are selective and often pointedly rewritten
laws from the rst Estonian republic are said to reect a climate of historical
continuity, a position unwittingly bolstered by the fact that numerous Western
countriesincluding the United Statesdid not ofcially recognize Soviet occu-
pation of the Baltic states. As a further bulwark for historical continuity, Article 122
of the Estonian Constitution gives the nal word on borders to the Tartu Peace
Treaty. Either the text of the treaty or the Constitution itself must change in order to
approve a different borderline.
Using this logic, Estonian negotiators initially presented their case for a border
treaty with Russia in legalistic terms. They sought a sort of border concession as
apology. When Russia acknowledged the terms of the Tartu Peace Treaty, Estonia
would not insist on territorial concessions
21
but rather what might be called historical
justice. Russia should in turn recognize the illegality of the Soviet presence in
Estonia, acknowledge the crimes of the Stalin era, and withdraw Russian troops from
Estonian territory.
22
In any case, at a minimum, Estonian negotiators felt that the
treaty gave them a tougher negotiating stance with Russia in order to have some
bargaining chips on the table.
23
This strategy proved singularly effective at infuriating Russian negotiators. Esto-
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nian insistence that Russia recognize the Tartu Peace Treaty was unacceptable from
a Russian viewpoint:
Estonia had repeatedly stated that it had no territorial claims on its neighbours and that
statements to the contrary made by some parties had no ofcial standing. However,
following the collapse of the all-Union [Soviet] centre, the Estonian parliament abruptly
changed its position and declared the right to discuss with Russia its claims to territory in
the Pskov and Leningrad oblasts.
24
In an ironic twist, Russias refusal to acknowledge the validity of the treaty is also
seen by Estonian analysts as evidence of latent Russian expansionism.
25
And in
response to charges about the crimes of the Stalin era, a relatively moderate
politician and former Yeltsin advisor expressed a common sentiment with the claim,
Attempts to blame Russia or Russians for the crimes of the Soviet Union are the
result of malicious lies and historic blindness.
26
The early phase of Estonian border negotiations (from 1992 to the end of 1994)
hinged on the necessity of Russia recognizing the validity of the 1920 Tartu Peace
Treaty without any conditions. Once that occurred, further negotiation on the border
could take place as a second step. In the face of steady Russian rejection, the new
Estonian prime minister Andres Tarand in late 1994 authorized a one-step process of
Russian recognition of the Tartu Peace Treaty.
27
Estonia offered immediate exibility
in establishing a mutually acceptable border along with the understanding that she
did not harbor territorial ambitions. In 1995, the Estonian Foreign Ministry issued an
informal statement to the effect that the unresolved legal status of the border did not
rule out technical agreement regarding its location and the work of border guards. A
very strong push from Estonia to bring the border to resolution yielded some
progress in 1996, but only by 1998 did agreement between the two countries look
likely
28
and, as indicated above, the rst stage of approving a treaty occurred in
March 1999.
Russian reluctance was due to more than anger over shifting citizenship and
language policies in Estonia or nationalist sentiment at home: it seems unlikely that
the border would have been settled quickly under any circumstances. Estonia herself
only reached agreements with Latvia in 1999 on sea and land borders, and the other
Baltic countries approached ratication of their borders with Russia in 1999 as well.
This makes Estonian presidential candidate Arnold Ruu tels contention that the
border with Russia could have been settled easily if he had been electedand,
presumably, Estonia had adopted a less confrontational policyunlikely. The agen-
das of both countries were very crowded in the last decade. Border negotiations were
closely tied with efforts to dene these new states, perhaps more painfully for Russia
but equally importantly for Estonia.
29
As it happened, the border instead provided an
opportunity for Russia to take a stand against her small neighbour. In 1994 Russia
began an expensive process of unilaterally demarcating the Soviet-era border,
complete with watch towers and other fortications.
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A Different Kind of Fence
On 23 August 1989, the 50th anniversary of the MolotovRibbentrop pact, Estonians
joined Latvians and Lithuanians to form a human chain across the three Baltic states.
This network of individuals joining hands to show their mutual deance was
properly understood as a rejection of the chains associated with Soviet power. But
what was described by Moscow as a separatist line was also a profoundly
pro-European gathering, so much so that Germanys role in the infamous anniversary
was scarcely considered. The legacy of Soviet occupation could only be fully
rejected by stressing the European nature of Estonian identity, a natural westward tilt
that for 40 years had been forcibly bent to Moscows will.
Having fought for independence in Europes name,
30
Estonias identity as a
sovereign nation has been expressed as a return to Europe,
31
an exercise as
revealing of Estonian needs as it is of anything essentially European. The European
question has never been easily resolved, especially for a country whose fate has often
been determined by neighbors with earthshaking European questions of their own.
Estonian efforts to reject the Soviet legacy include commemorative ceremonies for
Estonian soldiers who fought with the Axis powers during World War II. Though the
move was billed as a recognition of troops on both sides, the Estonian government
allocated 400,000 kroons (about U.S.$27,000) in 1999 to build a monument on the
site of an Estonian divisions battle to defend the German army and hold back Red
Army troops in 1944.
32
Estonia thus has at least two particular tensions regarding her European home,
both with repercussions for her relationship and border arrangements with Russia.
Sophisticated accounts of national identity highlight the fact that Europe already
tolerates fundamentally different norms of citizenship and national identity, often
represented by the dichotomous pair of France and Germany.
33
Part of the challenge
for Estonian government is nding ways to satisfy Europe on the issue of ethnic
Estonia in a way that contains resentment among the Estonian populace about
domination by Russia but meets at least some of the needs of cultural Russians. The
doctrine of historical continuity, given its use to obstruct entry to the national
community, won few friends abroad and from the mid-1990s has prompted serious
discussion in Estonia as well.
34
A second tension concerns Estonia as a case of relinquished or at least shared
sovereignty, allowing countries of the European Union both a tariff-free business
environment and a high degree of inuence on domestic policies. Estonia has
essentially ceded some of the traditional powers of the European-style nation state
and is determined to move under the European umbrella in another key area, defense.
With strong encouragement from the United States, Estonia has set her sights on
NATO membership and in many senses would see this as her crowning achievement
in defying Soviet dominance and Russian threats.
What is the image of Europe that motivates Estonia to work on these problems?
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For some Estonians it is a vision deeply imbued with the kind of historical
determinism that characterizes Samuel Huntingtons controversial clash of civiliza-
tions work.
35
In predicting that the main sources of conict in contemporary politics
would be across cultural divides, Huntington states, In the former Soviet Union,
communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but
Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians.
36
Hunt-
ington writes of a civilizational divide: and, as the temptation presents itself,
countries that are on the western side of the divide are quick to comprehend the
difference as one of civilized versus uncivilized.
37
Estonias Christian rather than
Orthodox past is understood as Western in a way that Russia can never hope to be;
this line of argument suggests a permanence about difference that neatly ts extreme
nationalist insistence in both countries about the inexibility of identity.
38
Contrary to a sort of permanent civilizational divide, insisting upon Others being
fundamentallyand dangerouslydifferent occurs precisely because of the threat of
integration. Anderson did not suggest the fragility of identity when he posed his
concept of imagined communities, but rather that while membership is more exible
than members comprehend, at the same time community is one of the most powerful
of human visions.
39
Those who tend to the Estonian people by weaving exclusive
national myths by their very actions suggest their fear that over time Estonians and
Russians can inuence one another. Relatively new programs that place cultural
Russians for extended visits with Estonian families and facilitate playtime together
for Estonian and cultural Russian children on weekends are instead important steps
toward a shared future.
40
Urging a different conception of nationalism as a prescription for Estonia is
unlikely to be helpful or even relevant however. Michael Ignatieff, for example, in
his sweeping generalizations about ethnic nationalism in new nations like Serbia
and Croatia, [and] the Baltic states, insists that these states are of necessity more
authoritarian than democratic.
41
With rather more nuance, Alfred Stepan presents the
fundamental dilemma for Estonia as one of nation state versus democracy.
42
But of
course Estonia can make far more credible claims about her democratic institutions
than most of the former Yugoslav, not to mention Soviet, states. And the highly
selective nature of participation in, say, early American and British democracies on
grounds of gender and race make the true determination of democracy an ex post
facto exercise.
Arista Cirtautas is convincing with the argument that it is not a lack of democracy
that marks states like Estonia but rather a shortage thus far of liberalism,
43
what
might be called the animating spirit of Western democratic institutions regarding
protection of minorities. Thus, Estonia holds competitive elections in a law-governed
state, responds to many suggestions from the international community regarding
policy toward her large cultural Russian minority, and is regularly cleared by
international agencies of charges regarding human rights violations lobbed from
Russia. Yet the issue of membership for a large group and acknowledgment of its
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multilayered identity remain prominent and troubling features of Estonian political
life. What troubles Europe is, rst, having a percentage of the population of Estonia
classied as stateless persons, and, second, having cultural Russians provide a
rallying point for Russia. A union between Estonians and cultural Russians can only
take place through a supremely European process of selective memory and an
abandonment of historical indignation, however justied.
Estonia has come to signify a political nation rather than a cultural one. When to
be Estonian meant to be under siege culturally, it is understandable that some
Estonians imagined themselves to have a monopoly on virtue. But, as happens
everywhere, members of the national in-group increasingly subject hitherto hallowed
icons to critical inquiry once the state itself is established. Raul Meels artistic
rendering of ags, including Estonias, with an overlay of pornographic text in the
matching language, and a young historians evidence suggesting that the last
president of the interwar Republic of Estonia, Konstantin Pats, cooperated with the
Soviet Union raised storms of controversy in 1998 and 1999. Both endeavours would
have been unthinkable ten or even ve years ago, and they signal a coming of age
for Estonia as a sovereign country.
Who Are the Cultural Russians in Estonia?
Over 375,000 cultural Russians live in Estonia today (the countrys population is 1.4
million). By one calculation, at least one-quarter of non-Estonians must have voted
in favor of Estonian independence in March of 1991, when Estonia was still under
Soviet control.
44
Some commentators have seen the determination of cultural Russian
loyalty to Estonia since then as an Estonian responsibility to win over hearts and
minds.
45
But the slow clarication of citizenship policy since independence set up a
system of barriers to entry that many cultural Russians resent and that separated most
of them from the founding moments of the state, including the vote on the adoption
of the countrys Constitution. (About 75,000 cultural Russians received Estonian
citizenship in 1992 by virtue of their parents or grandparents having been citizens of
Estonia in June 1940.) Approximately 25,000 of the non-Estonians who attended the
Congress of Estonia, a pre-independence gathering to promote Estonian statehood,
were allowed to receive citizenship through a simplied process from 1992 to
1995.
46
Cultural Russians with Estonian citizenship ve years after independence
totalled 135,000.
47
Estonians have had a great deal of historical opportunity to construct internal
boundaries, sadly not a new situation for them.
During the entire Soviet period a discourse on how to maintain the border between us
and them has taken place, especially among the titular nationalities. A positive image
of the typical Estonian and Latvian was maintained against a correspondingly negative
perception of the typical Russian in an attempt to create a culture of opposition resistant
to russication.
48
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These practices, sympathetic as a defensive strategy, proved difcult to abandon
when the titular nationality was suddenly in charge. The doctrine of historical
continuity defends policies that exclude cultural Russians from full political and civic
participation. As an Estonian parliamentarian (and poet) put it, We have become so
accustomed to being under siege that, after a brief period of walking upright and
feeling normal, we picked up stones again and returned to our crouch.
49
On an everyday level, those who live in Estonia continue to dene themselves
against the Other group there. Estonians have long described their own settlement
patterns, for example, in ways that disparage Russian practices: You see that we
Estonians build our farm houses far apart from one another, respecting privacy and
individualism which are so important for us. But the Russians! They have to live in
communes, right on top of each other, or they feel lonely.
50
A cultural Russians
version is rather different: Just look at the way Estonians build their houses! One
here [emphatic gesture] the next here [emphatic gesture at arms length]. They cant
even organize a community! How can we expect them to govern well?
51
Internal boundaries in Estonia are relevant to our consideration of the border not
just because Russia continues to link her negotiations with Estonias treatment of
cultural Russians, but also because settling the border is an important step in
determining who is inside the Estonian state once and for all. By 1996 the percentage
of cultural Russians in Estonia had fallen to an estimated 28%,
52
by any reckoning
still a sizeable group; some 20% of that group as of 1999 still had not obtained
citizenship of any country. After 1994 the emphasis on historical continuity in
Estonian policymaking shifted in most realms to pragmatism, but the key areas of
citizenship, education and language policy tended to remain under the control of
those who regard themselves as gatekeepers for the Estonian people.
53
This in turn
meant that Russias incentive to legalize the border arrangement was minimal, and
Russian politicians denounced the treatment of cultural Russians in Estonia as
ethnic apartheid and a violation of human rights.
Repeated studies of the situation by Western organizations have failed to substan-
tiate these charges, while nevertheless pointing out numerous troubling circum-
stances that disproportionately and negatively affect Russian-speaking minority
groups.
54
Estonians tend to portray problems with the cultural Russians in Estonia as
problems only in Russian minds: a Russication of the negative that pervades many
domestic social issues as well. But two facts are clear: Estonian choices in the
founding stage neatly separated the vast majority of cultural Russians from member-
ship in national political life, thus exposing them to complicated bureaucratic
procedures not experienced by most cultural Estonians; and a great deal more
Estonian vigor and ingenuity have gone into erecting elaborate language laws and
registration procedures than into funding the teaching of the Estonian language,
especially in the primarily Russian-speaking northeast.
55
Much of the focus for agencies in Estonia such as the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been on language and citizenship, two
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reasonably measurable indicators of tolerance and political integration. The domestic
Estonian political scene is rife with messages about the place of the Russian
language, the focus of much acrimony surrounding the role of cultural Russians in
the Republic of Estonia. From the beginning of independence, the government did
not issue its pronouncements in Russian and gave every impression of leaving
cultural Russians to fend for themselves.
56
Those who did not speak Estonianat
that time the overwhelming majority of cultural Russians resident in Estoniahad
the option of learning Estonian at their own expense and generally from poorly
developed programs.
57
Over time, the international community has provided
nancing for the teaching of Estonian in an effort to encourage cultural Russians to
take the citizenship test, which requires some understanding of Estonian language
and traditions. The fact that much of the support for their integration into Estonian
life has come from abroad is not lost on cultural Russians.
58
Considering a more distinct group historically, the Baltic Germans, offers a good
example for conceptualizing cultural Russians in Estonia. The adjective Baltic
applied to their having lived in the Baltic region and the German signied their
nation, with nation understood as a linguistic and cultural rather than political entity.
This latter qualication became increasingly important over time, as many of the
Baltic Germans were born in the Baltic region rather than in what came to be known
as Germany. They formed neither a conscious nor exclusive nationality group.
59
In
these senses, cultural Russians in Estonia are perhaps best understood as Baltic
Russians. They live in the Baltic region and feel a Baltic inuence, but have
primarily Russian linguistic and cultural identity. They do not necessarily consider
themselves a conscious national group. Of course, the demographic differences
between the Baltic Germans and the Baltic Russians should be mentioned. The Baltic
Germans were the powerful ruling class, in 1900 owning 60% of the arable land, and
they formed a very small percentage of the population.
60
Unlike the titular national-
ity, but like the Baltic Germans (and to the frustration of Russian diplomats in
Tallinn
61
), cultural Russians in Estonia express little union among themselves. But
their unhappiness over citizenship policyin addition to those who preferred not to
contend for Estonian citizenshipled a sizeable group of cultural Russians to avoid
statelessness by registering for the more easily obtained Russian citizenship offered
by the Russian Embassy, a process that accelerated between 1994 and 1996. If the
number of Russian citizens is as high as 150,000, as some estimate, then this is a
further complicating factor in integrating cultural Russians.
Many cultural Russians in Estonia believe that they are different from Russians in
Russia in part because some of them have never lived in Russia, but they still may
not feel particularly Estonian. This regional, rather than specically Estonian, sense
of self makes the term Baltic Russians, as with the Baltic Germans before them,
especially meaningful. One cultural Russian put it this way: The last time I was in
Moscow, this was in 1993, people I know half-jokingly called me bourgeois. Well,
I guess I am. They didnt just mean my clothes or my job, we really had such
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different opinions it was hard to nd common ground. But here I am seen as
somehow red or pretty much any color not found in the Estonian ag.
62
Though it is not the same as belonging, survey data indicate that Estonians have
come to understand that the cultural Russians who remain are there to stay, and
cultural Russians understand that there is no alternative to social integration in
Estonia.
63
The politico-linguistic messages in the Estonian capital Tallinn, where
about half of the population is culturally Russian, suggest that the Russian voice is
not welcome, however. One of the only Russian-language signs in Tallinns city
center marks the extensive ruin left by Soviet air force bombing during World War
II. (The fact that Soviet authority maintained this rubble as the site of German
bombing from the war does not reduce its current sting.) The rst menu provided
in a popular pizza restaurant in Tallinn is in Estonian and Finnish, with an alternative
menu available in English and Russian, the latter pair presumably non-native
languages. Less subtly, the Riigikogu, the Estonian parliament, is prone to introduc-
ing legislation affecting citizenship and language laws in ways that narrow oppor-
tunity or threaten job loss for those who have not learned Estonian, yielding a
quicksand-like state of impermanence for cultural Russians. In 1999 the parliament
moved to mandate the use of the Estonian language among business corporations,
non-prot organizations, sole proprietors, and their customers, even if all participants
have Russian as a native tongue. After considerable negotiation with the OSCE,
the terms were softened, but this was another reason for cultural Russians to feel
uneasy.
Relentless, often bureaucratic maneuvering is difcult for outside agencies to
monitor. International organizations in the Baltic and elsewhere face the challenge
that nativist movements persist, while international attention comes and goes. Locals
likely to suffer when international scrutiny is elsewhere know that the rules not only
can but probably will change at any time. Given the citizenship laws automatic
granting of citizenship only to those resident in Estonia before 1940again, justied
on the grounds of historical continuityrepresentatives of the international com-
munity in Tallinn were fully aware of the need to look out for the interests of the
large number of people, chiey cultural Russians, rendered stateless. Even so, the
complex process of registering for what observers were assured would be permanent
residency in 1994 suddenly became temporary residency,
64
and in any event was
avoided by a majority of cultural Russians. Rumors ew through the Russian-
speaking community as to the signicance of the registration process: many,
especially elderly non-citizens, were and are afraid that the range of documents
required to register could serve as an excuse to force them to leave the country. Some
were unable to ll out the forms they had obtained because the documents were in
Estonian.
One way in which cultural Russians in Estonia continue to feel their differences
is a focus on rootedness, an interpretation of Estonias history stressing a long-time
attachment to the land and, not coincidentally, emphasizing the relatively ephemeral
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loyalty of latecomers. Some Estonians frame their perception of Russians through
this lens: I have nothing against Russians in Russia, but the ones who choose to
come here are rootless. They left their homelandwhat are we to do with such
people?
65
The reaction from Russia and cultural Russians to such thinking has been
direct and angry,
66
but the moral authority of being more strongly linked with Europe
historically (even if it was due to occupation by European peoples) and having stayed
in the same place makes for a tight and proud national story vis-a`-vis the cultural
Russians.
This difference in background is often expressed in Estonian discourse as the
contrast between their own nature-loving national character
67
and the urban character
of cultural Russians. One Estonian told me how shocked he was to see enormous,
characterless apartment complexes outside of Stockholm: he had assumed that this
kind of blight on the landscape was only possible in the Soviet world. Soviet power
built factories in Estonia, and Russians came to work in them; neither is wanted and
both are characterized as backward, i.e., non-European. The fact that many Russians
in Estonia and elsewhere love to garden cannot enter this story; Russians and their
ways are seen as alien, thus building the cultural framework for legal acts such as the
1993 Law on Aliens.
68
Obviously those who live in Estonia will be better off with less stereotypical
thinking about one another, as Ain Haas emphasizes in his account of both cleavages
and shared concerns between the communities.
69
Even as early as 1993, 90% of
Estonians and 76% of cultural Russians surveyed said that they saw the Nordic
countries as closest to their culture.
70
It is the lure of Europe that continues to push
the Estonian government toward measures to clarify the legal standing of cultural
Russians, an important condition given the certainty that they will remain underrep-
resented in the organs of government. But the same logic that allowed nearly all
Estonian speakers to be categorized as citizens and the vast majority of Russian
speakers to become stateless is still in evidence in discussing social problems within
Estonia: crime tends to be presented as Russian, progress as Estonian.
An emotional Russian response to the treatment of Russian minorities in Estonia
and Latvia is matched by Baltic outrage when Russia attempts to instruct these
countries on their domestic affairs. Since revised Russian history continues to portray
the Soviet presence in the Baltic states after World War II as the result of invitation
rather than force, this historical controversy continues. Why should I have to deny
my own history to live here?
71
is a serious question with no easy response. Many
of the values that Estonians attribute to Russias position in the border negotiations
unaccountable, imperialisticcome home to roost when they talk about cultural
Russians in Estonia.
But these negative images and the desire for historical retribution are militated
against by the validation that Estonia has received from other countries of Europe.
Since 1996, and with a signicant acceleration in 1998, the Estonian government
made available more materials in Russian
72
and tried to appease European concerns
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about the availability and affordability of Estonian-language teaching. The border
has also been continually professionalized: as an indication of how workmanlike
Estonias border with Russia had become by 1998,
73
refugees from Kurdestan were
said to nd it four to ve times more expensive to be smuggled into Estonia than into
Latvia or Lithuania. And the border visa regime between Estonia and Russia, which
excites bitter resentment, is nevertheless well established.
74
While there have been a number of public rifts between cultural Russians in
Estonia and the majority nationalityleading even to an early and brief threat of
secession on the part of northeastern cities in protest over citizenship policymost
Estonians and cultural Russians at that time agreed on key priority issues for the
newly forming state, including the need to develop a market economy. But two
issues on which they did not agree were whether the governments treatment of
cultural Russians was fair
75
and how important the settling of the border should be.
76
The latter issue is now sufciently consensual that determining the border has wide
support. The difference in perception of the governments treatment of cultural
Russiansor, more precisely, what they have a right to expect from the govern-
mentis unlikely to change.
A key aspect of the future for Estonians and cultural Russians in Estonia, however,
is that both groups appear to be leaning sufciently westward, especially the younger
generation, to manifest a mutual European orientation. Cultural Russians in Estonia
have tended to see European institutions as defending their citizenship and language
rights in Estonia; Estonians see European institutions as defending them against
Russia. The will to statehood points westward, toward Europe, perhaps the place
where Estonians and Baltic Russians can meet.
Estonia as Security Belt, Cordon Sanitaire, or Neighbor?
In essence, since 1991 Russia and the West have been in competition for a Baltic
buffer zone. When Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced a unilateral troop
reduction in northwestern Russia in December 1997, he emphasized that Russia
wants a common border not to divide us but to make us closer, to become a border
of peace, not strife.
77
The Russian initiative included an offer to enclose the Baltic
states in a defense umbrella. Not surprisingly, Estonia promptly refused and suffered
continued unease about Russias assumption of a role in determining Estonias
future.
Estonia and the other Baltic states have instead welcomed opportunities to express
their opposition to Russian military policies and even to Russian rapprochement with
European associations. Estonia was particularly sharp in opposing Russian member-
ship in the Council of Europe in 1995, expressing support for an independent
Chechnya in 1996, and hailing NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The hostile
reaction from Russia has been strong, and over time has come to focus less on the
Baltic states as Russias possible gateway to Europe than on the Baltic countries as
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a kind of lter that comes between Russia and prosperous Western neighbors, thus
inhibiting Russian economic and political development.
78
The default setting in both houses of the Russian parliament toward Estonia is
negative, much as the Estonian Riigokogu tends to react negatively to legislation
favoring cultural Russians in Estonia.
79
Opposition to giving the border legal status
among Russian deputies tends to fall into two broad camps. The rst and largest
group is pragmatic and sees little advantage in ratifying the treaty, given the
likelihood that Russian nationalists would protest and public reaction would be
negative. A smaller but more vocal group, ultra-nationalists of various political
stripes, reason that signing only weakens Russias position, and she must above all
maintain the upper hand in the Baltic states vis-a`-vis the West. There is nevertheless
quieter recognition among many Russian deputies that the border will have to be
resolved. Andrei Nikolaevs transition from chief of the Russian border guards to
deputy in the Duma was regarded by Estonian diplomats as providing much-needed
information about Estonian reality in an otherwise unfriendly environment.
Demonstrating what was then unusual resistance to presidential diktat, the upper
house of the Russian parliament initially voted against authorizing an agreement
between Presidents Yeltsin and Meri about troop withdrawals from Estonia. Only
when strong international pressure was brought to bear did the grudging withdrawal
occur in 1994, three years after Estonian independence. Most likely, when the border
issue becomes sufciently important to Western countries, Russia will seek conces-
sions but ultimately sign. Now that Estonia is on the verge of more formal
integration into a Western trade alliance, circumstances are ripe for pressure on
Russia and Estonia to formalize their mutual border.
The Riigikogu will ratify the border agreement even though it will exclude the
Tartu Peace Treaty. The sweetener for the Estonian side is membership in the
European Union, and so pragmatism and international pressure play a signicant
role. Both the Riigikogu and the Duma would probably prefer that when the day for
ratication comes it be quick and drowned out by other, distracting news items.
Conclusion
Even as the border between Estonia and Russia remains unsettled in legal terms, the
boundaries between communities in Estonia continue to be subjected to intense
scrutiny by both Russia and the West. Latvias grilling by Russia about her
handling of protests by ethnic Russian pensioners in 1998 and subsequent conces-
sions on her own pre-war treaty with Russia are instructive and revealing about the
way in which Russia seeks to gain the upper hand in negotiations. As Estonia moves
toward border ratication without Russian acknowledgment of either Soviet occu-
pation in 1940 or the Tartu Peace Treaty, her desire for Western integration weakens
the case of those pressing for historical continuity above all else. This exibility
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also assists in building good relations between Estonians and cultural Russians in
Estonia.
The ineffectiveness of erce Russian protest about NATO intervention in Kosovo
could herald NATO expansion to the Baltic states, accession of the latter regarded
in the summer of 1999 by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott as nearly
inevitable.
80
The border between Russia and Estonia will in any case continue to be
as much an emotional ashpoint as a geographic boundary. The Estonian poet and
former parliamentary deputy Jaan Kaplinskii captured this sense of the border as a
personal divide for Estonians when he wrote that The EastWest border is always
wandering/sometimes eastward, sometimes west /Only the heart, only the heart is
always on one side /and the mouth doesnt know on behalf of which or both it has
to speak.
81
While formally ratifying the border between Estonia and Russia will
give more legal certainty to the present arrangement, the divide between the two
countries remains an important source of tension for Estonian and Russian national
identity.
The constitution of boundaries within Estonia and the border between Estonia and
Russia thus overlaps considerably, and not solely because Russia insists on linkage
between the two. How to dene and how to obtain Estonian citizenship, the basis for
membership in her political community, raises important concerns when ethnically
identiable groups receive distinctly different treatment. Estonias movement from a
cultural to a political nation has brought increasing awareness that nationality policy
and foreign affairs are a matter of choice rather than predetermined by instrumental
applications of historical experience.
NOTES
* Research for this article was supported by three grants for travel to Estonia and Russia from
the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the National
Endowment for the Humanities and the U.S. Department of State under the Title VIII
program. The author also wishes to thank the members of the Rahvusvaheliste ja Sotsiaalu-
uringute Instituut, who provided a stimulating intellectual community during my residence in
Tallinn, and Kara Brown for research assistance. None of these organizations or individuals
is responsible for the views expressed here.
1. For an insightful treatment of the contours of the nation, see Anthony D. Smith, National
Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), pp. 818.
2. On the constructed nature of ethnic identity, see Frederik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), and, in a recent treatment including the Estonian
case, David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near
Abroad (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
3. What to call the peoples whose native tongue is Russian and who now reside in Estonia is
a matter of some controversy. A few scholars follow the Estonian practice of calling them
settlers, colonists or even occupants, terminology this author considers inappropriate
given their understanding that they were simply moving within the Soviet Union. Russian
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speakers is one possibility, but it could imply monolingualism. I use cultural Russians
here to emphasize the dominant language and cultural association of these peoples without
suggesting that they are resistant to, for example, speaking the Estonian language or
achieving political integration in Estonia.
4. The Russian poll on the countrys enemies was reported by Vladimir Emelianenko, Skolko
stoit suverenitet? Moskovskie novosti 31 March 1996, p. 7. In addition to charges of human
rights violations from former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his various foreign
ministers, scholars ranging from the confrontational S. V. Kortunov, Imperskie ambitsii i
natsionalnye interesy (Moscow: Moscow Social Science Foundation, 1998), to the usually
more amiable Sergei Stankevich, Toward a New National Idea, in Stephen Sestanovich,
ed., Rethinking Russias National Interests (Washington,: CSIS, 1994), pp. 2432, are
strident about the treatment of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia.
5. The continuing presence of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
mission in Tallinn to evaluate minority affairs is a great irritant to Estonians, for example,
who believe that pressure from Russia rather than the level of ethnic tension provoked an
international monitor. In May 1999 Estonian President Lennart Meri called for the missions
conversion to an education center to to help Estonia overcome the burden of its Soviet past
(http://www.postimees.ee).
6. For an account of Russian threats to the Baltic states, although the author excludes the
sometimes provocative participation in this dialogue on Estonias part, see Mark A. Cichock,
Interdependence and Manipulation in the RussianBaltic Relationship: 199397, Journal of
Baltic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1999, pp. 89116.
7. It was not uncommon to hear the term little Stalins in reference to Russians in Estonia in
the post-independence period; after the Russian Duma elections in 1993, one prominent
politician referred to cultural Russians in a radio interview as little Zhirinovskiis. Already
by 1995 this kind of usage had signicantly lessened, and media coverage since then has
grown more likely to include positive images of cultural Russians (Teet Kallas has been a
persistent force on this issue, e.g., Vene ajakirjandus, Postimees, 18 December 1999
(http://www.postimees.ee).
8. For example, Maimu Berg suggested that the Estonian press overdramatizes tension and
conicts between cultural Russians and Estonians (Printsessid, parmud ja poliitikud ajakir-
janduse embuses, Luup, 29 September 1997 (http://www.postimees.ee.luup).
9. See Eesti Avatud U

hiskonna Instituut, Tru Rahvusvaheliste ja Sotsiaaluuringute Instituut, and

Tru Sotsiaalteaduskond, Vene Kusimus ja Eesti Valikud (Tallinn: Tru Kirjastus, 1998); and
Aksel Kirch, ed., The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems,
and Trends (Tallinn: Estonian Academy Publishers, 1997).
10. Geoffrey Evans, Ethnic Schism and the Consolidation of Post-Communist Democracies:
The Case of Estonia, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No.1, 1998,
pp. 5774.
11. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1993). Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith included the
Estonian case as instrumental nationalism (Gellner) or historically rooted community (Smith)
in the Warwick Debates on Nationalism, with both approaches allowing for changeable
membership. Ernest Gellner, The Nation: Real or Imagined? and Anthony D. Smith,
Memory and Modernity: Reections on Ernest Gellners Theory of Nationalism, in Nations
and Nationalism, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996, pp. 357388.
12. Ernest Renan, What is a Nation? [Quest-ce quune nation?, 1882], in Geoff Eley and
Ronald Grigor Suny, Becoming National (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 5253.
13. Ibid.
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14. Richard Rose and William Maley, Nationalities in the Baltic States: A Survey Study
(Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1994), p. 53.
15. Estonia has earned the image of the little country that could in terms of economic reform,
and thus an invitation to join the European Union. See, for example, the glowing proles in
the Financial Times Survey, 24 February 1998, pp. IVIII.
16. Remarks of President Lennart Meri at a meeting hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 15 March 1999 (http://www.ceip.org/programs/ruseuras/meri.htm ).
17. Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the International Affairs Committee in the Russian State Duma,
interview with the author in Moscow, May 1999. Lukins successor after the 1999 Duma
elections, Dimitrii Rogozin, is a Communist and relatively inexperienced in international
relations.
18. Though Kadri Liik (Ilves raakis Ivanoviga hispaania keeles EestiVene suhetest, Pos-
timees, 15 May 1999) reported cordialeven jollyrelations at a meeting between the
Estonian and Russian foreign ministers, Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov said that
Moscow could not allow a situation where the Duma refused to ratify the signed border agree
ment (http://www.postimees.ee).
19. See George Kennans comments, in Richard Ullman, The US and the World: An Interview
with George Kennan, New York Review of Books, 12 August 1999, p. 4.
20. Mart Laar, War in the Woods: Estonias Struggle for Survival, 19441956 (Washington:
Compass Press, 1992).
21. Some groups take the territorial issue very seriously, however, seeking especially the union
of extended families divided by the border. Peoples such as the Setus, who, although
Russied, carry on certain cultural traditions in common with Estonians, are regularly
featured in Estonian-language newspapers and celebrated in museum exhibitions. Demonstra-
tions were held on a regular basis in Tallinn, the Estonian capital, demanding that Estonia
reclaim nominally Russian territory inhabited by ethnically like peoples. Given Estonias shift
on the border issue, however, the focus has moved to ease of contact between Estonian family
members separated by the border.
22. Of these three goals, only the latter has been achieved (and has received Western support).
The negotiations on troop withdrawals required three years and played a considerable role in
aggravating Estonian anger toward Russia. For a good discussion, see Mare Haab, Estonia,
in Hans Mouritzern, ed., Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects for Europes Baltic Rim
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 116118.
23. Raul Malk, Estonian Foreign Ministry, interview with the author in Tallinn, May 1994.
24. Vladimir A. Kolossov et al., Ethnoterritorial Conicts and Boundaries in the Former Soviet
Union (Durham, UK: IBRU Brieng Series, 1992), pp. 56.
25. Haab, Estonia, p. 110.
26. Stankevich, Toward a New National Idea, p. 29.
27. In the later Russian-language edition of his EestiVene Piir (Tallinn: Ilo, 1993), author Edgar
Mattisen considers the two key positive changes for border negotiations to be the withdrawal
of Russian troops and the fall of Laars government, both in 1994 (EstoniiaRossiia: istoriia
granitsy i ee problemy, (Tallinn: Ilo, 1995).
28. Raul Malk, interview with the author in London, May 1998; James Carroll, Estonia Presses
for Swift Agreement on Border, Baltic Times, 1420 November 1996, p. 4.
29. On the plethora of issues complicating border settlements for Russia, see Andrea Chandler,
Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States,
19171993 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1998), pp. 101119.
30. In exploring Germanys ambiguous relationship with Europe, Timothy Garton Ash notes the
historical temptation for Germany to act as a European country and therefore tap the
inherent moral good associated with this labeleven if the action in question is the invasion
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of other European countries. Timothy Garton Ash, In Europes Name: Germany and the
Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993).
31. See Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to
Independence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 374, for an excellent account of
the Baltic states yearning for Europeand insistence upon Europes obligation to them.
32. Denise Albrighton, War Memorial to Mark Estonias Complex History, Baltic Times, 39
June 1999, p. 4.
33. See, for example, Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
34. See, for example, Rein Ruutsoos consideration of the problems inherent in the historical
continuity approach. His article excited considerable commentary (Keeruline tee prob-
lemaatilisse rahvusriiki appeared in Vikerkaar, No. 2, 1995followed by an immediate
rebuttal by Juhan Talvepp. 4460). Among the interesting responses were those of Marju
Lauristin (Veel kord Eesti Kongressist, Rahvarindest ja rahvusriigist, pp. 174176) and
Rein Veidemann (Ajalugu ja voim, p. 181), both in Vikerkaar, Nos 56, 1995. Ruutso
published a nal article-length response, nuanced but unrepentant: Vaevaline tee memuaris-
tikast ajaloo uurimisse, Vikerkaar, No. 8, 1995 (http:///www.zzz.ee/vikerkaar/viker8/
ruutsoo.html).
35. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993,
pp. 2249.
36. Ibid., p. 27.
37. Smith, National Identity, treats what are called elsewhere ethnic and civic nationalism as
poles between which identities shift, rather than settling for some kind of geographic
ascriptions. Thus, a Western country facing secession based on arguments concerning ethnic
identity is entirely plausible, making his one of the few frameworks that can account for
Canada and secessionist movements in Quebec.
38. For a sophisticated discussion of the ways in which Huntingtons argument bolsters the case
for nationalism in Russia, see A. P. Tsygankov and P. A. Tsygankov, Pliuralizm ili
obosoblenie tsivilizatsii? [Pluralism or the isolation of civilization?], Voprosi losoi, No. 2,
1998, pp. 1834.
39. Anderson, Imagined Communities.
40. On the role of friendship in breaking down cultural barriers, see Kadri Allikmae, Eesti ja
vene lapsed muttasid uheskoos mooda metsa, Postimees, 17 September 1999 (http://
www.postimees.ee); and Malle Pajula, Vene lapsed lihvivad eesti peredes keelt, Eesti
Paevaleht, 21 April 1999 (http://www.epl.ee).
41. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York:
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1993), p. 8.
42. Alfred C. Stepan, When Democracy and the Nation-State are Competing Logics: Reections
on Estonia, Archives Europeennes de Sociologie, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1994, pp. 127141.
43. Arista Maria Cirtautus, Nationalism in East European Latecomers to Democracy, in
Stephen E. Hanson and Willfried Spohn, eds, Can Europe Work? Germany and the
Reconstruction of Postcommunist Societies (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995),
pp. 2446. See also Priit Jarves treatment of Estonias strengths and weaknesses as a new,
catch-up democracy: Transition to Democracy, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 23, No. 1,
1995, pp. 1927.
44. Rein Taagepera, Ethnic Relations in Estonia, 1991, Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 23, No.
2, 1992, p. 126.
45. Klara Hallik, Eestima Venelased: kas Eestimaa voi Venemaa vahemus in Vene Kusimus ja
Eesti Valikud, pp. 203232.
259
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46. Marika Kirch, Aksel Kirch, Ilvi Riim and Tarmo Tuisk, Integration Processes in Estonia
19931996, in Aksel Kirch, ed., The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society,
p. 53. In an effort to mobilize support, inclusive citizenship measures were promised at the
Congress of Estonia, which did not materialize once independence was achieved.
47. Ibid.
48. Ole Nrgaard et al., The Baltic States After Independence (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,
1996), p. 169.
49. Jaan Kaplinskii, interview with author in Tallinn, March 1994.
50. Peeter Vihalemm, interview with author in Tartu, March 1989.
51. Mark Levin, interview with author in Tallinn, October 1993.
52. This gure is from a 1996 estimate by the Estonian Statistical Ofce. One way to gauge the
political temperament of those discussing the Russian population is whether they use these
easily available post-migration numbers or the more attention-getting but now out-of-date
1989 census data.
53. Thus, the much-debated citizenship exams require some knowledge of Estonian language and
history. Another possibilityshort of granting citizenship on less demanding terms of
residence, for examplewould be to require classes rather than an examination, an approach
favored by Jaan Einasto and Rein Taagepera. Jaanus Piirsalu, Teadlased soovitavad anda
vene noortele keskkooli lopetamisel kodakondsuse, Eeasti Paevaleht, 14 June 1999
(http://www.epl.ee).
54. These quotations are from the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki October 1993 Report, Vol. 5,
No. 20, Integrating Estonias Non-citizen Minority. A more recent treatment was able to point
to greater effort from governmental institutions since 1994, but included the cultural backdrop
of insufcient tolerance among Estonians and Latvians which affects many of these projects:
Forced Migration Projects, Estonia and Latvia: Citizenship, Language and Conict Preven-
tion (New York: Open Society Institute, 1997).
55. On the sad condition of the northeastern cities of Narva and Sillamae, for example, see
Denise Albrighton, Estonias Little Russia, Baltic Times, 1730 June, 1999, p. 16, and
Kertu Ruus, Sillamae igatseb eestluse jarele, Eesti Paevaleht, 25 June 1999
(http://www.epl.ee).
56. Marina Ochakovskaia, the only cultural Russian on then prime minister Laars staff,
interview with the author in Tallinn, February 1994. Ochakovskaia was responsible for the
one early Russian-language publication targeted to the concerns of cultural Russians, My
zhivem v Estonii (Tallinn Gosudarstvennaia kantseliarniia Pravitelstvo ER, 1994). In her
struggle to get the booklet funded she faced tremendous ministerial-level opposition on the
grounds that Estonian educational projects should take precedence over the so-called needs
of such people.
57. I attended two introductory-level courses in the Estonian language during my 19931994
residency in Tallinn. The rst, with a cost equal to one-fth of the monthly wage of many
participants, was poorly taught and attended by exhausted dock workers trying to learn at
least ve of the 14 commonly used cases of Estonian grammar, for fear of losing their jobs.
The other course was excellent, twice as expensive, and attended by better-educated Russian
speakers.
58. Sergei Isakov, then a professor at Tartu University, now also a member of the Estonian
parliament, interview with the author in Tartu, May 1994. The bulk of Estonian-language
tuition is still nanced from abroad. (On efforts to place Russian-speaking children on
extended stays with Estonian families, see Albrighton, Estonias Little Russia.)
59. Thomas Sowell, Migrations and Cultures: A World View (New York: Basic Books, 1996),
p. 58.
60. Ibid., p. 56.
260
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61. Valerii Budiakin, Russian embassy in Estonia, interview with the author in Tallinn, February
1994.
62. N.S. (who requested anonymity), interview with the author in Tallinn, March 1994.
63. Mati Heidmets, Eesti Valikud, in Vene kusimus ja Eesti valikud, pp. 239254.
64. This betrayal of Western trust went over badly, and contributed to a 1994 demarche
by international representatives against the Laar administrations failure to clarify the
signicance of registration and to set clear and manageable procedures for it.
Kirsti Pallysahoo, Finnish embassy in Estonia, interview with the author in Tallinn, April
1994.
65. Peeter Vihalemm, interview with the author in Tartu, March 1989. On the usually unpleasant
process of migrating to Russia, see Hilary Pilkington, Migration, Displacement and Identity
in Post-Soviet Russia (London: Routledge, 1998), especially pp. 116183.
66. See, for example, the pamphlet by Apollon Kuzmin, Kto v Pribaltike korennoi? (Moscow:
PAO, 1993).
67. For a discussion on Estonian and Latvian distrust of urban life and reafrmation of the rural
character of Baltic identity, see David Kirby, The Baltic World 17721993: Europes
Periphery in an Age of Change (London and New York: Longman, 1995), pp. 418422.
68. For a comprehensive discussion, see Ann Sheehy, The Estonian Law on Aliens, RFE/RL
Research Report, 24 September 1993. One cultural Russian in Tallinn remarked to me at the
time, First I was a settler, then a colonist, then an occupant, now an alien. Whats next?
69. Ain Haas, Non-violence in Ethnic Relations,Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1996,
pp. 4776.
70. Michael Geistlinger and Aksel Kirch, Estonia: A New Framework for the Estonian Majority
and the Russian Minority (Vienna: Braumuller, 1995), p. 75. Subsequent study by Peeter
Vihalemm conrmed a profound reorientation from east to west in terms of economic and
cultural inuence, and through Estonias Nordic gate (Changing Baltic Space: Estonia and
Its Neighbors, Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1999, pp. 250269).
71. Marina Ochakovskaia, interview with the author in Tallinn, February 1994.
72. The Estonian State Web Center is available in Estonian, Russian, and English, for example
(http://www.riik.ee).
73. As early as 1996, then Director of the Russian Federal Border Service Andrei Nikolaev
emphasized the functionality of the border arrangement, given agreements between the two
countries border guards, despite the lack of formal recognition (Granitsy na zamke i
granitsy prozrachnye, Literaturnaia gazeta, 4 September 1996, p. 10).
74. The complaints from the Russian and Estonian sides of the border are similar; see Igor
Mikhailov, Vytesnenie, Novyi mir, No. 2, 1998, p. 147; and EestiVene kontrolljoone
uletasmisest Petserimaal, Setomaa, October 1999 (http://www.estpak.ee/ ,setomaa).
75. In contrast to the 72% of Estonians who believed that Russians who live in Estonia are
treated fairly, only 29% of Russian speakers agreed with this statement (Rose and Maley,
Nationalities in the Baltic States, pp. 4445).
76. Interviews by the author in 19931994 revealed a wide divide on the issue of settling the
border with Russia at that time. Cultural Russians gave it a high priority, while most
Estonians saw it as a less urgent issue than, for example, economic reform.
77. Guardian Weekly, 14 December 1997, p. 3.
78. S. Kortunov, Russias Way: National Identity and Foreign Policy, International Affairs,
Vol. 44, No. 4, 1998, pp. 154155.
79. Reecting both this attitude toward Estonia and sensitivity to border issues, a Duma deputy
from the Pskov region requested funding for a military orchestra on the grounds that it was
necessary in order to maintain Russian military spirit at the border. Deputatskii zapros
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[deputy inquiry] No. 45254, Deputy V. S. Nikitin, May 1999, read by the author in the Duma
Parliamentary Library, Moscow.
80. As reported by Agence France-Presse, 16 July 1999.
81. Jaan Kaplinsky, The Wandering Border (London: HarperCollins, 1992), p. 9.
262
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