THE ATLANTIC

WALL (2)
Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway
ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND ILLUSTRATOR
STEVEN J ZALOGA received his BA in history from Union College and his
MA from Columbia University. He has worked as an analyst in the aerospace
industry for over two decades, covering missile systems and the international
arms trade, and has served with the Institute for Defense Analyses, a federal
think-tank. He is the author of numerous books on military technology and
military history, with an accent on the US Army in World War II as well as Russia
and the former Soviet Union.
ADAM HOOK studied graphic design, and began his work as an illustrator in
1983. He specializes in detailed historical reconstructions, and has illustrated
Osprey titles on the Aztecs, the Greeks, the American Civil War and the
American Revolution. His work features in exhibitions and publications
throughout the world. He lives in East Sussex, UK.
FORTRESS 89
THE ATLANTIC
WALL (2)
Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway
STEVEN J ZAL OGA I LLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK
Series editors Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovi c
First published in 2009 by Osprey Publishing
Midland House, West Way, Botley, Oxford 0X2 OPH, UK
443 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016, USA
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2009 Osprey Publishing Limited
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AUTHOR'S NOTE
The author would like to thank Alain Chazette for the use of photos from
his extensive archive. Rob Plas and Marc van Etten provided indispensable
help in helping to track down bunkers in the Hoek van Holland area. Thanks
also go to Wachtmeester Alex van Riezen and to the Nederlands Instituut
voor Militaire Historie for help in obtaining photos and other information
on the coastal bunkers taking part in the Walcheren battles. David Keough
at the US Army's Military History Institute was also most helpful in pointing
out resources for this study.
ARTIST'S NOTE
Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the
color plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale.
All reproduction copyright whatsoever is retained by the Publishers.
All enquiries should be addressed to:
Scorpio Gallery, PO Box 475, Hailsham, East Sussex BN27 2SL, UK
The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon
this matter.
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study of all aspects of fortifications and their armaments, especially
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CONTENTS
I NTRODUCTI ON 4
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 5
Defense sectors . Coastal artillery . Coastal obstacles . Coastal artillery radar
Controlled submarine minefields - The midget submarine threat
Coastal commando units
A TOUR OF THE SITES 24
Belgium . The Netherlands - Norway . Denmark
THE SITES IN COMBAT 52
The Scheldt campaign . K-Verbande in the Netherlands . Combat in Norway
The last battle
THE SITES TODAY 60
FURTHER READING 61
GLOSSARY 63
INDEX 64
THE ATLANTIC WALL (2)
BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, DENMARK
AND NORWAY
INTRODUCTION
The At l ant i c Wal l wa s the l arges t a nd mos t ext ens i ve f orti f i cati on pr ogr a m
in mo de r n Eur o pe a n hi st ory, f ar out s t r i ppi ng the Ma g i no t Li ne in l engt h,
mat er i al , a nd cos t . Thi s is the s econd book in thi s seri es, f ol l owi ng Fort res s
63 on the Atlantikwall on the French At l ant i c coas t . Thi s vol ume ext ends the
cover age f r om the Bel gi an c oa s t ea s t wa r d t o the Net her l ands and De nma r k,
a nd nor t h t o No r wa y . The pr evi ous b o o k f ocus ed on the At l ant i c Wal l ' s
pr i ma r y rol e in r epul s i ng the i nevi t abl e Al l i ed i nvas i on of Fr ance. In the cas e
of t he count r i es c over ed in t hi s vol ume , the mi s s i on wa s mor e c ompl e x.
Coa s t a l def enses in Bel gi um wer e the s a me as t hos e in nei ghbor i ng France
a nd par t of the s a me ant i -i nvas i on s cheme. But for the rest of this regi on, the
Atlantikwall wa s a r es pons e t o mor e di verse threats pos ed by the Royal Navy.
The Bri ti sh art of wa r ha d l ong f avor ed coas t al r ai di ng; the na me s of ma ny
of t he f ort i f i ed si tes me nt i one d in thi s b o o k elicit echoes of pa s t bat t l es
f r om the Na pol e oni c age a nd bef or e. To avoi d repeat i ng the s a me subj ect s
c over ed in t he earl i er For t r es s vol ume , t hi s b o o k shi fts t he f ocus a wa y
f r om ant i -i nvas i on def enses s uch as coas t al obs t acl es , a nd pr ovi des greater
cover age t o other coas t al def enses s uch as radar, cont rol l ed mi nes , and coast al
def ense s mal l craf t .
No r wa y wa s t he first count r y t o see ext ens i ve depl oyment of coas t al
artillery, pr ovoke d in l arge meas ur e by earl y Bri ti sh c o mma nd o rai ds . Allied
decept i on oper at i ons t hr ough the wa r at t empt ed t o convi nce the Ger mans that
an i nvas i on of No r wa y wa s par t of Al l i ed strategy, in hopes of tyi ng down
Ge r ma n f orces. Ther e wa s a revi val of Nor we g i a n defenses in the late s ummer
of 1 9 4 4 . The l os s of cri ti cal U- boat bas es in Fr ance f orced the Kr i egs mar i ne
t o depl oy its s ur vi vi ng f orce t o No r we g i a n ha r bor s s uch as Tr ondhei m,
i nvi gor at i ng Roya l Na v y act i ons t o t hese nor t her n wat er s a nd pr ovoki ng
r enewed def ense ef f orts. When the Re d Ar my pus hed the Wehr macht out of
Fi nl and vi a the arct i c Fi nnma r k r egi on of No r wa y, coas t al def enses wer e
rei nf orced t o prot ect the t r oop convoys s t r eami ng down al ong the coas t f rom
arcti c wat er s .
Al t hough the t hreat of a mphi bi ous i nvas i on on the Dut ch coas t wa s slight
due t o t he t errai n, t he i mpor t a nt por t s of Rot t e r da m a nd Ams t e r da m and
thei r acces s t o t he key ri vers l eadi ng i nt o the Ge r ma n i ndust ri al hear t l and
gua r a nt e e d s er i ous f ort i f i cat i on ef f ort s. De nma r k pr es ent s a di fferent cas e
al together, wi t h its def enses ori ent ed pri mari l y t o keepi ng the Bri ti sh fleet out
of the Bal t i c, wi t h s t r ong gun pos i t i ons t o cover the na r r ow st rai t s.
4
Of the regi ons covered in this book, onl y the Net her l ands s a w ext ensi ve
combat . The Atlantikwall al ong the Dut ch coas t became i nvol ved in the aut umn
1944 fighting t o open the appr oaches t o Ant wer p. The fiercest of these battl es
t ook pl ace on Wal cheren, where British amphi bi ous forces pai d a heavy pri ce t o
overcome a concent rat i on of fortified guns . No r wa y remai ned a backwat er for
mos t of the war, the arctic nort h seeing s ome c omba t in the aut umn of 1944
duri ng the wi t hdrawal of Ger ma n forces f r om Fi nl and. De nma r k wa s s par ed
any ext ensi ve l and c omba t and its Atlantikwall def enses wer e never t est ed.
Curi ousl y, No r wa y a nd De nma r k became model s for the final evol ut i on of
Ger man coast al defense doctri ne, serving as the provi ng gr ounds for several new
types of wea pon i ncl udi ng gui ded t or pedoes , underwat er acoust i c s ens ors , and
infrared detectors.
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
Ge r ma n coas t al def enses on the No r t h Sea dat e ba c k ma ny cent uri es , a nd
duri ng the ref orms of Kai ser Wi l hel m in the late 1880s , the Kri egs mari ne (navy)
wa s assi gned this mi s s i on. Thes e forti fi cati ons were moder ni zed duri ng Worl d
War I, and the Kr i egs mar i ne wa s conf r ont ed wi t h the need t o def end the
occupi ed Bel gi an coas t agai ns t Bri ti sh naval oper at i ons . Ge r ma n coas t al
fortification in Worl d War I wa s not part i cul arl y el abor at e, usual l y consi st i ng
of open " ke t t l e " pos i t i ons (Kesselbettungen), whi ch wer e l arge ci rcul ar gun
pits wi th crew shelters and prot ect ed recesses for ammuni t i on and crew. The
defense of the Bel gi an coas t in 1 9 1 4 - 1 8 hel ped t o s hape Ge r ma n at t i t udes
a bout coas t al def ense when deal i ng wi t h the Roya l Na vy. Bri ti sh s t rat egy
f avored peri pheral oper at i ons and rai di ng, especi al l y agai ns t vi tal por t s a nd
other coas t al obj ecti ves. The cl assi c exa mpl e wa s the Bri ti sh naval rai d agai ns t
Zeebr ugge and Os t end on Apri l 2 3 , 1 9 1 8 , whi ch at t empt ed t o s abot age bot h
port s by si nki ng bl ocks hi ps in key pas s ages . The Zeebr ugge rai d wa s part l y
successful but the Ge r ma n coas t al batteri es inflicted frightfully hi gh casual t i es
A B O V E
Three views of the Atlantikwall
defences. The image on the
right shows a 75mm anti-tank
gun guarding the shores
of Ostend, now part of the
Domain Raversijde museum.
(Author's photograph)
B E L O W L E F T
The crowning glory of German
coast defense in World War I
was the repulse of the British
naval raid at Zeebrugge in
1918. This photo was taken
in J une 1940 following the fall
of Belgium and shows German
troops operating one of the
Belgian Vickers 3.7-inch guns
near the famous Zeebrugge
Mole where the 1918 battle
took place. (NARA)
B E L O W R I G H T
The most vivid example
of the value of coastal defense
occurred on April 9,1940 when
Norway's Oscarsborg fortress
on the approaches to Oslo sank
the German cruiser Blucherwith
gun and torpedo fire. Three
280mm Model 1892/93 guns
remained in German service
with 5./MAA.501, and one is
seen here shortly after the war
when photographed by a US
Army inspection team. (NARA)
"Alarm!" A German rifle section
scrambles from a Bauform 502
personnel bunker, part of
Strongpoint Roon in
Middelkerke, Belgium.
(A. Chazette)
on the rai di ng f orce. The Os t end rai d wa s a failure due t o Ger ma n gunfi re, and
a repeat rai d on Ma y 10 wa s onl y margi nal l y successful . The defense of these
t wo por t s hel ped est abl i sh the mi s s i on for the Kri egs mari ne coas t al artillery.
Ge r ma n doct ri ne di d not f avor def enses s ubs t ant i al enough t o prevent a
ful l -scal e i nvas i on, but rat her suffi ci ent t o deter Roya l Na v y rai ds and
di s cour age Bri ti sh war s hi ps f r om bomba r di ng the coas t .
Wi t h t he ri se t o po we r of Hi t l er a nd t he Na z i s in the earl y 1 9 3 0 s ,
Ge r ma ny e mba r ke d on its mos t el abor at e f ort i f i cat i on effort of the moder n
era, the Wes t wal l , better known t o the Al l i es as the Si egfri ed Li ne. Thi s linear
def ens i ve line a l ong Ger ma ny' s wes t er n f ront i er ha d little t act i cal rel evance
t o the coas t al def ens e mi s s i on, but it ha d a s ubs t ant i al t echni cal i mpact on
the l ater Atlantikwall in t wo ma j or r es pect s . To begi n wi t h, it hel ped usher
in a ne w ge ne r a t i on of f or t r es s des i gn t hat pl a c e d gr eat er e mpha s i s on
s hel l pr oof a nd b o mb p r o o f cons t r uct i on t hr ough the use of steel -rei nf orced
concret e. Unl i ke the Ma g i no t Li ne, these bor der f ort i f i cat i ons wer e relatively
s mal l bunker s ba s ed on the exper i ences of the a r my in the t rench fi ghti ng of
1 9 1 7 - 1 8 . Secondl y, the Wes t wal l ga ve a dde d i mpor t a nc e t o Or gani zat i on
Todt , a pa r a mi l i t a r y c ons t r uc t i on f or ma t i on under Dr. Fri t z Todt t hat
be c a me a s s oc i a t e d wi t h all ma j o r Ge r ma n s t at e civil engi neeri ng pr oj ect s
i ncl udi ng t he a ut o b a hn. Gi ven t he pecul i ar pol i t i cal dyna mi c s of Na z i
Ge r ma ny wi t h ma ny l ar ge s t at e or g a ni z a t i ons vyi ng f or t he f avor of the
Fiihrer, Or ga ni z a t i on Todt ha d s ubs t ant i al bur eaucr at i c i ncenti ves t o pus h
g r a ndi os e c ons t r uc t i on pr oj ec t s whet her wa r r a nt e d by mi l i t ar y necessi t y
or not . Hi t l er wa s es peci al l y s us cept i bl e t o Todt ' s bl a ndi s hment s due t o
hi s per s ona l ent hus i a s m f or gr a ndi os e archi t ect ure, as wel l as his per s onal
exper i ence as an i nf ant r yman in the t renches in Wor l d War I wher e bunker s
wer e a mat t er of life or deat h.
The bl i t zkri eg vi ct ori es in the s pr i ng a nd earl y s ummer of 1 9 4 0 present ed
the Wehr macht wi t h a s ubs t ant i al new chal l enge of def endi ng an ext ended
coas t l i ne f r om the Arct i c Ci rcl e of nort hern Nor wa y, down the At l ant i c coas t
t o the No r t h Sea t owa r ds the Ska ger r a k, s ome 3 , 8 0 0 k m ( 2, 400 mi l es ) . The
f our occupi ed count ri es in the nort hern sect or - Nor wa y, De nma r k, Bel gi um,
a nd the Net her l ands - al r eady ha d modes t coas t al artillery def enses. The onl y
coas t al def enses t hat pl ayed a rol e in the 1940 c a mpa i gn wer e the Nor we gi a n
def enses in the Os l o Fj or d wher e the Ge r ma n crui ser Bliicber wa s s unk on
Apr i l 9, 1 9 4 0 in a duel wi t h t wo f ort i f i ed bat t er i es . As t he Wehr macht
depl oyed for oc c upa t i on dut i es , t hese exi st i ng coas t al def enses f or med a thin
crus t for wha t woul d l ater emer ge as the Atlantikwall.
Ger ma ny r emai ned on the offensive in 1 9 4 0 -
4 1 and pai d little attenti on t o defensi ve concerns.
A significant number of l arge coast al batteries and
r ai l way guns were depl oyed t o the Pas-de-Cal ai s
on the Engl i sh Channel , but this wa s an offensive
oper at i on i ntended t o provi de fire s uppor t for the
pl anned Seelowe i nvas i on of Bri t ai n. In 1 9 4 1 ,
Or ga ni za t i on Todt began a l arge cons t ruct i on
pr og r a m in several French port s t o create massi ve
b o mb p r o o f shel ters t o ha r bor the U- boat fleet
in oper at i ons t o s t rangl e Bri t ai n by s ubmar i ne
bl ockade and commer ce rai di ng; smal l er schemes
wer e al s o under wa y on s ubmar i ne bunkers in
No r wa y and S-boat ( t orpedo boat ) shelters in the
6
Net her l ands . Wi t h the gr adual a ba ndonme nt of pl ans t o i nvade Bri tai n a nd
the strategi c shift t o the Rus s i an front, there wa s s ome di s cus s i on in Febr uar y
1941 of erecting fortifications al ong the Channel as an economy-of -f orce tacti c,
enabl i ng relatively modes t uni ts t o def end very l ong coast l i nes. Hi tl er rej ected
these pl ans , if for no other r eas on t han it mi ght ti p his hand regardi ng pl ans
t o i nvade the Sovi et Uni on in J une 1 9 4 1 . The onl y ar ea t o recei ve heavy
fortification wa s the Channel I s l ands , whi ch enj oyed Hi tl er' s speci al at t ent i on
as the onl y British l ands in his gr as p.
The coas t al def ense di l emma emer ged l ate in 1 9 4 1 wi t h the begi nni ng of
British rai ds al ong the Nor we g i a n coas t . Bri ti sh speci al f orces l anded on the
Lof ot en i sl ands on the nort hern Nor we g i a n coas t on Ma r c h 4, 1 9 4 1 agai ns t
mi ni mal oppos i t i on. Thi s pr ompt e d the Wehr ma c ht t o rei nf orce the s cant
naval coas t al bat t eri es wi t h a r my bat t eri es . In Ma r c h 1 9 4 1 , No r wa y wa s
al l otted 160 ar my coas t al batteri es and in J une this pr o g r a m wa s ext ended by
addi ng 90 batteri es t o west ern Eur ope and 10 t o De nma r k. Bri ti sh c o mma nd o
operat i ons cont i nued in No r wa y at Spi t zbergen on Augus t 17, 1 9 4 1 , a nd a
return rai d t o the Lof ot en i s l ands on December 2 7 , 1 9 4 1 . Thes e r ai ds , as wel l
as si mi l ar ones on the French coas t , wer e mor e a nui s ance t han a si gni f i cant
threat, but they caus ed s ome wor r y in Berl i n. The di rect resul t wa s a Fuhrer
T O P L E F T
A variety of munition bunkers
were developed to support
artillery positions. This is an Fl
246 munition bunker, part of
WN 82 Flak-Batterie Olmen in
IJ muiden which supported the
fortified 105mm flak positions
on the crest of the coastal dune
above. (Author's photograph)
T O P R I G H T
Tobruks, more formally
designated as Ringstande,
were the most widely use field
fortification in the Atlantikwall.
They were small, simple
structures with a characteristic
round opening for a machine
gun or other weapon. Since
they had an open roof and were
built to the lower B1 standards,
they were not designated
"permanent" fortifications.
This example was part of the
IJ muiden fortification zone.
(Author's photograph)
L E F T
This is a superb example of
the open-kettle-style gun pits
typical of the Atlantikwall in
1940-43, armed in this case
with a war-booty Cockerill
120mm mle. 1931 Belgian field
gun. This is part of the Batterie
Saltzwedel neu/Tirpitz of
6./MAA.204from 1941 until
April 1944, and now preserved
at the Domain Raversijde
museum. (Author's photograph)
T O P L E F T
The Dieppe raid led to
an intensive program to
protect coastal batteries
with steel-reinforced concrete
casemates like this Bauform
671 armed with a 150mm C/36
destroyer gun and currently
preserved as part of the
Domain Raversijde museum.
(Author's photograph)
T O P R I G H T
This is another example
of camouflage, a Schneider
105mm mle. 1913 field gun of
4./HKAA.180 built at Thyboron,
Denmark in 1943 with the
Bauform 671 casemate
enclosed in a false wooden
structure to look like a civilian
building. (NARA)
di rect i ve on De c e mbe r 14, 1 9 4 1 t hat or der ed t he cons t r uct i on of a " Ne w
Wes t wal l wi t h as s mal l a number as pos s i bl e of per manent f i xed t r oops . " The
di recti ve recogni zed t hat Ge r ma n occupat i on f orces were stretched very thinly
a l ong t he c oa s t , a nd t hat f ort i f i cat i ons coul d s ubs t i t ut e f or ma npo we r in
r emot e a r ea s . The pri ori t y f or t he f ort i f i cat i on p r o g r a m wa s No r wa y, the
French a nd Bel gi an Channel coas t , the Dut c h coas t , and the Ge r ma n Bi ght, in
t hat order. The emphas i s on No r wa y in this earl y di recti ve wa s a recogni t i on
t hat No r wa y pr es ent ed an especi al l y difficult def ensi ve chal l enge due t o its
ext ens i ve coas t l i ne, as wel l as the i mpor t ance of the coas t al convoys al ong
the No r we g i a n c oa s t t hat wer e bri ngi ng vi tal mat er i al s t o the Ge r ma n wa r
i ndust ry f r om the mi nes in nort hern Nor wa y. The coas t al artillery posi t i ons
ha d t wo pr i nci pal mi s s i ons : pr ot ect i on of Ge r ma n coas t al s hi ppi ng, a nd
def ense agai ns t enemy r ai ds . The initial Ne w West wal l cons t ruct i on wa s on a
very s mal l scal e a nd f ocus ed on rei nf orci ng the coas t al artillery pos i t i ons by
pr ovi di ng select bat t eri es wi t h pers onnel bunker s for their crews al ong wi th
pr ot ect ed a mmuni t i on bunker s .
On February 2 7 / 2 8 , 1 9 4 2 , the c omma ndos struck France agai n at Bruneval ,
spi ri ti ng a wa y a secret Ge r ma n coas t al radar. Thi s pr ompt ed anot her Fiihrer
di recti ve on Ma r c h 2 3 , 1 9 4 2 whi ch r ecogni zed t hat wi t h the s et backs in
Rus s i a, the Atl anti c coas t eventual l y mi ght be threatened wi th Angl o-Ameri can
at t acks . The hi ghes t pri ori t i es f or f ort i f i cat i on r emai ned No r wa y and the
Channel I sl ands. The forti fi cati on cons t ruct i on escal at ed a hundredf ol d f rom
an initial 3, 000 cubi c met ers of rei nf orced concret e us ed in Oct ober 1941 t o
3 7 3 , 7 0 0 cubi c met ers in Sept ember 1942.
In s pi t e of t he s ur ge in c ons t r uc t i on, t he Ne w Wes t wal l p r o g r a m ha d
l i mi ted r es our ces due t o the de ma nds of the Rus s i a n f ront. The pr i mar y f ocus
of the cons t r uct i on wa s a r ound ma j or por t s , si nce these wer e vi ewed as the
mos t at t ract i ve t arget s f or Bri t i sh r ai ds . To pri ori t i ze the cons t r uct i on, a few
doz e n key por t s wer e des i gna t ed as f ort i f i ed a r ea s (Festungsbereicben).
The St. Na z a i r e r ai d, whi ch occur r ed on Ma r c h 28 onl y a f ew days after the
Fi i hrer di rect i ve, onl y s er ved t o i l l us t rat e t he cont i nui ng vul nerabi l i t y of
the por t s . By J une 1 9 4 2 , the Ne w Wes t wal l for the first t i me a bs or be d mor e
concret e t han the U- boa t bunker pr og r a m.
On Augus t 13, 1 9 4 2 Hi t l er hel d a meet i ng wi t h seni or offi ci al s t o outl i ne
t he s t r at egi c a i m of wha t he no w dubbe d Atlantikwall, the At l ant i c Wal l .
" The r e is onl y one bat t l e f ront (the Rus s i a n Fr ont ) . The ot her f ront s can onl y
be def ended wi t h mode s t f or ces . . . Dur i ng the winter, wi t h f anat i cal zeal , a
f or t r es s mus t be bui l t whi c h wi l l hol d in all c i r c ums t a nc e s . . . e xc e pt by an
8
at t ack l ast i ng for we e ks . " For the first t i me, Hi t l er l ai d out s ome det ai l s of
the s cope of t he p r o g r a m, i ndi cat i ng t hat t he Atlantikwall wo ul d i nvol ve
15, 000 bunker s a nd 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 t r oops on the At l ant i c c oa s t f r om Spai n t o the
Net her l ands t o be fi ni shed by Ma y 1 9 4 3 , t he earl i est t i me an Al l i ed i nvas i on
of wes t er n Eur ope wa s likely. Thi s p r o g r a m di d not a ddr e s s t he speci f i c
requi rement s for Scandi navi a, t hough Hi t l er cons i der ed the pr oj ect s there t o
be par t of the overal l Atlantikwall effort. He rei t erat ed t hat the f ocus s houl d
be the def ense of por t s t hat wer e vi ewed as the mos t likely Al l i ed obj ect i ves
whi l e the open beaches in bet ween por t s wer e a s s i gned a l ower pri ori t y.
The Aug us t 1 9 4 2 di rect i ve s ubs t ant i al l y shi f t ed t he f ocus of Atlantikwall
def ens es . Whi l e pri ori t y ha d pr evi ous l y g one t o t he Cha nne l I s l ands a nd
Nor wa y, the f ocus wa s no w shi fted t o the Fr ench a nd Bel gi an Channel coas t .
Of the 1 5 , 0 0 0 bunker s in the pr o g r a m, 1 1 , 0 0 0 wer e al l ocat ed t o the AOK . 7
and AOK. 1 5 (Armeeoberkommando, Ar my hi gh c o mma nd ) , whi ch cover ed
f rom the west ern Net her l ands t hr ough Bel gi um t o Nor ma ndy. The AOK . l on
the At l ant i c c oa s t of Fr ance wa s al l ot t ed 1, 500 t o 2 , 0 0 0 bunker s a nd t he
remai ni ng bunker s wer e aut hor i zed for the Net her l ands . Thi s shift in pri ori t y
wa s in par t due t o the i mmi nent compl et i on of muc h of the f orti f i cati on wor k
on the Channel I s l ands , but mor e i mpor t ant l y t o the gr owi ng t hreat of Al l i ed
i nvas i on. Onl y da ys after thi s conf er ence, the Al l i es s t r uck wi t h a ma s s i ve
rai d at Di eppe, on Augus t 17, 1 9 4 2 . The Di eppe r ai d onl y served t o rei nf orce
the urgency of the pr og r a m, t hough it di d not l ead t o any ma j or change in
its s cope. Its one techni cal effect wa s t o f ocus the need for better pr ot ect i on
of the coa s t a l art i l l ery bat t eri es t hat wer e vul ner abl e in ope n g un pi t s .
The Augus t di recti ve led t o the first ma j or wa ve of Atlantikwall cons t r uct i on,
the Winterbauprogramm ( Wi nter Cons t r uc t i on Pr og r a m) f r om Sept ember
1942 t hr ough Apri l 1 9 4 3 . Al t hough the f ocus r emai ned on rei nf orci ng the
numer ous coas t al bat t eri es al r eady depl oyed al ong the coas t , the Di eppe r ai d
emphas i zed the need t o shi el d the gun bat t eri es wi t h i nf ant ry pos i t i ons a nd
t o est abl i sh def enses al ong the so-cal l ed Freie Kuste ( open c oa s t ) , the coas t al
areas bet ween the port s and other defensi ve zones . Hi t l er dr ew the concl us i on
t hat the gun bat t eri es ha d t o be encas ed in s t eel -rei nf orced concr et e, a nd
i nsi st ed t hat he pr ef er r ed " 2 0 pr ot ect ed guns t o 2 0 0 unpr ot ec t ed g u n s . "
Thi s i ni ti ated the Scbartenbauprogramm in the s pr i ng of 1 9 4 3 .
The Atlantikwall cons t r uct i on pr o g r a m rel i ed on s t andar di zed bunker
desi gns pr epar ed by the ar my' s Fort i f i cat i on Engi neer Co r ps in Berl i n. The
original Westwal l fortifications had been desi gnat ed in the OB (Offene Bettung,
open pl at f or m) or Vf (Verstarkfeldmassig, rei nf orced field pos i t i on) seri es.
Al t hough s ome of these des i gnat i ons were ret ai ned duri ng the cons t ruct i on of
the Atl anti c Wall, a new series of desi gnat i ons emerged. Ther e is s ome di spari ty
in how these desi gns are identified, s o, for exa mpl e, the " 6 1 1 " bunker desi gn
is vari ousl y cal l ed Bauf or m 6 1 1 ( const ruct i on pl an 611) ; R6 1 1 ( Regel bau 6 1 1 :
Some units showed
considerable ingenuity in
camouflaging bunkers like this
example painted to resemble
a house in Ostend. (National
Archives Canada PA-1744386)
9
const ruct i on s t andar d 611) or H6 1 1 (Heer 6 1 1 : Ar my 611) t o distinguish army
bunker s f r om ai r f orce ( L: Luf t waf f e) a nd navy ( M: Kr i egs mar i ne) bunker
des i gns . Ther e wer e a bout 7 0 0 of t hese s t andar d des i gns , of whi ch about
2 5 0 were us ed on the Atl anti c Wal l ; mos t of the new desi gns i ntended for the
Atlantikwall wer e in the new 6 0 0 seri es. It s houl d be ment i oned t hat these
desi gns were often modi f i ed in the field t o better mat ch l ocal terrai n cont ours .
Besi des the s t andar di zed desi gns, there were l ocal i zed vari at i ons of s t andard
pl ans as well as entirely new desi gns, s omet i mes identified wi th an SK suffix for
Sonderkonstruktion (speci al desi gn) .
In gener al , Or ga ni za t i on Todt di s t i ngui s hed bet ween t wo mai n cat egori es
of f ort i f i cat i on: the per manent (stdndige) " b o mb p r o o f " bunker s , whi ch were
fully encl os ed t ypes , a nd rei nf orced field f ort i f i cat i ons, whi ch were usual l y
ope n- t oppe d a nd i ncl uded s uch t ypes as ope n gunpi t s a nd the ubi qui t ous
Tobr uk. The l atter wa s a s mal l def ensi ve pos i t i on na me d after i mpr ovi s ed
def ens es dur i ng the fi ghti ng a r ound Tobr uk in 1 9 4 2 t hat had been creat ed
us i ng concret e dr ai nage pi pes . Offi ci al l y cal l ed Ringstande, the Tobr uks were
typi cal l y us ed as we a pons s t ands fitted wi t h an open ri ng pos i t i on at one end.
Mo s t wer e bui l t for use as machi ne- gun pos i t i ons , but they wer e a r med wi t h
a vari et y of we a pons i ncl udi ng mor t a r s , pedes t al - mount ed guns and obs ol et e
t ank t urret s (Panzerstellungen).
Ther e were five mai n types of per manent , bombpr oof bunkers . The mos t
c o mmo n wa s the Unterstand (bunker) whi ch came in three mai n varieties: the
pers onnel bunker (Unterstand fur Mannscha)Hen), muni t i ons s t orage bunker
(Unterstand fiir Munition) a nd the rel ati vel y unc ommon we a pons gar age
(Unterstand fiir Waff en und Gerat). Thes e bunkers ma de up mor e t han half of
all the per manent bunkers . The utility bunkers (Versorgungsstande) were very
si mi l ar in desi gn and i ncl uded medi cal , ki tchen and other mi scel l aneous types.
The s econd mos t c o mmo n t ype of per manent bunker wa s the gun cas emat e
(Schartenstand), whi ch wa s a fully encl osed gun bunker with an open embrasure
and these ma de up about a third of the per manent bunkers on the Atlantikwall
wi t h wi des pr ead cons t r uct i on begi nni ng in the spri ng of 1943. Thes e were
s upport ed by dedi cated fi re-control /observati on bunkers (Beobachtungsstande).
Ta bl e 1 : Atlantikwall bunk e r c ons t r uc t i on
Re gi on AOK. 15 AOK. 7 AOK. 1 Ne t he r l a nds De n ma r k No r wa y Tot al
Personnel 946 960 554 357 814 3,631
Storage 396 181 149 114 184 213 1,237
HQ 118 68 42 39 95 24 386
Gun casemate 767 876 733 241 432 131 3,180
Observation 54 34 46 6 88 43 271
Utility 72 57 42 13 140 24 348
Tobruks 2,399 3,142 1,338 1,596
7 ?
Total 4,752 5,318 2,904 2,366 7,753 435 17,528
Coastline (km) 708 1,566 818 383 7,314 2,532 13,321
Density/km 6.7 3.4 3.5 6.1 >0.24 >0.17 1.3
Atlantikwall fortifications on the North Sea
Navy Coastal Navy Coastal
Artillery Batteries Flak Batteries
14
2./MAA.201
3./MAA.201
4./MAA.201
5./MAA.201
6./MAA.201
7./MAA.201
8./MAA.201
9./MAA.201
9. 1 ./MAA.202
10. 4./MAA.202
11. 5./MAA.202
12. 6./MAA.202
13. 7./MAA.202
./MAA.202
15. 9./MAA.202
16. 2./MAA.203
17. 3./MAA.203
18. 4./MAA.203
19. 1./MAA.204
20. 2./MAA.204
21. 3./MAA.204
22. 4./MAA.204
23. 5./MAA.204
24. 6./MAA.204
25. 7./MAA.204
26. 1./MAA.205
27. 2./MAA.205
28. 3./MAA.205
29. 4./MAA.205
30. 5./MAA.205
31. 6./MAA.205
32. 7./MAA.205
33. 8./MAA.205
34. 1./MAA.607
35. 2./MAA.607
36. 3./MAA.607
37. 4./MAA.607
38. 5./MAA.607
39. 6./MAA.607
40. 7./MAA.607
41. 8./MAA.607
42. 9./MAA.607
43. 10./MAA.607
44. 11./MAA.607
45. 2./MFA.246
46. 3./MFA.246
47. 4./MFA.246
48. 5./MFA.246
49. 1./MFA.808
50. 2./MFA.808
51. 3./MFA.808
52. 5./MFA.808
53. 1./MFA.810
54. 3./MFA.810
55. 1./MFA.813
56. 2./MFA.813
57. 3./MFA.813
58. 4./MFA.813
59. 5./MFA.813
60. 2./MFA.815
61. 3./MFA.815
62. 4./MFA.815
63. 5./MFA.815
64. 1./MFA.816
65. 2./MFA.816
66. 3./MFA.816
67. 4./MFA.816
68. 5./MFA.816
Army Coastal
Artillery Batteries
A. 1./HKAA.1230
B. 2./HKAA.1230
C. 3./HKAA.1230
4./HKAA.1230
5./HKAA.1230
6./HKAA.1230
1./HKAA.1231
2./HKAA.1231
3./HKAA.1231
4./HKAA.1231
5./HKAA.1231
1./HKAA.1240
4./HKAA.1240
5./HKAA.1240
6./HKAA.1240
StPG
V
^ < 5 ?
Schiermonnikoog * ^.
StPG
Texel
364
Den Helder 3 8
3
& a 4 5 1
4940y34
5

StPG Callantsoog 4r
3 9
StPG Petten A |
StPG Schoorl * 43
N
A
StPG Castricumj44
Festung V
I J mui den 6 J A
StP GZandvoort
6
3l ^2
A 6 3
6
J ft A66
Amsterdam
( D C
5
4 7 <
i Groningen
Usselmeer
(ZuiderZee)
StPG Katwijk l
6
Festung j f c
Hoek van Hol l and 27 1? r
56A^
StPG Oostvoorne ^0 ^2 9 ^
StPG Goeree
l
t ^f % * A K
NE T HE RL A NDS
Utrecht
StPG Schouwenj^
VB
1 3
V 5 3
Vl i ssi ngen
1 4 A
A544 1 5
StPG Breskens18 16
StPG Zeebrugge^
StPG
Oostende204<H_
M ^2 1
N 22
23
1
1 7 ^
Brugge
VB Verteidigungsbereich - Defence Zone
StPG Stiizpunktgruppe - Strongpoint Group
HKAA* Heeres Kusten Artillerie Abteilung - Army Coastal
Artillery Regiment
MAA Marine Artillerie Abteilung - Navy Artillery Regiment
MFA A Marine Flak Abteilung - Navy Flak Regiment
0 50 miles
0 50km
The remai ni ng t ypes i ncl uded a vari ety of headquar t er s bunker s s uch as
c omma nd pos t s (Gefechtsstdnde), a nd r adi o pos t s (Nachrichtenstdnde).
Tabl e 1 s ummar i zes the mai n t ypes of per manent bunker s bui l t al ong the
Atlantikwall by these cat egori es . The AOK. 1 5 sector, whi ch stretched f r om
the Pas-de-Cal ai s in France al ong the Bel gi an coas t and up t o the Scheldt Est uary
in the Net herl ands , had by far the greatest densi ty of per manent bunkers . The
Net herl ands al s o had a relatively dense al l ot ment of bunkers , f ol l owed by the
remai ni ng ar eas of the French coas t , AOK. 7 in No r ma nd y a nd AOK . l on
the Atl anti c coas t and Bay of Biscay. Bot h De nma r k and No r wa y had relatively
thin bunker coverage; details are l acki ng on the total number of Tobr uks built
in these countri es, but even if these number s were i ncl uded, the overal l t ot al
11
Coastal defenses in the Low
Countries often included an
additional seawall to prevent
Allied tanks from exiting the
beach. This is a fairly typical
example along the beach north
of Nieuport. (National Archives
Canada PA-174344)
number of bunker s rel ati ve t o the coast l i ne woul d be smal l c ompa r e d wi th
the other areas of the Atlantikwall. The Nor we gi a n figures do not include the
numer ous fortifications created al ong the coas t either by tunneling into the rock
or usi ng quarri ed r ock for const ruct i on.
Defense sectors
I nf ant r y def ens es a l ong t he Atlantikwall t ended t o be t hi ckes t wher e the
l i kel i hood of i nvas i on wa s great es t , s o coas t al i nf antry pos i t i ons were densest
in Bel gi um a nd t he Ne t he r l a nds , whi l e rel at i vel y thi n in De nma r k a nd
No r wa y. The bas i c t act i cal el ement of the i nf ant ry coas t al def enses wa s the
r es i s t ance nest ( W or WN : Widerstandsnest) whi ch us ual l y cons i s t ed of a
s mal l number of bunker s a nd Tobr uks , roughl y bet ween a s qua d and pl at oon
in si ze. In i mpor t a nt s ect or s , a res i s t ance nest woul d be bui l t a r ound a gun
pos i t i on, s uch as a 5 0 mm pe de s t a l - mount e d ant i -ai rcraf t gun in an open
Tobr uk, or a si mi l ar we a p o n in a full gun ca s ema t e. Several resi st ance nests
f or med a s t r ongpoi nt ( St . R: Stiitzpunkt) whi ch wa s a pl at oon- s i zed def ense
at mi ni mum, a nd s omet i mes up t o a c o mpa ny in si ze. Several s t r ongpoi nt s
f or med a s t r ongpoi nt g r oup (St. P. Gr. : Stiitzpunktgruppe) whi ch wa s bet ween
a c o mpa ny a nd a bat t al i on in si ze as s i gned a f r ont age of a ki l omet er or mor e.
Several s t r ongpoi nt gr oups f or med a def ense zone ( VB: Verteidigungsbereich)
t hough this cat egor y wa s not wi del y us ed in Fr ance or Bel gi um, whi ch i nstead
des i gnat ed the r egi ment al s ect or s as coas t al def ense g r oups ( KVG: Kiisten
Verteidigung Gruppen), a nd t he di vi s i onal s ect ors as c oa s t def ense sect ors
( KVA: Kiisten Verteidigung Abscbnitte).
The l ar ges t a nd mo s t power f ul c oa s t a l def ens e s ect or wa s the f ort ress
(Festung), whi ch wa s not appl i ed t o t act i cal field f or mat i ons , but rather wa s
res erved for s t rat egi cal l y i mpor t a nt si tes s uch as ma j or por t s . The Festung
des i gna t i on e nc o mpa s s e d all def ens i ve f or ma t i ons in the def ended ar ea,
a nd as of t en as not wa s pr i mar i l y c o mp o s e d of Kr i e gs ma r i ne f or mat i ons
r ei nf or ced by He e r ( ar my) f or ma t i ons . A Festung wa s t ypi cal l y cent ered
a r ound a core pos i t i on (Kernwerk), whi ch wa s a heavi l y fortified st rongpoi nt .
The Kernwerk cont r ol l ed the key el ement in the def ense of the si te, s uch as
the s houl der s of a por t or an i s l and cover i ng a river estuary.
Coastal artillery
The cent erpi ece of Ge r ma n coas t al
def ense wa s coas t al artillery. Al t hough
there had been s ome desi gn of specific
coa s t a l arti l l ery we a po ns pri or t o
1 9 4 0 , the e nor mous de ma nds of the
Atlantikwall as well as its relatively l ow
pri ori t y in Ge r ma n i ndustri al pl anni ng
me a nt t hat nearl y all coas t al arti l l ery
wa s a da pt e d f r om naval or field
artillery. In gener al , the Kr i egs mar i ne
est abl i shed the initial por t defenses and
t hese pos i t i ons wer e l ater ampl i f i ed
by t he depl oyment of a r my coas t al
bat t eri es. However , the pat t ern vari ed
bot h by r egi on a nd t i me, a nd these
i s s ues ar e e xa mi ne d in mor e detai l in
the count r y sect i ons of this book.
12
The interior of a Bauform 612
gun casemate armed with a
75mm PaK 40 anti-tank. This
bunker is part of the Domain
Raversijde in Ostend, and the
gun is located further back in
the casemate than in wartime
since the embrasure is covered
to protect the interior from the
weather. (Author's photograph)
Nei ther the army nor navy coul d agree on coast al artillery doctri ne or tactical
practi ces. The navy regarded their coas t al artillery as a l and-bas ed versi on of
war s hi p artillery and f ol l owed si mi l ar fi re-control pract i ces . Kr i egs mar i ne
coast al artillery batteries were nearl y al ways pl aced near the shore wi th direct
vi ew t o sea so that the guns coul d engage enemy war s hi ps by direct si ghti ng if
necessary. Na va l tacti cal doctri ne stressed the need t o engage movi ng enemy
war s hi ps , s o naval fi re-control s t at i ons as s i gned t o each bat t ery ha d r ange
finders and pl otti ng tabl es t o detect, t rack, and target enemy war s hi ps and t o
pas s this dat a t o the batteri es. Besi des the essenti al fire cont rol pos t (Leitstand),
the naval batteries often had a separat e angl e-measuri ng pos t (Peilstand) l ocat ed
s ome distance f rom the mai n battery to ensure greater preci si on of range-finding.
The navy preferred t o mount their guns on f i xed, traversi ng mount s , whi ch in
practi ce meant shielded medi um guns and shi el ded or turreted heavy guns on
sockets. In practi ce, the navy wa s s omet i mes obl i ged t o use field guns due t o
short ages of sui tabl e naval guns .
The Batterie Saltzwedel
neu/Tirpitz of 6./M AA.204 on
the western side of Ostend was
armed with pintle-mounted
105mm SKC/32U submarine
guns in Bauform 671 casemates
starting in April 1944. This
well-preserved example is
part of the Domain Raversijde
museum; the embrasure
is covered by a wi ndow to
protect it from the weather.
(Author's photograph)
13
The ar my preferred t o l ocat e its coas t al
batteries s ome di st ance f rom shore s o that
the batteri es were not i mmedi at el y evi dent
t o enemy war s hi p guns . The ar my s a w its
mai n mi s s i on as repel i nvasi ons or rai di ng
part i es, and engagi ng movi ng enemy
wars hi ps wa s not a hi gh priority. The ar my
di d not like f i xed arti l l ery for coas t al
def ense, but pref erred nor ma l field guns .
Thi s was based on the experi ences of Worl d
War I, such as t hose at Gal l i pol i , where the
ar my drew the concl us i on that it woul d be
i mpossi bl e to protect an ext ended shoreline
wi th sufficient we a pons , and i nst ead opt ed
t o keep the coas t al artillery mobi l e so t hat
it coul d be move d t o a t hreat ened sect or
once the s i t uat i on bec a me clearer. Thi s
pr oved t o be a very short -si ght ed t act i cal
not i on; Al l i ed Wor l d War II a mphi bi ous
l andi ngs had al s o t aken the Gal l i pol i
l essons t o heart and f avored brief, vi ol ent,
and overwhel mi ng at t acks that woul d not
al l ow the Wehr macht t i me t o bri ng up
addi t i onal arti l l ery t o repel the l andi ngs .
In the event, ar my tacti cal doctri ne resul ted
in bat t ery fi re-control conf i gur at i ons t hat pl aced little empha s i s on movi ng
target pl otti ng, and thus had little capabi l i t y t o engage movi ng t arget s beyond
ordi nary direct sight engagement . A Swedi sh coas t al artillery survey of Ge r ma n
practi ces after the wa r st rongl y f avor ed the Kr i egs mar i ne pract i ces over the
Heer' s doctri ne.
Coastal obstacles
The Wehr macht us ed var i ous t ypes of coas t al obs t acl e t o i mpede the Al l i ed
use of l andi ng craft. Thi s pr og r a m wa s a part i cul ar f avori te of Er wi n Ro mme l
when he t ook over the i nvas i on f ront in the a ut umn of 1 9 4 3 . Thes e obs t acl es
wer e especi al l y dens e in Bel gi um a nd the Ne t he r l a nds , but qui t e s par s e in
Nor wa y. They are cover ed in mor e detai l in the pr evi ous bo o k in this seri es
on the At l ant i c Wal l in Fr ance ( Fort res s 63) .
-
A quick source of coastal
defenses came from the use
of war-booty tank turrets like
this APX-2B turret from Belgian
armyACG-1 cavalry tanks.
A total of 13 of these were
used along the Belgian
coast, this one at Ostend.
(A. Chazette)
Coastal artillery radar
Unti l Wor l d War II, coas t al arti l l ery wa s mor e effecti ve in dayl i ght hour s .
Ni ght enga gement s depended on i l l umi nat i on of the t ar get wi t h f l ares or
IN COASTAL MOUNTING | | ] RHEINMETALL 150MM C/36 DESTROYER GUN
One of the most common naval guns used in Kriegsmarine
Atlantikwall gun batteries was the 15cm Torpedoboots
Kanone (Tbts K) C/36. This destroyer gun had been devel oped
by Rheinmetall in the early 1930s, and these weapons were
usually depl oyed in the normal Tbts LC/36 mount whi ch
empl oyed a conventional armor splinter-shield covering
all of the gun except the rear. The gun and mount wei ghed
18.8 metric tons and empl oyed a conventional socket whi ch
had a special adaptor to bolt it to the floor of the casemate.
The gun fired a 45.3kg projectile to a maxi mum range
of 23.5km.
The M272 was part of a family of similar gun casemates
{Geschutzschartenstande), and the first was built in April 1943
wi th 27 being constructed in Norway (5), Denmark (10),
Netherlands (4) and France (8). This weapon was also mounted
in other types of gun casemates, such as the Bauform 671.
In the age before radar,
searchlights and flares were
the primary means of night
illumination for coastal artillery
batteries. This is a 60cm
Flakscheinwerfer 36 preserved
at the Domain Raversijde
museum in an anti-aircraft gun
pit. (Author's photograph)
s earchl i ght s . Thes e t r adi t i onal t echni ques wer e far f r om s at i s f act ory in the
event of s t r ong wi nds , f og or ot her weat her condi t i ons t hat wer e a f requent
occur r ence a l ong the coas t . The advent of naval s urf ace-s earch r adar opened
up t he pos s i bi l i t y of cr eat i ng al l -weat her, 24- hour c oa s t a l def ens es . The
Kr i egs mar i ne ha d been the pi oneer s of Ge r ma n mi l i t ary r a da r and had begun
t o recei ve t he Fr eya earl y wa r ni ng r a da r in 1 9 3 8 ; a bout a hundr ed wer e
compl et ed pr i or t o the out br ea k of the war, but ma ny wer e requi si t i oned by
the Luf t waf f e f or ai r def ens e.
Freya wa s f ol l owed shortl y af t erwards by the Seetakt (sea-tactical) radars ,
whi ch wer e the first dedi cat ed s urf ace-s earch naval r adar s . The Luf t waf f e
s pons or e d a s epar at e devel opment t r ack, a nd the Wi i r zbur g f ami l y of
f i re-control r a da r s for di rect i ng fl ak bat t eri es wa s r eady in 1940. After a
pr omi s i ng start, Ge r ma n r adar devel opment s t agnat ed until 1943 due t o 1941
deci si ons t o cut l ong-t erm advanced research on the pr es umpt i on that the war
woul d s oon be over. The hi story of Ge r ma n war t i me r adar devel opment is t oo
compl i cat ed t o char t here, but the pr og r a m ha d several effects on Ge r ma n
coas t al defenses. Surf ace search r adar s such as Seetakt pr oved t o be well suited
L E F T
The most common
Kriegsmarine coastal radar
on the Atlantikwall was the
FuMO-215 Wiirzburg-Reise,
which was used both in the
tactical search role, and in
some cases as a dedicated
artillery fire control radar.
(NARA)
R I G H T
The FuMO-11 Rennerwasthe
Kreigsmarine's first attempt at
a dedicated microwave artillery
fire control radar, but technical
problems with the design
severely curtailed its
deployment. (NARA)
16
t o the earl y war ni ng rol e and coul d pr ovi de
good, all-weather coverage out t o the hori zon
of enemy s hi ppi ng, as l ong as the Al l i es
were not empl oyi ng electronic j ammi ng. The
Kri egsmari ne created a Na va l Tacti cal Ra da r
Service and erected a chai n of coast al r adar s as
part of the Atlantikwall effort. By 1 9 4 2 , these
early r adar s al l owed Ger ma n coas t al artillery
t o engage Bri ti sh s hi ppi ng in the Channel .
These surface-search r adar s were not accurat e
enough in azi mut h even if reas onabl y accurat e
in r ange, and this led t o further i nterest in
dedi cated fire-control r adar s .
The s mal l numbe r of naval r a da r s
avai l abl e di d not per mi t each gun bat t er y
or even each r egi ment t o have its o wn
s t at i on. The Kr i e gs ma r i ne es t abl i s hed O Z
(Ortungszentralen: naval radar r epor t i ng
cent ers) as the l i nk bet ween t he r a da r
s t at i ons a nd t he va r i ous ot her el ement s of
coas t def ense. Ai r da t a wa s exc ha nged wi t h
the Luf t waf f e' s F MZ (Flugmelderzentralen:
ai rcraf t r epor t i ng cent ers) whi l e naval da t a
wa s pas s ed t o the regi onal Seeko. The Seeko r egi onal c o mma n d cent ers ha d
an artillery staff a nd this staff in t urn pa s s e d the da t a d o wn t o the arti l l ery
g r oup c o mma nde r s a nd t hen on d o wn t o t he i ndi vi dual g un bat t er i es by
t el ephone. Thi s wa s not a n es peci al l y effi ci ent me t hod f or f a s t - movi ng
engagement s a nd l ed t o i nt erest in t he cons t r uct i on of s mal l , i nexpens i ve
r adar s t at i ons t hat coul d be depl oyed at the bat t ery level.
Devel opment of t act i cal arti l l ery f i re-di recti on r a da r s wa s not ma t ur e in
Ge r ma ny in 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 . Ge r ma ny a t t e mpt e d t o a da p t Al l i ed mi c r o wa v e
t echnol ogy t o the Seet akt wi t h the cent i met ri c F u MO- 1 1 ( Renner) r a da r for
mor e preci se azi mut h dat a. However , the Renner suf f ered s er i ous rel i abi l i ty
pr obl ems and wa s never pr oduc e d in a de qua t e quant i t i es . In the abs ence of
this c ompa c t fi re-control radar, the Kr i egs mar i ne wa s obl i ged t o rely on the
l arge F u MO- 2 1 4 Wi i rzburg-Ri es e ( Gi ant Wi i r zbur g) , an excel l ent al l -purpos e
r adar ori gi nal l y des i gned for ai rcraf t det ect i on a nd f l ak cont r ol . Thes e wer e
depl oyed by the Kr i egs mar i ne in the coas t al rol e bot h for s ur f ace s ear ch a nd
artillery fire di rect i on, but the si ze of the r a da r mea nt t hat they coul d onl y be
empl oyed f r om l arge f i xed si tes, a nd wer e very vul ner abl e t o Al l i ed at t ack.
A deri vati ve of the F u MO- 2 1 4 c ode na me d F u MO- 2 1 4 / - 2 1 5 Scheer wa s al s o
devel oped speci f i cal l y f or art i l l ery fire di r ect i on a nd it of f ered bet t er
na r r ow- be a m a ccur a cy a nd gr eat er r es i s t ance t o j a mmi ng ; it wa s never
avai l abl e in a dequa t e number s . A t hi rd f i re-control radar, the Ba r ba r a , wa s
al s o in devel opment but not wi del y depl oyed.
The depl oyment patterns of Kri egs mari ne coast al r adar s vari ed consi derabl y
f rom country to country. In the Net herl ands , the 41s t Ra da r Compa ny depl oyed
32 naval surveillance radars , wi th only one at Langer ak dedi cated t o artillery fire
control and none in the air search rol e. In cont rast , of the 4 1 coas t al r adar s in
Nor way, 2 2 were used for naval surveillance, 10 as dedi cated fire control r adar s ,
and 9 as air search r adar s . The significant difference in al l ot ment wa s due in
part to the l arge number of Luf t waf f e air search r adar s in Net her l ands as par t
Another source of electronic
early warning of approaching
Allied ships and aircraft were
passive radar monitoring posts
like this FuMB.21/27. These
picked up the emissions from
Allied radars and this data was
used to alert the coastal radars.
(NARA)
17
of the Kammhuber line shielding Germany, and the cor r es pondi ng l ack of need
for naval air search r adar s . The l arge number of naval survei l l ance r adar s in
the Net herl ands al ong such a short coast l i ne reduced the need for dedi cat ed
fire-control radars. Instead, the 41s t Ra da r Compa ny depl oyed t wo i ntermedi ate
O MZ f or war d r adar report i ng s t at i ons at ' s - Gr avenhage ( The Ha g ue ) and
Den Hel der besi des the O Z report i ng center in Ha a r l e m t o mor e qui ckl y
di ssemi nate t racki ng dat a. In cont r as t , the gun bat t eri es in No r wa y l acked
nearby surveillance r adar s and so s ome of the mor e i mpor t ant batteri es were
issued their own F u MO- 2 1 4 radar. Thes e di spari ti es coul d be seen in pas s i ve
radar moni t ori ng pos t s as well wi th nine pos t s in the Net her l ands and onl y t wo
in all of Nor way.
In general, Ger man coast al defenses had adequat e coast al r adar coverage for
normal survei l l ance, but the net wor ks s el dom ha d the r es our ces t o pr ovi de
much in the wa y of fire-control di recti on due t o a s hor t age of mi cr owave sets.
Priority in advanced r adar s went t o the Luf t waf f e' s air defense of the Rei ch.
Furt hermore, the Ger ma n naval r adar net wor ks s el dom had the res ources or
resiliency to survive dedi cat ed Allied ant i -radar campai gns that preceded maj or
amphi bi ous oper at i ons . The Ge r ma n r adar s coul d be s ma s hed by air at t ack
and bl i nded by electroni c count er meas ur es ; Angl o- Amer i can r adar t echnol ogy
remai ned years ahead of Ge r ma n t echnol ogy bot h in t erms of the r adar s a nd
electronic count er meas ur es .
To make up for the shortage of radars, the Kri egsmari ne attempted to devel op
a variety of other sensors for coast al defense. The mos t i mport ant of these were
radar interception/direction-finding receivers (FunkmejZbeobacbtungsgerdt) such
as the FuMB- 4 S a mos and FuMB- 5 Fa no, whi ch pi cked up the si gnal s f r om
Allied aircraft and ship radars . Thes e stati ons coul d often detect Allied shi ps at
twice the di stance of nei ghbori ng radars . However, they were not precise enough
for use in fire direction, and were mai nl y used for early warni ng. Allied electronic
discipline duri ng ma j or amphi bi ous oper at i ons dr amat i cal l y r educed their
effectiveness, since they had no val ue if the Allied shi ps and aircraft were not
emitting si gnal s.
Anot her pas s i ve t ar get det ect i on s ys t em wa s t he Zei s s WPG- ZS t
Wdrmepeilgerdt i nfrared detector. Thi s wa s a f orerunner of the cont empor ar y
t hermal i magi ng fi re-control s ys t em a nd wa s i nt ended t o detect enemy s hi ps
by the heat s i gnat ure. Thi s set wa s c ompa c t enough for use in coas t al arti llery
HJ Ml 78 FIRE CONTROL POST, SEEZIELBATTERIE
Kriegsmarine coastal gun batteries included a fire control
post {Leitstand) to identify, track, and designate targets for the
battery. Three-story posts like this one had a rangefinder post
on the top, an observation deck in the front, and worki ng space
on the lower level. The rangefinder post could use a variety of
stereoscopic range finders, usually warship types mounted on
sockets. The observation deck had variety of fixed observation
devices for target tracking, usually a pedestal - mounted optical
sight for determi ni ng bearing wi th the data passed electrically
to the computi ng room below.
Al though the two observation decks were the most
obvious features of such a bunker, the heart of the operati on
was in the chambers located at the base of the bunker. These
compartments mi mi cked the fire control on a warship, but due
to the fixed position of the battery, the firing computati ons
were less elaborate than on a movi ng warship. The computi ng
HEERENDUIN, WN 81, IJMUIDEN, THE NETHERLANDS
room received data from the observation decks above whi ch
were entered into the fire direction computer (Rechenschieber)
and then integrated wi th bearing data from an adjacent bearing
computer {Kleingerat) obtai ned from the battery's small
Peilstand bunker located some distance away. The adjacent
pl otti ng room mai ntai ned data on the targets, usually wi th
range and deflection pl otti ng boards. Once the target's range,
bearing, and speed were determi ned, a firing solution was
computed and passed to the individual guns via a special
swi tchboard {Scholtkasten). The fire control bunker was the
battery's communi cati on hub having radio and tel ephone
links to higher headquarters as well as to other battery posts.
The M178 configuration shown here was first constructed
in April 1943 and was not especially common, wi th one each
in Norway and the Netherlands and two in France. However,
the general features were fairly typical.
The Kriegsmarine was not
especially enthusiastic about
the use of controlled mines for
harbor defense, but began
deploying such weapons in
1944. This is the most common
type, the RMA; the control
cables that led back to the
shore command post are
evident in this view.
(NARA)
bat t er i es , ha d an a z i mut h a c c ur a c y of t wo mi l s a nd coul d det ect l arge
wa r s hi ps t o a r ange of a bout 1 5 - 2 0 ki l omet er s . Li ke ma ny devi ces on the
" bl e e di ng edge of t e c hno l o g y" it ha d rel i abi l i t y a nd cos t i s s ues ; the a r my
s howe d mor e ent hus i as m for it t han the navy. The Var a bat t ery in No r wa y
recei ved a set in earl y 1 9 4 5 , a nd t he a r my depl oyed f our sets in Fes t ung
St avanger t o det ect a ppr oa c hi ng l andi ng craf t. In De nma r k, three sets were
depl oyed at Es bj er g in 1 9 4 5 t o cover the har bor ent rance and a si ngl e set wa s
bei ng depl oyed near Cope nha g e n at Hel l er up in the s pri ng of t hat year.
Controlled submarine minefields
Cont r ol l ed s ubma r i ne mi nes ar e one of the ol des t f or ms of naval mi ne.
In cont r as t t o the mor e f ami l i ar f or m of naval mi nes that are ar med when they
are depos i t ed at s ea, cont rol l ed mi nes are c o mma nd act uat ed and s o remai n
i nact i ve f or mo s t of thei r depl oyment . They ar e mos t c ommonl y us ed for
har bor def ense and they are especi al l y val uabl e in si t uat i ons where other types
of naval mi nes woul d pos e t oo great a threat t o commerci al wat erborne traffic.
The US Ar my wa s one of the mo s t ent hus i as t i c pr opone nt s of cont rol l ed
s ubma r i ne mi nes a nd ha d e mpl oye d t hem in the def ense of the Amer i can
coas t si nce the 19t h century. Al t hough the Kr i egs mar i ne empl oyed buoyant
cont rol l ed mi nes in Worl d War I, duri ng the r ear mament pr ogr a m of the 1930s
the navy hi gh c o mma nd deci ded agai ns t a moder ni zed equi val ent . The British
rai ds on Di eppe on Augus t 1 9 , 1 9 4 2 and St. Nazai r e on Ma r c h 2 8 , 1 9 4 3 ma de
it qui te cl ear t hat Ge r ma n har bor defenses were i nadequat e and that control l ed
mi nes coul d pr ovi de a useful adj unct t o ot her means of har bor defense such
as coas t al artillery. The Kr i egs mar i ne had been rel uct ant t o pl ant ext ensi ve
mi nef i el ds bl ocki ng ma j or por t s due t o the ha z a r d they pos e d t o nor mal
fi shi ng a nd commer ci al traffic as wel l as their own war s hi ps . The cont rol l ed
mi nef i el ds permi t t ed nor ma l acti ve mi nef i el ds t o be set up a r ound the por t s ,
wi t h a si ngl e cl ear channel cover ed by cont rol l ed s ubmar i ne mi nes t hat coul d
be left dor ma nt until an at t ack occur r ed.
The val ue of cont rol l ed s ubmar i ne mi nes remai ned cont roversi al within the
Kr i egs mar i ne, but a pr og r a m wa s begun in 1943. Rat her t han devel op a new
mi ne, f our exi st i ng types of s eabed mi nes were modi f i ed as
cont r ol l ed mi nes by addi ng wat ert i ght fittings for
cabl es t o connect t hem t o s hore. The mi nes were
pl ant ed on the shore bot t om and connected
by under wat er cabl e t o a s hore cont rol
s t at i on. The cont rol s t at i on coul d
command- det onat e the mi nes bas ed on
vi sual t racki ng of an enemy vessel, or
I bas ed on the magnet i c s i gnat ure of
the enemy vessel f r om the magnet i c
detector in the mi ne itself when the
shi p pa s s e d over head. The mi nes
coul d al s o be act i vat ed t o operat e in
a nor ma l , aut omat i c mode , relying
on their magnet i c detector. In total , 25
har bor s were fitted wi th 729 control l ed
w
s ubmar i ne mi nes in 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 , wi th 12 of
t hese por t s in Fr ance. Bot h De nma r k and
the Net her l ands had five por t s covered, whi le
Bel gi um had t wo and No r wa y onl y one.
20
One of the solutions to
the threat of British midget
submarines was to deploy
these Rheinmetall-Borsig R300
rocket-propelled depth charge
launchers to Norwegian and
Danish ports in 1944-45.
(NARA)
The midget submarine threat
The Roya l Na v y began t o pr obe Ge r ma n ha r bor def ens es in No r wa y wi t h
mi dget s ubma r i nes , s t art i ng wi t h a f ai l ed Cha r i ot at t ack on the bat t l es hi p
Tirpitz in the Tr ondhei m f j ord in Oc t ober 1 9 4 2 . Thi s at t ack wa s f ol l owed by
a part i al l y successf ul at t ack on Tirpitz on Sept ember 2 2 , 1 9 4 3 by X- Cr a f t ,
a nd a f ai l ed penet r at i on of Ber gen ha r bor by We l ma n craf t in No v e mb e r
1943. The pri nci pal under wat er def ense t o thi s poi nt ha d been ant i - t or pedo
booms and net s, whi ch wer e obvi ous l y i nadequat e. The Kr i egs mar i ne bega n
t o i nvest i gat e t echni ques bot h for the det ect i on of the mi dget s ubma r i nes as
well as means t o at t ack t hem once det ect ed. Unl i ke the Roya l Na v y a nd US
Navy, whi ch ha d al r eady depl oyed s eabed magnet i c a noma l y det ect or s , the
Kr i egs mar i ne di d not use this t echni que f or ha r bor def ens e, al t hough s uch a
syst em wa s under devel opment by 1 9 4 5 . The Kr i egs mar i ne di d at t empt t o
depl oy acous t i c s ens or s , the El ekt r oakus t i c K HA {Kiistenhorchanlage) a nd
the c ompet i ng At l as Wer ke KUG- 5 . The s e wer e pa s s i ve a cous t i c s t at i ons
t hat wer e anchor ed in ha r bor s t o listen f or enemy s ubma r i nes , us ual l y wi t h
mul t i pl e s t at i ons t o ma k e it pos s i bl e t o t r i angul at e the s our ce of the s ound.
One of the K HA s ys t ems wa s depl oyed at Ho r nb a e k in De nma r k, but t he
acous t i c s ys t ems wer e mos t wi del y us ed in No r we g i a n ha r bor s , wi t h s ome
10 sets depl oyed in 6 ha r bor s a nd f j ords by 1 9 4 5 .
Rhei nmet a l l - Bor s i g ha d a l r ea dy be gun wo r k on a r oc ket - pr opel l ed
ant i - s ubmar i ne dept h- cha r ge l auncher, t he br eec h- l oa ded, s i ngl e t ube
3 8 0 mm Raket enwer f er 3 0 0 M4 3 whi ch fi red a 3 0 0 k g r ocket proj ect i l e wi t h
a 158kg expl os i ve char ge t o a r ange of a bout 3 km. A s mal l number wer e sent
for tri al s wi t h MAA. 5 0 6 at Agde ne s in t he Tr ondhe i m f j ord in Apri l 1 9 4 4
where they wer e j udged t o be r e a s ona bl y s ucces s f ul . The y wer e depl oyed in
modes t number s wi t h coas t al artillery bat t eri es t o prot ect har bor s in No r wa y
as wel l as wi t h 2 . / MAA. 5 1 8 in De nma r k in the Es bj er g def ens e sector. So far
as is known, they wer e not us ed in c o mba t .
Coastal commando units
One of the mos t des per at e i nnovat i ons in Ge r ma n coas t al def ens e wa s the
creat i on of speci al naval c o mma n d o uni t s in 1 9 4 4 . Des ul t or y ef f ort s t o
devel op mi ni at ur e s ubma r i nes bega n in 1 9 4 3 , s pur r ed on bot h by Bri t i sh
21
The K-Verbande submarine
units were designed to be
mobile so that they could be
moved to invasion sites. This
Biberfrom K-Flotilla.261 being
towed on its standard transport
trailer by a half-track prime
mover was burned out by an air
attack on the Amiens-Bapaume
road in early September 1944.
(NARA)
exampl es and by the Ital i an successes in the Medi t er r anean. Thes e scat t ered
efforts were finally cons ol i dat ed by Vi ce Admi r al Hel mut h Heye in Apri l 1944
as Ko mma n d o der Kl ei nkampf ver bande ( KdK or K- Ver bande: Smal l Co mb a t
Uni t Co mma nd ) . The first mi dget s ubmar i ne at t acks wer e conduct ed agai ns t
the Al l i ed fleet off Anzi o in l ate Apri l 1 9 4 4 . In cont r as t t o t he J a p a ne s e ,
Ital i an and Bri ti sh use of s mal l s ubmar i nes , whi ch wer e offensi vel y ori ent ed
and us ed for naval r ai di ng, the K- Ver bande wa s envi s i oned as a novel ,
l ow-cos t , ant i -i nvas i on f orce for coas t al def ens e. To cut t hr ough t he us ual
military bureaucracy, this force wa s i ndependent of regi onal naval c o mma nds .
The K-Verbande eventual l y t ook cont rol of a wi de r ange of unconvent i onal
weapons i ncl udi ng manned t or pedoes , mi dget s ubmar i nes , s hore-bas ed gui ded
t or pedoes , r obot at t ack boat s , and naval c o mma n d o uni ts.
Each of the five K-Di vi si onen (K-Di vi si ons) i ncl uded several K-Fl oti l l a, each
speci al i zi ng in a part i cul ar type of craft. The initial oper at i ons were conduct ed
by manned t or pedoes , whi ch were an i mpr ovi s ed s ubmar i ne consi st i ng of an
unar med, manned cont rol t or pedo on t op a nd an a r med G7 e electric t or pedo
bel ow. The first versi on, the Neger, wa s us ed at Anzi o and wa s f ol l owed by
the i mpr oved Mar der . A t ot al of si x Ne g e r / Ma r de r fl oti l l as wer e depl oyed;
about 2 0 0 Neger and 3 0 0 Ma r de r were built. The Ma r de r ma nned t or pedoes
were agai n depl oyed f r om the French c oa s t in J ul y- Aug us t 1 9 4 4 , a nd
were subsequent l y sent t o Bel gi um, the Net her l ands , Nor wa y, and De nma r k.
The Ma r de r s ubs wer e l ater s uppl ement ed by mor e s ophi s t i cat ed one- ma n
Q
105MM SK C/32, MARINE FLAK BATTERIE WEST (3./MFLA.810), STUTZPUNKT EDELWEISS, NOLLEDIJK,
VLISSINGEN, THE NETHERLANDS
The 105mm SK C/32 was one of the most common Kriegsmarine
flak weapons, and had originally been designed by Rheinmetall-
Borsig for small warships. The basic warship version was fitted
wi th a shrapnel shield, and this type was frequently used on
land. During World War II, wi th the increasing use of this
weapon in the coastal flak role, an enclosed turret mount
was developed, primarily for weather protecti on, since these
batteries were located along the North Sea. There were two
configurations of steel cupola: the rounded type seen here, and
a similar design built of wel ded flat sheet steel. The cupola was
mounted on a variety of concrete schwere Flakstand gun pits
wi th cavities for ammuni ti on stowage around their periphery.
Each battery had four of these turrets, and this particular
battery was also supported by a Fl 246 ammuni ti on bunker-
fire direction i nformati on came from a nearby Wurzburg
A radar codenamed Wilma. Three batteries of this regi ment
were located in the i mmedi ate Festung Vlissingen area, MFB
Nord, Ost and West, all wi th the same weapons. This battery
was commanded by Lt. Krautman and had a compl ement
of 123 troops. One of its turrets was destroyed and one lightly
damaged duri ng an RAF raid on October 9. The battery saw
extensive combat use both in an anti-aircraft mode and
against surface targets duri ng the fighting al ong the Scheldt
in October 1944.
German coastal defense
technology at the end of
the war was a curious mix
of innovation, desperation,
and improvisation. There was
no better example than the
initial deployments of
advanced, wire-guided T10
Spinne torpedoes by the K-
Verbande at Strib in Denmark
in early 1945. The torpedoes
were housed in a concrete
garage and loaded on an
improvised wooden cart.
To launch the torpedo, the
cart was lowered to the shore
by winch, and the torpedo
released and launched off the
cart once submerged. (NARA)
s ubma r i nes whi ch coul d carry t wo t or pedoes ,
not abl y the Biber, and 10 Bi ber fl oti l l as were
eventual l y organi zed. About 330 Bi ber and 390
of the later Mol c h were delivered. The K-Flotillas
wer e des i gned t o be mobi l e, a ut onomous uni ts
that coul d be held in reserve a wa y f rom the coast ,
and then rapi dl y moved i nto posi t i on by l and to
strike at Allied i nvasi on forces. They were carri ed
on a speci al wheel ed trailer that coul d be rapi dl y
move d by r oa d usi ng a hal f-track pri me-mover,
a nd then transf erred i nto the wat er at a sui tabl e
boa t l andi ng or beach.
The K- Ver bande al s o i ncl uded the Li ns e
expl os i ve craft, whi ch were smal l woode n mot or
boa t s oper at ed in uni ts consi st i ng of a c omma nd
boa t al ong wi t h t wo expl os i ve boat s . The expl os i ve boat s were oper at ed by
a si ngl e c r e wma n who s t eered t hem cl os e t o the t ar get , bai l i ng out at an
oppor t une moment . Cont r ol of the Li nse wa s then t aken over by radi o-cont rol
f r om the c o mma nd boat . On st ri ki ng the enemy vessel , the expl os i ve charge
in the rear of the boa t s ank, a nd wa s det onat ed a few s econds after i mpact
by a del ay fuze t o ma x i mi z e d a ma g e . A t ot al of 1, 201 Li ns e boa t s were
manuf act ur ed. A Li ns e flotilla ha d a s t andar d compl ement of 16 c omma nd
boa t s a nd 3 2 expl os i ve boa t s a nd 11 Li ns e flotillas wer e organi zed. Besi des
the s ubma r i nes a nd Li ns e boa t s , the K- Di vi s i onen us ual l y i ncl uded a naval
c o mma n d o pl a t oon ( MEK: Marine Einsatz Kommando) wi t h 3 0 - 6 0 t r oops
for demol i t i on a nd rai di ng.
The K- Ver ba nde s a w c ons i der a bl e c o mb a t in the Ne t he r l a nds dur i ng
the c a mpa i g n al ong the Schel dt f r om the a ut umn of 1944 t hr ough the earl y
wi nt er of 1 9 4 5 , but their mos t ext ensi ve depl oyment wa s in Scandi navi a wi th
f our of the five di vi s i ons s t at i oned in Nor wa y.
A TOUR OF THE SITES
Belgium
Dur i ng the Gr ea t War, the Kr i egs mar i ne' s coas t al arti l l ery f orce experi enced
its fi rst l ar ge- s cal e depl oyment a wa y f r om home wat er s a l ong the Bel gi an
coas t . S ome 2 2 5 guns wer e depl oyed, shi el di ng the canal exi t s t hat led t o the
U- boa t ha r bor in Br ugge ( Br uges ) . The s ucces s of the U- boat s in commer ce
r ai di ng a r ound Bri t ai n preci pi t at ed the l egendary Roya l Na v y rai ds of Ma r c h
1918 agai ns t Zeebr ugge and Os t end. After the war, little of the 1918 defenses
r emai ned, havi ng been s pi ked by the Ge r ma ns pri or t o their wi t hdr awal and
s c r a pped after the war. Bel gi um ha d a mode s t ar r ay of coas t al def enses in the
i nt er war year s i ncl udi ng the excel l ent Vi ckers 9 4 mm ( 3. 7i n. ) pedes t al gun,
a nd t hes e wer e i ni ti al l y oc c upi ed by Ge r ma n t r oops in 1 9 4 0 bef ore mor e
el abor at e def ens es wer e or gani zed.
The Ge r ma n coas t al arti l l ery f orces depl oyed in Bel gi um bet ween 1940
a nd 1 9 4 4 wer e s ubs t ant i al l y l ess t han t hos e bet ween 1 9 1 4 a nd 1 9 1 8 .
Ze e br ug g e l ost its s t rat egi c i mpor t a nc e, as the l onger-ranged U- boat s were
ba s e d out of ha r bor s in Fr a nc e r at her t han in t he mo r e conf i ned wat er s
of Bel gi um. The Atlantikwall in Bel gi um wa s l argel y an ext ens i on of the
Channel def ens es in the nei ghbor i ng Pas - de- Cal ai s regi on of Fr ance under
AOK . 1 5 cont r ol . As a resul t , the def ens e s ect or s here wer e number ed and
24
T O P L E F T
Kettle positions were typical
of the early Belgian batteries
like this camouflaged 155mm
GPFof3./HKAA.1260in
Middelkerke. (A. Chazette)
T O P R I G H T
Some of the early naval
batteries in Belgium had the
advantage of shielded guns
like this 105mm SKL/40 of
7./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie
Kursaal. (A. Chazette)
M I D D L E
Bunkers were often sheathed
in camouflage nets as seen
in this stretch of defenses at
Wenduine near Blankenbergh
in September 1944, part of a
1 .Marine-Funkmessabteilung
coastal radar post. A Wurzburg
Riese radar is evident to the
right. (National Archives
Canada PA-174350)
L E F T
The Belgian coast had a
relatively heavy concentration
of railroad guns for its heavy
artillery. This is the 280mm
Kurze Bruno station in Bredene
with E.696. (A. Chazette)
25
The brains of the naval gun
batteries were contained in the
plotting rooms located deep
inside the fire control post.
These rooms contained a
variety of mechanical and
electro-mechanical computing
devices, which converted data
from the range finders and
bearing devices into firing
solutions for the battery's guns.
(NARA)
Ta bl e 2: We h r ma c h t c oas t al ar t i l l er y bat t er i es i n B e l g i u m, s u mme r 1944
Na v y coas t al bat t er i es B a t t e r y n a me No. of guns Cal i ber
1./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Hamilton 4 75mm
2./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Hundius 4 105mm
3./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Salzwedel-Alt 4 75mm
4./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Ramien 4 105mm
5./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Schutte 4 105mm
6./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Salzwedel-Neu 4 105mm
7./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Kursaal 4 105mm
A r my c oas t al bat t er i es B a t t e r y n a me No. of guns Cal i ber
1./HKAA.1240 HKB Vosscheslag 6 155mm
4./HKAA.1240 HKB Groenendijk 6 155mm
5./HKAA.1240 HKB De Panne 6 155mm
6./HKAA.1240 HKB Westende 6 155mm
A r my r ai l r oad bat t er i es B a t t e r y l oc at i on No. of guns Cal i ber
E.718 Knokke 3 170mm
E.717 Blankenberghe 3 170mm
E.655 Zeebrugge 4 150mm
E.687 Lisseweghe 2 203mm
E.690 Bredene 4 280mm
26
na med in the AOK. 1 5 f as hi on as KVA. A (Kiisten Verteidigung Abschnitt-A:
Coa s t Def ens e Sect or - A) . Ea c h KVA r oughl y c or r e s ponde d t o a di vi s i onal
sector, and wa s further di vi ded i nto three regi ment al sect ors ( KVA. A1 t o A3 ) .
The navy guns in Bel gi um wer e an unus ual l y mot l ey sel ecti on i ncl udi ng
Tsari st 3i n. field guns r echamber ed by the Pol es in 1926 for s t andar d French
7 5 mm ammuni t i on, as well as mor e convent i onal naval guns . The pr edomi nant
ar my coast al we a pon wa s the K418( f ) , better known by its French des i gnat i on
of 1 5 5 mm GPF. The mos t power f ul we a pons in Bel gi um wer e not the
fi xed bat t eri es, but rat her f our r ai l r oad gun bat t eri es. The mos t c o mmo n
weapon wa s the 1 7 0 mm K( E) , whi ch wa s a gun t aken f r om the Worl d War I
Deutschland cl ass and remount ed on rail carri ages, and there wa s al s o a battery
wi th the powerf ul 2 8 0 mm Kur ze Br uno. As in the nei ghbori ng AOK. 1 5 sectors
in France, the Bel gi an coas t had a denser concent rat i on of i nfantry pos i t i ons
than in the nei ghbori ng Net her l ands becaus e of its rol e in def endi ng agai ns t an
expected Allied amphi bi ous i nvasi on. In the s ummer of 1944 it wa s occupi ed
by the 712. 1nfanteri e Di vi si on, 89. Ar mee Kor ps . Si nce the Bel gi an coas t wa s
only 36 miles ( 58km) l ong, the Atlantikwall cons t ruct i on there c ons umed onl y
510, 420 cubi c meters of concrete - less t han five percent of the t ot al .
The Netherlands
Coa s t a l def ens es in the Ne t he r l a nds cons t i t ut ed a bo ut a t ent h of t ot al
Atlantikwall f ort i f i cat i on acti vi ty in 1 9 4 2 - 4 4 . The Ne t he r l a nds wa s never
A B O V E L E F T
Coastal strongpoints
frequently had forward artillery
observation bunkers in the
dunes like this Bauform 143,
part of St.P. Lohengrin in
Zoutelande between
Westkapelle and Vlissingen.
The armored cupola can be
seen on the roof on the bunker.
Note also that the rear entrance
door is well protected by a
machine-gun position in
enfilade. This particular bunker
has been expertly restored by
the Bunkerbehoud foundation
and has a full interior; the rails
on the roof are a safety feature
and not part of the original
design. (Author's photograph)
A B O V E R I G H T
Life in a German coastal
bunker was cramped. This is the
preserved interior of a Bauform
502 of St.P. Lohengrin in
Vlissingen and this small room
would have accommodated ten
soldiers. (Author's photograph)
L E F T
Seezielbatterie Wijk-am-Zee,
2.1 MAA.201, was equipped
with four Bauform 671 gun
casemates as seen to the right
which were armed with 150mm
TbKC/36 naval guns during the
war. Its M473a fire control post
can be seen to the left; it was
in use as a seaside restaurant
when visited by the author in
2008. (Author's photograph)
27
A "battleship of the dunes," the
Seezielbatterie Schveningen-
Nord of 8./MAA.201 armed with
150mm SKC/28 naval guns. In
this view, the multi-tier S414
fire control post can be seen
in the foreground as well as
three of the Bauform 671
gun casemates beyond.
(Author's photograph)
es peci al l y hi gh on t he list of pr o ba bl e Al l i ed i nvas i on poi nt s , si nce the
l ow-l yi ng l and behi nd the coas t al di kes coul d be readi l y f l ooded and ma de
i mpas s i bl e. The Dut c h por t s at Rot t e r da m a nd Ams t e r da m and their access
t o key wa t e r wa ys l eadi ng i nt o t he Ge r ma n i ndus t ri al hear t l and ens ur ed a
s i gni f i cant f ort i f i cat i on ef f ort on the Dut c h c oa s t . A s econdar y r eas on for
heavy def ens e of t he Dut c h por t s wa s thei r rol e in bas i ng S- boat t or pe do
boa t s , whi ch wer e very act i ve in t he naval c a mpa i g ns in t he No r t h Sea.
A number of s ubs t ant i al S-boat shel ters wer e built in Dut ch har bor s t o defend
thi s f orce agai ns t RAF bombe r r ai ds .
The maj ori t y of the Dut ch coas t al defenses were s ubordi nat e to the WB N
(Wehrmachtsbefehl in den Niederlanden: Ar me d Forces Co mma n d in the
Net her l ands ) . The except i on wa s the Schel dt est uary regi on ar ound Breskens
and Vl i ssi ngen; it wa s s ubordi nat e t o the nei ghbori ng AOK. 1 5 whi ch controlled
Ge r ma n ar my units in the Pas -de-Cal ai s and Bel gi an coas t .
There were four pri mary defense zones in the Net herl ands, t wo desi gnated at
the hi ghest level as Festung (fortress) and the other t wo as Verteidigungsbereich
(defense zone) . The single mos t heavily fortified area wa s the Hoe k van Hol l and
( Hook of Hol l and) due to its strategic i mport ance. Asi de f rom including the cities
of The Ha gue and Rot t er dam, this estuary and port area offered access to the t wo
mos t i mport ant rivers in this area of northern Eur ope, the Ma a s (Meuse) and the
Rhi ne. Near l y a quart er of the ma j or forti fi cati ons built in the Net herl ands
duri ng the wa r were l ocat ed in this sector. The defense centered ar ound the Ne w
Wat erway, the late 19th-century canal connecti ng Rot t er dam t o the Nor t h Sea.
The center of the defenses wa s its Kernwerk on the sout h bank of the canal near
the site of t oday' s Eur opor t .
The s econd Festung in the Net her l a nds wa s I J mui den. Whi l e this s mal l
f i shi ng por t woul d har dl y s eem t o meri t s uch a des i gnat i on, the forti fi ed area
s erved t o cover the ent r ance of t he nei ghbor i ng No r t h Sea Ca na l whi ch led
t o Ams t e r da m a nd the I J s s el meer ( Zui der Zee) . The Kernwerk wa s bas ed on
For t ei l and, a Dut c h f orti f i ed i s l and at the ent rance of the canal . Thi s Festung
al s o i ncl uded a heavy concent r at i on of naval fl ak bat t eri es for ai r def ense,
a l ong wi t h forti fi ed r a da r s t at i ons .
28
The nor t her nmos t of the ma j or Dut c h forti fi ed zones wa s VB De n Hel der.
Thi s si te ha d s t r at egi c s i gni f i cance as a ma j o r por t at t he t i p of No r t h
Hol l a nd, cont r ol l i ng na va l acces s i nt o t he I J s s el meer . The f our t h ma j o r
def ens e s ect or wa s VB Vl i s s i ngen ( Fl us hi ng) , whi c h c ont r ol l ed a cces s t o
the Schel dt Es t uar y a nd the por t of Ant we r p. Thi s def ens e s ect or i ncl uded
a s ubs t ant i al ar s enal of na va l bat t er i es f aci ng t he No r t h Sea , as wel l a s
addi t i onal bat t er i es t o cont r ol t he Schel dt . On t he s out he r n ba nk of t he
Schel dt Es t ua r y wa s St r ongpoi nt Gr o u p Br es kens , a s ubs t ant i al def ens i ve
pos i t i on in its o wn ri ght wi t h a s i gni f i cant Landfront. Al t houg h t hes e
def ensi ve pos i t i ons wer e ori gi nal l y under WB N cont r ol , in Sept ember 1 9 4 2 ,
they wer e t rans f erred t o the nei ghbor i ng AOK . 1 5 c o mma n d as pa r t of t he
Channel Co a s t def ens e ef f ort . Wi t h t he a dva nc e of Ca na d i a n a nd Bri t i s h
f orces in Augus t 1 9 4 4 , the AOK. 1 5 r es pons i bi l i t y wa s shi f ted f urther up t he
coas t , t aki ng cont r ol of s t r ongpoi nt s up t o Oo s t v o o r ne . Wi t h the l i ber at i on
of Ant wer p in Sept ember 1 9 4 4 , the Schel dt Es t uar y s uddenl y t ook on great er
i mpor t a nc e , si nce wi t hout cont r ol of t he Schel dt t he por t wa s vi r t ual l y
usel ess due t o the t hreat of the s ubs t ant i al Ge r ma n coa s t a l def ens es . Due t o
thi s c ha nge in i mpor t a nc e , t hi s s ect or wa s r e de s i gna t e d as Festung a nd
pl ayed a si gni f i cant rol e in the brut al Oc t o b e r - No v e mb e r 1 9 4 4 engagement s
whi ch will be cover ed in mor e detai l later.
Besi des the us ual coas t al arti l l ery bat t eri es , the Net her l a nds ha d an
unusual l y heavy depl oyment of Kr i egs mar i ne flak batteri es. Thes e were mos t
often dual - pur pos e 1 0 5 mm naval guns t hat ha d a s econdar y rol e of c oa s t
defense. The wi des pr ead depl oyment wa s in par t due t o the need t o def end
Dut ch harbors f rom RAF at t acks , but the Net her l ands wa s in the pat h of Allied
heavy bomber s headi ng t owa r ds Ger many. So the bat t eri es wer e us ed bot h
in har bor defense and agai ns t the bomber s t r eams . In 1943 al one, the naval
flak batteri es fired 13, 253 r ounds of 1 0 5 mm a nd 2 6 , 9 1 4 r ounds of 2 0 mm
ammuni t i on. The flak batteri es pl ayed an i mpor t ant rol e in def endi ng Dut ch
harbors as they were avai l abl e in sufficient quant i t y t o ma ke air at t acks costly.
For exampl e, on J a nua r y 17, 1 9 4 5 a rai d by 30 Beauf i ght ers of 16 Gr oup i nto
the Den Hel der anchor age led t o the l oss of si x ai rcraft.
Festung harbors in the
Netherlands were based
around a heavily fortified
Kernwerk at the core of the
position. In the case of
IJ muiden on the approaches
to Amsterdam, the WN 73
Kernwerk was based on the
previous Dutch defenses on
Forteiland, a small island
bisecting the channel. The
brick structure in center is the
original Dutch Kustfort built in
1880-87 and armed with Krupp
240mm guns. On either side,
two of three Kriegsmarine
Ml 70 gun casemates are
visible; they were armed with
150mm SKL/40(h) naval guns.
One of a pair of Bauform 631
anti-tank gun casemates is
visible in the lower right,
largely submerged from
erosion. This small island, some
680m long and 300m wide, had
26 major bunkers built on it,
many of which still survive.
(Author's photograph)
2 9
Adjacent to the IJ muiden
Kernwerk was WN.81, which
included Seezielbatterie
Heerenduin of 4./MAA.201,
armed with four 170mm SKL/40
naval guns in M272 casemates.
The centerpiece was this M178
naval fire control post.
(Author's photograph)
The army also deployed some
of its divisional field guns in
casemates like this battery on
the outskirts of Bergen-op-
Zoom with four Bauform 669
casemates for the batteries of
Artillerie Regiment 1719 of the
719.lnfanterie Division. The
battery's casemates are
unusual in that several had an
additional Tobruk position built
on top. (Author's photograph)
WN 73 KERNWERK IJMUIDEN, NORTH SEA CANAL, THE NETHERLANDS
The Festung por t s on t he Nor t h Sea wer e t ypi cal l y based ar ound
a cor e posi t i on {Kernwerk) whi c h cover ed t he mai n por t
ent r ance - i n t hi s case, t he Nor t h Sea Canal ent r ance i nt o
Ams t er dam. The IJmui den Kernwerk was bui l t on For t ei l and, a
Dut ch f or t i f i ed i sl and wi t h t he Kustfort bui l t i n 1880- 87 and
ar med wi t h Ger man 240mm guns; i t was moder ni zed i n t h e
1920s wi t h sever al mor e moder n smal l bunker s. The i sl and was
subst ant i al l y r ebui l t i n t he s ummer of 1943 whi l e man n ed by
3. / MAA. 201. The Dut ch Kustfort was r ei nf or ced by addi ng t hr ee
l ar ge M170 casemat es f or Wor l d War I 150mm naval guns wi t h
associ at ed per sonnel bunker s, pl us a f i r e cont r ol post . These
bunker s wer e def ended by a host of smal l er bunker s cont ai ni ng
ant i t ank guns and machi ne guns, and t wo mor e ar t i l l er y
bat t er i es wer e added, ar med wi t h war - boot y Sovi et 122mm A-
19 f i el d guns. The seawar d beach was cover ed wi t h dr agons'
t eet h t o pr event t he l andi ng of t anks or vehi cl es.
Thi s Kernwerk was par t of an i nt er l ocki ng def ense syst em wi t h
ext ensi ve ar t i l l er y on bot h shoul der s of t he canal . Seezi el bat t er i e
Heer endui n, l ocat ed on t he IJmui den coast sout h of t he canal ,
had f our 170mm SKL/40 naval guns i n M272 casemat es, whi l e
Seezi el bat t er i e Wi j k-am-See on t he nor t h had a bat t er y of
150mm Tsts.K C/ 36 guns i n Bauf or m 671 casemat es. Thi s Festung
was al so suppor t ed by a heavy concent r at i on of naval f l ak
bat t er i es f or ai r def ense al ong wi t h f or t i f i ed r adar st at i ons.
1 . Bauf or m 636 SK f i r e cont r ol post
2- 4. Ml 70 gun casemat es f or 150mm SKL/40 g u n wi t h
adj acent Bauf or m 656 15- man per sonnel bunker
5. Bauf or m 671 SK gun casemat e f or Bri t i sh 3.7-i nch gun
6 - 7 . Bauf or m 611 gun casemat e f or Sovi et 122mm A-19 gun
8 - 1 3 . Bauf or m 631 ant i t ank gun bunker
1 4 - 1 5 . Bauf or m 633 Mor t ar pi t
1 6 - 1 9 . Bauf or m 644 mac hi ne- gun casemat e
2 0 . Local desi gn dec ont ami nat i on bui l di ng
2 1 . Bauf or m 635 Doubl e gr oup ( 20- man) per sonnel bunker
2 2 . Wat er r eser voi r
2 3 - 2 4 . Dept h char ge l auncher
2 5 . St or age bunker
2 6 . Bauf or m 668 6- man bunker used as c ant een
Not e s
1
Marko-Stand-
Marineartilleriekommando-
stand/stabsbatterie: Naval
artillery command post/
staff battery
2
HKB- Heereskiistenbatterie
3
Flagruko=
Flakgruppenkommandostand/
stabsbatterie: Flak group
command post/staff battery
Ta bl e 3: We h r ma c h t c oas t al ar t i l l er y bat t er i es i n t h e Ne t he r l a nds , s u mme r 1944
Na v a l ba t t e r y B a t t e r y n a me Ca s e ma t e No. of guns Cal i ber
2./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Wijk-am-Zee 671 4 150mm
3./MAA.201 Kernwerk IJ muiden Ml 70,611 3+2 150mm
4./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Heerenduin (Prien) M272 4 170mm
5./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Langerak M153c 4 150mm
6./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Zuidzand M671 4 94mm
7./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Noordwijk 671 4 155mm
8./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Schveningen-Nord 671 4 150mm
9./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Westduin 671 4 105mm
1./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Dishoek 4 150mm
4./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Oostkapelle 671 3 94mm
5./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Domburg 612 4 220mm
6./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Westkapelle 671 4 94mm
7./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Zoutelande 671SK 6 155mm
8./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Fidelio 612 4 220mm
9./MAA.202 Kernwerk Vlissingen M170 3 150mm
2./MAA.203 Seezielbatterie Breskens 671 4 76.2mm
3./MAA.203 Seezielbatterie Nieuwe Sluis 612 4 120mm
4./MAA.203 Seezielbatterie Cadzand 671 4 150mm
1./MAA.205 Marko-Stand
1
n/a n/a
2./MAA.205 Seezielbatterie Vineta 671 4 150mm
3./MAA.205 Seezielbatterie Rozenburg S412 3 280mm
4./MAA.205 Schwere Seezielbatterie Brandenburg SK Bettung 3 240mm
5./MAA.205 Kernwerk Hoek van Holland M170/622 4+2 120mm
6./MAA.205 Seezielbatterie Rockanje 671 4 94mm
7./MAA.205 Seezielbatterie Renesse Neu 671 4+3 75mm
8./MAA.205 Seezielbatterie Westerschouwen 671 6 94mm
1./MAA.607 Marko-Stand n/a
2./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Eierland M195 4 105mm
3./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Hors 671 4 120mm
4./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Kaaphoofd 612 4 105mm
5./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Duinrand no 4 194mm
6./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Falga 671 4 120mm
7./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Zanddijk M219 4 120mm
8./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Callantsoog 671 4 76.2mm
9./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Camperduin 612/671 4 105mm
10./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Bergen 671 4 120mm
11./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Egmond am See 671 4 105mm
32
Ar my bat t er y
Ar my bat t er i es
B a t t e r y n a me Ca s e ma t e No. of guns Cal i ber
1./HKAA.1230 HKB
2
De Koog 6 105mm
2./HKAA.1230 HKB Petten 612 4 105mm
3./HKAA.1230 HKB Castricum 671 4 105mm
4./HKAA.1230 HKBHillegom 669/671 6 105mm
5./HKAA.1230 HKB Katwijk 688 6 152mm
6./HKAA.1230 HKB Monster Bettung 6 152mm
1./HKAA.1231 HKB Helvoet 4+2 105mm
2./HKAA.1231 HKB Goedereede 671 4 105mm
3./HKAA.1231 HKB Ouddorp 669/671 6 152mm
4./HKAA.1231 HKB Haamstede 671 4 105mm
5./HKAA.1231 HKB Hellevoet 671 4 105mm
Na v a i Fl ak ba t t e r y B a t t e r y n a me
Na v a l coast al Fl ak bat t er i es
Ca s e ma t e No. of guns Cal i ber
2./MFA.246 Schw.Flak-Battr. Nansum no 4 105mm
3./MFA.246 Schw.Flak-Battr. Delfzil no 4 105mm
4./MFA.246 Schw.Flak-Battr. Termunten no 4 105mm
5./MFA.246 Marine-Flak-Battr. Terschelling-West FL 243a 4 105mm
1./MFA.808 Flagruko
3
Den Helder n/a n/a n/a
2./MFA.808 Marine-Flak-Battr. Dirksz-Admiral FL243/L 401 4 105mm
3./MFA.808 Marine-Flak-Battr. Vangdam no 4 105mm
5./MFA.808 Marine-Flak-Battr. Erfprinz FL243/L401 4 105mm
1./MFA.810 Flagruko Heldburg n/a n/a n/a
3./MFA.810 Marine-Flak-Battr. West no 4 105mm
1./MFA.813 Flagruko Hoek van Holland n/a n/a n/a
2./MFA.813 Marine-Flak-Battr. Nordmole no 4 105mm
3./MFA.813 Marine-Flak-Battr. Waterweg FL243 4 105mm
4./MFA.813 Marine-Flak-Battr. Briel FL243 4 105mm
5./MFA.813 Marine-Flak-Battr. Zande no 4 105mm
2./MFA.815 Marine-Flak-Battr. Vlieland-Ost FL243a 4 105mm
3./MFA.815 Marine-Flak-Battr. Vlieland-West FL243a 4 105mm
4./MFA.815 Marine-Flak-Battr. Den Hoorn no 4 105mm
5./MFA.815 Marine-Flak-Battr. Kreuzberg no 4 105mm
1./MFA.816 Flagruko n/a n/a n/a
2./MFA.816 Marine-Flak-Battr. Beverwijk no 4 105mm
3./MFA.816 Marine-Flak-Battr. Sud-Ost no 4 105mm
4./MFA.816 Marine-Flak-Battr.Olmen FL243 6 105mm
5./MFA.816 Marine-Flak-Battr. Duinenberg no 4 105mm
German fortification efforts
in Norway in 1940-41 focused
on the construction of massive
U-boat bunkers in Trondheim.
These facilities became more
important in the autumn of
1944 after the loss of U-boat
bases in France, leading to
additional coastal defense
efforts in the area. This is a
view of the submarine bunkers
immediately at the end of the
war. (NARA)
Norway
Of the Nor t h Sea coas t l i nes des cr i bed in thi s book, No r wa y wa s the first t o
see ext ensi ve coas t al def ense efforts s t art i ng in 1 9 4 0 , a nd ha d pri ori t y over
the Fr ench- Bel gi an coas t wel l i nto 1 9 4 3 . The earl y emphas i s on No r wa y wa s
due t o a vari et y of f act or s i ncl udi ng t he s t r at egi c i mpor t a nc e of the or e
suppl i es f r om nort hern No r we g i a n a nd nei ghbor i ng Swedi s h mi nes a nd the
cor r es pondi ng need t o prot ect the coas t al traf f i c, as wel l as the i mper at i ve
t o i nterdi ct the Bri t i sh Arct i c c onvoys s uppl yi ng t he Re d Ar my t hr ough
Mur ma ns k. No r wa y al s o pr ovi ded a me a ns t o cont r ol the nort hern s hor e of
the Skager r ak and t heref ore acces s t owa r ds the Bal t i c a nd the nor t hwes t er n
Ger ma n coas t . At the s a me t i me, the No r we g i a n c oa s t wa s all t oo acces s i bl e
t o Bri ti sh naval cent ers s uch as S c a pa Fl ow, a nd vul ner abl e t o r ai di ng
operat i ons by the Roya l Navy. No r wa y pres ent ed s ome uni que pr obl ems a nd
s ome uni que pot ent i al for coas t al def ens e.
PANZERTURM II (SBEHELFSAUSFUHRUNG), FESTUNG LIST A, NORWAY
Wehrmacht defensive positions in Norway made extensive
use of Panzerstellungen, whi ch consisted of obsolete tank
turrets mounted on bunkers derived from the common
Tobruk/Ringstand designs. In this case, the turrets were
leftovers from the PzKpfw II (F) Flamingo fl amethrower tanks,
termed expedient version {Behelfsausfuhrung) as they were
cheaply adapted for the role by blanking off the more elaborate
pivoting visors used on the tank. A coami ng was added on the
front turret roof to i mprove ventilation. A total of 63 of this
version were converted by Schichau in Elbing, along wi th 25 of
the normal series using unmodi fi ed Flamingo turrets; 31 of the
expedient version seen here were sent to Norway and 4 of the
normal series to Denmark; the rest went to the Eastern Front.
The Tobruk is a Bauform 232a dati ng from March 1943 and is
fairly typical of Panzerstellungen, wi th a circular openi ng capped
by an octagonal steel plate bol ted to the roof. These bunkers
were built to the reduced B1 standards of concrete thickness
and so were i ntended to be fully buried except for whatever
openi ng was needed for access to the interior, in this case
some crude steps along the side. The interior was a simple pit
under the gun and a compartment in the back for ammuni ti on
stowage; the unit of fire, the standard ammuni ti on allotment,
was 12,000 rounds. Since they were considered reinforced field
positions, no armored door was provi ded, al though some units
woul d add an improvised wooden door for weather protecti on.
The turrets were originally delivered in dark grey, but later in
"light tropical color" {heller Tropenanstich, RAL 7028), whi ch
was also wi del y used on many other Atlantikwall components.
Sometimes, camoufl age colors were applied over this, but most
photos show a single color.
The battlecruiser Gneisenau's
C turret was emplaced near
Trondheim in MKB 1/507 near
Orlandet in 1943; this image
shows the battery shortly
after its completion but
before camouflage nets
were attached. This battery
remained in Norwegian service
after the war and is currently
preserved as a museum.
(NARA)
This is a typical example of
the early Norwegian coastal
artillery deployments, in
this case a French Schneider
105mm mle. 1913. The kettle
position includes a concrete
slab with pintle, on which
was mounted a traversable
platform. The gun was lashed
to this for rapid traverse.
(NARA)
The enor mous length of coastl i ne wa s a f ormi dabl e chal l enge t o establishing
any s ort of compr ehens i ve def ense l i ne. The Nor we g i a n coas t ext ended
f r om the Ska ger r a k t o the No r t h Ca p e on the Arct i c Oc e a n, a di st ance of
2 , 5 3 2 k m ( 1, 570 mi l es) t hough the act ual coast l i ne wa s a daunt i ng 2 5 , 1 4 8 km
if meas ur ed al ong the numer ous f j ords. Mu c h of the coas t wa s mount ai nous
a nd undevel oped whi ch pr es ent ed e nor mous difficulty in movi ng any l arge
cons t r uct i on equi pment i nt o pl ace f or f ort i f i cat i on pur pos es . On the other
hand, the r ocky coast l i ne al s o permi t t ed the const ruct i on of defensi ve wor ks
by di ggi ng i nt o the r ockbed t o mi ni mi ze the need for ext ensi ve amount s of
steel -rei nforced concret e.
The e nor mous l engt h of the No r we g i a n coas t f orced the Wehr macht
t o di vi de the count r y i nt o three def ense s ect ors each wi t h a Kr i egs mar i ne
c omma nd and corres pondi ng Heer c omma nd. The navy' s sectors were Admi ral
der West ki i st e headquar t er ed in Ber gen, Admi r a l der Nor dki i s t e bas ed in
36
Ta bl e 4: E i ns at zgr uppe Wi k i n g p e r ma n e n t bunke r s i n No r wa y t h r o u g h J u l y 1944
B unk e r S t or a ge HQ G u n P l a t f or m Obs e r v a t i o n Me di c a l T o r p e d o
Kirkenes 14 1 9 0 1 1 1
Alta 9 4 5 0 2 0 0
Moen 5 1 0 0 1 0 0
Narvik 14 1 2 7 2 0 0
Bodo/Mosjoen 14 0 29 0 3 1 o
Trondheim 26 9 12 1 9 6 2
Andalsnes 36 1 16 0 2 2 2
Bergen 42 3 18 1 6 4 1
Kristiansand 50 5 24 4 14 10 0
Tonsberg 3 0 3 0 3 0 0
Tot al
213
( 296)
1
25
( 30)
118
( 220)
13
( 20)
43
( 71)
24
( 44)
6
( 9)
Not es
1
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of bunkers intended for completion
Trondhei m and Admi r al der Pol arkus t e in Tr oms o. In t urn, these sectors were
di vi ded into regi onal sea c omma nds (SeekommandantlSeeko). The Heer uni ts
were s ubordi nat e t o Ar me e obe r komma ndo Nor we g e n ( Nor wa y Ar my Hi gh
Co mma nd) t hough after J a nua r y 1 9 4 2 , the Ki r kenes sect or fell under A OK
Lappl and (later AOK. 2 0 Gebi rgs ) whi ch wa s res pons i bl e for the Fi nni sh front.
At peak st rengt h the a r my ha d five cor ps in No r wa y, i ncl udi ng one in the
Ki rkenes sector not under A OK Nor we g e n c o mma nd, but by 1 9 4 5 this ha d
been whi ttl ed down by the transfer of one cor ps t o other f ront s.
Ger man forti fi cati on wor k in No r wa y initially began in mi d- 1941 wi t h the
cons t ruct i on of rei nf orced s ubma r i ne bunker s in Tr ondhei m. Or ga ni z a t i on
Todt creat ed the Ei ns at zgr uppe Wi ki ng t o speci al i ze in cons t r uct i on wor k in
Scandi navi a. Fort i f i cat i on ef f ort s in the mor e r emot e nor t her n ar eas wer e
cons i derabl y hamper ed by the l ack of r oa d a nd rail l i nes, and pr ompt e d an
ambi t i ous Ge r ma n pr og r a m t o const ruct a s uppor t i ng t r ans por t at i on net wor k
t o link Ge r ma n occupat i on f orces. A further i ncenti ve t o creat e a r oa d a nd
rail net wor k in the nort h wa s Hi tl er' s s cheme t o creat e a ma j or Ge r ma n por t
in the Tr ondhei m area wi t h facilities for a quart er-mi l l i on Ge r ma n mi l i t ary
and civilian pers onnel . The enor mous de ma nds of these cons t r uct i on s chemes
B E L O W L E F T
Besides French artillery, the
Norwegian batteries also made
extensive use of World War I
artillery, such as this Skoda
210mm K39/40, originally
ordered by Turkey from
Czechoslovakia but kept in
production after 1939. (NARA)
B E L O W R I G H T
The difficulty of erecting
concrete casemates in the
remote regions of Norway
meant that most batteries
relied on camouflage umbrellas
like this 240mm SKL/40 of MKB
4/517 Batterie Mestersand near
Syltin 1943. (NARA)
The Atlantikwall i n Scandi navi a, 1944-45
1. Art.Gr. Underavsnitt Sydvaranger 31. Art.Gr. Sandessjoen
2. Art.Gr. Underavsnitt Nordvaranger 32. Art.Gr. Bronnoysund
3. Art.Gr. Underavsnitt Varde-Kiberg 33. Art.Gr. Vikna
4. Art.Gr. Underavsnitt Eismeer 34. Art.Gr. Namsos
5. Art.Gr. Underavsnitt Tanafjord 35. Art.Gr. Orlandet
6. Art.Gr. Kistrand 36. Art.Gr. Trondheim-Ost
7. Art.Gr. Nordkapp 37. Art.Gr. Trondheim-Vest
8. Art.Gr. Alta 38. Art.Gr. Kristiansund
9. Art.Gr. Oksfjord 39. Art.Gr. More
10. Art.Gr. Nordreisa 40. Art.Gr. Romsdal
11. Art.Gr. Varto 41. Art.Gr. Alesund
12. Art.Gr. Ullsfjord 42. Art.Gr. Standlandet
13. Art.Gr. Tromso 43. Art.Gr. Nordfjord
14. Art.Gr. Balsfjord 44. Art.Gr. Sognefjord
15. Art.Gr. Senja 45. Art.Gr. Hjeltefjord
16. Art.Gr. Gavlfjord 46. Art.Gr. Bergen
17. Art.Gr. Hadsel 47. Art.Gr. Korsfjord
18. Art.Gr. Flakstad 48. Art.Gr. Bomlafjord
19. Art.Gr. Moskenes 49. Art.Gr. Haugesund
20. Art.Gr. Vestvagoy 50. Art.Gr. Karmoy-Syd
21. Art.Gr. Svolvaer 51. Art.Gr. Stavanger-havn
22. Art.Gr. Vagsfjord 52. Art.Gr. Stavanger-Syd
23. Art.Gr. Harstad 53. Art.Gr. Egersund
24. Art.Gr. Andfjord 54. Art.Gr. Vanse
25. Art.Gr. Salangen 55. Art.Gr. Mandal-Sogne
26. Art.Gr. Narvik 56. Art.Gr. Kristiansund
27. Art.Gr. Korsnes 57. Art.Gr. Lillesand
28. Art.Gr. Vestfjord 58. Art.Gr. Arendal
29. Art.Gr. Folda 59. Art.Gr. Larvik
30. Art.Gr. Bode 60. Art.Gr. Makeroy
Art.Gr. Artilleriegruppe -Artillery Group
Seeko
Hammerfest
Seeko
Tromso
rSeeko^ k-bJ .*\ Tromso 7 l \
Harstad *2 4 1 5 \ r ^ T I iL I )
Seeko
Narvik
c ons ume d mos t of the earl y s uppl i es of rei nf orced concret e and s l owed any
coa s t a l def ens e f ort i f i cat i on. Loc a l uni t s wer e obl i ged t o ma ke do wi t h
i mpr ovi s at i ons , i ncl udi ng the us e of r ock t o creat e expedi ent defenses and to
use caves and t unnel s for a mmuni t i on and pers onnel shel ters. In compar i s on
wi t h the Atlantikwall in Fr a nc e, No r wa y wa s very weakl y pr ovi ded wi t h
rei nf orced concret e shel ters. So whi l e there wer e over 2, 000 gun cas emat es in
Fr ance, there wer e onl y a bout a hundr ed in Nor wa y.
38
L E F T
A Kriegsmarine coastal battery
in the Arctic Finnmark region
in 1943 armed with a 150mm
UbtsuTbts L/45 U-boat/torpedo
boat gun. In the background is
a camouflaged fire control
post. (NARA)
B E L O W L E F T
MKB 6/511 was deployed at
Skrolsvik with four of these
turreted 150mm SKC/28 naval
guns in MPL C/35 turrets and
became operational in August
1943. This is a fairly typical
example of the use of
dismounted warship guns
for coastal defense; these
guns had served as secondary
armament on the Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau cruisers. (NARA)
The initial steps t o def end the Nor we g i a n coas t began l ate in 1 9 4 0 wi t h
Kr i egs mar i ne pl ans t o a bs or b 13 exi st i ng No r we g i a n coas t al bat t eri es, a dd
addi t i onal bat t eri es f r om capt ur ed No r we g i a n a r my artillery, a nd rei nf orce
these batteri es wi th addi t i onal artillery t o i ncrease the t ot al t o 4 4 navy coas t al
batteries. The difficulties of movi ng cons t ruct i on suppl i es t o ma ny of the mor e
remot e coas t al posi t i ons f orced the naval coas t al batteri es t o depl oy in open
field empl acement s in many l ocat i ons . As a mi ni mum, at t empt s were ma de t o
provi de a concrete pl at f or m wi t h pintle mount for me di um coas t al guns a nd
t o provi de s ome f or m of prot ect ed ammuni t i on a nd crew shelter. The Bri ti sh
coastal rai ds in Ma r c h 1941 infuriated Hitler and tri ggered a scheme t o i ncrease
the Nor wegi a n coas t al batteri es wi t h 160 ar my coas t al batteri es.
The vas t maj or i t y of c oa s t a l art i l l ery pi eces depl oyed t o No r wa y wer e
war - boot y rat her t han s t andar d Ge r ma n field arti l l ery or naval guns ; a bout
1, 100 guns wer e event ual l y depl oyed in No r wa y. In c ompa r i s on, there wer e
Ta bl e 5: Ar t i l l er y d e p l o y me n t
i n No r wa y by c al i ber
Cal i ber Gu n s Bat t er i es
406mm 7 2
380mm 6 2
305mm 4 1
280mm 12 4
240mm 13 3
210mm 73 23
170mm 15 4
155mm 242 52
145mm 50 11
130mm 12 3
127mm 24 6
122mm 5 1
120mm 39 11
105mm 368 95
100mm 46 12
65-94mm 117 30
Tot a l 1,033 260
39
The Gneisenau turret of Batterie
Fjell (MKB.l 1/504) near Bergen
was covered with a camouflage
umbrella typical of Norwegian
sites consisting of wooden
outriggers and wire netting
with painted metal squares
and dried brush. (NARA)
Ta bl e 6: c oas t al bat t er i es , Ad mi r a l P ol a r Coas t
Ar t i l l er y g r o u p C o mma n d uni t
Art.Gr. Underavsnitt
Sydvaranger
HKAA.478 HKB 1/478 HKB 2/478 HKB 4/478 HKB 6/478 HKB 999 MKB 3/517 MKB 4/517
4x 75mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 75mm 3x 150mm 4x 240mm
Art.Gr. Underavsnitt
Nordvaranger
2./MKB.513 HKB 3/478 MKB 2/513
4x 105mm 3x 130mm
Art.Gr. Underavsnitt
Vardo-Kiberg
MAA.513 HKB 1/448 HKB 5/448 MKB 3/513 MKB 4/513
4x 105mm 3x210mm 3x 280mm 4x 88mm
Art.Gr. Underavsnitt
Eismeer
HKAA.448 HKB 2/448 HKB 3/448 HKB 4/448
5x 145mm 5x 145mm 5x 155mm
Art.Gr. Underavsnitt
Tanafjord
HKAA.480 HKB 1/480 HKB 2/480 HKB 3/480 HKB 4/480 HKB 5/480 MKB 1/513
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 6x 145mm 6x 145mm 4x 145mm 3x 130mm
Art.Gr. Kistrand I./HKAA.971 HKB 4/971 HKB 5/971 HKB 6/971 HKB 7/971 HKB 31/971
4x 155mm 4x 155mm 4x 155mm 4x 105mm 3x 130mm
Art.Gr. Hammerfest II./HKAA.971 HKB 3/971 HKB 16/971 HKB 17/971 HKB 18/971 HKB 19/971 MKB 1/514 MKB 5/514
4x 105mm 6x 155mm 4x 155mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 3x 130mm 4x 100mm
Art.Gr. Nordkapp IV./HKAA.971 HKB 1/971 HKB 2/971 HKB 8/971 MKB 2/514
6x 145mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 170mm
Art.Gr. Alta MAA.514 HKB 36/971 HKB 37/971 MKB 3/514 MKB 4/514 MKB 6/514 MKB 7/514
4x 155mm 4x 155mm 4x 155mm 3x 130mm 4x 150mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Oksfjord III./HKAA.971 HKB 32/971 HKB 33/971 HKB 34/971
4x 155mm 4x 155mm 6x 155mm
Art.Gr. Nordreisa I./HKAA.972 HKB 33/971 HKB 2/972 HKB 3/972
6x 145mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Varto MAA.448 HKB 4/971 HKB 31/971 HKB 1/972 HKB 4/972 HKB 5/972
4x 155mm 4x 155mm 6x 145mm 4x 155mm 4x 105mm
4 0
Art.Gr. Ullsfjord MAA.512 HKB 3/480 HKB 5/480 HKB 8/971 HKB 35/971 HKB 6/972 HKB 7/972 MKB 5/512
4x 145mm 4x 145mm 4x 105mm 4x 155mm 6x 145mm 4x 105mm 4x 150mm
Art.Gr. Tromso HKAA.773 HKB 18/971 HKB 8/972 MKB 2/512
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Balsfjord IV./HKAA.971 HKB 37/971 HKB 16/972 HKB 17/972 HKB 18/972 HKB 999 MKB 1/512
4x 155mm 4x 105mm 3x 210mm 3x 210mm 4x 120mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Senja II./HKAA.972 HKB 2/480 HKB 19/972 HKB 20/972 HKB 21/972 HKB 22/972 MKB 4/512
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 155mm 3x 150mm
Art.Gr. Gavlfjord HKAA.480 HKB 1/480 HKB 4/448 HKB 34/971
4x 105mm 4x 155mm 6x 155mm
Art.Gr. Vagsfjord MAA.511 MKB 1/511 MKB 2/511 MKB 3/511 MKB 5/511 MKB 6/511 MKB 7/511
3x 170mm 3x 105mm 4x 155mm 4x 406mm 4x 150mm 3x210mm
Art.Gr. Harstad II./HKAA.971 HKB 5/983 HKB 6/983
4x 155mm 4x 155mm
Art.Gr. Andfjord II./HKAA.983 HKB 12/983 HKB 13/983 HKB 14/983 HKB 15/983
4x 155mm 4x 155mm 4x 145mm 6x 155mm
Art.Gr. Salangen I./HKAA.983 HKB 1/983 HKB 2/983 HKB 3/983
4x 155mm 6x 150mm 3x 210mm
Art.Gr. Narvik III./HKAA.973 HKB 31/973 HKB 32/973 HKB 33/973 HKB 34/973 HKB 35/973 HKB 36/973 HKB 37/973
3x 210mm 3x 210mm 4x 105mm 6x 155mm 4x 105mm 4x 120mm 4x 105mm
Ar t . Ob. Gr .
Vest -Lof ot en
HKAA.971
Art.Gr. Hadsel I./HKAA.971 HKB 16/971 HKB 46/973 HKB 49/973
6x 155mm 6x 155mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Flakstad III./HKAA.971 HKB 5/448 HKB 4/480 HKB 2/971 HKB 5/971 HKB 32/971 HKB 36/971
3x210mm 6x 155mm 4x 105mm 4x 155mm 4x 155mm 4x 155mm
Art.Gr. Moskenes 5./MAA.514 MKB 2/514 MKB 5/514
4x 170mm 6x 155mm
Art.Gr. Vestvagoy MAA.514 MKB 1/514 MKB 4/514 MKB 6/514 HKB 3/971
3x 130mm 3x 130mm 3x 130mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Svolvaer IV./HKAA.973 HKB 47/973 HKB 48/973
6x 155mm 4x 105mm
Ar t . Ob. Gr .
L odi nge n
MAR.30
Art. Gr. Ofotfjord 3./ MAA516 MKB 2/516 MKB 3/516
4x 150mm 4x 305mm
Art.Gr. Korsnes V./HKAA.973 HKB 61/973 HKB 62/973 HKB 63/973 HKB 64/973
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Vestfjord MAA.516 MKB 1/516 MKB 4/516 MKB 5/516 MKB 7/516 MKB 8/516
4x 150mm 3x 406mm 4x 150mm 4x 100mm 4x 105mm
The most powerful of the
coastal guns deployed in
Norway was Batterie Trondenes
I armed with a 406mm SKL/45
"Adolfkanone." This scale plan
from a US Army report shows
its pedestal mounting in a
lightly armored turret. (NARA)
A view during the construction
of Batterie Trondenes I of MKB
5/511 nearHarstad shortly
before its completion in the
summer of 1943 gives some
idea of the size of the weapon.
(NARA)
-M
s
a bo ut 2 , 2 0 0 guns depl oyed on the Atlantikwall in Fr ance. The three mos t
nume r ous t ypes in No r wa y wer e Fr ench, the Schnei der 1 0 5 mm ml e 1913
( K331( f ) : 2 3 1 g uns , 58 bat t er i es ) ; Schnei der 1 0 5 mm ml e. 1 9 3 6 ( K332( f ) :
9 5 g uns , 2 4 bat t eri es ) a nd the Schnei der 1 5 5 mm ml e 1 9 1 7 ( K416( f ) :
109 guns , 2 1 bat t eri es ) . The mos t wi del y us ed Ge r ma n gun wa s the obs ol et e
2 1 c m Mo r s e r 18 wi t h 4 0 in servi ce in No r wa y in 13 bat t eri es. Depl oyment
by cal i ber wa s as des cr i bed in Tabl e 5.
By 1 9 4 4 , the Wehr ma c ht in No r wa y event ual l y depl oyed a t ot al of 12
naval coas t al artillery bat t al i ons a nd 11 ar my coas t artillery bat t al i ons . Bot h
t ypes of arti l l ery f or mat i ons wer e under naval c o mma nd , s ubor di nat e t o a
speci al arti llery staff at the regi onal Seeko headquar t er s . Due t o the di st ances
i nvol ved, as wel l as the conf us i ng geogr aphi c i nt ermi xt ure of naval and ar my
batteri es, the Wehr macht in No r wa y deci ded t o create an i ntermedi ate artillery
c o mma n d s t r uct ur e not us ual l y f ound el s ewhere on the Atlantikwall, the
Arti l l ery Gr o u p (Art. Gp. : Artilleriegruppe), whi ch cont rol l ed mi xed naval
and a r my bat t eri es as det ai l ed bel ow. Some of these gr oups were fairly l arge,
wi t h several gun bat t eri es as wel l as as s oci at ed t or pedo and r adar batteri es.
As a resul t , s ome of the l arger arti l l ery g r oups wer e in t urn br oken
do wn i nt o t act i cal artillery s ub- gr oups (Artillerie-Untergruppe) t o cont rol a
speci f i c obj ect i ve, s uch as a f j ord.
In the cas es of Bergen a nd Na r vi k,
the sheer number of bat t eri es in
t hese s ect ors f orced the creat i on
of three super gr oups t o coordi nat e
the arti llery f or mat i ons . Ar t . Ob. Gr .
(Artillerie-Obergruppen) For de
cont rol l ed the artillery gr oups in the
Bergen ar ea, Art . Ob. Gr. Vest -Lof ot en
cont r ol l ed five arti l l ery gr oups on
the s out hern appr oaches t o Nar vi k,
and Ar t . Ob. Gr . Lodi ngen cont rol l ed
three artillery gr oups in the Ha r s t a d
ar ea on the nort hern Na r vi k
a ppr oa c he s . In cont r as t t o other
ar eas of the Atlantikwall s uch as
Fr ance a nd the Net her l a nds , there
wer e f ew dedi cat ed fl ak regi ment s
f or coas t al def ens e. I ns t ead, fl ak
bat t eri es wer e depl oyed wi t hi n the
a r my coas t al artillery regi ment s.
1 1
42
Tabl e 7: coast al bat t er i es, Admi r a l Nor t h Coas t
Ar t i l l er y gr oup C o mma n d uni t
Art.Gr. Folda I./HKAA.974 HKB 1/971 HKB 7/971 HKB 1/974 HKB 2/974 HKB 3/974 HKB 8/974
6x 145mm 4x 105mm 6x 155mm 4x 105mm 6x 210mm 4x 88mm
Art.Gr. Bodo MAA.510 HKB 4/974 HKB 5/974 HKB 6/974 HKB 7/974 HKB 9/974 HKB 10/974 MKB 4/510
3x 210mm 4x 105mm 6x 155mm 4x 105mm 5x 155mm 4x 105mm 4x 150mm
MKB 5/510 MKB 6/510
4x 150mm 4x 150mm
Art.Gr. Sandessjoen II./HKAA.974 HKB 16/974 HKB 17/974 HKB 18/974 HKB 19/974 HKB 20/974 HKB 21/974 HKB 22/974
4x 155mm 4x 75mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 155mm 4x 105mm 4x105mm
MKB 1/510 MKB 2/510 MKB 3/510
4x 127mm 4x 120mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Bronnoysund lll.HKAA.974 HKB 31/974 HKB 32/974 HKB 33/974
6x 155mm 4x 155mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Vikna MAA.500 HKB 1/975 MKB 1/500 MKB 2/500
4x 75mm 4x 127mm 4x 127mm
Art.Gr. Namsos I./HKAA.975 HKB 2/975 HKB 3/975 HKB 4/975 HKB 5/975 HKB 6/975 HKB 7/975 HKB 8/975
6x 155mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 3x 210mm 5x 155mm 5x 105mm
Art.Gr. Orlandet MAA.507 HKB 16/975 HKB 18/975 HKB 19/975 MKB 1/507 MKB 4/507
5x 105mm 4x 105mm 6x 150mm 3x 280mm 3x 280mm
Art.Gr. Trondheim-Ost MAA.506 MKB 1/506 MKB 2/506 MKB 3/506 MKB 4/506 MKB 5/506 HKB 17/975
3x 150mm+
2x 210mm
4x 150mm+
2x210mm
4x 150mm 3x 120mm 3x 105mm 3x 150mm
Art.Gr. Trondheim-
Vest
II./HKAA.975 HKB 20/975 HKB 21/975 HKB 22/975 HKB 23/975 HKB 24/975 HKB 25/975 HKB 26/975
4x 155mm 6x 210mm 4x 150mm 4x 155mm 4x 76mm 4x 76mm 4x 76mm
HKB 27/975 HKB 6/971 HKB 2/976
4x 105mm 4x 155mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Kristiansund I./HKAA.976 HKB 3/976 HKB 4/976 HKB 5/976 HKB 6/976 HKB 7/976 MKB 3/505
4x 120mm 4x 88mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 155mm 3x 150mm
Art.Gr. More MAA.505 HKB 16/976 HKB 17/976 HKB 18/976 HKB 24/976 HKB 25/976 MKB 1/505
4x 88mm 6x 155mm 6x 155mm 4x 105mm 4x 88mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Romsdal II./HKAA.976 HKB 19/976 HKB 20/976 HKB 21/976 HKB 22/976
4x 105mm 3x210mm 6x 155mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Alesund lll.HKAA.976 HKB 23/976 HKB 30/976 HKB 31/976 HKB 32/976 HKB 33/976 HKB 34/976 MKB 2/505
4x 105mm 4x 88mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 88mm 3x 150mm
Art.Gr. Stadlandet IV./HKAA.976 HKB 35/976
4x 105mm
HKB 36/976
4x 105mm
HKB 37/976
4x 105mm
HKB 38/976
6x 155mm
43
Ta bl e 8: c oas t al bat t er i es , Ad mi r a l We s t Coas t
Ar t i l l er y g r o u p C o mma n d uni t
Art. Ob. Gr. Forde HKAA.981 HKB 5/981
Art.Gr. Nordfjord I./HKAA.981 HKB 1/981 HKB 2/981 HKB 3/981 HKB 4/981 HKB 6/981 HKB 17/981 MKB 9/504
4x 155mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 3x 130mm
Art.Gr. Sognefjord HKAA.981 HKB 11/981 HKB 12/981 HKB 13/981 HKB 14/981 HKB 15/981 HKB 16/981 MKB 7/504
4x 105mm 4x 88mm 4x 105mm 4x 100mm 4x 100mm 4x 105mm 4x 127mm
Art.Gr. Hjeltefjord III./HKAA.977 HKB 31/977 HKB 32/977 HKB 33/977 HKB 34/977 HKB 35, 37/977 HKB 38/977 MKB 5/504
4x 145mm 5x 155mm 4x210mm 4x 105mm 4+4x 88mm 5x 105mm 3x 150mm
Art.Gr. Bergen MAA.504 HKB 36/977 MKB 1/504 MKB 2/504 MKB 3/504 MKB 4/504 MKB 11/504
4x 105mm 3x210mm 3x 240mm 3x 240mm 3x 210mm 3x 280mm
Art.Gr. Korsfjord IV./HKAA.977 HKB 46/977 HKB 47/977 HKB 48/977 HKB 49/977 HKB 50/977 MKB 6/504 MKB 8/504
4x 88mm 3x 210mm 4x 100mm 4x 105mm 4x 100mm 4x 150mm 4x 127mm
Art.Gr. Bomlafjord IV./HKAA.977 HKB 61/977 HKB 62/977 HKB 63/977
4x 88mm 4x 88mm 6x 155mm
Art.Gr. Haugesund V./HKAA.977 HKB 64/977 HKB 65/977 HKB 66/977 HKB 68/977 MKB 10/504
3x 210mm 4x 145mm 6x 155mm 4x 75mm 4x 150mm
Art.Gr. Karmoy-Syd IV./HKAA.978 HKB 1/978 HKB 2/978 HKB 3/978 HKB 67/977
6x 155mm 4x 105mm 4x 122mm 4x 145mm
Art.Gr. Stavanger-Havn 6./HKAA.978 HKB 4/978 HKB 6/978 MKB 1/503
4x 150mm 4x 100mm 3x 100mm
Art.Gr. Stavanger-Syd I./HKAA.978 HKB 8/978 HKB 9/978 HKB 16/978 HKB 17/978 MKB 3/503 MKB 6/503
4x 100mm 4x 210mm 4x 100mm 4x 105mm 4x 170mm 4x 240mm
Art.Gr. Egersund II./HKAA.978 HKB 18/978 HKB 19/978 HKB 20/978 MKB 4/503
4x 88mm 4x 210mm 4x 100mm 4x 127mm
Art.Gr. Vanse III./HKAA.978 HKB 21/978 HKB 22/978 HKB 23/978 HKB 24/978 HKB 25/978 MKB 5/503
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 6x 150mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 3x 150mm
Art.Gr. Mandal/Sogne II./HKAA.979 HKB 17/979 HKB 18/979 HKB 19/979 HKB 20/979 HKB 21/979
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 155mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Kristiansand MAA.502 MKB 1/502 MKB 2/502 MKB 3/502 MKB 5/502 MKB 6/502
3x 150mm 3x 150mm 2x 210mm 4x 240mm 3x 380mm
Art.Gr. Lillesand III./HKAA.979 HKB 31/979 HKB 32/979
4x 105mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Arendal III./HKAA.979 HKB 33/979 HKB 34/979 HKB 35/979 HKB 36/979 HKB 37/979
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm
Art.Gr. Larvik I./HKAA.980 HKB 1/980 HKB 2/980 HKB 3/980 HKB 4/980 HKB 5/980
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 120mm 4x 88mm 4x 120mm
44
Art.Gr. Makeroy MAA.501 HKB 8/980 MKB 3/501 MKB 4/501 MKB 6/501 MKB 5/501 MKB 2/501
Art.Gr. Fredrikstad
Not e :
4x 105mm 4x 150mm 4x 150mm 3x 380mm 3x 280mm
I./HKAA.980 HKB 6/980 HKB 7/980 HKB 17/971
4x 100mm 4x 100mm 4x 155mm
4x 150mm
Coastal artillery units in Norway were designated in an alternate format than elsewhere on the Atlantikwall. The format for batteries in Norway was,
for example, HKB 6/908 where HKB or MKB identifies army or navy battery, prefix (6) identifies battery number, suffix (908) identifies parent regiment.
The standard format for battalions elsewhere was, for example, 1./HKAA.980 where numeral prefix (1.) identifies the battery, a Roman numeral prefix (II.)
identifies a battalion, and a numerical suffix (980) identifies parent regiment.
By far the mos t spectacul ar coast al artillery in No r wa y were the three dozen
heavy naval guns, usually surpl us warshi p weapons , assi gned t o critical defensive
assi gnments. The mos t powerf ul of these wea pons were the " Adol f ka none n, "
a set of 4 0 6 mm guns ori gi nal l y i nt ended for the never-compl et ed H-cl as s
battleships. They were installed in the islands shielding Nar vi k and were intended
t o cover all sea appr oaches t o this port . The Var a battery near Kri s t i ans and on
Although gun casemates
were relatively uncommon in
Norway compared with other
sections of the Atlantikwall,
some of the more important
batteries in the south were
reinforced. Batterie Vara of
MKB 6/502 covering the
Skaggerak with its three
380mm SKC/34 guns was
scheduled to be moved to
this impressive S169 casemate,
but it was never completed.
It is seen here during an
inspection of US Army officers
immediately after the war.
(NARA)
Tabl e 9: h e a v y coas t al guns i n No r wa y
Ba t t er y Uni t L oc at i on Nu mb e r T y p e S our c e
Batterie Trondenes I MKB 5/511 Harstad 4 405mm SKC/34 H-class battleship project
Batterie Engeloy MKB 4/516 Engeloy island 3 405mm SKC/34 H-class battleship project
Batterie Vara MKB 6/502 Movik 3 38cm SKC/34 battlecruiser projects
Batterie Notteroy MKB 6/501 Vardasen 3 38cm KM36/35(f) French battleship Jean-Bart
Batterie Lodingen MKB 3/516 Makeroy 4 305mm Bofors L/30 pre-war Norwegian coastal gun
Batterie Husoen MKB 1/507 Ostersjoomradet 3 28cm SKL/45 cruiser Goeben
Batterie Kiberg MKB 3/513 Husaen 3 28cm SKL/45 WWI warships
Batterie Orlandet MKB 4/507 Orlandet 3 28cm SKC/34 (triple) battleship Gneisenau
Batterie Fjell MKB 11/504 Fjell 3 28cm SKC/34 (triple) battleship Gneisenau
Batterie Mestersand MKB 4/517 Sylt 4 24cm SKL/40 pre-1900 battleships and cruisers
45
Ta bl e 10: Kr i e gs ma r i ne t o r p e d o bat t er i es i n No r wa y
B a t t e r y T o r p e d o Ar t i l l er y Gr o u p Local na v a l c o mma n d
Torpedobatterie Bokfjord 4x 53cm
Art.Gr. Un.
Sydvaranger
MAA.513
Torpedobatterie Porsoy 2x 53cm Art. Gr. Ofotfjord MAA.516
Torpedobatterie Korshamn 2x 53cm Art. Gr. Ofotfjord MAA.516
Torpedobatterie Ledangsholm 4x 53cm Art. Gr. Namsos MAA.506
Torpedobatterie Hasselvik (Hysness) 4x 53cm Art. Gr. Trondheim-ost MAA.506
Torpedobatterie Hambaara 4x 53cm Art. Gr. Trondheim-ost MAA.506
Torpedobatterie Nordlandet 4x 53cm Art. Gr. More MAA.505
Torpedobatterie J ulholmen 2x 52cm Art. Gr. More MAA.505
Torpedobatterie Otteroy syd 2x 52cm Art. Gr. More MAA.505
Torpedobatterie Angelshaug (Vemelsvik) 2x 45cm Art. Gr. Nordfjord MAA.504
Torpedobatterie Rutledal 2x45cm Art. Gr. Sognefjord MAA.504
Torpedobatterie Hjelte (Herdla) 3x 53cm Art. Gr. Hjeltefjord MAA.504
Torpedobatterie Gavlen 2x 45cm Art. Gr. Hjeltefjord MAA.504
Torpedobatterie Kvarven 3x 45cm Art. Gr. Bergen MAA.504
Torpedobatterie Radne (Leroy) 3x 53cm Art. Gr. Bergen MAA.504
Torpedobatterie Ljones 2x 45cm Art. Gr. Korsfjord MAA.504
Torpedobatterie Kaholm 3x 45cm Art. Gr. Makeroy MAA.501
the Skager r ak wa s mount ed in si mi l ar si ngl e-gun turrets in an S I 6 9 kettle
posi t i on; a set of mas s i ve cas emat es wa s under constructi on but not occupi ed at
the end of the war. Al t hough of less i mpressi ve size, many other surpl us warshi p
turrets were depl oyed in No r wa y i ncl udi ng eight 1 5 0 mm SKC/ 28 guns in twin
C/ 36 turrets i ntended for the i ncompl et e Graf Zeppelin aircraft carrier.
BATTERIE TRONDENES I, 5./MAA.511, HARSTAD, NORWAY
The most power f ul guns empl aced i n Nor way wer e t he massi ve
Kr upp 406mm Adol f kanonen in t wo bat t er i es at St ei gen and
Tr ondenes, whi ch had a max i mum r ange of 56k m (35 mi l es). The
guns wer e l ef t overs f r om t he abor t i ve H-class bat t l eshi ps. Si nce t he
naval t ur r et s wer e never c ompl et ed, t he guns wer e mount ed i n a
speci al BSG {Bettungshiess-Gerust) si ngl e mount i ng wi t h a t ur r et of
l i ght 45mm ar mor st eel . The guns wer e f i t t ed t o an S384 compl ex,
whi ch consi st ed of a deep concr et e wel l wi t h a hi gh gun pedest al ,
al ong wi t h a seri es of t unnel s l eadi ng back i nt o r ei nf or ced concr et e
ammuni t i on gal l eri es behi nd t he gun. In cont r ast t o t he sister
bat t er y in France, Bat t er i e Li ndemann near Cal ai s, an over head
casemat e was never bui l t f or t he Nor wegi an bat t er i es. The t ur r et
was cover ed wi t h a camouf l age umbr el l a const r uct ed of wo o d
out r i gger s wi t h wi r e net t i ng gar ni shed wi t h pi eces of whi t e and
gr een waxed paper and bunches of dr i ed grass.
Each bat t er y consi st ed of f our gun posi t i ons, l ocat ed about
250m apar t . Bat t ery Tr ondenes I, al so known as Bat t eri e Theo,
was l ocat ed on a rocky headl and nor t h of Har st ad, and posi t i oned
t o cover t he Andf j or den and Vagsf j or den on t he nor t her n
appr oaches t o Narvi k. Its sister, Bat t eri e Di et l , was l ocat ed on
Engel oy t o cover t he Vest f j or den on t he sout her n appr oach t o
Narvi k. The f our gun posi t i ons wer e l ocat ed 85- 105m above sea
l evel . Const r uct i on of t he bat t er y st ar t ed i n 1942, but t he bat t er y
was not ent i r el y compl et e at war' s end. A reserve ammuni t i on
bunker and an emer gency headquar t er s f or t he r egi onal Seeko
wer e still under const r uct i on. The bat t er y was pr ot ect ed by an
88mm f l ak bat t er y and t hr ee mor e l i ght f l ak bat t er i es ( 37mm and
77mm) i n t he ar ea. Bat t er i e Har st ad Nor d (1./MAA.511) wi t h t hr ee
170mm guns was posi t i oned downhi l l f r om Bat t eri e Tr ondenes
at t he t i p of t he headl ands f or sea-l evel def ense.
Batterie Flakfort of 1 ./MAA.508
covering the Copenhagen
roadstead was a former Danish
battery equipped with six of
these turreted 210mm SKL/51
guns. (NARA)
Ta bl e 1 1 : K-Ver bande i n No r wa y , 1945
Uni t B a s e We a p o n s
I . K-Di v i s i on Na r v i k
K-Flotilla 2/265 Engeloy 11 Biber
K-Flotilla 1/215 Ullvik 30 Linse
K-Flotilla 1/362 Brenvik 20 Marder
MEK.35 Harstad 60 troops
MEK.90 Oslo 30 troops
2. K-Di vi si on T r o n d h e i m
K-Flotilla 2/216 Namsos 24 Linse
K-Flotilla 1/216 Selvenas 36 Linse
K-Flotilla 1/267 Kristiansund 15 Biber
K-Flotilla 2/267 Molde 15 Biber
MEK.30 Molde 80 troops
3. K-Di vi si on B e r g e n
K-Flotilla 1/362 Herdla 20 Marder
K-Flotilla 215 Flatoy 30 Linse
K-Flotilla 2/362 Krokeidet 20 Marder
K-Flotilla 415 Stavanger 30 Molch
K-Flotilla 1/263 Sogne-Hollen 14 Biber
K-Flotilla 2/263 Tangen-Stolsviken 15 Biber
MEK.25 Stend-Bergen 60 troops
4. K-Di vi si on Os l of j or d
K-Flotilla 265 Haao 20 Biber
K-Flotilla 1/366 Stavern 15 Marder
K-Flotilla 2/366 Mageroy 15 Marder
Torpedo batteries
The val ue of t or pe do bat t eri es in the def ens e of No r wa y' s
nume r ous f j or ds wa s ma d e pai nf ul l y a ppa r e nt t o the
Kr i egs mar i ne on Apri l 9, 1 9 4 0 when the crui ser Bliicher wa s
s unk by t wo 2 8 c m t or pe doe s f r om the Os c a r bo r g f ort in
Os l of j or d. The No r we g i a n navy ha d begun es t abl i s hi ng
t or pe do bat t er i es as earl y as 1 8 9 0 , mount e d in conceal ed
under wat er l auncher s . Thes e bat t eri es wer e pos i t i oned t o cover
p a s s a g e wa y s t hat wer e 5 , 0 0 0 m wi de or l ess. Bes i des t aki ng
over s everal No r we g i a n bat t eri es a nd us i ng No r we g i a n navy
e qui pme nt t o cr eat e ot her s , t he Kr i e gs ma r i ne i nst al l ed their
own bat t eri es, eventual l y t ot al i ng 17 shore batteri es. In cont rast
t o t he or i gi nal No r we g i a n bat t er i es , the Ge r ma n bat t eri es
t ypi cal l y us ed des t royer-t ype tri pl e l aunch t ubes mount ed on
t he s ur f ace in a concr et e bui l di ng wi t h a f i re-cont rol pos t
l ocat ed near by, of t en s uppor t e d by a s ear chl i ght . A t ypi cal
bat t er y cons i s t ed of t hree of f i cers a nd 4 0 me n, a nd wa s
s ubor di na t e d t o t he coa s t a l arti l l ery bat t al i on in the ar ea. In
a ddi t i on t o t he s hor e bat t er i es , t wo f l oat i ng bat t eri es wer e
depl oyed in Ber gen.
Denmark
De nma r k wa s t he mo s t obs c ur e por t i on of the Atlantikwall.
De nma r k ha d very mode s t coas t al def enses pri or t o the 1940
i nvas i on, mai nl y cent ered a r ound Copenha gen' s harbor. As a
s hor t - t er m expedi ent , in the s umme r of 1 9 4 0 the Wehr macht
depl oyed 15 navy coa s t a l bat t eri es at the ma j or ha r bor s and
ma j o r c hoke poi nt s l eadi ng i nt o the Bal t i c, ba s ed pr i mar i l y
on ol d wa r - boot y art i l l ery t a ken f r om the Da ni s h ar s enal .
The na va l c o mma n d in De nma r k wa s des i gnat ed Admi r a l
S ka g g e r a k a nd wa s s ubor di na t e t o the Na v y Bal t i c Hi gh
Co mma n d {Marine Oberkommando Ostsee); there were three
s ubor di na t e Se e ko. The Ar my Hi g h Co mma n d De nma r k
( AOK- Da ne ma r k) wa s the cor r es pondi ng a r my c o mma nd.
The a ut umn of 1 9 4 0 s a w the first maj or const ruct i on effort
wi th a s cheme t o depl oy t wo heavy coast al batteries in Denmar k:
one at Ha ns t hol m oppos i t e No r wa y t o cont rol the Skagger ak,
and a pai r on Bor nhol m in the Bal ti c t o cover the Kat t egat . In the
event, the i nvas i on of the Sovi et Uni on in 1 9 4 1 curt ai l ed the
Bor nhol m pl a ns , but the Ha ns t hol m pr oj ect cont i nued al ong
wi t h a cor r es pondi ng bat t ery on the No r we g i a n si de of the
4 8
Skagger ak, Batteri e Var a. The Roya l Na v y rai ds on the No r we g i a n coas t in
earl y 1 9 4 1 f orced the Wehr macht t o r ecogni ze the we a k pr ot ect i on on the
Dani s h coas t , and in late Apri l 1940 the ar my deci ded t o depl oy ten coas t al
artillery batteri es t o De nma r k whi l e the navy e xpa nde d its cover age, especi al l y
the appr oaches t o the Sound and the Smal l a nd Gr eat Bel ts. As in Nor wa y,
mos t of the attenti on t hrough 1944 wa s in pr ovi di ng def ense for ma j or por t s ,
t hough in De nma r k this effort ext ended t o coveri ng the var i ous chokepoi nt s
into the Bal ti c. Since De nma r k wa s often overf l own by Al l i ed bomber s on their
way t o Ger ma n por t s , De nma r k had a very s ubs t ant i al Luf t waf f e forti fi cati on
and const ruct i on effort wi th numer ous r adar and fl ak si tes.
By the s ummer of 1 9 4 3 , wi t h the Atlantikwall pr og r a m in full bl oom in
France and the L o w Count ri es , the Wehr macht began t o exami ne a pos s i bl e
threat of an Allied amphi bi ous l andi ng in west ern De nma r k ai med at reachi ng
northern Germany. The mos t likely l andi ng areas were consi dered t o be northern
J ut l and or the Esbj erg area. One of the i mmedi at e out comes of this as s es s ment
was to substanti al l y augment the coas t al batteri es on Fa no Isl and off Es bj erg as
well as gun batteries t o defend the por t itself; 12 mor e ar my artillery batteri es
were al s o al l otted t o De nma r k. Four ar eas wer e decl ared Def ens e Zone s
(Verteidigungsbereiche): Es bj er g, Ha ns t e d, Fr eder i ks havn a nd Aa l bor g. The
vari ous i nfantry and artillery pos i t i ons wer e cons ol i dat ed i nt o s t r ongpoi nt
gr oups for greater unity of c o mma nd and a t ot al of 2 0 of these gr oups were
organi zed, seven of whi ch were ai rbas es rather t han coas t al defense sectors.
In spi t e of t he No r ma n d y i nvas i on in J une 1 9 4 4 , t he We hr ma c ht
cont i nued t o be concer ned over t hreat s t o De nma r k, ba s ed on the mi s t aken
intelligence as s es s ment t hat the Al l i es wer e wi t hhol di ng f orces f or pos s i bl e
oper at i ons agai ns t De nma r k or No r wa y. The Kr i egs ma r i ne wa s convi nced
that the great es t t hreat wa s agai ns t the Ka t t ega t on the eas t ern J ut l a nd coas t ,
the pr es umpt i on bei ng t hat Al l i ed act i ons t o cont r ol thi s ar ea woul d bl ock
U- boat s cons t ruct ed in the Bal ti c por t s f r om reachi ng their
new oper at i ng bas es in Nor wa y. As a resul t , a p r o g r a m t o
add 2 9 naval bat t eri es wa s begun. In cont r as t , Hi t l er a nd
the ar my were mor e concer ned a bout the t hreat pos e d t o
the wes t ern c oa s t of J ut l a nd as a pot ent i al s hor t cut i nt o
nort hern Ger ma ny. Thi s res ul t ed in t he cons t r uct i on of
three i nl and bl ocki ng pos i t i ons , c ode na me d the Br unhi l d,
Gudr un and Kri ehi l d l i nes, cons i s t i ng of ant i t ank di t ches
and field f ort i f i cat i ons rat her t han e l a bor a t e concr et e
f orti f i cati ons. By l ate 1 9 4 4 , the s i t uat i on wa s even mor e
ABOVE LEFT
This is one of the turreted St.
Chamond 210mm guns of MKB
3/502 at Flekkeroy first deployed
in the summer of 1940. Like
many of the heavy gun positions
in Norway, the lack of overhead
casemate protection led to more
extensive efforts at camouflage,
sometimes including elaborate
metal frames for its camouflage
umbrella. (NARA)
ABOVE RIGHT
Verteidigungsbereich Hansted
was the most heavily defended
sector on the Danish coast,
covering the southern shores of
the Skaggerak opposite
Kristiansand in Norway. The first
major fortified battery
constructed there was
Hanstholm I, begun in May 1940,
armed with these old 1902
German 170mm naval guns.
These were deployed in M270
casemates and the battery was
manned by 1 ./MAA.118. (NARA)
BELOW
Coastal torpedo batteries were
most common in Norway due
to their value in covering
narrow fjords. This is one
of the two 53cm launchers of
Torpedobatterie Korshamn of
MAA.516 at Ofotfjorden. (NARA)
49
T O P L E F T
The cruiser Gneisenau served as
the source for several heavy
batteries in the Netherlands
and Scandinavia, including
Batterie Stordal of 2./MAA.518
on Fano Island in Denmark that
was constructed late in 1944,
armed with a twin 150mm SK
L/55 in a C/28 turret on an
M 184 bunker. This battery was
preserved after the war. (NARA)
T O P R I G H T
One of the more common
turreted guns found in the
Netherlands and Denmark was
the dual-purpose 105mm SK
C/32 naval anti-aircraft gun
seen here as part of the VB
Hansted defenses, manned by
MFA.814. The armored turret is
completely covered in
camouflage net with paper or
metal garnishing. (NARA)
Ta bl e 12: Kr i e gs ma r i ne Coas t al Ar t i l l er y Ba t t e r i e s i n De n ma r k
MAA.134 Sylt 8./MAA.134
4 x 76mm
MAA.518 Esbjerg 2./MAA.518 3./MAA.518 4./MAA.518
4x 150mm 4x 150mm 4x 380mm
MAA.118 Hanstholm 1./MAA.118 2./MAA.118 3./MAA.118
4x 170mm 4x 380mm 4x 120mm
MAA.509 Lokken 1./MAA.509 2./MAA.509 3./MAA.509
4x 105mm 4x 120mm 8x 120mm
MAA.521
MAA.523
MAA.524
MAA.508
Grena
Arhus
MAA.522 Nykobing
Hals 1./MAA.521 2./MAA.521 3./MAA.521
4x 150mm 4x 88mm 4x88mm
6./MAA.521 7./MAA.521
4x75mm 4x 305mm
2./MAA.523 3./MAA.523 4./MAA.523
4x 75mm 4x 75mm 4x 75mm
2./MAA.524 3./MAA.524 4./MAA.524
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 75mm
3./MAA.522 4./MAA.522 5./MAA.522
4x 75mm 4x 150mm 4x 75mm
8./MAA.522 10./MAA.522 11 ./MAA.522
4x 75mm 4x 105mm 3x 88mm
Copenhagen 1./MAA.508 2./MAA.508 3./MAA.508
6x 210mm 4x 120mm 4x 88mm
6./MAA.508 7./MAA.508 8./MAA.508
12x 170mm+
4./MAA.509
4x 127mm
4./MAA.521
4x 127mm
5./MAA.509
4x 150mm
5./MAA.521
4x 75mm
5./MAA.523
4x 105mm
5./MAA.524
4x 75mm
6./MAA.522
4x 75mm
12./MAA.522
4x 75mm
4./MAA.508
4x 75mm
6./MAA.523
4x 75mm
6./MAA.524
3x 105mm
7./MAA.522
4x 127mm
5./MAA.508
4x 150mm
4x 75mm
6x 305mm
4x 127mm
50
Tabl e 13: Kr i e gs ma r i ne Coast al Fl ak Bat t er i es i n De n ma r k
MFA.234 Sylt 7./MFA.234
4x 75mm
MFA.204 Esbjerg 2./MFA.204 3./MFA.204 4./MFA.204 5./MFA.204
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm
MFA.814 Hanstholm 2./MFA.814 3./MFA.814 4./MFA.814 5./MFA.814
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 105mm
MFA.716 Frederikshavn 2./MFA.716 3./MFA.716 4./MFA.716
4x 105mm 4x 105mm 4x 75mm
MFA.717 Arhus 2./MFA.717 3./MFA.717 4./MFA.717 5./MFA.717
4x 88mm 4x 75mm 4x 88mm 4x 75mm
Tabl e 14: Ar my Coas t al Ar t i l l er y Bat t er i es i n De n ma r k
I./HKAR.180 Vemb II./HKAR.180 Vrogum III./HKAR.180 Hjorring
1./HKAR.180 4x 105mm 6./HKAR.180 4x 105mm 9./HKAR.180 4x 105mm
2./HKAR.180 4x 105mm 7./HKAR.180 4x 105mm 10./HKAR.180 4x 105mm
3./HKAR.180 4x 105mm 8./HKAR.180 4x 105mm 20./HKAR.180 4x 122mm
4./HKAR.180 4x 105mm 11./HKAR.180 4x 122mm 21./HKAR.180 4x 122mm
5./HKAR.180 4x 105mm 12./HKAR.180 4x 122mm
17./HKAR.180 4x 194mm 13./HKAR.180 4x 122mm
18./HKAR.180 4x 122mm 14./HKAR.180 4x 150mm
19./HKAR.180 4x 122mm 15./HKAR.180 4x 122mm
20./HKAR.180 6x 152mm 16./HKAR.180 4x 122mm
unsettl ed due t o the a dva nc e of the Re d Ar my f r om the eas t as wel l as Sovi et
naval oper a t i ons in the Bal t i c. In c ons e que nc e , AOK- Da n e ma r k wa s
over r ul ed, a nd pri ori t y f or def ens i ve cons t r uct i on shi f t ed t o t he Ka t t e g a t
coas t l i ne, as r e c omme nde d by the navy. The Kr i e gs ma r i ne pl a nne d t o
depl oy 2 0 mor e bat t eri es in earl y 1 9 4 5 , but t he c ol l a ps e of t he Ge r ma n
war ec onomy prevent ed t hi s; in Apri l 1 9 4 5 there wer e s ubs t ant i al shifts of
coas t al gun batteri es f r om De nma r k t o the Eas t er n f ront . Li kewi s e, there wa s
consi derabl e t urmoi l in the ar my coas t al artillery batteri es as AOK- Da ne ma r k
realized that the mor e likely threat t o De nma r k wa s not an Al l i ed a mphi bi ous
i nvas i on, but an Al l i ed advance i nt o De nma r k f r om the s out h vi a Ger many.
A number of the a r my coas t al bat t eri es wer e move d t o t he s out her n por t i on
of De nma r k t o set up a ne w def ens e l i ne. In t ot al , 2 2 a r my a nd 4 6 navy
coas t al artillery bat t eri es wer e depl oyed in De nma r k dur i ng the war, t hough
the number wa s in fl ux t hr ough mos t of 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 . The navy al s o depl oyed 16
flak batteri es for the def ense of ma j or por t s .
THE SITES IN COMBAT
Of the f our count ri es s ur veyed in thi s book, onl y the Net her l ands endured
si gni f i cant c o mba t al ong its stretch of the Atlantikwall. Bel gi um' s short coas t
wa s l i ber at ed by t he Ca na d i a n Ar my dur i ng the l i ght ni ng a dva nc e of
Sept ember 1 9 4 4 . No r wa y experi enced s ome l i mi ted fi ghti ng in Oct ober 1944
whe n t he Re d Ar my s t or me d t he arct i c Fi nnma r k r egi on, chas i ng the
Wehr macht out of Fi nl and. However , this di d not i nvol ve ext ensi ve c omba t
al ong the Atlantikwall. De nma r k exper i enced no si gni f i cant c omba t on its
por t i on of the Atlantikwall.
The Scheldt campaign
Al t houg h t he Bri t i sh Ar my c a pt ur e d Ant we r p in mi d- Sept ember 1 9 4 4 ,
t he oppor t uni t y t o bounc e t he Rhi ne by a i r bor ne as s aul t wi t h Ope r a t i on
Market-Garden di s t r act ed Al l i ed at t ent i on f r om the pr es s i ng need t o cl ear
bot h ba nks of the Schel dt Es t uary. Wi t hout cont rol of the Schel dt the por t of
Ant we r p wa s us el es s , si nce ma r i t i me traf f i c c oul d be i nt erdi ct ed by the
nume r ous Ge r ma n coas t al bat t eri es on either si de. Wi t hout the s uppl i es t hat
coul d have been del i vered t hr ough Ant wer p, the Al l i ed advance stal l ed in the
a ut umn of 1 9 4 4 . Fol l owi ng the def eat at Ar nhem, Ei s enhower i nsi sted that
Mont g ome r y' s 21s t Ar my Gr o up ref ocus its at t ent i on on the Schel dt mi s s i on.
By t he t hi rd week of Sept ember , the Wehr macht al s o ha d real i zed the
cri ti cal i mpor t ance of the Schel dt a nd began a del i berat e effort t o rei nforce
the pos i t i ons on bot h banks of the river. Hi tl er des i gnat ed the Breskens pocket
on the s out h ba nk as Festung Scbelde Sud whi l e the i s l and of Wal cheren
a nd Sout h Bevel and t o the nor t h wa s des i gnat ed as Festung Scbelde Nord.
Thi s c ha nge in des i gnat i on ha d little t o do wi t h any rei nf orcement of the
f ort i f i cat i on, rat her it wa s a s ymbol i c ges t ur e as Hi t l er ha d or der ed all
Festungen t o be hel d t o t he l as t ma n. On Sept ember 15, the 70. 1nf anteri e
Di vi s i on t ook over def ens e of Wal cher en a nd Sout h Bevel and whi l e by
Sept ember 18, the 64. 1nf anteri e Di vi s i on t ook up pos i t i ons in the Breskens
pocket . The 64t h wa s a Rus s i a n f ront vet eran a nd by far the mor e s t ubbor n
f oe; the 70t h wa s a so-cal l ed " s t o ma c h " di vi si on filled out wi t h t r oops wi th
medi cal pr obl ems a nd des i gnat ed as a stati c di vi si on for coas t al defense t as ks .
The def ense of the Br es kens pocket wa s ai ded cons i der abl y by the barri ers
pres ent ed by the Canal -de-l a-Lys a nd the Le opol d Ca na l as well as f l ooded
ar eas as s oci at ed wi t h t hem. Ther e ha d been s ome ef f orts ma de in 1944 t o
creat e a Landfront s out h of Bres kens cons i s t i ng of s ome pi l l boxes . Al t hough
there wer e five ma j or coas t al arti llery batteri es in the Bres kens pocket , they
ha d a l i mi ted rol e in the s ubs equent fi ghti ng as their cas emat es kept the guns
poi nt ed out t o s ea. The 3r d Ca na di a n Di vi s i on secured a penet rat i on over the
Le opol d Ca na l on Oc t ober 6, 1 9 4 4 , a nd f ol l owed this wi t h an amphi bi ous
l andi ng f r om Terneuzen a r ound the east ern s houl der of the Bres kens pocket
on Oct ober 9. In spi te of these s ucces s es , the 64. 1nfanteri e Di vi s i on wa ged a
det ermi ned def ense a nd the pocket wa s not cl eared until earl y November .
In the mea nt i me, the 2nd Ca na di a n Di vi s i on had been as s i gned t o clear
Sout h Bevel and by pus hi ng up the nar r ow i st hmus f rom the east. The difficulty
of thi s as s aul t l ed t o a bol d deci s i on t o lift t wo bat t al i ons f r om the Bri ti sh
5 2 nd Di vi s i on a c r os s the Schel dt us i ng a mphi bi ous Buf f al o LVT ( l andi ng
vehi cl e, t racked) of the 79t h Ar mour e d Di vi s i on, s uppor t ed by Sher man DD
a mphi bi ous t a nks on Oc t obe r 2 6 . The 2 nd Ca na di a n Di vi s i on pus hed
a cr os s Sout h Bevel and a nd r eached the na r r ow c a us e wa y t o Wal cheren on
Oct ober 3 1 .
After the s ucces s of t he 5 2 nd Di vi s i on a mphi bi o us ope r a t i on, anot her
mor e a mbi t i ous ope r a t i on wa s s chedul ed f or Wal cher en. Ear l i er in t he
mont h, RAF Bo mbe r C o mma n d ha d s t r uck at t he Wes t ka pel l e di ke,
breachi ng it a nd f l oodi ng mos t of the i s l and. Thi s c ompl i c a t ed the Ge r ma n
def ense effort, but a bout hal f the Ge r ma n c oa s t a l bat t eri es wer e still hi gh
and dry on the di kes . The a mphi bi ous as s aul t wa s a t wo- pr ong e d oper a t i on
cons i s t i ng of Ope r a t i on Infatuate J , a not he r ri ver l a ndi ng by t he 5 2 n d
Di vi s i on agai ns t Vl i s s i ngen ( Fl ushi ng) us i ng the a mphi bi ous e qui pme nt of
the 79t h Ar mo ur e d Di vi s i on; a nd Infatuate II by t he 4t h Speci al Servi ce
Br i gade l andi ng by s ea agai ns t Wes t kapel l e.
The t own of Vl i s s i ngen ha d been heavi l y f ort i f i ed as MK B Ke r nwe r k
Vl i ssi ngen and i ncl uded 9 . / MAA. 2 0 2 . The deci s i on t o s t age the l andi ng in
the pr eda wn hour s s ubs t ant i al l y r educed cas ual t i es dur i ng the l andi ng pha s e ,
but the f i ght i ng f or the t own pr ove d mo r e di f f i cul t due t o t he nume r o us
bunkers and pi l l boxes .
The Wes t kapel l e l andi ng zone wa s i mper i l ed by t he pr es ence of t hree
coas t al arti l l ery bat t eri es of MAA. 2 0 2 . MK B Wes t kapel l e of 6 . / MAA. 2 0 2 ,
i denti f i ed as " W1 5 " in Bri t i sh doc ume nt s , wa s a r me d wi t h f our Bri t i s h
3. 7i n. ant i -ai rcraf t guns capt ur ed at Dunki r k s uppor t ed by t wo 7 5 mm guns
t hat wer e in gun pi t s. Thi s bat t ery wa s par t of St r ongpoi nt Ti ef l and def ended
by 5. / Gr enadi er Re gi me nt 1 0 1 8 . The nei ghbor i ng MK B Zo ut e l a nde of
7 . / MAA. 2 0 2 ( " W1 3 " ) wa s a r me d wi t h f our 1 5 0 mm Tb t K C/ 36 naval guns
in Ba uf or m 6 7 1 ca s ema t es rei nf orced by t wo 7 5 mm guns in Ba uf or m 6 1 2
c a s ema t es . It wa s pa r t of St r ongpoi nt Rhe i ng ol d hel d by 5. / Gr ena di er
Regi ment 1 0 1 8 . Bes i des the c oa s t a l bat t er i es in t he l andi ng z one, MK B
Dombur g of 5 . / MAA. 2 0 2 ( " W1 7 " ) near Zout el a nde ha d f our French 2 2 0 mm
guns in open pi t s , whi ch wer e in eas y r each of the l andi ng ar ea. Al t hough
there had been s ome RAF st ri kes agai ns t the bat t eri es , the ma i n guns wer e
f uncti onal at the t i me of the Bri ti sh l andi ngs .
The Bri t i sh a mphi bi ous f orce hea di ng t o wa r ds Wes t kapel l e on t he
mor ni ng of No v e mb e r 1 i ncl uded gun- a nd r ocket - f i r i ng s uppor t craf t as
well as the bat t l es hi p H MS Warspite a nd the moni t or s Erebus a nd Roberts.
The gun battl e bet ween the Roya l Na v y a nd MAA. 2 0 2 began s hort l y after
0 8 0 0 hour s wi t h Warspite b o mb a r d i ng W1 7 , Roberts ver s us W1 3 a nd
Erebus ver s us W1 5 . In the event , Erebus s uf f ered a f ai l ure of its t ur r et
t raverse, and s o Roberts wa s obl i ged t o engage t wo gun bat t eri es . The Roya l
Na v y Cl os e Suppor t S qua dr o n ha d its gun a nd r ocket craf t spl i t i nt o t wo
gr oups , pl anni ng t o di stract the Ge r ma n gunner s f r om the vul nerabl e i nfantry
l andi ng craf t. Two L CT( R) r ocket craf t of the Sout her n Gr o u p wer e hit by
MK B Zout e l a nde , but ma na g e d t o reti re after fi ri ng mos t of their r ocket s .
The gr oup' s ni ne gun s uppor t craft at t empt ed t o engage the Ge r ma n bunker s ,
but mos t wer e severel y da ma g e d in a very unequal duel wi t h the bunker s .
The si t uat i on wi t h the Nor t her n Gr o up wa s not muc h better, a nd an acci dent
wi t h one of the r ocket craf t res ul t ed in several r ocket s s t ri ki ng t wo of t he
gun craf t . Onc e a ga i n, t he heavi l y pr ot ect ed MK B Wes t kapel l e ha d t he
better of the gun duel s , severel y d a ma g i ng mo s t of t he gun s uppor t craf t .
Of 2 7 s uppor t craf t t aki ng pl ace in t he ope r a t i on, t en wer e s unk a nd s i x
were severely da ma g e d; 172 s ai l ors wer e ki l l ed or mi s s i ng a nd 125 wounde d.
The sacri f i ce of the gun s uppor t craf t ha d not been in vai n as t he 4t h
Speci al Servi ce Br i gade l anded at Wes t kapel l e l argel y i nt act s t art i ng at 0 9 5 7 .
By the t i me the l andi ng craf t went a s hor e , MK B Zo ut e l a nde ha d r un out
of a mmuni t i on. MK B Wes t kapel l e c ont i nued t o fire a nd d a ma g e d t wo
mor e t ank l andi ng craf t; the bat t ery wa s fi nal l y cl eared by 4 1 Roya l Ma r i ne
Co mma n d o a r ound noon whi l e MK B Zout e l a nde wa s over r un by 4 8 Roya l
Ma r i ne Co mma n d o in t he earl y af t er noon. The MK B Do mb u r g pos i t i on
wa s not t aken unti l the next day. Al t houg h MAA. 2 0 2 ha d f ai l ed t o s t op
the l andi ngs , t hese t wo uni t s wer e a r g ua bl y t he mo s t des t r uct i ve of a ny
Atlantikwall gun bat t eri es dur i ng the war.
K-Verbande in the Netherlands
The Kr i egs mar i ne r ecogni zed the i mpor t a nc e of Ant we r p a nd l acki ng me a ns
t o i nterdi ct the por t , as s i gned the K- Ver bande t he t as k of at t acki ng Al l i ed
s hi ppi ng. The oper at i ons got off t o a po o r s t art on t he ni ght of Oc t obe r 5/ 6
when K- Fl ot i l l a . 214 s uppor t e d by t he ME K . 6 0 c o mma n d o s a t t e mpt e d
t o at t ack Al l i ed mi ne s we e pe r s f r om t hei r ba s e in Gr oni ng e n. The s ma l l
boat s wer e uns ea wor t hy in t ypi cal a ut umn No r t h Sea condi t i ons , a nd after
l osi ng nearl y hal f their boa t s the fl oti l l a ha d t o be r et ur ned t o Ge r ma ny f or
r ebui l di ng wi t hout a c c ompl i s hi ng anyt hi ng; thei r pl ace wa s t a ke n by
K- Fl ot i l l a. 215. Thei r po o r per f or ma nc e on c o mb a t mi s s i ons l ed t o s chemes
t o use the boat s t o res uppl y i s ol at ed Ge r ma n gar r i s ons at Dunki r k a nd in the
Breskens pocket . Thes e Oc t ober mi s s i ons f l opped due t o the l i mi ted capaci t y
of the boa t s a nd thei r vul ner abi l i t y t o s ea c ondi t i ons . The K- Ve r ba nde
at t empt ed t o us e t hem in the cal mer wa t er s of the Schel dt , a nd a r ai d wa s
c onduc t ed on t he ni ght of Oc t obe r 2 3 a ga i ns t Al l i ed por t s s uppor t i ng
oper at i ons on Sout h Bevel and wi t h me a ge r res ul t s . The boa t f l oti l l as wer e
ineffective a nd Admi r a l He ye r e c omme nde d t hat they be hel d in res erve as
a pot ent i al count er at t ack f orce f or any Al l i ed a mphi bi ous l andi ngs in No r t h
T O P L E F T
Kernwerk Vlissingen was heavily
fortified along the Scheldt and
this is a Bauform 143 artillery
observation bunker of WN
Leuchtenburg near the Orange
Mole on the south side of the
port. This bunker has been
restored by the Bunkerbehoud
foundation and the guardrails
are a postwar safety measure.
(Author's photograph)
T O P R I G H T
This is one of the Bauform 671
casemates of MKB Westkapelle
of 6./MAA.202 (W15) armed
with British 3.7-inch anti-
aircraft guns during the brutal
gun duels fought during the
landings on Walcheren in
November 1944. Two of the
casemates were blown up
by British engineers after the
battle, and these surviving two
were later demolished after
the war. This is a Dutch Army
photo taken in 1946 after the
casemate had been disarmed.
(Nederlands Instituut voor
Militaire Historie)
BATTERIE WESTKAPELLE, 6./MAA.202, WESTKAPELLE, WALCHEREN, THE NETHERLANDS
This battery, better known by its British map designation as
W15, was one of the two batteries of Kapitan Robert Opalka's
MAA.202 whi ch fiercely resisted the British landings on
Walcheren on November 1,1944. This battery consisted of four
Bauform 671 SK gun casemates armed wi th four British 3.7-inch
anti-aircraft guns captured at Dunkirk. The battery was
supported by an M262 fire control post at the southern end. The
Bauform 671 was one of the most common types of Atlantikwall
casemates wi th 96 in the Netherlands, 59 in Denmark, 86 in
Norway and 254 in France. The embrasure offered 120 degrees
of traverse but at the same time, the crew was exposed to
hostile fire wi th no gun shield on these weapons. This casemate
type was categorized as "ohne Nebenraume", that is wi thout the
larger storerooms sometimes found in the larger casemate
types. This type had two small ammuni ti on rooms to either side
behi nd the main gun position (shown in the plan view, above
right), and access was by way of an armored door at the rear; the
battery had an inventory of 2,628 rounds at the end of October
1944 and fired most of them duri ng the course of the battle. The
preferred method of construction was the use of wooden
shuttering when the concrete was poured over the steel
reinforcing rods. However, an alternate method using an outer
shell of prefabricated concrete bricks was sometimes used as in
this case.
Hol l a nd. A r ai d agai ns t Moe r di j k bl ew up s ome undef ended har bor facilities
on the ni ght of No v e mb e r 2 1 , whi l e t he Li ns e oper at i ng bas e at Burgs l ui s
wa s b o mb e d out of exi s t ence on De c e mbe r 4. A r ai d on Dec ember 5 wa s
c a ught in t he ope n by t he RAF, a nd mos t of the dozen Li ns e wer e s unk. An
a t t empt ed r ai d on De c e mbe r 12 cos t s everal mor e Li ns e a nd the r emai nder
of t he f l ot i l l a wa s p a c k e d up a nd s ent ba c k t o Ge r ma ny f or over haul .
Addi t i ona l Li ns e wer e sent t o t he Ne t he r l a nds in 1 9 4 5 , but t hese s mal l craf t
pr ove d mor e da ng e r ous t o thei r ope r a t or s t han the Al l i ed navi es . The Li ns e
oper a t i ons ha d pr oven s o cos t l y a nd futile t hat the No r t h Sea c omma nde r
r e c o mme nd e d t hat ope r a t i ons be ha l t ed; Admi r a l Doni t z i ns i s t ed they
cont i nue, as t he Kr i e gs ma r i ne ha d f ew ot her s ur f ace wa r s hi ps as i de f r om
S- boat s t o c onduc t oper a t i ons in t he No r t h Sea. Dur i ng the cour s e of 1 9 4 5 ,
t he Li ns e boa t s c onduc t e d a f urt her 1 7 1 s or t i es a nd l os t 5 4 boa t s in the
pr oc es s wi t hout s i nki ng any Al l i ed ves s el s .
The dubi ous val ue of the Li ns e expl os i ve boa t s l ed t o r enewed at t ent i on
t o mi dget s ubma r i ne s , a nd bes i des t he i nact i ve K- Fl ot i l l a. 261 s t at i oned at
Poot er haven si nce Sept ember, t wo mor e Bi ber uni t s , K- Fl ot i l l a. 262 and 2 6 6 ,
wer e depl oyed at Gr oni ngen in December. Initial oper at i ons in mi d- December
wer e l argel y uns ucces s f ul due t o t he suscept i bi l i t y of the s mal l s ubmar i nes
t o t he wi nt er weat her , a nd s ever al wer e l os t at s ea bef or e ever engagi ng
Al l i ed s hi ps . A mi s s i on by K. Fl ot i l l a . 261 on t he ni ght of De c e mbe r 2 2
wa s a di s as t er, whe n Bri t i s h MT B t or pe do boa t s i nt ercept ed the fl oti l l a
whi l e the s ubma r i nes wer e bei ng t owe d t o s ea by R- boat s . Four Bi bers were
i mmedi at el y l os t , a nd, of the five t hat es caped, f our mor e wer e l ost duri ng
the cour s e of the r ai d. Anot her g r oup of ten Bi bers as s i gned t o l ay mi nes in
t he Schel dt t hat s a me eveni ng l os t t wo t o mi nes , anot her wa s caught on the
s ur f ace by a Ro y a l Na v y mo t o r l a unc h a nd s unk, a nd s everal mor e wer e
s unk or d a ma g e d by Bri t i sh ant i - s ubmar i ne pa t r ol s t hr ough the cour s e of
Dec ember 2 3 . The first s ucces s of the fl oti l l as occurred at 16: 25 on December
2 3 when a Bi ber t or pe doe d the Pa na ma ni a n frei ghter Alan Dale dest i ned for
Ant we r p. Bi ber at t acks pet er ed out l ater in the mont h due t o the weather,
a nd the Royal Na v y cl ai med 2 7 capt ur ed, s unk or pr obabl y s unk, and 16 mor e
pos s i bl y s unk.
The wi nt er weat her l i mi t ed oper at i ons in the new year. Whe n the at t acks
r e s ume d in ear nes t in Ma r c h 1 9 4 5 , Al l i ed a nt i - s ubma r i ne f orces wer e very
act i ve, cl ai mi ng 3 5 mi dge t s ubs des t r oyed in Ma r c h a nd 19 in Apri l al ong
wi t h 16 pos s i bl y s unk in Ma r c h a nd 4 in Apr i l ; act ual l os s es wer e muc h
hi gher, a nd t he K- Ve r ba nde l os t 7 0 Bi ber a nd Mo l c h mi dge t s ubma r i ne s
dur i ng 1 0 2 s or t i es . The vul ner abi l i t y of t he K- Ver ba nde wa s nowher e mor e
evi dent t han t he ni ght of Ma r c h 1 1 / 1 2 whe n a ma j o r oper a t i on wa s s t aged
a ga i ns t s hi ppi ng in t he Schel dt wi t hout s i nki ng a si ngl e s hi p whi l e l os i ng
13 Bi ber, 9 Mo l c h a nd 16 Li ns e . Dur i ng t he 1 9 4 5 a c t i ons , t he mi dget
s ubma r i ne s pr i mar i l y rel i ed on mi nel ayi ng a nd a c c ount e d f or seven mi nor
Al l i ed ves s el s t ot al i ng l ess t ha n 5 0 0 t ons . The Bi ber wa s r ei nf or ced by the
mu c h mo r e c a p a b l e S e e hund, whi c h ope r a t e d at s ea l i ke a c onvent i ona l
s ubma r i ne ; a det ai l ed t r eat ment of t he l at t er r ema i ns out s i de the s cope of
thi s bo o k. Over al l , t he res ul t s of t he K- Ver bande oper at i ons wer e ext remel y
p o o r in l i ght of t he r es our ces al l ot t ed t o t hem, es peci al l y c o mp a r e d wi t h
t he S- boat s ope r a t i ng out of thei r ha r de ne d ha r bor bunker s . As ment i oned
i n t he No r we g i a n s ect i on, a f ar mo r e s ubs t a nt i a l f or ce wa s depl oyed
in No r wa y i ncl udi ng f our of t he fi ve K- Ver ba nde di vi s i ons , but they never
s a w c o mb a t .
Combat in Norway
Coa s t a l arti l l ery in No r wa y s a w very little c o mb a t dur i ng t he war. One
Ge r ma n officer es t i mat ed t hat the bat t eri es in s out her n No r wa y fi red a bout
2 0 0 r ounds dur i ng the war, mos t l y at ni ght agai ns t Bri ti sh s mal l craf t . The
mos t ext ensi ve engagement s t ook pl ace in De c e mbe r 1 9 4 4 a nd J a nua r y 1 9 4 5
due t o Roya l Na v y des t r oyer a nd crui s er act i ons of f St a va nger i nvol vi ng
Bat t ery Eger s und. In cont r as t t o the c oa s t a l arti l l ery, naval a nd a r my f l ak
uni ts t hat wer e par t of the coas t al arti l l ery g r oups wer e us ed on a number of
occas i ons agai ns t Al l i ed ai r r ai ds .
When Fi nl and wi t hdr ew f r om the wa r on Sept ember 4, 1 9 4 4 , the t er ms of
the armi st i ce f orced the Wehr macht t o wi t hdr a w f r om Fi nl and. Wi t h the Re d
Ar my occupyi ng the Bal ti c coas t , this meant a fi ghti ng evacuat i on vi a nort hern
Fi nl and i nt o the Fi nnma r k ar ea of nor t her n No r wa y . The Wehr ma c ht ha d
fortified the area a r ound Pet s amo and there wa s s ome hope t hat 19. Gebi r gs
Kor ps coul d hol d on t o the ar ea, as wi nt er c a me earl y in the Arct i c a nd
there wa s the convi ct i on t hat the Re d Ar my wo ul d a wa i t better weat her.
Recogni zi ng their vul nerabi l i t y, on Oc t obe r 3, 1 9 4 4 Hi t l er aut hor i zed
Oper at i on Nordlicht {Northern Light), a wi t hdr awal out of nort hern Fi nl and
back t o the Lyngen Posi t i on, a def ensi ve line al ong the Lyngen Fj or d a nd the
nort hern ti p of Sweden. In the event, the Re d Ar my l aunched an offensi ve on
Oct ober 7 , 1 9 4 4 t hat over whel med the Ge r ma n defensi ve lines in Fi nl and and
led t o the capt ur e of Pe t s a mo on Oc t obe r 1 5 . No t cont ent t o chas e t he
Wehr macht out of Fi nl and, the thi rd phas e of the Sovi et offensi ve ai med at
seizing the Nor we g i a n por t of Ki r kenes , a nd thi s ar ea wa s capt ur ed by the
end of the mont h, bri ngi ng the offensi ve t o a cl os e. Dur i ng the fi ghti ng, s ome
of the coas t al arti l l ery bat t eri es t ook pa r t in pr ovi di ng fire s uppor t f or t he
harri ed Ge r ma n def ender s , fi ri ng a bo ut 6 0 0 r ounds . Ma n y of t he mobi l e
batteri es wer e wi t hdr awn f r om the coas t t o rei nf orce the Lyngen Li ne, a nd
t hose left behi nd were usual l y s pi ked bef ore their capt ur e by Sovi et f orces.
The Sovi et advance f orced the Kr i egs mar i ne t o move the bat t l eshi p Tirpitz
f r om its r emot e anchor age in the Al t af j or d t o Tr o ms o f or us e as a f l oat i ng
coas t al battery. Thi s put the da ma g e d s hi p wi t hi n r ange of RAF La nc a s t er s ,
whi ch s t r uck t he wa r s hi p on No v e mb e r 1 2 , 1 9 4 4 , f i nal l y s i nki ng it af t er
15 previ ous at t acks by RAF a nd Roya l Na v y ai rcraf t .
The last battle
One of the st rangest battl es on the Atlantikwall in the Net her l ands occur r ed
in Apri l 1945 on the i sl and of Texel . Thi s fi ghti ng wa s an uni nt ended out c ome
of Ge r ma n pol i ci es in 1 9 4 3 - 4 5 t o " di l ut e " Ge r ma n occupat i on t r oops al ong
the Atlantikwall wi t h Sovi et pri s oners of war, who vol unt eered t o serve in the
Wehrmacht rat her t han ri sk deat h in the ghas t l y pr i s on c a mps . In Febr uar y
1 9 4 5 , Geor gi s chen Ba t a i l l on. 822, cons i s t i ng of a bout 8 0 0 Ge or g i a n a nd
4 0 0 Ge r ma n t r oops , wa s sent t o occupy the i nf antry def enses of St r ongpoi nt
Texel . The uni t wa s par t of the pa per 219. 1nf ant eri e Di vi s i on or gani zed in
Ma r c h 1 9 4 5 t o free up Ge r ma n t r oops in t he De n Hel der def ens e sector.
Besi des this uni t, there were three coas t al artillery batteri es on the i sl and al ong
wi th a number of other Ge r ma n def enses, i ncl udi ng a r adar pos t . On the ni ght
of Apri l 5/ 6, 1 9 4 5 the Ge or gi a n t r oops mut i ni ed a nd ki l l ed mo s t of t he
Ger man t r oops in their bat t al i on. They di d not ma na g e t o over come the naval
batteri es MK B Ei erl and a nd Hor s of 2.1 a nd 3 . / MAA. 6 0 7 or the a r my bat t ery
1. / HKAA. 1230, whi ch wer e ma nne d by Ge r ma n t r oops . Whi l e the arti l l ery
batteri es tied down the mut i neers , rei nf orcement s arri ved f r om the ma i nl a nd,
mai nl y Mar i ne- Schut zenr egi ment . 163. A vi ol ent battl e pi tti ng the Geor gi a n
t r oops and Dut ch resi st ance fi ghters agai ns t the Wehr macht uni ts l ast ed for
t wo weeks wi th the Geor gi ans l osi ng a bout 5 6 5 men; a bout 800 Ge r ma ns a nd
117 Dut ch ci vi l i ans al s o di ed duri ng the rebel l i on. The Geor gi ans cont i nued
to fight agai ns t the Ge r ma ns even after the Ma y 8 capi t ul at i on and Ca na di a n
t r oops di d not arri ve on the i s l and unti l Ma y 2 0 , br i ngi ng an end t o t he
bl oods hed. The l i ngeri ng fi ghti ng on Texel has led this cur i ous encount er t o
be dubbed " t he l ast battl e of Worl d War I I . "
The K-Verbande midget sub-
marine flotillas in Holland began
to receive the improved Molch
submarine in 1945. This type
carries two torpedoes or mines
on the lower hull sides, though
this preserved example at the
Marshall Museum in Overloon,
the Netherlands lacks the
weapons. (Author's photograph)
BATTERIE FJELL, MKB.11/504, BERGEN, NORWAY
Among the most impressive Atlantikwall fortifications were two
turrets from the battlecruiser Gneisenau empl aced in Norway
at Orlandet and Fjell. The Gneisenau was damaged duri ng the
"Channel Dash" and whi l e under repair, it was damaged again
by an RAF raid. The subsequent reconstruction program
planned to replace the existing triple 280mm SK C/28 in Drh L
C/28 turrets wi th 380mm guns, freeing the weapons for coastal
defense. The A turret had been damaged duri ng an inconclusive
duel wi th the HMS Renown duri ng the April 1940 Norwegi an
campaign, and critically damaged in the February 26/27 RAF
raid, so its guns were re-used in three new single turrets in
Seezielbatterie Rozenburg in the Hook of Holland. In 1943, the
B turret was disassembled and moved to Fjell whi l e the C turret
went to Orlandet. The Drh L C/28 turrets were modi fi ed in the
process, wi th the stereoscopic rangefinders removed.
The Batterie Fjell was located on a rocky ridge on the island
of Fjell about 175m above sea level, covering the southern
approaches to Bergen. The 17m- deep shaft for the turret was
excavated out of quartzite rock whi ch mi ni mi zed the need
for extensive amounts of steel-reinforced concrete. Once
compl eted, the turret was covered wi th the usual camoufl age
umbrella consisting of wooden outriggers and wire netti ng
wi th painted metal squares and dried brush.
A large chamber was constructed under the gun turret for
supporting equi pment and ammuni ti on. The chamber was
connected to an extensive tunnel network, whi ch linked
the various supporti ng structures including an engi ne
and generator chamber i mmedi atel y behi nd the battery
for power, a ventilator room, and a defensive bunker wi th
47mm anti-tank gun to protect the main entrance. There was
also an ammuni ti on reserve for about 300 rounds, connected
to the turret by a narrow gauge railway. The tunnels also led
to an extensive underground gallery to the east of the turret
contai ni ng the mai n crew quarters and additional ammuni ti on
storage. The S446 fire control post was located about 250m to
the east, and coul d be reached by a tunnel . The compl ex was
defended by several bunkers i ncl udi ng two Bauform 633 wi th
50mm M19 automati c mortars, and a Bauform 629 antitank
gun bunker. There was also a four- gun 88mm Flak battery
near the site in concrete gun pits. Due to the i mportance
of the battery, the fire control post was supported by a Freya
surface search radar located to the east. The gun battery first
underwent proof-firing in the summer of 1943, but never saw
combat use.
The Fjell battery began to be disassembled in 1947 and
compl etel y scrapped by 1981; the turret shaft is now covered
wi th a cafe. Its sister battery north of Trondhei m, renamed Fort
Austrat in Norwegi an Kystartilleriet service, remained in service
until finally decommi ssi oned and converted into a museum
wi th the turret still intact.
1 . S446 command bunker
2. R633 bunker
3. Transformer bunker
4. Defense bunker
5. Crew quarters
6. Main entrance bunker
7. Main turret
8. Western access
A. Shell handling room
B. Charge handl i ng room
C. Main ammuni ti on trunk
D. Auxiliary ammuni ti on hoist trunk
THE SITES TODAY
Bel gi um ret ai ns a numbe r of c oa s t a l bunker s , a nd by the far the mos t
i nteresti ng is Do ma i n Raver s i j de on the wes t ern si de of Os t end. Thi s wa s the
f ormer royal doma i n t hat wa s t urned over t o the provi nce of West Fl anders by
Pri nce Kar el in 1 9 8 1 . Unl i ke ot her por t i ons of the Bel gi an coas t where the
bunker s ha d been demol i s hed, ma ny bunker s r emai ned i ntact on the estate.
The pa r k cont ai ns not onl y the ext ens i ve Wor l d War II Bat t eri e Sal t zwedel
neu/ Ti rpi t z, but al s o el ement s of the Wor l d War I Batteri e Aachen. Thi s is one
of the mos t ext ensi ve a nd best -preserved sites on the entire Atlantikwall and
cont ai ns numer ous rest ored bunkers and gun pos i t i ons . If I had t o r ecommend
a si ngl e Atlantikwall site for r eader s t o visit, this woul d be the one.
The Net her l ands wa s ha ppy t o ri d itself of memor i es of the Ger ma n
occupat i on, and the severe f l ood of 1953 convi nced the government t o begin
a c a mpa i gn t o r emove mos t of the bunkers ; their hast y const ruct i on and the
ri sk of er os i on pos e d a t hreat t o the vi tal coas t al dunes . Onl y a handf ul of
l arge sites r emai n, al t hough there are numer ous bunker s scat t ered about .
The concent rat i on a r ound I J mui den is the mos t i nteresti ng as it i ncl udes the
subst ant i al Seezielbatterie Heerendui n in the dunes behi nd the parki ng lot of the
seasi de Hol i day Inn al ong wi t h s ome nei ghbori ng flak batteri es. The IJ mui den
Ker nwer k is al s o nearby and can be visited on speci al t ours. The correspondi ng
bat t ery site on the nor t h si de of the Kernwerk has di s appear ed under the
mas s i ve Cor us i ndust ri al pa r k, but there are s ome bat t eri es in nei ghbori ng
Wi j k- am- Zee. Anot her memor a bl e site is Seezielbatterie Schveni ngen-Nord on
the beach on the nort h si de of the city. Thi s battery is l ocat ed in the protected
coas t al dunes a nd s o is off l i mi t s, but can be easi l y seen f r om the beach. In
cont ras t t o the Ams t e r da m ar ea, the extensi ve forti fi cati on efforts on the Ho o k
of Hol l and near Rot t er dam have l argel y been obl i terated by the constructi on of
the mas s i ve Eur opor t dock facility, t hough there are still many scattered bunkers
in the Nor dmol e area on the north si de. The gun batteries involved in the violent
bat t l e for Wal cheren have l ong si nce been r emoved, but the Bunker behoud
f oundat i on has been undert aki ng a pr ogr a m t o restore s ome surviving personnel
and obs er vat i on bunkers in the ar ea, i ncl udi ng exampl es in Zout el ande and
Vl i ssi ngen. Thes e are little gems wi t h ext remel y authenti c reconst ruct i ons of
the interior, whi ch gi ve a g ood i dea of the war t i me life in these bunkers.
De nma r k t ook f ew pai ns t o pr es er ve the ma ny bunker s al ong the west ern
c oa s t of J ut l a nd, but in the 1 9 8 0 s the Na t i ona l For es t a nd Na t ur e Agency
began t o cat al og the survi vi ng sites wi t h an ai m t owa r ds sel ecti ng s ome of the
mor e si gni f i cant si tes for l ater pr es er vat i on. In 2 0 0 5 , the Cul t ur al Her i t age
Agency des i gnat ed s urvi vi ng bunker s t o be " wor t hy of pr es er vat i on, " whi ch
obl i ges st at e agenci es t o cons ul t bef ore des t r oyi ng survi vi ng bunker s on state
pr oper t y; bunker s on pr i vat e l and are not pr ot ect ed. Ma n y bunker s r emai n
al ong the c oa s t becaus e they have pr oven t o be t oo muc h t r oubl e t o r emove.
No r wa y ha d rel at i vel y little heavy bunker cons t r uct i on cons i der i ng
t he l ar ge numbe r of gun bat t eri es depl oyed t here. Af ter Wor l d War II, the
Nor we g i e n Kystarti l l eri et t ook over ma ny of the better Ge r ma n gun batteri es
a nd kept t hem in servi ce for ma ny years . Thi s preserved a number of batteri es,
but al s o l i mi ted publ i c acces s as they became cl os ed mi l i tary pos t s . The mos t
i mpr es s i ve are the Adol f ka nonen at Tr ondenes a nd the Gnei s enau turret at
Or l andet ; the Var a bat t ery ha d its gun r emoved, but the l arge and i ncompl et e
gun c a s e ma t e is still on si te. Ther e ar e l ar ge numbe r s of s mal l Ge r ma n
forti fi cati ons al ong the Nor we g i a n coas t i ncl udi ng s ome rarities such as several
Pz Kpf w II Fl a mi ngo Panzerstellungen.
For r eader s i nt eres t ed in vi si t i ng t hes e s i t es , t he b o o k s in t he Further
reading secti on t hat f ol l ows pr ovi de mor e detai l , not abl y the regi onal st udi es.
However , it is very hel pf ul t o check mor e recent i nf or ma t i on as acces s t o
ma ny of these sites depends on the t i me of year. The Internet is a par t i cul ar l y
useful s our ce of i nf or ma t i on on t he mus e ums . In t he c a s e of s o me of t he
mor e r emot e bunker s whi ch are not par t of publ i c mus e ums , I have f ound
t hat over head t opogr a phi c i mager y s uch as t hat pr ovi ded by Goog l e Ear t h is
enor mous l y val uabl e in wal ki ng t our s of t he bunker s , especi al l y when us ed
in conj unct i on wi t h GPS.
FURTHER READING
Al t hough the hi story of the Atlantikwall in Fr ance is well covered in Engl i sh
l anguage s our ces , this is not the cas e wi t h the Atlantikwall in the L o w
Countri es and Scandi navi a, whi ch has been l argel y i gnored in Engl i sh account s .
One of the better archi val s our ces is the US Ar my' s Sea c oa s t Arti l l ery
Eval uat i on Boa r d report , but copi es are difficult t o find except in the archi ves.
I l ocat ed exa mpl es at the Na t i ona l Archi ves a nd Re c or ds Admi ni s t r at i on
( NARA II) in Col l ege Par k, Ma r yl a nd a nd the US Ar my Mi l i t ar y Hi s t or y
Institute at Carl i sl e Bar r acks , Pennsyl vani a. One of the s t range as pect s of this
l arge study is t hat there is little cover age of Fr ance or the L o w Count r i es , but
relatively extensi ve detail on Scandi navi a.
Whi l e t here is little c over a ge of the Atlantikwall on t he No r t h Sea in
Engl i sh, there is a bunda nt cover age in Fl emi s h, Dut c h, Da ni s h, Ge r ma n, a nd
Nor we g i a n; s ome of the books l i sted bel ow are mul t i -l i ngual wi t h Engl i s h or
Ge r ma n s ect i ons . Ther e is par t i cul ar l y g o o d c over a ge of t he Ne t he r l a nds .
Some of the regi onal st udi es are especi al l y hel pful if pl anni ng t o visit the si tes,
as they often serve as cat al ogs of r emai ni ng f ort i f i cat i ons.
UNPUBLISHED GOVERNMENT REPORTS
Clearing the Channel Ports: Part V Canadian Participation in the
Operations in North-West Europe 1944. (Report No. 184, Historical
Section, Canadian Military Headquarters)
German Seacoast Defenses - European Theater (7 volumes, Seacoast Artillery
Evaluation Board, US Forces, ETO, 1945)
GENERAL ATLANTIKWALL STUDIES
Helmut Blocksdorf, Hitler's Secret Commandos: Operations of the
K-Verband (Pen & Sword: 2008)
Lawrence Paterson, Weapons of Desperation: German Frogmen and Midget
Submarines of World War II (Chatham: 2006)
Rudi Rolf, Der Atlantikwall: Die Bauten der deutschen Kustenbefestigungen
1940-1945 (Zeller: 1998)
Rudi Rolf, Der Atlantikwall: Perlenschnur aus Stahlbeton (AMA: 1983)
Rudi Rolf, Het Duitse Fortificatie-ontwerp 1935-1945
(Beetsterzwaag: 1985)
Rudi Rolf and Peter Saal, Fortress Europe (Airlife: 1988)
Hans Sakkers and Hans Houterman, Atlantikwall in Zeeland en Vlaanderen
(Citadel: 2000)
Michael Schmeelke and Alarm Kiiste, Deutsche Marine-, Heeres- und
Luftwaffenbatterien in der Kiistenverteidigung 1939-1945
(Dorfler: 2006)
BELGIUM
Alex Deseyne, De Rust Bezet 1914-1918 (Goekink Graphics: 2007)
Alex Deseyne, Raversijde 1914-1918: Geschiedenis van de Batterij Aachen
(West-Vlaanderen: 2005)
Frank Philippart et al, De Atlantik Wall: Van Willemstad tot de Somme
(Lannoo: 2004)
Mariette J acobs, Raversijde 1940-1944: De Atlantikwall Batterij Saltzwedel
neu/Tirpitz (West-Vlaanderen: 1995)
Karl Schmeelke, Michael Schmeelke, Deutsche Kustenbefestigungen in Belgien
1914-1945 (Podzun-Pallas: 1995)
Alain Van Geeteruvon, De Atlanische Muur, Deel 1: De Bouwheren
(De Krijger, 1990)
Alain Van Geeteruvon and Dirk Peeters, De Atlanische Muur, Deel 2:
De Bunkers leger en marine types (De Krijger, 1990)
DENMARK
Jens Andersen and Rudi Rolf, German Bunkers in Denmark: A Survey
(PRAK: 2006)
Vibeke Ebert, The Atlantic Wall from Nymindegab to Skallingen
(Blavandshuk Egnsmuseum: 1992)
M. Svejgaard, The Kriegsmarine Command, Control and Reporting System,
bunkers and electronic systems in Denmark 1940-45 (Gyges: 2007)
Peter Willumsen et al, Der Atlantikwall auf Fano (weXco: 2004)
THE NETHERLANDS
H. E Ambachtsheer, Van verdediging naar bescherming: De Atlantikwall in
Den Haag ( VOM: 1995)
C. Bal, Scheveningen-Den Haag 1940-1945: Van Dorp en Stad tot
Stutzpunktgruppe Scheveningen (Rodi: 2001)
Peter Hei j koop and Jeroen Rij psma, De Atlantikwall op Goeree
(Rijpsma: 2006)
Maarten Peters, De Atlantikwall: Omstreden erfgoed van Rijnmond tot
IJmond (Open Kaart: 2005)
Ruud Pols and Leo de Vries, Seefront IJmuiden: Duitse bunkers in de
kustverdediging van de Festung IJmuiden (Pirola: 2005)
Jeroen Rij psma and Kl aas van Brakel, Radarstellung Biber: Kustverdiging
op Voorne 1940-45 (Rijpsma: 2005)
Rudi Rolf and Hans Sakkers, Duitse bunkers in Nederland (PRAK: 2005)
Hans Sakkers, Festung Hoek van Holland (Fortress Books: 1992)
Hans Sakkers, Vesting Vlissingen (Bunkerbehoud: 2004)
NORWAY
Roy Andersen, Stride nom Strandsonen: Generalinspektoatet for
Kystartilleriet 1899-2001 (Eide: 2005)
Trygve Dahl, Festung Greipstad 1940-45 (Stiftelsen: 2005)
Erik Ettrup and Daniel Schellenberger, Festung Lista: Atlanterhavsvollen
i Norge (Commentum: 2007)
Erik Ettrup, Erik Ritterbach and Daniel Schellenberger, Der Atlantikwall in
Norwegen: Festung Stavanger 1940-45 (Mails & More: 2005)
J an Fjortofy, Tyske kystfort i Norge (Agder: 1982)
J an Olav Flatmark, Sunnmore i Festung Norwegen (Snohette: 1994)
Olav Kobbeltveit, Fjell Festung i Krig og Fred (Eide: 2006)
GLOSSARY
AOK Armeeoberkommando; high command of an army
Art.Gr. Artilleriegruppe, artillery group
Art.Ob.Gr. Artillerieobergruppe, artillery super-group
Bauform construction plan
Eo r EB Eisenbahnbatterie: railroad battery
Festung Fortress, major fortified area
Festungsbereich fortified area
Flagruko Flakgruppenkommandostand/stabsbatterie: flak group command
post/staff battery
Flugplatz Airbase
Heer German Army
HKAA Heeres-kiisten-artillerie-abteilung, Army coastal artillery regiment
HKAR Heeres-Kusten-artillerie-regiment, Army coastal artillery regiment
HKB Heereskiistenbatterie; Army coastal battery
IR Infantry regiment
K-Division K-Verbande division
K-Flotilla K-Verbande flotilla
Kernwerk core position of Festung
KVA Kiisten Verteidigung Abschnitt, divisional coast defense sector
K-Verbande also KdK, Kommando der Kleinkampfverbande, small combat
unit command
Kriegsmarine German Navy
KVG Kiisten Verteidigung Gruppe, coast defense group
Landfront Fortified positions of coastal defense sector protecting rearward
towards the land
MAA Marine-artillerie-abteilung: Navy artillery regiment
Marko-Stand Marineartilleriekommandostand/stabsbatterie: Naval artillery
command post/staff battery
MEK Marine Einsatz Kommando; commando units of the K-Verbande
MKB Marine Kiisten Batterie: Navy coastal battery
OB offene Bettung, open platform
Regelbau construction standard, sometimes abbreviated as R when used Regelbau
with a particular plan, for example R621
S-boat German motor torpedo boat; often called E-boat by the Allies
Schartenstand Gun casemate
Seeko Seekommandant; regional naval command
Seezielbatterie Naval battery; alternate of MKB
SK bunker design suffix for Sonderkonstruktion, special design
St.P. Stiitzpunkt; strongpoint, typically platoon to company size
St.P.Gr. Stiitzpunktgruppe; strongpoint group, typically company to
battalion size
Tobruk A class of small bunkers with circular openings for a
crew-served weapon
Tonne Metric ton (1, 000kg; 2. 204 lb)
Unterstande Bunker
VB Verteidigungsbereich; defense zone
Vf Verstarkfeldmassig; reinforced field position such as a tobruk
Wo r WN Widerstandsnest; resistance nest, typically section to
platoon sized
Westwall German fortifications created in the late 1930s on the
French-German border, also known as Siegfried Line
INDEX
References to illustrations are shown in
bold. Plates are prefixed pi, with captions
on the page in brackets. Suffix m indicates
a map. Suffix / indicates a table.
Alan Dale (Panamanian freighter) 56
Allied forces: 2nd Canadian Division 52
3rd Canadian Division 52
4th Special Service Brigade 53
41 Marine Commando 55
48 Marine Commando 55
52nd Division 52
Antwerp 5, 29, 52
artillery: 75mm Pak anti-tank guns 5, 13
150mm destroyer guns 8, pl l 4(15)
39, 49
150mm submarine guns 13, 39
210mm Morser 18 42
280mm Model 1892/93 guns 5
406mm Adolfkanone 42bis, 45, 45/,
pl47(46) 60
anti-aircraft guns 12, 29, 33/, 50
Belgian Vickers 94mm pedestal gun
5, 24
British 3.7-inch anti-aircraft 53, pl54(55)
55
Cockerill 120mm Model 1931 field gun
7
French field guns 36, 39/, 42, 53
Gneisenau secondary armament 39, 50
heavy naval guns 45-6, 45/
Kriegsmarine flak batteries pl22(23) 29,
32/, 50, 51/
railroad guns 25, 26, 27
Skoda 210mm 37
tank turrets 10, 15, pl34(35) 49
Atlantic Wall: additional seawall 12
bunker construction 10/
coastal radar chain 17
construction priorities 8, 9
defense sector organization 12, 24, 27,
29, 36-7
density of bunkers 11-12
fortifications on the North Sea 11m
in Scandinavia 38, 38m
Belgian coastal batteries 5, 24, 25bis,
26/, 27
Blucher (German cruiser) 5, 6, 48
Breskens pocket 28, 29, 52
Bruneval raid 8
Bunkerbehoud Foundation 27, 55
bunkers
see also reinforced field fortifications
bombproof 10
camouflaged 25
fire control/observation 10, 26, 27,
28, 31
forward artillery observation llbis
gun casemates Hbis, 10, 31
munitions 7, 10
personnel 6, 10
S-boat 6, 28, 56
standard designs 9-10
submarine 6, 35, 37
types 10-11
casemates, disguised as buildings 8, 9
Channel Islands 8, 9
coastal artillery 12-15
fire control posts 5, pl l 8( 19)
Heer doctrine 15
infrared detectors 19-20
Kriegsmarine 13, 27, 27, 28, 31, 31
coastal obstacles 15
controlled submarine minefields 20, 20
Den Helder 29bis, 57
Denmark: coastal batteries 48, 48-9,
50- 1/
planned deployments 49, 51
Dieppe raid 9, 20
Domain Raversijde museum 5, 7, 8,
Ubis, 16, 60
Donitz, Admiral Karl 56
Einsatzgruppe Wiking 37, 37/
Erebus, HMS (monitor) 53
fortress sites 12
Festung Hoek van Holland 28
Festung Ijmuiden 28, 29, pl30(31) 60
Festung Schelde 29, 52
Gallipoli lessons 15
German forces: 19 Gebirgs Korps 57
41st Radar Company 17, 19
64 Infanterie Division 52
70 Infanterie Division 52
712 Infanterie Division 27
Georgischen Bataillon 822 57, 59
Marine-Schutzenregiment 163 59
Gneisenau (German battlecruiser)
secondary armament 39, 50
turret 36, 40, 45/, pl58(59) 60
Graf Zeppelin (German aircraft carrier) 46
Heye, Vice Admiral Helmuth 23, 55
Hitler, Reichsfuhrer Adolf 6, 7-8, 8-9, 9,
39, 49, 57
infrared detector, Zeiss WPG-ZSt 19-20
K-Verbande (Small Combat Unit) 23
in the Netherlands 55-6
in Norway 48/
KernwerkM, 28, pl30(31)
Krautman, Leutnant 23
Linse explosive motor boats 24, 48/,
55-6, 56
midget submarine threat: acoustic
sensors for 21
rocket-propelled depth charges 21, 21
Royal Navy attacks 21
midget submarines: Biber 23, 24, 48/, 56
Marder 23, 48/
Molch 24, 48/, 56, 59
Neger 23
Seehund 56
Netherlands: coastal batteries 27, 28, 33/
coastal radars 17, 19
Naval batteries 32/
New West Wall see Atlantic Wall
Norway: artillery command structure 42
British raids 7
coastal artillery 39, 39/, 42
coastal artillery combat 57
Einsatzgruppe Wiking bunkers 37/, 38w
North Coast batteries 43/
Polar Coast batteries 40- 1/
torpedo batteries 46/, 49
West Coast batteries 44-5/
Norwegian coast 35-6
Opalka, Kapitan Robert 55
Organization Todt 6bis, 10, 37
Ostend 5, 6, 24
radars: deployment 17, 19, 42
Freya 16
FuMB passive monitoring receivers 17, 19
FuMO 214/215 Scheer 17
FuMO-11 Renner centimetric 16, 17
FuMO-214 Wurzburg-Reise 16, 16, 17,
19, 23, 25
naval reporting centers 17, 19
Seetakt 16-17
reinforced field fortifications: camouflaged
gunpits 37, 40, 46, 49, 50
'kettle' gunpits 5, 7, 25bis
Tobruks 7, 10, 11, 31, pl34(35)
reinforced field fortifications
see also bunkers
Rommel, General Erwin 15
Royal Navy Close Support Squadron 53
St Nazaire raid 8, 20
Scheldt campaign 52-3, 55
Scheldt Estuary 29, 52, 56
searchlights 15-16, 16
Terror, HMS (monitor) 53
Texel mutiny 57-8
Tirpitz (German battleship) 21, 57
Todt, Dr Fritz 6
torpedoes, wire-guided 23, 24, 42, 46/,
48, 49
Trondheim 35, 37
Vlissingen 28, 29, 52, 55
Walcheren 5, 52-3
Warspite, HMS (battleship) 53
Westkapelle Batterie 53, 55, pl54(55) 55
Zeebrugge 5, 5, 24
64
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Design, technology and history of key fortresses, strategic
positions and defensive systems
THE ATLANTIC
WALL (2)
Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway
Germany's Atlantic Wall was the most ambitious military fortification
program of World War II. Following its conquest of Western Europe,
Germany had to defend some 5,OOOkm of Atlantic coastline from the
Spanish border to the Arctic Circle. The United States' entry into the
war and the inevitability of an Anglo-American landing in Western
Europe resulted in the fortification of this coastline along its entire
length. Focusing on the northern Atlantic Wall in the Low Countries
and Scandinavia, this title addresses the special aspects of these
countries, such as the early concentration on fortifying Norway, in
response to early British commando raids; the greater use of turreted
naval guns and the establishment of first-line Flak defenses in the Low
Countries to counter the Allied strategic bombing campaign.
Full color artwork _ Photographs _ Unrivaled detail _ Color maps
US$18.95 UK11.99
CAN $22.00
IS B N 978-1-84603-393-3
33
5 1 895