2.1.

2 Changes in Land Tenure under British Rule

India's invasion by the British brought about, in the course of time, a comlete
transformation in the country's land tenure system. The !ast India Comany e"erienced
difficulty in its trading because the sale of British goods in India #as insignificant. $n the
other hand, the e"ortation of gold and silver from !ngland to ay for Indian goods #as
soon rohibited. The comany found a solution by securing money from India to ay for
Indian goods. It collected ta"es for the Indian rulers #hich, in the beginning, brought
revenues of only 1% & of the levied ta"es, but, since the control over the amount of levied
ta"es became la" at the end of the 'ogul eriod, its revenues increased. In addition, they
#ere assigned areas as ()agir*+' The decisive brea,through came #hen, in 1-./, the office
of 'de#an' for Bengal, $rissa, and Bihar, namely the financial sovereignty for these areas,
#as assigned to the Comany #ith the concession for levying ta"es in e"change for a
global sum of Rs. 2.. million er annum.
0fter some time of e"erimentation, in 1-12, Cor#allis' 3ermanent
4ettlement brought a final regulation of the rocedure for levying ta"es,
#hich led to decisive changes in land tenure. The British did as if all the
land belonged to the state and #as thus at their disosal. They registered
the local ta" collectors, #ho #ere called 5amindars, as o#ners of the land
in their district. These 5amindars had to collect and deliver the ta"es6 the
amount #as fi"ed at the beginning and remained the same ermanently. To give them an
incentive, they #ere free to decide ho# much to demand from the cultivators. $n the
other hand, the fi"ed lum ta" sum #as an incentive to ut more land under cultivation
and, thus, have more ta"ayers in one region. In order to do so, one could rot bleed the
individual farmers too much.
The right to the land conferred on the 5amindars #as alienable, rentable, and heritable.
This meant the introduction of a comlete novelty, in India. The rivilege of utili5ing
land had become a saleable good. Those #ho had been cultivators until then obtained the
status of 'occuancy tenants.' These occuancy rights #ere heritable and transferrable and
#ere not tamered #ith as long as the holders aid their ta"es. In contrast to these, the
tenants #ho cultivated land o#ned by the ta" collectors #ere'' tenants at #ill', i.e., they
could be evicted.
In the beginning, there #ere hardly any roblems. The scarcity of cultivators revented
the 5amindars from demanding too high ta"es. They #ere interested in attracting eole
to cultivate the land and, thus, to increase the number of ta" ayers in order to increase
the difference bet#een the revenues and the fi"ed amount that bad to be remitted.
The detrimental conse7uences of recogni5ing the ta" collectors as landlords and of
introducing the legal institution of saleable rivate landed roerty first became evident
as, later, considerable changes occurred in India in the demograhic and economic
situation. The industrial revolution in !ngland, namely, brought about a change in the
British olicy in India. The ob)ective #as no longer to imort from India, but to sell
!nglish roducts in India. 4ince the te"tile industry layed an imortant role at the
beginning of industriali5ation in !ngland, very large amounts of chea roducts
manufactured by mechanical looms #ere e"orted to India and this soon led to a collase
in the te"tile home industry in India. 0 large number of #eavers became unemloyed. In
order to secure a basis of e"istence, they migrated to the rural areas and tried to lease land
they could farm. The scoe of this migration89acca's inhabitants alone decreased from
1/%,%%% to 2%,%%% bet#een 1:2; and 1:2-8 caused ressure on the rural areas and
brought about a comlete change in the relationshis bet#een 5amindars and tenants. The
monooly of controlling the means to secure livelihood shifted o#er unilaterally into the
hands of the 5amindars #ho #ere able to e"tort more and more ta"es as the demand for
land increased. This led to indebtedness and often to the loss of occuancy rights and
relegation to tenants at #ill.
The great discreancy bet#een the fi"ed amount of ta"es to be remitted and the
increasing revenues made the 5amindars #ealthy. 4oon they no longer #ent to the trouble
of collecting the ta"es themselves but rather sub leased this office to others #hile they
themselves lived on the remainder bet#een the amount claimed as ta"es and that aid to
the (sub assignees.( The difference bet#een the revenues and the amounts to be remitted
#as so great that even the (sub assignees( tried to sub lease. 0fter some time, it became
7uite common to have 1% to 2% intermediaries, more or less #ithout a secific function,
bet#een the government and the farmers, and they all had a share in the cultivation yield.
In addition, ab#abs, sulements and fees for the most curious reasons #ere introduced6
for e"amle, for using an umbrella, for ermission to sit do#n in the 5amindar's office,
for being allo#ed to stand u again, etc. 'oreover, the (began( unaid #or, #hich the
tenants #ere forced to erform on the 5amindar's land, too, on larger and larger
roortions. $n the average, it amounted to 2% 2/ & of the lease. <nder the effect of
these develoments #hich should be regarded as late conse7uences of the changes in the
land tenure brought about by the (3ermanent 4ettlement,( more and more cultivators
became indebted, lost their occuancy rights, and droed in status to tenants at #ill or
agricultural labourers. $n the other hand, the #ealth of the 5amindars ,et increasing on
account of the income they earned from the difference bet#een the amount of ta"es and
the rentals, the increase in cultivated areas, ,money lending, and e"roriation of debtors.
In the course of time, the 5amindari region #as characteri5ed by the mar,ed difference
bet#een #ealth, o#er, and rosects in life. !ven the government e"erienced
dra#bac,s on account of this system. Changes in the monetary value, rices, and the
amount of cultivated areas turned the fi"ed ta", after 1/% years, into nothing but a to,en
sum, and considerable ta" tosses ensued.
The 5amindari system #as not introduced in the #hole of India. Because of the
e"erience made #ith the system, better ,no#ledge of the conditions in India, and liberal
influences on the colonial olicy, the rovinces #hich became British ossessions later
#ere assigned other ta"ation systems. The ryot#ari system #as introduced in 'adras,
Bombay, and 0ssam. <nder that system, the government claimed the roerty rights to
all of the land. but allotted it to the cultivators on the condition that they ay the ta"es.
They could use, sell, mortgage, be7ueath, and lease the land as long as they aid their
ta"es. $ther#ise, they #ere evicted. This direct ta" relation bet#een the government and
the cultivators #as meant to revent sub ta" collectors, thus increasing urchasing o#er,
and, in that #ay,imroving the mar,eting rosects for !nglish roducts. =ere, the ta"es
#ere only fi"ed in a temorary settlement for a eriod of thirty years and then revised.
This #ay, the government increased its revenue.
In >orth India and in the 3un)ab #here villages #ith )oint land rights #ere common, an
attemt #as made to utili5e this structure in the 'ahal#ari system. Ta"ation #as
imosed #ith the village community as theoretical landlord, since it had the land rights.
The village community had to distribute these ta"es among the cultivators #ho o#ed
ta"es individually and )ointly. !veryone #as thus liable for the others' arrears. 0 village
inhabitant8 the lambardar8 collected the amounts and remitted them in bul,. =ere, too, ta"
assessment #as revised at intervals.
9esite this different system, the conditions for cultivators constantly deteriorated in
these regions as #ell. The high ta"es fi"ed by the governmen8t half to t#o thirds of the
net yield #as the usual amount made investments imossible. Because of fragmentation
resulting from inheritance, the farms became smaller and smaller. The fact that land
could be used as collateral made it ossible to borro# money to ay ta"es in the case of
cro failures. But, in that #ay, more and more farms assed into the hbands of
moneylenders, often better off cultivators in the village. In the course of time, these
ceased to cultivate their land themselves and sub leased it instead. ?inally, the ryot#ari
region #as no longer a self cultivator region. 'ore than one third of the land #as leased
and in many districts more than t#o thirds. The great demand for land o#ing to the
oulation gro#th made it ossible to let others #or, for oneself.
In the 'ahal#ari region as #ell, sub leasing and indebtedness became ,more and more
common. Indeed, it #as not ossible to transfer the land to eole #ho #ere not from the
locality, but the result #as that landed roerty became concentrated in the hands of a
fe# #ealthy eole, #hereas the others lost their rights. 0 constantly increasing number
of eole #ere or became landless. @hile in the middle of the last century there #ere still
no landless, in 1121 and 11;/, resectively 22 and -% million landless labourers #ere
registered. $thers succeeded in renting some land, but on less favourable terms. 4hare
tenancy, in articular, increased greatly.
The British land olicy #hich lasted 1/% years as #ell as the conse7uences of economic
changes and the drastic oulation gro#th led to a comlete change in the land tenure
system in India. @hereas, formerly, the cultivators ossessed the right of use and the
government the right to imose ta"es, no# the rights in land #ere slit into many ieces.
In this rocess, not only did a large number of cultivators lose their valid land rights and
fell in status to unrotected tenants and labourers. 0t the same time, the ta" collectors
became landlords and large lando#ners. 0 stratum of intermediaries #ho did not have a
secific function develoed, and the land assed into the hands of moneylenders. This
caused an enormous differentiation in financial conditions, #hereby, the mass of farmers
lived in ab)ect overty.
To e"lain the further develoment follo#ing India and 3a,istan's indeendence, it is
very imortant tonote that, admittedly, the economic situation of the different grous of
the rural oulation had develoed very differently, and a large art of the oulation
became oor, but, in its main traits, the social system remained intact, There e"isted
namely a comlicated relationshi attern bet#een landlords, cultivators, and landless
eole #hich #as based on mutual rights and obligations and #hich rovided everyone
#ith a lace8even if a oor one 8 #ithin the rural society. The system aimed at satisfying
the needs of everyone in the economic and social sector, and #as based on the fact that
all members deended uon one another.
Thus, the landlords o#ned land, it is true, but #ere deendent uon
the landless tenants, agricultural labourers, and village craftsmen to
cultivate it. Inversely, the landless could rot utili5e their labour in an
agrarian society if the landlords did rot give them the ossibility of
#or,ing on the fields. This made it necessary for the landlords to maintain
the landless' economic situation at least at a level #hich #as not detrimental
to their caacity to #or,, nor caused them to migrate. This not only forced
the e"istence of a minimum #age, although very lo#, but also induced
financial aid in emergencies, cro failures, etc. In addition, the landlords
referred to face #ant than not meet the obligations resulting from their
labour relationshis.
4uch mutual relationshis e"isted even in the social sector. The landlord assured the
rotection and reresentation of their #or,ers e"ternally, #hereas the landless adoted a
loyal attitude to#ards their emloyers and #ere, so to say, automatically on his side. This
secured him o#er and influence and ut him in a osition to reresent their interests
#ell e"ternally. In the #ars. these behavioural atterns became so ingrained that the
obligations of the strong to#ards the #ea, became social norms, and aternalistic
behaviour #as a rere7uisite for being recogni5ed as a leading ersonality. This norm,
#hich is tyical for rural societies, sets obvious limits to e"loitation. It is true that the
level of these limits is very lo#, but they guaranteed subsistence. It is also imortant to
observe that the rights had been unilaterally shifted to the benefit of the landlords, but the
landless did not consider themselves to be e"loited. =ere, religion may have layed an
imortant role, but the e"istence of mutual relationshis even if they #ere une7ual #hich
granted security against threat to e"istence #ere also of e"treme imortance.
htt*AAecon.lse.ac.u,AstaffAmghata,Alandref.df* for effects of land reforms
II. $eration Barga
0fter indeendence, India sought to imrove the living standards of
sharecroers through tenancy reform. The Land Reforms 0ct of 11//
and its successive amendments have t#o main clauses* B1C 4harecroers
#ill have ermanent and inheritable incumbency rights to land that is
registered in their name rovided that they ay the legally stiulated
share to the landlords, do not leave the land fallo#, and do not sublease
the land. !"cet in such cases, the sharecroer #ill lose his right to
the land only if the landlord #ants to use the land for ersonal cultivation. These rights
are inheritable but not transferable. B2C The share
that the landlord can demand from a registered tenant #ill be no greater
than 2/ ercent.
.
This hase of tenancy reform is #idely recogni5ed as a failure B0u
11-/C. Looholes in the la# allo#ed landlords to abuse the ersonal
cultivation e"emtion and to threaten to evict the tenant #henever he
tried to register. 'oreover, the tenant #as resonsible for registering
himself, and the government rovided little institutional suort for
him to do so. By virtue of their #ealth and suerior caste, landlords
#ielded a lot of o#er #ithin the village and #ere therefore able to
intimidate tenants. This #as comounded by the fact that the government usually too, the
landlordDs side in disutes. 0s a result, before
$eration Barga, very fe# sharecroers #ere registered, cro shares
#ere signiEcantly belo# the legal minimum, and tenure #as #idely erceived as being
insecure BBardhan and Rudra 11:;C.
In 11--, the ne#ly elected government assed the @est Bengal Land
Reforms 0ct, #hich closed most of the looholes in the 11// act. 'ost
imortant, it set very stringent and #ell8deEned conditions under #hich
the landlord could utili5e the ersonal cultivation clause to evict a
tenant.
0t the same time, the ne# government launched $eration Barga, a
massive and #ell8ublici5ed village8to8village camaign to register tenants and ensure
their rights. <nder this rogram the rocess used to
register tenants #as altered to ma,e it easier for the sharecroer to
register. $eration Barga ofEcials sought out hesitant sharecroers,
e"lained the la#, and offered them the oortunity to register. 'oreover, the ne#
government used its o#n village olitical organi5ations to
ma,e sure that landlords did not intimidate tenants, that tenants #ho
registered did not face rerisal from the landlords, and that disutes
#ere handled fairly in the courts. $eration Barga is #idely regarded
as a success. By 1112, more than ./ ercent of an estimated 2.2 million
share tenants had been registered.