Philosophy of language

Philosophy of language is the branch of philosophy that studies language. Its primary concerns include
the nature of linguistic meaning, reference, language use, language learning and creation, language
understanding, truth, thought and experience (to the extent that both are linguistic), communication,
interpretation, and translation.
At heart, the discipline is concerned with five fundamental issues.
How are sentences composed into a meaningful whole, and what are the meanings of the parts of
sentences?
hat is the nature of meaning? (hat exactly is a meaning?)
hat do we do with language? (How do we use it socially? hat is the purpose of language?)
How does language relate to the mind, both of the spea!er and the interpreter?
How does language relate to the world?
"xtension and intension
#hilosophers of language are not much concerned with what individual words or sentences mean. $he
nearest dictionary or encyclopedia may solve the problem of the meaning of words, and to spea! a
language correctly is generally to !now what most sentences mean. hat is more interesting for
philosophers is the %uestion of what it means for an expression to mean something. hy do expressions
have the meanings they have? hich expressions have the same meaning as other expressions, and
why? How can these meanings be !nown? And the best, and simplest, %uestion might be, &what does the
word 'meaning' mean?&
In a similar vein, philosophers wonder about the relationship between meaning and truth. #hilosophers
tend to be less concerned with which sentences are actually true, and more with what kinds of meanings
can be true or false. (ome examples of %uestions a truth)oriented philosopher of language might as!
include* +an meaningless sentences be true or false? hat about sentences about things that don't exist?
Is it sentences that are true or false, or is it the usage of sentences?
,anguage, how things 'mean' something, and truth are important not -ust because they are used in
everyday life. language shapes human development, from earliest childhood and continuing to death.
/nowledge itself may be intertwined with language. 0otions of self, experience, and existence may
depend entirely on how language is used and what is learned through it.
$he topic of learning language leads to all !inds of interesting %uestions. Is it possible to have any
thoughts without having a language? hat !inds of thoughts need a language to happen? How much
does language influence !nowledge of the world and how one acts in it? +an anyone reason at all
without using language?
$he philosophy of language is important because, for all of the above reasons, language is important,
and language is important because it is inseparable from how one thin!s and lives. #eople in general
have a set of vital concepts which are connected with signs and symbols, including all words (symbols)*
&ob-ect,& &love,& &good,& &1od,& &masculine,& &feminine,& &art,& &government,& and so on. 2y
incorporating &meaning,& everyone has shaped (or has had shaped for us) a view of the universe and
how they have &meaning& within it.
3
(et for the tas!, many philosophical discussions of language begin by clarifying terminology. (ome
philosophers )) for instance some semiotic outloo!s, and some wor!s by linguist 0oam +homs!y ))
worry that the term &language& is too vague. "ntire systems have been developed to clarify the field.
Contents
3 History
4 5a-or problems and sub)fields
o 4.3 +omposition and parts
4.3.3 #rinciple of compositionality
4.3.4 #roblem of universals and composition
o 4.4 $he nature of meaning
4.4.3 $ypes of meaning
4.4.3.3 6agueness
4.4.4 Ideas and meaning
4.4.4.3 "mpiricism and words
4.4.4.4 +riti%ue of idea theories
4.4.4.7 A cognitive idea theory
4.4.7 $ruth and meaning
4.4.7.3 ,ogic and language
4.4.7.4 8avidson, $ars!i, and truth theories
4.4.7.7 +riti%ues of truth)theories of meaning
4.4.9 :sage and meaning
4.4.9.3 ittgenstein's turn
4.4.9.4 #eter (trawson, /eith 8onnellan, and usage
4.4.9.7 #aul 1rice
4.4.9.9 ;urgen Habermas
4.4.9.< +onceptual and inferential role semantics
4.4.9.= +riti%ues of use theories of meaning
4.4.< +onse%uences and meaning
o 4.7 ,anguage and the world
o 4.9 5ind and language
4.9.3 Innateness and learning
4.9.4 ,anguage and thought
o 4.< (ocial interaction and language
4.<.3 5eaning and social structures
4.<.4 +ommon ground
4.<.7 >hetoric and discourse analysis
4.<.9 ,iterary theory
7 5iscellaneous
o 7.3 Important theorists
o 7.4 Important topics and terms
o 7.7 >eferences
History
$he in%uiry into language stretches bac! to the beginnings of western philosophy with #lato, Aristotle,
and the (toics.
#lato argued in the dialogue Cratylus that there was a natural correctness to names. $o do this, he
pointed out that compound words and phrases have a range of correctness. ?or example, it is obviously
wrong to say that the term &houseboat& is any good when referring to, say, a cat, because cats have
nothing to do with houses or boats. He also argued that primitive names (or morphemes) also had a
natural correctness, because each phoneme represented basic ideas or sentiments. ?or example, the letter
4
and sound of &l& for #lato represented the idea of softness. However, by the end of the +ratylus, he had
admitted that some social conventions were also involved, and that there were faults in the idea that
phonemes had individual meanings. (A lin! to the full text of the Cratylus can be found here, courtesy of
5.I.$.)
Aristotle concerned himself with the issues of logic, categories, and meaning creation. He separated all
things into notions of species and genus. He thought that the meaning of a predicate was established
through an abstraction of the similarities between various individual things. $his is called a theory of
nominalism (see the section below for more details).
5edieval philosophers also had some interest in the sub-ect )) for many of them, the interest was
provo!ed by a dependence upon their -ob of translating 1ree! texts. @f particular interest is the wor! of
#eter Abelard, noteworthy for his remar!able anticipation of modern ideas of language.
5any modern western philosophers such as :mberto "co, ?erdinand de (aussure, ;.,. Austin, ;. >.
(earle, ,eibniA, ;ohn ,oc!e, 6ico, ;ohann 1eorg Hamann, ;ohann 1ottfried Herder, Immanuel /ant,
Hegel, ilhelm von Humboldt, +harles #eirce and ?riedrich 0ietAsche also saw the field as important.
$hough philosophers had always discussed language, it too! on a central role in philosophy beginning in
the late nineteenth century, especially in the "nglish spea!ing world and parts of "urope. $he
philosophy of language was so pervasive that for a time, in analytic philosophy circles, philosophy as a
whole was understood to be a matter of mere philosophy of language. In the 4Bth century, &language&
became an even more central 'theme' within the most diverse traditions of philosophy. $he phrase &the
linguistic turn&, was used to describe the noteworthy emphasis that modern)day philosophers put upon
language.
Major problems and sub-fields
Composition and parts
A ma-or %uestion in the field ) perhaps the single most important %uestion for formalist and structuralist
thin!ers ) is, &how does the meaning of a sentence emerge out of its parts?&
Principle of compositionality
5uch about composition of sentences is addressed in the wor! of linguistics of syntax.
5ore logic)oriented semantics tend to loo! towards the principle of compositionality in order to explain
the relationship between meaningful parts and whole sentences. $he principle of compositionality
asserts that a sentence can be understood on the basis of the meaning of the parts of the sentence
(words) along with an understanding of its structure.
Problem of universals and composition
7
@ne debate that has captured the interest of many philosophers is the debate
over the meaning of universals. @ne might as!, for example, &when people say
the word, &roc!s&, what do they mean?& $wo general answers have emerged to
this %uestion. (ome have said that the expression stands for some real entity out
in the world called &roc!s&. @thers have said that it stands for some collection of
particular roc!s that we put into a common category. $he former position has
been called philosophical realism, and the latter has been called nominalism.
?rom the radical realist's perspective, the connection between ( and 5 is a connection between two
abstract entities. $here is an entity, &man&, and an entity, &(ocrates&. $hese two things connect together
in some way or overlap one another. #lato's theory of forms was an instance of this.
?rom a nominalist's perspective, the connection between ( and 5 is the connection between a particular
entity ((ocrates) and a vast collection of particular things (men). $o say that (ocrates is a man is to say
that (ocrates is a part of the class of &men&.
Another perspective is to consider &man& to be a property of the entity, &(ocrates&. A property is a
characteristic of the thing.
(till another perspective considers &man& to be the product of a propositional function. A propositional
function is an operation of language that ta!es an entity ((ocrates) and outputs a proposition. In other
words, a propositional function is li!e an algorithm. $he meaning of man is whatever ta!es the entity,
&(ocrates&, and turns it into the statement, &(ocrates is a man&.
The nature of meaning
$he answer to the %uestion, &hat is the meaning of meaning?&, is not immediately obvious. @ne
section of philosophy of language tries to answer this very %uestion.
Types of meaning
1eoffrey ,eech posited that there are two essentially different types of linguistic meaning* conceptual
and associative.
$he conceptual meanings of an expression have to do with the definitions of words themselves, and the
features of those definitions. $his !ind of meaning is treated by using a techni%ue called the semantic
feature analysis. $he conceptual meaning of an expression inevitably involves both definition (also
called &connotation& and &intension& in the literature) and extension (also called &denotation&).
$he associative meaning of an expression has to do with individual mental understandings of the
spea!er. $hey, in turn, can be bro!en up into six sub)types* connotative, collocative, social, affective,
reflected and thematic (5wiha!i 4BB9).
Vagueness
@ne issue that has bothered philosophers and ordinary people for as long as there have been words is the
problem of the vagueness of words. @ften, meanings expressed by the spea!er are not as explicit as the
listener would li!e them to be. $he conse%uences of vagueness can be disastrous to classical logic
because they give rise to the (orites paradox.
Ideas and meaning
Essential terms
+oncepts
+ategories
(ets
+lasses
0atural !inds
$ypes and to!ens
1enus and (pecies
#roperty
"ntity
>elation
9
$o the %uestion, &what is meaning?&, some have answered &meanings are ideas&. 2y such accounts,
&ideas& are used to refer to images as held in the mind, or to mental activity in general.
"ach idea is understood to be necessarily about something external andCor internal, real or imaginary.
?or example, in contrast to the abstract meaning of the universal &dog&, the referent &this dog& may
mean a particular real life chihuahua. In both cases, the word is about something, but in the former it is
about the class of dogs as generally understood, while in the latter it is about a very real and particular
dog in the real world.
Empiricism and ords
$he classical empiricists are usually ta!en to be the most strident defenders of idea theories of meaning.
8avid Hume is well)!nown for his belief that thoughts were !inds of imaginable entities. ((ee his
"n%uiry +oncerning Human :nderstanding, section 4). It might be inferred that this perspective also
applied to his theory of meaning.
His forebearer, ,oc!e, seemed a bit more s!eptical, considering all ideas to be both imaginable ob-ects
of sensation and the very unimaginable ob-ects of reflection. He stressed, in the "ssay +oncerning
Human :nderstanding, that words are used both as signs for ideas )) but also to signify the lac! of
certain ideas.
5ental images, sounds, and recollections have been called &mental representations& in current literature.
$hose who defend this view are called representationalists.
Criti!ue of idea theories
@ver the past century, idea theories of meaning have been criticiAed by many philosophers for several
reasons.
@ne criticism made as early as 1eorge 2er!eley and as late as ,udwig ittgenstein, was that ideas
alone are unable to account for the different variations within a general meaning. ?or example, any
hypothetical image of the meaning of &dog& has to include such varied images as a chihuahua, a pug,
and a 2lac! ,ab. and this seems impossible to imagine, all of those particular breeds loo!ing very
different from one another. Another way to see this point is to %uestion why it is that, if we have an
image of a specific type of dog (say of a chihuahua), why it should be entitled to represent the entire
concept.
Another criticism is that some meaningful words, !nown as non)lexical items, don't have any
meaningfully associated image. ?or example, the word &the& has a meaning, but one would be hard)
pressed to find a mental representation that fits it.
Another is a problem of composition ) that it is difficult to explain how words and phrases combine into
sentences if only ideas were involved in meaning.
(till another ob-ection lies in the observation that certain linguistic items name something in the real
world, and are meaningful, yet which we have no mental representations to deal with. ?or instance, it is
not !nown what 2ismarc!'s mother loo!ed li!e, yet the phrase "Bismarck's mother" still has meaning.
" cognitive idea theory
<
5emberships of a graded class
2ut the idea theory of meaning has lately been defended in new form. +alled the theory of prototypes, it
suggests that classes are understood on the basis of the ideas we might have about particular, ideal
member(s) of the class.
?or example, the category of &birds& may have the idea of a robin as the prototype )) the ideal !ind of
bird. ith experience, we come to grade the members of the class as being more or less bird)li!e by
comparing the members to the prototype. (o, for example, a penguin or an ostrich would sit at the edge
of the meaning of &bird&, because a penguin is unli!e a robin.
If true, then this theory would account for the concern expressed by ittgenstein (above). In which case,
one of the more decisive criticisms against the idea theory of meaning would be overcome.
$his theory of prototypes has been defended by contemporary cognitive scientists "leanor >osch and
1eorge ,a!off.
Truth and meaning
(ome have asserted that meaning is nothing substantially more or less than the truth conditions they
involve. ?or such theories, an emphasis is placed upon reference to actual things in the world to account
for meaning, with the caveat that reference more or less explains the greater part (or all of) meaning
itself.
#ogic and language
A set of philosophers who advocated a truth)theory of meaning were the logical positivists, putting stoc!
in the notion that the meaning of a statement arose from how it is verified.
In their analysis, logic was at the core of understanding truth and meaning. $o understand this insight,
some explanation of the history of logic is necessary.
Classical logicians had !nown since Aristotle how to codify certain common patterns of reasoning. 2ut
the turn toward language philosophy is tied closely to the development of modern logic. It began with
the wor! of the 1erman logician 1ottlob ?rege in the late nineteenth century. ?rege, simultaneously
with 1eorge 2oole and +harles (anders #eirce, advanced logic significantly by showing how to codify
inferences using (entential connectives, li!e and, or and if)then, and %uantifiers li!e all and some. 5uch
of this wor! was made possible by the development of set theory.
,ogical analysis was further advanced by 2ertrand >ussell and Alfred 0orth hitehead in their
groundbrea!ing #rincipia 5athematica, which attempted to produce a formal language with which the
truth of all mathematical statements could be demonstrated from first principles. >ussell differed from
?rege greatly on many points, however. He re-ected (or perhaps misunderstood) ?rege's sense)reference
distinction. He also disagreed that language was of fundamental significance to philosophy, and saw the
pro-ect of developing formal logic as a way of eliminating all of the confusions caused by ordinary
language, and hence at creating a perfectly transparent medium in which to conduct traditional
philosophical argument. He hoped, ultimately, to extend the proofs of the Principia to all possible true
=
statements, a scheme he called logical atomism. ?or a while it appeared that his pupil ittgenstein had
succeeded in this plan with his &$ractatus ,ogico)#hilosophicus&.
>ussell's wor!, and that of his colleague 1. ". 5oore, developed in response to what they perceived as
the nonsense dominating 2ritish philosophy departments at the turn of the century, a !ind of 2ritish
Idealism most of which was derived (albeit very distantly) from the wor! of Hegel. In response 5oore
developed an approach (&+ommon (ense #hilosophy&) which sought to examine philosophical
difficulties by a close analysis of the language used in order to determine its meaning. In this way 5oore
sought to expunge philosophical absurdities such as &time is unreal&. 5oore's wor! would have
significant, if obli%ue, influence (largely mediated by ittgenstein) on @rdinary language philosophy.
$avidson% Tars&i% and truth theories
$he 6ienna +ircle, a famous group of logical positivists from the early 4Bth century (closely allied with
>ussell and ?rege), adopted the verificationist theory of meaning. $he verificationist theory of
meaning (in at least one of its forms) states that to say that an expression is meaningful is to say that
there are some conditions of experience that could exist to show that the expression is true. As noted,
?rege and >ussell were two proponents of this way of thin!ing.
A semantic theory of truth was produced by Alfred $ars!i for the semantics of logic. According to
$ars!i's account, meaning consists of a recursive set of rules that end up yielding an infinite set of
sentences, &'p' is true if and only if p&, covering the whole language. His innovation produced the notion
of propositional functions discussed on the section on universals (which he called &sentential
functions&), and a model)theoretic approach to semantics (as opposed to a proof)theoretic one). ?inally,
some lin!s were forged to the correspondence theory of truth ($ars!i, 3D99).
#erhaps the most influential current approach in the contemporary theory of meaning is that s!etched by
8onald 8avidson in his introduction to the collection of essays Truth and Meaning in 3D=E. $here he
argued for the following two theses*
Any learnable language must be statable in a finite form, even if it is capable of a theoretically
infinite number of expressions))as we may assume that natural human languages are, at least in
principle. If it could not be stated in a finite way then it could not be learned through a finite, empirical
method such as the way humans learn their languages. It follows that it must be possible to give a
theoretical semantics for any natural language which could give the meanings of an infinite number of
sentences on the basis of a finite system of axioms.
1iving the meaning of a sentence, he further argued, was e%uivalent to stating its truth
conditions. He proposed that it must be possible to account for language as a set of distinct grammatical
features together with a lexicon, and for each of them explain its wor!ings in such a way as to generate
trivial (obviously correct) statements of the truth conditions of all the (infinitely many) sentences built
up from these.
$he result is a theory of meaning that rather resembles, by no accident, $ars!i's account.
8avidson's account, though brief, constitutes the first systematic presentation of truth-conditional
semantics. He proposed simply translating natural languages into first)order predicate calculus in order
to reduce meaning to a function of truth.
Criti!ues of truth-theories of meaning
Fuine attac!ed both verificationism and the very notion of meaning in his famous essay, &$wo 8ogmas
of "mpiricism&. In it, he suggested that meaning was nothing more than a vague and dispensable notion.
Instead, he asserted, what was more interesting to study was the synonymy between signs. He also
pointed out that verificationism was tied to the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements,
and asserted that such a divide was defended ambiguously. He also suggested that the unit of analysis
for any potential investigation into the world (and, perhaps, meaning) would be the entire body of
statements ta!en as a collective, not -ust individual statements on their own.
E
@ther criticisms can be raised on the basis of the limitations that truth)conditional theorists themselves
admit to. $ars!i, for instance, recogniAed that truth)conditional theories of meaning only ma!e sense of
statements, but fail to explain the meanings of the lexical parts that ma!e up statements. >ather, the
meaning of the parts of statements is presupposed by an understanding of the truth)conditions of a whole
statement.
(till another ob-ection (noted by ?rege and others) was that some !inds of statements don't seem to have
any truth)conditions at all. ?or instance, &HelloG& has no truth)conditions, because it doesn't even attempt
to tell the listener anything about the state of affairs in the world. In other words, different propositions
have different grammatical moods.
8eflationist accounts of truth, sometimes called 'irrealist' accounts, are the staunchest source of criticism
of truth)conditional theories of meaning. According to them, &truth& is a word with no serious meaning
or function in discourse except to affirm an expression. ?or instance, for the deflationist, the sentences
&It's true that $iny $im is trouble& and &$iny $im is trouble& are e%uivalent. In conse%uence, for the
deflationist, any appeal to truth as an account of meaning has little explanatory power.
$he sort of truth)theories presented here can also be attac!ed for their formalism both in practice and
principle. $he principle of formalism is challenged by the informalists, who suggest that language is
largely a construction of the spea!er, and so, not compatible with formaliAation. $he practice of
formalism is challenged by those who observe that formal languages (such as present)day
%uantificational logic) fail to capture the expressive power of natural languages (as is arguably
demonstrated in the aw!ward character of the explanation of definite description statements as laid out
in >ussell's direct reference theory).
?inally, over the past century, forms of logic have been developed that are not dependent exclusively on
the notions of truth and falsity. (ome of these types of logic have been called modal logics. $hey explain
how certain logical connectives such as &if)then& wor! in terms of necessity and possibility. $he
successes of such systems naturally give rise to the argument that these systems have captured the
natural meaning of connectives li!e if)then far better than an ordinary, truth)functional logic ever could.
'sage and meaning
(ittgenstein)s turn
$he philosopher ,udwig ittgenstein was originally an artificial language philosopher, following the
influence of >ussell, ?rege, and the 6ienna +ircle. However, as he matured, he came to appreciate more
and more the phenomenon of natural language. #hilosophical Investigations, published after his death,
signalled a sharp departure from his earlier wor! with its focus upon ordinary language use.
His wor! would come to inspire future generations and spur forward a whole new discipline, which
explained meaning in a new way. 5eaning in natural languages was seen as primarily a %uestion of how
the spea!er uses language to express intentions.
$his close examination of natural language proved to be a powerful philosophical techni%ue.
#ractitioners who were influenced by ittgenstein's approach have included an entire tradition of
thin!ers, featuring ;. ,. Austin, #. ?. (trawson, ;ohn (earle, #aul 1rice, >. 5. Hare, >. (. #eters, and
;Hrgen Habermas.
Peter *trason% +eith $onnellan% and usage
#ast philosophers had understood reference to be tied to words themselves. However, (ir #eter (trawson
disagreed in his seminal essay, &@n >eferring&, where he argued that there is nothing true about
statements on their own. rather, only the uses of statements could be considered to be true or false.
Indeed, one of the hallmar!s of the ordinary use perspective is its insistence upon the distinctions
between meaning and use. "Meanings", for ordinary language philosophers, are the instructions for
I
usage of words ) the common and conventional definitions of words. sage, on the other hand, is the
actual meanings that individual spea!ers have ) they things that an individual spea!er in a particular
context wants to refer to. $he word &dog& is an example of a meaning, but pointing at a nearby dog and
shouting &$his dog smells foulG& is an example of usage. ?rom this distinction between usage and
meaning arose the divide between the fields of #ragmatics and (emantics.
Jet another distinction is of some utility in discussing language* &mentioning&. Mention is when an
expression refers to itself as a linguistic item, usually surrounded by %uotation mar!s. ?or instance, in
the expression &'@popanax' is hard to spell&, what is referred to is the word itself (&opopanax&) and not
what it means (an obscure gum resin). ?rege had referred to instances of mentioning as &opa%ue
contexts&.
In his essay, &>eference and 8efinite 8escriptions&, /eith 8onnellan sought to improve upon
(trawson's distinction. He pointed out that there are two uses of definite descriptions* attributive and
referential. Attributive uses provide a description of whoever is being referred to, while referential uses
point out the actual referent. Attributive uses are li!e mediated references, while referential uses are
more directly referential.
Paul ,rice
$he philosopher #aul 1rice, wor!ing within the ordinary language tradition, understood &meaning& to
have two !inds* natural and non!natural. "atural meaning had to do with cause and effect, for example
with the expression &these spots mean measels&. "on!natural meaning, on the other hand, had to do with
the intentions of the spea!er in communicating something to the listener.
In his essay, #ogic and Conversation, 1rice went on to explain and defend an explanation of how
conversations wor!. His guiding maxim was called the cooperative principle, which claimed that the
spea!er and the listener will have mutual expectations of the !ind of information that will be shared. $he
principle is bro!en down into four maxims* #uality (which demands truthfulness and honesty), #uantity
(demand for -ust enough information as is re%uired), $elation (relevance of things brought up), and
Manner (lucidity). $his principle, if and when followed, lets the spea!er and listener figure out the
meaning of certain implications by way of inference.
$he wor!s of 1rice led to an avalanche of research and interest in the field, both supportive and critical.
@ne spinoff was called >elevance theory, developed by 8an (perber and 8eirdre ilson during the
mid)3DIBs, whose goal was to ma!e the notion of relevance more clear.
-urgen Habermas
In his wor!, &:niversal pragmatics&, Habermas began a program that sought to improve upon the wor!
of the ordinary language tradition. In it, he laid out the goal of a valid conversation as a pursuit of
mutual understanding.
Conceptual and inferential role semantics
Main article% &nferential role semantics
5ichael 8ummett argued against the !ind of truth)conditional semantics presented by 8avidson. instead
he argued that basing semantics on assertion conditions avoids a number of difficulties with truth)
conditional semantics, such as the transcendental nature of certain !inds of truth condition. He leverages
wor! done in proof-theoretic semantics to provide a !ind of inferential role semantics, where*
$he meaning of sentences and grammatical constructs is given by their assertion conditions. and
(uch a semantics is only guaranteed to be coherent if the inferences associated with the parts of
language are in logical harmony.
D
A semantics based upon assertion conditions is called a verificationist semantics* cf. the verificationism
of the 6ienna +ircle.
@ther wor! has been done by 1ilbert Harman on the closely related sub-ect of conceptual role
semantics.
Criti!ues of use theories of meaning
+ognitive scientist ;erry ?odor has noted that use theories (of the ittgensteinian !ind) seem to be
committed to the notion that language is a public phenomenon )) that there is no such thing as a &private
language&. ?odor criticiAes such claims because he thin!s it is necessary to create or describe the
language of thought, which would seemingly re%uire the existence of a &private language&.
#hilosopher of language +hristopher 1au!er has indirectly attac!ed use theories of meaning by denying
that intention matters in communication.
Conse!uences and meaning
(till another perspective comes courtesy of the #ragmatists, who insist that the meaning of an expression
lies in its conse%uences. #hilosopher and polymath +harles (anders #eirce wrote the following*
"The whole function of thought is to produce habits of action''' To develop its meaning, we have,
therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it
involves' "ow, the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, not merely under such
circumstances as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly occur, no matter how improbable
they may be'"
"'''& only desire to point out how impossible it is that we should have an idea in our minds which relates
to anything but conceived sensible effects of things' (ur idea of anything is our idea of its sensible
effects) and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves'" (from the essay &How to 5a!e
@ur Ideas +lear&, hosted courtesy of peirce.org). In a sense, #eirce adovates a theory of meaning that is
somewhat li!e verificationism in these statements, but is uni%ue in how he arrives at that point.
@utside of the #ragmatic tradition was +anadian 4Bth century philosopher of media 5arshall 5c,uhan.
His famous dictum, &the medium is the message&, can be understood to be a conse%uentialist theory of
meaning. His idea was that the medium which is used to communicate carries with it information*
namely, the conse%uences that arise from the fact that the medium has become popular. ?or example,
one &meaning& of the lightbulb might be the idea of being able to read during the night.
$he controversial social psychologist and ethicist $homas (AasA also seemed to hold this view, stating
that &a word means its conse%uences& in debate.
#anguage and the orld
Investigations into how language interacts with the world are called &theories of reference&.
1ottlob ?rege was an advocate of a mediated reference theory, which appealed to the sense of a
referent (the sense being the way the referent is presented).
2y contrast, in response to 2ritish idealism, 2ertrand >ussell sought to scrap all &unreal& things
from language. $o do this, he created a direct reference theory.
?rege's mediated reference theory seems to differ from >ussell's direct reference theory in that the
former seems to leave room for senses, while the latter does not. $his is problematic because it
seemingly fails to recogniAe the difference in meaning between two statements that have the same
referent but have different meanings. ?or example, &$he #resident of the :nited (tates in 4BB9& and
&1eorge . 2ush& refer to the same thing, but in one case the person is presented in a certain light ) as
3B
the #resident ) while in the other they are presented -ust by name. $here has to be something in between
that accounts for this meaningful difference.
Mind and language
Innateness and learning
(ome of the ma-or issues in the philosophy of language that deal with the mind are paralleled by modern
psycholinguistics. (ome important %uestions* how much of language is innate? Is language ac%uisition a
special faculty in the mind? hat's the connection between thought and language?
$here are three general perspectives on the issue of language learning*
$he behaviorist perspective, which dictates that not only is the solid bul! of language learned,
but it is learned via conditioning.
$he hypothesis testing perspective, which states that syntactic rules and meanings are
triangulated by a child using hypotheses, in much the same way that any learning occurs.
$he innatist perspective, which states that at least some of the syntactic settings are innate and
hardwired.
$here are varying notions of the structure of the brain when it comes to language, as well*
+onnectionist models , which emphasiAe the idea that person's lexicon and their thoughts operate
in a !ind of networ!.
0ativist models , which assert that there are specialiAed devices in the brain that are dedicated to
language ac%uisition.
+omputation models , which emphasiAe the wor! done related to logic)li!e processing of the
mind.
"mergentist models , which focus upon the notion that natural faculties are a complex system that
emerge out of simpler biological parts.
>eductionist models
#anguage and thought
Another important %uestion relating to language and the mind is, to what e*tent does language influence
thought +and vice!versa,- $here have been a number of different perspectives on this issue, ranging
across a number of suggestions.
?or example, linguists (apir and horf suggested that language limited the extent to which members of
a linguistic community can thin! about certain sub-ects (a hypothesis paralleled in 1eorge @rwell's
novel &3DI9&). $o a lesser extent, issues in the philosophy of rhetoric (including the notion of framing of
debate) suggest the influence of language upon thought.
$here is also some controversy about the very meaning of a &thought&. 1ottlob ?rege believed that
thought occupied a &third realm&, that was neither psychological nor a part of the universe, and believed
that his 2egriffsschrift calculus was a theory of thought. 2y contrast, ittgenstein ) in the $ractatus
,ogico)#hilosophicus ) considered thought to be a &significant proposition&.
*ocial interaction and language
5etasemantics is a term of art used to describe all those fields that examine the social conditions that
give rise to meanings and languages. "tymology (the study of the origins of words) and (tylistics
(philosophical argumentation over what ma!es &good grammar&, relative to a particular language) are
two examples of metasemantic fields.
Meaning and social structures
33
@ne of the ma-or fields of sociology, symbolic interactionism, is based on the insight that human social
organiAation is based almost entirely on the use of meanings.
Common ground
+ommon ground is a !ey notion in #ragmatics, given popular formulation by Herbert +lar!. He
investigates how all communication depends on a store of common !nowledge between spea!er and
listener.
.hetoric and discourse analysis
>hetoric is the study of the particular words that people use in order to achieve the proper emotional and
rational effect in the listener, be it to persuade, provo!e, endear, teach, etc. (ome offshoots include*
$he examination of propaganda and didacticism.
$he examination of the purposes of swearing and pe-oratives (especially how it influences the
behavior of others, and defines relationships).
$he effects of gendered language.
,inguistic transparency , or spea!ing in an accessible manner, inspired by 1eorge @rwell's essay,
Politics and the .nglish /anguage.
#erformative utterances and the various tas!s that language can perform (called &speech acts&),
pioneered by ;.,. Austin's boo!, 0ow to 1o Things 2ith 2ords.
$he logical concept of the domain of discourse.
#iterary theory
,iterary theory is a discipline that overlaps with the philosophy of language. It emphasiAes the methods
that readers and critics use in understanding a text. $his field, being an outgrowth of the study of how to
properly interpret messages, is closely tied to the ancient discipline of hermeneutics.
Miscellaneous
In 3D<Bs, an artificial language loglan was invented that is based on first order predicate logic.
Important theorists
Among the most important theorists in the philosophy of language are*
#lato and Aristotle ) classical philosophers
?erdinand de (aussure ) founder of linguistic (tructuralism
;ohn (tuart 5ill ) influential in theories of reference
,udwig ittgenstein ) creator of the &meaning is use& dictum
"rnst +assirer ) theory of language as part of a general theory of symbolic forms
alter 2en-amin , 5artin Heidegger ) philosophers tied to the Humboldtian tradition
6alentin 6oloshinov , >ossi),andi ) 5arxist theoreticians of language
5ichel ?oucault , ;ac%ues 8errida ) #ost)structuralist figures
HKlLne +ixous , ;ulia /risteva, ;udith 2utler ) feminist theoreticians of language
5i!hail 2a!htin , 5aurice 2lanchot, #aul de 5an ) $heoreticians of literature whose wor! is of
philosophical relevance
+harles #eirce , :mberto "co ) advocates of philosophically oriented forms of semiotics
1ottlob ?rege , 2ertrand >ussell, (aul /rip!e, >ichard 5ontague ) analytical philosophers of
language rooted in logic)li!e analysis of language
0oam +homs!y and ;erry ?odor ) syntactic, computational, and !nowledge)oriented
perspectives
/eith 8onnellan , ;Hrgen Habermas, ;.,. Austin, H. #. 1rice, and ;ohn (earle ) use)oriented
theorists
34
Important topics and terms
?ields of interest
o #ragmatics , >hetoric, (emantics, (emiotics, (yntax
o (emantics of logic
o 1eneral semantics
o (ymbolic interactionism
#arts of speech
o (pea!er C (or &"ncoder&)
o Interpreter C (or &8ecoder&)
o Intentionality
o (igns and #honemes
o $one
o $ruth conditions (and C or satisfaction conditions)
o 5eaning
o Ideas
o (ense and reference
o (peech acts
o ,inguistic +ontext (see also deixis)
o ,inguistic community
"ssential aspects of meaning
o +oncepts
o +ategories , sets, classes, and 0atural !inds
o $ypes and to!ens
o 1enus and (pecies
o +onnotation and denotation (intension and extension)
o (tatements and propositions
o (ub-ect and predicate
o (ynonyms , antonyms, and all other )onyms
"ssential aspects of reference
o "ntities
o #roperties
o >elations
o 8eixis
o >eferential use
o Attributive use
,inguistic phenomena
o 8emonstratives and Indexicals
o 8escriptions , esp. 8efinite descriptions
o #roper names
o 5etaphor
o &Is& (of identity, predication, existence)
o (entences (+ommandative, Indicative, and #erformative)
.eferences
+ollins, ;ohn. (4BB3). http*CCwww.sorites.orgCIssueM37Ccollins.htm
1au!er, +hristopher. Nero $olerance for #ragmatics.
http*CCasweb.artsci.uc.eduCphilosophyCgau!erCNero$olerance.pdf
1reenberg, 5ar! and Harman, 1ilbert. (4BB<). +onceptual >ole (emantics.
http*CCwww.princeton.eduCOharmanC#apersC+>(.pdf
37
Hale, 2. and +rispin right, "d. (3DDD). 2lac!well +ompanions $o #hilosophy. 5alden,
5assachusetts, 2lac!well #ublishers.
,ycan, . 1. (4BBB). #hilosophy of ,anguage* A +ontemporary Introduction. 0ew Jor!,
>outledge.
5iller, ;ames. (3DDD). http*CCarchives.econ.utah.eduCarchivesCpen)lC3DDDm34.3CmsgBB3I<.htm
5wiha!i, Alice. (4BB9). http*CCwww.ifeas.uni)mainA.deC(wa?oC(?335wiha!i.pdf
(tainton, >obert ;. (3DD=). #hilosophical perspectives on language. #eterborough, @nt.,
2roadview #ress.
$ars!i, Alfred. (3D99). $he (emantical +onception of $ruth.
http*CCwww.ditext.comCtars!iCtars!i.html
1lossary of ,inguistic terms.
http*CCwww.sil.orgClinguisticsC1lossary@f,inguistic$ermsCcontents.htm
Language, philosophy of
Philosophical interest in language, while ancient and enduring (see Language, ancient
philosophy of; Language, medieval theories of; Language, Renaissance philosophy of;
Language, early modern philosophy of), has blossomed anew in the past century. There are
three ey historical sources of the current interest, and three intellectual concerns which
sustain it.
Philosophers nowadays often aspire to systematic and even mathematically rigorous accounts
of language; these philosophers are in one way or another heirs to !ottlob "rege, #ertrand
Russell, Ludwig $ittgenstein and the logical positivists, who strove to employ rigorous
accounts of logic and of meaning in attempts to penetrate, and in some cases to dispel,
traditional philosophical %uestions (see Logical positivism). &ontemporary philosophers, too,
are often attentive to the roles that philosophically interesting words (lie 'now(, 'true(, 'good(
and 'free() play in ordinary linguistic usage; these philosophers inherit from 'ordinary language
philosophers(, including !.). *oore, +.L. ,ustin and again $ittgenstein, the strategy of finding
clues to deep philosophical %uestions through scrutiny of the woraday usage of the words in
which the philosophical %uestions are framed (see -rdinary language philosophy).
Philosophical interest in language is maintained by foundational and conceptual %uestions in
linguistics, %uintessentially philosophical problems about the connections between mind,
language and the world, and issues about philosophical methodology. These springs sustain a
rich and fascinating field of philosophy concerned with representation, communication,
meaning and truth.
1 Philosophy of linguistics
Language is an impressive and fascinating human capacity, and human languages are
striingly powerful and comple. systems. The science of this capacity and of these systems is
linguistics. Lie other sciences, and perhaps to an unusual degree, linguistics confronts difficult
foundational, methodological and conceptual issues.
$hen studying a human language, linguists see systematic e.planations of its syntax (the
organi/ation of the language(s properly constructed e.pressions, such as phrases and
sentences; see 0ynta.), its semantics (the ways e.pressions e.hibit and contribute to
meaning; see 0emantics), and its pragmatics (the practices of communication in which the
e.pressions find use; see Pragmatics).
39
The study of synta. has been guided since the 1234s by the wor of 5oam &homsy, who, in
reaction to earlier behaviourist and structuralist movements in linguistics (see #ehaviourism,
analytic; #ehaviourism, methodological and scientific; 0tructuralism in linguistics; 0aussure, ".
de), taes an unapologetically cognitivist approach. 6uman linguistic capacities, he holds,
issue from a dedicated cognitive faculty whose structure is the proper topic of linguistics.
7ndeed, &homsy construes at least the study of synta. and (large parts of) semantics as
attempts to uncover cognitive structures. "inding impressive commonalties among all nown
natural languages, and noting the paucity of evidence and instruction available to children
learning a language, &homsy suggests that surprisingly many features of natural languages
stem from innate characteristics of the language faculty (see &homsy, 5.; Language,
innateness of).
$hereas contemporary philosophers have tended to stay at a remove from wor in synta.,
discussing rather than doing it, semantics is another matter entirely. 6ere many of the great
strides have been made by philosophers, including !ottlob "rege, #ertrand Russell, Ludwig
$ittgenstein, Rudolf &arnap, Richard *ontague and 0aul 8ripe. (6owever, %uite a number of
linguists and logicians who do not call themselves philosophers also have contributed heavily
to semantics.) -ne ma9or strand in semantics in the past century has consisted in the
development and careful application of formal, mathematical models for characteri/ing
linguistic form and meaning (see 0emantics, game:theoretic; 0emantics, possible worlds;
0emantics, situation).
Pragmatics, at least as much as semantics, has benefited from the contributions of
philosophers. Philosophical interest in pragmatics typically has had its source in a prior interest
in semantics ; in a desire to understand how meaning and truth are situated in the concrete
practices of linguistic communication. The later $ittgenstein, for instance, reminds us of the
vast variety of uses in which linguistic e.pressions participate, and warns of the danger of
assuming that there is something aptly called their meanings which we might uncover through
philosophy. +.L. ,ustin sees in subtleties of usage clues to the meanings of philosophically
interesting terms lie 'intentional( and 'true(. ,ustin eeps a careful eye to the several different
things one does all at once when one performs a 'speech act( (for instance< uttering a sound,
voicing the sentence '+(ai faim(, saying that one is hungry, hinting that one(s companion might
share their meal, and causing them to do so). 6is ta.onomy has provided the basis of much
subse%uent wor (see 0peech acts; Performatives). 6.P. !rice, while critical of some of
,ustin(s methods, shared the aim of distilling meaning from the mury waters of use. !rice
portrays conversation as a rational, cooperative enterprise, and in his account a number of
conceptions of meaning figure as central strategies and tools for achieving communicative
purposes. !rice(s main concern was philosophical methodology (see =>), but his proposals
have proven e.tremely popular among linguists interested in pragmatics (see &ommunication
and intention; *eaning and communication). Recently, philosophers and linguists have
become increasingly persuaded that pragmatic concerns, far from being mere addenda to
semantics, are crucial to the %uestions of where meaning comes from, in what it consists, and
how the many incompletenesses and fle.ibilities in linguistic meaning are overcome and
e.ploited in fi.ing what speaers mean by their words on particular occasions (see Pragmatics;
7mplicature; *etaphor; Linguistics, philosophy of).
-ur focus on language should not omit a field of study with a rather broader scope, namely
semiotics, which is the study of signs and signification in general, whether linguistic or not. 7n
the view of the scholars in this field, the study of linguistic meaning should be situated in a
more general pro9ect which encompasses gestural communication, artistic e.pression, animal
signalling, and other varieties of information transfer (see 0emiotics; ,nimal language and
thought; ,nimal thought, recent wor on).
2 Meaning: language, mind and world
Philosophy aims at intellectually responsible accounts of the most basic and general aspects
of reality. Part of what it is to provide an intellectually responsible account, clearly, is for us to
3<
mae sense of our own place in reality ; as, among other things, beings who conceive and
formulate descriptions and e.planations of it.
7n framing issues about our roles as describers and e.plainers, philosophers commonly draw a
triangle in which lines connect 'Language(, '*ind( and '$orld(. The three lines represent
relations that are eys to understanding our place in reality. These relations in one or another
way constitute the meaningfulness of language.
Mind World. #etween *ind and $orld there are a number of crucial relations studied by
philosophers of mind. ,mong these are perception, action, the mind(s bodily constitution and
intentionality (the mind(s ability to thin about what is in the world) (see *ind, philosophy of).
Mind Language. ?sing and understanding language is a heavily mental activity. "urther, this
activity seems to be what the real e.istence of meaningful language consists in. 7n short, mind
invests meaning in language.
Theorists of language focus on the *ind@Language connection when they consider
understanding to be the cornerstone concept, holding, for instance, that an account of meaning
for a given language is simply an account of what constitutes the ability to understand it (see
*eaning and understanding). Philosophy has seen a variety of accounts of wherein
understanding consists. *any have been attracted to the view that understanding is a matter
of associating the correct ideas or concepts with words (see, for instance, Loce, +.; "rege, !.;
Language of thought). -thers have e%uated understanding with nowing the re%uirements for
accurate or apt use of words and sentences (see, for instance, Aavidson, A.; Aummett,
*.,.).). 0till others find the ey to understanding in one(s ability to discern the communicative
goals of speaers and writers (see, for instance, !rice, 6.P.), or more directly in one(s ability to
'pass( linguistically, without censure (see, for instance, $ittgenstein, L.). &ertainly, these
approaches do not e.clude one another.
0ome philosophers focus more on production than consumption ; on the speaer(s side of
things ; analysing linguistic meaning in terms of the goals and practices of speaers, and in
terms of relations among communities of speaers (see !rice, 6.P.; &ommunication and
intention; Language, conventionality of; Language, social nature of).
*any of the philosophers who see understanding and use as the eys to linguistic meaning
have held that the meaningfulness of language in some sense derives from mental content,
perhaps including the contents of beliefs, thoughts and concepts. This enhances the interest of
cognitive semantics, which is a thriving field of study (see 0emantics; 0emantics, conceptual
role; 0emantics, informational; 0emantics, teleological; &oncepts).
7t has not gone un%uestioned that mind indeed can assign meaning to language, and in fact
scepticism about this has figured %uite prominently in philosophical discussions of language.
$ittgenstein has been read as at least flirting with scepticism that there is anything our minds
can do that would constitute meaning one thing rather than another (see $ittgenstein, L.
==14;1B; *eaning and rule:following; Private states and language). $.C. Duine, starting from
the thought that meaning is whatever good translation captures, and on arguments that good
translation is not s%uarely dictated by any real facts, concludes that meaning is highly
indeterminate. Duine is not alone in the view that linguistic and mental meaning are best seen
not as 'out there( to be discovered, but rather as partly constituted or constructed by our
practices of interpreting and translating (see Duine, $.C.; Aavidson, A.; Aennett, A.&.; Lewis,
A.8.; Radical translation and radical interpretation).
Language Mind. 7f mind assigns meaning to language, so also language enables and
channels mind. ,c%uiring and trafficing in a language brings one concepts, thoughts and
habits of thought, with all sorts of conse%uences (see 0apir:$horf 6ypothesis; Linguistic
discrimination; Language and gender). 7ndeed, having language is so crucial to our ability to
frame the sophisticated thoughts that appear essential to language:use and understanding,
3=
that many doubt whether mind is 'prior( to language in any interesting sense (see *eaning and
communication; Aavidson, A.).
Language World. 0ince language is the vehicle of our descriptions and e.planations of
reality, philosophers are concerned about what if anything maes for a true or apt
characteri/ation of reality. Philosophers have these concerns for reasons of philosophical
methodology (which we will come to in a moment), but also owing to the naturalness and
plausibility of a certain picture of meaning.
,ccording to this picture, the ey to meaning is the notion of a truth-condition. , statement(s
meaning determines a condition that must be met if it is to be true. "or e.ample, my statement
'7reland is larger than *anhattan(, given what it means, is true 9ust in case a certain state of
affairs obtains (namely, a certain island(s being larger than a certain other island). ,ccording to
the truth:conditional picture of meaning, the core of what a statement means is its truth:
condition ; which helps determine the way reality is said to be in it ; and the core of what a
word means is the contribution it maes to this (perhaps, in the case of certain sorts of word,
this would be what the word refers to) (see 0emantics; *eaning and truth; Reference).
$hile the truth:conditional picture of meaning has dominated semantics, a serious challenge
has been presented by philosophers, including *ichael Aummett, who urge that the ey to
meaning is a notion of correct use. ,ccording to this alternative picture, the core of a
sentence(s meaning is the rule for its appropriate utterance. -f course, the two pictures
converge if sentences are correctly used e.actly when they are true. The interest of the
distinction emerges only when (a 'realist( conception of) truth is dislodged from this role,
whether because of scepticism about truth itself, or because truth is seen as too remote from
the crucible of social practice to be the meaning:relevant criterion for correct use (see Realism
and antirealism; 7ntuitionistic logic and antirealism; *eaning and verification; Aummett, *.,.).;
Truth, pragmatic theory of; Truth, deflationary theories of; Truth, coherence theory of; Truth,
correspondence theory of). The challenge illustrates a sense in which the *ind@Language and
Language@$orld connections can seem to place a tension on the notion of meaning (meaning
is whatever we cognitively grasp, but the meaning of language 9ust is its bearing on the world).
3 Linguistic philosophy
,part from language(s interest as a target of science and its centrality to our self:conception as
describers of reality, language plays a ey methodological role in philosophy. 7t is this role
perhaps more than anything else that has e.plained the continued close attention paid to
language in the past century by philosophers woring in such varied areas as epistemology,
aesthetics, ethics, metaphysics, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind.
The methodological role of language in philosophy is most easily e.plained by e.ample. ,
philosopher is interested in the nature of value; they want to now what goodness is.
Language enters when they observe that goodness is what is attributed when we say of a
thing that it 'is good(. 0o the philosopher focuses on certain statements, and sees an
understanding of what such statements mean and in general of how they wor. They e.plore
whether such statements are ever ob9ectively true or false, whether their truth or aptness
varies from speaer to speaer, whether a satisfying e.planation of them entails that the word
'good( refers to or e.presses a genuine characteristic (of actions, states of affairs, persons,
and so on), and how their meaning relates to the distinctive sorts of endorsement that such
statements commonly convey (see ,nalytic ethics; )motive meaning).
The pattern e.hibited in the e.ample of value is apparent throughout philosophy. $e are
interested in nowledge, fiction, necessity, causation, or sensation, so we find ourselves
studying statements about what interests us< statements attributing nowledge, describing
fictions, asserting necessities, assigning causes and reporting sensations. Tools from the
philosophy of language mae available %uite a number of views about what these statements
mean and in general about how they do their e.pressive and communicative wor; and these
3E
views inform and support philosophical positions on the real ob9ects of philosophical interest.
There have been dramatic and no doubt e.aggerated claims about such techni%ues ; for
instance, that philosophy should simply consist in this sort of study of language. #ut it is if
anything an understatement to say that linguistic sophistication has deepened philosophical
understanding and has advanced debate in nearly all areas of philosophy (see &onceptual
analysis).
Philosophy of #anguage
Course $escription
$his course will consider philosophical issues about syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Among these
three areas, our primary focus will be on semantics, with significant attention to pragmatics, and and a
fairly cursory loo! at syntax.
3ynta* is concerned with the rules that determine whether a sentence is grammatical or not. (yntax is of
interest to philosophy for a number of reasons. 0oam +homs!y has argued that the basic features of
syntax are innate and universal, a claim that is closely connected with the early modern dispute in
philosophy over &innate ideas.& Another claim of philosophical interest is what ;erry ?odor calls &the
modularity of mind,& the idea that many of the operations of the mind are carried out by specialiAed
subsystems rather than by a general faculty of reasoning or problem)solving which is simply applied to
different areas. ?odor has used syntax as an example to illustrate this modularity.
e will consider in detail issues involving the important semantic concepts of truth, meaning, and
reference, including the following* (3) hat is it for a word or sentence to be meaningful? Is it true, as
the logical positivists asserted, that any sentence that cannot be empirically verified is meaningless? (4)
How do words and sentences ac%uire meanings? Are they -ust labels for ideas or thoughts which could
exist in precisely the same way without language? @r do our thoughts to some extent ac%uire their
meaning from the words we use? And if the latter, how do those words ac%uire their meanings? (7)
hat is the relation between meaning and reference? +an the reference of my words be determined in
part by things I am unaware of, or only by my own beliefs and intentions about their reference?
?inally, we will consider some issues about pragmatics, or features of language that depend on the
contexts in which it is used. In particular we will consider issues about &speech acts,& or the !inds of
things we can do with words. about the implicit rules that govern conversations. and about the nature of
metaphor. $hroughout the semester we will attend to connections between the philosophy of language
and other areas of philosophy, especially metaphysics and the philosophy of mind.
Te/ts
illiam 1. ,ycan, Philosophy of /anguage% 4 Contemporary &ntroduction (>outledge, 4BBB)
;. ,. Austin, 0ow to 1o Things with 2ords (Harvard, 3DE<)
,udwig ittgenstein, Philosophical &nvestigations (5acmillan, 3D<I)
0oam +homs!y, (n "ature and /anguage (+ambridge, 4BB4)
3I
Course $escription0 $he aim of this course is to introduce you to various themes in the philosophy of
language. $here are several ways of approaching the philosophy of language. In this course, we will
ta!e a historical)thematic approach. >ather than approaching the philosophy of language exclusively as
an analysis of meaning produced by the human sub-ect, this course will investigate the historical and
conceptual origins of language. e will %uestion the relationship between language and human
consciousness, history, and philosophy in general. e will ta!e a conceptual and historical rather than
an analytical approach to the philosophy of language. #hilosophy of language is one of the areas where
one can observe the differences between the analytic and continental schools in philosophy as well as a
dialogue between these schools of thought. e will read the wor!s of 1ottlob ?rege, 2ertrand >ussell,
and ;ohn Austin, who are considered to be representatives of analytical philosophy, as well as the wor!s
of several thin!ers who are regarded as belonging to the continental tradition, such as ?erdinand de
(aussure, 5artin Heidegger, ;ac%ues 8errida and 5ichel ?oucault.
3D