Cases

1. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance (235 SCRA 630) *

2. Garcia vs. Mata (G.R. No. L-33713)*
3. Farias vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 147387) *
4. Lopez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 144573)
5. Tan vs. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. (G.R. No.148420)
6. Rodrigo vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 125498)
7. Pimentel vs. HRET (G.R. No. 141489)
8. Angara vs. Electoral Commission (G.R. No. 45081)
9. Dumlao vs. Comelec (G.R. No. L-52245)
10. Oposa vs. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083)
11. Anti Graft League of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 97787)
12. Serrano De Agbayani vs. PNB (G.R. No. L-23127)
13. Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy (88 SCRA 679, 281 SCRA 330)
14. Republic vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 79732)
15. Taada vs. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915)
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in
these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as
the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been
filed by the several petitioners in these cases, with the exception of the Philippine
Educational Publishers Association, Inc. and the Association of Philippine Booksellers,
petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated comment, to which
the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and the Philippine Press Institute,
Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan T. David, petitioner in G.R. No. 115525, each
filed a reply. In turn the Solicitor General filed on June 1, 1995 a rejoinder to the PPI's reply.
On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.
I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills. Some of the petitioners
(Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did
not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the
Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of
Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate
where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they
complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the
Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994.
Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done was to amend
H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630.
That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version just becomes the
text (only the text) of the House bill."
The contention has no merit.
The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an
amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least
two occasions during the Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills,
which, in consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became the enrolled bills. These
were:
R.A. No. 7369 (AN ACT TO AMEND THE OMNIBUS INVESTMENTS CODE OF 1987 BY
EXTENDING FROM FIVE (5) YEARS TO TEN YEARS THE PERIOD FOR TAX AND DUTY
EXEMPTION AND TAX CREDIT ON CAPITAL EQUIPMENT) which was approved by the
President on April 10, 1992. This Act is actually a consolidation of H. No. 34254, which was
approved by the House on January 29, 1992, and S. No. 1920, which was approved by the
Senate on February 3, 1992.
R.A. No. 7549 (AN ACT GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO WHOEVER SHALL GIVE REWARD TO
ANY FILIPINO ATHLETE WINNING A MEDAL IN OLYMPIC GAMES) which was approved by the
President on May 22, 1992. This Act is a consolidation of H. No. 22232, which was approved
by the House of Representatives on August 2, 1989, and S. No. 807, which was approved by
the Senate on October 21, 1991.
On the other hand, the Ninth Congress passed revenue laws which were also the result of the
consolidation of House and Senate bills. These are the following, with indications of the dates
on which the laws were approved by the President and dates the separate bills of the two
chambers of Congress were respectively passed:
1. R.A. NO. 7642
AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR TAX EVASION, AMENDING FOR
THIS PURPOSE THE PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992).
House Bill No. 2165, October 5, 1992
Senate Bill No. 32, December 7, 1992
2. R.A. NO. 7643
AN ACT TO EMPOWER THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO
REQUIRE THE PAYMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX EVERY MONTH AND
TO ALLOW LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS TO SHARE IN VAT REVENUE,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992)
House Bill No. 1503, September 3, 1992
Senate Bill No. 968, December 7, 1992
3. R.A. NO. 7646
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO
PRESCRIBE THE PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES BY
LARGE TAXPAYERS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS
OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED (February
24, 1993)
House Bill No. 1470, October 20, 1992
Senate Bill No. 35, November 19, 1992
4. R.A. NO. 7649
AN ACT REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, INSTRUMENTALITIES OR AGENCIES INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS (GOCCS) TO
DEDUCT AND WITHHOLD THE VALUE-ADDED TAX DUE AT THE RATE OF
THREE PERCENT (3%) ON GROSS PAYMENT FOR THE PURCHASE OF
GOODS AND SIX PERCENT (6%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS FOR SERVICES
RENDERED BY CONTRACTORS (April 6, 1993)
House Bill No. 5260, January 26, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1141, March 30, 1993
5. R.A. NO. 7656
AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS TO DECLARE DIVIDENDS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
(November 9, 1993)
House Bill No. 11024, November 3, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1168, November 3, 1993
6. R.A. NO. 7660
AN ACT RATIONALIZING FURTHER THE STRUCTURE AND
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR SPECIFIC
PROGRAMS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (December 23, 1993)
House Bill No. 7789, May 31, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1330, November 18, 1993
7. R.A. NO. 7717
AN ACT IMPOSING A TAX ON THE SALE, BARTER OR EXCHANGE OF
SHARES OF STOCK LISTED AND TRADED THROUGH THE LOCAL STOCK
EXCHANGE OR THROUGH INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, BY
INSERTING A NEW SECTION AND REPEALING CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS
THEREOF (May 5, 1994)
House Bill No. 9187, November 3, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1127, March 23, 1994
Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in the
exercise of its power to propose amendments to bills required to originate in the House,
passed its own version of a House revenue measure. It is noteworthy that, in the particular
case of S. No. 1630, petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as members of the Senate, voted to
approve it on second and third readings.
On the other hand, amendment by substitution, in the manner urged by petitioner Tolentino,
concerns a mere matter of form. Petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it
would make if, as the Senate actually did in this case, a separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead
enacted as a substitute measure, "taking into Consideration . . . H.B. 11197."
Indeed, so far as pertinent, the Rules of the Senate only provide:
RULE XXIX
AMENDMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
68. Not more than one amendment to the original amendment shall be
considered.
No amendment by substitution shall be entertained unless the text
thereof is submitted in writing.
Any of said amendments may be withdrawn before a vote is taken
thereon.
69. No amendment which seeks the inclusion of a legislative provision
foreign to the subject matter of a bill (rider) shall be entertained.
xxx xxx xxx
70-A. A bill or resolution shall not be amended by substituting it with
another which covers a subject distinct from that proposed in the original
bill or resolution. (emphasis added).
Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the Philippine
Senate possesses less power than the U.S. Senate because of textual differences between
constitutional provisions giving them the power to propose or concur with amendments.
Art. I, 7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments as on other Bills.
Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.
The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine Constitution and the decision to drop
the phrase "as on other Bills" in the American version, according to petitioners, shows the
intention of the framers of our Constitution to restrict the Senate's power to propose
amendments to revenue bills. Petitioner Tolentino contends that the word "exclusively" was
inserted to modify "originate" and "the words 'as in any other bills' (sic) were eliminated so
as to show that these bills were not to be like other bills but must be treated as a special
kind."
The history of this provision does not support this contention. The supposed indicia of
constitutional intent are nothing but the relics of an unsuccessful attempt to limit the power
of the Senate. It will be recalled that the 1935 Constitution originally provided for a
unicameral National Assembly. When it was decided in 1939 to change to a bicameral
legislature, it became necessary to provide for the procedure for lawmaking by the Senate
and the House of Representatives. The work of proposing amendments to the Constitution
was done by the National Assembly, acting as a constituent assembly, some of whose
members, jealous of preserving the Assembly's lawmaking powers, sought to curtail the
powers of the proposed Senate. Accordingly they proposed the following provision:
All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. In case of
disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the Assembly may repass the
same by a two-thirds vote of all its members, and thereupon, the bill so
repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the
President for corresponding action. In the event that the Senate should
fail to finally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days
from the opening of the next regular session of the same legislative term,
reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the
Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted
and may be submitted to the President for corresponding action.
The special committee on the revision of laws of the Second National Assembly vetoed the
proposal. It deleted everything after the first sentence. As rewritten, the proposal was
approved by the National Assembly and embodied in Resolution No. 38, as amended by
Resolution No. 73. (J. ARUEGO, KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION 65-66 (1950)). The proposed
amendment was submitted to the people and ratified by them in the elections held on June
18, 1940.
This is the history of Art. VI, 18 (2) of the 1935 Constitution, from which Art. VI, 24 of the
present Constitution was derived. It explains why the word "exclusively" was added to the
American text from which the framers of the Philippine Constitution borrowed and why the
phrase "as on other Bills" was not copied. Considering the defeat of the proposal, the power
of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete
"as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without
such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate
certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the
coequality of the two chambers of Congress.
That this is also the understanding of book authors of the scope of the Senate's power to
concur is clear from the following commentaries:
The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is
apparently without restriction. It would seem that by virtue of this
power, the Senate can practically re-write a bill required to come from
the House and leave only a trace of the original bill. For example, a
general revenue bill passed by the lower house of the United States
Congress contained provisions for the imposition of an inheritance tax .
This was changed by the Senate into a corporation tax. The amending
authority of the Senate was declared by the United States Supreme Court
to be sufficiently broad to enable it to make the alteration. [Flint v. Stone
Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389].
(L. TAADA AND F. CARREON, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES 247
(1961))
The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House of
Representatives because it is more numerous in membership and
therefore also more representative of the people. Moreover, its
members are presumed to be more familiar with the needs of the
country in regard to the enactment of the legislation involved.
The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power
to propose or concur with amendments to the bills initiated by the House
of Representatives. Thus, in one case, a bill introduced in the U.S. House
of Representatives was changed by the Senate to make a proposed
inheritance tax a corporation tax. It is also accepted practice for the
Senate to introduce what is known as an amendment by substitution,
which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House of
Representatives.
(I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 144-145 (1993)).
In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must
"originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose
an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school
text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill
omitting or adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and
endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known
as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at all.
(A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (1950))
To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the
House by prescribing that the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting
clause must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may be incorporated
in place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is
no rule prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an
amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made.
II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they
assume that S. No. 1630 is an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references
to its certification that it was passed by the Senate "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking
into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something
substantially different between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No.
11197. From this premise, they conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and
in the Senate and that it is the product of two "half-baked bills because neither H. No. 11197
nor S. No. 1630 was passed by both houses of Congress."
In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere
amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison
of the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic
petition of petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two bills, at the
same time indicates that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be
amendments to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate
bill was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to
pass the Senate on second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first
reading it was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it
required that S. No. 1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills
could be referred to the Conference Committee.
There is legislative precedent for what was done in the case of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
When the House bill and Senate bill, which became R.A. No. 1405 (Act prohibiting the
disclosure of bank deposits), were referred to a conference committee, the question was
raised whether the two bills could be the subject of such conference, considering that the bill
from one house had not been passed by the other and vice versa. As Congressman Duran put
the question:
MR. DURAN. Therefore, I raise this question of order as to procedure: If a
House bill is passed by the House but not passed by the Senate, and a
Senate bill of a similar nature is passed in the Senate but never passed in
the House, can the two bills be the subject of a conference, and can a law
be enacted from these two bills? I understand that the Senate bill in this
particular instance does not refer to investments in government
securities, whereas the bill in the House, which was introduced by the
Speaker, covers two subject matters: not only investigation of deposits in
banks but also investigation of investments in government securities.
Now, since the two bills differ in their subject matter, I believe that no
law can be enacted.
Ruling on the point of order raised, the chair (Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr.) said:
THE SPEAKER. The report of the conference committee is in order. It is
precisely in cases like this where a conference should be had. If the
House bill had been approved by the Senate, there would have been no
need of a conference; but precisely because the Senate passed another
bill on the same subject matter, the conference committee had to be
created, and we are now considering the report of that committee.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 13, July 27, 1955, pp. 3841-42 (emphasis added))
III. The President's certification. The fallacy in thinking that H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 are
distinct and unrelated measures also accounts for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's)
contention that because the President separately certified to the need for the immediate
enactment of these measures, his certification was ineffectual and void. The certification had
to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which at the momentwas being
considered. Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it would be necessary for the President
to certify as many bills as are presented in a house of Congress even though the bills are
merely versions of the bill he has already certified. It is enough that he certifies the bill which,
at the time he makes the certification, is under consideration. Since on March 22, 1994 the
Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill which had to be certified. For that matter
on June 1, 1993 the President had earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment
because it was the one which at that time was being considered by the House. This bill was
later substituted, together with other bills, by H. No. 11197.
As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main
decision that the phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26 (2) qualifies not only the requirement that
"printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the members three days
before its passage" but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it must have
passed "three readings on separate days." There is not only textual support for such
construction but historical basis as well.
Art. VI, 21 (2) of the 1935 Constitution originally provided:
(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been
printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least
three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall
have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereof shall be allowed and the
question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.
When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, it was provided in Art. VIII, 19 (2):
(2) No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to the Members three days before its passage, except when
the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.
This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art. VI, 26 (2)
of the present Constitution, thus:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeasand nays entered in
the Journal.
The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on
separate days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed,
the need for a law may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or
public calamity which it is meant to address.
Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency, especially in
a country like the Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic condition. Even if this were
the case, an enormous budget deficit does not make the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less
urgent or the situation calling for its enactment any less an emergency.
Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these cases)
believed that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they
responded to the call of the President by voting on the bill on second and third readings on
the same day. While the judicial department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance of the
President's certification, the respect due coequal departments of the government in matters
committed to them by the Constitution and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion caution a stay of the judicial hand.
At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate
where it was discussed for six days. Only its distribution in advance in its final printed form
was actually dispensed with by holding the voting on second and third readings on the same
day (March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission of the bill on
February 8, 1994 on second reading and its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it
was finally voted on by the Senate on third reading.
The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1)
to inform the members of Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice
that a measure is progressing through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others
interested in the measure to prepare their positions with reference to it. (1 J. G.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 (1972)). These
purposes were substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No. 7716.
IV. Power of Conference Committee. It is contended (principally by Kilosbayan, Inc. and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI)) that in
violation of the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the people's right to know
(Art. II, 28 and Art. III, 7) the Conference Committee met for two days in executive session
with only the conferees present.
As pointed out in our main decision, even in the United States it was customary to hold such
sessions with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance and it was only in 1975 when
a new rule was adopted requiring open sessions. Unlike its American counterpart, the
Philippine Congress has not adopted a rule prescribing open hearings for conference
committees.
It is nevertheless claimed that in the United States, before the adoption of the rule in 1975,
at least staff members were present. These were staff members of the Senators and
Congressmen, however, who may be presumed to be their confidential men, not
stenographers as in this case who on the last two days of the conference were excluded.
There is no showing that the conferees themselves did not take notes of their proceedings so
as to give petitioner Kilosbayan basis for claiming that even in secret diplomatic negotiations
involving state interests, conferees keep notes of their meetings. Above all, the public's right
to know was fully served because the Conference Committee in this case submitted a report
showing the changes made on the differing versions of the House and the Senate.
Petitioners cite the rules of both houses which provide that conference committee reports
must contain "a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or other
amendments." These changes are shown in the bill attached to the Conference Committee
Report. The members of both houses could thus ascertain what changes had been made in
the original bills without the need of a statement detailing the changes.
The same question now presented was raised when the bill which became R.A. No. 1400
(Land Reform Act of 1955) was reported by the Conference Committee. Congressman
Bengzon raised a point of order. He said:
MR. BENGZON. My point of order is that it is out of order to consider the
report of the conference committee regarding House Bill No. 2557 by
reason of the provision of Section 11, Article XII, of the Rules of this
House which provides specifically that the conference report must be
accompanied by a detailed statement of the effects of the amendment
on the bill of the House. This conference committee report is not
accompanied by that detailed statement, Mr. Speaker. Therefore it is out
of order to consider it.
Petitioner Tolentino, then the Majority Floor Leader, answered:
MR. TOLENTINO. Mr. Speaker, I should just like to say a few words in
connection with the point of order raised by the gentleman from
Pangasinan.
There is no question about the provision of the Rule cited by the
gentleman from Pangasinan, but this provision applies to those cases
where only portions of the bill have been amended. In this case before us
an entire bill is presented; therefore, it can be easily seen from the
reading of the bill what the provisions are. Besides, this procedure has
been an established practice.
After some interruption, he continued:
MR. TOLENTINO. As I was saying, Mr. Speaker, we have to look into the
reason for the provisions of the Rules, and the reason for the
requirement in the provision cited by the gentleman from Pangasinan is
when there are only certain words or phrases inserted in or deleted from
the provisions of the bill included in the conference report, and we
cannot understand what those words and phrases mean and their
relation to the bill. In that case, it is necessary to make a detailed
statement on how those words and phrases will affect the bill as a
whole; but when the entire bill itself is copied verbatim in the conference
report, that is not necessary. So when the reason for the Rule does not
exist, the Rule does not exist.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 2, p. 4056. (emphasis added))
Congressman Tolentino was sustained by the chair. The record shows that when the ruling
was appealed, it was upheld by viva voce and when a division of the House was called, it was
sustained by a vote of 48 to 5. (Id.,
p. 4058)
Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert new provisions
as long as these are germane to the subject of the conference. As this Court held in Philippine
Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz,
the jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between
the Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision. What is important is
that its report is subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress. This Court
ruled that it would not entertain allegations that, because new provisions had been added by
the conference committee, there was thereby a violation of the constitutional injunction that
"upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed."
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners'
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the
bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copiesthereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both
the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was
duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
(Id. at 710. (emphasis added))
It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees in the Philippines
in a 1979 study:
Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed. These
committees may be given instructions by their parent bodies or they may
be left without instructions. Normally the conference committees are
without instructions, and this is why they are often critically referred to
as "the little legislatures." Once bills have been sent to them, the
conferees have almost unlimited authority to change the clauses of the
bills and in fact sometimes introduce new measures that were not in the
original legislation. No minutes are kept, and members' activities on
conference committees are difficult to determine. One congressman
known for his idealism put it this way: "I killed a bill on export incentives
for my interest group [copra] in the conference committee but I could
not have done so anywhere else." The conference committee submits a
report to both houses, and usually it is accepted. If the report is not
accepted, then the committee is discharged and new members are
appointed.
(R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND
LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J. D. LEES AND M. SHAW,
eds.)).
In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference committees. We cite
it only to say that conference committees here are no different from their counterparts in
the United States whose vast powers we noted in Philippine Judges Association
v. Prado, supra. At all events, under Art. VI, 16(3) each house has the power "to determine
the rules of its proceedings," including those of its committees. Any meaningful change in the
method and procedures of Congress or its committees must therefore be sought in that body
itself.
V. The titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197. PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art.
VI, 26 (1) of the Constitution which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." PAL contends that
the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from the VAT is not
expressed in the title of the law.
Pursuant to 13 of P.D. No. 1590, PAL pays a franchise tax of 2% on its gross revenue "in lieu
of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license and other fees and charges of any
kind, nature, or description, imposed, levied, established, assessed or collected by any
municipal, city, provincial or national authority or government agency, now or in the future."
PAL was exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other entities by 103 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, which provides as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the
value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international
agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including that granted to PAL, by
amending 103, as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the
value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those
granted under Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
The amendment of 103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716 which reads:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,
WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND
FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM
[BY] WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," Congress thereby
clearly expresses its intention to amend any provision of the NIRC which stands in the way of
accomplishing the purpose of the law.
PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of the law by
specific reference to P.D. No. 1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the
constitutional requirement, since it is already stated in the title that the law seeks to amend
the pertinent provisions of the NIRC, among which is 103(q), in order to widen the base of
the VAT. Actually, it is the bill which becomes a law that is required to express in its title the
subject of legislation. The titles of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to
103 of the NIRC as among the provisions sought to be amended. We are satisfied that
sufficient notice had been given of the pendency of these bills in Congress before they were
enacted into what is now R.A.
No. 7716.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now made by PAL
was rejected. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL
CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR
REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED THEREWITH. It
contained a provision repealing all franking privileges. It was contended that the withdrawal
of franking privileges was not expressed in the title of the law. In holding that there was
sufficient description of the subject of the law in its title, including the repeal of franking
privileges, this Court held:
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the
general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not
only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.
[Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297] As has been correctly
explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically
stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject
as expressed in the title, and adopted to the
accomplishment of the object in view, may properly
be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in
the same act the machinery by which the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction,
and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If
such matters are properly connected with the subject
as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they
should also have special mention in the title.
(Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725)
(227 SCRA at 707-708)
VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have held that, as a general proposition,
the press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional
guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group
belonging to the press for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the
press on the basis of the content of the publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT
while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any
rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom
is unconstitutional."
With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the
press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive
the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax
burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. It is thus different from the
tax involved in the cases invoked by the PPI. The license tax in Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) was found to be discriminatory because it was laid on
the gross advertising receipts only of newspapers whose weekly circulation was over 20,000,
with the result that the tax applied only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large
papers were critical of Senator Huey Long who controlled the state legislature which enacted
the license tax. The censorial motivation for the law was thus evident.
On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1983), the tax was found to be discriminatory because although it
could have been made liable for the sales tax or, in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the
privilege of using, storing or consuming tangible goods, the press was not. Instead, the press
was exempted from both taxes. It was, however, later made to pay a special use tax on the
cost of paper and ink which made these items "the only items subject to the use tax that
were component of goods to be sold at retail." The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
differential treatment of the press "suggests that the goal of regulation is not related to
suppression of expression, and such goal is presumptively unconstitutional." It would
therefore appear that even a law that favors the press is constitutionally suspect. (See the
dissent of Rehnquist, J. in that case)
Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O. No. 273 are withdrawn
"absolutely and unqualifiedly" by R.A. No. 7716. Other exemptions from the VAT, such as
those previously granted to PAL, petroleum concessionaires, enterprises registered with the
Export Processing Zone Authority, and many more are likewise totally withdrawn, in addition
to exemptions which are partially withdrawn, in an effort to broaden the base of the tax.
The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is highlighted by the fact that
transactions, which are profit oriented, continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An
enumeration of some of these transactions will suffice to show that by and large this is not so
and that the exemptions are granted for a purpose. As the Solicitor General says, such
exemptions are granted, in some cases, to encourage agricultural production and, in other
cases, for the personal benefit of the end-user rather than for profit. The exempt
transactions are:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state
(agricultural, marine and forest products, cotton seeds in their original
state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and
poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance agriculture (milling of
palay, corn, sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer,
ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal
effects of citizens returning to the Philippines) or for professional use, like
professional instruments and implements, by persons coming to the
Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used
for manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and services
subject to percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services,
and services rendered under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international
agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not
exceeding P500,000.00.
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for
Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)
The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the
press because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional." PPI cites in support of this assertion the following statement in Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The
protection afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license
tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies
the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the wares
and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike.
Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom of
press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in preferred position.
The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly
for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint
on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling
goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's
Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is
unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income
or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a
sermon."
A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil.
386 (1957) which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those
engaged in the sale of general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on
the sale of bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining the free exercise of its
right to propagate.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a
privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange
of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely
for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its
right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is
not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds
derived from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free
to those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to increase the price,
while reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the resulting burden on the
exercise of religious freedom is so incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any
other economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines
costly. Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the tax on the sale of
vestments would be to lay an impermissible burden on the right of the preacher to make a
sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by 107 of the NIRC, as
amended by 7 of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the
expenses of registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting
in 108 of the NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not liable to pay the
VAT does not excuse it from the payment of this fee because it also sells some copies. At any
rate whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is
assessed this tax by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
VII. Alleged violations of the due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule
on taxation. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2)
classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the
rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive
system of taxation."
With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the application of the tax to existing
contracts of the sale of real property by installment or on deferred payment basis would
result in substantial increases in the monthly amortizations to be paid because of the 10%
VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out, is something that the buyer did not anticipate
at the time he entered into the contract.
The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an early case: "Authorities from
numerous sources are cited by the plaintiffs, but none of them show that a lawful tax on a
new subject, or an increased tax on an old one, interferes with a contract or impairs its
obligation, within the meaning of the Constitution. Even though such taxation may affect
particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of
another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of
another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said
that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense." (La Insular v.
Machuca Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-Siong, 39 Phil. 567, 574 (1919)). Indeed not only existing
laws but also "the reservation of the essential attributes of sovereignty, is . . . read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order." (Philippine-American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor
General, 22 SCRA 135, 147 (1968)) Contracts must be understood as having been made in
reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of the government and no
obligation of contract can extend to the defeat of that authority. (Norman v. Baltimore and
Ohio R.R., 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935)).
It is next pointed out that while 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of
agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants
no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of real property
for socialized and low-cost housing is exempted from the tax, but CREBA claims that real
estate transactions of "the less poor," i.e., the middle class, who are equally homeless,
should likewise be exempted.
The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential
goods and services was already exempt under 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the
enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted
exemption to these transactions, while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the
VAT. Moreover, there is a difference between the "homeless poor" and the "homeless less
poor" in the example given by petitioner, because the second group or middle class can
afford to rent houses in the meantime that they cannot yet buy their own homes. The two
social classes are thus differently situated in life. "It is inherent in the power to tax that the
State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption
infringe no constitutional limitation.'" (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955). Accord, City
of Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil. 912 (1968); Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 (1984);
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988)).
Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI,
28(1) which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."
Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable
and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough
that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in
similar situation. (City of Baguio v. De Leon, supra; Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, supra)
Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273 long before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted.
R.A. No. 7716 merely expands the base of the tax. The validity of the original VAT Law was
questioned in Kapatiran ng Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA
383 (1988) on grounds similar to those made in these cases, namely, that the law was
"oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive in violation of Art. VI, 28(1) of the
Constitution." (At 382) Rejecting the challenge to the law, this Court held:
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It
is uniform. . . .
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and
services sold to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of
0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of
goods or services by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross
annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are
consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax
are sales of farm and marine products, so that the costs of basic food and
other necessities, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are
expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general
public.
(At 382-383)
The CREBA claims that the VAT is regressive. A similar claim is made by the Cooperative
Union of the Philippines, Inc. (CUP), while petitioner Juan T. David argues that the law
contravenes the mandate of Congress to provide for a progressive system of taxation
because the law imposes a flat rate of 10% and thus places the tax burden on all taxpayers
without regard to their ability to pay.
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT,
are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of
taxation." The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct
taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized."
(E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. (1977)). Indeed, the
mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise,
sales taxes, which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited
with the proclamation of Art. VIII, 17(1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present
Art. VI, 28(1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.
Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if
not impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to
pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by
providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, 3, amending 102 (b) of the
NIRC), while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4, amending 103 of
the NIRC).
Thus, the following transactions involving basic and essential goods and services are
exempted from the VAT:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state
(agricultural, marine and forest products, cotton seeds in their original
state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and
poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance agriculture (milling of
palay, corn sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds, fertilizer,
ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal
effects of citizens returning to the Philippines) and or professional use,
like professional instruments and implements, by persons coming to the
Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used
for manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and services
subject to percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services,
and services rendered under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international
agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not
exceeding P500,000.00.
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for
Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)
On the other hand, the transactions which are subject to the VAT are those which involve
goods and services which are used or availed of mainly by higher income groups. These
include real properties held primarily for sale to customers or for lease in the ordinary course
of trade or business, the right or privilege to use patent, copyright, and other similar property
or right, the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, motion
picture films, tapes and discs, radio, television, satellite transmission and cable television
time, hotels, restaurants and similar places, securities, lending investments, taxicabs, utility
cars for rent, tourist buses, and other common carriers, services of franchise grantees of
telephone and telegraph.
The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad claims of constitutional violations
by tendering issues not at retail but at wholesale and in the abstract. There is no fully
developed record which can impart to adjudication the impact of actuality. There is no
factual foundation to show in the concrete the application of the law to actual contracts and
exemplify its effect on property rights. For the fact is that petitioner's members have not
even been assessed the VAT. Petitioner's case is not made concrete by a series of
hypothetical questions asked which are no different from those dealt with in advisory
opinions.
The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges
arbitrariness. A mere allegation, as here, does not suffice. There must be
a factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint. Considering that
petitioner here would condemn such a provision as void on its face, he
has not made out a case. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative
doctrine that where the due process and equal protection clauses are
invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad
standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as
would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption
of validity must prevail.
(Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661)
Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of a concrete case. It may be
that postponement of adjudication would result in a multiplicity of suits. This need not be the
case, however. Enforcement of the law may give rise to such a case. A test case, provided it is
an actual case and not an abstract or hypothetical one, may thus be presented.
Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for adjudicating abstract issues.
Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion that does
not really settle legal issues.
We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, 1, 2 to decide whenever a claim is made that
"there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This duty can only arise if an actual
case or controversy is before us. Under Art . VIII, 5 our jurisdiction is defined in terms of
"cases" and all that Art. VIII, 1, 2 can plausibly mean is that in the exercise of
that jurisdiction we have the judicial power to determine questions of grave abuse of
discretion by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Put in another way, what is granted in Art. VIII, 1, 2 is "judicial power," which is "the power
of a court to hear and decide cases pending between parties who have the right to sue and
be sued in the courts of law and equity" (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 559 (1912)), as
distinguished from legislative and executive power. This power cannot be directly
appropriated until it is apportioned among several courts either by the Constitution, as in the
case of Art. VIII, 5, or by statute, as in the case of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296)
and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). The power thus apportioned
constitutes the court's "jurisdiction," defined as "the power conferred by law upon a court or
judge to take cognizance of a case, to the exclusion of all others." (United States v. Arceo, 6
Phil. 29 (1906)) Without an actual case coming within its jurisdiction, this Court cannot
inquire into any allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the
government.
VIII. Alleged violation of policy towards cooperatives. On the other hand, the Cooperative
Union of the Philippines (CUP), after briefly surveying the course of legislation, argues that it
was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present
Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would
therefore be to infringe a constitutional policy. Petitioner claims that in 1973, P.D. No. 175
was promulgated exempting cooperatives from the payment of income taxes and sales taxes
but in 1984, because of the crisis which menaced the national economy, this exemption was
withdrawn by P.D. No. 1955; that in 1986, P.D. No. 2008 again granted cooperatives
exemption from income and sales taxes until December 31, 1991, but, in the same year, E.O.
No. 93 revoked the exemption; and that finally in 1987 the framers of the Constitution
"repudiated the previous actions of the government adverse to the interests of the
cooperatives, that is, the repeated revocation of the tax exemption to cooperatives and
instead upheld the policy of strengthening the cooperatives by way of the grant of tax
exemptions," by providing the following in Art. XII:
1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution
of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount
of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of
life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on
sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries
that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However,
the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of
the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private
enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective
organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their
ownership.
15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and
growth of cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic
development.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. In the first place, it is not true that P.D. No. 1955 singled
out cooperatives by withdrawing their exemption from income and sales taxes under P.D.
No. 175, 5. What P.D. No. 1955, 1 did was to withdraw the exemptions and preferential
treatments theretofore granted to private business enterprises in general, in view of the
economic crisis which then beset the nation. It is true that after P.D. No. 2008, 2 had
restored the tax exemptions of cooperatives in 1986, the exemption was again repealed by
E.O. No. 93, 1, but then again cooperatives were not the only ones whose exemptions were
withdrawn. The withdrawal of tax incentives applied to all, including government and private
entities. In the second place, the Constitution does not really require that cooperatives be
granted tax exemptions in order to promote their growth and viability. Hence, there is no
basis for petitioner's assertion that the government's policy toward cooperatives had been
one of vacillation, as far as the grant of tax privileges was concerned, and that it was to put
an end to this indecision that the constitutional provisions cited were adopted. Perhaps as a
matter of policy cooperatives should be granted tax exemptions, but that is left to the
discretion of Congress. If Congress does not grant exemption and there is no discrimination
to cooperatives, no violation of any constitutional policy can be charged.
Indeed, petitioner's theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are
exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the
following are exempt from taxation: charitable institutions, churches and parsonages, by
reason of Art. VI, 28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of Art.
XIV, 4 (3).
CUP's further ground for seeking the invalidation of R.A. No. 7716 is that it denies
cooperatives the equal protection of the law because electric cooperatives are exempted
from the VAT. The classification between electric and other cooperatives (farmers
cooperatives, producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, etc.) apparently rests on a
congressional determination that there is greater need to provide cheaper electric power to
as many people as possible, especially those living in the rural areas, than there is to provide
them with other necessities in life. We cannot say that such classification is unreasonable.
We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity of
R.A. No. 7716. We have in fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining its enforcement
pending resolution of these cases. We have now come to the conclusion that the law suffers
from none of the infirmities attributed to it by petitioners and that its enactment by the
other branches of the government does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any
question as to its necessity, desirability or expediency must be addressed to Congress as the
body which is electorally responsible, remembering that, as Justice Holmes has said,
"legislators are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as are the courts." (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267,
270, 48 L. Ed. 971, 973 (1904)). It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing
that we should enforce the public accountability of legislators, that those who took part in
passing the law in question by voting for it in Congress should later thrust to the courts the
burden of reviewing measures in the flush of enactment. This Court does not sit as a third
branch of the legislature, much less exercise a veto power over legislation.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the temporary
restraining order previously issued is hereby lifted.
G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975
EUSEBIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ERNESTO S. MATA, Secretary of National Defense, and GENERAL MANUEL T. YAN,
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents-appellees.
Emilio Purugganan for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de
Leon and Solicitor Eulogio Raquel-Santos for respondents-appellees.

CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, Branch IX, in civil case Q-13466, entitled "Eusebio B. Garcia, petitioner, versus Hon.
Ernesto Mata (Juan Ponce Enrile), et al., respondents," declaring paragraph 11 of the "Special
Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines" of Republic Act No.
1600
1
unconstitutional and therefore invalid and inoperative.
We affirm the judgment a quo.
The facts material to this case are embodied in the following stipulation submitted jointly by
both parties to the lower court:
Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of
the Philippines until his reversion to inactive status on 15 November
1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332. At the time of
reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain with a monthly emolument
of P478.00, comprising his base and longevity pay, quarters and
subsistence allowances;
On June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect,
petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated
active commissioned service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner
had an accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months
and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 2334, and such reversion was
neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial
proceedings;
From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on
inactive status and as such, he has neither received any emoluments
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever employed in
the Government in any capacity;
As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the
necessary petitions with the offices of the AFP Chief of Staff, the
Secretary of National Defense, and the President, respectively, but
received reply only from the Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant
General.
On September 17, 1969 the petitioner brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a
Sum of Money" in the court a quo to compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense
and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
2
to reinstate him in the active
commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay
all the emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive
status. On December 2, 1970 the trial court dismissed the petition. The court ruled that
paragraph 11 of the "Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines" in Republic
Act 1600 is "invalid, unconstitutional and inoperative."
The petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active
commissioned service in the AFP when Republic Act 1382 took effect on June 18, 1955.
Section I of this law provided:
Reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated
commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the
approval of this Act shall not be reverted into inactive status except for
cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their own
request: Provided, That for purposes of computing the length of service,
six months or more of active service shall be considered one year.
(emphasis supplied)
The petitioner's accumulated active commissioned service was thus short of the minimum
service requirement prescribed in the aforequoted provision of R.A. 1382.
On July 11, 1956,
3
while the petitioner was yet in the active service, Republic Act 1600 was
enacted into law. Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (on page 892 of the Act) provided as follows:
11. After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no
reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a
tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of five
consecutive years: PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines on active duty for more than two years
on the date of the approval of this Act except those whose military and
educational training, experience and qualifications are deemed essential
to the needs of the service, shall be reverted to inactive status within one
year from the approval of this Act: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That reserve
officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned
service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act
shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper
court-martial proceedings or upon their request; PROVIDED, FURTHER,
That any such reserve officer reverted to inactive status who has at least
five of active commissioned service shall be entitled to a gratuity
equivalent to one month's authorized base and longevity pay in the rank
held at the time of such reversion for every year of active commissioned
service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve officer who receives a
gratuity under the provisions of this Act shall not except during a National
emergency or mobilization, be called to a tour of active duty within five
years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
Secretary of National Defense is authorized to extend the tour of active
duty of reserve officers who are qualified military pilots and doctors;
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations authorized
in this Act for the Department of National Defense notwithstanding any
provision of this Act to the contrary and any unexpended balance of
certification to accounts payable since 1 July 1949 regardless of purpose
of the appropriation shall be made available for the purpose of this
paragraph: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the Secretary of National
Defense shall render a quarterly report to Congress as to the
implementation of the provisions of this paragraph. ( pp. 892-893, RA
1600) (emphasis supplied)
The petitioner consequently argues that his reversion to inactive status on November 15,
1960 was in violation of the abovequoted provision which prohibits the reversion to inactive
status of reserve officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated active
commissioned service.
On the other hand, the respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance or
pertinence whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained
therein, and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2
4
of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines, which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriation bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to such appropriation.
A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to
any appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very first
clause of paragraph 11 itself, which reads,
After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no
reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a
tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of five
consecutive years:
the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for
the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers
to the fundamental government policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion
to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy continue
throughout the entire paragraph.
In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was indeed a non-appropriation item
inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against
"riders" to the general appropriation act." It was indeed a new and completely unrelated
provision attached to the Appropriation Act.
The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1
5
of the 1935 Constitution of
the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional
requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act
that was not fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or
properly connected with that subject.
In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the subject and is
properly connected therewith, the subject to be considered is the one expressed in the title
of the act, and every fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor of
the validity of the legislative enactment. But when an act contains provisions which are
clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are
inoperative and without effect.
We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of the act.
Thus, in Sumulong vs. Comelec, 73 Phil. 288, 291, this Court held that it is "a sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject." The constitutional provision
was intended to preclude the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not
germane to the subject-matter of the bill.
6

The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the
operation of the government." Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly
included in this restricted subject or any matter properly connected therewith is valid and
operative. But, if a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted
subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion
to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.
To quote the respondents-appellees on this point:
It is obvious that the statutory provision in question refers to security of
reserve officers from reversion to inactive status, whereas the subject or
title of the statute from which it derives its existence refers to
appropriations. Verily, it runs contrary to or is repugnant to the above-
quoted injunctive provision of the Constitution. Where a conflict arises
between a statute and the Constitution, the latter prevails. It should be
emphasized that a Constitution is superior to a statute and is precisely
called the "supreme law of the land" because it is the fundamental or
organic law which states the general principles and builds the substantial
foundation and general framework of law and government, and for that
reason a statute contrary to or in violation of the Constitution is null and
void (Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden, 78 Phil. 599).1wph1.t If a
law, therefore, happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law,
courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness (Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1).
Upon the foregoing dissertation, we declare Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being
unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation it is as
though it has never been passed.
7

Verily, not having shown a clear legal right to the position to which he desires to be restored,
the petitioner cannot compel the respondents to reinstate and/or call him to active duty,
promote or readjust his rank, much less pay him back emoluments and allowances.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is denied, and the decision of the lower court dismissing
the complaint is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 147387 December 10, 2003
RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A.
AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN
THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE,
JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE,
AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking
to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act),
insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election
Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except
for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Farias,
Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the
petition, the petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives.
Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of
Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a
member of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is a consolidation of the following bills
originating from the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR
ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES;"
1


Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY,
HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES."
2

A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate
3
and sixteen
(16) members of the House of Representatives,
4
was formed to reconcile the conflicting
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report,
5
signed
by its members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the
conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto
V. Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep.
Didagen P. Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House could no longer
submit an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon moved that the House
return the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee in view of the proposed
amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his objection to the proposal. However,
upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the return of the report to the
Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action.
6

In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its
conferees
7
to the Bicameral Conference Committee.
8
Then again, for unclear reasons, upon
the motion of Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another set of conferees
9
to the
Bicameral Conference Committee.
10

On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye
moved that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the
contrasting provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the
report had been recommitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Chair responded
that the Bicameral Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of
a new Bicameral Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to
examine the new report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of
the report until the other members were given a copy thereof.
11

After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No.
1742. The House approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no
abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Reps. Farias and Garcia expressed their belief
that Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative,
expressed his doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, Rep.
Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the Bicameral Conference Committee Report and
asked if this procedure was regular.
12

On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report
on the contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.
and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly
certified by the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000
and Senate Bill No. 1742," and "finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001."
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for
being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have
only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the
dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of
the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election
practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy.
The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials,
thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials.
By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which
he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate
of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection
or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained;
thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto
resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared
null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon
its approval" is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as
jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in
Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,
13
that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the
constitutional mandate on the "Accountability of Public Officers:"
14

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate
during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their
respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to
dismiss the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to
institute the present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the
majority of the members of the House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown
that they have suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do
petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since the assailed statute does not involve the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners allegations that
"irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by
the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the
bill was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI
of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is so broad
that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of
certificates of candidacy by elective officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No.
9006 as expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term
of an elective official by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one
which he is permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso facto resigned
therefrom. The legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code in Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove the "unfairness" of considering an
elective official ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for another elective office. With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are
now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if they
run for any office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency or other elective positions, other
than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not
be expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make
the title of the act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the
title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general subject which the statute
seeks to effect without expressing each and every means necessary for its accomplishment.
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to
its subject to find expression in its title. Mere details need not be set forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section
67, leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while
Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists between these two
sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon
the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by popular will. The latter
cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the
due process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life,
liberty and property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations
thereof presume that the formalities of the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first
be filed, and the accused would be entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a
court having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack of due process is premature as no
one has, as yet, been charged with violation of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the
House of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the
Rolls those members thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections.
These respondents merely complied with Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption
of validity until declared otherwise by the Court.
The Courts Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural
issue raised by the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus
standi to file the petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of
Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.
15
The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a
statute to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
16

However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of
"overarching significance to our society,"
17
had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,
18
this Court brushed aside the procedural
requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions
separately filed by then Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of
Representatives assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of
Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act
No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v.
Orbos.
19
Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the
Senate, joined by other petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716
(Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.
20

Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to
challenge the validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,
21
Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,
22
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,
23
Albano v.
Reyes,
24
and Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.
25

Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo
26
as deriving its existence from the
constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching significance" that justifies this Courts
adoption of a liberal stance vis--vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the
national elections barely seven months away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue
now and resolve the same forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite
apropos:
... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore,
the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits,
strong reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may
likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the
paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections
beings barely six months away, reinforce our stand.
27

Every statute is presumed valid.
28
The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a
valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law.
29

It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have
the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends
the limit imposed by the fundamental law.
30
And where the acts of the other branches of
government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciarys solemn and sacred duty to
nullify the same.
31

Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised
by the petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider
32

At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which
provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and
Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective.
All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended
accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except
for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling
legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely
calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
33

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that
the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that
the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a
technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every
end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details
need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
34

The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides
not only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media
of communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public
service, including access to media time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public
information campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination.
35

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be
expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
36

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to
the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court
has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
37

The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are
particularly instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
So all were looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would cover
this provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that
correct? Thats all. Because I believe ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term "fair
election practice," it really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions
inserted earlier seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I think, Im very
comfortable with the title "Fair Election Practice" so that we can get over with these things
so that we dont come back again until we find the title. I mean, its one provision which I
think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this limitation actually provides
for fairness in election practices as the title implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Yes.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
So I would want to beg the House contingent, lets get it over with. To me, ha, its not a very
touchy issue. For me, its even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it
was voted in the Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we
come back as a Bicam just for the title Is that what youre ...?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Its not the title per se, its the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. Im happy that
there is already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us were also comfortable
with it. But it would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that were all comfortable
with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yes. Anyway, lets listen to Congressman Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of
provisions deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is
actually one that indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to enhance the holding of free,
orderly, honest ... elections through fair election practices." But as you said, we will put that
aside to discuss later one.
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly
adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination.
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election
Code is a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling
the playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a rider.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it
is covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I
hope that the House contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it
expressly provides for fair election practices because ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for a
title that is more generic so that then we have less of an objection on constitutionality. I
think thats the theory. So, there is acceptance of this.
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the
special provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ...
REP. MARCOS:
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
REP. MARCOS:
What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, sige, fine, fine. Lets a brainstorm. Equal...
REP. PADILLA:
Mr. Chairman, why dont we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the
Omnibus Election Code?"
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Why dont we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?"
REP. PICHAY:
Thats not an election practice. Thats a limitation.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
REP. MARCOS:
The Fair Election.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, Fair Election Act.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair
election practices?
REP. PICHAY:
Fair election practices?
REP. MACARAMBON:
Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala nang practices nga.
REP. PICHAY:
Wala nang practices.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.
(Informal discussions)
REP. PICHAY:
Approve na iyan.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act."
The rest wala nang problema ano?
VOICES:
Wala na.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Wala na iyong practices?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.
O, wala na? We will clean up.
REP. MARCOS:
Title?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
The short title, "This Act ..."
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Youre back to your No. 21 already.
REP. MARCOS:
The full title, the same?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..." Thats the House version, eh,
dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title "This Act shall be known as the Fair Election
Act."
38

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment
or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department
found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into
law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of
Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are
not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the
political branches of the government.
39
It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or
propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the
desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should
be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the
serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance.
40
Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court
in Dimaporo v. Mitra
41
upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in
the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it
imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and
the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly
deserving members of Congress is achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should
be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of
its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the
notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.
42
In this case, it cannot be claimed
that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the
House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their
reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators
were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution
43

The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive
ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the
other.
44
The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this
manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
45

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions.
46
On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in
a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure
47
while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.
48

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil
service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in
any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political
and electoral activities.
49

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect
on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other
than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or
look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-
vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the
persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the
petitioners insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities
attended the passage of the said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued
thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by
the House during its session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill
submitted by the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on
the floor without copies thereof being furnished the members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by
it was not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-
members at the time it was presented to and rammed for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its
alleged Report was instantly made and passed around for the signature of the BCC
members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one
that convened on November 23, 2000;
g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were
couched in terms that comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and
jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in 16, R.A. No. 9006,
with the provision that "This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;"
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was
furnished the members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have
the same 16 as it now appears in RA No. 9006, but 16 of the compromise bill,
HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for which no objection thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not
"contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendments to the subject measure;" and
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is Section 12 of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the
purported proposed amendment to the compromise bill of Member Paras as
stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision states, thusly:
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. Any elected official who runs for president and vice-
president shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
50

The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is
not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the
House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases
51
reveals
the Courts consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the
salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved
the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference
Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these
internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.
52
Whatever doubts there
may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court
reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia,
53
viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was
held: "At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure."
The Effectivity Clause
Is Defective
Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it "shall
take effect immediately upon its approval," is defective. However, the same does not render
the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera,
54
this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.
55

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code
56
and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No.
9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in
constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy
or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the
government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole
function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the
limits of legislative power.
57
No such transgression has been shown in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144573. September 24, 2002
ROSARIO N. LOPEZ, in her capacity as Chairman of the PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES
OFFICE (PCSO), RICARDO G. GOLPEO, in his capacity as PCSO General Manager, MARIA PAZ
A. MAGSALIN, in her capacity as PCSO Assistant General Manager for Administration, Atty.
Villamin Lam and the PCSO Board of Directors, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ROMEO A. LIGGAYU, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Are decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
suspension without pay immediately executory pending appeal?
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the May 18,
2000 resolution
1
of the Court of Appeals
2
in CA-G.R. SP No. 57588, which granted
respondents prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining
the implementation of respondents suspension pending appeal.
The antecedent facts are as follows: Private respondent Atty. Romeo A. Liggayu, Manager of
the Legal Department and Resident Ombudsman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO), was administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman with: 1) Violation
of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), for issuing a subpoena without authority
purportedly in relation to OMB-0-99-0571 entitled,FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE
BUREAU versus MANUEL MORATO, et al.; and 2) complicity in the anomalous contracts
entered into by PCSO and Golden Lion Films for the production of 1,092 episodes of Ang
Pangarap Kong Jackpot, subject matter of OMB-0-99-0571 and 0572 entitled, FFIB vs.
MANUEL MORATO, et al. and OMB-ADM-0-99-0254 entitled, FFIB vs. ISRAEL G. ESTRELLA, et
al.
3
crlwvirtualibrry
On January 6, 2000, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the charge against private
respondent in connection with the said anomalous contracts of the PCSO but found him
guilty of Conduct Prejudicial To The Best Interest Of The Service for issuing a subpoena in
relation to OMB-0-99-0571 entitled, FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU versus
MANUEL MORATO, et al., in excess of his authority as Resident Ombudsman of PCSO. Thus,
the Office of the Ombudsman imposed upon him the penalty of one (1) year suspension
without pay.
4
Later, the penalty was modified to six (6) months and one (1) day suspension
without pay.
5
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Private respondents motion for reconsideration was denied.
6
On March 6, 2000, a petition
for review was filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals via Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court and prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/and or writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, on March 8, 2000, petitioners implemented the suspension of private
respondent in compliance with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman.
On March 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
Office of the Ombudsman from implementing the suspension order against private
respondent.
7
crlwvirtualibrry
On March 20, 2000, private respondent filed an amended petition impleading the herein
petitioners.
8
On motion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals dropped
the names of the impleaded members of the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Section
6, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
9
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On May 18, 2000, a resolution was issued granting private respondents prayer for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the execution of private
respondents suspension. In the same resolution, petitioners were asked to explain why they
should not be cited in contempt of court for failing to comply with the Temporary Restraining
Order dated March 16, 2000. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction is hereby granted. Let a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be
issued enjoining respondents from implementing immediately the assailed decision of the
Ombudsman to suspend petitioner for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay pending
final determination of the petition for review by petitioner before this Court.
It appearing that respondents failed to implement the resolution of the Court dated March
16, 2000 ordering the issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining respondents from
enforcing the assailed decision dated January 6, 2000 and order dated February 4, 2000 of
the Office of the Ombudsman, they are hereby ordered to explain within ten (10) days from
notice why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
10
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On May 31, 2000, petitioners, by way of Explanation,
11
manifested to the Court of Appeals
that they could not have complied with or implemented the TRO dated March 16, 2000 since
they were not yet parties to the case at the time of its issuance. Even assuming that the
order was applicable to them, the same was rendered moot and academic by petitioners
suspension on March 8, 2000.
On June 27, 2000, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
12
On the same date,
the Court of Appeals ordered petitioners, under pain of contempt, to reinstate private
respondent to his former position pending resolution of his appeal.
13
Hence, on July 7, 2000,
private respondent was reinstated as Manager of the Legal Department and Resident
Ombudsman of PCSO.
14
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In the present recourse, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in enjoining the execution of petitioners suspension pending appeal.
The petition is without merit.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
15
provides:
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertained only on the following grounds:
x x x
Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
x x x .
Rule III, Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
16
states:
Sec. 7. Finality of Decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be
final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration
of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration
or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.
Construing the above-quoted provisions, the Court held in Lapid v. Court of Appeals
17
that
only orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence,
immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other
than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these
cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the
period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said
order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of
right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions
should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the
essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. As
explained by the Court
x x x Section 27 states that all provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory; and that any order, directive or decision of the said
Office imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one
[month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary], is final and unappealable. As such the
legal maxim [expressio] unius est exclusio [alterius] finds application. The express mention of
the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these
statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which
impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable
and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case,
will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. This finds support in the Rules of
Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that (I)n all other cases, the decision
shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the
respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari (should now be
petition for review under Rule 43) shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of
R.A. 6770.
18
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Petitioners claim that the applicable provision is Rule 43, Section 12 of the 1997 Rule of Civil
Procedure, which provides that [t]he appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order
or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon
such terms as it may deem just, lacks merit. While it is true that inFabian v. Desierto,
19
the
Court declared unconstitutional Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, and all other provisions
of law implementing the same, the declaration should be interpreted to mean that the said
provisions are void only insofar as they provide that administrative appeals from the Office of
the Ombudsman shall be taken to the Supreme Court. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the proper forum for administrative appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman
is the Court of Appeals. The provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman with respect to the finality and execution of
decisions are not affected by the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, and therefore still stand. It is a
fundamental principle in statutory construction that a statute may be constitutional in one
part and unconstitutional in another and that if the invalid part is severable from the rest,
the portion which is unconstitutional may stand while that which is constitutional is stricken
out and rejected. Whenever a statute contains unobjectionable provisions separable from
those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of the court to so declare and to maintain
the act insofar as it is valid. The separability clause found in Section 40 of Republic Act No.
6770 creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than
complete nullity of the statute.
20
crlwvirtualibrry
Likewise, the Court finds unavailing the claim of petitioners that the stay of execution
pending appeal from the order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman violates
the equal protection clause for being unfair to government employees charged under the
Civil Service Law, where the decisions in disciplinary cases are immediately executory. The
legislature has seen fit to grant a stay of execution pending appeal from disciplinary cases
where the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman is not public censure,
reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one
month salary. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute
and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission at
the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
notwithstanding that later wisdom may recommend the inclusion.
21
crlwvirtualibrry
All told, the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the execution of private respondents suspension
pending appeal. The penalty imposed on private respondent for Conduct Prejudicial To The
Best Interest of The Service was six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay.
Considering that private respondent appealed from the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the stay of execution of the penalty of suspension should therefore issue as a
matter of right.
Finally, the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in directing petitioners to explain
within ten (10) days from notice why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court
for failing to implement the resolution dated March 16, 2000 restraining the execution
pending appeal of the January 6, 2000 decision and February 4, 2000 order of the Office of
the Ombudsman. It is within the inherent powers of the Court of Appeals to ensure
compliance with its lawful orders.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED, and the May 18,
2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 57588 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
G.R. No.148420 December 15, 2005
ANDREA TAN, CLARITA LLAMAS, VICTOR ESPINA and LUISA ESPINA, Petitioners,
vs.
BAUSCH & LOMB, INC., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review
1
are the decision
2
and resolution
3
of the Court of Appeals
which set aside the December 22, 1998 order
4
of Judge Genis Balbuena of Branch 21,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City and ordered the transfer of Criminal Case No. CBU-
45890 to Branch 9, RTC, Cebu City.
The antecedents follow.
On April 8, 1997, an information
5
for violation of paragraph 1, Article 189
6
of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) was filed before Branch 21, RTC, Cebu City against petitioners Andrea Tan,
Clarita Llamas, Victor Espina and Luisa Espina of Best Buy Mart, Inc. The information read:
That on or about June 27, 1996 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, abovementioned
accused, conspiring and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously distribute and sell counterfeit RAY BAN sunglasses bearing the appearance
and trademark of RAY BAN in the aforesaid store wherein they have direct control,
supervision and management thereby inducing the public to believe that these goods offered
by them are those of RAY BAN to the damage and prejudice of BAUSCH AND LOMB, INC., the
exclusive owner and user of trademark RAY BAN on sunglasses.
7

On January 21, 1998, respondent filed a motion to transfer the case to Branch 9, RTC, Cebu
City. Administrative Order No. 113-95
8
(A.O. No. 113-95) designated the said branch as the
special court in Region VII to handle violations of intellectual property rights.
On March 2, 1998, petitioners filed a motion to quash
9
the information on the ground that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the offense charged against them. The penalty
10
provided by
the RPC for the crime was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC).
On March 6, 1998, respondent filed an opposition to the motion to quash,
11
explaining that
BP 129 had already transferred the exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide violations of
intellectual property rights from the MTC and MTCC to the RTC and that the Supreme Court
had also issued Administrative Order No. 104-96 (A.O. No. 104-96)
12
deleting and
withdrawing the designation of several branches of the MTC and MTCC as special intellectual
property courts.
On December 22, 1998, the court a quo denied respondents motion to transfer the case and
granted petitioners motion to quash. It ruled:
Accused [wa]s charged for violation of Art. 189 of Revised Penal Code the penalty for which
is prision correccionalin its minimum period or a fine ranging from P500.00 to P2,000.00, or
both. Hence, within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts (Sec. 32(2),
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended).
Administrative Orders Nos. 113-95 and 104-96, cited by plaintiff, cannot prevail over the
express provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, jurisdiction of courts being a
matter of substantive law.
If this Court has no jurisdiction over the case, the same is true with Branch 9 of the same
court, Therefore, the motion to transfer the case to the latter should fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to transfer is denied, while the motion to
quash is granted. The case is thus dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
13

Respondent received the order on January 21, 1999 but filed neither an appeal nor a motion
for reconsideration. Rather, it filed a petition for certiorari
14
in the Court of Appeals on March
23, 1999 or one (1) day beyond the period allowed in Section 4, Rule 65
15
of the Rules of
Court.
Respondents procedural lapses notwithstanding, the appellate court gave due course to the
petition and set aside the trial court order:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The assailed Order of
December 22, 1998 isVACATED and another is entered ordering the transfer of Crim. Case
No. CBU-45890 to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, and directing the public
respondent to accordingly transmit the records thereof.
SO ORDERED.
16

Hence, the present petition for review, centered on the following issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION OF
RESPONDENT THAT IS FRAUGHT WITH FATAL INFIRMITIES.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE CORRECT RULING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION UNDER ARTICLE 189 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
17

There is no merit in the petition.
As to the first assigned error, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in giving
due course to the petition for certiorari because respondent failed to appeal or file a motion
for reconsideration of the trial courts order granting the motion to quash. Worse,
respondent filed the petition in the appellate court one day after the reglementary period
expired.
Needless to state, the acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due
course thereto is, in
general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
18

Besides, the provisions of the Rules of Court, which are technical rules, may be relaxed in
certain exceptional situations.
19
Where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be
a substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, it is within our
power to suspend the rules or exempt a particular case from its operation.
20

Under certain special circumstances,
21
a petition for certiorari may be given due course
notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration was filed in the lower court. The
exception applies in this case since the order of the trial court was, as will be discussed later,
a patent nullity.
Likewise, the one-day delay in the filing of the petition may be excused on the basis of equity
to afford respondent the chance to prove the merits of the complaint.
In Yao v. Court of Appeals,
22
we held:
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in
terms of compliance may be relaxed. In other words, if strict adherence to the letter of the
law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice or where the merit of a partys cause is
apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements,
procedural rules should definitely be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to
lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.
Hence, the only relevant issue left for our resolution is whether or not the jurisdiction over
the crime allegedly committed by petitioners is vested on the RTC.
Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. The limitations to this rule-making
power are the following: the rules must (a) provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases; (b) be uniform for all courts of the same grade and (c) not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
23
As long as these limits are met, the
argument used by petitioners that the Supreme Court, through A.O. Nos. 113-95 and 104-96,
transgressed on Congress sole power to legislate, cannot be sustained.
A.O. No. 113-95 designated special intellectual property courts to promote the efficient
administration of justice and to ensure the speedy disposition of intellectual property cases.
A.O. No. 104-96,
24
on the other hand, was issued pursuant to Section 23 of BP 129
25
which
transferred the jurisdiction over such crimes from the MTC and MTCC to the RTC and which
furthermore gave the Supreme Court the authority to designate certain branches of the RTC
to exclusively handle special cases in the interest of the speedy and efficient administration
of justice. Accordingly, the RTC was vested with the exclusive and original jurisdiction to try
and decide intellectual property cases.
The transfer of jurisdiction from the MTC and MTCC to the RTC did not in any way affect the
substantive rights of petitioners. The administrative orders did not change the definition or
scope of the crime of unfair competition with which petitioners were charged.
Both administrative orders therefore have the force and effect of law, having been validly
issued by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its constitutional rule-making power. The trial
court, being a subordinate court, should have followed the mandate of the later A.O. 104-96
which vested jurisdiction over the instant case on the RTC. Thus, the appellate court correctly
found that the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, the order of the trial court was a patent nullity. In resolving the pending
incidents of the motion to transfer and motion to quash, the trial court should not have
allowed petitioners to collaterally attack the validity of A.O. Nos. 113-95 and 104-96. We
have ruled time and again that the constitutionality or validity of laws, orders, or such other
rules with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally. There is a legal presumption of
validity of these laws and rules. Unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the
legal presumption of its validity stands.
26
The trial courts order was consequently null and
void.
The transfer of this case to Branch 9, RTC, Cebu City, however, is no longer possible. A.M. No.
03-03-03-SC
27
consolidated the intellectual property courts and commercial SEC courts in one
RTC branch in a particular locality to streamline the court structure and to promote
expediency. The RTC branch so designated will try and decide cases involving violations of
intellectual property rights, and cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It is now called a special commercial court. In Region VII, the designated special
commercial court is Branch 11, RTC, Cebu City. The transfer of this case to that court is
therefore warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals decision dated October 20, 2000 is
hereby AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that Criminal Case No. CBU-45890 shall be
transferred to Branch 11, RTC, Cebu City. Let the records of the case be transmitted thereto
and the case tried and decided with dispatch.
.R. No. 125498 July 2, 1999
CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A. FACUNDO and REYNALDO G.
MEJICA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:
In our Decision dated 18 February 1999, we upheld the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over petitioners thus:
Petitioner mayor's position having been classified as Grade 27 in
accordance with R.A. No. 6758, and having been charged with violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner is subject to the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. By virtue of the same Section 4
a., as amended, his co-accused are also subject to the Anti-Graft Court's
jurisdiction.
We noted that while Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, did not expressly include the
position of Municipal Mayor as among those within the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and
original jurisdiction, such position is embraced in the catch-all provision, Section 4 a. (5).
The Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
1
however, does not specify the
Grade accorded the position of Municipal Mayor. Instead, Section 9 of said law provides:
Sec. 9. Salary Grade Assignments for Other Positions. For positions
below the Officials mentioned under Section 8 hereof and their
equivalent, whether in the National Government, local government units,
government-owned or controlled corporations or financial institutions,
the Department of Budget and Management is hereby directed to
prepare the Index of Occupational Services to be guided by the
Benchmark Position Schedule prescribed hereunder and the following
factors: (1) the education and experience required to perform the duties
and responsibilities of the position; (2) the nature and complexity of the
work to be performed; (3) the kind of supervision received; (4) mental
and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work; (5) nature
and extent of internal and external relationships; (6) kind of supervision
exercised; (7) decision-making responsibility; (8) responsibility for
accuracy of records and reports; (9) accountability for funds, properties
and equipment; and (10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in
the job.
Benchmark Position Schedule
Position Title Salary Grade
Laborer I 1
Messenger 2
Clerk I 3
Driver I 3
Stenographer I 4
Mechanic I 4
Carpenter II 5
Electrician II 6
Secretary I 7
Bookkeeper 8
Administrative Assistant 8
Education Research Assistant I 9
Cashier I 10
Nurse I 10
Teacher I 10
Agrarian Reform Program Technologist 10
Budget Officer I 11
Chemist I 11
Agriculturist I 11
Social Welfare Officer I 11
Engineer I 12
Veterinarian I 13
Legal Officer I 14
Administrative Officer II 15
Dentist II 16
Postmaster IV 17
Forester III 18
Associate Professor I 19
Rural Health Physician 20
In no case shall the salary of the chairman, president, general manager or
administrator, and the board of directors of government-owned or
controlled corporations, and financial institutions exceed Salary Grade
30: Provided, That the President may, in truly exceptional cases, approve
higher compensation for the aforesaid officials.
In accordance with the above Section and that of Section 6
2
of the same law, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) prepared the Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades where the position of Municipal Mayor was assigned Salary
Grade 27.
Petitioners now move for a reconsideration of our decision, contending that the authority of
the DBM was limited to the "preparation" of the Index of Occupational Services, Position
Titles and Salary Grades. A new law adopting said Index, petitioners argue, is required for
such Index to have the force of law. It is also alleged that the authority conferred upon the
DBM constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers resulting in the executive branch,
through the DBM, determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners overlook Section 444 (d) of the Local Government Code,
3
which provides:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation
corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A.
No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above provision is confirmatory of the Salary Grade assigned by the DBM to Municipal
Mayors, and should thus lay the matter of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over petitioner
Mayor to rest.
In any event, we find unmeritorious petitioners' contention that a new law adopting the
Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades is necessary for it to have
legal effect. To accord merit to petitioners' argument would render superfluous the above-
quoted Section 9. If Congress intended the Index to be, in petitioners' words, "a mere
preparatory step," it could have simply required the DBM to submit a proposed Index before
enacting R.A. No. 6758, and incorporated therein such a proposal.
The implications of petitioner's theory would likewise result in absurdity for it would mean
that every time the DBM assigns a position to its proper grade, Congress would have to enact
a law adopting such allocation. Such a construction would be contrary to Section 17 (a) of
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Section 14, R.A. No. 6758, which authorizes the
DBM to administer and revise the Compensation and Position Classification System as
necessary.
The reason Congress delegated the administration of the System to the DBM is precisely to
relieve itself of this cumbersome task, leaving to the DBM the preparation of the Index of
powers by the legislature to administrative agencies. With their specialized knowledge,
administrative agencies are more up to tasks involving their expertise.
. . . To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings,
the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from it delegates, who are supposed to be experts
in the particulars fields assigned to them. With this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statue by "filling
in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide.
4

Through delegation, Congress may devote more time to address other pressing matters.
Moreover, Congress may be slow to act on matters requiring continuous decision. Thus,
Professor Jaffe's observations, quoted by then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in Trade
Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS-WFTU) vs.Ople,
5
is even more
appropriate today:
. . . Power should be delegated where there is agreement that a task
must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the
legislature without the assistance of a delegate or without an
expenditure of time so great as to lead to the neglect of equally
important business. Delegation is most commonly indicated where the
relations to be regulated are highly technical or where their regulation
requires a course of continuous decision.
With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts.
6

It must be clarified that what Congress delegated to the DBM is the administration of the
Compensation and Position Classification System, and, with it the, assignment of Salary
Grades not the determination of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. When the DBM
assigns a position a certain Salary Grade, it does so pursuant to its authority under R.A. No.
6758. That by such allocation the official comes under the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan is only incidental to the exercise of such authority.
R.A. No. 6758 is not an undue delegation of legislative powers. The rule is that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated, or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestats delegata non
delegari potest.
7
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and
not through the intervening mind of another.
8
Congress however may delegate to another
branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law for the reasons stated above. Nevertheless, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself
it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
9

R.A. No. 6758 is complete in itself. It sets forth the policy to be carried out or implemented
by the delegate, the DBM in this case, in Section 2 thereof:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State
to provide equal pay for substantially equal and to base differences in
pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions. . . .
R.A. No. 6758 fixes a standard and the limits of such standards are sufficiently determinate or
determinable. Particularly with regard to the assignment of Salary Grades for positions below
those in Section 8, Section 9 provides the standards which should guide the DBM in
preparing the Index of Occupational Services. These are (a) the Benchmark Position Schedule
prescribed in Section 9 and (b) the ten (l0) factors enumerated therein.
Finally, petitioners claim that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since the witnesses in their case would come from
Baguio City and San Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to petitioners, would defeat one of
the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the convenience of the accused.
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to implement its
intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions with
Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this Court is
duly-bound to obey the congressional will.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration.
This denial is FINAL.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.1wphi1.nt
G.R. No. 141489 November 29, 2002
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE, LEONARDO
Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA M.
SARENAS, petitioners,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JUSTICES JOSE A.R. MELO, VICENTE V.
MENDOZA and JOSE C. VITUG, and REPRESENTATIVES ASANI S. TAMMANG, RAUL M.
GONZALES, DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, DANTON Q. BUESER,
1
NAPOLEON R. BERATIO,
SIMEON E. GARCIA and SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 141490 November 29, 2002
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE, LEONARDO
Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA M.
SARENAS, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, its Chair, SENATE PRESIDENT BLAS F. OPLE, and
Members, namely: SENATORS FRANKLIN M. DRILON, RENATO L. CAYETANO, LOREN
LEGARDA-LEVISTE, ROBERT Z. BARBERS, ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG, GREGORIO
HONASAN, RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR., TERESA AQUINO-ORETA, RAUL S. ROCO,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, VICENTE C. SOTTO III and REPRESENTATIVES LUIS A. ASISTIO, EMILIO
R. ESPINOSA, JR., WIGBERTO E. TAADA, MANUEL M. GARCIA, SIMEON A. DATUMANONG,
ANTONIO M. DIAZ, FAUSTINO S. DY, JR., PACIFICO M. FAJARDO, ERNESTO F. HERRERA, NUR
G. JAAFAR, CARLOS M. PADILLA, ROGELIO M. SARMIENTO and SPEAKER MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court are two original petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the composition of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET" for brevity)
2
and the Commission on
Appointments ("CA" for brevity).
3
Petitioners pray that respondents be ordered to "alter,
reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the composition of the HRET and the CA to include
party-list representatives in accordance with Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the CA be enjoined from exercising their functions
until they have been reorganized.
Antecedent Facts
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a party-list system in the House of
Representatives ("House" for brevity), as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law
except the religious sector."
On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. The Act sought to "promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives, to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives."
4

On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held
which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and
organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners
were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including petitioners from party-list
groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
5
(APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga
Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-
NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to
the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12
other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district
representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent
6
by electing its
representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET
and the CA.
7
From available records, it does not appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections
the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the
CA. As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and
the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political
parties.
On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then
Senate President Blas F. Ople,
8
as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired),
9
as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested
Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET,
respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.
In its meeting of January 20, 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal
to refer Senator Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives.
10
On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an
Indorsement
11
of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary
General Roberto P. Nazareno.
On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against
the HRET, its Chairman and Members,
12
and against the CA, its Chairman and
Members.
13
Petitioners contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act,
party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET,
14
and 2.4 seats in the
CA.
15
Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of February 8, 2000,
16
the
Court en banc directed the consolidation of G.R. No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.
On February 11, 2000, petitioners filed in both cases a motion
17
to amend their petitions to
implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as
Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions
and admitted the amended petitions.
Senator Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and
uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was
joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO
as co-petitioners.
Petitioners cite as basis Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
"Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members,"
18
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners also invoke the following provision of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list. xxx"
19

According to the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment,
20
at the time petitioners filed
the instant petitions the House had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-list
representatives, constituting 6.3636% of the House. Of the remaining 206 district
representatives affiliated with different political parties, 151 belonged to LAMP (68.6354%),
36 belonged to LAKAS (16.3636%), 13 to the Liberal Party (5.9090%), 1 member (0.4545%)
each to KBL, PDRLM, Aksyon Demokratiko, Reporma and PROMDI, and 1 representative was
an independent.
In their Reply to Consolidated Comment,
21
petitioners alleged that, following the Solicitor
Generals computation, the LP and LAKAS were over-represented in the HRET and the CA.
Petitioners particularly assail the presence of one LP representative each in the HRET and the
CA, and maintain that the LP representatives should be ousted and replaced with nominees
of the 14 party-list representatives.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE
HRET.
2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.
3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND THE CA TO RECONSTITUTE
THEMSELVES TO INCLUDE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the instant petitions are procedurally
defective and substantially lacking in merit for having been filed prematurely, thus:
"It is a generally accepted principle that the averments in the pleading determine the
existence of a cause of action. In the instant petitions, petitioners failed to aver that they or
any one of them was elected by a party or organization registered under the party-list system
as a Member of the HRET or CA to represent said party or organization under the party-list
system of the House of Representatives."
22

The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the issues raised in the petitions under review, citing the
following pronouncement in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales :
23

"Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of the alleged facts,
procedural questions acquire a relatively minor significance, and the transcendental
importance to the public of the case demands that they be settled promptly and definitely
brushing aside xxx technicalities of procedure."
Petitioners reliance on Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales is misplaced. The "procedural questions"
that petitioners want the Court to brush aside are not mere technicalities but substantive
matters that are specifically provided for in the constitutional provisions cited by petitioners.
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the
CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution
24
explicitly confers on the Senate and on the
House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution,
25
each chamber of Congress exercises the power to
choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal.
These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
"Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the House of Representatives who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the Supreme
Court and the election of the Members of the House of Representatives who are to
compose the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17
and 19 of Article VI of the Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet for its organization
and adoption of such resolutions as it may deem proper." (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provides:
"Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments. Within thirty (30)
days after both Houses of Congress shall have organized themselves with the
election of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted. It shall be composed of
twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented herein.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have
agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse
clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17
and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House
that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the
CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional
representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives
seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant
case to the court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is premature.
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute,
being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional
representation.
26
However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not
interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a
clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
27
Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.
28
Neither can the Court
speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated
for membership in the HRET and the CA.
The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list
groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA.
Neither does it appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list
representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the
available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from
participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their
nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions, with the predictable result that
the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA.
As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of
Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a constitutional question will not be heard and
resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there
must be an actual controversy; (2) the person or party raising the constitutional issue must
have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the
controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4) the resolution of
the constitutional issue must be indispensable to the final determination of the
controversy.
29

The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not alleged
that they are entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA.
Neither have they claimed that they have been nominated by the party-list groups in the
House to the HRET or the CA. As such, they do not possess the personal and substantial
interest required to confer them with locus standi. The party raising the constitutional issue
must have "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
30

We likewise find no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves.
Finally, the issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by subsequent
events. On May 14, 2001, a new set of district and party-list representatives were elected to
the House. The Court cannot now resolve the issue of proportional representation in the
HRET and the CA based on the "present composition" of the House of Representatives as
presented by petitioners and the Solicitor General. With the May 14, 2001 elections, it is
certain that the composition of the House has changed. In the absence of a proper petition
assailing the present composition of the HRET and the CA, the instant petitions must fail.
Otherwise, for the Court to rule on the instant petitions at this time would be tantamount to
rendering an advisory opinion, which is outside our jurisdiction.
31

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition and mandamus are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C.
MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the
respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for
the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are
as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and
the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of
the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed
the following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS
CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no
se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion
de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y
confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said
respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first
district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution,
paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya
presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the
Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in
the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period
during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b)
that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the
limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional
provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of
the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a
"Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission
promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion
to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ
prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral
Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National
Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the
Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the
Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of
controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their
internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if
the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such
proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should
be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the
Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of
the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be
sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it
involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the
respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to
decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9,
1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the
election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction
and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution
to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and functions
conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election
protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said
protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government,
and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme
Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming
the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest
had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of
its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that
might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions,
created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department,
and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the
purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which
prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on
March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which
protests against the election of members of the National Assembly should be filed;
that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was
exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its
quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral
Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of
the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest
filed by said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the
Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not
reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not
operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the
Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the
Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and
unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of
the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and
2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section
1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd
Congress of the united States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the
petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent
Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the
case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal
propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the
affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy.
However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in
evading the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our
sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither
would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass
upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains
not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of
the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This,
however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the
refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case
may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly
in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates
as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a
majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its
power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to
define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly
controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial
power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the
other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility,
but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill
of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere
political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution
are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of
the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article
VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is
in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument
by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in
this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect
the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our
Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison,
the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are
authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark,
their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last
and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to
come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and
court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935,
confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the
Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National
Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National
Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended
by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its
proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9,
1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should
be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in
our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution
and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion
to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to
determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when
and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the
reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by
the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other
European types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the
American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial
department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the
power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise
would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what
is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides
that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The
former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in
Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3,
Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920)
and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case,
the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were
we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if
the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our
constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire
framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we
avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are
clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy
for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the
second proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to
take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3,
1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the
interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and
three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in
the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this
constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who
adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par.
5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the
Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as
follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in
order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified.
This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding
contested elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by
the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-
committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal
of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of
executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to
initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For the
purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices
designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which
the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by
the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a
member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with
slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four
members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the
Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the
House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in
the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted
to the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on
the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all
cases contesting the election of any of their members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by
the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein, three elected
by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to
its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as
proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by
the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon
abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a
similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated
as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the
Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission
and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead
of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26,
1934, reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be
judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the
party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by
the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three
justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to
be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and
others, proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in
lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks
were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope
of the said draft:
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning
of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the
election and qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall
also be judged by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is
nothing to be judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a
controversy. If there is no question about the election of a member, there is
nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be
determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall
confirm also the election of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action
of the House of Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a
matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After
a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his
election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that
for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative
body, because he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is
elected? What happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does
anybody confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass
and proclaims in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected,
and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on
the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause
refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries
to be elected in place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a
case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case
the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do
so by certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to
the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers
exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of
the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the
gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more
questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft
cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of the sections
which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested
elections are already included in the phrase "the elections, returns and
qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted merely for the
sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own
instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power
is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right
to contest the election and qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained
as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the
qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right
to question the eligibility of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the
Electoral Commission and make the question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election
is contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission
has power and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly even though that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the
Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco,
Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the
original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship
Committee said:
x x x x x x x x x
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la
objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula
del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar
tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa
dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos
el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de
modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en
que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate
Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros
tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale
practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido
en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como
los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus
meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que
tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
x x x x x x x x x
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the
power to decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight
(98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by
reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral
Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority
party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six
(46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the National Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the
National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second
largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the
largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number
of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style
Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention,
agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the
words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial
and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57,
58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political
parties in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages
which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive
judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year
1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted
elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committees appointed at
the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges
and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this
description which might be referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with
their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election
petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses
and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their
opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed
or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at
the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was heard and
decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The
committee of privileges and elections although a select committee. The committee
of privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is called
an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the
members named was required to be present, but all the members of the house
were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the
right of membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years
previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined
by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert
Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office in
consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell
remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every
principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from
whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully,
induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in
questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a
distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy
for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the
house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of
members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion
for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following terms:
"Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal
dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously
notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite
sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of
justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well
known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who are
ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist
themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial
management of the very business, upon which they should determine with the
strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville
brought in a bill which met with the approbation of both houses, and received the
royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by
the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the
nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the
constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable,
that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have
led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement,
which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has
not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by
Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis,
Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on
the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of
the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important
rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-
partisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its
prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a
rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the
practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868
[31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879
[42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c.
51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII,
p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally
heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts.
Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally
determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic
law provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet
are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37,
par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the
Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections
to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding
legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the
Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution
of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the
legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential
elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of
the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a
contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol.
19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five
members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and
five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in
the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses
voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the
experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was
a member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court
of the United States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913]
Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least
abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in
their majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar
with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore,
they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested
it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in
the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened
peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy
certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the
vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as
hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be
said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral
Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It
was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional
precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of
partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the
Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in
view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further
endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme
Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority
in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It
is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the
provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative
Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that
it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from
and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that
power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1;
State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf
of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral
Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which
protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The
Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested
cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only
would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority
from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the
resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be
presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of
cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority
effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse
than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate
on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the
ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and,
by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this
result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner
regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the
national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity
to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the
commission in the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as
we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral
Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable
time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National
Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as
there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has
been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the
ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended
to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the
Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive
determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court
in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were
designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ
working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be
animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they
were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies
might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human
institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts,
however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which
the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are
considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of
the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on
November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned
in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of
the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally
organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for
the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of
election protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December
3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the
archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the
petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the
National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only
on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-
protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling
the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly
on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases had
already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to
organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted
to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of
members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3,
1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election
contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of
confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to
decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority
incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the
time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the
returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed
by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required
by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact,
certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-
elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body
(No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of
the United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to
take his seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect
presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he
takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C.
A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections
where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision
or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and
the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to
enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the
return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the
determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United
States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded
as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and
Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the
Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members
should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a
law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution
the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter
of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired,
each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members against
whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as
cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members not
theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record
First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature;
Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-
640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First
Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record
First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the
Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated
also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the
authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to
have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its
members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by
indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the
theory of separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and
duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the
agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the
only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the
source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with
specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into
effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission
was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied
power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of
filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan
influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the
manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of
the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole
judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also
section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the
time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time
and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if
any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is
not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the
privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member
against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and
cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the
time within which protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that
the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the
time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission
as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of
the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral
Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of
sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by
petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of
Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya,
who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming
elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a
member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the
laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a
resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of
the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art.
XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws,
which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective
officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law,
and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the
term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run
for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him,
and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory
provisions:
Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local
elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six
(6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.
Sec. 4. ...
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State,
including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other
similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the
offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political
activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned
crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court
or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie
evidence of such fact.
... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).
Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... The election shall be
held on January 30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)
Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The election period shall be
fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art.
XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on
December 29, 1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question
the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the
Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from
any form of harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not be taken
up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue
has been squarely raised,
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and
void for being violative of the Constitution.
I . The procedural Aspect
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities,
hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of
parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and
Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of
their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely
different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity
as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a
taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint
Petition, it would have required only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on
one hand said petitioners lgot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in
the interest of orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties
have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and
controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause
guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from
implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application
of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the
COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is
being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical
issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without
the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary
jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82
SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the
Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:
1) xxx
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective
provincial and city officials. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:
Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their
Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that
neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor
disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been
calle ed to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they
assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor
substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus
standi in seeking judicial redress.
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit,
and that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs.
The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by
one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement.
Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the
expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
In the same vein, it has been held:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the
requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general
rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised
by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine Constitution
Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and
sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds.
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted
and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative
power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]),
citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the
institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court
in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this
Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality
of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of
the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not
an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan.
They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue
of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be
dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts
not being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural
standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina(26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481
[1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and
Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have
impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections
which will be held only a few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him
personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other
candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with
the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's
contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those
of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates
should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General
has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more
than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be
a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like
one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from
which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood
assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he
would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from
the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal
protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]).
Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all
Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs.
Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board,
21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of
the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in
question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it
may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief
Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the
questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal
breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be
declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt
(Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on
Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentence of the legislature
to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided
they are reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be
divided in two parts. The first provides:
a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact ...
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle
that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts
will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs.
Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to
the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for
public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and
one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible
to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that
charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44,
Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore,
may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of
the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the
Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible
conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person
charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of
guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby
declared valid. Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of
Article XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in
existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the
elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective
provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall
have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of
such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby
declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and
NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN,
minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION
T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented
by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE
MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS
BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation
or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The
principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.
1
The complaint
2
was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit
3
and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed
for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn."
4
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."
5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush
and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the
basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance
of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise
known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water
table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which
may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive
erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and
other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent
spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of
typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands
and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j)
the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation
of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide
gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon
of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention
to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the
course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's
land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more
than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the
country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin
old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted
timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the
aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per
annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources
after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the
plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident
and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced
and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare
and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment
of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a
final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as
Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to
the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is
an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who
may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and
devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly
contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental
Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the
State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources
(sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind
the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other
than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.
6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action
against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.
7
In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states
no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the
latter in this case.
8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than
what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest
so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to
them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question
of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be
properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore
assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a
certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same
can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and
hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said
civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
9
Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations.
10
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court
cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking
to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes
that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a
cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may
not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the
sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e.,
to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental
law.
11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and
that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified
data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon
the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary
sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide
sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water
and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance.
12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources,
13
then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192,
14
Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall
be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section
3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of
the different segments of the population to the development and the use
of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation
but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development
and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987,
15
specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit
of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation
of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that
takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to
the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying
out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's
natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will
serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present
and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing
policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the
social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and
(c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity
and well-being."
16
As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee
and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations."
17
The latter statute, on the
other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights
of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right.
18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action,
19
the question submitted to the court for
resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter
should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the
point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved
in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint?
20
In Militante vs.
Edrosolano,
21
this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence
thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts
alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs
prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they
are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-
vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,
22
Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred
as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of
the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions
of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for
lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson,
23
Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that
the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not
be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment
of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e.,
to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental
law.
24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms
and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber
license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President
may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process
clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry,
25
this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare
as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary:
26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can
hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
27

cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health
and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp.
28
this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant
to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral,
safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral
and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York,
29
quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,
30
to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But
neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of
his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could
apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases
of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97787 August 1, 1996
The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., represented by REYNALDO L. BAGATSING, in
his capacity as Chief Prosecutor/Investigator, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. REYNALDO SAN JUAN, Provincial Governor, Hon. JOSE M. BARRETO, SR., Provincial
Vice-Governor, Hons. ERNESTO ESTRADA, ROMAN REYES, ISIDRO PACIS, LEONISA VERGEL
DE DIOS, REMEDIOS PARALEJAS, TIMOTEO PASCUAL, ALFREDO VILLANUEVA, AMOS REYES,
Members of the Provincial Board of Rizal, Hon. EUTROPIO MIGRIO, Presiding Judge, RTC-
Pasig, Branch CLI (151), Ortigas & Company Ltd., represented by ATTY. FRACISCO ORTIGAS,
JR., Asian Appraisal Co. Inc., Rizal Provincial Appraisal Assessor, Provincial Auditor and
District Engineer, JESS DOE, STEVE DOE and HECTOR DOE, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:p
It is fundamental in this jurisdiction that any party may only come to court if he has
legal standing and a valid cause of action. Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, a self-confessed "non-governmental, non-stock and non-profit
organization, which was constituted to protect the interest of the Republic and its
instrumentalities and political subdivisions and its constituents against abuses of its
public officials and employees," claims the instant petition for certiorari is a
taxpayer's suit which it filed because the Provincial Board of Rizal (the Board)
allegedly illegally disbursed public funds in transactions involving four parcels of
land in Ugong Norte, Pasig. The allegation is denied by respondents who challenge
the propriety of this action, as well as the capacity of petitioner to file the same.
Public respondents, officers of the Province of Rizal (the Province), even intimate
that the filing of this petition is politically-motivated.
On March 20, 1975, the President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 674, establishing the Technological Colleges of Rizal. Among other things, it
directed the Board to provide funds for the purchase of a site and the construction
of the necessary structures thereon. Acting upon an authority granted by the office
of the President, the Province was able to negotiate with respondent Ortigas & Co.,
Ltd. (Ortigas) for the acquisition of four parcels of land located in Ugong Norte,
Pasig. Three deeds of absolute sale were executed on April 22 and May 9, 1975,
whereby Ortigas transferred its ownership over a total of 192,177 square meters of
land to the Province at P110.00 per square meter. The projected construction,
however, never materialized because of the decimation of the Province's resources
brought about by the creation of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) in 1976.
Twelve years later, with the property lying idle and the Province needing funds to
propel its 5-years Comprehensive Development Program, the then incumbent
Board passed Resolution No. 87-205 dated October 15, 1987 authorizing the
Governor to sell the same. The said property was eventually sold to Valley View
Realty Development Corporation (Valley View) for P700.00 per square meter or a
total of P134,523,900.00, of which 30 million was given as downpayment. On May
10, 1988, after learning about the sale, Ortigas filed before Branch 151 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig an action for recission of contract plus damages with
preliminary injunction against the Province. Docketed as Civil Case No. 55904, the
complaint alleged that the Province violated one of the terms of its contracts with
Ortigas by selling the subject lots which were intended to be utilized solely as a site
for the construction of the Rizal Technological Colleges and the Rizal Provincial
Hospital.
Meanwhile, the new provincial officials, including herein public respondents,
assumed office. On April 21, 1988, the Board adopted Resolution No. 88-65 which
provided for the rescission of the deed of sale between the Province and Valley
View on the ground that the sale price was exceedingly low and, thus, prejudicial to
the Province. Because of this, Valley View then filed a complaint docketed as a Civil
Case No. 55913 against the Province for specific performance and damages. The
case was, however, dismissed after the parties executed on August 12, 1988 a
compromise agreement whereby the Province returned the 30-million peso
downpayment earlier given by Valley View.
Civil Case No. 55904 was also resolved through a compromise agreement executed
by and between the Province and Ortigas on March 20, 1989. Under the said
compromise agreement, which was approved by respondent Judge Eutropio
Migrio in his decision dated March 21, 1989, the Province agreed to reconvey the
four parcels of land to Ortigas at a price of P2,250.00 per square meter, or a total of
P432,398,250.00, payable within two years at an annual interest rate of fourteen
percent. This amount is higher than the market values separately determined by
respondents Asian Appraisal, Inc. and the Provincial Appraisal Committee, which
respectively pegged the price of the subject properties at P1,800.00 and P2,200.00
per square meter. Ortigas made its final payment on March 30, 1991.
On April 1, 1991, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with application
for preliminary injunction seeking the nullification of the March 20, 1989
compromise agreement, and, corollarily, the decision of respondent Judge
approving the same.
A reading of the petition immediately raises several questions: (1) Is the present
action a taxpayer's suit? Collarily, does petitioner possess the legal standing to
question the transaction entered into by the Provincial Board of Rizal with private
respondent Ortigas? (2) Is the Supreme Court the proper forum for the instant
petition? (3) Assuming arguendo that the prior questions may be answered in the
affirmative, is the present action barred by laches?
Petitioner and respondents agree that to constitute a taxpayer's suit, two
requisites must be met, namely, that public funds are disbursed by a political
subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity
is committed, and that the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires
act.
1
The same pronouncement was made in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,
Jr.,
2
where the Court also reiterated its liberal stance in entertaining so-called
taxpayer's suits, especially when important issues are involved. A closer
examination of the facts of this case would readily demonstrate that petitioner's
standing should not even be made an issue here, "since standing is a concept in
constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved."
3

In the case at bar, disbursement of public funds was only made in 1975 when the
Province bought the lands from Ortigas at P110.00 per square meter in line with
the objectives of P.D. 674. Petitioner never referred to such purchase as an illegal
disbursement of public funds but focused on the alleged fraudulent reconveyance
of said property to Ortigas because the price paid was lower than the prevailing
market value of neighboring lots. The first requirement, therefore, which would
make this petition a taxpayer's suit is absent. The only remaining justification for
petitioner to be allowed to pursue this action is whether it is, or would be, directly
affected by the act complained of. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,
4

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases
suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the
question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions." (Citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d
633 [1962])
Undeniably, as a taxpayer, petitioner would somehow be adversely affected by an
illegal use of public money. When, however, no such unlawful spending has been
shown, as in the case at bar, petitioner, even as a taxpayer, cannot question the
transaction validly executed by and between the Province and Ortigas for the
simple reason that it is not privy to said contract. In other words, petitioner has
absolutely no cause of action, and consequently no locus standi, in the instant case.
Petitioner committed further procedural error by filing its petition with this Court.
While it is ostensibly questioning the reconveyance of the subject lots to Ortigas,
that is, the acts of the Governor of Rizal and of the members of the Provincial
Board, it is in effect mainly assailing the March 21, 1989 judgment of respondent
Judge Migrio who approved the compromise agreement. The proper remedy
which it should have taken was to file a petition for review of the trial court's
decision before the Court of Appeals because petitioner is questioning the wisdom
of the trial court's action which, in turn, calls for a factual determination of the
feasibility of an amicable settlement between the litigants. No legal issue
cognizable by this Court was ever raised by petitioner. Even if there was, such an
action would have failed because of petitioner's lack of legal standing to file the
same.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner did have the personality and was justified in
lodging this case before the Court, did it do so seasonably? We think not. The
questioned decision was promulgated on March 21, 1989 and, no appeal having
been made therefrom, became final and executory on April 55, 1989. Petitioner
filed the present action only on April 1, 1991, two years later, contending that the
trial court's decision merely adopted the compromise agreement which
provided, inter alia, that the last installment was due only on March 30, 1991. This
specious line of reasoning is easily demolished. Why should petitioner wait until
the parties to the transaction have fulfilled their respective obligations, which is
two years from the date of the contract, when it could have questioned the same
much earlier, even at the contract's inception, and in the process, spared everyone
from unnecessary aggravation?
Accordingly, after concluding that, not only does petitioner lack the legal
personality to file this so-called taxpayer's suit, but that it filed the same beyond
the reglementary period, this Court no longer finds any reason to delve into the
merits, or the lack of it, of the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. Cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971
FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN, defendants,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant.
Dionisio E. Moya for plaintiff-appellee.
Ramon B. de los Reyes for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:
A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if any, to be attached to a
statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of this appeal from a lower court decision.
Plaintiff Francisco Serrano de Agbayani, now appellee, was able to obtain a favorable
judgment in her suit against defendant, now appellant Philippine National Bank, permanently
enjoining the other defendant, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan, from proceeding with an
extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to plaintiff mortgaged to appellant Bank to
secure a loan declared no longer enforceable, the prescriptive period having lapsed. There
was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant that if the moratorium under an
Executive Order and later an Act subsequently found unconstitutional were to be counted in
the computation, then the right to foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting. In arriving at
such a conclusion, the lower court manifested a tenacious adherence to the inflexible view
that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creating no rights and imposing no duties, and thus
as inoperative as if it had never been. It was oblivious to the force of the principle adopted by
this Court that while a statute's repugnancy to the fundamental law deprives it of its
character as a juridical norm, its having been operative prior to its being nullified is a fact that
is not devoid of legal consequences. As will hereafter be explained, such a failing of the lower
court resulted in an erroneous decision. We find for appellant Philippine National Bank, and
we reverse.
There is no dispute as to the facts. Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from
defendant Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate
mortgage duly registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the province of
Pangasinan. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of
P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant instituted extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the
recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against
both defendants on August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage sought to
be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity,
July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against
defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the decision now on appeal.
Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own
theory the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945,
when Executive Order No. 32
1
was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative
act
2
extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the
computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the
loan. As noted, the lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit
in favor of plaintiff.
Hence this appeal, which, as made clear at the outset, possesses merit, there being a failure
on the part of the lower court to adhere to the applicable constitutional doctrine as to the
effect to be given to a statute subsequently declared invalid.
1. The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for
that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that
infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act
taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its
being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When
the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void
and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution.
3
It is understandable
why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or
executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such
challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with.
This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed
their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had
to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed
to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely
because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what
had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official."
4
This language has been quoted with approval
in a resolution inAraneta v. Hill
5
and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores.
6
An
even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court
in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co.
7

2. Such an approach all the more commends itself whenever police power legislation
intended to promote public welfare but adversely affecting property rights is involved. While
subject to be assailed on due process, equal protection and non-impairment grounds, all that
is required to avoid the corrosion of invalidity is that the rational basis or reasonableness test
is satisfied. The legislature on the whole is not likely to allow an enactment suffering, to
paraphrase Cardozo, from the infirmity of out running the bounds of reason and resulting in
sheer oppression. It may be of course that if challenged, an adverse judgment could be the
result, as its running counter to the Constitution could still be shown. In the meanwhile
though, in the normal course of things, it has been acted upon by the public and accepted as
valid. To ignore such a fact would indeed be the fruitful parent of injustice. Moreover, as its
constitutionality is conditioned on its being fair or reasonable, which in turn is dependent on
the actual situation, never static but subject to change, a measure valid when enacted may
subsequently, due to altered circumstances, be stricken down.
That is precisely what happened in connection with Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium
legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea,
suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable
by war sufferers. So it was explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban
8
where such enactment was
considered in 1953 "unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute
longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect."
9
At
the time of the issuance of the above Executive Order in 1945 and of the passage of such Act
in 1948, there was a factual justification for the moratorium. The Philippines was confronted
with an emergency of impressive magnitude at the time of her liberation from the Japanese
military forces in 1945. Business was at a standstill. Her economy lay prostrate. Measures,
radical measures, were then devised to tide her over until some semblance of normalcy
could be restored and an improvement in her economy noted. No wonder then that the
suspension of enforcement of payment of the obligations then existing was declared first by
executive order and then by legislation. The Supreme Court was right therefore in rejecting
the contention that on its face, the Moratorium Law was unconstitutional, amounting as it
did to the impairment of the obligation of contracts. Considering the circumstances
confronting the legitimate government upon its return to the Philippines, some such
remedial device was needed and badly so. An unyielding insistence then on the rights to
property on the part of the creditors was not likely to meet with judicial sympathy. Time
passed however, and conditions did change.
When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question before it was its satisfying
the rational basis test, not as of the time of its enactment but as of such date. Clearly, if then
it were found unreasonable, the right to non-impairment of contractual obligations must
prevail over the assertion of community power to remedy an existing evil. The Supreme
Court was convinced that such indeed was the case. As stated in the opinion of Justice
Bautista Angelo: "But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been
pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at
present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342
and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar
debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language
means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before
they could affect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period
seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and
should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically
left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote,
more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law
the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike
similar statutes in the United States.
10
The conclusion to which the foregoing considerations
inevitably led was that as of the time of adjudication, it was apparent that Republic Act No.
342 could not survive the test of validity. Executive Order No. 32 should likewise be nullified.
That before the decision they were not constitutionally infirm was admitted expressly. There
is all the more reason then to yield assent to the now prevailing principle that the existence
of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which
legal consequences are attached.
3. Precisely though because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid
governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has
made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in their number and unanimity that during
the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force,
prescription did not run. So it has been held from Day v. Court of First
Instance,
11
decided in 1954, to Republic v. Hernaez,
12
handed down only last year. What is
deplorable is that as of the time of the lower court decision on January 27, 1960, at least
eight decisions had left no doubt as to the prescriptive period being tolled in the meanwhile
prior to such adjudication of invalidity.
13
Speaking of the opposite view entertained by the
lower court, the present Chief Justice, in Liboro v. Finance and Mining Investments
Corp.
14
has categorized it as having been "explicitly and consistently rejected by this
Court."
15

The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944,
when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were
started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The
prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive
Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated,
covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-
judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before
prescription could be availed of as a defense.
WHEREFORE, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of plaintiff filed August
10, 1959 dismissed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 124360 December 3, 1997
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
G.R. No. 127867 December 3, 1997
EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TAADA, FLAG
HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION (FDC),
SANLAKAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY,
in his capacity as the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation,
and PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, respondents.
EASTERN PETROLEUM CORP., SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORP., SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC.,
TWA, INC., and DUBPHIL GAS, Movants-in-Intervention.
R E S O L U T I O N

PUNO, J.:
For resolution are: (1) the motion for reconsideration filed by the public respondents; and (2)
the partial motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner Enrique T. Garcia and the
intervenors.
1

In their Motion for Reconsideration, the public respondents contend:
I
Executive Order No. 392 is not a misapplication of Republic Act No. 8180;
II
Sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of Republic Act No. 8180 do not contravene section 19,
Article XII of the Constitution; and
III
Sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of R.A. No. 8180 do not permeate the essence of the said
law; hence their nullity will not vitiate the other parts thereof.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, the intervenors argue:
2.1.1 The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 restores the disproportionate
advantage of the three big oil firms Caltex, Shell and Petron over the small oil
firms;
2.1.2 The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 "disarms" the new entrants
and seriously cripples their capacity to compete and grow; and
2.1.3 Ultimately the total nullification of Republic Act. No. 8180 removes
substantial, albeit imperfect, barriers to monopolistic practices and unfair
competition and trade practices harmful not only to movant-intervernors but also
to the public in general.
In his Partial Motion for Reconsideration,
2
petitioner Garcia prays that only the provisions of
R.A. No. 8180 on the 4% tariff differential, predatory pricing and minimum inventory be
declared unconstitutional. He cites the "pernicious effects" of a total declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180. He avers that "it is very problematic . . . if Congress can
fastrack an entirely new law."
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration and partial motion for reconsideration.
We shall first resolve public respondents' motion for reconsideration. They insist that there
was no misapplication of Republic Act No. 8180 when the Executive considered the depletion
of the OPSF in advancing the date of full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. They
urge that the consideration of this factor did not violate the rule that the exercise of
delegated power must be done strictly in accord with the standard provided in the law. They
contend that the rule prohibits the Executive from subtracting but not from adding to the
standard set by Congress. This hair splitting is a sterile attempt to make a distinction when
there is no difference. The choice and crafting of the standard to guide the exercise of
delegated power is part of the lawmaking process and lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Congress. The standard cannot be altered in any way by the Executive for the Executive
cannot modify the will of the Legislature. To be sure, public respondents do not cite any
authority to support its strange thesis for there is none in our jurisprudence.
The public respondents next recycle their arguments that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of R.A. No.
8180 do not contravene section 19, Article XII of the Constitution.
3
They reiterate that the
4% tariff differential would encourage the construction of new refineries which will benefit
the country for they Filipino labor and goods. We have rejected this submission for a reality
check will reveal that this 4% tariff differential gives a decisive edge to the existing oil
companies even as it constitutes a substantial barrier to the entry of prospective players. We
do not agree with the public respondents that there is no empirical evidence to support this
ruling. In the recent hearing of the Senate Committee on Energy chaired by Senator Freddie
Webb, it was established that the 4% tariff differential on crude oil and refined petroleum
importation gives a 20-centavo per liter advantage to the three big oil companies over the
new players. It was also found that said tariff differential serves as a protective shield for the
big oil companies.
4
Nor do we approve public respondents' submission that the entry of new
players after deregulation is proof that the 4% tariff differential is not a heavy disincentive.
Acting as the mouthpiece of the new players, public respondents even lament that
"unfortunately, the opportunity to get the answer right from the 'horses' mouth' eluded this
Honorable Court since none of the new players supposedly adversely affected by the assailed
provisions came forward to voice their position."
5
They need not continue their lamentation.
The new players represented by Eastern Petroleum, Seasoil Petroleum Corporation, Subic
Bay Distribution, Inc., TWA Inc., and DubPhil Gas have intervened in the cases at bar and
have spoken for themselves. In their motion for intervention, they made it crystal clear that it
is not their intention ". . . to seek the reversal of the Court's nullification of the 4% differential
in section 5(b) nor of the inventory requirement of section 6, nor of the prohibition of
predatory pricing in section 9(b)."
6
They stressed that they only protest the restoration of
the 10% oil tariff differential under the Tariff Code.
7
The horse's mouth therefore
authoritatively tells us that the new players themselves consider the 4% tariff differential in
R.A. No. 8180 as oppressive and should be nullified.
To give their argument a new spin, public respondents try to justify the 4% tariff differential
on the ground that there is a substantial difference between a refiner and an importer just as
there is a difference between raw material and finished product. Obviously, the effort is
made to demonstrate that the unequal tariff does not violate the unequal protection clause
of the Constitution. The effort only proves that the public respondents are still looking at the
issue of tariff differential from the wrong end of the telescope. Our Decision did not hold that
the 4% tariff differential infringed the equal protection clause of the Constitution even as this
was contended by petitioner Tatad.
8
Rather, we held that said tariff differential substantially
occluded the entry point of prospective players in the downstream oil industry. We further
held that its inevitable result is to exclude fair and effective competition and to enhance the
monopolists' ability to tamper with the mechanism of a free market. This consideration is
basic in anti-trust suits and cannot be eroded by belaboring the inapplicable principle in
taxation that different things can be taxed differently.
The public respondents tenaciously defend the validity of the minimum inventory
requirement. They aver that the requirement will not prejudice new players ". . . during their
first year of operation because they do not have yet annual sales from which the required
minimum inventory may be determined. Compliance with such requirement on their second
and succeeding years of operation will not be difficult because the putting up of storage
facilities in proportion to the volume of their business becomes an ordinary and necessary
business undertaking just as the case of importers of finished products in other
industries."
9
The contention is an old one although it is purveyed with a new lipstick. The
contention cannot convince for as well articulated by petitioner Garcia, "the prohibitive cost
of the required minimum inventory will not be any less burdensome on the second, third,
fourth, etc. years of operations. Unlike most products which can be imported and stored with
facility, oil imports require ocean receiving, storage facilities. Ocean receiving terminals are
already very expensive, and to require new players to put up more than they need is to
compound and aggravate their costs, and consequently their great dis-advantage vis-a-
vis the Big 3."
10
Again, the argument on whether the minimum inventory requirement
seriously hurts the new players is best settled by hearing the new players themselves. In their
motion for intervention, they implicitly confirmed that the high cost of meeting the inventory
requirement has an inhibiting effect in their operation and hence, they support the ruling of
this Court striking it down as unconstitutional.
Public respondents still maintain that the provision on predatory pricing does not offend the
Constitution. Again, their argument is not fresh though embellished with citations of cases in
the United States sustaining the validity of sales-below-costs statutes.
11
A quick look at these
American cases will show that they are inapplicable. R.A. No. 8180 has a different cast. As
discussed, its provisions on tariff differential and minimum inventory erected high barriers to
the entry of prospective players even as they raised their new rivals' costs, thus creating the
clear danger that the deregulated market in the downstream oil industry will not operate
under an atmosphere of free and fair competition. It is certain that lack of real competition
will allow the present oil oligopolists to dictate prices,
12
and can entice them to engage in
predatory pricing to eliminate rivals. The fact that R.A. No. 8180 prohibits predatory pricing
will not dissolve this clear danger. In truth, its definition of predatory pricing is too loose to
be real deterrent. Thus, one of the law's principal authors, Congressman Dante O. Tinga filed
H.B. No. 10057 where he acknowledged in its explanatory note that "the definition of
predatory pricing . . . needs to be tightened up particularly with respect to the definitive
benchmark price and the specific anti-competitive intent. The definition in the bill at hand
which was taken from the Areeda-Turner test in the United States on predatory pricing
resolves the questions." Following the more effective Areeda-Turner test, Congressman Tinga
has proposed to redefine predatory pricing, viz.: "Predatory pricing means selling or offering
to sell any oil product at a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of
destroying competition, eliminating a competitor or discouraging a competitor from entering
the market."
13
In light of its loose characterization in R.A. 8180 and the law's anti-
competitive provisions, we held that the provision on predatory pricing is constitutionally
infirmed for it can be wielded more successfully by the oil oligopolist. Its cumulative effect is
to add to the arsenal of power of the dominant oil companies. For as structured, it has no
more than the strength of a spider web it can catch the weak but cannot catch the strong;
it can stop the small oil players but cannot stop the big oil players from engaging in predatory
pricing.
Public respondents insist on their thesis that the cases at bar actually assail the wisdom of
R.A. No. 8180 and that this Court should refrain from examining the wisdom of legislations.
They contend that R.A. No. 8180 involves an economic policy which this Court cannot review
for lack of power and competence. To start with, no school of scholars can claim any
infallibility. Historians with undefiled learning have chronicled
14
over the years the disgrace
of many economists and the fall of one economic dogma after another. Be that as it may, the
Court is aware that the principle of separation of powers prohibits the judiciary from
interferring with the policy setting function of the legislature.
15
For this reason we italicized
in our Decision that the Court did not review the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180 but its
compatibility with the Constitution; the Court did not annul the economic policy of
deregulation but vitiated its aspects which offended the constitutional mandate on fair
competition. It is beyond debate that the power of Congress to enact laws does not include
the right to pass unconstitutional laws. In fine, the Court did not usurp the power of the
Congress to enact laws but merely discharged its bounden duty to check the constitutionality
of laws when challenged in appropriate cases. Our Decision annulling R.A No. 8180 is justified
by the principle of check and balance.
We hold that the power and obligation of this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of
laws cannot be defeated by the fact that the challenged law carries serious economic
implications. This Court has struck down laws abridging the political and civil rights of our
people even if it has to offend the other more powerful branches of government. There is no
reason why the Court cannot strike down R.A. No. 8180 that violates the economic rights of
our people even if it has to bridle the liberty of big business within reasonable bounds.
In Alalayan vs. National Power Corporation
16
the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, held:
2. Nor is petitioner anymore successful in his plea for the nullification of the
challenged provision on the ground of his being deprived of the liberty to contract
without due process of law.
It is to be admitted of course that property rights find shelter in specific
constitutional provisions, one of which is the due process clause. It is equally
certain that our fundamental law framed at a time of "surging unrest and
dissatisfaction," when there was the fear expressed in many quarters that a
constitutional democracy, in view of its commitment to the claims of property,
would not be able to cope effectively with the problems of poverty and misery that
unfortunately afflict so many of our people, is not susceptible to the indictment
that the government therein established is impotent to take the necessary
remedial measures. The framers saw to that. The welfare state concept is not alien
to the philosophy of our Constitution. It is implicit in quite a few of its provisions. It
suffices to mention two.
There is the clause on the promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and
economic security of all the people, as well as the pledge of protection to labor
with the specific authority to regulate the relations between landowners and
tenants and between labor and capital. This particularized reference to the rights
of working men whether in industry and agriculture certainly cannot preclude
attention to and concern for the rights of consumers, who are the objects of
solicitude in the legislation now complained of. The police power as an attribute to
promote the common weal would be diluted considerably of its reach and
effectiveness if on the mere plea that the liberty to contract would be restricted,
the statute complained of may be characterized as a denial of due process. The
right to property cannot be pressed to such an unreasonable extreme.
It is understandable though why business enterprises, not unnaturally evincing lack
of enthusiasm for police power legislation that affect them adversely and restrict
their profits could predicate alleged violation of their rights on the due process
clause, which as interpreted by them is a bar to regulatory measures. Invariably,
the response from this Court, from the time the Constitution was enacted, has
been far from sympathetic. Thus, during the Commonwealth, we sustained
legislations providing for collective bargaining, security of tenure, minimum wages,
compulsory arbitration, and tenancy regulation. Neither did the objections as to
the validity of measures regulating the issuance of securities and public services
prevail.
The Constitution gave this Court the authority to strike down all laws that violate the
Constitution.
17
It did not exempt from the reach of this authority laws with economic
dimension. A 20-20 vision will show that the grant by the Constitution to this Court of this all
important power of review is written without any fine print.
The next issue is whether the Court should only declare as unconstitutional the provisions of
R.A. No. 8180 on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory and predatory pricing.
Positing the affirmative view, petitioner Garcia proffered the following arguments:
5. Begging the kind indulgence and benign patience of the Court, we humbly
submit that the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned provisions of R.A. No.
8180 implies that the other provisions are constitutional. Thus, said constitutional
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 may and can very well be spared.
5.1 With the striking down of "ultimately full deregulation," we
will simply go back to the transition period under R.A. 8180
which will continue until Congress enacts an amendatory law
for the start of full oil deregulation in due time, when free
market forces are already in place. In turn, the monthly
automatic price control mechanism based on Singapore Posted
Prices (SPP)will be revived. The energy Regulatory Board (ERB),
which still exist, would re-acquire jurisdiction and would easily
compute the monthly price ceiling, based on SPP, of each and
every petroleum fuel product, effective upon finality of this
Court's favorable resolution on this motion for partial
reconsideration.
5.2 Best of all, the oil deregulation can continue uninterrupted
without the three other assailed provisions, namely, the 4%
tariff differential, predatory pricing and minimum inventory.
6. We further humbly submit that a favorable resolution on this motion for partial
reconsideration would be consistent with public interest.
6.1 In consequence, new players that have already come in can
uninterruptedly continue their operations more competitively
and bullishly with an even playing field.
6.2 Further, an even playing field will attract many more new
players to come in in a much shorter time.
6.3 Correspondingly, Congress does not anymore have to pass a
new deregulation law, thus it can immediately concentrate on
just amending R.A. No. 8180 to abolish the OPSF, on the
government's assumption that it is necessary to do so.
Parenthetically, it is neither correct nor fair for high
government officials to criticize and blame the Honorable Court
on the OPSF, considering that said OPSF is not inherent in nor
necessary to the transition period and may be removed at any
time.
6.4 In as much as R.A. No. 8180 would continue to be in place
(sans its unconstitutional provisions), only the Comprehensive
Tax Reform Package (CTRP) would be needed for the country to
exit from IMF by December 1997.
7. The Court, in declaring the entire R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional, was evidently
expecting that Congress "can fasttrack the writing of a new law on oil deregulation
in accord with the Constitution" (Decision p. 38) However, it is very problematic, to
say the least, if Congress can fasttrack an entirely new law.
7.1 There is already limited time for Congress to pass such a
new law before it adjourns for the 1998 elections.
7.2 At the very least, whether or not Congress will be able to
fasttrack the enactment of a new oil deregulation law
consistent with the Honorable Court's ruling, would depend on
many unforseeable and uncontrollable factors. Already, several
statements from legislators, senators and congressmen alike,
say that the new law can wait because of other pending
legislative matters, etc. Given the "realities" of politics,
especially with the 1998 presidential polls six months away, it is
not far-fetched that the general welfare could be sacrificed to
gain political mileage, thus further unduly delaying the
enactment of a new oil deregulation law.
8. Furthermore, if the entire R.A. No. 8180 remains nullified as unconstitutional,
the following pernicious effects will happen:
8.1 Until the new oil deregulation law is enacted, we would
have to go back to the old law. This means full regulation, i.e.,
higher tariff differential of 10%, higher petroleum product price
ceilings based on transfer prices of imported crude oil, and
restrictions on the importation of refined petroleum products
that would be allowed only if there are shortages, etc.
8.2 In consequence of the above, the existing new
players, would have to totally stop their operations.
8.3 The existing new players would find themselves in a bind on
how to fulfill their contractual obligations, especially on their
delivery commitments of petroleum fuel products. They will be
in some sort of "limbo" upon the nullification of the entire
R.A. No. 8180.
8.4 The investments that existing new players have already
made would become idle and unproductive. All their planned
additional investments would be put on hold.
8.5 Needless to say, all this would translate into tremendous
losses for them.
8.6 And obviously, prospective new players cannot and will not
come in.
8.7 On top of everything, public interest will suffer. Firstly, the
oil deregulation program will bedelayed. Secondly, the prices of
petroleum products will be higher because of price ceilings
based on transfer prices of imported crude.
9. When it passed R.A. No. 8180, Congress provided a safeguard against the
possibility that any of its provisions could be declared unconstitutional, thus
the separability clause thereof, which the Court noted (Decision, p. 29). We humbly
submit that this is another reason to grant this motion for partial reconsideration.
In his Supplement to Urgent Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioner Garcia amplified
his contentions.
In a similar refrain, the public respondents contend that the "unmistakable intention of
Congress" is to make each and every provision of R.A. No. 8180 "independent and separable
from one another." To bolster this proposition, they cite the separability clause of the law
and the pending bills in Congress proposing to repeal said offensive provisions but not the
entire law itself. They also recite the "inevitable consequences of the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180" as follows:
1. There will be bigger price adjustments in petroleum products due to (a) the
reimposition of the higher tariff rates for imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products [10%-20%], (b) the uncertainty regarding R.A. 8184, or the "Oil
Tariff Law," which simplified tax administration by lowering the tax rates for
socially-sensitive products such as LPG, diesel, fuel oil and kerosene, and increasing
tax rates of gasoline products which are used mostly by consumers who belong to
the upper income group, and (c) the issue of wiping out the deficit of P2.6 billion
and creating a subsidy fund in the Oil Price Stabilization Fund;
2. Importers, traders, and industrial end-users like the National Power Corporation
will be constrained to source their oil requirement only from existing oil companies
because of the higher tariff on imported refined petroleum products and
restrictions on such importation that would be allowed only if there are shortages;
3. Government control and regulation of all the activities of the oil industry will
discourage prospective investors and drive away the existing new players;
4. All expansion and investment programs of the oil companies and new players
will be shelved indefinitely;
5. Petitions for price adjustments should be filed and approved by the ERB.
Joining the chorus, the intervenors contend that:
2.1.1 The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 restores the disproportionate
advantage of the three big oil firms Caltex, Shell and Petron over the small oil
firms;
2.1.2 The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 "disarms" the new entrants
and seriously cripples their capacity to compete and grow; and
2.1.3 Ultimately, the total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 removes
substantial, albeit imperfect, barriers to monopolistic practices and unfair
competition and trade practices harmful not only to movant-intervenors but also to
the public in general.
The intervenors further aver that under a regime of regulation, (1) the big oil firms can block
oil importation by the small oil firms; (2) the big oil firms can block the expansion and growth
of the small oil firms. They likewise submit that the provisions on tariff differential, minimum
inventory, and predatory pricing are separable from the body of R.A. No. 8180 because of its
separability clause. They also allege that their separability is further shown by the pending
bills in Congress which only seek the partial repeal of R.A. No. 8180.
We shall first resolve petitioner Garcia's linchpin contention that the full deregulation
decreed by R.A. No. 8180 to start at the end of March 1997 is unconstitutional. For
prescinding from this premise, petitioner suggests that "we simply go back to the transition
period under R.A. No. 8180. Under the transition period, price control will be revived through
the automatic pricing mechanism based on Singapore Posted Prices. The Energy Regulatory
Board . . . would play a limited and ministerial role of computing the monthly price ceiling of
each and every petroleum fuel product, using the automatic pricing formula. While the OPSF
would return, this coverage would be limited to monthly price increases in excess of P0.50
per liter."
We are not impressed by petitioner Garcia's submission. Petitioner has no basis in
condemning as unconstitutional per se the date fixed by Congress for the beginning of the
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Our Decision merely faulted the Executive
for factoring the depletion of OPSF in advancing the date of full deregulation to February
1997. Nonetheless, the error of the Executive is now a non-issue for the full deregulation set
by Congress itself at the end of March 1997 has already come to pass. March 1997 is not an
arbitrary date. By that date, the transition period has ended and it was expected that the
people would have adjusted to the role of market forces in shaping the prices of petroleum
and its products. The choice of March 1997 as the date of full deregulation is a judgment of
Congress and its judgment call cannot be impugned by this Court.
We come to the submission that the provisions on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory
and predatory pricing are separable from the body of R.A. No. 8180, and hence, should alone
be declared as unconstitutional. In taking this position, the movants rely heavily on the
separability provision of R.A. No. 8180. We cannot affirm the movants for the determine
whether or not a particular provision is separable, the courts should consider the intent of
the legislature. It is true that the most of the time, such intent is expressed in a separability
clause stating that the invalidity or unconstitutionality of any provision or section of the law
will not affect the validity or constitutionality of the remainder. Nonetheless, the separability
clause only creates a presumption that the act is severable. It is merely an aid in statutory
construction. It is not an inexorable command.
18
A separability clause does not clothe the
valid parts with immunity from the invalidating effect the law gives to the inseparable
blending of the bad with the good. The separability clause cannot also be applied if it will
produce an absurd result.
19
In sum, if the separation of the statute will defeat the intent of
the legislature, separation will not take place despite the inclusion of a separability clause in
the law.
20

In the case of the Republic Act No. 8180, the unconstitutionality of the provisions on tariff
differential, minimum inventory and predatory pricing cannot but result in the
unconstitutionality of the entire law despite its separability clause. These provisions cannot
be struck down alone for they were the ones intended to carry out the policy of the law
embodied in section 2 thereof which reads:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy It shall be the policy of the State to deregulate the
downstream oil industry to foster a truly competitive market which can better
achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply
of environmentally-clean and high-quality petroleum products.
They actually set the stage for the regime of deregulation where government will no longer
intervene in fixing the price of oil and the operations of oil companies. It is conceded that the
success of deregulation lies in a truly competitive market and there can be no competitive
market without the easy entry and exit of competitors. No less than President Fidel
V. Ramos recognized this matrix when he declared the need is to ". . . recast our laws on
trust, monopolies, oligopolies, cartels and combinations injurious to public welfare to
restore competition where it has disappeared and to preserve it where it still exists. In a
word, we need to perpetuate competition as a system to regulate the economy and achieve
global product quality."
21

We held in our Decision that the provisions on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory and
predatory pricing are anti-competition, and they are the key provisions of R.A. No. 8180.
Without these provisions in place, Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil
industry. Consider the 4% tariff differential on crude oil and refined petroleum. Before R.A.
No. 8180,
22
there was a ten-point difference between the tariff imposed on crude oil and
that on refined petroleum. Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 lowered the difference to four by
imposing a 3% tariff on crude oil and a 7% tariff on refined petroleum. We ruled, however,
that this reduced tariff differential is unconstitutional for it still posed a substantial barrier to
the entry of new players and enhanced the monopolistic power of the three existing oil
companies. The ruling that the 4% differential is unconstitutional will unfortunately revive
the 10% tariff differential of the Tariff and Customs Code. The high 10% tariff differential will
certainly give a bigger edge to the three existing oil companies, will form an insuperable
barrier to prospective players, and will drive out of business the new players. Thus, there can
be no question that Congress will not allow deregulation if the tariff is 10% on crude oil and
20% on refined petroleum. To decree the partial unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 will
bring about an absurdity a fully deregulated downstream oil industry where government is
impotent to regulate run away prices, where the oil oligopolists can engage in cartelization
without competition, where prospective players cannot come in, and where new players will
close shop.
We also reject the argument that the bills pending in Congress merely seek to remedy the
partial defects of R.A No. 8180, and that this is proof that R.A. No. 8180 can be declared
unconstitutional minus its offensive provisions. We referred to the pending bills in Congress
in our Decision only to show that Congress itself is aware of the various defects of the law
and not to prove the inseparability of the offending provisions from the body of R.A. No.
8180. To be sure, movants even overlooked the fact that resolutions have been filed in both
House of Congress calling for a total review of R.A. No. 8180.
The movants warn that our Decision will throw us back to the undesirable regime of
regulation. They emphasize its pernicious consequences the revival of the 10% tariff
differential which will wipe out the new players, the return of the OPSF which is too
burdensome to government, the unsatisfactory scheme of price regulation by the ERB, etc.
To stress again, it is not the will of the Court to return even temporarily to the regime of
regulation. If we return to the regime of regulation, it is because it is the inevitable
consequence of the enactment by Congress of an unconstitutional law, R.A. No. 8180. It is
settled jurisprudence that the declaration of a law as unconstitutional revives the laws that it
has repealed. Stated otherwise, an unconstitutional law returns us to the status quo anteand
this return is beyond the power of the Court to stay. Under our scheme of government,
however, the remedy to prevent the revival of an unwanted status quo ante or stop its
continuation by immediately enacting the necessary remedial legislation. We emphasize that
in the cases at bar, the Court did not condemn the economic policy of deregulation as
unconstitutional. It merely held that as crafted, the law runs counter to the constitutional
provision calling for fair competition.
23
Thus, there is no impediment in re-enacting R.A. No.
8180 minus its provisions which are anti-competition. The Court agrees that our return to the
regime of regulation has pernicious consequences and it specially symphatizes with the
intervenors. Be that as it may, the Court is powerless to prevent this return just as it is
powerless to repeal the 10% tariff differential of the Tariff Code. It is Congress that can give
all these remedies.
24

Petitioner Garcia, however, injects a non-legal argument in his motion for partial
reconsideration. He avers that "given the 'realities' of politics, especially with the 1998
presidential polls six months away, it is not far-fetched that the general welfare could be
sacrificed to gain political mileage, thus further unduly delaying the enactment of a new oil
deregulation law." The short answer to petitioner Garcia's argument is that when the Court
reviews the constitutionality of a law, it does not deal with the realities of politics nor does it
delve into the mysticism of politics. The Court has no partisan political theology for as an
institution it is at best apolitical, and at worse, politically agnostic. In any event, it should not
take a long time for Congress to enact a new oil deregulation law given its interest for the
welfare of our people. Petitioner Garcia himself has been quoted as saying that ". . . with the
Court's decision, it would now be easy for Congress to craft new law, considering that
lawmakers will be guided by the Court's points."
25
Even before our Decision, bills amending
the offensive provisions of R.A. No. 8180 have already been filed in the Congress and under
consideration by its committees. Speaker Jose de Venecia has assured after a meeting of the
Legislative-Executive Advisory Council (LEDAC) that: "I suppose before Christmas, we should
be able to pass a new oil deregulation
law.
26
The Chief Executive himself has urged the immediate passage of a new and better oil
deregulation law.
27

Finally, public respondents raise the scarecrow argument that our Decision will drive away
foreign investors. In response to this official repertoire, suffice to state that our Decision
precisely levels the playing field for foreign investors as against the three dominant oil
oligopolists. No less than the influential Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry
whose motive is beyond question, stated thru its Acting President Jaime Ladao that ". . . this
Decision, in fact tells us that we are for honest-to-goodness competition." Our Decision
should be a confidence-booster to foreign investors for its assures them of an effective
judicial remedy against an unconstitutional law. There is need to attract foreign investment
but that policy has never been foreign investment at any cost. We cannot trade-in the
Constitution for foreign investment. It is not economic heresy to hold that trade-in is not a
fair exchange.
To recapitulate, our Decision declared R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional for three reasons: (1) it
gave more power to an already powerful oil oligopoly; (2) it blocked the entry of effective
competitors; and (3) it will sire an even more powerful oligopoly whose unchecked power
will prejudice the interest of the consumers and compromise the general welfare.
A weak and developing country like the Philippines cannot risk a downstream oil industry
controlled by a foreign oligopoly that can run riot. Oil is our most socially sensitive
commodity and for it to be under the control of a foreign oligopoly without effective
competitors is a clear and present danger. A foreign oil oligopoly can undermine the security
of the nation; it can exploit the economy if greed becomes its creed; it will have the power to
drive the Filipino to a prayerful pose. Under a deregulated regime, the people's only hope to
check the overwhelming power of the foreign oil oligopoly lies on a market where there is
fair competition. With prescience, the Constitution mandates the regulation of monopolies
and interdicts unfair competition. Thus, the Constitution provides a shield to the economic
rights of our people, especially the poor. It is the unyielding duty of this Court to uphold the
supremacy of the Constitution not with a mere wishbone but with a backbone that should
neither bend nor break.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Motions for Reconsideration of the public respondents and of the
intervenors as well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Enrique Garcia are
DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 79732 November 8, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HENRICO UVERO, ET AL., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Raymundo T. Nagrampa for private respondents.

VITUG, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land
owned by the private respondents for the widening and concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos
Section, Philippine-Japan Highway Loan (PJHL) road. While the right of the Republic is not
now disputed, the private respondents, however, demand that the just compensation for the
property should be based on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No.
76, as amended, which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the
declared valuation by the owner, whichever is lower. The Regional, Trial Court ruled for the
private respondents. When elevated to it, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.
In Export Processing Zone Authority ("EPZA") vs. Dulay, etc. et al.,
1
this Court held the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain to be a judicial function and it
thereby declared Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including
Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the contrary extent, as unconstitutional and as an
impermissible encroachment of judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now conceded by the
Republic was reiterated in subsequent cases.
2

The petition for review, despite the aforesaid pronouncement by this Court, has been given
due course upon the pleas of the Solicitor General to have us address the following concerns:
I
EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PD 1533 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND VOID; UP TO WHEN RETROACTIVELY; EFFECT ON A PENDING
APPEALED CASE WHERE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PD 1533 NOT ASSAILED
BEFORE COURT A QUO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN EPZA
VS. HON. DULAY, ETC., ET AL. (G.R. NO. 59603, APRIL 29, 1987)
DECLARING PD 1533 UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID, BE APPLIED IN THIS
CASE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT VALUATION OF LAND SOUGHT FOR EXPROPRIATION
AS APPEARING ON THE TAX DECLARATION BE USED AS PRELIMINARY
BASIS FOR THE TEN PER CENT (10%) DEPOSIT REQUIRED UNDER RULE 67
OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED BEFORE PLAINTIFF IS
PERMITTED ENTRY THEREON.
The last item is not an issue; being merely provisional in character, the matter has not been
questioned by the private respondents.
3
We will thus limit ourselves to the first two issues
which, in turn, really boil down to whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question
should have prospective, not retroactive, application. The petitioner proposes the
affirmative.
Instruction is the brief treatise made by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, whose words we quote
There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of a statute.
The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v.
Shelby, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore
stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at
all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of
unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it
nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in
other words, a total nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court in
passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal
the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses
to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such
statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or
disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is
no judgment against the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may
operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar cases, but it
does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal,
supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The parties to the suit are
concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound.
The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing
that "when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. . . .
4

The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as being,
for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed.
Here, of course, we refer to the law itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution. It is not
always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally faultyper se. Thus, it may well be valid
in its general import. but invalid in its application to certain factual situations. To exemplify,
an otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate
retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To
that extent, its retroactive application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations
of contracts.
5

A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects
and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in our decisions
on the moratorium laws,
6
we have been constrained to recognize the interim effects of said
laws prior to their declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise been unable
to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play. So also, even as a practical
matter, a situation that may aptly be described as fait accompli may no longer be open for
further inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of a governing
statute.
The instant controversy, however, is too far distant away from any of the above exceptional
cases. To this day, the controversy between the petitioner and the private respondents on
the issue of just compensation is still unresolved, partly attributable to the instant petition
that has prevented the finality of the decision appealed from. The fact of the matter is that
the expropriation cases, involved in this instance, were still pending appeal when the EPZA
ruling was rendered and forthwith invoked by said parties.
In fine, we hold that the appellate court in this particular case committed no error in its
appealed decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TA;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification
of that decision.
1
Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette.
2

In the Comment
3
required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was
a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that
the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary,
did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was
concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a
Reply
4
refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required
the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3,
Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for
the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to
be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and
that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not
supported by eight members of this Court.
5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that
the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out
by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision,
6
is the Civil
Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could
validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack
of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of
a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly,
this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-
penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons
they may affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of
course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like
a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be
said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply
directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid
as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as anultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable
only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and
regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place
after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The
circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by
the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the
wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule
but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the
mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration.
7
The evident purpose was to
withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette
8
and that six others felt that publication could be made
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed.
9
One reserved his vote
10
and
another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it
should be made.
11
It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to
arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by
the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of
general circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out
regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of
the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no
information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by
the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement
for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to
give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,
although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere
refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a
matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an
advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to
public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty
residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review
the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their
freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the
legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive
law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon
their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to
become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified
by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.