15 Castro v.

People
| Corona, J.
G.R. No. 180823 23 July 2008

FACTS

Reedley International School dismissed Tans son, Justin Albert for violating the terms of his disciplinary probation. RIS
reconsidered its decision upon Tans request but imposed non-appealable conditions such as excluding Justin Albert from
participating in the graduation ceremonies. Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education violation of the Manual
of Regulation of Private Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil Code against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal
of his son was undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. After investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS
code violation point system allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions. After investigation, the Dep-Ed found
that RIS code violation point system allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions.
Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it. The Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any condition. Thus, he was able to
graduate from RIS and participate in the commencement ceremonies held on March 30, 2003. After the graduation
ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. In the course of their conversation, Tan intimated that he was
contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including petitioner who was the assistant
headmaster. Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week of April and told him that Tan was planning to sue the
officers of RIS in their personal capacities. Before they hung up, petitioner told Ching: Okay, you too, take care and be careful
talking to *Tan+, thats dangerous. Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner said talking to him was
dangerous. Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City
against petitioner on August 21, 2003. Petitioner was charged with grave oral defamation.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the petitioner is guilty of Grave Oral Defamation

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Petitioner is NOT GUILTY of Grave Oral Defamation. The Supreme Court held that the facts in this case do not constitute Grave
Oral Defamation. It Held that at most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code: Article
26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:

x x x x x x x x x

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

x x x x x x x x x

The Court reminded the petitioner that as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such, he should
always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.













































JULIANA P. YAP, Petitioner
Vs.
MATIN PARAS AND ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR.,




According to Yap, Paras sold IN 1971 to her his share in the intestate estate for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private
document. Nineteen years later, (in 1990), Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.

When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with
the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr., who dismissed the criminal case on
the ground that the issue in the civil case is prejudicial to the criminal case for estafa.
Issue: Is the Judge correct in motu proprio dismissing the criminal case?
Ruling: The judge is wrong. First, he should not have dismissed the criminal case but only suspended it. Second, it was wrong
for him to dismiss the criminal case outright, since it requires a motion first from the proper party.
The rule provides: Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall
be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. Third, there is actually no prejudicial question
here.
Anent the issue of prejudicial question, the rule provides that:

Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of
the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

It was held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal
action pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused".
Indeed, the civil case at bar does not involve the same facts upon which the criminal action is based. There was no motion for
suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras was
raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action would
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.










































Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan


G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the
former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of
several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines



RULING:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity
of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to
issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it. Explaining the nature of
the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of
the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis--vis Congress Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge
its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution which provides that each-
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence
of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days.

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination
by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did
not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.


































MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS July 31, 2000 (G.R. No. 138509)
PARTIES: Petitioner: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS Respondent: ISAGANI D. BOBIS


FACTS:
October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified or terminated
January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis
Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez
February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license
Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
before entering into the second marriage *after petitioner sued for bigamy, its just when the respondent filed a
declaration of absolute nullity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

HELD:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:7 (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be
void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case
at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner.

Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It
is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

*Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority.
Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)














































Beltran vs. People

FACTS: In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but after 24 years of
marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felixs PI. Felix countered that Beltran
left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the
lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said
that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets
resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the
case to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar.

HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration
of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial
to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring
a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of
other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage
void.

With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared
null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense.



















































Philippine Agila Satellite vs Trinidad Lichauco 489 scra 22
FACTS
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly organized corporation, whose President and Chief Executive Officer is co-
petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in
1994 had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning
the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. The Philippine government, through the DOTC, was tasked
under the MOU to secure from the International Telecommunication Union the required orbital slots and frequency
assignments for the Philippine satellite.

The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International Telecommunication Union two orbital slots,
designated as 161o East Longitude and 153o East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S.
Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine
orbital slots to PASI for its satellites. Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter confirming the Philippine Governments
assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its satellites.

PASI averred that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations for
the launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital.
However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly embarked on a crusade to malign
the name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.

Aggrieved by Lichaucos actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted a civil complaint against Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary
of the DOTC. The complaint, alleging three causes of action, was for injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages.
The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged crusade to malign the name of
plaintiff De Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.

ISSUE
Is the suit one against the state?

RULING
The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a
private citizen that would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against
the State itself, although the latter has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield
the public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of
the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his duties.

As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction against her performing any
act in relation to orbital slot 153o East Longitude; one for declaration of nullity of award, seeking to nullify the alleged award of
orbital slot 153o East Longitude; and one for damages against Lichauco herself.

As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of the government will result in
a charge against or financial liability to the government that the complaint must be regarded as a suit against the State itself.
However, the distinction must also be raised between where the government official concerned performs an act in his/her
official and jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned
who should be impleaded as the proper party- defendant or respondent.

As to the first two causes of action, the Court ruled that the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes
of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do
not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers
attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award,
nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit would
have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government
agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance
obtains in this case.

The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals states: While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded
against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be
noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious
to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs.
Aligaen, etc., et al.: Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials
or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State
from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a
State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property
rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have,
is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.' The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.















FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO Respondents.

D E C I S I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the (1) Resolution[1] dated 5 March 2001 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, Francisco Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 of Quezon City, People of the Philippines and Elena M. Librojo, which dismissed petitioner
Francisco Magestrados Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy; and (2) Resolution[2] dated 3 May 2001 of the
same Court denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint[3] for perjury against petitioner with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was docketed as I.S. No. 98-3900.

After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended
the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an
information for perjury against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. Pertinent portions of the
information are hereby quoted as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful statement under oath upon a material matter before a
competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath and which the law so require, to wit: the said accused subscribe
and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City, per Doc. No. 168, Page No. 35, Book
No. CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely alleging that he lost Owners Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N-173163, which
document was used in support of a Petition For Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title and filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and assigned to Branch 99 of the
said court, to which said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado signed and swore on its verification, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book No. CLXXV
Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the
said affidavit and petition are false, the truth of the matter being that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and as
a consequence of which said title to the property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan, thus,
making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage and prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo.[4]

The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 90721 entitled,
People of the Philippines v. Francisco Magestrado.

On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion[5] for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner
alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98- 34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages,
pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, must be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since
the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.

On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order*6+ denying petitioners motion for suspension of proceedings, thus:

Acting on the Motion for Suspension of Proceedings filed by the *herein petitioner Magestrado], thru counsel, and the
Comment and Opposition thereto, the Court after an evaluation of the same, finds the aforesaid motion without merit, hence,
is hereby DENIED, it appearing that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as previously scheduled on July 19 and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning.


On 17 August 1999, a motion[7] for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but was denied by the MeTC in an Order[8] dated
19 October 1999.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[9] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a prayer for Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, on the
ground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.

On 14 March 2000, RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, reasoning thus:

Scrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil cases abovementioned, in relation to the criminal action for PERJURY, this
Court opines and so holds that there is no prejudicial question involved as to warrant the suspension of the criminal action to
await the outcome of the civil cases. The civil cases are principally for determination whether or not a loan was obtained by
petitioner and whether or not he executed the deed of real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-
173163, whereas the criminal case is for perjury which imputes upon petitioner the wrongful execution of an affidavit of loss to
support his petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163. Whether or not he committed perjury is
the issue in the criminal case which may be resolved independently of the civil cases. Note that the affidavit of loss was
executed in support of the petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 which petition was
raffled to Branch 99 of the RTC. x x x.[10]


Again, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[11] but this was denied by RTC- Branch 83 in an Order[12] dated 21
December 2000.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari[13] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63293. Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, and in
effect sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43 of petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721,
as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof.

On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed[14] the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 on the ground that petitioners
remedy should have been an appeal from the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The
Court of Appeals ruled that:

Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the correct and appropriate remedy?
We rule negatively.

The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition, may be appealed x x x under Section 10, Rule 44 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules. Thus, the said rule
provides:

Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus
cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from
receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record x x x.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is hereby DISMISSED.[15]


The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration*16+ in a Resolution*17+ dated 3 May 2001.

Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Orders of Judge Estrella T. Estrada dated March 14, 2000 denying petitioners Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and her subsequent Order dated December 21, 2000, denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereafter filed can only be reviewed by the Court of Appeals thru appeal under Section 10, Rule 44 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City, had committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of her jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari and petitioners subsequent
motion for reconsideration on the ground of a prejudicial question pursuant to the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the
prevailing jurisprudence.


After consideration of the procedural and substantive issues raised by petitioner, we find the instant petition to be without
merit.

The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the proper remedy which petitioner should have availed himself of before the
Court of Appeals: an ordinary appeal or a petition for certiorari. Petitioner claims that he correctly questioned RTC-Branch 83s
Order of dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 through a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Private respondent and public respondent People of the Philippines insist that an ordinary appeal was the proper
remedy.

We agree with respondents. We hold that the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari,
pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court (and not under Rule 44, Section 10, invoked by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated 5 March 2001).

The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not only because RTC-Branch 83 did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 but also because RTC-Branch 83s
Order of dismissal was a final order from which petitioners should have appealed in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it in
the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory
order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the merits of the latter.[18] RTC-
Branch 83s Order dated 14 March 2001 dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 finally
disposes of the said case and RTC-Branch 83 can do nothing more with the case.

Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Revised Rules of Court to be appealable. The manner of appealing
an RTC judgment or final order is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:

Section 2. Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record
on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.


Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available to
petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was adequate to deal with any question whether of fact or of law, whether of error
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of judgment which the trial court might have committed. But petitioners
instead filed a special civil action for certiorari.

We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.*19+ Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy,[20] certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal.[21]

As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have repeatedly emphasized that the perfection of appeals in the manner
and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal
renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not
part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of
substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere
technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.[22]

The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[23] A party cannot substitute
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability
of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action for certiorari.[24] As this Court held in Fajardo
v. Bautista[25]:

Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal, not
certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Accordingly,
although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is
shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects
of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for
the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned by the petitioners own neglect or error in the choice of
remedies.


On 21 December 2000, petitioner received a copy of the Order of the RTC-Branch 83 denying his motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358; hence, he had until 18 January 2001 within which to file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner on 19 February 2001 with the Court of
Appeals cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. As petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, RTC-Branch 83s
dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari had long become final and executory.

For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly denied outright the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner before it.

Moreover, there are even more cogent reasons for denying the instant Petition on the merits.

In the Petition at bar, petitioner raises several substantive issues. Petitioner harps on the need for the suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending before MeTC-Branch 43 based on a prejudicial question still to be
resolved in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of
money) which are pending before other trial courts.

For clarity, we shall first discuss the allegations of petitioner in his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of
mortgage) and that of private respondent in her complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money).

Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages filed on 8 May 1988 by
petitioner against private respondent with RTC-Branch 77. Petitioner alleges that he purchased a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 thru private respondent, a real estate broker. In the process of negotiation,
petitioner was pressured to sign a Deed of Sale prepared by private respondent. Upon signing the Deed of Sale, he noticed
that the Deed was already signed by a certain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-fact of vendor Spouses Guillermo and Amparo
Galvez. Petitioner demanded from private respondent a special power of attorney and authority to sell, but the latter failed to
present one. Petitioner averred that private respondent refused to deliver the certificate of title of the land despite execution
and signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of the consideration. Petitioner was thus compelled to engage the services of one
Modesto Gazmin, Jr. who agreed, for P100,000.00 to facilitate the filing of cases against private respondent; to deliver to
petitioner the certificate of title of the land; and/or to cancel the certificate of title in possession of private
respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did nothing upon receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 from petitioner. In fact,
petitioner was even charged with perjury before the Office of the City Prosecutor, all because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.s
wrongdoing. Petitioner further alleged that he discovered the existence of a spurious Real Estate Mortgage which he allegedly
signed in favor of private respondent. Petitioner categorically denied signing the mortgage document and it was private
respondent who falsified the same in order to justify her unlawful withholding of TCT No. N-173163 from petitioner. Thus,
petitioner prayed for:

1. The cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage dated August 2, 1997 as null and void;

2. As well as to order *herein private respondent+ to DELIVER the Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
173163 to [herein petitioner];

3. Condemning [private respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sums of

a) P100,000.00 as MORAL DAMAGES;

b) P50,000.00 as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;

c) P50,000.00 as Attorneys fees and

d) Cost of suit.

4. A general relief is likewise prayed for (sic) just and equitable under the premises.


Civil Case No. Q-98-34349,[26] on the other hand, is a complaint for a sum of money with a motion for issuance of a writ of
attachment filed by private respondent against petitioner on 14 May 1988 before RTC-Branch 84. Private respondent alleges
that petitioner obtained a loan from her in the amount of P758,134.42 with a promise to pay on or before 30 August 1997. As
security for payment of the loan, petitioner executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a parcel of land registered
under TCT No. N-173163. Petitioner pleaded for additional time to pay the said obligation, to which respondent agreed. But
private respondent discovered sometime in February 1998 that petitioner executed an affidavit of loss alleging that he lost the
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163, and succeeded in annotating said affidavit on the original copy of TCT No. N-
173163 on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Private respondent further alleges that she also discovered that
petitioner filed a petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 with the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-10052. Private respondent demanded that petitioner pay his obligation, but the latter
refused to do so. Resultantly, private respondent prayed for the following:

A. That upon filing of this Complaint as well as the Affidavit of attachment and a preliminary hearing thereon, as well
as bond filed, a writ of preliminary attachment is (sic) by the Honorable Court ordering the Sheriff to levy [herein petitioner]
property sufficient to answer *herein private respondents+ claim in this action;

B. That after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in *private respondents+ favor as against *petitioner+,
ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P758,134.42 plus interest thereon at 5% per month from September 1997 up
to the date of actual payment; actual damages in the sums of P70,000.00 each under paragraphs 11 and 12 of the complaint;
P200,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; twenty (20%) of the principal claim as attorneys fees plus
P2,500.00 per appearance honorarium; and P60,000.00 as litigation expense before this Honorable Court.

[Petitioner] prays for such further relief in law, justice and equity.


As to whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending final outcome of Civil Case No. Q-98-34349
and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308, we take into consideration Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the
same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.


The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.[27]

A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case
before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.[28]

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings
until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question
must be lodged in another tribunal.[29]

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal
action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.*30+ Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and
the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.[31]

However, the court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and upon proper application for a
stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of another case pending in another court, especially
where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of cases on
its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second
action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled, the second action should be
stayed.[32]

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its
dockets, considering its time and effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done
in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and
courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the trial court would suspend the proceedings in the criminal case before it is
submitted to its sound discretion.[33]

Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to the courts discretionary authority is not subject to reversal on review unless it
constitutes an abuse of discretion. As the United States Supreme Court aptly declared in Landis v. North American Co., the
burden of making out the justice and wisdom from the departure from the beaten truck lay heavily on the petitioner, less an
unwilling litigant is compelled to wait upon the outcome of a controversy to which he is a stranger. It is, thus, stated that only
in rare circumstances will a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside, while a litigant in another, settling the rule of law
that will define the rights of both is, after all, the parties before the court are entitled to a just, speedy and plain determination
of their case undetermined by the pendency of the proceedings in another case. After all, procedure was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.*34+

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on
whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case
such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.

A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 pending before RTC-Branch 77, and Civil
Case No. Q-98-34349, pending before RTC-Branch 84, are principally for the determination of whether a loan was obtained by
petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage involving the property covered by
TCT No. N-173163. On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 90721 before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the determination of
whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163.

It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of
the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by
petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner
knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT No. N-173163.

MeTC-Branch 43, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 for cancellation of mortgage
before the RTC-Branch 77; and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 for collection of a sum of money before RTC-Branch 84, do not pose a
prejudicial question in the determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury in Criminal Case No. 90721. RTC-Branch 83,
likewise, did not err in ruling that MeTC-Branch 43 did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion for
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions dated 5 March 2001 and 3 May 2001of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 63293 are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case
No. 90721, and to expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice to the right of the accused to due process. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.




















































































COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILS.) INC. and ERIC MONTINOLA, Petitioners, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and DR. DEAN
CLIMACO, Respondents.


D E C I S I O N


REYES, R.T., J.:


WE are confronted with triple remedial issues on prejudicial question, forum shopping, and litis pendentia.

We review on certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) upholding the order of the Social Security Commission
(SSC),[2] denying petitioners motion to dismiss respondent Climacos petition for compulsory coverage with the Social Security
System (SSS).

The Facts

Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of softdrink beverages.[3] Co-
petitioner Eric Montinola was the general manager of its plant in Bacolod City.[4] Respondent Dr. Dean Climaco was a former
retainer physician at the companys plant in Bacolod City.*5+

In 1988, petitioner company and Dr. Climaco entered into a Retainer Agreement[6] for one year, with a monthly compensation
of P3,800.00,*7+ where he may charge professional fees for hospital services rendered in line with his specialization.*8+ The
agreement further provided that either party may terminate the contract upon giving thirty (30)-day written notice to the
other.*9+ In consideration of the retainers fee, Dr. Climaco agrees to perform the duties and obligations*10+ enumerated in
the Comprehensive Medical Plan,[11] which was attached and made an integral part of the agreement.

Explicit in the contract, however, is the provision that no employee-employer relationship shall exist between the company and
Dr. Climaco while the contract is in effect.[12] In case of its termination, Dr. Climaco shall be entitled only to such retainer fee
as may be due him at the time of termination.*13+


Dr. Climaco continuously served as the company physician, performing all the duties stipulated in the Retainer
Agreement and the Comprehensive Medical Plan. By 1992, his salary was increased to P7,500.00 per month.[14]

Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the Department of Labor and Employment and the SSS whether he was an employee of
the company. Both agencies replied in the affirmative.[15] As a result, Dr. Climaco filed a complaint[16] before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City. In his complaint, he sought recognition as a regular employee of the
company and demanded payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay,
Christmas bonus and all other benefits.[17]

During the pendency of the complaint, the company terminated its Retainer Agreement with Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco
filed another complaint[18] for illegal dismissal against the company before the NLRC Bacolod City. He asked that he be
reinstated to his former position as company physician of its Bacolod Plant, without loss of seniority rights, with full payment of
backwages, other unpaid benefits, and for payment of damages.[19]

The Labor Arbiter, in each of the complaints, ruled in favor of petitioner company.[20] The first complaint was dismissed after
Labor Arbiter Jesus N. Rodriguez, Jr. found that the company did not have the power of control over Dr. Climacos performance
of his duties and responsibilities. The validity of the Retainer Agreement was also recognized. Labor Arbiter Benjamin Pelaez
likewise dismissed the second complaint in view of the dismissal of the first complaint.

On appeal, the NLRC, Fourth Division, Cebu City, affirmed the Arbiter disposition.[21] On petition for review before the CA, the
NLRC ruling was reversed.[22] The appellate court ruled that using the four-fold test, an employer-employee relationship
existed between the company and Dr. Climaco. Petitioners elevated the case through a petition for review on certiorari[23]
before this Court.

Meantime, on November 9, 1994, while the NLRC cases were pending, Dr. Climaco filed with the SSC in Bacolod City, a
petition[24] praying, among others, that petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. be ordered to report him for compulsory
social security coverage.

On April 12, 1995, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued
that there is no employer-employee relationship between the company and Dr. Climaco; and that his services were engaged by
virtue of a Retainer Agreement.[25]

Dr. Climaco opposed the motion.[26] According to Dr. Climaco, *t+he fact that the petitioner [i.e., respondent Dr. Climaco]
does not enjoy the other benefits of the company is a question that is being raised by the petitioner in his cases filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City, against the respondent *i.e., petitioner company+.*27+


On July 24, 1995, the SSC issued an order stating among others, that the resolution of petitioner companys motion to dismiss
is held in abeyance pending reception of evidence of the parties.*28+

In view of the statements of Dr. Climaco in his opposition to the companys motion to dismiss, petitioners again, on March 1,
1996, moved for the dismissal of Dr. Climacos complaint, this time on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia.*29+

SSC and CA Dispositions

On January 17, 1997, the SSC denied petitioners motion to dismiss, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the respondents Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit.

Accordingly, let this case be remanded to SSS Bacolod Branch Office for reception of evidence of the parties pursuant to the
Order dated July 24, 1995.

SO ORDERED.[30]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration*31+ received the same fate.*32+

On April 29, 1997, the company filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. On March 15, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition,
with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, under the premises, the Court holds that public respondent Social Security Commission did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed orders, and the herein petition is therefore DISMISSED for want of merit.

SO ORDERED.[33]

Hence, the present recourse.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for Our consideration:

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS, HAVING
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT, CONSIDERING THAT:

I.
THE PREVIOUS COMPLAINT FOR REGULARIZATION AND/OR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, WHICH IS NOW PENDING RESOLUTION
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, POSES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT CASE.

II.
GIVEN THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES, RESPONDENT CLIMACO IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING, WHICH THEREBY CALLED
FOR THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF HIS PETITION BEFORE THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION.

III.
THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE ALSO BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHT ON THE GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA, AS THERE ARE OTHER
ACTIONS PENDING BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES FOR THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION.[34] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

The petition fails.

The Court notes that petitioners, in their petition, averred that the appeal from the NLRC and CA dispositions on the illegal
dismissal of respondent Climaco is still pending with this Court. Upon verification, however, it was unveiled that the said case
had already been decided by this Courts First Division on February 5, 2007.


While we deplore the failure of petitioners and counsel in updating the Court on the resolution of the said related case,
We hasten to state that it did not operate to moot the issues pending before Us. We take this opportunity to address the
questions on prejudicial question, forum shopping, and litis pendentia.

No prejudicial question exists.

Petitioners allege that Dr. Climaco previously filed separate complaints before the NLRC seeking recognition as a regular
employee. Necessarily then, a just resolution of these cases hinge on a determination of whether or not Dr. Climaco is an
employee of the company.[35] The issue of whether Dr. Climaco is entitled to employee benefits, as prayed for in the NLRC
cases, is closely intertwined with the issue of whether Dr. Climaco is an employee of the company who is subject to compulsory
coverage under the SSS Law. Hence, they argue, said regularization/illegal dismissal case is a prejudicial question.

The argument is untenable.

Our concept of prejudicial question was lifted from Spain, where civil cases are tried exclusively by civil courts, while criminal
cases are tried exclusively in criminal courts. Each kind of court is jurisdictionally distinct from and independent of the
other. In the Philippines, however, courts are invariably tribunals of general jurisdiction. This means that courts here exercise
jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases. Thus, it is not impossible that the criminal case, as well as the civil case in which
a prejudicial question may rise, may be both pending in the same court. For this reason, the elements of prejudicial question
have been modified in such a way that the phrase pendency of the civil case in a different tribunal has been eliminated.*36+

The rule is that there is prejudicial question when (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.[37] It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action both
pend and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed. This is so because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[38]

Here, no prejudicial question exists because there is no pending criminal case.[39] The consolidated NLRC cases cannot be
considered as previously instituted civil action. In Berbari v. Concepcion,[40] it was held that a prejudicial question is
understood in law to be that which must precede the criminal action, that which requires a decision with which said question is
closely related.

Neither can the doctrine of prejudicial question be applied by analogy. The issue in the case filed by Dr. Climaco with the SSC
involves the question of whether or not he is an employee of Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. and subject to the compulsory
coverage of the Social Security System. On the contrary, the cases filed by Dr. Climaco before the NLRC involved different
issues. In his first complaint,[41] Dr. Climaco sought recognition as a regular employee of the company and demanded
payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, Christmas bonus and all other
benefits.[42] The second complaint[43] was for illegal dismissal, with prayer for reinstatement to his former position as
company physician of the companys Bacolod Plant, without loss of seniority rights, with full payment of backwages, other
unpaid benefits, and for payment of damages.[44] Thus, the issues in the NLRC cases are not determinative of whether or not
the SSC should proceed. It is settled that the question claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the case
before the court.[45]

There is no forum shopping.

Anent the second issue, petitioners posit that since the issues before the NLRC and the SSC are the same, the SSC cannot make
a ruling on the issue presented before it without necessarily having a direct effect on the issue before the NLRC. It was
patently erroneous, if not malicious, for Dr. Climaco to invoke the jurisdiction of the SSC through a separate petition.[46] Thus,
petitioners contend, Dr. Climaco was guilty of forum shopping.

Again, We turn down the contention.

Forum shopping is a prohibited malpractice and condemned as trifling with the courts and their processes.[47] It is proscribed
because it unnecessarily burdens the courts with heavy caseloads. It also unduly taxes the manpower and financial resources
of the judiciary. It mocks the judicial processes, thus, affecting the efficient administration of justice.[48]

The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two (2) competent tribunals of two
(2) separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may
repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached.[49]

It is well to note that forum shopping traces its origin in private international law on choice of venues, which later developed to
a choice of remedies. In First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals,[50] the Court had occasion to outline the origin
of the rule on forum shopping. Said the Court:

x x x forum shopping originated as a concept in private international law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to
choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to secure procedural
advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat
these less than honorable excuses, the principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a court, in conflicts of law
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the parties are
not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

x x x x

In the Philippines, forum shopping has acquired a connotation encompassing not only a choice of venues, as it was originally
understood in conflicts of laws, but also to a choice of remedies. As to the first (choice of venues), the Rules of Court, for
example, allow a plaintiff to commence personal actions where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff (Rule 4, Sec. 2*b+). As to remedies,
aggrieved parties, for example, are given a choice of pursuing civil liabilities independently of the criminal, arising from the
same set of facts. A passenger of a public utility vehicle involved in a vehicular accident may sue on culpa contractual, culpa
aquiliana or culpa criminal each remedy being available independently of the others although he cannot recover more than
once.

In either of these situations (choice of venue or choice of remedy), the litigant actually shops for a forum of his action. This
was the original concept of the term forum shopping.

Eventually, however, instead of actually making a choice of the forum of their actions, litigants, through the encouragement
of their lawyers, file their actions in all available courts, or invoke all relevant remedies simultaneously. This practice had not
only resulted to (sic) conflicting adjudications among different courts and consequent confusion enimical (sic) to an orderly
administration of justice. It had created extreme inconvenience to some of the parties to the action.

Thus, forum-shopping had acquired a different concept which is unethical professional legal practice. And this
necessitated or had given rise to the formulation of rules and canons discouraging or altogether prohibiting the practice.

What therefore started both in conflicts of laws and in our domestic law as a legitimate device for solving problems has been
abused and misused to assure scheming litigants of dubious reliefs.[51]

Thus, in order to prevent forum shopping, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provide:

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the
same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.[52]

Forum shopping is not only strictly prohibited but also condemned. So much so that *f+ailure to comply with the foregoing
requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts
of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.*53+


There is forum shopping when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court.[54] In short, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other.[55]

There is res judicata when (1) there is a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or order is on the merits; and (4) there is between the two cases identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action.[56]

Measured by the foregoing yardstick, Dr. Climaco is not guilty of forum shopping. While it is true that the parties are identical
in the NLRC and in the SSC, the reliefs sought and the causes of action are different.

Admittedly, Dr. Climacos basis in filing the cases before the NLRC and the SSC is his Retainer Agreement with the
company. This does not mean, however, that his causes of action are the same:

x x x Some authorities declare the distinction between demands or rights of action which are single and entire and those which
are several and distinct to be that the former arise out of one and the same act or contract and the latter out of different acts
or contracts. This rule has been declared to be unsound, however, and as evidence of its unsoundness, reference has been
made to the fact that several promissory notes may, and often do, grow out of one and the same transaction, and yet they do
not constitute an entire demand. The better rule is that the bare fact that different demands spring out of the same or
contract does not ipso facto render a judgment on one a bar to a suit on another, however distinct. It is clear that the right of a
plaintiff to maintain separate actions cannot be determined by the fact that the claims might have been prosecuted in a single
action. A plaintiff having separate demands against a defendant may, at his election, join them in the same action, or he may
prosecute them separately, subject of the power of the court to order their consolidation. There may be only one cause of
action although the plaintiff is entitled to several forms and kinds of relief, provided there is not more than one primary right
sought to be enforced or one subject of controversy presented for adjudication.[57] (Underscoring supplied)

As the SSC and the CA correctly observed, different laws are applicable to the cases before the two tribunals. The Labor Code
and pertinent social legislations would govern the cases before the NLRC, while the Social Security Law would govern the case
before the SSC. Clearly, as the issues pending before the NLRC and the SSC are diverse, a ruling on the NLRC cases would not
amount to res judicata in the case before the SSC.

The elements of litis pendentia are absent.

Lastly, petitioners contend that the petition of Dr. Climaco before the SSC is defective because there were pending actions
between the same parties and involving the same issues in different fora.[58]

For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) identity of the parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the
two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[59]

In the case under review, there is no litis pendentia to speak of. As previously explained, although the parties in the cases
before the NLRC and the SSC are similar, the nature of the cases filed, the rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in each
tribunal, are different.

As a last attempt, however, petitioners invoke Rule 16, Section 1(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners contend
that the petition Dr. Climaco lodged with the SSC is another action prohibited by the Rule.*60+

In Solancio v. Ramos,[61] the issue centered on whether the pending administrative case before the Bureau of Lands is
another action, which would justify the dismissal of the complaint of plaintiff against defendants before the then Court of
First Instance (now RTC) of Cagayan. Ruling in the negative, the Court noted that both parties as well as the trial court have
missed the extent or meaning of the ground of the motion to dismiss as contemplated under the Rules of Court.*62+ Mr.
Justice Regala, who wrote the opinion of the Court, explained the phrase another action in this wise:

This is not what is contemplated under the law because under Section 1(d), Rule 16 (formerly Rule 8) of the Rules of Court,
*now Rule 1, Section 16(e) of the Rules of Court, supra+ one of the grounds for the dismissal of an action is that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. Note that the Rule uses the phrase another
action. This phrase should be construed in line with Section 1 of Rule 2, which defines the word action, thus

Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Every other remedy is a special proceeding.*63+


Evidently, there is no another action pending between petitioners and Dr. Climaco at the time when the latter filed a petition
before the SSC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.





































JESSE Y. YAP versus HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 35, General Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City;
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL
MIRABUENO,
Respondents.




DECISION


PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Decision[2] dated April 30, 2003 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 68250.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their company
Primetown Property Group.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said
purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses
Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.

In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining checks
were deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that the Account is Closed. Demands were made
by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter
failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks.

On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and attorney's fee
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6231.[3] On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and
instituted a similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6238.[4]
Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General
Santos City. The criminal complaints were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case
No. 35522-I.[5]

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial
question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings.[6] Petitioner prayed that the
proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved.

The MTCC, in its Orders[7] dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a
Partial Motion for Reconsideration[8] relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a
Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I.[9] The subsequent motions were denied in the Order[10] dated
October 18, 2000.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[11]
before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On July
2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[12] denying the petition.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was denied in an Order dated October 18, 2001.[14]

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for the
Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[15] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.

On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision[16] dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA opined that Civil Case
Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The CA ruled:

In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved therein is not the
validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants therein are entitled to
collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this
Court to state that the sale and the rediscounting of the checks are two transactions, separate and distinct from each other. It
so happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in question, but rather the rediscounting of the checks.
Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the validity of the sale stands on hollow
ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is contested in the subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom
why the petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action for the annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in his
answer that the sale be declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution
of the issues therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[17]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[18] which was denied in the Order[19] dated July 17, 2003.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE CIVIL
CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE
PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO.
35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME CHECKS).
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.[20]
The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists in the
present case. It is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages
were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil cases, the issue
as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that
is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court rules that there is no valid
consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be held liable
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other elements, that the check should have been
issued for account or for value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be rightfully
pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and
to close his account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made this order due to the failure of Evelyn to
deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to him.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil Case
Nos. 6231 and 6238 which would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not the validity of the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but whether
the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising from the checks. These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor
of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to private complainants. The checks were subsequently dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue of
whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[21]

The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the
suspension of the proceedings in the MTCC.

We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.[22]
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the
other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If
the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action
based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the
civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.[23] Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action
can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.[24]
The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is
whether the private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have
rediscounted from Evelyn.
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and
damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks
with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.[25]
In Jose v. Suarez,[26] the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5% was void,
such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus
the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled that whether or not the interest rate imposed
by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases
because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed
before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncing check has been
issued.

Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,[27] that:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not the non-payment
of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of
the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property,
but an offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued as an evidence of debt - though not
intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg.
22.

x x x x

x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt -
is malum prohibitum.


To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the
faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade
and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibitum.[28]

Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul[29] is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint for nullification of a
deed of sale on the ground of an alleged double sale. While the civil case was pending, an information for estafa was filed
against Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising from the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil complaint.
The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial question considering that the defense in the civil case was based on the very same
facts that would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the estafa case.

The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay the
private respondents the value of the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the
material question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of
its issuance.

Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and
6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases
against him. The validity and merits of a partys defense and accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies
and evidence brought before the court, are better ventilated during trial proper.

Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine and to
put to test all their respective allegations and evidence through a well designed machinery termed trial. Thus, all the
defenses available to the accused should be invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the proper forum that
should ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.









































































DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, vs. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March
12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.

The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing,
Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22)
against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. The case was docketed as
I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent
with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S.
Janiola.

On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a
Complaint dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the
checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case
Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the
resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words,
private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accuseds
Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this
case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the
issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the
elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded
the civil case.

Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are without
consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil
case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action
may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).8
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision
dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in
the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was
shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil
action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in
character.10
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.

The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF
THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11

The Courts Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988,
the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted
provision and in Beltran v. People,13 are:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a)
the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision was
amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal
case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is
specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal
action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.

On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall
be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions
of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be
interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal
action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the
provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial
question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law
indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had."14 In the instant case, the
phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation
to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term
criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and
criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:

Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not
abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the
proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
reads:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency
of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which
requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely
connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was
filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No.
7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself
but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system."16
This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible
that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation
that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly
worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action
may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during
the trial with the court hearing the case.

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6
of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the
preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the
same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in
order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the
subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere
afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.

In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific performance,
overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said:

Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the
resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against
him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.19
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private
respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more
than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building
for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of
consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of the civil
action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by
petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents positions
cannot be left to stand.

The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak
of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.

To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in
this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and void
for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot
be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.

It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.20
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks
were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of
cases21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP
22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check
was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for
their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the
mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the
issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for
violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some
right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do
in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.

In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5%
interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check
was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the
subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with
Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that
he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making
of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of
consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that
private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is
subject of prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the
issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no
prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of
the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-
61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61
with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

























LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner - versus - RAMON P. JACINTO, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] dated November 28, 2001 and the
Resolution[2] dated August 6, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62773. The CA had set aside the Resolutions
dated October 25, 2000[3] and December 18, 2000[4] of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and reinstated the Resolution[5]
dated March 3, 1999 of the City Prosecution Office of Makati which dismissed the petitioners complaint against respondent
Ramon P. Jacinto in I.S. Nos. 99-A-1536-44 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 22 or The Bouncing Checks Law.
The undisputed facts, as gleaned from the records, are as follows:

The First Womens Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from the petitioner Land Bank in the aggregate amount of P400
million, evidenced by a Credit Line Agreement[6] dated August 22, 1997. As security for the loan, respondent Ramon P.
Jacinto, President of FWCC, issued in favor of Land Bank nine (9) postdated checks amounting to P465 million and drawn
against FWCCs account at the Philippine National Bank. Later, before the checks matured, petitioner and respondent
executed several letter agreements which culminated in the execution of a Restructuring Agreement on June 3, 1998. Under
the new agreement, the loan obligation contracted under the Credit Line Agreement of August 22, 1997 was restructured, its
terms of payment, among others, having been changed or modified. When FWCC defaulted in the payment of the loan
obligation under the terms of their restructured agreement, petitioner presented for payment to the drawee bank the
postdated checks as they matured. However, all the checks were dishonored or refused payment for the reason Payment
Stopped or Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. Respondent also failed to make good the checks despite demands.
Hence, on January 13, 1999, Land Bank, through its Assistant Vice President, Udela C. Salvo, Financial Institutions Department,
filed before the Makati City Prosecutors Office a Complaint-Affidavit[7] against respondent for violation of B.P.
22. Respondent filed his Counter-Affidavit[8] denying the charges and averring that the complaint is baseless and utterly
devoid of merit as the said loan obligation has been extinguished by payment and novation by virtue of the execution of the
Restructuring Agreement. Respondent also invoked the proscription in the May 28, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 133 in Special Proceedings No. M-4686 for Involuntary Insolvency which forbade FWCC from
paying any of its debts.

In a Resolution[9] dated March 3, 1999, Prosecutor George V. De Joya dismissed the complaint against respondent, finding that
the letter-agreements between Land Bank and FWCC restructured and novated the original loan agreement. It was held that
there being novation, the checks issued pursuant to the original loan obligation had lost their efficacy and validity and cannot
be a valid basis to sustain the charge of violation of B.P. 22.

On June 21, 1999, petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.*10+

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the DOJ for review. On April 10, 2000, the DOJ issued a Resolution[11] dismissing
the appeal. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, the DOJ reversed its ruling and issued a Resolution
dated October 25, 2000 holding that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. Thus, the DOJ held that:
WHEREFORE, there being probable cause to hold respondent triable for the offense of violation of BP 22 (nine (9) counts), the
Department Resolution dated April 10, 2000 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the resolution of the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Makati City, dismissing the complaint should be, as it is, hereby REVERSED. Said office is directed to file the
appropriate informations for violation of BP 22 (nine (9) counts) against respondent. Report the action taken within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the above Order but it was denied in a Resolution dated December 18, 2000.
Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

On November 28, 2001, the CA, in the assailed Decision, reversed the Resolution of the DOJ and reinstated the Resolution of
Prosecutor De Joya dismissing the complaint. While the CA ruled that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability,
it nevertheless held that novation may prevent criminal liability from arising in certain cases if novation occurs before the
criminal information is filed in court because the novation causes doubt as to the true nature of the obligation. Also, the CA
found merit in respondents assertion that a prejudicial question exists in the instant case because the issue of whether the
original obligation of FWCC subject of the dishonored checks has been novated by the subsequent agreements entered into by
FWCC with Land Bank, is already the subject of the appeal in Civil Case No. 98-2337 (entitled, First Womens Credit
Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines for Declaration of Novation) pending before the CA. The CA also gave
consideration to respondents assertion that the Order dated May 28, 1998 of the RTC proscribing FWCC from paying its debts
constitutes as a justifying circumstance which prevents criminal liability from attaching.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration from the said decision having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari, raising the following assignment of errors:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ELEMENT OF A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION EXISTS IN THE
INSTANT CASE AND THAT THE RECOMMENDATION FOR THE FILING OF INFORMATIONS IN COURT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT
WAS MADE WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ORDER DATED MAY 28, 1998 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 133, CONSTITUTES AS A JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT PREVENTS CRIMINAL LIABILITY FROM
ATTACHING.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE LANDBANK
CHARTER RELATIVE TO THE COLLECTION OF ITS FINANCIAL EXPOSURES.[13]

Essentially, the issue to be resolved in this case is whether the CA erred in reversing the Resolution of the DOJ finding probable
cause to hold respondent liable for violation of B.P. 22.

Petitioner asserts that the June 3, 1998 Restructuring Agreement did not release FWCC from its obligation with Land
Bank.[14] It merely accommodated FWCCs sister company, RJ Ventures and Development Corporation.*15+ Whether there
was novation or not is also not determinative of respondents responsibility for violation of B.P. 22, as the said special law
punishes the act of issuing a worthless check and not the purpose for which the check was issued or the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. In ruling that the Order dated May 28, 1998 of the RTC in Special Proceedings No. M-4686 constituted a
justifying circumstance, the CA failed to take judicial notice of Section 86-B (4)[16] of Republic Act No. 7907 which excludes the
proceeds of the checks from the property of the insolvent FWCC.

Respondent counters that there was novation which occurred prior to the institution of the criminal complaint against him and
that if proven, it would affect his criminal liability.[17] Respondent averred that if the CA would judicially confirm the existence
of novation in the appeal of Civil Case No. 98-2337 before it, then it would follow that the value represented by the subject
checks has been extinguished. Respondent argues that the consideration or value of the subject checks have been modified or
novated with the execution of the Restructuring Agreement. The payment of the obligation supposedly already depended on
the terms and conditions of the Restructuring Agreement and no longer on the respective maturity dates of the subject checks
as the value or consideration of the subject checks had been rendered inexistent by the subsequent execution of the
Restructuring Agreement. He maintains that the subject checks can no longer be the basis of criminal liability since the
obligation for which they were issued had already been novated or abrogated.

We grant the petition.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists
in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised
in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.[18] The elements of a prejudicial question are provided under Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, as follows: (i) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.[19]

A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before
a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected.[20] Not every defense
raised in a civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an
issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal case and its resolution should determine whether or
not the latter action may proceed. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility
of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.[21] Neither is there a prejudicial
question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. [22]

In the instant case, we find that the question whether there was novation of the Credit Line Agreement or not is not
determinative of whether respondent should be prosecuted for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

Respondents contention that if it be proven that the loan of FWCC had been novated and restructured then his liability under
the dishonored checks would be extinguished, fails to persuade us. There was no express stipulation in the Restructuring
Agreement that respondent is released from his liability on the issued checks and in fact the letter-agreements between FWCC
and Land Bank expressly provide that respondents JSS (Joint and Several Signatures) continue to secure the loan
obligation and the postdated checks issued continue to guaranty the obligation. In fact, as aptly pointed out by petitioner,
out of the nine (9) checks in question, eight (8) checks were dated June 8 to October 30, 1998 or after the execution of the
June 3, 1998 Restructuring Agreement. If indeed respondents liability on the checks had been extinguished upon the execution
of the Restructuring Agreement, then respondent should have demanded the return of the checks.[23] However, there was no
proof that he had been released from his obligation. On the contrary, the Restructuring Agreement contains a proviso which
states that This Agreement shall not novate or extinguish all previous security, mortgage, and other collateral agreements,
promissory notes, solidary undertaking previously executed by and between the parties and shall continue in full force and
effect modified only by the provisions of this Agreement.*24+

Moreover, it is well settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an accommodation, is covered by
B.P. 22.[25] Thus, this Court has held that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the
prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.[26] The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.[27] Section 1 of B.P. 22 enumerates the
following elements: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of
the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment. Thus, even if it be subsequently declared that novation took place between the FWCC and petitioner,
respondent is not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for the dishonored checks.

As to the issue of whether the Order dated May 28, 1998 of the RTC of Makati City in Special Proceedings No. M-4686 for
Involuntary Insolvency constitutes as a justifying circumstance that prevents criminal liability from attaching, we rule in the
negative. As stated at the outset, the said order forbids FWCC from paying its debts as well as from delivering any property
belonging to it to any person for its benefit. Respondent, however, cannot invoke this Order which was directed only upon
FWCC and is not applicable to him. Therefore, respondent, as surety of the loan is not exempt from complying with his
obligation for the issuance of the checks.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 28, 2001 Decision and August 6, 2002
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62773 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated
October 25, 2000 of the Department of Justice directing the filing of appropriate Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against
respondent Ramon P. Jacinto is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
















PIMENTEL VS PIMENTEL

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March
2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72
(RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel)
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed
against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3] holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held
that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried
even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:


WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a
Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[4]


Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal
case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by
overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of
Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime,
the marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per
the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial
on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.[8] Respondents
petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for
annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal
action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal
action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil
action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[10] A
prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.[11]


The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,[12] which punishes any
person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants,
or his spouse.*13+ The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder[14]
or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused
killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of petitioners will.*16+ At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent
were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have
no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.


We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals*17+ that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There
was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that *t+here is x x x a recognition written
into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.*18+ In fact, the Court
declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.*19+

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of
petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
91867.

SO ORDERED.




































Quimiguing vs Icao

TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao
CITATION: 34 SCRA 132

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and
confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by
defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and
attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of
action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court
ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also
receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in
Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children
does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and
this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.










G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos,
presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order denying amendment
of the same pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was averred that
the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married,
succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a
result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she
claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child
had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to
a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee
(whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa
mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code,
and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally represent
them if they were already born.

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right
of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents
and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides
imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first
part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding
Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a
esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento
del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de
antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his
lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to
claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages
under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao.

So ordered.




















































Continental Steel v. Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009

FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death
and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA. The claim was for Hortillanos unborn child who died. Hortillanos
wife had a premature delivery while she was on her 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during the labor. The
company granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and death benefits.
Hortillano claimed that the provision in CBS did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or
must have acquired juridical personality. Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not contemplate death of an
unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. They also claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement of the
benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate dependent. None, which existed in Hortillanos case. They further contend that the
only one with civil personality could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil Code. Hence, according to petitioner, the unborn child
never died. Labor Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment
he/she was conceived. Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiters decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N only one with juridical personality can die.
HELD: No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a
child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is
irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do not provide at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before s/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception.

ISSUE: W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent.
HELD: Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The fetus would have not reached 38-39 weeks without
depending upon its mother.



















Continental Steel v. Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009



D E C I S I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:


Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 27 February
2008 and the Resolution[2] dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution[3]
dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting
bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of
respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and
Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and
the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

x x x x

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of
death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

x x x x

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

x x x x

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his
family in the following manner:

x x x x

4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate
dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers
and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]


The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery
on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January
2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and
other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the
Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed
to settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).[9] In a Submission
Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of
whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2


and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to
resolve said issue.[11]

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their
respective Position Papers, [12] Replies,[13] and Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montao.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union
maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should
have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the
CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe
Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death
benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also
prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave,
bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.[15] Dugans child was only
24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and
only died during labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as Continental Steel;
and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees unions were the
same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts
shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn
child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1)
death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles
40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never
died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that
a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to
a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it
never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified
the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The
failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA the death of whom
would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits bound the Union to the legally
accepted definition of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel,
referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the
companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the
parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted company practice.

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling that
Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:


This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as
provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is death;
(2) such death must be of employees dependent; and (3) such dependent must be legitimate.

On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4,
paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is death; (b) such death must
be of employees dependent; (c) such dependent must be legitimate; and (d) proper legal document to be presented.*18+


Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had
the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for
support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically,
his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was
also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay
Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his
bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death
benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.


Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[19] under Section 1, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos claims for bereavement leave with pay and other
death benefits because no death of an employees dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of
pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal
person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its
contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that
the status of a child could only be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the
conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were
lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos Resolution dated 20 November
2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:


*Herein petitioner Continental Steels+ exposition on the legal sense in which the term death is used in the CBA fails to
impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death
benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil
personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature
delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a death as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event
causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel]
has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term death of a legitimate dependent as condition for granting
bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following *Continental Steels+ theory, there can be no experience of
death to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less
than loss of human life, especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant
to assuage the employee and the latters immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring
legal status or personality upon the unborn child. *Continental Steels+ insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for
statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.[20]


Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated
November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].[21]


In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration[23] of Continental Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the
literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never
acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2)
the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of
the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA
are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g.,
death certificate.

It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and
unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests
on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms death and dependent as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the
CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the
same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent
terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a
child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be
applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost
only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.


We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person
are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to
his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the childs parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death
benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latters death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code
expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,[25] that the State must protect equally with the life of the
mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a
dependent is one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
someone else. Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could
not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for
sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child
of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the
child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel
avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in
the mothers womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27]
we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and
there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on
the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. (Emphasis ours.)


Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are
only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and
illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate
status. (Emphasis ours.)



It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child
attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married
and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and
accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos
claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if
possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the
parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39
weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case
of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.[29] In the
same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[30] we pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of
judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner
acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is
involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is
the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we
are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the
latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.


IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in
the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.