ON THE EXISTENCE OF BRUNO LATOURS MODES:

FROM PLURALIST ONTOLOGY TO ONTOLOGICAL PLURALISM

by Terence Blake
Abstract: In this article I take a critical look at the origins
and sources of Bruno Latour's pluralism as it is expressed in his
book AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($) and compare it to other
similar pro*ects +,ittgenstein) &e-erabend) Badiou./ I consider
the accusations of reductionism and of relati0ism) and demonstrate
that Latour's 1empirical metaph-sics2 is not an ontological
reductionism but a pluralist ontolog- recognising the existence of
a pluralit- of entities and of t-pes of entities/ Nor is it an
epistemological relati0ism but an ontological pluralism affirming
the existence of a pluralit- of t-pes of existence/ hese t3o
strands) pluralist ontolog- and ontological pluralism) mutuall-
reinforce each other to produce at least the outlines of a robust
pluralist realism/
FOREWORD: CRITIQUE AND DIPLOMACY, STRATEGY AND ALLUSION
4,here do -ou critici5e from6 #on7t -ou see that critici5ing is
still kno3ing) kno3ing better6 hat the critical relation still
falls 3ithin the sphere of kno3ledge/ of 4reali5ation8 and thus of
the assumption of po3er6 (riti9ue must be drifted out of/ Better
still: #rifting is in itself the end of all criti9ue/ he desire
underl-ing and informing institutions composes set;ups 3hich are
energetic in0estments in the bod-) in language/8 +L-otard) <=>?)
cited from #RI&,!R@%) %emiotext+e.) <=AB./
4La3rence criticised &rench literature for being incurabl-
intellectual) ideological and idealist) essentiall- critical)
critical of life rather than creati0e of life/// ,e can onl-
assemble among assemblages8 +#eleu5e and Carnet) #IAL!DU$%) B=;EF
G EH) published in &rench in <=>>./
I read Latour 3ith man- &rench texts resonating in m- mind) texts
from the period *ust before and *ust after "a- 7IA/ here are man-
such texts dating from this epoch and later that seem to ha0e
formed the pre;indi0idual conceptual soup from 3hich Latour dra3s
to elaborate his o3n process of intellectual indi0iduation/ !ne
line of argument in those texts 3as the criti9ue of 4criti9ue8 as
the triumph of negati0it- and conformism disguised as lucidit-) of
intellectual la5iness disguised as sophistication) of meta;
discourse and abstraction disguised as perspicuit-/ (riti9ue 3as
said to be the ne3 a0atar of transcendence) a 3a- to a0oid
engaging 3ith life and concrete experience/ (ritical thought)
though necessar-) 3as seen as insufficient) and potentiall-
destructi0e of thought and life if gi0en primac-/ ,hat 3as needed
3as creati0e life) seen as an empirical concrete art of
composition and assemblage/
It is interesting to note that Caul &e-erabend 3as talking in much
the same 0ein at roughl- the same time) critici5ing Copper7s
critical rationalism for the primac- it ga0e to criti9ue/ An
important difference 3as that &e-erabend did not limit his
discussion to the shortcomings of 0arious academic accounts of the
practice of science/ Je 3as 3illing to pose the general 9uestion
of the nature and 0alue of science/ Latour affirms that properl-
understood his anal-ses do not undermine science but explain 3h-
it is as reliable as it is/ ,hat he undermines) or so he sa-s) is
a persistent deformation) a phantasm concerning the nature and
function of science/ his is onl- half true/ Jis idea is that
criti9ue has become so democratised that an-one can appl- its
techni9ues to cast doubt on solid science) such as e0olutionar-
biolog- or the stud- of climate change) in fa0our of positions
that ha0e no real research behind them +creationism) climate
denialism. and 3hose defence reposes on *ust these critical
techni9ues and nothing else/ ,hile I globall- agree) I think
9uestioning of the critical attitude goes too far and brands more
general critical examination of the sciences as irrational/
Latour7s thesis is not ne3) &e-erabend +3ho Latour ne0er seems to
refer to) preferring to impl- that he 3as not influenced b- the
illustrious epistemological predecessors of science studies.
declared that his aim 3as not to make criti9ue easier but a lot
more difficult/ Yet he also maintained that more general 9uestions
on the cogniti0e status and on the 0alue of scientific results are
a necessar- part of a democratic education and of an elightened
participation in societ-/
Latour7s 3orks emerge from this creati0e context of ideas) that 3e
ma- group together under the rubric of 4post;structuralism8) or
more generall- of epistemological and ontological pluralism/ Yet
he does not easil- ackno3ledge this source) except in the 0aguest
terms/ ,ords) concepts) images that he seems to present as his o3n
deri0e from this background/ he 9uestion one can pose is 3h- does
he not full- ackno3ledge his immediate predecessors/ !n his o3n
theor- of mediation this influence is both ine0itable and
desirable) for to 4multipl- the mediators8 is supposed to
strengthen a position rather than 3eaken it/ %ometimes I think
that Latour is a "achia0ellic master manipulator) a cunning
diplomat deplo-ing a rhetorical strateg- to become the stereot-pe
of the Dreat &rench ChilosopherK sometimes I think that he is a
master of the allusi0eness that is necessar- to enrich one7s st-le
3ith enough transindi0idual 0ibranc- to reall- be able to sa-
something both contentful and ne3/
I do not kno3 ho3 to resol0e m- dilemma) 3hich comes from ha0ing
read man- texts that he has surel- read and hearing their
resonances in his o3n 3ords/ his impression of 4dL*M 0u8 combines
3ith other 3orries about the explicit content of his 0ie3s that I
find I both appro0e and feel dissatisfied 3ith) that I summarise
b- sa-ing 4he7s on the right track) but he doesn7t go far enough8/
In man- 3a-s I find Bruno Latour7s s-stem is an ad0ance on Alain
Badiou7s philosoph- 3ith its four truth procedures) 3here Latour
discerns fifteen modes of 0eridiction) 3hich are also modes of
existence/ Yet behind the talk of an open pluralit- of truth;
rLgimes and their specific mediations and institutions there are
signs of conceptual and institutional conser0atism and of
authoritarian legitimation of the status 9uo/
I share Latour7s desire for philosophers to indulge in more
4empirical research8) concei0ed broadl-/ "- concern is that
sometimes he slides bet3een this more general sense of empiricism)
3here a philosopher like #eleu5e can be considered to do
+conceptual) affecti0e) perceptual) political) and e0en religious.
empirical field3ork and a more limited sense in 3hich Latour has
done field3ork but not #eleu5e) nor Badiou) L-otard and %erres/ "-
9uarrel is 3ith the diplomatic caricature of himself that Latour
secretes) consciousl- or not) and that interferes 3ith the part of
his message that I like and 3ish to help publicise/
ON ACADEMIC REGRESSION IN CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
,e are li0ing through a period of intellectual regression in the
realm of (ontinental Chilosoph-) a regression that proclaims
itself to be a decisi0e progress be-ond the merel- negati0e and
critical philosophies of the recent past/ Yet the philosophies of
#eleu5e) &oucault) #errida and L-otard cannot be summed up in the
image of pure criti9ue/ heir critical dissolution of the dogmatic
residues contained in e0en the most inno0ati0e philosophies the-
had encountered did not lea0e us in a po3erless 0oid of negati0it-
and paral-sis/ heir 4deconstruction8 3ent all the 3a- do3n)
deconstructing e0en the notion of criti9ue and liberating the
possibilit- of ne3 assemblages and ne3 processes of
sub*ecti0ation/
#espite his insinuations to the contrar-) Bruno Latour7s
compositionism is the direct application of post;structuralist
thought) that he is 0er- familiar 3ith/ Jis talk) containing
o0ertones of scientistic bra0ado) about his 4empirical8 research
is 0er- misleading) as his s-stem is parasitic on these
philosophical predecessors/ Je is ho3e0er a good populariser of
difficult ideas) and his 3ork should be encouraged as long as 3e
do not accept his o3n contextualisation of his research/ Latour is
0er- much an inheritor of #eleu5e) L-otard) #errida and %erres and
the intellectual contemporar- of Laruelle and %tiegler/ It is his
continuation of this pluralist lineage that gi0es his 3ork its
superiorit- o0er Badiou7s s-stem) not an- primac- of the empirical
o0er the philosophical/
Be-ond the criti9ue of the ne3 figures of transcendence and
ontotheolog- these thinkers ga0e concrete sketches of ho3 to see
the 3orld in terms of a 0er- different sort of ontolog- based on
immanence N a pluralist diachronic ontolog-/ he recent promotion
of philosophical successors to this constellation of thinkers of
immanence) such as Badiou and Oi5ek) has not led to an- real
progress but to a labour of tra0est-ing the past +one has onl- to
look at Badiou7s #$L$UO$ and Oi5ek7s !RDAN% ,IJ!U B!#I$%. and
to a return to such intellectual deadends as Lacanian
ps-choanal-sis +especiall- understood s-nchronicall-) as Badiou
understands e0er-thing) as a speculati0e s-stem./ But e0en these
regressi0e philosophers remain in dialogue) ho3e0er one;sided and
un*ust) 3ith their illustrious predecessors) and stri0e to
confront them at the le0el of conceptual richness that
characterised their 3ork/
he next step 3as to keep up the general aura of ha0ing 4gone
be-ond8 the older supposedl- negati0e thinkers but to radicall-
simplif- the conceptual le0el) presenting eas- summar-
presentations of the ne3 thought 3hile con0enientl- forgetting the
conceptual paths follo3ed/ his step 3as taken b- the epigoni:
"eillassoux) 3ho still retains an ele0ated st-le and at least an
intention of conceptual rigourK and its pop 0ariant in Draham
Jarman7s adaptation for the masses/ &or example) in J$ JIR#
ABL$ Draham Jarman gi0es a popularised 0ersion his theoretical
position in the form of a fla3ed reading of) and an unsatisf-ing
response to) %ir Arthur $ddington7s famous paradox of the t3o
tables/ Unfortunatel-) Jarman sho3s himself incapable of grasping
the anti;reductionistic import of $ddington7s argument and
proposes an abstract philosophical dualism to replace $ddington7s
pluralist 0ision of scientific research/ Jarman claims that his
account escapes the reductionism that he mistakenl- attributes to
$ddington7s 0ie3) despite reducing the ob*ects of common sense)
science) and the humanities to the status of 4utter shams8/ It is
implied that the theoretical *ustification for this unsatisf-ing
presentation is to be found else3here in Jarman7s 3orks) but this
is not the case/
Jo3e0er) it is Badiou7s philosoph- that expresses in its purest
and most general form the ne3 paradigm that articulates explicitl-
3hat is else3here *ust blithel- presupposed as a form of thought
too e0ident to e0en be a3are of/ he next step in consolidating
the regression that Badiou7s philosoph-) ho3e0er inno0ati0e)
represents +a regression that Badiou7s thought does not initiate
but rather registers and legitimates. corresponds to the far less
ambitious productions of the ob*ect;oriented ontologists/ I sa-
far less 4ambitious8 in the sense of conceptual ambition) because
their ambition is if possible e0en greater than that of Badiou)
but it is of a different order than the conceptual/ he- are the
marketised 0ersion of the Badiou;Oi5ek constellation) and so the
extremel- politicised tone has been discreetl- dissol0ed to lea0e
a more demagogic packaging to the stale ideas that !!! trumpets
ambitiousl- as the ne3 construction after so much criti9ue/ he
attempts b- this ne3 generation of phiosophers to elaborate a
thought capable of guiding us in the ne3 historical con*uncture
that 3e are entering 3ithout being able to produce the concepts
necessar- to describe it are far from original/ &aced 3ith the
inade9uac- of these 0ariants of Badiou7s ontological h-pothesis
"ehdi Belha* @acem describes the need for a 4ne3 con*ecture8/ Je
examines 0arious attempts to go be-ond the metaph-sical
problematic secreted unconsciousl- b- the trend to3ards
speculati0e capitalism) of 3hich Badiou7s metaph-sics is the
explicitation and the most accomplished form/ "B@ en0isions such
mo0ements as %peculati0e Realism and !b*ect;!riented !ntolog- as
containing nothing ne3 capable of leading us out of the Badiousian
predicament/
It is normal that in this context &ranPois Laruelle7s philosoph-
is at last coming into its o3n/ It could not attain full
0isibilit- and be understood on its o3n terms 3hile the 3ork of
#eleu5e and #errida 3ere in progress) as his criti9ues of that
3ork 3ere onl- half;true) based on gi0ing it an ultimatel-
uncharitable reading as remaining 3ithin the norms of sufficient
philosoph-) but other readings are possible/ his 3as not the
appropriate background to sho3 up the singularit- and the
penetration of his ideas/ Laruelle pursued o0er the decades his
un3a0ering commitment to immanence) and this pro*ect shines forth
no3 against the background of the regression that Badiou;Oi5ek;
"eillassoux and the !!!xians represent/
Caul &e-erabend gi0es us a sketch of a different sort of ontolog-
than that of the Badiou;Oi5ek;epigoni carrousel) an ontolog- that
is itself sub*ect to the process of research instead of lording it
o0er the sciences) the arts) lo0e) and political struggle/ Bruno
Latour goes in this direction) that of a diachronic ontolog-) and
expresses the fairl- ob0ious demand that religion be included
among the 0arious 4truth;procedures8 or modes of existence that
are also) as "ehdi Belha* @acem points out) modes of 4prehension8
+using ,hitehead7s term./ &ranPois Laruelle made use of science to
rid philosoph- of its s-nchronic pretentions) and has no3 opened
philosoph- onto the 3hole field of prehensions) including religion
+gnosticism and m-sticism.) art +photograph-.) literature
+science;fiction.) politics +democrac-.) ps-choanal-sis +non;
anal-sis./ Bernard %tiegler underlines the catastrophe 0isible
inside Clato7s o3n 3orks of the replacement of the preceding
traditional diachronic cosmolog- b- a ne3 t-rann- of thought and
action based on the establishment of a s-nchronic ontolog-/
I make use of the &e-erabendian concept of abundance to resume the
features of a diachronic ontolog- that makes a place for realism
AN# historicit-) for speculation AN# re0isabilit-/ 4,ithdra3al8 is
an artefact) the pessimistic conse9uence of emplo-ing a simplified
set of abstractions to describe the different modes of existence)
spatialising them and so producing and promoting a s-nchronic
ontolog- 3hich can neither account for change nor e0en do *ustice
to the man- elements and aspects of the 3orld/ &e-erabend
distinguished the 3a- of the scientist) or more generall- the 3a-
of research) from the 3a- of the philosopher/ (onse9uentl- he 3as
0er- 3ar- of academic philosoph-) its abstractions) its *argon)
and its dualisms/ his led him to be 0er- attenti0e to the life of
the ordinar- person and to defend common sense realit- from
academic philosophers 3ho 3ould teach us that the abundance of the
concrete 3orld is an illusion) a 4sham8) and that onl- their
philosophical abstractions are real/
All this talk about diachronic ontolog- and processes of
indi0iduation raises the 9uestion of non;academic prehensions of
the 3orld) that 3e ma- summari5e follo3ing &e-erabend and Laruelle
under the term 4gnosis8/ Jo3 much gnosis does one actuall- see in
academic talk about gnosticism6 Caul &e-erabend praised the
gnostics for being able to put into 9uestion not *ust aspects of
the 3orld but also criticise in their globalit- both our
understanding of the 3orld and also the 3orld itself/ &e-erabend7s
3hole thought from his anarchism) his defence of counter;
induction) to his sketches of an ontolog- capable of under3riting
his pluralist methodolog- and politics of democratic relati0ism)
bears the mark of his affinities 3ith Dnosticism/ If Dnosticism is
the opposite of an external doctrine to be administered b- a
hierarchical institution based on ontological stupidit- and
blindness +as much of the academ- has become. then it is to be put
more in relation 3ith processes of ps-chic and collecti0e
indi0iduation +as Qung has argued./ &e-erabend7s st-le embodies
4gnosis8 in this sense) and one 3ould 3ish to see ) for example)
talk of the hermetic #eleu5e be itself more hermetic +gnostic)
diachronic) indi0iduating. and less academic +dogmatic)
s-nchronic) alienating./
he 9uestion then is not to be in the academ- or not/ here is no
right place to be) as L-otard remarked) *ust a right 3a- of being:
a good conductor of intensities 3hether inside or outside the
academ-/ ,e cannot sa- that artists exemplif- a creati0it- that is
lacking in academic philosoph-/ $0en philosoph- professors can be
non;philosophers) or better non;standard philosophers) inno0ating
outside the conceptual hegemonies imposed b- tradition/ $0en
artists can be careerist pimps/ here is no absolute criterion)
and e0en our 0ocabular- can betra- our thought/ I 3ould like to
talk in terms of non;academics and ask 4#oes -our path of energies
take -ou closer to the sources of immanence68 I 3ould like to
talk) as Laruelle does) of 4thought;po3er8 on the analog- 3ith
labour;po3er) but all that is academic *argon if it is not tied to
the li0ed experience it tries to con0e-/ &e-erabend) a uni0ersit-
professor) condemned the academ-) its language and its cli9ues/ Je
did not talk or teach or think like the 0ast ma*orit- of his
colleagues/ Yet he claimed to ha0e al3a-s had 4complete freedom8
to do things his 3a-/ Being in the academ- or not administrati0el-
speaking is not the criterion/ But being inside the collecti0e
phantasm that it secretes and sustains) and 0oluntaril-
perpetuating that phantasm or doing something else is a criterion
HOW TO READ LATOUR (1: P!"#t$%&s' !( )a"*%s
!ne cannot help noticing a certain 0agueness and conceptual
tension in Latour7s use of the term 4"oderns8) and of 3hat role
his appeal to a notion of 40alues8 pla-s in his pro*ect:
preliminar- sur0e- to open up the field of in9uir- or rhetorical
reduction to ser0e the purposes of his o3n agenda/ he 9uestion is
thus posed of ho3 3e ma- best read this book) and Latour7s 3ork in
general/
%t-le and 0ocabular- are important to Latour7s message) as are
argumentati0e and rhetorical strateg-/ his implies that 3e do not
read Latour through the literalism and the narro3 rationalism of
4double;click8 spectacles/ #ouble;click is the name for a mode +of
discourse and of existence. that reduces existence to information
treated as unmediated and transparent access to realit-/ In
opposition to the claim of double;click rationalit- to be the onl-
trust3orth- access to realit-) since it takes itself to be the
onl- mode of existence) Latour argues that there are in fact man-
modes of existence/ $ach of these modes generates its o3n
information and sub*ects it to multiple transformations) and each
embodies different 0alues/ he rise to hegemon- of double;click
rationalit- corresponds to 3hat "ax ,eber called the process of
rationali5ation) 3hich brought 3ith it the reduction of the man-
modes of existence to one) and thus the 4disenchantement8 of the
3orld/
+Note: Latour la-s out fifteen modes of existence and of
40eridiction8) but unlike Badiou and his magic number of four
4truth;procedures8 Latour is open to the possibilit- of adding
others/ In this regard 3e can see Badiou as still practicing a
priori philosoph-) 3here Latour true to his 3ord is intent on
practicing an empirical metaph-sics./
!ne can note that Latour7s choice of theoretical 0ocabular- is
0oluntaril- simple) and one moti0e for this choice is the desire
to a0oid the misleading associations and connotations that adhere
to the more technical 3ords of the philosophical tradition/
Jo3e0er) I agree 3ith #eleu5e that it is often the books that make
the choice of a non;technical 0ocabular- that are the most
difficult/ ,e ha0e seen in the last post that Latour7s use of the
3ord 4modern8 conceals man- problems) as does his choice of the
3ord 40alues8) and I ha0e argued that his text on his o3n account
must not be taken at face;0alue +4face;0alue. is another name for
double;click) the omnipresent enem- of the recognition of the
pluralit- of modes./
I think that this creates a situation that is a challenge for an-
conse9uent pluralism/ Latour7s book is 3ritten not as *ust a
monist double;click treatise about a pluralism of modes of
existence but as itself an enactment of such pluralism) and is to
be read accordingl-/ Its aim is) after the double;click
disenchantment of the 3orld) to reenchant the 3orld b- in0esting
it 3ith a pol-theism of 0alues/ It re9uires that 3e read it 3ith
pol-theistic a3areness/ (ertainl- 3e can and must read it for
information) but 3e must also be a3ake to its strategies and
con*unctural alliances/ ,e must appreciate its fictioning of
beings and of conceptual personae) and 3e must approach it 3ith
religious care to respond to the li0ing spirit underl-ing its
potentiall- dead letter/ ,e must relate to it in terms of the
ps-chic construction) or indi0iduation) that it exemplifies and
renders possible/
his pol-theism of reading is in line 3ith m- o3n approach to
understanding and interpretation/ I personall- don7t belie0e in
direct access to a text +or to an-thing else.) nor does Latour/ I
read a text 3ith e0er-thing I70e got/ (ertainl- it is important to
take note of the 0ocabular- and of the distinctions foregrounded
b- the author) but I argue that the- must be read against this
pol-theistic background/
HOW TO READ LATOUR (+: A,a&-st Stra&,$t R%a.&-,
,e are often confronted 3ith the demand that 3e read a 3riter
4first8 in their o3n terms) and then in a later phase propose
h-potheses for interpreting the text/ his is a naR0e empiricist
methodological principle based on the idea that 3e must first seek
direct unmediated 4ra38 data) and then elaborate h-potheses to
explain that data/ his principle is based on an impossibilit-)
the m-th of information untransformed b- theoretical
interpretation) and is in no 3a- applicable to the process of
research/ Latour himself condemns it under the name of 4#ouble
(lick8) the m-th of transport of information 3ithout
transformation/ his is a basic principle of Latour7s research
from the 0er- beginning N 3e ha0e onl- to recall that Latour
started out in Biblical exegesis/
here is no 4blank;slate8 reading) *ust registering 3hat Latour
sa-s in his o3n terms/ (an 3e then read Latour 3ith constant
reference to the kno3n facts concerning the domains he discusses6
his 3ould be -et another positi0ist reduction of his text) as
Latour does not claim to be gi0ing a report on the results of
empirical research: 4it is not in the mode of kno3ledge that I
claim to be 3orking8 +AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($) BA<./
Latour7s text is not an exercise in 4speaking straight8 +#ouble;
(lick.) but in 4speaking 3ell8 +plurimodal diplomac-./ As such it
re9uires something other than 4reading straight8: a plurimodal or
pol-theist reading/
Latour calls the approach emplo-ed in his text 4plurimodal8)
4diplomatic8) or 4relationist8/ Jis text is constructed on the
fable of an anthropologist 3ho 3ishes to reconstitute the 0alue
s-stem of modern ,estern societies/ %he is careful to a0oid the
naR0e error of 4belie0ing 3hat the ,est sa-s about itself8 +?A.)
taking a trul- anthropological approach) understanding that
4modernism7s accounts of itself ma- ha0e no relation to 3hat has
actuall- happened to it8 +?A./ Jer in0estigation in0ol0es li0ing
among her informants and participating in their dail- acti0ities
3ithout being credulous/ %he understands that this is the onl- 3a-
to disco0er the 0alue s-stem of her informants) 43ho account for
this s-stem in terms to 3hich she must a0oid gi0ing too much
3eight8/
he 4surprising8 disco0er- of this fictitious in0estigator is that
not onl- do the accounts gi0en b- the moderns of each mode of
existence that she isolates not correspond to their actual
practice) but that the- are 0er- often shocked b- the more
ade9uate accounts that she comes up 3ith based on her
in0estigations/ he- tend to den- that her accounts are accurate)
preferring to belie0e 9uite naR0el- in their o3n utterl-
unrealistic accounts) and she must exercise much diplomac- to get
her findings accepted/ he per0asi0eness of this denegation and
naR0etL are in large part responsible for the difficult- of the
in0estigation/
I think this fable of the anthropological in0estigator is a good
model of the sort of reading that is appropriate to AN INQUIRY
IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($/ he reader of Latour7s 3ork must li0e
3ith it 3ithout gi0ing too much 3eight to its o3n self;account)
and be alert to possible instances of denegation and of naR0etL
+3hether authentic or feigned. in the 0er- construction of the
pro*ect 3ithin the text/ Bernard %tiegler gi0es us +in 4Bernard
%tiegler's Charmac-: A (on0ersation8) (onfigurations Solume <A)
Number H) &all ?F<F. 0er- useful ad0ice in reading Latour7s
texts:
4Right no3 I ha0e a st-listic difficult- 3ith Latour/ If -ou 3ill)
for me) Latour ;; 3ho I think is a 0er- interesting person ;; is
in a bad relation 3ith philosoph- /// he is in a state of
philosophical denial /// I al3a-s ha0e the impression) because of
this denial) that there is a certain blindness) a certain naR0etL
e0en) in Latour7s reasoning process) a certain c-nicism8/
his gi0es us a fruitful set of criteria for reading Latour: be on
the lookout for occurrences of philosophical denial) of blindness)
of naR0etL) and of c-nicism/ It is clear that %tiegler thinks that
because of his philosophical denegation Latour is still stuck to
some extent in naR0e empiricism/ In effect)Latour7s 3ork embodies
a double empiricism: an empiricism of net3orks) that one has *ust
to trace and follo3) and also one of modes of existence that one
has to describe and pre0ent from imposing their felicit-
conditions on another mode/
,e can obser0e the con*oined presence of blindness) naR0etL and
c-nicism in the beginning chapters of Latour7s ne3 book:
<. Blindness: Latour conflates a philosophical definition of the
"oderns +those 3ho belie0e in %cience7s radical separation from
Colitics and in the d-namic of progress brought about b- that
separation. 3ith an empirical socio;economic defintion +the
technologicall- ad0anced societies of $urope and the United
%tates./ Je passes from one sense to the other 3ithout seeming to
notice) creating a certain degree of 0agueness and of conceptual
confusion in his declarationsK
?. NaR0etL: Latour7s anal-ses taken as real;life political
prescriptions are naR0e in that the- ignore important socio;
economic realities of class) po3er) institutions) and cultural /
H. (-nical: Latour is not 0er- reliable in enouncing all the
stakes of his anal-ses) and is often pursuing se0eral agendas at
once/ Jis st-le is an inter0ention in a field of forces) allies
and enemies) not all of 3hich are made explicit) and 3hose
characteri5ation often depends more on strategic con0enience and
rhetorical positioning than on straight;talking referential prose/
#oes all this in0alidate 3hat Latour has to sa-6 Not at all)
Latour7s 4blindness8 is counterbalanced b- a ne3 insight into
materialit-/ %tiegler praises Latour for posing important
9uestions and for bringing a concern 3ith 4things8 into
philosoph-:
4I find that he is extremel- intelligent and he often raises
pertinent 9uestions) but) moreo0er) he is interested in ob*ects
and things and this interests me /// I think that the thing) the
banal 4thingness8 of the thing) is something extremel- important
that philosoph- has a tendenc- to re*ect/ I therefore regret that
in #errida7s 3ork) the criti9ue of logocentrism does not lead in
the end to a reconsideration of things/ Jere) Latour is 0er-
interesting8/
his reaction of %tiegler7s highlights an impression that one ma-
ha0e in reading Latour of real no0elt- embedded in disingenuous
narration/ he a0oidance of traditional philosophical *argon is no
doubt a useful heuristic procedure for extracting us from
sedimented presuppositions/ But it has the disad0antage of
exaggerating the no0elt- of the anal-ses and of cloaking important
conceptual affinities and precedents/ It cannot be put for3ard as
an obligator- methodic principle) but ma- be of use 3hen
considered as *ust one heuristic amongst man-/ he conclusion for
reading Latour is that 3e should both go 3ith the actual net3ork
of concepts elaborated b- Latour and at the same time interpret
that net3ork in terms of a pluralit- of perspecti0es or modes
insofar as the- are pertinent to the matters at hand/ $xegesis is
not straight reading nor free association) but pragmatic
pertinence/
SITUATING LATOUR/S ENUNCIATIONS: META0LANGUAGE OR NEWSPEA1
Bruno Latour7s book AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($ purports to
describe the felicit- conditions of a pluralit- of modes of
existence and of their corresponding modes of 0eridiction/ %o it
is reasonable to raise the 9uestion of the situation of
enunciation instituted in the book) and of the status of Latour7s
o3n speech acts/ In the passage from certaint- to trust the
enunciati0e modalit- changes:
4But 3hen one has to appeal to trust) the interlocutor- situation
is entirel- different: one has to share the concern for a fragile
and delicate institution) encumbered 3ith terribl- material and
mundane elements;; oil lobbies) peer e0aluation) the constraints
of model;making) t-pos in thousand;page;long reports) research
contracts) computer bugs) and so on8 +H./
Latour7s o3n discourse seems to allude to a possible scientific
status) b- the constant e0ocation of an 4anthropolog- of the
"oderns8) -et much of 3hat he sa-s is philosophical in form and
content) containing idios-ncratic speculation 3hose e0idential
support is not readil- apparent / he lack of clarit- o0er the
ob*ect of the in9uir- +the 4"oderns8 and their 40alues8. and o0er
the potential audience for its results adds to the pu55lement o0er
the status of his discourse/ In the conclusion Latour states:
4hus 3hile I ha0e spoken all along of an in9uir- and e0en of a
9uestionnaire) it is not in the mode of kno3ledge that I claim to
be 3orking/ he term 4in9uir-8 has to be taken in a plurimodal
sense 3hose ob*ect is to preser0e the di0ersit- of modes/ (an 3e
call this approach 4empirical philosoph-86 I am not sure) gi0en
ho3 indifferent philosoph- has become to the tasks of description/
$xperimental metaph-sics6 (osmopolitics6 (omparati0e anthropolog-6
Cractical ontolog-6 /// o situate this reprise of the rationalist
ad0enture) but to mark clearl- that it 3ill not take place under
the auspices of #ouble (lick) I ha0e entrusted it to the term
diplomac-8/
%o it is not in the mode of kno3ledge) -et empirical/ In the
beginning of the book Latour appeals to his status as a
practitioner of science studies) and 3e kno3 he has published
books on a case stud- of technolog- and of la3/ Jis book on
religious enunciation R$Q!I(IND is not based on a case stud- but
on his o3n +experiential6 philosophical6. impressions of 3hat such
utterance is all about/ 4Clurimodal8) including the mode of
kno3ledge but not limited to it) seems an apt description) but so
does 4meta;modal8) if 3e 3ant to capture the idea that it is not
political diplomac- that is at pla-) but ontological diplomac-/
he scene of this diplomac- is 0ague too: the in0estigator must
sho3 diplomac- 3ith her informers and stri0e to obtain their
assent for her redescriptions of their practices and institutions)
diplomac- again in the negotiations bet3een the different modes of
existence) and -et again in the negotiations bet3een the "oderns
and the 4others8/
#espite an effort to locate and free us from categor- mistakes
3hen one mode of existence is confused 3ith or impinges on
another) Latour himself mixes philosophical considerations and
empirical claims in a confusing 3a-/ he result is a 0agueness or
4muddiness8 that complcates his argument and gi0es an illusion of
concreteness/ here emerges from all this an impression of
authorit-) -et the bibliograph- to support his claims is lacking/
here is an attempt to exploit the trust the reader ma- ha0e in
Latour7s pre0ious 3ork on re0isioning of science and ha0e it
accorded to claims about other domains) institutions) and modes of
existence 3here no such 3ork is cited/ he ob*ections that the
text en0isions come from nai0e stra3 men 3ho are trapped in the
snares of sub*ect;ob*ect) the bifurcation nature;societ-) the
impossible 9uest for unmediated certaint-) or of double;click
literalism/ here is so much renaming that one has trouble
formulating ob*ections that ha0e not been rendered impossible b-
the ne3 terminolog-/ An interesting case is the fate of the 3ord
4transcendence8) 3hich becomes split in t3o: there is a 4bad8
transcendence and a 4good8 transcendence) 3hich is defined so as
to be s-non-mous 3ith immanence +4immanence) for AI"$) is
s-non-mous 3ith good transcendence8./ his is in line 3ith a
return to a more consensual +4diplomatic8. posture and an attempt
to a0oid 4pro0ocation8) at least at the le0el of terminolog-/
Alread- Latour had renamed his position from 4social
constructi0ism8 to 4constructi0ism8/ No3 3e ha0e him renouncing
constructi0ism in fa0our of compositionism) and the return of
0alues) institutions) and e0en +4good8. transcendence/ here are
no boundaries bet3een domains) but one ma- not mix different modes
of existence) under penalt- of 4categor- mistake8/ Yet one ma-
ask: are all such crossings sterile errors6 If this ontolog- is
diachronic) 3ith modes of existence e0ol0ing) mutating) coming
into being and disappearing) can such crossings sometimes be
producti0e6 he terminolog- of categor- mistakes) though necessar-
for eliminating 4bad8 mixtures) ma- eliminate too much +3hat about
the possibilit- of 4good8 mixtures and tend to3ards stasis/ !nce
3e ha0e our map of 0alues and modes that characterise us are 3e
*ust going to agree to be different from our others) or are 3e
going to s3ap and mix 3ith them6 It is strange to police the
proliferation of h-brids at the ob*ect le0el 3ith the stern
3arnings against categorial confusion at the meta;le0el/
!n the 9uestion of 4Salues8) I think that Latour effectuates an
illegitimate transition at the beginning of the book from
experience to 0alue in his presentation of his pro*ect/ hen he
gi0es the 0alue thus located a ne3 content +4ne3 account8./ %o the
defence of the 0alues of the moderns is a strange tension of
conser0ati0e and re0isionar- mo0es/
Latour7s 4felicit- conditions8 are to be distinguished from the
0alues he posits) being rather the criteria determining that some
0alue has been respected or attained) or not/ Reducing science to
the 0alue of 4ob*ecti0it-8 as Latour does in the introduction) or
religion to con0ersion) is a dubious mo0e/he idea that each mode
of existence embodies a 40alue8 that can be isolated out is a
rhetorical reduction/ It is rhetorical because it consists in
persuasi0el- re;defining the experience underl-ing a mode of
existence 3hile gi0ing the appearance of simpl- re;stating that
experienceK it is a reduction in that something of the complexit-
of that experience is lost/ ,anting us to gi0e up the 4belief in
beliefs8 in fa0our of a belief in 0alues seems little gain) but
tends to3ards den-ing an- cogniti0e dimension to 0alues/ here is
also the inter;textual aspect/ Latour relies hea0il- on a fu55-
set of allusions to pre0ious &rench philosophers/ In particular
much of his pluralism has a #eleu5ian ring) *ust as his
declaration of the end of the modernist master narrati0e of
$mancipation is a L-otardian concept/ In #eleu5e7s terms 0alue is
al3a-s a term for the conformist codification of practices and of
modes of existence) and it is rather singular e0aluations that
allo3 us to construct our modes of existence 3ithout succombing to
transcendence in the sense of a higher ob*ecti0e court of appeal/
Latour seems to be tr-ing to re0amp the terminolog- to produce
more conser0ati0e conclusions than such thinkers 3orked to3ardsK
here is a 3hole strand of re;defining the terms of his
predecessors rather than confronting them that goes in the same
directionK Jis re;defining of 4deconstruction8 into purel-
negati0e critical thought is an important example/ Jis 3iping out
of t3o generations of predecessors is of a piece 3ith his
considering onl- stra3 man ob*ectors/ Noone 3ants to be a dualist
still belie0ing in subect;ob*ect or the bifurcation of Nature and
%ociet-) noone 3ants to belie0e in the unmediated access to the
real or in the uniitar- autonomous sub*ect/ But the 0ictor- o0er
+i/e/ the deconstruction of. these concepts in fa0our of +it 3as
not *ust negati0e. multiplicities of heterogeneous elements
arranged in immanent net3orks N this 3as not Latour7s contribution
but that of his immediate predecessors/ %o I think that looking
0er- 3aril- at a seemingl- innocent 3ord such as 40alue8 is
important to understand Latour7s pro*ect in a 3ider intellectual
context than that 3hich he himself indicates explicitl-/ An
unreliable narrator of the necessit- of trust is not to be taken
at face 0alue/
THE DEMOCRACY OF TRUST AND THE )ALUE OF 2PROT03
At the beginning of AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($ Bruno
Latour recounts an anecdote to illustrate the ne3 situation 3e
find oursel0es in toda-) at the end of the 4modernist
parenthesis8:
4he-7re sitting around a table) some fifteen &rench
industrialists responsible for sustainable de0elopment in 0arious
companies) facing a professor of climatolog-) a researcher from
the (ollTge de &rance/ It7s the fall of ?F<FK a battle is raging
about 3hether the current climate disturbances are of human origin
or not/ !ne of the industrialists asks the professor a 9uestion I
find a little ca0alier: 4But 3h- should 3e belie0e -ou) an- more
than the others68 I7m astonished/ ,h- does he put them on the same
footing) as if it 3ere a simple difference of opinion bet3een this
climate specialist and those 3ho are called climate skeptics///68
Latour 3onders if the scientist 3ill respond 3ith a summar- of the
indisputable data leading to certain kno3ledge) but the response
is a summar- of 4the large number of researchers in0ol0ed in
climate anal-sis) the complex s-stem for 0erif-ing data) the
articles and reports) the principle of peer e0aluation) the 0ast
net3ork of 3eather stations) floating 3eather buo-s) satellites)
and computers that ensure the flo3 of information/// the pitfalls
of the models that are needed to correct the data as 3ell as the
series of doubts that ha0e had to be addressed on each of these
points8/
No appeal to indubitable data or to certain kno3ledge) but to
trust in the institution of science: 4Je sees no higher court of
appeals8/
Latour recounts being shocked b- the sceptical 9uestion of the
industrialist) surprised at the lack of appeal to the certaint- of
expert kno3ledge) and fa0orabl- impressed b- the scientist7s
account of the research process and b- his recourse to trust in
the institution/ Je sees a shift in philosoph- of science) in
epistemolog-) in ontolog-) in this appeal to trust instead of to
certaint- and to the institution instead of to unmediated access/
here is some complacence here as Latour finds that scientists
ha0e shifted from their (artesian dogmatism and certaint- to a
Qamesian +and b- implication Latourian. pragmatism/ B- implication
it is reall- Latour 3ho 3on the 4%cience ,ars8/
Yet Latour does not reall- explain 3h- this change in beha0iour
has taken place/ 4he modernist parenthesis is at an end8 is a
rather 0ague explanator- h-pothesis) itself in need of
explanation/ !ne problem is that the notion of modernism is
defined in a 0ariet- of 3a-s) such that its extension is 9uite
0ague/ !ne definition of the moderns is: those for 3hom others
ha0e beliefs 3hereas the- ha0e kno3ledge/ !n this definition the
modernist parenthesis goes back to Clato) or e0en to "oses/ "ore
often it is limited to $urope A%R +After the %cientific
Re0olution./
Latour7s explanation for the change in metaph-sics that
characterises the change of epoch is the gra0it- of the ecological
crises that beset us/ he 0alue of (ertaint- leads to
inflexibilit-) 3hereas the times re9uire flexibilit- and fluidit-
under the 0alue of rust/ But this notion of the epoch is
ambiguous bet3een an internal and an external 0ersion/ Ja0e the
scientists themsel0es due to ne3 research findings disco0ered that
the- must abandon their dogmatic rigidit- and authoritarian
tendencies6 !r has the rise of a less credulous and less
deferential attitude in all domains led scientists to re0ise their
epistemolog- and their rhetorical strategies6
In the anecdote recounted b- Latour 3e ha0e a scientist being
sub*ected to a ca0alier 9uestion b- an industrialist 3ho has
chosen to rela-) according to Latour) the sort of ob*ections that
the climate sceptics use/ he scientist replies philosophicall-)
but 3h-6 !ne industrialist is easil- snobbed and dismissed +unless
he represents Big "one- needed b- the scientists or his
colleagues./ But man- ob*ections made in all sorts of 0enues from
the S to the classroom) from philosophical *ournals to %& no0els
ma- ha0e pla-ed their part in tempering the expert7s attitude/
his is the de0elopment of 3hat %te0e &uller calls 4protscience4)
the urge to3ards a democratisation of science impelled b- a sort
of protestant re0olution conducted b- the users of science/ his
mo0ement has had negati0e effects) such as making room for the
nai0e or c-nical climate sceptics and for the intelligent
designers/ But it has also had the positi0e effect of demanding
more concrete explanations) of the t-pe the climate expert gi0es
in the anecdote) than *ust the assertion 4%cience sa-s it is so8/
,hat I am arguing is that 3here Latour sees the sign of a ne3
epoch in the scientist7s response) 3e can also see its sign in the
industrialist7s 9uestion/ No contradiction 3ith Latour7s pro*ect)
but a slight shift of emphasis/ ,e ma- follo3 the lead pro0ided
%te0e &uller) 3ho describes the rise of an attitude that is
sceptical of the certaint- of science 3ithout falling into the
opposition bet3een trust and denialism/ his is 3hat he calls
protscience) and he h-pothesises that it ma- be responsible for
the contemporar- passage from the appeal to the absolute authorit-
of the expert to the call for reasoned and pro0isional trust in
the scientific communit-/ Cerhaps he should integrate into each
mode its o3n 4CR!;8) so that 3e 3ould ha0e not *ust protscience
but also protla3) protanal-sis) proteconom- and e0en protreligion
+gnostics) hermeticists) alchemists included./ Crotanal-sis is
co0ered alread- b- the integration of obie Nathan's
ethnops-chiatr-/ Crotreligion 3ould lead to combining "$ and R$L
as submodes under a more embracing supermode) that one could call
IN# +or process of indi0iduation./
LATOUR AND 4ADIOU
he parallel bet3een Latour7s and Badiou7s ontologies is important
to keep in mind as I think that it fruitfull- illuminates both
pro*ects/ !ne of the tasks 3ith reading Latour is to re;establish
a philosophical context 3ithout dragging his 3ork back into a set
of presuppositions that he is tr-ing to escape/ An examination of
Latour7s conceptual debts to post;structuralist thinkers
demonstrates that Latour7s book is both more speculati0e and less
empirical than ad0ertised) but the comparison 3ith Badiou sho3s
that there is a fundamental difference in their approaches/ Badiou
is still doing a priori philosoph- and has sho3n himself incapable
of expanding the number of truth procedures that he posits +for
example) to include religion.) 3hile there is no real reason
inside his s-stem not to en0isage other such procedures/ ,e can
conclude that Latour7s 3a- of taking up the notions of ontolog-
and of truth) and of pluralising them in terms of an open list of
modes of 0eridiction and of existence) is empirical in spirit/
&urther) Latour7s s-stem proposes much more of a diachronic
ontolog- +Latour7s 4being;as;other8) including both alterit- and
alteration. from the 0er- beginning) 3hereas Badiou7s ontolog- is
s-nchronic at the le0el of Being) 3ith a diachronic supplement in
the notion of the e0ent/
(ontrar- to Badiou) Latour does not reacti0ate a foundational
st-le) rather he does e0er-thing to a0oid such a thing/Badiou7s
philosoph- is foundational in a 0er- classical sense) and I think
his idea that 4mathematics is ontolog-8 is a regressi0e mo0e/
#espite his explicit claims) Badiou7s difference 3ith the later
,ittgenstein is not so much that of his re*ection of the
4linguistic turn8 as that of his failure to effectuate the
diachronic turn or the abandon of the idea of foundations/ &or
,ittgenstein mathematics is a constantl- e0ol0ing patch3ork) and
set theor- is not at all the foundational instance that it is for
Badiou/ ,ittgenstein 3as also 9uite intent on separating religious
experience from the t-pe of existence in0estigated b- the
sciences) and on separating ps-chological experience from
ps-choanal-sis) 3hich he regarded as an in0asi0e m-tholog-/ %o
Latour is far closer to ,ittgenstein than he is to Badiou/
&or Badiou mathematics is ontolog-) and there is no other: there
is onl- one mode of existence/ Jis is a pluralism of content)
e0er-thing is multiplicit- of multiplicities/ Latour proposes a
pluralism of modes of existence and not *ust of content) and so
for him ontolog- is itself multiple/ he modes are a little like
regional ontologies) onl- the- do not exist as regions inside some
totalising space) but are 9ualitati0el- incommensurable/ In that
respect he is closer to ,ittgenstein than to Badiou/
LATOUR AND STIEGLER: I.%!"!,# a-. M!.%s !( E5&st%-c%
Reading Bruno Latour and Deof Bo3ker7s discussion of the different
approaches to science in &rance and in the $nglish;speaking 3orld)
one can begin to situate the contribution of Latour7s ne3 book to
discussions that are tra0ersed b- the AnglophoneU(ontinental
di0ide/ $ach side sees the other as ignoring crucial problems) so
rather than choose sides Bo3ker and Latour attempt a s-mmetric
account of the difference/ heir obser0ations correspond to m- o3n
experience of the differences of approach) 3hich sometimes has
produced difficulties of communication 3ith &rench philosophers
o0er the HF -ears I ha0e been li0ing here in &rance) and also some
frustration at the differing but e9uall- limiting presuppostions
on both sides/
his set of differences is something I noticed from the beginning
3hen I arri0ed in &rance in <=AF/ !ne element is that the notions
of theor-;ladenness and incommensurabilit-) 3hich had led to
intense discussions in Anglophone philosoph- of science in the IFs
and >Fs) had been accepted as e0ident since the beginning of the
?Fth (entur-/ Jo3e0er) this strong anti;empricist orientation did
not lead to an- 9uestioning of the epistemological status of
science) nor to its relati0isation in terms of outside)
ps-chological and social) influences/ his also explains 3h-
Copper) @uhn) and &e-erabend are t-picall- treated as more or less
the same) separated onl- b- minor theoretical nuances/ &or the
&rench epistemologists) science is essentiall- a theoretical
rather than empirical enterprise/ Jo3e0er) this does not
relati0ise science) 3hich is simpl- posited as rational par
excellence/
his re*oins m- o3n obser0ation that &rench philosophical
formulations often sound radical 3hen read in an Anglophone
context) but ha0e their scope limited in &rance b- shared implicit
presuppositions/ %imilarl-) man- radical Anglophone pronouncements
seem ob0ious to the &rench) as the- subtract out an- deep
9uestioning of scientific rationalit-/
Bernard %tiegler) 3ho is not cited in Latour and Bo3ker7s text)
falls into the as-mmetr- imposed b- this dichotom-/ Je does not
tackle criticall- the notion of science) -et his restoration of
the centralit- of the concept of ideolog- in his recent book
CJAR"A(!L!DI$ #U &R!N NAI!NAL lea0es him in an ambiguous
situation 3ith respect to science/ %ometimes %tiegler praises
science for its critical rationalit-) for its abilit- to 9uestion
and re0ise e0en its most basic assumptions and most entrenched
interpretations/ %ometimes he finds ideological assumptions
embedded in proposed scientific paradigms e/g/ neo;liberal
economics +but ne0er in the hard sciences.) embod-ing a dogmatic
process of rationalisation/ Jis recent references to a 4#ar3inian8
notion of contro0ers- +3here ri0al interpretations compete until
the best interpretation sur0i0es. tend to3ards enshrining a monist
principle 3here the pluralit- of interpretations in a domain are
pro0isionall- entertained in 0ie3 of ultimate con0ergence on a
single 3inner/
Bruno Latour does not make use of the notion of 4ideolog-8 in his
theoretical meta;language) no doublt considering it to be too
molar or macro;conceptual) co0ering too man- different sorts of
cases to be a useful theoretical term/ Latour uses instead the
notion of illegitimate crossings bet3een different forms of
enunciationUmodes of existence/ hese are closel- e9ui0alent to
the long chains of transindi0iduation that Bernard %tiegler
e0okes/ !ne could transform %tiegler7s theoretical 0ocabular-
slightl- and talk in terms of modes of transindi0iduation/ his
3ould ha0e the ad0antage of emphasising that the modes of
existence are not s-nchronic uni0ersals) but contingent)
diachronic contingent formations/ his diachronicit- is allo3ed
for but is not 0er- 3ell articulated in Latour7s s-stem/
,hen one mode of existence imposes its o3n felicit- conditions on
another) the resulting categor- mistake produces illegitimate
translations that tra0est- the meaning of the utterances) and gi0e
an inade9uate account of the existence corresponding entities/ %o
the past and present of a mode is deformed) and its capacit- for
fruitful inno0ation is 3iped out/ In !ldspeak 3e could sa- that
this imposition or infringement produces 4ideological8
deformations of the different modes of existence) 3here the
difference bet3een the experience of a mode on the one hand and
the accounts gi0en b- its practitioners and adherents/ %uch
monological translation creates problems and at the same time
remo0es an- possibilit- of resol0ing them/
In each case of 4crossing8 or of encounter bet3een different
modes) one has to discern the different modes present in the
situation and anal-se their functioning/ It is important to see if
there are hegemonic crossings) 3here one mode imposes its
conditions on the others) or rather compositional crossings) 3here
each mode functions according to its o3n conditions in a
diplomaticall- satisf-ing common assemblage/ Yet e0en Latour does
not allo3 for the possibilit- of heuristicall- positi0e
interferences bet3een modes e/g/ the role of Ne3ton7s religious
beliefs in his scientific constructions/ %tiegler in his recent
seminars emphasises the need for 4transgression8) and so the
9uestion becomes are all transgressi0e crossings necessaril-
sterie6
EMPIRICISM )S HERMENEUTICS (1: READING LATOUR RELIGIOUSLY
#oes Bruno Latour ha0e t3o philosophies) as he claims recentl-) or
*ust one6 Is this a empirical or 4double;click8 9uestion6 !r is it
a hermeneutical 9uestion6 does it depend on our interpretation)
3hich ma- be different than the one Latour gi0es of his o3n 3ork6
Cerhaps it is e0en religious6 Latour himself declares
4Droping) contradictor- exegesis: this is religion itself/
$t-molog- attests to this: religion is the relationship among or)
better still) the relati0ism of interpretationsK the certaint-
that one obtains truth onl- through a ne3 path of alterations)
in0entions) de0iations that make it possible to obtain) or not)
against rote reiteration and 3ear and tear) the faithful rene3al
of 3hat has been said8 +AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($) H<H./
his is good ad0ice on ho3 to read his book: a0oid the 3eak
reproducti0e reading of 4rote reiteration8) and read criticall-
and creati0el- to engage in the 4faithful rene3al8 of 3hat Latour
has 3ritten/ Reading is interpretation and not repetition) and
such interpretation is necessaril- plurimodal/ Jermeneutics is
thus essential to Latour7s thought) and to reading his books/ In
the list of authors that constitute his hermeneutic hori5on) I
3ould not include in pride of place such official hermeneutic
authors as #ilthe-) Dadamer) and Ricoeur/ Rather precedence should
be gi0en to %pino5a) Niet5sche) Jeidegger) &oucault and #eleu5e/
Bad ad0ice 3ould begin b- telling people not to read in terms of
their preferred modes of existence) but rather according to one7s
o3n fa0oured mode/ his is the monist or monotheist mode of
reading that *udges e0er-thing in terms of its one supreme 0alue/
Reading) I ha0e argued) is interpretation) it cannot be contained
3ithin the borders of one domain/ Reading is tied to pluralism and
intensit-) it 4takes into account the fact that a border indicates
less a di0iding line bet3een t3o homogeneous sets than an
intensification of crossborder traffic bet3een foreign elements8
+AI"$) HF./
%ome good 3ork of exegesis has been done on Latour7s 3ork in 0ie3
of the intensification of our reading experience/ I do not see
critical discussion as condemned to remain at the le0el of mere
generalities) expressing emotional reactions of re*ection or
appropriation/ A good hermeneutic reading certainl- in0ol0es not
*ust linear rote summar- but global framing) 3andering
tra*ectories) and plurimodal intensities) including critical
intensit- +something that Latour is full of) despite his
in0eighing against 4criti9ue8./
!ne possible conclusion that one could dra3 from the book is that
of the need for 4religious studies8) on the model of science
studies) to complete or transform the perspecti0es of this
preliminar- report/ Unfortunatel-) there is nothing in AN INQUIRY
IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($) or an- other of Latour7s texts) to sho3
that he has done an- field 3ork on the sub*ect of religion) of
an-thing approaching the tenor and rigour of the 3ork he has done
for %cience and La3 and echnolog-/ hat is a 0er- serious
shortcoming of AI"$/ #oing religious studies is not the same thing
as speaking religiousl-) nor is speaking religiousl- necessaril-
speaking about Dod/ he 4religious8 is a mode of 0eridiction) not
a special content or an obligator- name/ It directs our attention
+to the nearest and the neighbour./ If I read Latour7s book 3ith
attention) as neighbour) 3ith all I70e got) then I am reading it
religiousl- 3hether I speak of Dod or not/
his raises the 9uestion of the cogniti0e dimension of religion as
Latour7s professed 0ie3 seems to fa0our a form of reductionist
demarcationism 3hich is in contradiction 3ith the pluralism he
espouses/ here are serious problems 3ith Latour7s use of the
informationUtransformation dichotom-) his demarcation of science
from religion) and the resulting referential neutralisation of
religion/ Jis 0ie3s on religion are 3orrisome because the- are
utterl- unempirical) ie the- are not based on an- concrete
research 3ith the di0erse populations of belie0ers) but on his o3n
experiences) readings) and reflexions/ Yet in R$Q!I(IND) and e0en
more so in AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($ he relies on the
authorit- gi0en him b- his studies on science) technolog- and la3
to insinuate that his 0ie3s on religion are part of an empirical
4anthropological8 in0estigation/
A comparison 3ith the ideas of Caul &e-erabend is illuminating/
&e-erabend recognises an apparent 9ualitati0e difference bet3een
religious traditions and straight referential traditions such as
science) in that religion explicitl- includes a performati0e +or
transformati0e. aspect) but not in such a 3a- as to replace or
exclude the referential cogniti0e aspect/ %o the difference in
kind is that religious traditions are more complete than +most.
secular traditions) in that the- include both a performati0e and a
cogniti0e dimension/ A second difference is that in fact) but
unbekno3nst to them and so onl- in repressed and truncated form)
secular traditions ha0e this performati0e aspect too/
Latour7s account of religion seems open to the the accusation of
formalism) of establishing a preser0e for a merel- 4generic8
religion 3ith no creedal content/ It is also protectionist) 3here
&e-erabend7s 0ie3s are trans0ersalist and non;demarcationist)
fa0orising a s-mmetrical account arguing that both religion and
science ha0e a cogniti0e dimension) and that both of them are
performati0e) i/e/ that the cogniti0eUperformati0e distinction is
not pertinent for demarcating science and religion/ Not onl- is
there no absolute conceptual distinction) there is also
historicall- a constant practice of interference and of heuristic
interaction/ Religion has 4interfered8 positi0el- 3ith science
throughout its histor-) and not *ust negati0el- as a popular
positi0ist m-th 3ould ha0e us belie0e/
he distinction in terms of different 4felicit- conditions8 is not
at all ne3) and 3as ad0anced b- post;,ittgensteinian philosoph- of
religion o0er BF -ears ago/ It is a protectionist)
territorialising) conser0ati0e mo0e) un3orth- of the rest of
Latour7s pluralist ontolog-/ It is too sharp a distinction) and
its normati0e force has a potentiall- negati0e effect on the
conduct of science/ %uch a demarcationist approach is
methodologicall- illegitimate +it is normati0e and not 4agnostic8)
as Latour7s method re9uires./ It is also both purificator- +an
approach that Latour condemns in his criti9ue of modernit-. and
unrealistic) and so 3ould ha0e had disastrous conse9uences for
scientific progress if it had been applied b- the actors 3hose
intuitions and comportment are supposed to be described in
Latour7s account/
he most that Latour can do is to create a protected reser0e 3ith
its o3n felicit- conditions for some sort of 4generic8 religion/
here is something 0er- diluted about a shared rLgime of
religiosit- that does not foreground the actual beliefs and
ob*ections) the creeds and the contro0ersies that matter to actual
religious obser0ance) 3hich are not mere differences of opinion
but incommensurable rifts 3ithin the religious 4truth rLgime8/
$ither the particular identit- of his religious obedience is
dissol0ed) or Latour is committing the fallac- of homogeneit- b-
his generic partitioning of the truth rLgimes/ Je is thus
condemned b- his non;cogniti0ist approach to religion both to
embrace the empirical trans0ersalit- and di0ersit- of religious
experience+pluralism. and to turn it against the established
creedal boundaries) and so to in0alidate actual religious
affiliation and institutional identit- b- 0oiding them of all
cogniti0e content +formalism./
EMPIRICISM 6s HERMENEUTICS (+: Lat!*r7s 2t8! 9$&"!s!9$&%s3
AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($ purports to be the se9uel to ,$
JAS$ N$S$R B$$N "!#$RN) published ?F -ears earlier/ ,here that
book7s emphasis 3as mainl- negati0e) as the title sho3s)
deconstructing the false identit- that 3as mistakenl- supposed to
characterise us) this ne3 book is positi0e in its aim to present
3hat 3e ha0e been and still are/ In the last post 3e sa3 that the
book is a hermeneutic treatise) both exemplif-ing a
reinterpretation of the "oderns) purporting to replace the
erroneous interpretation that has been coextensi0e 3ith the modern
epoch) and calling for interpretation in its turn/ his
hermeneutic dimension is confirmed b- the 4origin stor-8 that
Latour recounts about the beginnings of his pro*ect in his Roman
(atholic -outh and in his apprenticeship in Biblical exegesis:
4the s-stematic destruction b- exegesis of all dogmatic
certitudes) far from 3eakening the truth 0alue that the successi0e
glosses pla-ed out o0er and o0er) made it possible at last to
raise the 9uestion of religious truth/ But onl- on condition of
ackno3ledging that there 3as an itinerar- of 0eridiction 3ith its
o3n felicit- conditions8 +BI!DRACJY !& AN INS$%IDAI!N) H./
%o in Latour7s intellectual biograph- religion and hermeneutics
come first) and the stud- of science comes later to confirm this
idea of a non;empirical itinerar- of 0eridiction) incommensurable
3ith the ideal of pure unmediated contact 3ith the real:
4Imagine m- ama5ement 3hen I disco0ered) in Duillemin7s laborator-
in <=>E) located in a splendid Louis @ahn building o0erlooking the
Cacific !cean) that scientific 3ork bore a strange resemblance to
the exegesis I had left behind in Burgund-8 +BI!DRACJY !& AN
INS$%IDAI!N) E./
Yet the book 3hose genesis is thus related proceeds in a different
order) no longer biographical but pedagogical/ %trangel- it
foregrounds a claim to be a treatise of 4empirical philosoph-8)
purporting to gi0e a more ade9uate account of our experience:
4!nl- experience 3ill tell us 3hether this h-brid apparatus using
ne3 techni9ues of reading) 3riting) and collecti0e in9uir-
facilitates or complicates the 3ork of empirical
philosoph- that it seeks to launch8 +AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !&
$'I%$N($) xx;xxi./
In the first t3o chapters Latour begins 3ith science and the
disco0er- of its dependance on e9uipment and net3orks) proceeds to
La3 as an example of another t-pe of 0eridiction and then
introduces religion as a confirming instance) comporting -et
another itinerar- of 0eridiction/ his se9uence of science;la3;
religion occurs t3ice) first in (hapter !ne and then again in
(hapter 3o/ &ar from being a simple empirical account of Latour7s
intellectual e0olution) it is a rational reconstruction designed
to establish the idea that Latour7s 3ork has passed from one
philosoph- +actor;net3ork theor-. to another +modes of existence
pro*ect.) and that the reasons for the passage are empirical/
he book itself abounds in 4empirical8 0ocabular-) distinguishing
the experience and 0alues of the "oderns from the accounts gi0en
of their experience/ Latour proposes to remain 4faithful8 to the
experience but to gi0e more ade9uate accounts/ Je enshrines this
empirical commitment as a methodological principle gi0ing rise to
a set of 4specific tests8 of the ade9uac- of his account: 4he
first is factual and empirical: ha0e 3e been faithful to the
field b- suppl-ing proofs of our claims68 +IE./ he passage from
(hapter !ne 3ith its net3orks to (hapter 3o 3ith its prepositions
corresponding to different modes seems to correspond to this
passage from one philosoph- to another/
his discrepanc- bet3een biograph- and rational reconstruction is
reinforced if 3e take into account the #eleu5ian background and
resonances of Latour7s 0ocabular-/ In his anal-ses of %pino5a and
the construction of a plane of immanence #eleu5e associates
inextricabl- a 9uantitati0e pluralism of heterogeneous elements
3ith a 9ualitati0e pluralism of their composition in modes of
existence/ &or example here in a seminar from #ecember =th <=AF:
4Les deux critTres de l7Lthi9ue) en d7autres termes) la
distinction 9uantitati0e des existants) et l7opposition
9ualitati0e des modes d7existence) la polarisation 9ualitati0e des
modes d7existence) 0ont Vtre les deux maniTres dont les existants
sont dans l7Vtre/ (a 0a Vtre les liens de l7Wthi9ue a0ec
l7!ntologie8/ +4he t3o criteria of ethics) in other 3ords) the
9uantitati0e distinction of existents) and the 9ualitati0e
opposition of modes of existence) the 9ualitati0e polarisation of
modes of existence) are going to be the t3o manners in 3hich
existents are in being/ hat 3ill be the relation bet3een the
$thics and !ntolog-8) m- translation./
%o from the point of 0ie3 of the philosophical background to
Latour7s thought there seems to be no reason to concei0e of his
e0olution as containing t3o distinct philosophies/ he
heterogeneous net3orks and the differing modes of existence are
inseparable for #eleu5e) and Latour traces his in0ol0ement 3ith
#eleu5e7s thought back to his doctoral thesis:
4In a thesis defended in <=AE /// I had de0eloped that argument in
an anal-sis of
"ark7s gospel and of 4%aint8 CLgu-//// A bit of #errida and LL0i;
%trauss plus a large dose of #eleu5e helped gi0e the argument the
contemporar- sheen that neither CLgu- nor Bultmann) of course)
could ha0e pro0ided8 +BI!DRACJY) H./
LATOUR, WITTGENSTEIN, AND THE PRIMACY OF THE RELIGIOUS SPIRIT
Bruno Latour7s religious outlook is central to AN INQUIRY IN!
"!#$% !& $'I%$N($) and his disco0er- of different modes of
enunciation +and thus of existence. goes back to his
apprenticeship in Biblical exegesis/ Indeed religious enunciation
appears as a model for the rest: 4there are fe3 institutions more
obsessed 3ith the distinction bet3een truth and falsit- than the
religious institution/ And -et 3e also understand that it 3ould be
erroneous to claim to *udge religious 0eridiction according to the
entirel- distinct modes of la3 or science8 +BE./ Religion needs to
be *udged b- its o3n specific interpretati0e ke-/
In religion 3e see most clearl- and most intensel- the concern
3ith being 4faithful8 to a message that re9uires constant
4inno0ation8 in order to be preser0ed and transmitted ane3:
4It is entirel- possible) our anthropologist tells herself) that
the relation found here bet3een 0alue and institution is a uni9ue
case/ !nl- in the religious domain;;and perhaps onl- in the
histor- of the (hristian churches;;3ould 3e find such a series of
betra-als) in0entions) reforms) ne3 starts) elaborations) all
concentrated and *udged on the basis of the principal 9uestion of
3hether one is remaining faithful or not to the initial message/
But her o3n idea +the origin of her eureka moment. is that the
situation is perhaps the same for all the "oderns7 institutions8
+EE./
here is a substantial o0erlap here 3ith Lud3ig ,ittgenstein7s
0ie3s on different 4forms of life8 in relation to the 9uestion of
the status of the religious as mode of enunciation and of
existence/ ,ittgenstein began his CJIL!%!CJI(AL R$"AR@% 3ith an
appeal to the 4spirit8 in 3hich he 3ished it to be read: 4his
book is 3ritten for such men as are in s-mpath- 3ith its spirit/
his spirit is different from the one 3hich informs the 0ast
stream of $uropean and American ci0ili5ation in 3hich all of us
stand/ hat spirit expresses itself in an on3ards mo0ement) in
building e0er larger and more complicated structuresK the other in
stri0ing after clarit- and perspicuit- in no matter 3hat
structure8 +&ore3ord) <=HF./ his spirit is not at all 4"odern8)
in that it is not exclusi0el- de0oted to follo3ing the 4on3ards
mo0ement8 of moderni5ation) -et it is not against that mo0ement
either: it is not anti;modern) but rather 3hat Bruno Latour calls
4amodern8:
4Jo3 3ill 3e call this retrospecti0e disco0er- that 3e ha0e ne0er
been modern6 Cost;modern6 No since this 3ould impl- a belief that
3e ha0e been 3hat 3e ha0e ne0er been/ I propose to call it
amodern8 +Costmodern6 No %impl- Amodern/ %teps o3ards an
Anthropolog- of %cience/ An essa- Re0ie3./
,ittgenstein then proceeds to an in0ocation of Dod +4I 3ould like
to sa- Xhis book is 3ritten to the glor- of Dod7) but no3ada-s
that 3ould be chicaner-) that is) it 3ould not be rightl-
understood/ It means the book is 3ritten in good 3ill) and in so
far as it is not so 3ritten) but out of 0anit-) etc/) the author
3ould 3ish to see it condemned/ Je cannot free it of these
impurities further than he himself is free of them8./
,ittgenstein7s 0ie3s on religion are complex) but he did not see
religion as a matter of fact) or a 9uestion of belief/ Je sa3 it
as dealing 3ith matters of concern) a deepened attitude to life
in0ol0ing the 3hole person) embod-ing the con0ersion from the bad
3ill of 0anit- or egoism to the good 3ill of 4doing the 3ill of
Dod8/
Bruno Latour begins his book AN $NQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($
3ith an epigraph: 4%i scires donum dei8 +4If thou didst kno3 the
gift of Dod8./ his is from he Dospel according to Qohn) (hapter
B) 0erse <F) 3here Qesus asks for 3ater from a %amaritan 3oman and
promises the 3ater of e0erlasting life/ he 3hole incident is
rele0ant to Latour7s s-stem of modes existence/ Qesus asks for
literal 3ater +mode of existence #() double click. and declares
that he can gi0e 4li0ing 3ater8 +mode of existence R$L)
religious./ Je con0inces her he is a prophet b- sho3ing that he
kno3s intimate details of her life +#(.) but he proposes a
different sort of kno3ledge) adoration of the &ather 4in spirit
and in truth8/ In Latourian terms Qesus7s 3ords must be understood
in a different 4interpretati0e ke-8) 3hat ,ittgenstein calls a
different 4spirit8) than the dead letter of double;click7s mode of
0eridiction/
Indeed) Latour does not hesitate to concei0e his 3hole ontological
pro*ect) his pluralism of modes of existence) in religious terms)
as a Centecostal pluralism) a form of speaking in tongues/ Jis
conceptual persona) an anthropological in0estigatress stud-ing the
modes of existence of the "oderns
4purports to be speaking 3hile obe-ing all the felicit- conditions
of each mode) 3hile expressing herself in as man- languages as
there are modes/ In other 3ords) she is hoping for another
Centecost miracle: e0er-one 3ould understand in his or her o3n
tongue and 3ould *udge truth and falsit- according to his or her
o3n felicit- conditions/ &idelit- to the field comes at this
price8 +EA./
he repeated references to the idea of an 4empirical philosoph-8
must themsel0es be understood in the right interpretati0e ke-/
Latour seems to be appealing to the same sort of authorit- as that
of the empirical sciences) but this is *ust a con0enient
rhetorical mask/ Je defines such reference to uninterpreted facts
as 4first 3a0e empiricism8 and makes clear that such a philosoph-
is not e0en ade9uate to the sciences that it takes as the model to
impose on all enunciation/ In the expression 4empirical
philosoph-8 he can onl- mean 4second 3a0e empiricism8 ke-ed to the
pluralit- of modes of existence and respectful of the multiple
interpretati0e ke-s/ here is something strangel- circular about
this idea of 4fidelit- to the field8) and so it is not surprising
that Latour makes no real disco0eries of unsuspected rLgimes of
enunciation) but lifts each readil- recogni5able domain to the
rLgime of enunciation that characterises it most essentiall-/ he
procedure amounts to a form of 3hat ,illard San !rman Quine
called 4semantic ascent8) and the rLgimes of enunciation thus
4found8 +and their corresponding modes of existence. are the
empirical correlates of a prior hermeneutic decision/
RYLE AND LATOUR: ON CATEGORY MISTA1ES
At the beginning of (hapter 3o of AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !&
$'I%$N($ Bruno Latour recounts an anecdote based on Dilbert
R-le7s introduction of the notion of categor- mistake in J$
(!N($C !& "IN# +<=B=.: 4he canonical example in0ol0es a foreign
0isitor going through the buildings of the %orbonne) one after
anotherK at the end of the da-) he complains that he 4hasn7t seen
the Uni0ersit- of the %orbonne/8 Jis re9uest had been
misunderstood: he 3anted to see an institution) but he had been
sho3n buildings / / / &or he had sought in one entit- an entirel-
different entit- from 3hat the first could sho3 him8 +AN INQUIRY
IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($) BA;B=./
Latour7s initial comment on this stor- is a little surprising) as
he supposes that the 0isitor7s re9uest 3ould ha0e been satisfied
if he had been introduced to the rector) to the facult- assembl-)
or to the uni0ersit-7s attorne-) but this supposition is itself
based on a categor- mistake) since Latour is here confusing the
Uni0ersit- as an institution 3ith particular members or
representati0es of that institution/ Latour then proceeds to
explain: 4Jis interlocutors had misheard the ke- in 3hich 3hat he
3as re9uesting could be *udged true or false) satisfactor- or
unsatisfactor-8 +B=./ R-le7s name is not cited) but this remark is
faithful to R-le7s anal-sis of categor- mistakes as based on a
misapplication of concepts consisting in allocating them to the
3rong logical t-pe/
Latour7s explanation follo3s from the introduction) in (hapter
!ne) of his thesis concerning 4the pluralism of modes and thus the
pluralit- of ke-s b- means of 3hich their truth or falsit- is
*udged8 +<A./ he context he gi0es is that of Austin7s theor- of
speech acts:
4But the difficult- is not so great) after all) if 3e turn to the
3ork done b- Q/ L/ Austin and his successors on 4speech acts/8 he
notions of felicit- and infelicit- conditions) no3 solidl-
established in our intellectual traditions) make it possible to
contrast 0er- different t-pes of 0eridiction 3ithout reducing them
to a single model8 +<A./
If 3e look up the expression8categor- mistake8 on the site
associated 3ith the book) 3e find this entr-:
4he expression is 0aluable in beginning to separate the different
modes: it supposes that 3e 9uestion a situation in a ke- 3hich 3e
soon reali5e is not the right one and in 3hich it 3ill be
pointless to persist/ Better simpl- to change ke-/ he phrase is
attributed to +R-le) <=B= Y?FFZ.) 3ho 3anted to counter the
Bifurcation of soul and bod-K his example is of a 0isitor 3ishing
to 0isit the Uni0ersit- of !xford) 3ho complains after seeing a
large number of buildings that he has still not seen the
Uni0ersit-8/
It is interesting to compare Latour7s account 3ith the original
0ersion) 3hich is a little clearer:
4A foreigner 0isiting !xford or (ambridge for the first time is
sho3n a number of colleges) libraries) pla-ing fields) museums)
scientific departments and administrati0e offices/ Je then asks
XBut 3here is the Uni0ersit-6 I ha0e seen 3here the members of the
(olleges li0e) 3here the Registrar 3orks) 3here the scientists
experiment and the rest/ But I ha0e not -et seen the Uni0ersit- in
3hich reside and 3ork the members of -our Uni0ersit-/7
It has then to be explained to him that the Uni0ersit- is not
another collateral institution) some ulterior counterpart to the
colleges) laboratories and offices 3hich he has seen/ he
Uni0ersit- is *ust the 3a- in 3hich all that he has alread- seen
is organi5ed/ ,hen the- are seen and 3hen their co;ordination is
understood) the Uni0ersit- has been seen/ Jis mistake la- in his
innocent assumption that it 3as correct to speak of (hrist (hurch)
the Bodleian Librar-) the Ashmolean "useum and the Uni0ersit-) to
speak) that is) as if Xthe Uni0ersit-7 stood for an extra member
of the class of 3hich these other units are members/ Je 3as
mistakenl- allocating the Uni0ersit- to the same categor- as that
to 3hich the other institutions belong8 +J$ (!N($C !& "IN#) I./
his mistake of allocating a term to the 3rong categor- is an
error in logical grammar/ Latour seems to 3ant to echo this
anal-sis 3hen he chooses the term 4preposition8 to designate the
interpreti0e ke- necessar- to situate a set of utterances in their
appropriate categor-) to understand them according to the correct
rLgime of enunciation) and to follo3 their particular tra*ector-
of 0eridiction:
4o designate these different tra*ectories) I ha0e chosen the term
preposition) using it in
its most literal) grammatical sense) to mark a position;taking
that comes before a proposition is stated) determining ho3 the
proposition is to be grasped and thus constituting its
interpreti0e ke-8/
his use of 4preposition8 is in fact metaphorical) and not at all
4literal8 +3ord added b- the translator. nor 4grammatical8 +the
grammatical categor- of preposition is not at all engaged.) but
et-mological and morphological: 4preposition8 is anal-sed into
pre;position/ Jere again Latour is guilt- of a categor- mistake/ A
further example of this non;literal use of the term 4preposition8
comes in (hapter %ix 3hen Latour discusses the difference bet3een
his pro*ect and critical thought as exemplified in #errida7s
deconstruction: 4And it is finall- #errida) the Oeno of
4differance)8 3ho 3as right al3a-s to preface the notion of
construction 3ith the preposition 4de8: constructi0ism is al3a-s
in fact de;construction8 +<EI./ his is a grammatical error) 3e
are not properl- talking about a preposition but about the prefix
4de;8/ hus the author finds himself once more enmeshed in the
0er- error that his manual is 3arning against/
LATOUR/S PLURALISM +:O: CAN WE PLURALISE THE PLURALISTS;
Cluralism becomes interesting 3hen it is not *ust an
ackno3ledgement of a pluralit- of closed and finished totalities
but 3hen it sees each totalit- as open and porous) 3hose
unification is an ongoing process) and constituted as 3ell of open
and porous subpluralities/ !ne of the conse9uences of this 3a- of
thinking is that totalities are not consituted b- one sole
s-nthesis) but b- se0eral different and conflicting operations of
s-nthesis that ma- dra3 the boundaries in different 3a-s/ Another
is that the subpluralities are in interaction inside a totalit-
and bet3een totalities/ %o I 3ould distinguish a 4structuralist8
pluralism emphasising macroscopic 3holes and closure) and a
4poststructuralist8 pluralism that completes this picture 3ith a
s3arm of underl-ing interferences and interactions and
h-bridisations/
his means that pluralists in this sense are read- to anal-se
inno0ations in terms of transformation) transfer) translation)
transport) trans0ersalit-) etc and to break do3n all identities
into multiplicitous components/ he problem is that the- onl-
rarel- incorporate these insights into their st-le of 3ork/
#eleu5e and Duattari) 3ith their idea of the rhi5ome and 3ith
their slogan 4pluralism is not *ust something -ou talk about it7s
something -ou do8 +m- 3ords.) made important gestures in this
direction/ But more can and should be done/
,hen these pluralists explain that closed totalities are
hallucinator- or fantasmatic pseudo;entities +ie the opposite of
Luhmann7s notion of 4operational closure8) 3hich characterises
3hat I am calling structuralist pluralism.. 3ith 9uantum tunnels
and relati0istic 3ormholes underl-ing and undermining their macro;
structure) then the- should not act like the- 3ere the onl-
pluralists in the 3orld/ No) Latour7s s-stem is not born from some
philosophical tabula rasa and he is 3rong not to engage 3ith past
and present pluralists) and 3hen he talks about %ouriau and modes
of existence he is doing misdirection in m- e-es/ Je is 3rong to
talk about pluralism 3ithout discussing people like Laruelle and
%tiegler and #eleu5e and &e-erabend and Badiou) 3ho sometimes
confirm sometimes contradict his anal-ses) and sometimes *ust
plain go further along that path than he does/ etc etc/
Latour 3ishes to a0oid 4fundamentalism8 in 9uestions of religion
and also of science and politics/ Je defines this fundamentalism
as 4the refusal of contro0ersies8 +i/e/the refusal of discussions
3here there is no pre;gi0en arbiter. and 4the attempted exercise
of hegemon- of one mode of existence o0er the others8 +inter0ie3
4L7uni0ersel) il faut le faire8 in (RIIQU$) No0/ ?F<?) p =EH./
his dogmatic domination is 3hat man- pluralists ha0e fought under
the name of reductionism/ Reduction lies in treating religion as a
matter of belief) and as submitted to the same truth;rLgime as
referential domains like science/ Latour is 9uite explicit that
for him) and I think for man- other religious people) religion is
not a 9uestion of belief at all) not a 9uestion of reference to
the ph-sical 3orld) but one of performati0e in0ocation and
transformati0e message/ !ne can find examples of this non;
cogniti0ist approach to religion in the mo0ement of
dem-thologisation) but also in #re-fus and @ell-7s ALL JIND%
%JININD) and in post;,ittgensteinian philosoph- of religion/
%la0o* Oi5ek propounds this sort of approach as the premise of a
possible emancipator- use of religion/ It ma- be a minorit-
position compared to the number of fundamentalists) but it is not
negligeable) and Latour is not a lone 0oice cr-ing in the
3ilderness/
&rom this point of 0ie3 fundamentalism as the insistence on
defining religion as a matter of belief in factual propositions
about the 3orld is a deformation of religion/ his
4transformati0e8 or 4performati0e8 understanding of religion has
something good and something bad to it/ he bad part is that it
looks suspiciousl- like tr-ing to ha0e -our cake and eat it too)
making seeming claims about the 3orld and then dancing back and
sa-ing that -ou are in fact doing something else entirel-) making
-our propositions immune to criticism/ But the good part is that
it preser0es an important use for religious language) defending it
against its positi0istic elimination as mere superstition/ I must
admit that I am not indifferent to this language if it is used
4poeticall-8) that is to sa- to express deep or transformati0e
experiences/ But I 3ould argue here that the religious person
3ould ha0e to accept that this poetic and transformati0e language
is becoming in itself more pluralist/ he brute fact of finding
that one is mo0ed b- certain 3ords and images and rituals that are
closel- tied to profound experiences and insights becomes a little
suspicious 3hen it con0enientl- conforms to a pre;constituted
faith) let us sa- (atholicism in Latour7s case/ Di0en the
empirical di0ersit- of the 40arieties of religious experience8) to
use ,illiam Qames7 expression) this is too con0enient b- far[
"an- people make use of 4religious8 language) 3idel- interpreted)
outside all instituted religious denominations/ %uch language
occurs in the context of the practice of -oga or meditation) of
anal-sis or of the martial arts) in songs and films and comic
books/ It is emplo-ed e0en b- those 3ho consider themsel0es to be
total atheists/ his is 3h- one can consider that there is more to
religion than the making of referential claims about the ph-sical
uni0erse) and that fundamentalism is a reductionist approach to
religion/ his heuristic +or 4gnostic8. use of religious language
and images is more common than one might think/ It corresponds to
3hat Bernard %tiegler +and Dilbert %imondon) and (arl Qung. calls
indi0iduation/
In the discussion of the cogniti0e status of religion it is
difficult to maintain a balanced perspecti0e/ An interesting
attempt is made in Jubert #re-fus and %ean @ell-7s Jeideggerian
treatment of both pol-theism and monotheism as useful contemporar-
3a-s of understanding the 3orld and oursel0es in ALL JIND%
%JININD/ heir account of religious language is 4existential8 and
so situates religion as ha0ing a certain sort of cogniti0e
function) but still maintains it as incommensurable 3ith the t-pe
of referential cognition 3hich characterises natural science/
Religion is seen as incarnating a t-pe of understanding of the
3orld that is radicall- different from) and so unable to
contradict or be contradicted b-) or e0en enter into conflict
3ith) the natural sciences/ It is at this price of the referential
neutralisation of religion that the- can emplo- it positi0el- to
fulfil their program: to lure back the shining things) to lure
back the gods) 4to find meaning in a secular age8/
%imilarl-) both Bruno Latour and Caul &e-erabend gi0e accounts of
religion that) in related but different 3a-s) remo0e it from its
customar- opposition 3ith secularism/ &or Latour religion is one
4rLgime of enunciation8 or 4mode of existence8 among others) 3ith
its o3n 4conditions of felicit-8) aimed at transformation rather
than information/ &e-erabend extends Latour7s 0ie3 of religious
traditions as different in kind from secular traditions) b-
ne0ertheless insisting that as ra3 materials the- can be of use in
secular traditions such as the sciences or ma- e0en be emplo-ed to
correct +or at least to relati0ise.the one;sidedness of these
traditions/ his is 3here &e-erabend goes further than Latour/
Latour 4protects8 religion from the accusation of) for example)
scientific insufficienc- or political 0iolence/ hese sorts of
accusations amount to criteria of the demarcation of religion
from) and its subordination to) some other instance +0er- often
science. supposed to be free from 0iolence and cogniti0el- more
reliable/ Latour makes this sort of mo0e impossible b- claiming
that religion is so different that it is 4not e0en
incommensurable8 3ith referential rLgimes such as science:
http:UU333/bruno;latour/frUsitesUdefaultUfilesUAI;&R$$O$;R$LIDI!N;
DB/pdf/
&e-erabend recognises a possible 9ualitati0e difference bet3een
religion and straight referential traditions in that it includes a
performati0e aspect) but not) he argues to the detriment of a
referential cogniti0e aspect/ %o the apparent difference in kind
is due to the greater completeness of religious traditions as
compared to +most. secular traditions/ Je is 3illing to add that
in fact) but unbekno3nst to them and so in truncated form) secular
traditions ha0e this performati0e aspect too/
&e-erabend is classicall- deconstructi0e here) accepting initiall-
a binar- demarcation +scienceUreligion. to go on to re;0alorise
the 3eaker term +in rationalist discussions this is often
religion.) to then efface the demarcation and lea0e a more complex
and more ambiguous situation +complexit- and ambiguit- being terms
that &e-erabend uses to describe his o3n 4deconstructi0e8 strateg-
N &e-erabend explicitl- compares his arguments to deconstruction)
though he declares that he prefers 4Nestro-) 3ho 3as a great)
popular and funn- deconstructeur) 3hile #errida) for all his good
intentions) can7t e0en tell a good stor-8./ Latour is certainl-
funnier and more popular in st-le than #errida) but I find that
there is something protectionist about his humour/
LATOUR, FEYERA4END, DELEU<E: CORRECTING A RE)ISIONIST HISTORY
Bruno Latour is complicit in the effacing or the do3npla-ing of
the ideas and influence of the pre0ious generation of (ontinental
philosophers +and I include &e-erabend in this categor-) alongside
#eleu5e) L-otard) #errida) and &oucault. and their role in
inspiring) or e0en often anticipating) his o3n ideas/ Je gi0es the
same biased 0ie3 of philosophical histor- as "eillassoux and !!!
in 3hich correlationism and the flight from realism continued
through most of the last half of the ?Fth (entur-) and in 3hich
the \ne3\ realists bring us 3hat 3as lacking in deconstruction and
poststructuralism) and so take a decisi0e step for3ard/ Rather
than ackno3ledging a 0er- real) and in fact massi0e) debt to
&e-erabend) #eleu5e) et al/) he misrepresents and denigrates their
contributions) and prefers to reach e0en further back to arde)
Qames) ,hitehead) and %ouriau to m-stif- those 3ho are too -oung
or too credulous to detect the !r3ellian re3riting of the recent
past that he often engages in/
In a recent inter0ie3 +?F<?.) discussing his o3n methodolog-)
Latour affirms 4this a thing that I learned from the 4scientists8
I studied) i/e/ that: 4An-thing goes as long as it leads to 3hat
-ou 3ant to find8/ Qust as in a laborator- -ou ha0e instruments of
all sorts) including the most archaic and the most contemporar-)
because that is 3hat is necessar- in production) I m-self ha0e
learnt a lot from 4true8 scientists) hard scientists) i/e/ total
indifference to 9uestions of method8 +page <?H) m- translation./
his is 0er- exactl- 3hat &e-erabend proposes in ADAIN% "$J!#
+alread- in the essa- 0ersion published in <=><.) and Latour seems
to be guilt- of a little 4creati0e forgetting8 here/ Je continues
for t3o and a half pages +[. on the same theme) appl-ing this
notion it to his o3n 3ork) and concludes) once again echoing
&e-erabend 3ithout deigning to cite him: 4%o) ho3 do -ou produce
ob*ects that resist 3hat is said of them6) 3ell) an-thing goes8
+<?I./
(ontrar- to the repeated attempts +3ith 3hich Latour himself is
complicit. to associate &e-erabend 3ith a nai0e espousal of chaos
and anarch-) &e-erabend emphasised that 3e need both tenacit- and
proliferation) rules and their heuristic suspension) order and
chaos) speculation and testabilit-/ Je condemned the 4nai0e
anarchism8 of no rules) he disliked chaos but claimed to ha0e made
creati0e use of it in certain contexts) and he re*ected the
dogmatism of the traditional anarchists along 3ith their
scientism/ &e-erabend 3anted more responsibilit-) not less) and
proposed that all those concerned) in citi5en assemblies) should
decide on 3hat ontologies) theories) methods to appl- N and not
*ust the experts/
&e-erabend7s anarchism is 4epistemological8 precisel- because he
3ants to get a3a- from the need to posit a dogmatic 4anarchist8
method/ &e-erabend explains that he did propose such a dogmatic
anarchism for science in the earl- IFs) but then the encounter
3ith the needs of the practicing scientist) and later the
encounter 3ith the needs of the more di0erse population of
students that 3ere enrolled after more democratic education
policies 3ere adopted in the U% +at the end of the IFs.) led him
to re*ect e0en the most open set of rules as long as the- 3ere
meant to be applied uni0ersall- instead of as rules of thumb/ his
is similar to Latour's e0olution from the methodological anarchism
that he espouses abo0e to his later concerns 3ith democractic
assemblages/
Aside from the need to diffuse a smokescreen around certain ke-
but disturbing influences) such as &e-erabend and #eleu5e) 3hose
explicit ackno3ledgement could get him into trouble in his search
for a consensual surface) 3e cannot ignore Latour's rhetorical) or
\diplomatic\) strateg- of adapting his presentation to the
auditor-/ o the $nglish;speaking 3orld familiar 3ith &e-erabend7s
epistemolog- he makes a political criti9ue) accusing him of
\anarchism\ +ignoring that &e-erabend7s later name for his
position 3as 4democratic relati0ism8./ o a &rench politicist
inter0ie3er he comes out 3ith a defence of exactl- the sort of
epistemological anarchism +4an-thing goes8. that &e-erabend
defended decades before Latour/ &e-erabend himself does not take
credit for this idea) stating that he heard Copper defending it in
the <=BFs/ Latour does not mention this point) preferring in the
inter0ie3 to affirm that Copper makes no real contribution to the
stud- of science) but is a political thinker hiding behind an
epistemological mask/
!n the 3hole 9uestion of methodological anarchism 0ersus
epistemological anarchism &e-erabend is 9uite clear that Copper
3as ad0ocating methodological anarchism) the idea that there 3as
no fixed method for science other than 3hat 3orked or 3as
appropriate in a specific case) in the BFs/ Alread- &e-erabend
agreed) but thought it 3as a banalit-) as his friends in the @raft
(ircle took this methodological anarchism for granted/ he
problem) as &e-erabend later came to realise) 3as that this
methodological anarchism is basicall- incompatible 3ith taking
science as a preconstituted ob*ect) and so he argued that Copper7s
more specific methodological suggestions 3ere a case of circular
reasoning/ Copper) he claimed) presupposes the 0er- instances of
good science +eg Ne3ton) "ax3ell) $instein. that his criteria are
supposed to neutrall- select out/ In fact the criteria are
generalisations made from a partisan set of pre;decided instances)
and not the other 3a- around/ his is the difference) at least in
&e-erabend7s 3ork) bet3een methodological anarchism applied inside
the pre;constituted and pre;demarcated sciences) and &e-erabend7s
epistemological anarchism +circa <=II. 3hich puts that demarcation
totall- up for grabs and argues for all sorts of trans0ersal
composites as necessar- for 3hat 3e commonl- think of as
scientific progress/
(ontrar- to Latour's attempts to depict &e-erabend) and the 3hole
of the post;'IA generation) as caught in negati0it- and criti9ue)
it must be emphasised that Latour7s starting point 3as in
religious exegesis) and it is he 3ho has expressed sadness at the
disappearance of this mode of existence/ &e-erabend7s starting
point 3as aesthetic +opera and theatre. and scientific) and at the
end of his life he expressed the satisfaction that he 43as ne0er
hindered in an-thing8) and that he had finall- come to the
maturit- of being capable of lo0ing another person +Dra5ia./ In
his autobiograph- &e-erabend describes in a concrete and personal
3a- his progressi0e steps to3ards such lo0e) 3hereas Latour talks
about an abstract phenomenon of 4con0ersion8 as an all;or;none
point;like experience in his book on religion) R$Q!I(IND/ %o I
think that Latour is the more abstract thinker) and the true
disappointed nostalgic/ Je is caught in the contradiction of
pretending to be a descripti0e anthropologist of the modern and
-et including in his empirical description) out of nostalgia) a
mode of existence that he claims has disappeared/
!n the technical side of his epistemolog-) Latour is often guilt-
of making naR0e empiricist statements and mo0es despite his
seeming sophistication in other passages/ Jis attempted
uni0ersalising of so;called 4empirical8 obser0ations) are far more
theor-;laden and 0alue;laden than he is often 3illing to take into
account/ his is one of m- ma*or criticisms of AN INQUIRY IN!
"!#$% !& $'I%$N($: the 3hole pro*ect is formulated in naR0e
empiricist terms) despite his meta;theoretical reflections on a
4second empiricism8/ his gets him caught in a set of pragmatic
contradictions that &e-erabend ne0er fell into/
Another disturbing feature of Latour's proclamations is his
emphasis of the ke- ad0ance his s-stem makes in o0ercoming the
sub*ectUob*ect dichotom-/ his claim to radical progress o0er the
recent past is ludicrous to an-one 3ho kno3s the e0en slightest
bit about the philosophies of #eleu5e) #errida) L-otard) and
&oucault/ Jo3e0er) it ma- be of use to consider the absurdit- of
this claim in relation to the de0elopment of post;positi0ist
epistemolog-/ &e-erabend7s epistemological anarchism does not
presuppose sub*ects facing ob*ects/ &rom the 0er- beginning in the
earl- EFs &e-erabend 3as influenced b- ,ittgenstein) and
considered scientific statements as part of non;sub*ecti0e
language;games/ Je 3as also influenced b- Copper) 3ho later
summarised his position in <=I> in a paper called 4$pistemolog-
,ithout a @no3ing %ub*ect8/ he 3hole Copperian tradition
elaborated such an epistemolog- outside the sub*ect;ob*ect face;
off) as did the Quinean and the ,ittgensteinian traditions in
their o3n 3a-s/
he sub*ect;ob*ect face;off *ust has nothing to do 3ith this 3hole
decades long e0olution of Anglophone epistemolog-) and Latour
sho3s either his ignorance or his incomprehension of the treatment
of these 9uestions in the $nglish;speaking 3orld/ ,hate0er his
other faults) Copper broke decisi0el- 3ith this epistemolog- of
the kno3ing sub*ect and Latour cannot 3ish it a3a- to create a
0oid bet3een himself and ,hitehead/ &e-erabend in the essa-
0ersion of ADAIN% "$J!# +<=><. 3as alread- presenting the
sub*ect as a collecti0e assemblage entangled 3ith other
assemblages) a rela- station for the passage of 0arious forces)
influences) processes and e0ents/ his anal-sis is blindingl-
ob0ious in his treatment of the Jomeric cosmolog- in the book
ADAIN% "$J!# of <=>E) 3here he declares that a more contemporar-
0ersion of this t-pe of cosmolog-) that he endorses) can be traced
back to $rnst "ach/
,ittgenstein 3as a reader of ,illiam Qames and 3as influenced b-
him for his philosoph- of ps-cholog- and his philosoph- of
religion) and there are strong pragmatic aspects to his general
perspecti0e/ !ne of his big ideas 3as the foll- of tr-ing to think
4outside language games8/ Another 3as a deepening of the notion of
philosophical grammar/ +&e-erabend mentions ho3 he deri0ed his
idea of incommensurabilit- and theor- change from the reading of
the CJIL!%!CJI(AL INS$%IDAI!N% and he first expounded it in <=E?
to a group of ,ittgensteinians) 3ho 3ere unmo0ed) finding it
rather ob0ious./ I think that Latour is indebted to this positi0e
legac- of ,ittgenstein7s) and that talking about R-le and Austin
is -et another piece of misdirection Also ,ittgenstein is a ke-
reference for #a0id Bloor and the strong programme of the
sociolog- of kno3ledge) and so Latour is pla-ing do3n his debt to
the guiding figure of a programme that he learnt from and then
ri0alised 3ith/
,h- did #eleu5e famousl- condemn ,ittgenstein7s 4legac-86 ,e must
remember that in L!DI( !& %$N%$ #eleu5e is 9uite eulogious of
,ittgenstein for the idea of meaning as use) that he cited
,ittgenstein's criti9ue of &reud's m-tholog- as a precursor of the
ideas de0elopped in ANI;!$#ICU%) and that in A J!U%AN# CLA$AU%
the important idea of 4incorporeal transformations8 is discussed
in relation to the tradition of 4linguistic8 philosoph- initiated
b- ,ittgenstein/ %o #eleu5e) as usual 3hen e0aluating a mo0ement
of thought) appro0ed of the creation of concepts in this tradition
but disappro0ed of the conser0atism of meaning and the policing of
language/ &e-erabend) 3ho admits to ha0ing been decisi0el-
influenced b- ,ittgenstein) has exactl- the same attitude to the
conformism of some of his successors/ Latour) despite his
conceptual inno0ations) is in danger of elaborating a ne3 police
of meaning in his 3ill to establish the \felicit- conditions\ of
the 0arious modes of existence and to forbid illegitimate
crossings/
Latour cannot claim to be establishing empiricall- 3hat pre0ious
philosophers such as &e-erabend 3ere onl- able to ad0ance as
speculation/ Je cannot affirm that &e-erabend does not examine the
specific 3a-s in 3hich science produces kno3ledge/ his is false)
the 3hole point of the historical case stud- of Dalileo and of his
detailed studies of Bohr) are to indicate 3hat procedures did in
fact 3ork to ad0ance ph-sics/ rue &e-erabend does not do
laborator- studies) but noone e0er said that laborator- studies
are all there is to stud-ing scienceK Latour7s philosoph- of
science is 3oefull- deri0ati0e: his historico;semiotic stud- of
Casteur contributes no ne3 epistemological ideas) and confirms
&e-erabend's ideas deri0ed from the stud- of Dalileo/ And it is
3oefull- incomplete: he is doing intra;paradigmatic anal-ses of
net3orks in LAB!RA!RY LI&$) and is unable to deal 3ith the actual
content of scientific theories except b- taking a &e-erabendian
turn +see preceding remark on the Casteur studies./ %o the
looking;at;specific;3a-s;science;produces;kno3ledge criterion does
not distinguish &e-erabend from Latour either/ he onl- criterion
that does is the 4laborator- studies8 criterion) but it is of
limited 0alue) and is not rich enough to deal 3ith paradigm
changeK Latour does talk about paradigm;change in relation to
Casteur) but this is precisel- N! a laborator- stud-) but a
historical case stud- of the same t-pe that &e-erabend conducted
on Dalileo/
It 3ould be erroneous to maintain that &e-erabend's case stud- of
Dalileo *ust leads him to conclude that 4an-thing goes8/ his is
not at all true) and he proposes specific methods that Dalileo
used/ Jis conclusions are b- no means purel- negati0e/ Latour does
not engage 3ith &e-erabend's actual 0ie3s and arguments but 3ith
an empt- clichL far remo0ed from his actual texts/
he criticism of &e-erabend as an amusing #adaist is a case in
point/ It is no acute remark of Latour7s) but is a crucial point
ad0anced b- &e-erabend himself/ Je describes himself as closer to
the #adaists/ his is part of &e-erabend7s criti9ue of political
anarchism as being scientistic) dogmatic) indifferent to concrete
human li0es) based on resentment) and it is &e-erabend 3ho accuses
anarchism of dogmatic flattening/ Je declares that the problem
3ith nai0e anarchism is that it lea0es the hegemonic realit- in
place +including the sub*ect;ob*ect bifurcation. and so is part
of the same problem rather than the solution/ Latour is merel-
parasiting &e-erabend7s o3n ideas here) relabeling them) and
turning them against a fictitious &e-erabend 3ho ne0er existed/
#oes &e-erabend lea0e all forms of kno3ledge undifferentiated from
each other6 No) this is Latour7s problem in his actor;net3ork
phase) 3hich man- ha0e recognised to be one of the most
reductionist ontologies of science) and Latour sa-s as much in his
ne3 book/ Je sa-s that the actor;net3ork anal-sis al3a-s reduced
e0er-thing to the same sort of explanation in terms of net3orks)
and needs to be supplemented and pluralised b- his ne3 theor- of
modes of existence/ &e-erabend too fell into that sort of
undifferentiated theorising in the earl- IFs) expounding a sort of
radicalised Copperian uni0ersal pluralist methodolog- co0ering
art) science) religion) m-th etc/ But he broke 3ith that at the
end of the IFs) thanks to his "achian and ,ittgensteinian
inheritance/
&e-erabend spent much time anal-sing the t-pological distinctions
bet3een different sorts of cosmologies/ Je distinguished bet3een
cosmolog- A t-pe traditions +e/g/ Jomer and "ach. and cosmolog- B
t-pe +'enophanes and Copper./ In (!NQU$% !& ABUN#AN($ he
distinguishes bet3een Jomeric) Qudaic) and Rationalist traditions
and inside science itself $insteinian and Bohrian traditions/ Jis
t-polog- is different from Latour7s but he is emphatic that 3e do
need a t-polog-/ Latour does not differentiate inside science) as
he assigns it all to the one mode) that of reference/ But
reference for &e-erabend is too abstract and globalising a
categor-) and he considers it a retrospecti0e product of science
in the making/ Latour talks about stud-ing science in the making)
but this notion of reference does not distinguish bet3een
intraparadigmatic science 3here reference makes sense) and inter;
paradigmatic science 3here reference is constructed post hoc/
(uriousl-) #eleu5e and Duattari) 3ho elaborate their o3n t-polog-
of modes of existence in ,JA I% CJIL!%!CJY6) share 3ith Latour
this characterisation of science as reducible to the mode of
reference/ In this the- seem to gloss o0er the difference that
the- made in A J!U%AN# CLA$AU% bet3een ro-al science and nomad
science/ he later forgetting of this distinction and the sharp
demarcation that the- make bet3een science and philosoph-) on the
basis of the criterion of belonging to the mode of existence of
reference) is excessi0e/ If reference is constituted post hoc then
it cannot ser0e to identif- science in the making +i/e/ pro hoc.
but onl- science made/
!n this point it is Latour 3ho makes a better mo0e in an article
in &rench on Casteur +http:UU333/bruno;latour/frUfrUnodeU?H?./ Je
refers to the actors in the histor- of fermentation +Casteur)
-easts) lactic acid etc/. as 4conceptual personas8/ Je is clearl-
making use of the #eleu5oguattarianian concept 3ithout respecting
the demarcation that the- set up bet3een philosoph- and science/
(uriousl- this reference is omitted in the $nglish translation)
thus rendering it once again more difficult to locate the
#eleu5ian influences on Latour7s ideas/
LATOUR AND WHITEHEAD: A PRAGMATIC ALLIANCE
Is ,hitehead a ke- influence on the formation of Latour's thought6
he 9uestion can be posed because) despite Latour's increasing
number of references to ,hitehead's 3ork and and to his importance
as a philosopher) the essential ideas of his pro*ect seem to
predate his engagement 3ith ,hitehead's 3ork and concepts/ In a
seminar +at approximatel- H< mins. de0oted to IRR$#U(I!N% Latour
tells us that he had no real kno3ledge of ,hitehead at the time of
3riting this treatise) but that he became a ,hiteheadian onl-
later) through his discussions 3ith Isabelle %tengers/
I am not at all hostile to dra3ing a connection Latour and
,hitehead/ ,hen I 3as 0er- -oung +<E;<>. I read ,hitehead 3ith
much pleasure) although I probabl- didn7t understand 0er- much/
Later I read &e-erabend) 3ho became for a 3hile m- fa0orite
philosopher/ I am con0inced that there are important similarities
bet3een &e-erabend7s ideas and ,hitehead7s) but I don7t think that
there 3as an- influence) more7s the pit-/ %o 3hile I am 3illing to
ackno3ledge a resemblance bet3een Latour and ,hitehead) I am
dubious about the post hoc stories of influence that he recounts/
I am 3illing to go so far as to admit that Latour is best
understood against a ,hiteheadian backdrop) but I find that he is
re3riting his past on the basis of his present) and thus
falsif-ing a little/
"ore generall- I don7t think one should confuse the order of
rational reconstruction +rhetorical order. 3ith the order of
disco0er- +heuristic order./ %imilarit- +e/g/ bet3een Latour and
,hitehead.) or e0en eulogistic referencing) is not the same as
influence/ At the beginning of this blog) I discuss ALL JIND%
%JININD) 3hich I maintain is a pluralist treatise on modes of
existence/ Under the influence of %ha0iro7s book on ,hitehead)
3hich contrasts 0er- sharpl- the problematic of Jeidegger and that
of ,hitehead) I undertook to re3rite the ontological basis of A%/
I did so because I thought that such a pluralist endea0our is best
understood in ,hiteheadian terms) rather than) as the- themsel0es
understand it) in Jeideggerian terms/ I 3rote se0eral posts in
this line) but I e0entuall- abandoned it because I realised that
#re-fus and @ell- had managed to 4bend8 Jeidegger in a pluralist
pragmatist direction) compatible 3ith ,hitehead/ I realised that
thanks to their real inno0ations the differences bet3een Jeidegger
and ,hitehead on a classical reading of the t3o philosophers 3as
no longer an interesting 9uestion/
I bought into this sort of dichotom- o0er H -ears ago +in m- case
the dichotom- bet3een Jeidegger and ,hitehead as ontological
precursors to ALL JIND% %JININD.) but I abandoned it 0er- 9uickl-
as being too simplistic and ultimatel- futile/ Latour is &rench
and came to intellectual maturit- 3ithout ha0ing read the great
classics of of the pragmatist tradition/ #uring the IFs man-
important thinkers +#eleu5e) Duattari) L-otard) &oucault) $dgar
"orin) @ostas Axelos and man- others. had abandoned the sub*ect;
ob*ect bifurcation and epistemologies of demarcation) and came to
espouse 0arious forms of semiotics and of enunciati0e linguistics/
he origins of Latour's ideas are best understood in the light of
this milieu/ $0er- page of Latour is redolent of Dreimas and
%erres and #eleu5e and &oucault and L-otard/
I do not think that Latour7s 4public statements8 of influence are
to be taken at face 0alue) but are more to be seen in the
perspecti0e of pro0isional alliance than in terms of filiation/
(onceptual resemblance does not constitute proof of filiation +m-
example of &e-erabend o illustrates that./ he most substantial
textual con0ergence bet3een Latour and ,hitehead is in an article
3here he reformulates the findings of J$ CA%$URIOAI!N !& &RAN($
post hoc in ,hiteheadian terms/ Latour7s philosoph- of science at
the time of J$ CA%$URIOAI!N !& &RAN($ and IRR$#U(I!N% +<=AB.
is a transcription of the #eleu5ian and &oucauldian Niet5sche
re3orked b- Dreimasian semiotics/ $0en on this point the idea of
appl-ing semiotics not *ust to texts but to things is a
Niet5schean inspired one/ since for Niet5sche all things as 3ill
to po3er interpret and e0alue the 3orld/ Latour has declared that
at the time he 3as not ac9uainted 3ith arde) ,hitehead) or
,illiam Qames) and so 3as obliged to make do 3ith the conceptual
resources a0ailable to him/
In a paper dra3ing the philosophical conclusions from his stud- of
Casteur) and intent on o0ercoming the opposition bet3een realism
and constructi0ism) he declares that it is the reading of
,hitehead that permitted him to o0ercome this opposition: 4Before
reading ,hitehead) I could not extricate m-self from this dilemma8
+<H./ Jere Latour is referring to an e0ent in his personal
intellectual histor-) reading ,hitehead) 3hich 3as necessar- for
him to arri0e at a solution/
Jo3e0er) the original &rench 0ersion does not contain this
sentence) but a slightl- different one: 4A0ant ,hitehead) nous ne
pou0ions nous sortir de ce dilemme8 +<F. / 4Before ,hitehead) 3e
couldn7t get out of this dilemma/8 Jere there is no reference to
Latour7s reading but to intellectual histor-/ ,hitehead is said to
ha0e created the conditions for lea0ing the dichotom- behind/
Latour ma- ha0e found the solution directl- in ,hitehead or in a
later thinker) the biographical 9uestion is left open/
%trangel-) an earlier account of the same 3ork does not mention
,hitehead at all) but attributes the role of guide to exiting the
dichotom- to the semiotician Dreimas: 4his freedom in selecting
actors and redistributing properties among them is crucial to
understanding scientific practice) and) to m- kno3ledge) no other
discipline possesses that freedom/ All the others ha0e to start
from a 4natural8 di0ision bet3een human and nonhuman properties8
+H./
"- conclusion is not ho3e0er that the 4real8 debt is to Dreimas
and that the more recent references to ,hitehead are a mere
pedagogical or diplomatic de0ice/ Nor do I conclude that Dreimas
allo3ed him to get close to an insight that onl- the decisi0e
influence of ,hitehead cr-stallised into a 4real8 solution/ hat
3ould be a pre;Latourian naR0etL/ Latour himself pro0ides the more
appropriate conclusion:
here are mediators all the 3a- do3n) and adding sources 3ill
onl- add more mediations) none of them being reducible to mere
4document8or8information/8
#eleu5e) Dreimas) #errida) ,hitehead) ,illiam Qames) etc/ are all
4mediators8 permitting Latour to express his ideas no3 from one
angle no3 from another) first to one public and then to another/
here is a deep resemblance bet3een the s-stems of Latour and
,hitehead but I think that the terminological borro3ings do not
reflect a ma*or debt / Latour's more recent discussions of the
need to o0ercome the bifurcation of Nature are a 3eak point in his
argumentation/ he- criti9ue a stra3 man) a naR0e empiricism)
3hile not managing to hide Latour's o3n the naR0e empiricist
presuppositions/ If this is a ma*or influence of ,hitehead on
Latour it7s a bad one) but I think it7s mainl- 3indo3 dressing and
anxiet- of influence/
Latour read #eleu5e long before he read ,hitehead) and the
criti9ue of the bifurcation of Nature is e0er-3here in #eleu5e)
e/g/ the first fe3 pages of ANI;!$#ICU%) 3hich Latour read before
undertaking the 3ork leading to the 3riting of LAB!RA!RY LI&$/
IRR$#U(I!N% is a direct transposition of #eleu5e7s NI$O%(J$)
4net3ork8 is the 4rhi5ome8) e0er-thing is 4assemblages8)
4constructi0ism8 is from A J!U%AN# CLA$AU') 4modes of existence8
from #eleu5e's 3ritings on %pino5a and Niet5sche/ he
terminological and conceptual resemblances are massi0e) and 0er-
prior to Latour's encounter 3ith ,hitehead/ I don't think one
should do3npla- the con0ergence 3ith ,hitehead) but I don7t think
the reading of ,hitehead 3as a more important formati0e influence
than the stud- of #eleu5e/
FROM SEMIOTICS TO ONTOLOGY
<. R$LIDI!N AN# J$ $NUN(IAIS$ URN: he origins of Latour's
h-pothesis of multiple rLgimes of truth go back to his 3ork on
Biblical exegesis) as he declares repeatedl-/ he principle
theoretical influences there seem to be Bultmann and CLgu-/ his
is 3here Latour came to a \positi0e and constructi0e\ reading of
Bultmann's chains of translation\ +\(oming out as a Chilosopher\./
&ar from coming to a sceptical conclusion about religion) Latour
concludes that the long chain of mediations is the condition of
the truth of religious enunciation/ his is a singular bifurcation
point: Latour concei0es of religion as a specific rLgime of
enunciation) a mo0e 3hich man- ha0e made/ Je argues that \belief\
is not a pertinent categor- for this rLgime) nor is reference)
3hich he 3ill assign to factual kno3ledge/ Yet despite abandoning
belief) kno3ledge) reference and facts as non;pertinent) he
retains the notion of \truth\) and regards religious expressions
as belonging not *ust to a specific rLgime of enunciation) but to
a rLgime of truth or of \0eridiction\/ his ma- be 3here Latour
became interested in Dreimas's semiotics/ I think that this
separation of truth and reference created a gap in Latour's s-stem
that Dreimasian semiotics did not reall- fill) and that this is a
big part of the reason for the later mo0e to ,hitehead/ %eeing
things as themsel0es enunciations in the mode of reproduction
allo3ed Latour to semiotise e0er-thing 3ithout reducing e0er-thing
to language/
?. %(I$N($ AN# J$ %$"I!I( URN: Latour's beginning engagement
3ith science) including LAB!RA!RY LI&$ and right up to
IRR$#U(I!N%) is best understood against a background composed of
#eleu5e;%erres;L-otard;&oucault;#errida and a sort of generalised
Niet5scheanism and anti;Jegelianism/ he engagement 3ith net3orks
of reference 3as facilitated b- the Dreimasian paradigm of
semiotics that allo3ed Latour to treat human's and non;humans on
the same plane/ his permitted him to 0ie3 the historicit- of
kno3ledge as at the same time a historicit- of facts/ his is the
phase that Latour calls \historico;semiotic\ and \socio;semiotic\
+\Biograph- of an In0estigation\./
H. "A$RIAL $NII$% AN# J$ !N!L!DI(AL URN: Latour's
discussions 3ith Isabelle %tengers led to an \epiphan-\ in <=A>/
(onstantl- in danger of falling into a form of semiotic
reductionism) Latour sei5ed on ,hitehead's descriptions of the
\risk\ of in0ol0ed in persisting in being) e0en b- rocks/ his is
3here Latour's semiotic pluralism becomes 0eritabl- an ontological
pluralism) and the contribution of ,hitehead's thought 3as
decisi0e/ In one sense the contribution is minor) the addition of
a fifth mode +the mode of reproduction. after the four first modes
that Latour had alread- isolated +religion) reference) technolog-)
and double;click./ At the same time this ,hiteheadian encounter
led to a real bifurcation on Latour's intellectual path) that has
gro3n 3ider e0er since/ Jis first reaction 3as to 3rite up the
modes he had disco0ered in a little text called \Cetite
philosophie de l'Lnonciation\ +\Little philosoph- of enunciation\)
3ritten according to Latour in <=AA but published in <==A./ It is
interesting to note that the title still gi0es ke- place to the
semiotic register of rLgimes of enunciation) but that this is the
seed of the pro*ect that 3ill gi0e rise to AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$%
!& $'I%$N($ 3hich features in the title the ontological register/
METHOD: ONTOLOGICAL ASCENT AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCENT
Latour7s mo0ement is initiall- phenomenological/ Je attempts to
get a3a- from the abstraction of the sub*ect;ob*ect di0ision and
to come back to both historical and indi0idual experience/ !nl-
then can he rise to more 4cosmological8 concerns/ In the case of
the beings of metamorphosis +(hapter >. he begins 3ith a
historical sur0e- of the ,est's treatment of superstition) the
\irrational\ belief in magical forces) occult po3ers) and
in0isible beings/ Noting the rampant ps-chologi5ation of our
societ-) its massi0e use of ps-chotropic drugs) and its
fascination 3ith the fantastic in books) films) and t0 series) he
sees a contradiction bet3een our anxious a0oidance and persistent
denial of the literal existence of these metamorphic beings on the
one hand) and our readiness to expose oursel0es to them in
situations that treat them as mere \sub*ecti0e\ phenomena on the
other/
o come to grips 3ith their ontological status outside this
protecti0e framing in terms of sub*ecti0i5ation) Latour turns to
a description of the \original experience\ that permits us to
define their mode of existence) 3hich he takes to be the
phenomenon of emotion and moods/ Re*ecting the premise of this
sub*ecti0i5ation) that treats emotions as mere \inner\ phenomena)
he remarks that our experience is of something from outside us/
Rather than being confined to our interiorit-) emotions) on
Latour's h-pothesis) are ke- elements in the net3orks that produce
this interiorit-/ hese \ps-chogenic\ net3orks include man- sorts
of material elements such as drugs and the pharmaceutical
industr-) books) sho3s) films and the entertainment industr-)
famil- arrangements) and therapeutic arrangements/
,e ma- note that Latour's description of the \original experience\
of emotion presents it as al3a-s embedded in an imaginati0e or
fantas- context/ Je uses a language of energies) forces) po3ers)
metamorphoses and transmutations/ Je in0okes the experience of
dreams) the \subtle atmosphere of///moods\) the depictions of
m-tholog- and the manifestations of ritual/ his 3hole chapter is
a defence of ps-che against the reductions of ps-chologi5ation/
Rational ps-cholog-) including &reudian ps-choanal-sis) is
presented as a compendium of self;misunderstandings/
Latour argues to3ards the end of this chapter that 3e ma- consider
that ps-chogenic metamorphosis is onl- one part of the metamorphic
mode of existence) to 3hich he attributes uni0ersal extension:
4$0er-thing can) e0er-thing must) become something else8 +?FH./ In
doing so) he ele0ates it to a cosmogenic principle on a par 3ith
YrepZ) the persistence in being/ Jo3e0er this uni0ersalit- is onl-
a speculati0e 4h-pothesis8 inspired b- the cosmological status
that other collecti0es gi0e to these beings/ At the end he
descends once again to modern sub*ecti0it-) our experience of
emotions) and our interaction 3ith in0isible existents/
Latour calls his pro*ect 4empirical metaph-sics8 and I see this
same mo0ement of descent) ele0ation) and redescent e0er-3here in
the book/ %tarting off from some historical and social
generalities he descends to the 4original experience8
+empiricism.) the pri0ileged or paradigmatic example/ #oing the
phenomenolog- of this lets him extract the form of 0eridiction
+3ith its felicit- conditions. appropriate to the beings in0ol0ed
and lets him rise to the determination of their mode of existence/
his ontological determination lets him descend again to
experience) but this time finding the beings in 9uestion all
through experience) and not *ust confined to the paradigm case he
began 3ith/
In theor-) the phenomenolog- of the original experience has
primac-) -et the book as philosoph- is a speculati0e
reconceptualisation of experience/ %o the tid- methodological
se9uence from experience to speculation and back to experience
seems) at least some of the time) to be a fable hiding a 9uite
different se9uence 3here the speculation) guided b- prior
commitments) selects and characterises the experience that it 3ill
later) in the fable) claim merel- to describe and to generalise/
Latour's talk of 4empiricism8ser0es to blur or to co0er o0er these
methodological problems rather than resol0ing them/
COMPARISON WITH FEYERA4END
In an inter0ie3 +?F<?.) discussing his o3n methodolog-) Latour
affirms:
4this a thing that I learned from the 4scientists8 I studied)
i/e/ that: 4An-thing goes as long as it leads to 3hat -ou 3ant to
find8/ Qust as in a laborator- -ou ha0e instruments of all sorts)
including the most archaic and the most contemporar-) because that
is 3hat is necessar- in production) I m-self ha0e learnt a lot
from 4true8 scientists) hard scientists) i/e/ total indifference
to 9uestions of method8 +page <?H) m- translation./
his is 0er- exactl- 3hat &e-erabend proposes in ADAIN% "$J!#
+alread- in the essa- 0ersion published in <=><./ Latour continues
in the same 0ein for t3o and a half pages) appl-ing this notion of
epistemological anarchism to his o3n 3ork) and concludes: 4%o) ho3
do -ou produce ob*ects that resist 3hat is said of them6) 3ell)
an-thing goes8 +<?I./
As in the case of &e-erabend's philosoph-) epistemological
anarchism is explicitl- tied to a thesis of realism: the goal is
to produce ob*ects that \resist 3hat is said of them\/ his
anarchism is 4epistemological8 precisel- because &e-erabend 3ants
to get a3a- from the need to posit a dogmatic 4anarchist8 method
that has to be applied in e0er- case/ Je explains that he did
propose such a dogmatic anarchism for science in the earl- IFs)
but then the encounter 3ith the needs of the practicing scientist)
and later the encounter 3ith the needs of the more di0erse
population of students that 3ere enrolled after more democratic
education policies 3ere adopted in the U% +at the end of the IFs.)
led him to re*ect e0en the most open set of rules as long as the-
3ere supposed to be applied dogmaticall- as fixed) uni0ersal) and
binding principles) instead of heuristicall- as 0ariable) local)
suggestions or rules of thumb/ his is similar to Latour7s
intellectual e0olution from the methodological anarchism that he
espouses abo0e to his later concerns 3ith composing democractic
assemblages/
his e0olution from methodological anarchism to democratic
pluralism parallels the progression in &e-erabend7s 3ork from his
Copperian methodological anarchism applied inside the pre;
constituted and pre;demarcated sciences to his epistemological
anarchism +circa <=II. 3hich puts that demarcation totall- up for
grabs and argues for all sorts of trans0ersal composites as
necessar- for 3hat 3e commonl- think of as scientific progress)
and on to his democratic relati0ism as diplomatic guard rail for a
pluralist free societ-/
Latour tells us that this epistemological anarchist phase of his
3ork) that can be seen in his actor;net3ork phase 3ere in danger
of entrenching a h-per;reductionist approach/ Je argues that the
actor;net3ork anal-sis al3a-s reduces e0er-thing to the same sort
of explanation in terms of net3orks) and needs to be supplemented
and pluralised b- his ne3 theor- of modes of existence/ &e-erabend
too fell into that sort of undifferentiated theorising in the
earl- IFs) expounding a sort of radicalised Copperian uni0ersal
pluralist methodolog- co0ering art) science) religion) m-th etc/
But he broke 3ith that at the end of the IFs) thanks to his
"achian) Jegelian) and ,ittgensteinian inheritance/
&e-erabend spent much time anal-sing the t-pological distinctions
bet3een different sorts of traditions and cosmologies/ &or
example) in his last +unfinished. book (!NQU$% !& ABUN#AN($ he
distinguishes bet3een Jomeric) Qudaic) and Rationalist traditions)
and inside science itself bet3een $insteinian and Bohrian
traditions/ Jis t-polog- is different from Latour7s but he is
emphatic that 3e do need a t-polog- to distinguish bet3een
different modes of existence) and bet3een different forms of
kno3ledge/
THE SPECTRE OF RELATI)ISM
\,e are 3itnessing toda- the struggle for intellectual hegemon- ;;
for 3ho 3ill occup- the uni0ersal place of the 4public
intellectual8 ;; bet3een postmodern;deconstructionist cultural
studies and the cogniti0ist populari5ers of 4hard8 sciences\
+Oi5ek) 4Lacan Bet3een (ultural %tudies And (ogniti0ism8./
Oi5ek proposes his o3n regressi0e solution to escape from this
dichotom-: an imaginar- Lacanism +that could be called \Lacan;O\.
put together retrospecti0el- to outflank both constructi0ism and
cogniti0ism/ he position elaborated in Oi5ek7s texts amounts to
the combination of a poststructuralist approach +there is no meta;
language) the big !ther does not exist. and of a regressi0e
&reudo;Lacanian recoding of such ideas/ Oi5ek takes deconstructi0e
and pluralist arguments and then retranscribes them back3ards into
3hat he calls 4Lacanese8/ But this Lacan ne0er existed) it is the
necessar- mask for Oi5ek7s o3n ideas) a heuristic fantas-/
Oi5ek 3a0ers bet3een poststructuralist pluralism and a monist
reductionism founded on his idios-ncratic reading of Lacanian
ps-choanal-sis/ #espite the grand declarations) Oi5ek does not
accomplish an- break 3ith and going be-ond poststructuralism)
rather his 3ork represents its continuation / Unless one accepts
his caricature of poststructuralism as an accurate description) in
3hich case it is no big thing to go be-ond it/
his strateg- of una0o3ed parasitic feeding on and
misrepresentation of pluralist thought +3hen Oi5ek talks about
postmodern) deconstructionist) or poststructuralist thought he is
targeting the pluralist thought of #eleu5e) &oucault) L-otard) and
#errida. is no in0ention of Oi5ek's/ #eleu5e and Duattari argue
con0incingl- that Lacan7s thought is a compromise formation
bet3een the monism of his predecessor &reud and 0arious pluralist
insights that he integrated to correct or to pluralise the s-stem
partiall-/ %o) like &reud) Lacan feeds on) 3ithout gi0ing proper
recognition to) the 4other image of thought8 that #eleu5e
explicitl- links 3ith the names of Niet5sche) ,illiam Qames) and
,hitehead/
#iscussing \pluralism\ or the \pluralist\ in general can be in
itself a conceptuall- regressi0e gesture) creating the danger of
conflating the pluralist 3ith the relati0ist) or confusing
pluralism 3ith social constructionism/ As these latter positions
are relati0el- eas- to refute) such conflations and confusions
ha0e a strategic rhetorical ad0antage: one can seem b- hard;
hitting arguments to refute a 3hole gamut of positions and to be
in the theoretical a0ant;garde) 3ithout gi0ing oneself the trouble
to 3ork through an- reall- existing specific pluralist
elaborations in detail/ !ne ma- bra- loudl- about our fallibilit-
and the need and importance of empirical tests to ensure our
agreement 3ith the real) 3ithout e0er ha0ing confronted a real
pluralist position to test one's arguments/ As one has talked
about noone in particular specific 9uotations contradicting the
stereot-ped anal-sis can be ignored) declared irrela0ant)
interpreted as sa-ing the opposite of 3hat the- do indeed sa-)
etc/
hus to distinguish pluralism from its relati0ist shado3) 3e need
to elaborate the concept of a realist pluralism both in abstract
terms and also in relation to a concrete example of a pluralist
thinker/ he concrete example that 3e ha0e been examining in this
article is the pluralist metaph-sics of Bruno Latour as it is
expounded AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($/ o conclude I 3ish
to examine Latour7s contribution to an ontological +or realist.
pluralism/
] ] ]
LA!UR !N INSI%IBL$ $NII$%: Relati0ist olerance or !ntological
Cluralism6
Let us examine ho3 Latour deals 3ith the problem of superstition
in his ontological treatise AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($/
he general frame3ork of the book is materialist in the sense that
the 0arious modes of existence are embedded in material net3orks)
and that Latour regards the 0arious relations that define and
constitute these modes of existence as themsel0es material)
existing 3ith the same degree of material realit- as the elements
that are related/ Latour poses a basic ontological principle that
3hat is generated 3ithin and transits along these net3orks is not
reducible to them/ o take an epistemological example) kno3ledge
is produced inside the material net3orks of reference but cannot
be identified 3ith them/ o identif- kno3ledge and its net3orks
+i/e/) in the case of science) laboratories) instruments)
inscriptions) scientists themsel0es) and computer simulations)
etc/. 3ould be to commit a categor- mistake +nai0e reductionism./
o separate off kno3ledge as existing in some other non;material
realm 3ould be another categor- mistake +Clatonist idealism./ he
same can be said for the other \modes of existence\ that Latour
describes) on the principle that if all is material net3orks) 3hat
is produced and transits in these net3orks can be 9ualitati0el-
0er- different/
It is important to note that these distinctions ha0e nothing to do
3ith \belief\) but 3ith an empirical and conceptual anal-sis of
the 0arious material net3orks/ &or Latour the people occup-ing a
certain domain of practices ma- be totall- mistaken not onl- in
particular beliefs) but also globall- in the t-pe of existence
that the- attribute to the entities the- deal 3ith/ &or Latour
there is no 9uestion of ontological tolerance being extended to
e0er- 3orld0ie3) some are *ust plain 3rong/ his is the realist
principle underl-ing his ontolog-/ &or example) fundamentalist
(hristians) in Latour's terms) are mistaken) the- get the 3orld
3rong/ he same can be said +and Latour sa-s it often. about
climate change denialists +the- are 3rong about science) the- are
3rong about climate change) the politics that the- ad0ocate 3ould
ha0e disastrous conse9uences./ Latour's pluralism is no 3ish-;
3ash- tolerant relati0ism) but a doctrine of combat/
!0er and o0er again Latour emphasis the fallibilit- of our beliefs
and the need for ob*ecti0e tests/ ,hen he talks about
\interpreti0e ke-s\ characterising each mode of existence) this is
not beautiful soul relati0ism proclaiming \to each his belief\/
he ke- is a criterion that ensures that the claims and the
practices can be put to the test) to be 0alidated or re*ected as
compatible 3ith the ongoing engagement 3ith realit- that each mode
embodies/ he ke-s and the net3orks are the criteria that ensure
that 3e are not infallible) each in his or her o3n 3orld) and that
3e are not reducible to our s-stem of beliefs/
In (hapter > Latour applies this ontological pluralism to the
\irrational superstitions\ that are thought to characterise
traditional societies/ $nlightened modernit- and its 0ie3 of
reason has been self;consciousl- constituted in terms of a battle
against the superstitious belief in in0isible beings and occult
po3ers/ he pre0ious chapters of AN $NQUIRY IN! "!#$% !&
$'I%$N($ ha0e sho3n that the "oderns are mistaken about the
nature and composition of the 0isible 3orld/ &or Latour there is
no single40isible 3orld8) the 0er- idea is the result of a
categor- mistake/ Sisibilit- is constructed and maintained in
di0erse material net3orks) and means different things in different
contexts) mobilising different e9uipment and standards/
According to Latour) 3e are not as homogeneousl- reasonable as 3e
suppose/ A suspicious s-mptom from our histor- is the o0er3helming
0iolence that has accompanied the spread of Reason in the 3orld) a
sign that 3e are anxious and frightened about the entities that 3e
nonetheless assert to be de0oid of existence/he accusation made
b- the moderns against other cultures is that of their
4irrationalit-8 in their attribution of real existence to
in0isible beings/ Not existing in the ob*ecti0e 3orld) these
beings in the e-es of the moderns can onl- be pro*ections of the
human ps-che) the true locus of their existence/ he onl- mode of
existence that the- can ha0e is that of illusions and phantasms/
hese beings can onl- be explained in terms of the ps-cholog- of
the inner 3orld of sub*ecti0it-/
Appl-ing his method Latour must search for material net3orks that
are ps-chogenic) i/e/ engaged in the production and maintenance of
ps-ches and sub*ecti0ities/ he moderns that 3e are ma- ha0e no
positi0e institution for 3elcoming in0isible beings) but 3e ha0e
an abundance of ps-cho;techni9ues and ps-cho;entertainment to
stimulate) care for) or amuse oursel0es/ !ur naR0e) folk;
ps-cholog-) belief is that 3e do not produce our ps-ches but
rather that 3e possess them/ he self is supposed to be
autonomous) independent of net3orks for its existence/ here is no
meaning in the external 3orld that is not pro*ected b- means of
our internal representations/
In this ontological in0estigation into spirits) sub*ecti0ities and
ps-chic entities) traditional ps-choanal-sis cannot help us:
according to Latour 3hat is 4repressed8 is not *ust a part of the
inner ps-che that 3e pro*ect onto the outside 3orld) confusing
inner representations 3ith outer entities/ "ore fundamentall-)
3hat defines us is the ontological repression of the ps-chogenic
net3orks that endo3 us 3ith a ps-che/
!ur error is to attempt to think outside net3orks) to pa-
attention onl- to the 40isible8 products and to forget the
in0isible infrastructures/ In conse9uence) 3e no longer kno3 ho3
+or 3here. to situate the sub*ect and its \contents\/ (ertainl-
not inside) as interiorit- is not a gi0en) it is manufactured/ !ur
problem is one of attention) 3e do not notice the net3orks that
engender the ps-che/ %o 3e must return to the 4original
experience8 of this mode of existence: emotion/ $motion is a form
of crisis and transit) 3here our interiorit- is in the grip of
3hat feels like an outside force/ It in0ades us) takes possession
of us for a certain time and carries us a3a-) transforming our
reactions) and then lea0es us changed for better or 3orse/
he modern self is a contradictor- relation bet3een the belief in
an autonomous authentic ind0idual sub*ect alone in an ob*ecti0e
3orld de0oid of meaning) and the s3arm of entities that are
actuall- necessar- to its fabrication and continual modifications/
(aught in the repressi0e process of a0oidance of these outside
forces and of denial of their existence) the moderns ha0e produced
a 0ast arra- of therapeutic arrangements authorising their
ackno3ledgement as inner facts susceptible to 0arious forms of
manipulation/
Latour affirms that an ethnops-chiatric approach to therapeutic
situations gi0es us the best insight into the existence of these
in0isible beings and into the skill needed in dealing 3ith them/
,e alread- ha0e such a skill constructed o0er our man- contacts
3ith these in0isible beings/ ,e kno3 ho3 to de0iate and deflect
their forces to other targets and gain their energ- for going on
in life/ hese beings can transform us) alientaing or inspring us
in uncann- 3a-s/ he- metamorphose themsel0es too) so this is 3h-
the- are 4in0isible8) the- do not ha0e the persistence of the
beings of reproduction) the- do not belong to their rLgime of
0isibilit- and of stabilit-/ he- do not inhabit the same
net3orks/ But the- are real nonetheless/
hus in Latour's s-stem and in obie Nathan's practice these
in0isible beings are 9uite real) although perhaps not in the 3a-
that those 3ho consciousl- belie0e in their existence ma- suppose/
heir scope is not *ust therapeutic but ontological) foregrounding
b- means of their o3n proprties of metamorphosis and in0isibilit-
the alteration that characterises the form of ontological
pluralism that Latour ad0ocates) 3hich he calls \being;as;other\/
Latour ackno3ledges the existence of in0isible beings) of forces)
po3ers) di0inities and demons that do not take us as unified
personsK he emphasises the importance of ps-chic processes) of
incorporeal metamorphoses) transformations) transmutations and
becomings that oblige us to take being as alteration and
repetition as difference/ his is the language of affects and
intensities that 3as de0elopped b- both #eleu5e and L-otard) but
Latour does not gi0e them ontological primac-) as #eleu5e and
L-otard did at a certain moment/ he- constitute one mode of
existence amongs man-) and the pluri0erse does not repose on this
mode alone/ Latour also breaks a3a- the *argon;filled &reudo;
"arxist conceptual field that complicated this ontolog- and
burdened it 3ith a hea0-;handed academic st-le/ B- rene3ing our
theoretical 0ocabular- and references Latour has freed us from
anti9uated connotations and other dogmatic residues of the last
centur-7s philosophical combats/
AGAINST THE O4=ECTAL REDUCTION: LATOUR7S PLURALIST ONTOLOGY
Bruno Latour7s AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($ pro0ides us 3ith
a host of categories other than ob*ect for describing 3hat exists/
In particular) the d-namic aspect of matter is described in
(hapter > under the categor- "$ or 4the beings of metamorphosis8/
"ost of the chapter is focused on ps-chic entities) but at the end
he remarks that these beings 4precede the human) infinitel-8
+?FH./ It is clear that calling all existents 4ob*ects8 is alread-
a reduction) and 3e need a more plural 0ocabular-/
!n the 9uestion of the stabilit- of ob*ects) Latour has re0ealed
that he found this problem particularl- difficult/ It 3as onl-
after a con0ersation 3ith Isabelle %tengers about ,hitehead that
he had an illumination that this stabilit- 3as not uni0ersal) nor
3as it necessaril- tied to humans/ Je concei0ed that it belonged
to a specific mode of existence R$C or reproduction) that ensures
the persistence of beings/
Latour7s mo0ement is to get a3a- from the abstraction of the
sub*ect;ob*ect di0ision and to come back to both historical and
indi0idual experience/ !n the basis of an ontological anal-sis of
the phenomenolog-) he can then 3iden the import to more
4cosmological8 concerns/ Je makes it clear to3ards the end of the
chapter 3e ma- consider that ps-chogenic metamorphosis is onl- one
part of the metamorphic mode of existence: 4$0er-thing can)
e0er-thing must) become something else8 +?FH./ In doing so) he
ele0ates it to a cosmogenic principle on a par 3ith reproduction/
!n this model the beings of reproduction are prior to the
bifurcation of sub*ect and ob*ect) and so prior to) but at the
basis of) the constitution of ob*ects stricto sensu b- means of
human categorisation/ he interpla- bet3een persistence and
alteration) or reproduction and metamorphosis) is the 4musical8
substrate for all other modes of existence 3hich modulate this
rh-thmic composition of process and stabilit-: 4the- form the
basso continuo 3ithout 3hich no music 3ould be audible8 +?FB./
Jo3e0er this uni0ersalit- is onl- a speculati0e 4h-pothesis8
inspired b- the cosmological status that other collecti0es gi0e to
these beings/ At the end he descends once again to modern
sub*ecti0it-) our experience of emotions) and our interaction 3ith
in0isible existents/
Latour calls his pro*ect 4empirical metaph-sics8 and I see this
same mo0ement of descent) ele0ation) and redescent e0er-3here in
the book/ %tarting off from some historical and social
generalities he descends to the 4original experience8
+empiricism.) the pri0ileged or paradigmatic example/ #oing the
phenomenolog- of this lets him extract the form of 0eridiction
+3ith its felicit- conditions. appropriate to the beings in0ol0ed
and lets him rise to the determination of their mode of existence/
his ontological determination lets him descend again to
experience) but this time finding the beings in 9uestion present
all through experience) and not *ust confined to the paradigm case
he began 3ith/
ONTOLOGICAL PLURALISM IS NOT RELATI)ISM: THREE THESES
<. Against tolerance: Latour7s pluralism argues against climate
change denialism
!n this 0er- interesting 9uestion one should read the numerous
discussions of climate change denialism b- Latour) 3ho 0er-
intelligentl- outflanks the deniers) and sho3s that the- ha0e no
research to back up their claims) that the- are not credible
4others8 3hose point of 0ie3 is to be respected/ Latour's
pluralist ontolog- is not a uni0ersal relati0ism) as this 0er-
example pro0es/ he Difford lectures +&acing Daia: %ix lectures on
the political theolog- of nature. 3ere 0er- clear on this point/
Also AN INQUIRY IN! "!#$% !& $'I%$N($ opens on this 9uestion and
establishes Latour's re*ection of such sceptical and relati0ist
plo-s as based on a totall- inade9uate 0ie3 of science/ here is
no e9ui0alence of 0alue bet3een the scientific 0ie3 and pseudo;
scientific propaganda/
?. Against 4belief8: Latour's pluralism re*ects fundamentalism as
erroneous
It is important to note that the distinctions that Latour makes
bet3een the different modes of existence ha0e nothing to do 3ith
4belief8) but are based on an empirical and conceptual anal-sis of
the 0arious material net3orks that sustain them/ &or Latour the
people occup-ing a certain domain of practices ma- be totall-
mistaken not onl- in particular beliefs) but also globall- in the
t-pe of existence that the- attribute to the entities the- deal
3ith/ %uch is the case of the (hristian fundamentalist/ here is
no 9uestion of ontological tolerance being extended to e0er-
3orld0ie3 and to e0er- belief) some are *ust plain 3rong/ his is
the realist principle underl-ing Latour's pluralist ontolog-/
&undamentalist (hristians) in Latour7s terms) are mistaken o0er
man- things) not *ust about their o3n religion: their
preoccupation 3ith belief as the defining feature of religion is
3rong) their actual beliefs are false) their idea of reference to
the 3orld is 3rong) and so Latour concludes that the- get the
3orld 3rong/ As 3e ha0e seen) the same can be said +and Latour
sa-s it often. about climate change denialists +the- are 3rong
about science) the- are 3rong about climate change) the- are 3rong
in the politics that the- ad0ocate) 3hich 3ould lead to disaster
Latour7s pluralism is no 3ish-;3ash- tolerant relati0ism) but a
doctrine of combat/
H. ADAIN% $CI%$"I( I""UNIY: Latour's pluralism argues for the
fallibilism of our kno3ledge claims
Latour's pluralist ontolog- emphasises the fallibilit- of our
beliefs and the need for ob*ecti0e tests/ ,hen he talks about
4interpreti0e ke-s8 characterising each mode of existence) this is
not beautiful soul relati0ism proclaiming 4to each his belief8/
Appl-ing the 3rong interpreti0e ke- is a categor- mistake) i/e/ an
ontological error that results in false claims about the 3orld/
he ke- is a criterion that ensures that the claims and the
practices can be put to the test of experience) and so to be
0alidated or re*ected as compatible or not 3ith the ongoing
engagement 3ith realit- that each mode embodies/ !ur ontological
error is to attempt to think outside material net3orks and to
ignore the need for the appropriate interpretati0e ke-/ ,e tend to
pa- attention onl- to certain detached propositions and to reified
products) and to forget the modes of existence and the material
infrastructures/ he ke-s and the net3orks are the criteria that
ensure that it makes sense to tr- to get the 3orld right) taking
into account that our beliefs are not infallible) each in his or
her o3n 3orld) and that 3e oursel0es are not reducible to our
s-stem of beliefs/