1 ~^<r - -

A WORLD BA NK POLICY STUDY

Urban Transport
Urban
Transport
A World Bank
Poiicy Study
The World Bank
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
Foreword
U r ban tr anspor t di rectl y affects the economi c ef-
fi ci ency of ci ti es and the wel l - bei ng of ur ban i nhabi -
tants. Since al most everyone i n ur ban reas malees
dai l y use of some f or m of tr anspor t, the oper ati on of
the tr anspor t system is a maj or topi c i n most ci ti es of
the wor l d.
The pr i mar y objecti ve of the W or l d Bank's ur ban
pr ogr am, i ni ti ated i n 1972, was, and sti l l i s, to assist
member governments i n devel opi ng approaches to
the efHci ent and equi tabl e provi si n of ur ban services
and empl oyment. I n the case of ur ban tr anspor t,
i ni ti al responses to the Bank's pr ogr am reveal ed
wi del y di ffer i ng vi ews about the types of projeets that
were best sui ted to the needs of devel opi ng countri es.
Frequentl y, member countri es proposed ur ban trans-
por t projeets that i nvol ved heavy capi tal outl ays and
r ecur r i ng expendi tures, often w i t h l i ttl e benefi t to a
maj or i ty of the i nhabi tants of ur ban communi ti es. I n
parti cul ar, the tr anspor t needs of l ow- i ncome groups
recei ved i nsuffi ci ent attenti on.
Because of thi s, the Bank arti cul ated an approach
to ur ban tr anspor t that woul d be consi stent w i t h
broader sectoral and ci ty-l evel objecti ves. Thi s ap-
pr oach was set out i n an U r ban Tr anspor t Sector
Pol i cy Paper publ i shed i n M ay 1975. A s mor e and
mor e ur ban tr anspor t projeets have been under taken,
some by countri es themsel ves and others w i t h the
hel p of i nter nati onal agenci es, experi ence i n deal i ng
w i t h ur ban tr anspor t questi ons has added to our
knowl edge and understandi ng. M any of the pr ob-
l ems and issues rai sed i n the 1975 paper sti l l exi st
today, and the sol uti ons proposed i n 1975 r emai n
val i d. H owever , the Bank has refi ned i ts approach to
ur ban tr anspor t pr obl ems, and emphases have gr ad-
ual l y changed.
The Bank has i ncreasi ngl y stressed projeets de-
si gned to achi eve sustai ned sector-wi de benefi ts, such
as projeets that i mpr ove tr anspor t system manage-
ment or demnstrate r epl i cabi l i ty, rather than bei ng
targeted to l i mi ted secti ons of the communi ty. The
Bank has al so refi ned i ts vi ews on tr anspor t pol i cy.
The 1975 paper stated that Bank suppor t woul d
depend on whether bor r ower s i ni ti ated br oad pr o-
grams w i t h a wi de vari ety of r efor ms. But the i mpl e-
mentati on of a number of tr anspor t projeets that
r equi r ed maj or changes i n pol i cyf or exampl e, the
i ntr oducti on of r oad pr i ci ng i n ur ban r easr an i nto
di ffi cul ti es. Thi s pr ompted the Bank to shi ft to selec-
ti ve and progressi ve reforms that w i l l l ead, i n the
l ong ter m, t owar d the wi der use of sound ur ban
tr anspor t pol i ci es.
Other devel opments have al so i nfl uenced the
Bank's approach to ur ban tr anspor t. I n parti cul ar,
the unprecedented gr owt h i n demand for tr anspor t
and steep i ncreases i n the costs of energy and con-
str ucti on have exacerbated ur ban tr anspor t pr ob-
l ems. A s a resul t, l ow-cost sol uti ons and i nsti tuti onal
i mpr ovements have become mor e wi del y appreci at-
/'//
ed, and ci ty authori ti es are more w i l l i ng than they
once w ere to adopt traffi c management pl ans and
si mi l ar cost-effecti ve measures.
The experi ence that has been gai ned and the
changes that have taken pl ace over the past decade
have pr ompted a fresh l ook at the ur ban tr anspor t
sector and the pr epar ati on of thi s new Bank study on
ur ban tr anspor t pol i cy. The bookl et sets out the
current vi ew s of the W or l d Bank on ur ban tr anspor t
and the Bank's approach to f utur e l endi ng i n thi s
sector.
I n vi ew of the range of ur ban tr anspor t pr obl ems
f aci ng devel opi ng countri es and the many techni cal
aspects i nvol ved, thi s study is suppor ted by techni cal
papers by the Water Suppl y and U r ban Devel opment
Depar tment of the Bank:
lnstitution Building for Traffic Management
Toward Better Urban Transport Planning in Devel-
oping Countries
Urban Transit Systems: Guidelines for the Exami-
nation of Options
Bus Companies: Performance Evaluation and Im-
provement (f or thcomi ng)
Bus Services: Gritera for Profitability (f or th-
comi ng)
Traffic Management Projeets: Identification, Pre-
paration, and Appraisal (f or thcomi ng)
Both thi s U r ban Tr anspor t Pol i cy Study and the
techni cal papers recogni ze the vi tal rol e that ur ban
tr anspor t pl ays i n the ur ban devel opment process and
are di rected t ow ar d the W or l d Bank's pr i mar y objec-
ti ve i n ur ban tr anspor t: to i mpr ove ci ty effi ci eney and
al l evi ate poverty.
A nthony A . Chur chi l l
Di r ector
Water Suppl y and U r ban
Devel opment Depar tment
The Wor l d Bank
Urban Transport w as prepared under the di r ecti on of A nthony A .
Chur chi l l , di rector, Water Suppl y and U r ban Devel opment
Depar tment. A l an A r mstr ong - Wr i g ht w as the pr i nci pal author.
Substanti al contr i buti ons w ere made by Si r A l an Wal ters and the
regi onal project offi cers concerned w i t h ur ban tr anspor t. Research
assistance w as pr ovi ded by Barry Y atman, Si mn L ew i s, Veroni que
Bi shop, and Charl es Pi l i . The manuscri pt w as edi ted by Phi l l i p
Saw i cki .
iv
Contents
Summary
1. Urban Transport and Ci ty Efficiency
Conceptual Framework 1
Ci ty Form and Efficiency 2
Growth in Demand for Urban Transport 4
I mplications ofRapi d Growth 7
2. Managing Demand for Road Use
Road Pricing 8
Physical Restraints 10
Parking Restraints 11
UserTaxes 11
Other Restraints on Vehicle Ownership 11
Land Use Control 12
3. Improving Efficiency by Traffic Management
Parking Restrictions 14
Pri ori ty for Public Transport 15
Traffic Movement and Traffic Control 16
Road Safety Measures 17
The I nsti tuti onal Framework 18
Nati onal and Local Responsibilities 19
4. Public Transport: The Role of Bus Services
The Crisis in Public Transport 20
Public Transport Subsidies 22
Cri teri a for Viable Bus Services 22
The Role of Government 27
5. Investment Decisions
Investment i n Road Networks 29
Capital-Intensive Investments 30
Urban Transit Systems: Examination of Options 32
Investments and Transport Planning 36
6. World Bank Involvement in Urban Transport:
Experience and Directions
Lending Program, 1972-85 39
Project I mplementation Experience 40
Policy Issues and Directions 41
Conclusin 44
Appendix Tables
A - l . Urban Transport Data: Selected Cities 46
A -2. Bus Services: City Comparisons, 1983 48
A -3. Bus Services: Key I ndicators of Performance 49
A -4. Rail Services: Ci ty Comparisons, 1983 50
A -5. Rail Services: Capital Cost of Typi cal Rai l Systems 52
A -6. Transit System Characteristics 53
A -7. Worl d Bank Urban Transport Lending, 1972-85:
Breakdown of Investment Costs 54
A -8. Worl d Bank I nvolvement in the Urban Transport Sector, 1972-85
Bibliography
Boxes
1. Area Licensing i n Singapore 9
2. Electronic Road Pricing in Hong Kong 10
y 3. Korea and Egypt: Vehicle Ownership and Use 12
4. Restrictions on Parking and Street Trading 15
5. Bangkok Bus Laes 16
6. A bi djan: A Comprehensive Approach to Transport I mprovement
7. Calcutta: Prvate and Public Bus Operators 23
8. Bombay: Publicly Owned Bus Company 24
9. Hong Kong's Wi de Range of Bus Services 26
10. Route Associations 27
11. Deregulation in Colombo 28
12. Cities in Brazil: Access to Low-I ncome Areas 30
13. Kingston, Jamaica: Road Maintenance 31
14. Caracas Metro 32
15. Bus Expressways i n Porto Alegre 33
16. Hannover Li ght Rai l Transit 34
17. Osaka's Surface Rapid Railway 35
18. Sao Paulo Metro 36
19. Urban Transport Planning: A Two-Ti ered Approach 37
VI
Summary
D u r i n g the past two decades the popul ati ons of many
ci ti es i n A si a, A f r i ca, and L ati n A mer i ca have dou -
bl ed. Thi s huge popu l ati on gr owth has been accom-
pani ed by a substanti al expansi n of ci ty boundar i es
and much hi gher levi s of i ndustr i al and commer ci al
acti vi ty.
These changes have pl aced new and heavy de-
mands on ur ban tr anspor t systems, demands that
many ci ti es i n devel opi ng countr i es have been unabl e
to meet. A l thou gh there are fewer vehi cl es i n these
ci ti es, tr affi c congesti n is usual l y mu ch worse than
i t is i n the ci ti es of the devel oped wor l d. I n L agos or
Bangkok, f or exampl e, the average vehi cl e moves at
onl y about hal f the speed of the average vehi cl e i n
L ondon or Fr ankf ur t.
Sol vi ng tr anspor t pr obl ems has thus become one
of the chi ef tasks conf r onti ng gover nments i n the
devel opi ng countr i es, pr i mar i l y because of the eco-
nomi c i mpor tance of thei r bur geoni ng ci ti es. The
ur ban sector i n most devel opi ng countr i es accounts
f or at least 50 percent of gross nati onal pr oduct (G N P )
and i n some countr i es f or as mu ch as 70 percent.
Cl ear l y, an effecti ve tr anspor t system hel ps to raax-
i mi ze the economi c effi ci ency of any ci ty, whi l e an
i nf er i or system retards economi c progress. I n addi -
ti on, over bur dened tr anspor t systems have made
tr affi c acci dents a pr i nci pal cause of death and i nj ur y
i n the devel opi ng countr i es.
Today's tr anspor t pr obl ems have ari sen despi te
l arge annual expendi tur es on ur ban tr anspor t sys-
tems. Ci ti es i n devel opi ng countr i es of ten devote 15
to 25 percent of thei r annual expendi tur es to thei r
tr anspor t systems, and someti mes much mor e. Fur th-
er mor e, the over whel mi ng natur e of the ur ban tr ans-
por t pr obl em has someti mes tempted gover nments to
tr y to sol ve i t by spendi ng vast amounts of money on
subways and compl ex hi ghway i nf r astr uctur e. These
capi tal -i ntensi ve pr ojeets, however , have not al ways
been cost-effecti ve.
Pressure on ur ban tr anspor t systems i n the ci ti es of
the devel opi ng wor l d is l i kel y to i ncrease substanti al -
l y i n the f utur e. The popu l ati on gr owth that leads to
greater demand f or ur ban tr anspor t shows no si gns
of subsi di ng. I n fact, some forecasters expect the
popul ati ons of cer tai n T hi r d Wor l d ci ti es to quadr u-
pl e between 1980 and 2000. W i thou t even greater
effor ts to deal wi t h the pr obl ems of movi ng peopl e
and goods, many ci ti es i n the devel opi ng countr i es
w i l l conti nu to have tr anspor t systems that f ai l to
achi eve thei r goal s and i mpai r ci ty effi ci ency.
Because soci al , economi c, and topogr aphi cal con-
di ti ons var y f r om ci ty to ci ty, ur ban tr anspor t pr ob-
l ems wi l l not be sol ved by the adopti on of r eady-
made, uni ver sal pol i ci es. The Wor l d Bank beli eves,
however , that three pr i nci pi eseconomi c vi abi l i ty,
financial vi abi l i ty, and effi ci encycan be used to
V
gui de the devel opment of ur ban transport pol i ci es i n
most ci ti es.
When there is economi c vi abi l i ty and benefi ts
outwei gh the cost of transport, most peopl e w oul d be
w i l l i ng to pay these costs. Ur ban authori ti es, howev-
er, often subsi di ze transport. But subsi di es do not
necessari l y augment the suppl y of transport faci l i ti es
and, i n fact, ul ti matel y i nhi bi t expansi n. Few ci ti es
have suffi ci ent resources to per mi t subsi di es to go on
gr owi ng i n pace w i th rapi dl y i ncreasi ng demand.
Transport i mprovements shoul d be sel f-sustai ni ng
and repl i cabl e so that they may be wi del y appl i ed i n
other ci ti es and suburbs. To encourage sel f-sustai ni ng
repl i cabi l i ty, the users of ur ban transport faci l i ti es
shoul d usual l y pay the costs i ncur r ed.
A chi evi ng financial vi abi l i ty may necessitate a var-
i ety of approaches. I n the case of hi ghways, for
exampl e, wi despread ur ban congesti n i ndi cates that
the "pr i ce" to r oad users does not refl ect the val u of
ur ban roads. A l though the best approach may be
proper road pr i ci ng, thi s has pr oved di ffi cul t to
i mpl ement. A n al ternati ve is to l evy sui tabl e road
user taxes. I n the case of publ i c transport systems,
fares need to cover costs. Thi s is more easi l y achi eved
i f systems are effi ci ent so that costs are mi ni mi zed.
Encouragi ng effi ci ency requi res sui tabl e i ncenti ves
that are more l i kel y to exi st when pri vatel y owned
systems oprate under competi ti ve condi ti ons.
The publ i c sector must, however, retai n responsi -
bi l i ty for many for mi dabl e tasks that cannot be
assi gned to the pr vate firms. Onl y the publ i c sector
can undertake, for exampl e, traffi c regul ati on and
management, the setti ng of safety standards, trans-
por t pl anni ng, and the for mul ati on of transport pol -
i cy. Unfor tunatel y, many of these excl usi vel y gov-
ernmental tasks have been negl ected i n devel opi ng
countri es.
Urban Transport andCi ty Efficiency
The gr ow th patterns of T hi r d Wor l d ci ti es are si mi l ar
to those that occurred i n the West but are unfol di ng
faster and farther. M any ci ti es for med ar ound water
transport faci l i ti es and, l ater, al ong r ai l systems.
M otor vehi cl es al tered the ci ty shape once agai n.
Roads al l owed commerce, i ndustr y, and ur ban resi -
dents the fl exi bi l i ty to take advantage of the l ower
rents and greater space of the suburbs. But hel ter-
skel ter expansi n resul ted i n a new set of probl ems.
Business became cri ti cal l y dependent on adequate
Communi cati ons and transport systems for the move-
ment of goods and services thr oughout the ci ty. A t
present, the fai l ure of these systems to functi on
smoothl y i n many places i nhi bi ts exi sti ng business
acti vi ty and sti fles further gr ow th and devel opment.
A l though ci rcumstances di ffer consi derabl y fr om
ci ty to ci ty i n the devel opi ng countri es, certai n basic
trends determi ne transport demand: l arge increases
i n ur ban popul ati on l ead to a pr opor ti onal i ncrease
i n transport tri ps; the spread of ur ban reas gi ves ri se
to the expansi n of r oad networks, l onger journeys,
and the consumpti on of more fuel ; the greater avai l -
abi l i ty of motor i zed transport resul ts i n more moto-
ri zed tri ps and increases rn fuel consumpti on; i ncreas-
es i n househol d i ncomes crate a greater propensi ty
for travel and a mar ked i ncrease i n car ownershi p,
w i th a consequent demand for more road capaci ty;
and increases i n commerci al and i ndustri al acti vi ty
l ead to i ncreased vol umes of servi ce vehi cl es and
frei ght traffi c. Taken together, these factors resul t i n
a substanti al i ncrease i n transport demand, whi ch i n
tur n has si gni fi cant i mpl i cati ons for ci ty effi ci ency.
The most notabl e effects are wi despread traffi c
congesti n, greatl y i ncreased costsparti cul arl y i n
fuel consumpti onand a seri ous loss of pr oducti vi ty
i n commerce and i ndustry. The necessary basic ex-
pansi n of road networks and transport systems to
meet these demands and the more compl ex and
costl y sol uti ons that prevai l pl ace a consi derabl e
burden on ci ty budgets. Furthermore, househol ds i n
ur ban communi ti es are devoti ng i ncreasi ngl y l arge
pr opor ti ons of thei r i ncomes to transport. The budg-
et bi te is par ti cul ar l y si gni fi cant among l ow- i ncome
groups (for exampl e, 15percent of househol d i ncome
for l ow- i ncome groups i n New Del hi ; up to 20
percent i n K i ngston).
The speed w i th whi ch demand and costs have
gr ow n i n devel opi ng countri es has often over-
whel med the i nsti tuti ons responsi bl e for transport.
But despi te the seri ous i mpl i cati ons, demand for road
use has been al l owed to gr ow vi r tual l y unrestrai ned.
Managi ng Demand for Road Use
Substanti al expansi n of road capaci ty may be una-
voi dabl e when the demand for ur ban transport grows
rapi dl y. Even so, expansi n of road capaci ty and
much r oad congesti n can be reduced by suppress-
i ng excessive demand for road use. A n appreci abl e
amount of demand arises because users do not pay
the true costs of usi ng the roads, i n parti cul ar the
costs i nfl i cted on other road users. Several methods
viii
can be empl oyed to reduce excessive demand:
Road pr i ci ng, whereby motori sts are charged f or
usi ng congested roads (H ong K ong)1
A rea l i censi ng, whereby l ow-occupancy vehicl es
pay to enter congested ci ty centers dur i ng rush
hours (Singapore)
Physical restraints to discourage the movement of
pr vate cars across ci ty centers (Tuni s and G-
teborg)
Parki ng control s to prevent l ong- ter m downt own
par ki ng by commuters but al l ow nor mal business
activities (Singapore)
User taxes on fuel to restrai n the general use of
vehicl es (Republ ic of Korea)
Fi nanci al restraints on vehicl e ownershi p, such as
hi gh i mpor t duties, sales taxes, or annual l icensing
fees (Korea)
L and use control s to infl uence the magni tude and
type of transport demand (Curi ti ba and Bombay).
W i t h r api dl y gr owi ng demand f or r oad space and
the hi gh costs of expandi ng capacity, i t is probabl y
onl y a matter of a short ti me before most devel opi ng
countri es w i l l need some f or m of motor vehicl e
restraints to combat worseni ng transport condi ti ons.
I f these measures are coupl ed wi t h general i mpr ove-
ments i n traffic f l ows and publ i c transport that ben-
efit the maj or i ty of r oad users, they shoul d w i n
acceptance more easil y.
I mprovi ng Efficiency by Traffic Management
M u ch of the traffi c congestin i n the cities of devel -
opi ng countri es is the resul t of inefficient use of
exi sti ng streets and hi ghways. Several measures have
been used to speed up the movement of traffi c wi t h-
out spending l arge sums of money:
Restrictions on par ki ng, stoppi ng, and street tr ad-
i ng (San J os and L i ma)
Pr i or i ty measures f or publ i c transport vehicl es,
such as bus-onl y l aes and segregated ri ghts-of-
way (Bangkok)
Better contr ol of traffi c movementsthr ough such
means as traffi c signis and signs, i ntersecti on
i mprovements, and pedestrian wal kwaysbacked
up by the enforcement of traffi c regul ati ons (A bi d-
jan)
1. Examples and case studies noted in parentheses in this
summary are described in the boxes and in the main text.
Road safety measures, i ncl udi ng anal ysis of acci-
dent data, safe road design, i nspecti on of motor
vehicl es, dri ver tr ai ni ng and testing, and road user
educati on (Brazi l , Chi l e, and Costa Ri ca).
I n addi ti on, responsibil ities f or traffi c management
and enforcement of traffic rul es and regul ati ons
are of ten fragmented and uncl ear, and the agencies
charged wi t h such responsibil ities, i ncl udi ng the
traffi c pl ice, need to be strengthened. I n many cases,
a comprehensive approach to traffi c management has
been abl e to achieve considerabl e savings i n commu-
ter journey times and vehicl e operati ng costs, and
especial l y i n fuel consumpti on. I n addi ti on, i t has
been possibl e to del ete or defer expensive i nfrastruc-
ture projeets.
Public Transport
I n most devel opi ng countri es, buses are the maj or
mode of ur ban transport and of ten the onl y one
affordabl e to the poor. Because of the vari ety of
vehicl es i n use, they are efficient i n movi ng l arge
numbers of peopl e and i n meeti ng the demand f or
di fferent quanti ti es and qual i ti es of transport. Expe-
rience shows that the publ i c wel comes a wi de choice
of transport and makes tradeoffs between ti me and
di scomf or t and the amount they are wi l l i ng to pay.
But despite the cl ear need f or great vari ety i n publ i c
transport, there is a tendeney to establ ish l arg^, costl y
publ i c undertaki ngs that offer very l i mi ted choices.
Such services usual l y are heavi l y subsidized.
Subsidies general l y arise because of a desire to
mai ntai n certai n levis of service at fares that are
bel ow costs. But the anti ci pated benefi tsfor exam-
pl e, better services, reduced car use and congestin,
and greater patronage l eadi ng to i mpr oved vi abi l i -
tyusual l y f al l short of expectations. The mai n
reason f or the f ai l ure of subsidies is that they remove
incentives to reduce costs and usual l y l ead to inef-
ficieney, greater dficits, and yet more subsidies.
Cl earl y defined subsidies may be justi fi ed where
social and economi c benefits have been accuratel y
assessed and outwei gh al l the costs. But i n general , i t
w i l l be extremel y di f f i cul t f or cities to rel y on subsi-
di zed publ i c transport to meet f utur e massive de-
mands, whi ch are gr owi ng much faster than budget
revenues. A s a resul t of this si tuati on, much more
emphasis is bei ng pl aced on sel f-supporti ng services,
whi ch are now f l ouri shi ng i n many cities i n the T hi r d
W or l d.
Exami nati on of bus systems thr oughout the wor l d
ix
revei s that bus services are more l i kel y to be vi abl e
and capabl e of meeti ng gr ow i ng demands i f certai n
condi ti ons are present:
Transport systems are ow ned by pr vate operators
or, i n some cases, by publ i c corporati ons that
f ol l ow commerci al practi ces (Cal cutta and Bom-
bay).
There is competi ti on between servi ces, w hi ch
means that operators tend to become more res-
ponsi ve to customers' needs and more i nnovati ve
i n f i ndi ng ways to cut costs (A ccra and M onr ovi a) .
Operators are al l owed to choose among di fferent
sizes of buses and mi ni buses to meet di fferent
l evis of demand (Cal cutta and Bogot).
Di f f erent qual i ti es of service are avai l abl e, rangi ng
f r om basic but frequent and rel i abl e l ow-cost
services f or the ur ban poor to more comf ortabl e
services at hi gher fares f or hi gher i ncome groups
(H ong K ong).
Bus services are i nf or mal l y regul ated by coopera-
ti ves and route associ ati ons f or med by bus opera-
tors themsel ves (Daejeon and Buenos A i res).
There is a m ni mum of government regul ati on of
bus services, par ti cul ar l y fares, to encourage the
pr vate sector (Col ombo).
Governments can pl ay a maj or rol e i n rai si ng the
l evel of publ i c transport effi ci ency by i mpr ovi ng and
extendi ng the road networ k , by pr ovi di ng effecti ve
traffi c management, and by setti ng and enf orci ng
safety standards f or the operati on of buses.
I nvestment Deci si ons
Under pressure to effect urgent sol uti ons to mounti ng
transport probl ems, ci ty authori ti es of ten i nvest i n
capi tal -i ntensi ve hi ghways and r ai l transi t systems.
Gi ven the competi ng demands f or resources, howev-
er, ci ti es shoul d careful l y consi der l ow-cost al terna-
ti ves. I n the case of hi ghways, i nvestment can be
made cost-effecti ve by addressi ng the needs of com-
merci al traffi c and publ i c transport rather than the
needs of pr vate motori sts and by adopti ng modest
but effecti ve standards of road desi gn. For exampl e,
the pavi ng and drai nage of bus routes servi ng l ow -
i ncome reas bri ngs very hi gh rates of return (Brazi l ).
Stri ki ng benefi ts are obtai ned si mpl y by keepi ng
roads i n good condi ti on (K i ngston).
When demand f or road space outstri ps capaci ty,
under gr ound r ai l systems appear to offer par ti cul ar l y
attracti ve sol uti ons to the pr obl em, but the justi fi ca-
ti on and f ul l i mpl i cati ons of bui l di ng such systems,
i n parti cul ar the massi ve constructi on costs, are rare-
l y pr oper l y apprai sed (Caracas). A l ternati ve trans-
por t methods exi st that are abl e to cope w i t h very
hi gh demand, some at comparati vel y l ow costs. Since
i t is di f f i cul t and very costl y to change a deci si n to
bui l d substanti al i nf rastructure, i t is i mpor tant f or
ci ty governments to consi der the vari ous opti ons
before becomi ng commi tted to any parti cul ar transi t
system.
There are three mai n types of transi t systems:
Buses offer the cheapest and most fl exi bl e way of
meeti ng a wi de range of demands thr oughout a
ci ty. By operati ng i n excl usi ve busways al ong
dense corri dors, buses are general l y abl e to cope
w i t h the heavi est demands i n most ci ti es (Porto
A l egre).
L i ght r ai l transi t ranges f r om l ow-cost trams op-
erati ng al ong publ i c streets to hi gh-cost semi -
metro r ai l systems on excl usi ve tracks. The capac-
i ti es of l i ght r ai l transi t systems are si mi l ar to those
of bus systems, but l i ght rai l is much less flexible
i n meeti ng demands (H annover ).
Rapi d r ai l transi t (metros, undergrounds) offers
the hi ghest capaci ty at the hi ghest speed. These
systems now i nvol ve extremel y hi gh constructi on
costs and sophi sti cated technol ogy and are w el l
beyond the means of most ci ti es (Osaka and Sao
Paul o).
I n vi ew of the i mportance of mak i ng appropri ate
deci si ons, there is a need f or careful transport pl an-
ni ng and the exami nati on of opti ons. Transport pl an-
ni ng i n devel opi ng countri es, w i t h r api d gr ow th,
uncertai nti es i n f uture trends, and a dearth of data,
faces many di ffi cul ti es. Neverthel ess, i t is possi bl e to
take account of these di ffi cul ti es and f otmul ate
a l ong- ter m f r amewor k w i t hi n w hi ch compati bl e
short-term pl ans f or i nvestments can be made.
Worl d Bank I nvolvement in Urban Transport
A f ter a sl ow start on ur ban transport projeets i n
1972, and a pause dur i ng 1974-75 to reconsi der i ts
approach, the Wor l d Bank has steadi l y become more
i nvol ved. By 1985 the Bank's Boar d of Executi ve
Di rectors had approved some seventeen ur ban trans-
por t projeets, as wel l as thi r ty - tw o ur ban projeets
w i t h si gni fi cant transport components. Ur ban trans-
por t l endi ng i n these tw o f orms has amounted to
X
more than $1,000 mi l l i on. 2 M ost of thi s has been f or
r oad constr ucti on, i mpr ovement, and mai ntenance
(49 percent), assi stance to bus systems (17 percent),
and ai d to rai l ways (16 percent). A l though less has
been l oaned to i mpr ove traffi c management and r oad
safety (12 percent), such measures have a hi gh rate of
r etur n. M ost of the bal ance of l endi ng has been f or
tr ai ni ng and techni cal assi stance.
Experi ence w i t h ur ban tr anspor t projeets has hi gh-
l i ghted, i n parti cul ar, the i mportance of sound i n-
sti tuti onal arrangements, i mpr oved enforcement of
traffi c l aws, and better tr ai ni ng of the staffs of trans-
por t agenci es. A l though some ur ban transport pr oj -
eets have been beset by seri ous probl ems, sol uti ons
have been f ound, and to an i ncreasi ng degree these
projeets have br ought sati sfactory resul ts. The con-
tr i buti on that such projeets make to the effi ci ency of
ci ti es i s evi dent i n thei r very hi gh economi c rates of
r etur n and the si gni fi cant i mprovements i n the move-
ment of peopl e and goods.
2. Dol l ar amounts are U.S. dol l ars throughout.
The rol e of the Wor l d Bank i s to hel p countri es
devel op appropri ate transport pol i ci es and i nvest-
ments. I nvestments i n ur ban tr anspor t must be tai -
l ored not onl y to the needs of the ur ban sector but
al so to nati onal economi c strategy and budget con-
strai nts. Bank support is i ntended to hel p devel opi ng
countri es find i nexpensi ve ways of i ncreasi ng trans-
por t capaci ty and i mpr ovi ng tr anspor t f l ows, wi t h
par ti cul ar attenti on to the tr anspor t needs of the
ur ban poor. The Bank w i l l al so emphasi ze r oad
safety measures, whi ch have of ten been negl ected.
I nsti tuti on bui l di ng and pol i cy devel opmentpar ti c-
ul ar l y to pr omote effi ci ency i n publ i c t r anspor t wi l l
conti nu to be central to most of the Bank's assis-
tance. But the Bank w i l l al so be ready to depl oy i ts
experti se i n r evi ewi ng proposed i nvestments i n l arge-
scal e projeets, such as metros and el evated hi ghways.
The W or l d Bank's objecti ve f or ur ban transport i s to
i mpr ove effi ci ency and al l evi ate poverty i n ci ti es
by sti mul ati ng economi c gr owt h and pr oducti vi ty
thr ough the cost-effecti ve i nstal l ati on, oper ati on, and
management of transport systems.
xi
1
Urban Transport
and City Efficiency
M ost of the cities i n the devel opi ng countri es face
severe tr anspor t pr obl ems. Road congesti n is
spreadi ng, the movement of peopl e and goods is
sl owi ng to a cr awl , and tr anspor t costs are escal ati ng.
The resul t has been a serious decl i ne i n pr oducti vi ty
and ci ty effi ci ency, a dr ai n on ci ty and nati onal
budgets, and a strai n on ur ban i nsti tuti ons. The
tr anspor t crisis al so takes a human t ol l . Statistics
i nd cate that traffi c accidents are a pr i mar y cause of
death i n the devel opi ng w or l d.
Thi s troubl esome si tuati on has occurred l argel y
because of the unprecedented rate of gr ow t h of the
devel opi ng ci ti es. U r ban popul ati ons have doubl ed i n
size over the past ten to fi fteen years, and even hi gher
rates of gr ow t h are l i kel y i n the f utur e. Some ci ti es,
i n fact, expect to see thei r 1980 popul ati ons quadr u-
pl e by the year 2000. To accommodate l arger popu-
l ati ons, ur ban reas have spread out w ar d. Thi s en-
l argement, combi ned w i t h increased personal i n-
comes, greater commer ci al and i ndustr i al acti vi ty,
and l ack of pr oper pr i ci ng f or the use of roads and
tr anspor t services, has caused demand f or ur ban
tr anspor t to increase even mor e qui ckl y than the size
of ur ban popul ati ons. A s a consequence, the per f or -
mance of most tr anspor t systems has f al l en woef ul l y
short of demand.
Because they are under consi derabl e pressure to
effect i mpr ovements, some ci ty authori ti es have been
tempted to sol ve thei r mounti ng tr anspor t probl ems
by spendi ng money on expensi ve r ai l systems. But
resorti ng to capi tal -i ntensi ve sol uti ons is l i kel y to
mean the postponement or cur tai l ment of other i m-
por tant ci ty services.
The appr opr i ate pol i ci es f or i mpr ovi ng ur ban
tr anspor t w i l l depend on the di f f erent soci al and
economi c condi ti ons of the cities concerned, and i t is
not possi bl e to pr ovi de ready-made uni versal sol u-
ti ons. But governments can use certai n pri nci pi es to
gui de pol i cy.
Conceptual F r amew or k
Three pri nci pi es consti tute the conceptual f r ame-
w or k that has served as the basis of Wor l d Bank
pol i cy on ur ban tr anspor t:
Economic viability. Tr anspor t services and i nf r a-
structures shoul d be suppl i ed i f the benefits to
soci ety outwei gh the addi ti onal costs to society.
Financial viability. I nvestments shoul d be under-
taken and services suppl i ed i f the f i nanci ng is
sel f-sustai ni ng and enabl es the project to be r epl i -
cated.
Efficiency. Cost shoul d be kept to a m ni mum by
establ i shi ng sui tabl e i ncenti ves f or a gi ven quant-
i ty of services; si mi l ar l y, the mxi mum quanti ty of
services shoul d be pr ovi ded f or a gi ven cost.
When a transport project is economi cal l y vi abl e
and the benefi ts outwei gh the f ul l costs, most of the
peopl e i n new ur ban reas woul d be wi l l i ng to pay
f or si mpl e i mprovementspaved and drai ned access
roads, f or exampl ef r om whi ch they woul d benefi t,
but authori ti es are of ten rel uctant to col l ect al l of the
revenues needed f or the changes. As a resul t, ei ther
ur ban access and services are subsi di zed at the ex-
pense of the general taxpayer, or the quanti ty, qual -
i ty, and vari ety of services are l acki ng. Wel l -i nten-
ti oned arguments mai ntai n that subsi di es augment
the suppl y of transport f or the ur ban popul ati on,
par ti cul ar l y the poot, but that is not necessari l y the
case. Paradoxi cal l y, subsi di es of ten i mpose thei r own
l i mi tati ons. The need f or access to new urban reas
by way of buses and paved streets increases much
faster than budget revenues, and subsi di es cannot
expand i ndefi ni tel y. There is al ways a l i mi t. The
suppl y of subsi di zed services then fal l s short of the
extent of services f or whi ch the publ i c is wi l l i ng to
pay.
The pri nci pi e of financial vi abi l i ty appl i es more
overtl y to bus compani es and r ai l l i nes than to roads.
The objecti ve is to ensure that fares cover costs. I f
publ i c authori ti es do deci de as a matter of pol i cy
to subsi di ze bus or rai l tr anspor tati on, the subsi dy
shoul d not under wr i te the company's costs, since thi s
promotes i neffi ci ency and hi gher costs. The best ki nd
of subsi dy is one targeted to parti cul ar passengers.
A chi evi ng sel f-sustai ni ng financial vi abi l i ty f or
roadways can be more di f f i cul t since tr adi ti on ac-
cords them the status of free ri ghts-of -way. M ost
road users do not pay f or thei r occupati on of road
space, and wi despread ur ban congesti n shows that
the true road "r ental pr i ce" woul d be very hi gh
i ndeed. A n obvi ous way to move towar d financial
vi abi l i ty woul d be to i nsti tute r oad- pr i ci ng schemes,
but f or i nsti tuti onal , techni cal , pol i ti cal , and admi n-
i strati ve reasons, authori ti es have adopted thi s sol u-
ti on onl y rarel y. I n H ong K ong, where road pr i ci ng
has pr oved to be techni cal l y feasi bl e, i mpl ementati on
is faci ng strong opposi ti on f r om i nf l uenti al pressure
groups. A si mpl er method is rea l i censi ng. Under
thi s approach, l ow-occupancy vehi cl es pay a charge
f or travel i ng on any road i n a congested ur ban rea.
I n Si ngapore, the onl y ci ty i n whi ch rea l i censi ng has
actual l y been i mpl emented, i nner-ci ty traffi c pr ob-
lems were notabl y reduced.
Effi ci ency is achi eved when costs are as l ow as
possi bl e f or a gi ven servi ce. The mai n i nsti tuti onal
encouragement f or thi s is sui tabl e i ncenti ves. These
i ncenti ves shoul d not merel y encourage a conti nual
search f or less costl y ways of doi ng thi ngs but also
spur i nnovati on. Thete are many ways of ensuri ng
that i ncenti ves i n publ i cl y owned bus or r ai l corpor-
ati ons serve as spurs to effi ci ency rather than as
i nvi tati ons to di ssi pate resources. But bureaucrati c
i nerti a, pol i ti cal i nterference, and restri cti ons on
competi tors may make i t di f f i cul t f or publ i cl y owned
systems to achi eve effi ci ency. I n practi ce, pr vate
ownershi p under competi ti ve condi ti ons usual l y pr o-
vi des a more appropri ate and effi ci ent f or m of i nsti -
tuti onal arrangement.
Nonethel ess, the publ i c sector has a cruci al rol e to
pl ay i n urban transport, whi ch i n most ci rcumstances
cannot be assi gned to the pr vate sector. Onl y the
publ i c sector, f or exampl e, can pl an, authori ze, f und,
contr ol , and pl i ce the road networks. Si mi l arl y,
traffi c regul ati on and management, restrai nt mea-
sures, the l i censi ng of dri vers and vehi cl es, and the
setti ng of safety standards are cl earl y prerogati ves of
the publ i c sector. Furthermore, the publ i c sector
pl ays a cruci al rol e i n desi gni ng and i mpl ementi ng
l aws and regul ati ons that pr omote transport ef-
fi ci ency.
These are f or mi dabl e tasks. I f they are negl ected
by governmentsand they of ten arethere is no
concei vabl e way f or the pr vate sector to fill the gap.
Ci ty Form and Efficiency
M any ci ti es i n the devel opi ng countri es have gr own
at an unprecedented rate i n recent years, and thi s
gr owth is expected to conti nu i n the foreseeabl e
f utur e. I n 1950 onl y three ci ti es i n devel opi ng coun-
tri es had popul ati ons i n excess of 4 mi l l i on: Shanghai
(5.8 mi l l i on) , Buenos A i res (5.3 mi l l i on) , and Cal cut-
ta (4.4 mi l l i on) . By 1980, however, there were more
than twenty ci ti es i n devel opi ng countri es whose
popul ati ons topped 4 mi l l i on, and by the end of the
century there are expected to be at least si xty. I ndeed,
more than twenty ci ti es i n devel opi ng countri es are
forecast to have popul ati ons of more than 10 mi l l i on
each by the year 2000 (see Fi gure 1 and A ppen-
di x Tabl e A - l , whi ch provi des comprehensi ve ur-
ban transport data on selected reas).
The rate of ur ban gr owth has been especi al l y r api d
i n countri es that have tr adi ti onal l y been l argel y r ur al .
The ur ban popul ati ons i n the least urbani zed coun-
tri es i n A f r i ca, f or exampl e, appear l i kel y to quadr u-
pl e between 1980 and 2000. But i n absol ute terms the
l argest gr owth i n urban popul ati on is i n A si a. A
2
par ti cul ar l y notabl e exampl e is I ndi a wher e the ur -
ban popul ati on iscur r entl y expandi ng by mor e than
600,000 peopl e every mont h.
Fast-gr owi ng ci ti es i n the devel opi ng countri es
have nur tur ed busi ness and i ndustr y and have pr o-
vi ded jobs and hi gher i ncomes to many mi gr ants
f r om r ur al reas. I t hasbeen esti mated that the ur ban
sector i n most devel opi ng countri es contri butes at
l east 50percent of gross nati onal pr oduct ( G N P ) and
of ten as much as 70 percent. Thus, i t is i mpor tant
that ci ti es f uncti on ef f i ci entl ythat thei r resources
are used to maxi mi ze the ci ti es' contr i buti on to
nati onal i ncome. U r ban tr anspor t is abl e to make a
major contr i buti on to ci ty effi ci ency when peopl e and
goods are moved thr oughout the ci ty at mi ni mal
i nvestment and oper ati ng costs. I ndustr y and com-
merce now depend to a cr i ti cal degree on ease of
access to any par t of a ci ty. The l i nchpi n of economi c
progress is a conti nual l y greater degree of speci al i za-
ti on i n pl ants, wor kshops, and offi ces, but such
progress requi res mor e movement of goods and peo-
pl e. H omes must be l i nked w i t h pl aces of empl oy-
ment, whi l e producers of goods and servi ces must be
abl e to get them to mar ket. Fur ther mor e, an adequate
tr anspor t system enabl es ci ti es to become catal ysts
f or soci al , cul tur al , and pol i ti cal devel opment as wel l
as economi c gr owt h.
Conversel y, poor tr anspor t systems sti fl e economi c
gr owt h and devel opment, and the net effect may be
a loss of competi ti veness i n both domesti c and i nter -
nati onal mar kets. A l t hough they have smal l er num-
bers of vehi cl es, ci ti es i n the T hi r d Wor l d suffer worse
congesti n than ci ti es i n the i ndustr i al i zed countri es.
I n Lagos and Bangkok, f or exampl e, the average
vehi cl e travel s at onl y about hal f the speed of i ts
counter par t i n L ondon or Fr ankf ur t. Thi s i ndi cates
both the amount of ti me and enetgy that are wasted
and the scale of oppor tuni ty f or i mpr ovement.
Before the i nventi on of the r ai l way, ci ti es were
usual l y smal l i n rea but dense i n popul ati on. Since
tr anspor t on l and wasdi f f i cul t and costl y, ci ti es were
of ten f ounded at natur al har bor s or besi de navi gabl e
water ways to take advantage of cheaper sea trans-
por tati on.
The steam age br ought about changes not onl y i n
the f or m of ci ti es but also i n thei r size. Rai l technol ogy
i mposed a l i near system and a r i gi d r adi al f or m. The
ci ti es grew al ongsi de the r ai l l i nes, al l of whi ch met at
the center of the ci ty. Rai l systems, thus, enabl ed l arger
numbers of peopl e to wor k i n central busi ness di stri cts
whi l e l i vi ng i n suburbs ci se to the r ai l l i nes. The
Fi gure 1. T otal U r ban Popul ati on
of Devel opi ng Countr i es
Total
popul ati on
(bi l l i ons)
22
| | Ci ti es wi th more than 4 mi l l i on
i n
1.8
1.2
1960 1980 2000
Number of cities ui th
popul ati on of mure
than 4 mi l l i on: 8 22 60
techni que of r ai l capi tal i zed on tr anspor ti ng l arge
vol umes of f rei ght and l arge numbers of passengers
f r om or i gi n to desti nati on. I nherentl y a "bul k carri er,"
r ai l isqui te unsui tabl e f or movi ng smal l consi gnments
of goods ot f or tr anspor ti ng passengers l ateral l y over
wi de reas. Since densi ty is an essenti al desi derata of
a r ai l system, there were no exampl es of successful
ci rcumf erenti al r ai l ways. The passengers were too
di spersed and the f rei ght too f ragmentary.
The motor age i ntr oduced new possi bi l i ti es i n ur-
ban transport and new patterns of ci ty f or m. A t first,
i t appeared that the motor vehi cl e had si mpl y aug-
mented the tr end started by r ai l towar d di spersi ng
ur ban popul ati ons. But r oad transport isvery di f f erent
f r om r ai l transport and has i mposed i ts own uni que
f or m. Unl i ke r ai l ways, r oad transport systems can
oprate very ef f i ci entl y at l ow as wel l as hi gh traf f i c
densi ti es. Thi s greater f l exi bi l i ty hasmade i t possi bl e
to devel op both ci rcumf erenti al and r adi al transport
patterns. Onl y roads can meet the enormous vari ety
of demands f or f rei ght transport and personal mobi l -
i ty requi red by the twenti eth-century ci ty.
The devel opment of moder n ci ti es of ten l eads to
l arger wor k forces i n central busi nessdi str i cts, as wel l
as massi ve gr owt h of i ndustr y and trade i n suburbs
3
and ou t l y i ng towns. Thi s pattern of peri pheral
gr owt h occurred i n the Uni t ed States, Europe, A us-
tral i a, and J apan. Everywhere, trade and i ndustry
have mi grated t owar d the cheaper l and of the sub-
urbs once roads pr ovi ded access between suppl i ers
and markets. Rel eased f r om the arteri al ti es of the
rai l ways, busi nesses and peopl e have been abl e to
take advantage of the l ower rents and greater space
of the suburbs whi l e enjoyi ng the ameni ti es of ci ty
l i fe. Devel opi ng countri es are f ol l owi ng the same
urban gr owt h patterns but at far faster rates than
those experi enced i n the West. Even more than the
ci ti es of the i ndustri al i zed countri es, the burgeoni ng
ci ti es of the devel opi ng countri es are products of the
mot or vehi cl e, and that l egacy has brought a uni que
set of probl ems.
The provi si n of transport i n newl y devel oped ci ti es
is less constrai ned by the ci ty's f or m than i n l ong-
establ i shed ci ti es, but access may sti l l be hampered by
pol i ti cal and financial di ffi cul ti es. Provi di ng access is
usual l y the responsi bi l i ty of state or l ocal authori ti es.
A l t hough access is rarel y owned, control l ed, regul at-
ed, or charged for by pri vate groups or i ndi vi dui s,
securi ng i t is often beset by major pol i ti cal pressures
that make i t i mpossi bl e to bal ance competi ng needs.
I ndeed, i n some cases the authori ti es are powerl ess to
control access. I n squatter reas, for exampl e, access
can be gai ned onl y through l abyri nths of al l eys and
passageways that, i f not beyond the wr i t of the state,
are effecti vel y beyond i ts reach.
Spendi ng on transport is too often i nfl uenced not
by rati onal cal cul ati ons of economi c gai n but by
noti ons of pol i ti cal presti ge. M ost countri es spend
too much on pol i ti cal l y attracti ve but costl y faci l i ti es,
such as el evated roadways and mass rai l transi t
systems, i nstead of maki ng modest l abor- i ntensi ve
road i mprovements, extendi ng ci ty streets, and cre-
ati ng l ow- cost bus operati ons. Si nce rai l subways can
cost as much as $100 mi l l i on per ki l ometer, the
money spent bui l di ng just a few meters of subway
coul d be used i nstead to construct or upgrade several
mi l es of streets.
I t is not unusual f or urban governments to spend
between 15 and 25 percent of thei r annual budgets
on transport- rel ated i nvestments and operati ons, and
someti mes a good deal more. I n Cal cutta, f or exam-
pl e, i nvestment i n ur ban transport du r i ng 1972-78
amounted to approxi matel y $50 mi l l i on a year, an
amount equi val ent to 48 percent of the ci ty's total
pl anned i nvestment f or al l purposes. Cl earl y, wi t h
such l arge sums at stake, an appropri ate urban trans-
por t pol i cy is a cri ti cal el ement i n a ci ty's effi ci ency.
The savi ngs achi eved t hr ou gh cost-effecti ve i mprove-
ments ate therefore l i kel y to be grati f yi ngl y l arge
i ndeed. Thi s wi l l be parti cul arl y so i n the f uture si nce
f ew ci ti es can expect to escape r api d gr owt h i n
demand for transport faci l i ti es and servi ces.
Growth i n Demand for Urban Transport
The pattern of transport gr owt h depends to a great
degree on the si tuati on i n each ci ty, but certai n basi c
factors have a consi derabl e beari ng on both the l evel
and the rate of i ncrease i n demand. These are:
i ncreases i n popul at i on as a resul t of both hi gh
natural bi r t h rates and mi gr at i on f r o m r ur al reas
and smal l er t owns; geographi cal deconcentrati on;
avai l abi l i ty of motori zed transport; i ncreases i n
househol d i ncome; and i ncreases i n commerci al and
i ndustri al acti vi ty.
Increases in Population
The major cause of gr owt h i n urban transport de-
mand i n the devel opi ng wo r l d has been the dramati c
i ncrease i n urban popul ati ons. Fr om 1970 to 1980 the
ur ban popul ati ons of the devel opi ng countri es i n-
creased by an average of 50 percent. I ncreases wel l i n
excess of thi s average occurred i n many urban reas,
parti cul arl y where mi gr at i on f r om r ur al reas was
Fi gure 2. P opul ati on and Tot al Dai l y Tri ps
Tri ps per day
(mi l l i ons)
Mxi co Ci ry .
24
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Popul ati on (mi l l i ons)
4
substanti al . Str i ki ng exampl es of popul ati on gr ow th
d ur i ng that ten-year per i od are pr ovi d ed by a number
of A f r i can ci ti es, i ncl ud i ng N ai r obi (90 percent),
H ar ar e (85 percent), A bi d j an (102 percent), and Dar
es Sal aam (105 percent). Other ci ti es grew, but not as
r api d l y, such as J akarta (48 percent), Tuni s (46 per-
cent), and Bogot (47 percent).
Tr anspor t tri ps can be expected to gr ow at least i n
pr opor ti on to increases i n popul ati on. Fi gure 2 shows
that, i n a representati ve sel ecti on of ci ti es i n devel op-
i ng countri es, demand f or transport is r oughl y pr o-
por ti onal to increases i n popul ati on size. Other fac-
tors, such as greater par ti ci pati on of w omen i n the
l abor forc (where thi s leads to more empl oyment)
and those descri bed bel ow, may add to the gr ow th i n
demand f or transport.
Spread of Urban Areas
Economi c devel opment and popul ati on gr ow th resul t
i n the enl argement of ur ban reas and the need to
extend the road networ k and transport services. Thi s
i nvol ves maj or i nvestment and a consi derabl e burden
on ci ty resources.
Sao Paul o i n Brazi l (see Fi gure 3) provi des a
dramati c exampl e of the spread of ur ban reas i n
devel opi ng countri es. I n 1930 the ur ban rea of Sao
Paul o was appr oxi matel y 150 square ki l ometers and
the popul ati on was 1 mi l l i on. By 1962 the ci ty had
gr ow n to 750 square ki l ometers w i t h a popul ati on of
4 mi l l i on. I n 1980 the rea was 1,400 square ki l ome-
ters, and the popul ati on was more than 12 mi l l i on.
The spread of an ur ban rea is usual l y accompan-
i ed by changes i n empl oyment and resi denti al pat-
terns. As l and pri ces i n the central ci ty ri se, f or
exampl e, manuf actur i ng establ i shments may move
f r om the central ci ty to the suburbs. A l though thi s
change may di vert some tri ps away f r om transport
corri dors l eadi ng to the ci ty center, other ki nds of
empl oyment created i n the ci ty center may cause a
net increase i n tri ps and journey di stances. I f the
popul ati on and places of empl oyment become more
wi del y di stri buted as a ci ty gr ows, some pressure on
radi al traffi c corri dors may be rel i eved, but there w i l l
be i ncreased demand f or transport services and f aci l -
i ti es al ong the urban peri phery.
M uch also depends on the types of i ndustry i n the
ur ban rea, since certai n i ndustri es l end themsel ves
more easi l y to deconcentrated empl oyment patterns
than others. I n general , however, journeys tend to
l engthen as ci ti es gr ow , thus addi ng to the burden on
Fi gure 3. The Gr ow t h of Sao Paul o U r ban A r ea,
1930-80
[~~| 1930
0 10 20 30 40 .50 60 70
I L _ 1 I I I I I
Ki l ometers
the transport system. Between 1972 and 1978, f or
exampl e, the popul ati on of Bogot i ncreased f r om
2.85 mi l l i on to 3.80 mi l l i on, or 33 percent. Dur i ng the
same per i od , the average commuti ng di stance i n-
creased by about 13 percent, w i t h increases rangi ng
f r om 5 to 23 percent.
Availability ofMotorized Transport
A l though motor i zati on is sti l l i n i ts i nfancy i n many
devel opi ng countri es, the avai l abi l i ty of motor trans-
por t has i ncreased sharpl y i n recent years. I n I ndone-
si a, f or exampl e, there were 3 vehi cl es per 1,000
popul ati on i n 1970; by 1981 there were 9. I n the same
per i od , avai l abi l i ty rose i n Tuni si a f r om 20 to 40, i n
Brazi l f r om 37 to 83, i n the Republ i c of Korea f r om
3.5 to 14, i n N i ger i a f r om 2 to 10, and i n Turkey f r om
9 to 20. These substanti al rates of gr ow th i ntensi fi ed
congesti n i n places that were al ready cl ogged and
have reduced the effi ci ency of al l road vehi cl es, both
publ i c and pr vate.
I ncreased motor i zati on, coupl ed w i t h hi gh rates of
mi gr ati on f r om r ur al reas, has l ed i n tur n to hi gh
and i ncreasi ng rates of road acci dents. One study of
the causes of death i n fifteen devel opi ng countri es
showed that road acci dents were second onl y to
enteri ti s, and that as many peopl e were ki l l ed i n
traffi c acci dents as di ed f r om tubercul osi s. Research
carri ed out by the Overseas U ni t of the Transport and
5
Road Research L aboratory ( T R R L ) has shown that
f atal i ty rates ( measured as annual deaths per 10,000
l i censed vehi cl es) f r om road acci dents i n devel opi ng
countri es are of ten twenty ti mes greater than i n
Western Europe or N or t h A meri ca. N i geri a and
Ethi opi a were the most extreme exampl es, wi t h rates
exceedi ng 200. Kenya's rate was 65, whi l e hi gh rates
were al so f ound i n Paki stn ( 60) , Turkey ( 55) , I n-
donesi a ( 40) , and Col ombi a ( 35) . By compari son,
there were 3.3 f atal i ti es per 10,000 vehi cl es i n the
U ni ted States and the U ni ted K i ngdom.
Increases in Household Income
Data f rom the devel opi ng countri es on the rel ati on-
shi p between househol d earni ngs and amount of travel
are l i mi ted but are neverthel ess suffi ci ent to show that
i ncome has a di rect beari ng on travel demand, parti c-
ul arl y i n urban reas. Studi es i n a number of ci ti es
have f ound that hi gh-i ncome househol ds make rough-
l y doubl e the number of tri ps made by l ow-i ncome
househol ds. I n J ai pur, f or exampl e, l ow-i ncome
househol ds were f ound to make f our tri ps a day, whi l e
hi gh-i ncome househol ds made more than ei ght.
Where i ncomes have grown steadi l y there has al so
been a marked i ncrease i n car ownershi p. Thi s is
expl ai ned partl y by an i ncreased demand f or qual i ty
transportati on (speed, comf ort, pri vacy) and partl y by
the f ai l ure of publ i c transport systems to provi de
sati sfactory servi ce (see Fi gure 4) . Several studi es i ndi -
cate an el asti ci ty of roughl y two i n the rel ati onshi p
between i ncome and car ownershi p. I n J ordn, where
househol d i ncomes i ncreased 5.7 percent a year be-
tween 1970 and 1980, pr vate car ownershi p i ncreased
f rom 7 per 1,000 i n 1970 to 22 per 1,000 i n 1980, or
roughl y 12 percent annual l y. I n Brazi l , where average
annual per capi ta i ncome grew 5.1 percent, auto
ownershi p i ncreased at an annual rate of about 10
percent. The same el asti ci ti es were f ound i n I ndonesi a,
Thai l and, and Tuni si a. A s car ownershi p increases,
however, the use of publ i c transport tends to decl i ne
(see Fi gure 5) .
Increases in Commercial and Industrial Activity
L i ke increases i n popul ati on and car ownershi p, i n-
creases i n i ndustri al and commerci al acti vi ty can cr-
ate or contri bute to urban transport probl ems. The
l arger vol ume of f rei ght traffi c and the attendant use
of l arger and heavi er vehi cl es can be parti cul arl y
troubl esome. Roads i n and around i ndustri al reas,
Fi gure 4. I ncome and Car Ownershi p
Cars per thousand
i nhabi rants
350
Stuttgart Stuttgart
300
L ondon
250
T okyo
200 R ome
Vi enna
Madri d > ^ N ew York Ci ty
D ubl i n
150 yT
Sao Paul o
w ^- Arhens ^
100 Mxi co Ci ty V '
mmmmm^^mm I Cl AVtV
v l M a m K A mmn
SO C?ro \ e
\ : X ^ ^ L a g o s ^H o n gK o n g
A c c r a - , ^^ S_ K u a l a L umpur
Ci ti es wi th hi gh ownershi p
J ak ar ta- - ^ l uni s
0 Cal cutta-I - \ rSeoul 1 l
orusercharges
1 1
Karachi
0 2,500 5,000 7,500 10,000 12,500 15,000
Nati onal G N P per capi ta (1980 U.S. dol l ars)
rai l road f rei ght stati ons, and ports are of ten cl ogged
by commerci al vehi cl es, and thi s congesti n can spi l l
over i nto mai n corri dors. Damage to road surfaces
then accelerates and reduces road speed and effi ci ency.
A s a ci ty grows, manuf acturi ng acti vi ty i n the
central rea tends to decl i ne and is of ten repl aced by
commerci al acti vi ty that makes even greater demands
on the transport system. I n parti cul ar, the l oadi ng and
unl oadi ng of commerci al trucks is a f requent cause of
congesti n i n central business di stri cts. The hi gh dens-
i ty of bui l di ngs can make i t di f f i cul t or i mpossi bl e to
wi den roads and i ncrease thei r capaci ty. Congesti n is
of ten exacerbated when the road network must cope
wi t h a mi xture of motori zed vehi cl es, other modes of
transport (such as bi cycl es and pedal carts) , and pe-
destri ans.
Tuni si a provi des a good i l l ustrati on of the effeets
of greater i ndustri al and commerci al acti vi ty on
transport. Duri ng 1970-80 i ndustry grew at an an-
nual average rate of 9 percent and l ed to a f ourf ol d
i ncrease (15 percent a year) i n the number of com-
merci al vehi cl es, most of whi ch spent much ti me
addi ng to the congesti n on the roads of Tuni s, the
country's l argest ci ty. Si mi l arl y, rapi d growth i n
manuf acturi ng i n I ndonesi a duri ng the 1970s caused
a fivefold i ncrease i n the number of commerci al
vehi cl es. That, i n turn, pl aced consi derabl e strai n on
urban transport faci l i ti es i n J akarta, where most of
the i ndustri al devel opment had occurred. Thi s pat-
6
ter n can be seen i n many other ci ti es of A f r i ca, South
A mer i ca, and Southeast A si a.
I mpl i cati ons of Rapi d Growth
A l though i t is someti mes di f f i cul t to speci fy how much
each of the factors descri bed above contri butes to
tr anspor t demand, there is no doubt that col l ecti vel y
they have a substanti al effect. I n many cases, demand
has outstr i pped r oad capaci ty. Greater congesti n and
del ays of both passenger and commer ci al ttaffi c are
wi despread i n devel opi ng countri es and i nd cate the
seriousness of thei r tr anspor t probl ems. As a resul t,
costspar ti cul ar l y fuel consumpti on costsi ncrease
substanti al l y, and there is a serious loss of pr oducti vi ty
i n commerce and i ndustry. A hi gh l evel of pol l uti on is
another undesi rabl e feature of overl oaded streets.
Tr anspor t demand has increased so r api dl y i n many
devel opi ng countri es that compl ex and costl y sol u-
ti ons have of ten been adopted. Where at one ti me a
si mpl e traffi c ci rcl e mi ght have sufced, a grade-
separated i ntersecti on may become necessary, or tr af f -
ic di r ecti on by pol i cemen may have to gi ve way to
el ectri c si gni s, someti mes contr ol l ed by computer.
Bui l di ngs may have to be demol i shed and val uabl e
l and used to wi den roads or construct el evated r oad-
ways. To increase the capaci ty of publ i c transport
services, some ci ty authori ti es have resorted to repl ac-
i ng i nexpensi ve bus services wi t h heavi l y subsi di zed
mass transi t r ai l ways. H i gher prices for oi l and l abor
have fur ther escal ated ur ban tr anspor t spendi ng. A s a
resul t, ur ban transport often absorbs 15 to 25 percent
of ci ty budgets today, consi derabl y mor e than i t di d
ten or twenty years ago.
A l l i ncome groups i n ur ban communi ti es are now
devoti ng l arger pr opor ti ons of thei r i ncomes to trans-
por t. I n devel opi ng countri es i t is not uncommon to
find that 5 to 10 percent of ur ban househol d i ncome
is spent on tr anspor t. I n some cities the figure is 15
percent or mor e. The hi gh pr opor ti on of i ncome spent
on transport by hi gh-i ncome groups someti mes re-
flects thei r demand for hi gher qual i ty modes, especial -
l y pr vate automobi l es. For the ur ban poor, however,
spendi ng a hi gher pr opor ti on of i ncome on tr anspor t
may be a basic necessity that leaves less i ncome
avai l abl e for other purposes. I n the Saket resi denti al
rea of N ew Del hi , for exampl e, the average pr opor -
ti on of househol d i ncome spent on transport is 12
percent, whi l e l ow-i ncome groups spend as much as
15 percent. The range i n K i ngston, J amai ca, is be-
tween 15 and 20 percent, whi l e i n Cal cutta i t is
consi stentl y about 16 percent. (I n devel oped countri es
househol ds wi t hout cars spend about 3 to 5 percent of
thei r i ncomes on ur ban transport.)
The sheer speed wi t h whi ch demand and costs have
gr own i n devel opi ng countri es has of ten over whel med
the i nsti tuti ons responsi bl e for tr anspor t, many of
whi ch were poor l y equi pped to deal wi t h probl ems of
such magni tude. But despite the serious i mpl i cati ons,
demand has been al l owed to gr ow vi r tual l y unre-
strai ned. Tr anspor t i nfrastructure and services i n
many cities have become severel y overl oaded and are
rarel y used to best advantage. I n the case of r oad
networ ks, substanti al capaci ty has been and conti nes
to be l ost because of a l ack of pr oper traffi c manage-
ment and uneconomi c r oad use. The vi abi l i ty and
effi ci ency of publ i c transport has been greatl y i m-
pai r ed by a l ack of i ncenti ves, and i nvestments i n
i nappr opr i ate remedies have pl aced a heavy burden on
ci ty budgets.
Neverthel ess the si tuati on is far f r om hopel ess, and
there are many opportuni ti es to overeme these defi -
ciencies. M uch can be done to restrai n demand for road
use, and substanti al increases i n r oad capaci ty can be
achieved wi t h l ow-cost measures for traffi c manage-
ment. I n most cities there is al so consi derabl e scope for
i mpr ovi ng the vi abi l i ty and efficiency of publ i c trans-
por t services. A l though most cities wi l l be faced wi t h
substanti al i nvestment i n urban transport, there are
l ow-cost opportuni ti es to extend road networks and
meet the heavy demands for publ i c transport.
Figure 5. Car Ownershi p and Public Transport Use
Cars per chousand
i nhabi rants
75
\ n
Bangkok
50
Abi dj an a Nai robi
M ani l a
v i , \ * Bogot
K ual a L umpur * ^
25
J akarta
Tuni s
Bombay
Seoul # >
K arachi
0 1 1 i i i
0 20 40 60 80 100
Publ i c transport share of motori zed tri ps (percent)
Managing Demand
for Road Use
One answer to the ur ban transport cri si s i n the
devel opi ng wor l d is to tackl e the excess demand f or
transport. The methods range f r om road pr i ci ng and
rea l i censi ng to fuel tax and l and use contr ol . The
advantage of these demand management measures is
that they requi re l i ttl e i ni ti al capi tal outl ay. The
di sadvantage is the i nevi tabl e opposi ti on of the pub-
l i c to these measures, i n parti cul ar the payment f or
use of ci ty streets. Nonethel ess, wi t h careful prepar-
ati on and pl anni ng, transport demand management
can be one of the most cost-effecti ve means of deal i ng
wi t h urban transport probl ems.
Road Pricing
Because of the nature of roads, the usual market
forces that wor k wi t h other commodi ti es si mpl y do
not appl y and cannot correct f or excessive or une-
conomi c use. Rel yi ng on congesti n al one to r ati on
r oad use pl aces a hi gh and i nequi tabl e cost on al l
users of the congested r oad. I t is therefore l i kel y to
be i n the publ i c i nterest f or the government to em-
pl oy some f or m of road pr i ci ng.
A l though the advantages of road pr i ci ng have l ong
been recogni zed, i ts i ntr oducti on i nto ur ban reas
faces f or mi dabl e techni cal , admi ni strati ve, and pol i t-
i cal obstacl es. For a r oad- pr i ci ng system to be reason-
abl y effecti ve, the charges to i ndi vi dual users must be
rel ated to how much they use congested streets and
the degree of congesti n on those streets. But both
the cal cul ati on and col l ecti on of those charges can
prove di f f i cul t. I n most ur ban reas i t is i mpracti cal
to tr y to col l ect charges f or road use at the ti me they
are i ncurred. The use of tol l booths, f or exampl e,
mi ght wel l aggravate congesti n.
Enforcement is another maj or concern. A ny system
has to be desi gned to make i t possi bl e to i denti f y
vehi cl es whose dri vers tr y to evade bei ng charged.
A bove al l else, some means has to be f ound to
overeme the natural aversi n of motori sts to payi ng
f or faci l i ti es tr adi ti onal l y percei ved as bei ng free.
One system of road pr i ci ng that has proved to be
effecti ve i n Si ngapore (see Box 1) is rea l i censi ng,
whereby l ow-occupancy vehi cl es pay a charge f or
enteri ng a congested rea dur i ng rush hours. The
system encourages greater use of publ i c transport
and shared pr vate cars and di scourages unnecessary
journeys.
I f arrangements of thi s ki nd are to be successful ,
the publ i c transport system must be capabl e of trans-
por ti ng the motori sts and passengers di verted f r om
pr vate cars. I t is al so necessary to arrange some
method of prepayment, since col l ecti on of charges at
entry poi nts woul d be l i kel y to increase congesti n.
Qui ck i denti f i cati on of vehi cl es that have al ready
pai d the charges is necessary, and enforcement must
be effecti ve enough to prevent l arge-scal e evasi n.
Several othet probl ems al so have to be overeme.
8
I ~ ~
Box 1. Area Licensing in Singapore
Singapore is the onl y city that has i nsti tuted an
- area-licensing system. I n 1975, i n an attempt to com-
bat center-city traffic problems that were becoming
progressively more acute, the Singapore government
i ntroduced a scheme to restrain the use of prvate cars.
A charge is appl i ed to low-occupancy vehicles enter-
i ng the central business di stri ct duri ng the morni ng
rush peri od (7:30 to 10:15). A cordn around the
central business di stri ct demarcates the restricted rea.
,, Vehicles can enter this rea onl y at clearly marked
1 entry poi nts, and low-occupancy prvate cars are
required to display a special rea license disk for
whi ch a fee is charged ($2.50 a day or $50 a month).
Prvate cars wi th four or more occupants, goods
vehkles, and buses are exempt f rom payng the fee.
I ncl uded i n the scheme was the provisin of inexpen-
sive car parks to al l ow motorists to park at the
periphery of the lcensed rea and shuttle buses to
transport them to the ci ty center. Parki ng charges
wi thi n the restricted rea were raised substantially to
j further discourage the use of pri vate cars. To restrain
I the rapi d growth i n the ownershi p of pri vate cars, hi gh
annual license fees are charged for these vehicles. A n
( i mportant part of the scheme has been the provisin
of altrnate routes for through traffi c. Strict enforce-
j ment of the rules against illegal parki ng, combined
wi th a large degree of public acceptance of the
scheme, has resulted i n a l ow incidence of offenses.
A t the ti me the scheme was i ni ti ated, the govern-
ment developed a fl exi bl e approach that enabled i t to
respond qui ckl y to probl ems. For example, serious
j congestin developed each day mmediately after the
{ end of the restricted peri od, whi ch i ni ti al l y ran from
j 7:30 to 9:30 A .M. Thi s probl em was overeme by
i
extending the restricted peri od to 10:15. Since the
park-and-ri de arrangements proved to be unpopul ar
wi th motori sts, shuttle bus routes were changed to
carry passengers directly from residential reas to the I
ci ty center. Fears that the scheme mi ght adversely
affect business and other activities have generally not
been substantated. A ny impaets that the scheme may
have had on l and vales, l and use, and the envi ron-
ment have been largely eclipsed by other factors.
The i ni ti al dramati c decrease i n the number of
pri vate cars entering the restricted rea duri ng the
restricted peri od prompted suggestions that the fees i
were pitched too hi gh. But despite i ni ti al mi nor di f- )
fi cul ti es, the scheme stimulated the use of publ i c j
transport and shared vehicles. The substantial reduc- j
ti on i n congestin duri ng the morni ng rush hours has
been sustained. Duri ng the evening rush hours, how-
ever, when no restrictions are i n effect, mai n roads i n
and around the central business di stri ct are heavly
congested. The magnitude of this probl em has been
reduced, to some extent, by i mprovi ng altrnate cross-
town routes.
The scheme has achieved its mai n objectives whi l e j
provi ng to be both cost-effective and easy to admi ni s-
ter. A l though this pl an woul d undoubtedl y require
certain modi fi cati ons for use elsewhere, i t offers a
valuable model for other cities faced wi th the task of
dealing wi th serious traffic congestin. j
A rea licensing has resulted i n a 20 percent increase j
i n traffic speeds wi thi n the restricted zone and a 25
percent reducti on i n traffic accidents. Revenues from
the scheme have more than covered its capital and
recurrent costs.
Vehi cl es di verted f r om the congested rea, f or exam-
pl e, have to be pr ovi ded wi t h al trnate routes. The
l ayout of roads has to per mi t the i sol ati on of the
restri cted rea wi thout undul y i mpedi ng traffi c f l ow.
I f the hours of operati on are too short, congesti n is
l i kel y to increase before and after the restri cted
per i od, whi l e excessi vel y l ong hours of operati on and
hi gh charges may resul t i n under uti l i zati on of r oad
space and may seri ousl y affect business and other
acti vi ti es i n the restri cted rea.
A bove al l else, the government must have the
pol i ti cal wi l l to come to gri ps wi t h congesti n i n a
way that is unl i kel y to be popul ar wi t h motori sts. A
substanti al effort to achi eve publ i c acceptance and
the f l exi bi l i ty to respond to changi ng condi ti ons are
necessary concomi tants of such a system.
Despi te the success of rea l i censi ng i n Si ngapore,
efforts to i ntroduce i t el sewhere have not progressed
very far. A uthor i ti es i n other ci ti es have been rel uc-
tant to tr y i t, par tl y because of doubts as to whether
the system w i l l wor k and par tl y out of fear of publ i c
reacti on. Neverthel ess, the experi ence i n Si ngapore
i ndi cates that rea l i censi ng can be a most cost-
effecti ve and practi cal means of r ati oni ng r oad space.
Schemes of thi s type may al so make i t possi bl e to
avoi d or at least defer enl argement of a ci ty's trans-
por t i nf rastructure. Because of the l arge benefi ts that
can be expected, the Wor l d Bank w i l l conti nu to gi ve
9
i t s s upport t o wel l -desi gned area-l i censi ng and ot her
road- pri ci ng schemes.
I n an at t empt t o devel op and test sol ut i ons t o t he
many probl ems i nvol ved wi t h more preci se r at i oni ng
of road space, H ong K ong has embarked on an
i nnovat i ve road- pri ci ng scheme (see Box 2). A l -
t hough t hi s scheme may event ual l y prove t o be
adapt abl e f or use el sewhere, i t i s l i kel y t o be some
t i me before i t i s suffi ci ent l y devel oped for general
appl i cat i on i n Ui rban reas. I n t he meant i me, rea
l i censi ng and ot her less sophi st i cat ed demand man-
agement measures are wel l wi t hi n t he capabi l i t i es of
devel opi ng count ri es and wi l l suffi ce t o al l evi at e
congest i n.
Physi cal Restraints
The t raffi c f l ow has been reduced i n some ci ti es
(Tuni s and Gt eborg i n part i cul ar) by di vi di ng t he
cent ral busi ness di s t ri ct i nt o "cel l s ." Publ i c t rans port
and emergency vehi cl es are al l owed t o cross t he
borders bet ween cel l s, but ot her t raffi c must use
entrances and exi t s ont o ci rcul ar rout es t hat bypass
t he cent ral rea. A s a resul t of t hi s arrangement ,
t raffi c fl ows across Gt eborg's cent ral busi ness di s-
t r i ct bet ween 1970 and 1982 decreased 45 percent ,
whi l e t raffi c acci dents wi t hi n t he di s t ri ct decreased by
Box 2. El ect roni c Road Pri ci ng i n H ong K ong
The hi ghest vehi cle dcnsi ty i n the worl d is i n Hong
Kong where traffi c congesti n has become i ncreasi ng-
\ y pervasi ve i n recent years. Between 1976 and 1981
the number of pri vate cars grew at a rate of 13 percent
j a year, to reach a densi ty of about 280 vehi cles for
I
every ki l ometer of road.
Faced wi t h a deteri orati ng traffi c si tuati on, the
government deci ded i n 1982 to i mpose severe fi nanci al
! restrai nts on the ownershi p of pri vate cars. Thi s was
recogni zed as a crude stopgap measure unt i l a more
i effecti ve and equi table method coul d be devi sed for
cont rol l i ng traffi c. Aft er an exami nati on of varous
j opti ons (i ncl udi ng the area-li censi ng scheme used i n
Si ngapore), the Hong Kong government deci ded t o
pi oneer i n electroni c road pri ci ng. Thi s plan is cur-
I rently bei ng tested on a pi l ot basi s wi t h about 5,000
vehi cles (mai nly government owned).
A n electroni c number pate (EN P) about the si ze of
a vi deo cassette tape has been i nstalled on each of the
about 56 percent .
The compl et ed fi rst phase of a s i mi l ar scheme i n
Tuni s has produced pr omi s i ng resul ts t hat coul d wel l
be repl i cat ed i n ot her ci ti es where spare capaci t y i s
avai l abl e on rout es bypassi ng t he ci t y centers. I n
ot her ci t i es, t he cost of pr ovi di ng t hi s addi t i onal
capaci t y, t oget her wi t h t he cost of addi t i onal fuel
consumed i n more ci rcui t ous j ourneys, may be con-
si derabl e and needs t o be careful l y wei ghed agai nst
t he benefi ts of reduced congest i n and t raffi c acci -
dents i n t he ci t y center.
A compl et el y di fferent approach t o reduce peak
demand i s pr ovi ded by staggered wor ki ng hours .
Thi s measure has t he dual benefi ts of spreadi ng t he
l oad on bot h roads and publ i c t rans port systems.
M or e even l oadi ng dur i ng a reduced but l onger peak
per i od ut i l i zes r oad space and t rans port resources
more effi ci ent l y. Some success i n st aggeri ng has been
achi eved by vari ous i ncent i ve and vol unt ar y schemes
i n a number of ci t i es. But wi del y staggered wor ki ng
hours , whi ch woul d produce t he greatest benefi t s,
have general l y not gai ned acceptance, mai nl y be-
cause many busi ness act i vi t i es depend on i nt eract i on
among t hei r workers or wi t h cl i ent s and ot her bus-
i nesses. Nonet hel ess, t he pr omot i on of staggered
wor ki ng hours by ci t y aut hori t i es i s wel l wor t h t he
smal l expense i nvol ved.
test vehi cles. Thi s EN P has been desi gned to be easi ly
i nstalled, tamper-proof, and able to wi thstand the
ri gors of dai ly travel . Electroni c loops are buri ed
under the road surface at each chargi ng poi nt , and
when vehi cles pass over, the loops wi l l collect i nfor-
mati on encoded on the EN P and transmi t i t to a central
computen
Charges wi l l be di splayed at each chargi ng poi nt
and wi l l vary wi t h the ti me and l ocati on. The charges
wi l l be recorded on the vehi cle's account, and bi li s wi l l
be presented for payment mont hl y. Dri vers wi l l be
able to obtai n detai led statements of charges i f they
wi sh. A t selected locati ons cameras wi l l automati cally
photograph vehi cles wi t h defecti ve or i mproperl y op-
erati ng E N PS for enforcement purposes.
Thi s system wi l l be i ntroduced t hroughout Hong
Kong onl y when the government is sati sfi ed that i t wi l l
work and that the i nterests of the publ i c are protected.
10
Parki ng Restraints
Par ki ng control s are usual l y empl oyed to i mpr ove
traffi c f l ow by reduci ng the number of par ked vehi -
cles obstr ucti ng the r oad (di scussed f ur ther i n Chap-
ter 3). But par ki ng control s may also di scourage
automobi l e use and r ati on r oad space. By i mposi ng
speci al charges f or par ki ng i n certai n reas i t is
possi bl e to reduce the movement of cars i nto cong-
ested l ocati ons dur i ng peak peri ods w i thout i nterf er-
i ng w i t h nor mal business and commer ci al acti vi ti es.
I f par ki ng charges are set compar ati vel y l ow f or an
i ni ti al short per i od and then progressi vel y rai sed f or
l onger peri ods, l ong-ter m parkers (commuters, f or
exampl e) w i l l be di scouraged f r om par ki ng i n the
rea because they w i l l have to pay a substanti al dai l y
fee. People w i t h business appoi ntments and shoppers
desi ri ng shor t-ter m par ki ng w i l l be encouraged, how -
ever, since they w i l l benefi t f r om both l ow er charges
and greater avai l abi l i ty of par ki ng places because of
more r api d turnover. Thi s approach has been an
i mpor tant contr i buti on to the success of the area-
l i censi ng scheme used i n Si ngapore (Box 1).
Par ki ng restrai nts, however, tend to cause substan-
ti al increases i n i l l egal par ki ng and must therefore be
accompani ed by stri ct enforcement of par ki ng regu-
l ati ons. H i gh charges f or par ki ng may also cause
addi ti onal tri ps dur i ng peak peri ods (as w hen peopl e
are dr i ven to w or k i n the mor ni ngs by other f ami l y
members w ho then r etur n home and repeat the
journey i n the eveni ngs). Par ki ng control s may al so
crate many unpr oducti ve tr i ps, f or exampl e, w hen
dri vers ci rcu ate i n traffi c w ai ti ng f or passengers or
l ooki ng f or par ki ng pl aces. Fur ther mor e, par ki ng
control s do not deter thr ough traf f i c, w hi ch is of ten
a pr i mar y cause of congesti n i n ci ty centers. As a
resul t, par ki ng contr ol may be mor e effecti ve as a
restrai nt w hen i t f or ms par t of a mor e comprehensi ve
demand management scheme, as i n Si ngapore.
User Taxes
Vehi cl e use may also be restrai ned by excise taxes
customari l y i mposed on f uel , ti res, spare parts, and
the l i ke. These taxes i ncrease the cost of automobi l e
travel as a f uncti on of use or di stance and may
restrai n total use, but they do not affect where and
w hen an automobi l e is used. I n parti cul ar, excise
taxes have no di scerni bl e effect dur i ng peak or off-
peak peri ods and i n congested or noncongested
reas. Since vehi cl e use i n most devel opi ng countri es
is concentrated i n ur ban reas, such taxes may at
least hel p to retard the spread of congesti n.
Some excise taxes have undesi rabl e side effects.
A l though a tax on ti res or spare parts, f or exampl e,
may restrai n vehi cl e use, i t may al so gi ve rise to
greater use of unsafe ti res or poor mai ntenance, so
that br eakdowns and acci dents i ncrease rather than
reduce congesti n.
But a tax on f uel is comparati vel y si mpl e to admi n-
i ster and has a di rect rel ati onshi p to the amount of
vehi cl e use. I t is therefore an attracti ve w ay of reduc-
i ng pri vate vehi cl e use. To make sure that publ i c and
commer ci al tr anspor t is not undul y restrai ned as
w el l , however, some f or m of di f f erenti al tax on fuel
f or buses and trucks may be necessary.
Onl y a f ew countri es use a f uel tax speci fi cal l y f or
restrai ni ng vehi cl e use to contr ol congesti n. I n oth-
ers the cost of fuel is kept bel ow the w or l d market
pri ce, a si tuati on that encourages even greater vehi cl e
use (see Box 3). Reduci ng car use w oul d rel i eve the
pressure f or heavy i nvestments i n tr anspor t i nf r a-
structure. A n added advantage w oul d be a r educti on
i n domesti c f uel consumpti on; i n oi l - pr oduci ng coun-
tri es thi s w oul d al l ow mor e oi l to be sol d abroad i n
r etur n f or badl y needed f orei gn exchange.
Other Restraints on Vehicle Ownershi p
A mor e general method of i nhi bi ti ng vehi cl e owner -
shi p is to establ i sh hi gh i mpor t duti es, sales taxes,
and annual l i censi ng fees on vehi cl es (see Box 3). L i ke
exci se taxes, financial restrai nts of thi s k i nd do not
i nfl uence the l ocati on and ti me of car use. I n practi ce,
f i nanci al restrai nts on owner shi p are l i kel y to do l i ttl e
mor e than sl ow dow n the gr ow th i n the number of
vehi cl es. As i ncome levis ri se, moreover, financial
restrai nts of thi s type must peri odi cal l y be adjusted
upw ar d to remai n effecti ve.
O f the vari ous financial restrai nts avai l abl e, hi gh
annual l i censi ng fees are pr obabl y the most effecti ve,
since these charges cannot be recovered w hen the
vehi cl e is resol d. A l though sales and other acqui si ti on
taxes on new cars are l i kel y to be refl ected i n resale
pri ces and may be seen by some buyers as an i nvest-
ment that coul d appreci ate w i t h a ri se i n taxes, hi gh
sales taxes i n most cases w i l l reduce the abi l i ty of
motori sts to buy new cars. As a consequence, vehi cl e
owners w i l l be encouraged to keep thei r cars l onger.
A di sadvantage of usi ng the sales tax to di scourage
car purchase is that ol der cars may be less safe
and break dow n more f requentl y, thereby addi ng
Box 3. Korea and Egypt: Vehicle Ownershi p and Use
User Taxes. Korea malees effective use of both excise
taxes and fi nanci al restraints on car ownershi p. Heavy
ownershi p fees and excise taxes are complemented by
a comprehensive publi c transport network. Total ac-
qui si ti on taxes, whi ch run to about 60 percent of cost,
are not parti cularly hi gh by worl d standards, but the
annual ownershi p tax is over $400 and the price of
gasoline is extremely hi gh at $4.50 a galln (1985).
Ownershi p of commerci al vehicles and buses, i n con-
trast, is encouraged by very l ow taxes: a sales tax of
15 percent and an annual ownershi p tax of $50. On
the basis of per capita income, Korea has one of the
lowest automobi le ownershi p rates i n the worl d (six
cars per 1,000 populati on i n 1983). Thi s si tuati on may
not last, however, since there is pressure to reduce
taxes on pri vate cars to encourage Korea's auto indus-
try. I f this takes place, the use of pri vate cars could be
greatly sti mulated and city authori ti es wi l l have to
i ntroduce some other means of demand management
or face worsening congestin and heavy investment i n
i nfrastructure.
Low-Pri ced M otor Fuel. The government of Egypt for
many years has kept the cost of fuel artificaly l ow. As
a consequence, the number of pri vate cars i n Cai ro has
increased by 17 percent a year, creating massive
congestin throughout the central ci ty. A lthough the
domestic price of gasoline i n Egypt has been raised i n
recent times, i t is sti ll only about 60 percent of the
worl d price, whi le diesel fuel is as l ow as 20 percent
of the worl d pri ce. A n overall increase i n fuel prices
could therefore have a significant i mpact on the level
of private car use i n Cai ro.
Such a change would also allow the sale of more
fuel abroad, thus provi di ng badly needed forei gn
exchange to help easethe country's debt.
to congesti n. To offset these tendenci es, speci al
i ncenti ves to replace ol der cars can be i mpl emented.
Si mi l arl y, hi gh penalti es f or traffi c obstructi on may
reduce the number of tri ps by older and less rel i abl e
vehi cles travel i ng i n congested reas.
Exci se and ownershi p taxes are not l i kel y to pro-
vi de an opt i mum sol uti on to congesti n. Thei r chi ef
valu is that they can usual l y be appl i ed rel ati vel y
qui ckl y wi t hi n the f ramework of exi sti ng l egi sl ati on
and thus can serve as stopgap measures unti l more
effecti ve control measures are devi sed and i mpl e-
mented.
Land Use Control
Effecti ve l and use pl anni ng and control can also
di mi ni sh the demand f or transport services. Some
ci ti es have been zoned so that empl oyment opportu-
ni ti es are l ocated away f r om ci ty centers and ci se to
resi denti al reas, the ai m bei ng to reduce work tri ps,
parti cul arl y i n congested central reas. A ttempts
have also been made to control the densi ty of l and
oceupati on and thus to reduce the l oad on transport
systems generally. For exampl e, i n certai n parts of
Curi ti ba, Brazi l , the densi ty of devel opment has been
control l ed so that demand f or transport is l i mi ted to
the capaci ty of the publ i c transport system. Si mi l arl y,
demand f or transport can be reduced by l ocati ng
publ i c servi ce faci li ti es ci se to i ntended consumers
and by l ocati ng major traffi c generators away f r om
central reas. I n Bombay, f or exampl e, the demand
pl aced on central ci ty roads by heavy goods traffi c is
bei ng control l ed by l ocati ng a maj or f rei ght termi nal
at Wadal a on the outski rts of the ci ty.
L and use control i n devel opi ng countri es generally
has proved to be i neffecti ve, however, and i ts i mpl e-
mentati on is beset by many seri ous di ffi cul ti es. These
i ncl ude a l ack of proper enforcement, wi de and
bl atant di sregard f or regul ati ons, and publ i c opposi -
ti on. Where some measure of control has been exer-
ci sed, results of ten have been contrary to expecta-
ti ons. Thi s is mai nl y because of the many compl ex
factors i nvol ved wi t h l and use pl anni ng and the
di ffi cul ti es of adapti ng regul ati ons to rapi dl y chang-
i ng ci rcumstancesa feature of devel opi ng coun-
tri es.
I t is onl y a matter of ti me before most ci ti es i n
devel opi ng countri es w i l l need to restrai n the use of
motor vehi cles as part of an overal l pl an to com-
bat worseni ng transport condi ti ons. Gi ven the wi de
range of opti ons, f r om road pri ci ng and rea l i cen-
si ng to staggered wor ki ng hours and user taxes,
authori ti es can select measures best sui ted to the
parti cul ar ci rcumstances of thei r ci ti es. M ost of these
measures are l i kel y to be unpopul ar wi t h motori sts,
but i f demand management is coupl ed w i t h general
12
i mprovements i n traf f i c flow and publ i c transport, i t
shoul d benefi t the maj or i ty of road users and even-
tual l y gai n acceptance.
A l though i t may become more and more necessary
to restrai n excessive r oad use, demand management
cannot provi de the total sol uti on to congesti n.
M any journeys, par ti cul ar l y those of publ i c transport
vehi cl es and goods vehi cl es, make a vi tal contr i bu-
ti on to the devel opment of the ci ty, and thei r gr ow i ng
demand f or r oad space must be met. Thus, even w i t h
effecti ve demand management, most ci ti es w i l l be
faced w i t h l arge i nvestments to increase the capaci ty
of thei r transport system. A very cost-effecti ve means
of accompl i shi ng thi s is the use of comprehensi ve
traf f i c management measures.
13
3
I mproving
Efficiency by Traffic
Management
Rapi dl y i ncreasi ng demands f or transport i n the
devel opi ng countri es and the resul ti ng traffi c conges-
ti n have l ed to pol i ti cal pressures to bui l d new
transport i nfrastructures. But most devel opi ng coun-
tri es can i l l af f ord the expense of these sol uti ons, and
thus there is a need to consi der l ow-cost al ternati ves.
One such al ternati ve is the use of traffi c management
measures that are desi gned to reduce congesti n and
i ncrease road capaci ty by contr ol l i ng the movement
of traffi c.
I n many ci ti es road capaci ty is seri ousl y reduced
thr ough wasteful use and negl ect. A l though ci r cum-
stances vary consi derabl y, most ci ti es are l i kel y to be
faced wi t h some, i f not al l , of the same probl ems:
On-street par k i ng, both l egal and i l l egal
On-street l oadi ng and unl oadi ng of del i very trucks
and passenger vehi cl es
Commerci al tradi ng conducted i n the streets
A hi gh pr opor ti on of uneconomi c road users,
parti cul arl y pri vate cars
Conf l i cti ng or poor l y contr ol l ed traffi c move-
ments, i ncl udi ng pedestri an movements
Heavy thr ough traffi c i n central reas
Sl ow- movi ng hand- dr awn or ani mal - dr awn vehi -
cles
Poor road surfaces and l ack of street l i ghti ng
Traffi c acci dents and br ok en- down vehi cl es
General l ack of regard f or and enforcement of
traffi c regul ati ons.
Where reduced capaci ty has made traffi c condi ti ons
unsati sfactory, i t is l i kel y that several or most of these
condi ti ons exi st. Thi s wi de range of traffi c probl ems
cal i s f or a comprehensi ve package of di fferent mea-
sures.
Parki ng Restrictions
The most frequent and wi despread causes of reduced
road capaci ty are i ndi scri mi nate curbsi de par k i ng
and stoppi ng to l oad or unl oad passengers and
goods. These acti ons reduce the road space avai l abl e
to movi ng vehi cl es and i mpede the f l ow of traffi c.
The net effect, a substanti al reducti on of road capac-
i ty, is parti cul arl y seri ous al ong mai n roads dur i ng
peak peri ods. Street tr adi ng i n congested reas has
si mi l ar effects and attracts addi ti onal pedestri ans to
al ready cr owded streets.
M any ci ti es have deal t wi t h these probl ems by
restri cti ng on-street par k i ng and stoppi ng dur i ng
peak peri ods on busy streets and i ntr oduci ng control s
on street tr adi ng (see Box 4). These restri cti ons have
hel ped rel i eve congesti n but requi re f i r m and con-
ti nued enforcement.
A l though par k i ng contr ol schemes must be care-
f ul l y pl anned, thei r i mpl ementati on is comparati vel y
si mpl e. They usual l y requi re onl y traffi c signs and
14
Box 4. Restrictions on Parking and Street Trading
San J os: On-Street Parki ng. I n San J os, Costa Rica,
a comprehensive urban transport project is being
undertaken w i th the help of the Worl d Bank to i m-
prove the traffic fl ow i n the central business di stri ct.
The project is to construct and w i den several radi al
roads, establish road maintenance procedures, i nstal l
an integrated traffic signal system, and introduce ex-
tensive traffic management measures, i ncl udi ng pri or-
ity bus routes, in the business di stri ct. An mportant
element of the scheme is the i ntroducti on of parki ng
restrictions and the banni ng of parki ng along pri ori ty
bus routes. Before these measures were i ntroduced,
average car speeds were between 15 and 20 kilometers
an hour and as l ow as 10 kilometers an hour on a
number of central rea streets. Bus speeds averaged
onl y 12-16 kilometers an hour, and bus delays were
\ g increasingly serious. The probl em arse
pri mari l y because intense commercial development i n
! the business di stri ct generated substantial on-street
truck and customer parki ng i n the absence of off-street
l oadi ng and parki ng facilities.
To counter this si tuati on, the city's authorities em-
barked on a coordinated parki ng program composed
| of: ful l -ti me or peak-hour parki ng restrictions where
the need for more traffic space is paramount, parti cu-
l arl y along pri ori ty bus routes; the i nstal l ati on of
parki ng meters and the setting of parki ng charges to
encourage quick turnover; formal designation of l oad-
i ng and unl oadi ng spaces; and a greatly strengthened
program of enforcement. I t has not been possible to
specify w hi ch improvements are due to the new park- 1
i ng regulations and w hi ch are due to other com- L
ponents of the project. Nevertheless, the overall pro-
gram has proved very effective i n i mprovi ng traffic
fl ow . The journey speeds of buses have i mproved, and
i t has been possible to l i mi t new road construction to
cri ti cal l y needed links i n the overall hi ghw ay system.
L i ma: Control of Street Tradi ng. I n Li ma, Per, trad-
i ng became so cxtensive i n many streets i n the early
1970s that traffic was almost brought to a standstill i n ;
the central rea. The probl em was tackled by setting
up a special forc for the enforcement of street tradi ng i
regulations and di verti ng street tradi ng to more suit- j
able locations. I n addi ti on, the creation of pedestran 1
streetsparticularly i n a porti on of J i von de la j
Uni onattracted both pedestrians and street traders. 1
As a result traffic fl ow throughout the central rea was 1
vastly i mproved. I n several mai n streetsAvenue N i - j
colas de Pierola, for exampleheavy traffic now flows i
comparatively smoothly and w i th less confl i ct w i th j
pedestrians. f
marki ngs, an enforcement staff, and possi bl y tow
trucks. The greatest di f f i cul ty is l i kel y to be obtai ni ng
publ i c acceptance, parti cul arl y w here on-street park-
i ng has become so firmly establ i shed that i t is consi d-
ered a " r i ght. " But the l ow costs of such schemes and
thei r substanti al benefi ts to the communi ty as a
w hol e are usual l y suffi ci ent to demnstrate thei r
val u.
I f on-street parki ng is to be restri cted or banned,
al ternati ve parki ng places are l i kel y to be essenti al .
When consi deri ng al ternati ve parki ng l ocati ons and
the amount of parki ng that needs to be provi ded,
pl anners shoul d bear i n mi nd that the avai l abi l i ty of
ei ther on-street or off-street parki ng spaces attracts
traffi c i n w ays that may run counter to other mea-
sures desi gned to i mprove traffi c flow. Neverthel ess,
i t may be parti cul arl y i mportant to provi de parki ng
and stoppi ng places f or business acti vi ti es i n certai n
reas.
Provi si n of off-street parki ng and faci l i ti es f or
handl i ng goods shoul d be l eft to the pri vate sector,
w i th a m ni mum of regul ati on, provi ded thei r effect
on traffi c is taken i nto account. I n parti cul ar, l and use
regul ati ons shoul d permi t the constructi on of such
faci l i ti es at sui tabl e l ocati ons, and parki ng operators
shoul d be permi tted to charge market pri ces.
Priority for Public Transport
I n many ci ti es, parti cul arl y duri ng rush peri ods,
the greatest pr opor ti on of road space is taken up by
pri vate cars, w hi ch handl e onl y a smal l proporti on of
al l personal tri ps. The great maj ori ty of commuters
travel i n publ i c transport, usi ng comparati vel y f ew
vehi cl es. The average bus or tram carri es about
ei ghty passengers and takes up the space of no more
than tw o pri vate cars. Pri vate cars rarel y carry more
than tw o peopl e and f requentl y onl y the dri ver.
M ani l a provi des a f ai rl y representati ve exampl e of
ci ty traffi c. There, pri vate cars account f or al most 75
percent of al l vehi cl es but carry l i ttl e more than 25
percent of al l commuters. Si mi l ar percentages are
f ound i n M xi co Ci ty.
I n many ci ti es i t is common practi ce to gi ve pri or-
15
i t y to publ i c t ransport and other hi gh-occupancy
vehi cl es. P ri ori t y i s most of t en pr ovi ded by "bus
onl y " l aes but may also be i n the f or m of excl usi ve
ri ght s-of -way f or buses and trams, and i n some cases
whol e streets are devoted onl y t o publ i c t ransport
and pedestri ans. Publ i c t ransport has also been fa-
vored by speci al phases at traffi c l i ghts and excl usi ve
t ur ni ng movements at i ntersecti ons. Si nce these mea-
sures are fl exi bl e, they can be appl i ed dur i ng peak
traffi c peri ods on heavi l y used roads so as t o cause
other r oad users t o choose al trnate routes or t o
travel i n the off peak. A not her benefi t is obtai ned by
per mi t t i ng emergency and securi ty vehi cles t o use
pr i or i t y faci l i ti es and thus respond faster t o urgent
cal i s.
Si nce pr i or i t y arrangements f or publ i c t ransport
f or m part of more comprehensi ve traffi c management
schemes, other traffi c may not necessari l y be worse
off. Obvi ousl y , however, pri vate dri vers caught I
congesti n may be t empt ed to use the speci al faci l i -
ti es pr ovi ded f or publ i c t ransport . Henee, the success
of publ i c t ransport pr i or i t y measures depends to a
great extent on firm enforcement. P ri ori t y faci l i ti es
f or publ i c t ransport have been i nt roduced successful-
l y i n a l arge number of ci ti es i n devel opi ng countri es.
A t y pi cal exampl e is f ound i n Bangkok (Box 5).
Traffic Movement and Traffic Control
Conf l i ct i ng movements between vehi cl es and be-
tween vehi cl es and pedestri ans i ntensi fy traffi c
congesti n. Thi s pr obl em oceurs mai nl y at i ntersec-
ti ons, where vehi cl es and pedestri ans make a vari ety
of maneuvers. M any of these maneuvers del ay other
Box 5. Bangkok Bus Laes
Faced wi th wi despread and growi ng congesti n i n
Bangkok, the Thai government embarked i n 1978 on
a comprehensi ve urban transport scheme. The proj -
ect, supported by the Worl d Bank, was desi gned to
strengthen urban transport management, increase the
capaci ty of the road network, and i mprove publ i c
transport. Extensi ve pri ori ty bus measures were an
i mportant element of the project. A t the ti me of
project apprai sal, the speed of buses duri ng peak
peri ods i n the central rea was as l ow as 10 ki lometers
an hour, whi l e the speed of cars was l i ttl e better than
12 ki lometers an hour. More than 60 percent of all
personal tri ps on mai n roads i n Bangkok were made
i n buses and mi ni buses, whi ch together accounted for
onl y 6 percent of all passenger vehi cles. Pri vate cars,
whi ch made up more than hal f of traffi c (57 percent
of al l vehi cles), carri ed only 26 percent of commuters.
Both types of vehicles were constantly caught i n traffi c
snarls. Then, i n 1980, 145 ki lometers of traffi c laes
were set aside for exclusi ve use by buses.
Surveys carri ed out by the Asi an I nsti tute of Tech-
nology on behalf of the Transport and Road Research
Laboratory showed that as a result of the comprehen-
sive measures both bus and car travel ti mes i mproved
si gni fi cantly i n almost al l cases. I n reas where the
most success was achi eved, bus and car mean travel
ti mes were reduced 25 to 30 percent. On none of the
streets surveyed were bus or car travel ti mes made
worse.
Observed bus flows were very hi gh, wi t h up to 250
standard buses and 150 pri vate mi ni buses usi ng a
WMmmmmmmmammmmmmmmaan^KMmmmmmmammmmMmmm
single bus lae duri ng an average peak hour. A l l tol d,
these vehicles had a carryi ng capaci ty of about 18,000
passengers an hour. Such i ntensi ve uti l i zati on of a
si ngle traffi c lae hi ghli ghts the effi ci cnt use that can
be made of l i mi ted road space by i ntroduci ng pri ori ty
measures.
The i ni ti al regulati ons di d not permi t buses to leave
the bus laes. Thi s increased bus bunchi ng and there-
fore caused some congesti n at bus stops. Thi s draw-
back, however, was usually not suffi ci ent to offset the
general i mprovement i n bus runni ng ti mes. Subse-
quent relaxati on of the regulati ons, whi ch al l owed
buses to pass each other, resulted i n further reducti ons
i n bus travel ti mes. Car travel ti mes were made
somewhat greater by thi s modi fi cati on but remai ned
substanti ally less than before the bus laes were i ntro-
duced.
A fol l ow-up survey i n 1981 showed that bus travel
ti mes on i mportant bus laes had been reduced by 38
percent and car travel ti mes by 20 percent as a result
of the pri ori ty measures. A study of bus lae vi olati ons
showed that some 20 percent of the vehicles i n pri ori ty
bus laes were Ilegal users, mai nly sl ow-movi ng non-
motori zed vehi cles. Thi s was an i ndi cati on that
strengthened enforcement mi ght lead to even better
results.
The overall success of the project i llustrates the hi gh
valu of pri ori ty bus laes. The cost of the project was
less than $1.5 mi l l i on, yet i t has provi ded substanti al
benefits to a majori ty of Bangkok's road users, parti c-
ul arl y bus and mi ni bus passengers.
16
traffi c and are also a potenti al cause of acci dents.
Compar ati vel y si mpl e traffi c r egul ati on and mi nor
r oad wor ks can greatl y reduce conf l i cti ng movements
and hel p i ncrease the effecti ve capaci ty of the r oad
networ k. The measures most commonl y used i ncl ude
i nstal l i ng traffi c contr ol si gni s at i ntersecti ons, re-
r outi ng traf f i c, desi gnati ng one-way streets, and ban-
ni ng the conf l i cti ng tur ns. A l though these changes
i nvol ve extensi ve i nstal l ati on of traffi c signs and
si gni s and r oad mar ki ngs, the costs are very l ow i n
compar i son wi t h the costs of constr ucti ng addi ti onal
i nf r astr uctur e.
M i nor r oad wor ks can achi eve addi ti onal i mpr ove-
ments by al teri ng the exi sti ng i nf r astr uctur ewi den-
i ng roads to pr ovi de tur ni ng laes and extra laes f or
thr ough traf f i c, i nstal l i ng traffi c i slands to channel
traffi c mor e effi ci entl y, and bui l di ng f ootbri dges,
fl yovers, and pedestri an tunnel s to seprate pedestri -
ans and vehi cles. The use of f ootbr i dges, fl yovers,
and tunnel s is of ten the best techni cal sol uti on, but
i t is costl y and may be i mpr acti cal because of lack of
space. Wher e there are many pedestri ans, f ootpaths
may have to be wi dened. Other val uabl e but i nex-
pensi ve i mpr ovements i ncl ude constr ucti ng short
r oad l i nks at cruci al l ocati ons i n the r oad networ k
and pavi ng access roads and cycle tracks i nto squat-
ter reas.
M or e sophi sti cated efforts, such as traffi c contr ol
systems that use vehi cle detectors and l i nk traffi c
si gni s to computers to opti mi ze traffi c f l ow, may be
compar ati vel y costl y but sti l l pr ovi de very si gni fi cant
returns i n the f or m of much reduced journey ti mes
and vehi cle oper ati ng costs.
A l t hough many ki nds of traf f i c management mea-
sures can be effecti ve when appl i ed i ndi vi dual l y at
vari ous l ocati ons, the greatest benefi ts are l i kel y to
come f r om comprehensi ve efforts i nvol vi ng large
reas or enti re r oad networ ks backed up by pr oper
enforcement. One ci ty i n whi ch thi s approach has
had great success is A bi dj an i n the I vor y Coast
(Box 6).
Road Safety Measures
The r api d bui l d- up i n the number of motor vehi cles
and pedestri ans i n most ci ti es i n devel opi ng countri es
has br ought wi t h i t an extremel y hi gh rate of traffi c
acci dents. I n some devel opi ng countri es the acci dent
Box 6. A bi dj an: A Comprehensi ve A ppr oach to Tr anspor t I mpr ovement
The government of the I vory Coast has adopted a
comprehensive approach to i mprovi ng the transport
system i n A bi djan. I t consists of:
Various traffic i mprovements, i ncludi ng the crc-
ati on of one-way streets, the i nstallati on of i nte-
grated traffic signis, signs, and road marki ngs in
the central business di stri ct, and the extensin of
traffic management programs throughout the city
Measures to i mprove the movements of pedestrians
and buses in high-density, low-i ncome communi -
ties
The i mprovement of pedestrian faci li ti es, i ncludi ng
constructi on of footbridges
The constructi on of a bus-way and reserved bus
laes i n the central business di stri ct
A high-speed express bus network, made possible
by the constructi on of new road li nks
The upgradi ng of bus terminis and bus stops and
constructi on of a bus depot
The constructi on of pri mary roads to i mprove
public transport access to low-i ncome arcas.
Before the project began, key sections of the ci ty's
road network were seriously overloaded, and down-
town congestin lasted for as much as twelve hours
each day. I n neighborhoods in other parts of the ci ty,
there was strenuous competi ti on for road space as
buses, cars, taxi s, and parked cars competed wi th
pedestrians, market customers, and street traders. As
populati on and motori zati on rates grew, traffic
congestin began to have an adverse effect on the
entire nati onal economy.
Considerable all-round i mprovement has occurred
as a result of the project, whi ch was undertaken wi th
World Bank assistance. The runni ng times for buses
crossing the central business di stri ct have been halved,
and the eli mi nati on of congestin caused by the load-
i ng and unloadi ng of buses has benefited other traffi c.
These improvements have been achieved even though
rush-hour traffic has increased by roughly 20 to 30
percent. By maki ng better use of the exi sti ng road
network and other transport facilities, A bi djan found
it possible to delctc or defer several expensive i nfra-
structure projeets and to reduce planned investments
between 1981 and 1984 by $120 mi l l i on or more.
17
rate (i n rel ati on to number of vehi cl es) is many ti mes
that of devel oped countri es. I n addi ti on to the suffer-
i ng and di stress that such acci dents br i ng, thei r cost
to the economy is far f r om negl i gi bl e. The measur-
abl e costs of such acci dents have been cal cul ated at
about 1 percent of G N P f or devel opi ng countri es.
Research by the Transport and Road Research
L abor ator y i n devel opi ng countri es has demonstrat-
ed that acci dents are caused by compl ex i nteracti ons
among vehi cl es, roads, weather condi ti ons, and hu-
man acti ons and reacti ons. M ost acci dents are attr i -
buted to unsafe dri ver or pedestri an behavi or. I n the
case of dri vers, acci dents are of ten the resul t of
negl i gence or of shortcomi ngs i n dri ver educati on
and the l i censi ng system. Pedestri ans of ten pl ace
themsel ves at ri sk because they are unaware of dan-
ger or, i n the case of mi grants f r om r ur al reas, they
l ack f ami l i ar i ty wi t h ur ban traffi c condi ti ons. The
ri sks are of ten mul ti pl i ed by poor road condi ti ons
and the absence of pedestri an faci l i ti es, such as
si dewal ks. I n addi ti on, vehi cl es i n devel opi ng coun-
tri es are of ten i n unsafe condi ti on because of poor
mai ntenance or di ffi cul ti es i n obtai ni ng spare parts.
M ost traffi c acci dents are avoi dabl e, and acci dent
rates have been substanti al l y reduced by concerted
efforts to do so thr ough comprehensi ve road safety
programs. Programs of thi s type usual l y i ncl ude such
measures as:
Col l ecti on and anal ysi s of road acci dent data i n
order to i denti f y causes and l i kel y acci dent spots
and to moni tor the effectiveness of countermea-
sures
Specific consi derati on of road safety i n road desi gn
and traffi c engi neeri ng
Changes i n traffi c l aws
Better enforcement of traffi c regul ati ons
Regul ar i nspecti ons and spot checks of the oper-
ati ng condi ti on of motor vehi cl es
Dr i ver tr ai ni ng and testi ng
Road user educati on and road safety publ i ci ty
I nsti tuti onal ref orms, i ncl udi ng cl ear desi gnati on
of responsi bi l i ti es f or road safety.
Some devel opi ng countri es have made extensi ve
efforts to i mpr ove road safety. A Wor l d Bank- f i -
nanced ur ban transport project i n San J os, Costa
Ri ca, has served as a catal yst f or programs that pl ace
speci al emphasi s on educati ng chi l dren about r oad
safety. Chi l e has made road safety a compul sory part
of the cur r i cul um i n school s and has used the pri vate
sector extensi vel y to pr omote road safety. A N ati ona!
Commi ttee of Traffi c Educati on has been set up
composed of representati ves of i nsurance compani es.
the press, T V and r adi o, car deal ers, and ti re manu-
facturers, as wel l as pl i ce departments.
Brazi l has a strong road safety agency that has
i mpl emented very effecti ve educati on and enforce-
ment programs. Dur i ng the first five years of the
campai gn, the i nci dence of traffi c acci dents decreasec
f r om 47 to 13 per mi l l i on vehi cl e-ki l ometers. More
si gni fi cantl y, traffi c acci dent deaths decreased f rom
4.5 to 1 per mi l l i on vehi cl e-ki l ometers. A l though I
may not be possi bl e to determi ne preci sel y the par
pl ayed by the government's campai gn i n these spec-
tacul ar reducti ons, there can be l i ttl e doubt that I
was an essenti al factor.
The I nstitutional Framework
The r api d gr owth of traffi c places a consi derabl e
burden on ur ban transport i nsti tuti ons. Rapi c
gr owth bri ngs wi t h i t the need f or more traffi c
control s and regul ati ons, effecti ve pl i ce enforce-
ment, and the i ntr oducti on of sophi sti cated techni ca!
measures.
U nf or tunatel y, ur ban transport i nsti tuti ons ofter.
are i l l -equi pped to deal wi t h the sheer increase i n
traffi c or to adopt advances i n technol ogy that woul c
hel p them overeme probl ems. I t is rare to find single
agencies wi t h the comprehensi ve author i ty needed to
deal wi t h the l arge range of transport probl ems anc
to coord nate overal l sol uti ons. I nstead, authori ty is
usual l y di vi ded among several agencies, each deal i ng
wi t h di fferent el ements of the traffi c pr obl em. Of ten.
too, the boundari es of these agenci es' author i ty tenci
to be i ndi sti nct; the resul t is a dupl i cati on of respon-
si bi l i ty, an under mi ni ng of accountabi l i ty, and resist-
ance to change. I n Cal cutta, f or i nstance, ten di fferent
agencies are i nvol ved i n the devel opment of the road
networ k and are concerned wi t h traffi c management.
Recentl y, an i mpor tant step towar d consol i dati or.
was taken when f ul l responsi bi l i ty f or traffi c engi-
neeri ng was assigned to the Cal cutta Metr opol i tan
Devel opment A uthor i ty. U nt i l then, the authori ty's
engi neers had spent much of thei r ti me i n coordi na-
ti on and l i ai son acti vi ti es wi t h the many other agen-
cies concerned wi t h traffi c management.
The abi l i ty of muni ci pal i ti es to cope wi t h transpon
probl ems has also been i mpai r ed by l ack of suffi ci en:
resources, par ti cul ar l y trai ned staff. When serious
transport probl ems ari se, muni ci pal agencies often
18
have l i ttl e choi ce but to resort to stopgap sol uti ons.
A s a resul t, the overal l transport si tuati on deteri or-
ates and the effi ci ency of the ur ban rea suffers. Thus,
consi derabl e attenti on must be pai d to i nst i t ut i onal
reorgani zati on and t r ai ni ng so that traffi c manage-
ment schemes can be pr oper l y pl anned, desi gned,
i mpl emented, and enforced.
Because of the consi derabl e di fferences between
countri es, there can be no har d and fast rul es f or
what consti tutes a sound i nst i t ut i onal structure.
Nonethel ess, i t i s necessary to defi ne reas of respon-
si bi l i ty f or pol i cy, executi ve f uncti ons, and enforce-
ment and to pr ovi de the necessary resources to carry
out those responsi bi l i ti es. Of par ti cul ar i mportance
is the need to di sti ngui sh between nati onal and l ocal
responsi bi l i ti es.
Nati onal and Local Responsibilities
A t the national l evel , appropri ate responsi bi l i ti es i n-
cl ude the devel opment and moni t or i ng of urban trans-
por t pol i ci es, standards, speci fi cati ons, and l aws. I den-
t i f yi ng and supervi si ng research and tr ai ni ng i n the
urban transport sector are al so nati onal responsi bi l i -
ti es. I n addi t i on, nati onal agenci es shoul d provi de
advi ce and assi stance to l ocal agenci es on the pl an-
ni ng, desi gn, and i mpl ementati on of traffi c manage-
ment schemes. Eventual l y, the nati onal agency shoul d
devel op the abi l i ty to i denti f y, apprai se, and supervi se
urban transport projeets on a nati onal scal e. Probabl y
the best l ocati on f or a nati onal transport agency i s
wi t hi n an operati onal mi ni stry, such as a mi ni stry of
publ i c wor ks. Si nce the devel opment of urban trans-
por t pol i cy at the nati onal l evel is l i kel y to i nvol ve
several other government mi ni stri es, coor di nati on by
a hi gh-l evel advi sory group wi l l be necessary.
A t the local l evel , responsi bi l i ti es shoul d i ncl ude
the pl anni ng, desi gn, i mpl ement at i on, and mai nte-
nance of l ocal traffi c management schemes. Other
l ocal responsi bi l i ti es shoul d i ncl ude moni t or i ng tr af f -
i c condi ti ons, dr af t i ng and i mpl ement i ng l ocal traffi c
regul ati ons, and coor di nat i ng enforcement w i t h the
pl i ce. Because of the constructi on wor k i nvol ved
and the need to mai nt ai n mar ki ngs, si gns, and equi p-
ment, a l ocal traffi c management agency i s best
l ocated i n an operati onal department, such as a
publ i c wor ks or engi neeri ng department. The en-
f orcement agency woul d nor mal l y be i n the l ocal
pl i ce department. Si nce the success of traffi c man-
agement measures depends to a great extent on
effecti ve enforcement, i t is i mpor t ant f or the enforce-
ment agencyusual l y the pl i ceto be i nvol ved i n
dr af t i ng traffi c regul ati ons and i n pl anni ng traffi c
i mpr ovement schemes. L ocal transport agenci es have
a greater chance of bei ng effecti ve i f they come wi t hi n
the pur vi ew of the ci ty or muni ci pal counci l and i f
thei r wor k is pr oper l y coordi nated wi t h that of other
ur ban devel opment agenci es. I n addi t i on, they must
ei ther be pr ovi ded wi t h thei r own budgets or have
ready access to f undi ng.
A l t hough most ci ti es i n devel opi ng countri es face
seri ous traffi c probl ems and resource l i mi t at i ons,
there are many l ow-cost sol uti ons, and i mpr ove-
ments can be made wi t h sound i nst i t ut i onal arrange-
ments f or establ i shi ng pol i cy, f or the pl anni ng, de-
si gn, and i mpl ement at i on of traffi c management
schemes, and f or effecti ve enforcement of traffi c
regul ati ons. Where comprehensi ve traffi c manage-
ment has been adopted, the flow of traffi c general l y
has been greatl y i mpr oved, and the financial burdens
of i nf rastructure constructi on have been substanti al l y
reduced.
19
Public Transport:
The Role ofBus
Services
thus added to traffi c congesti n.
Experi ence shows a need f or a great vari ety of
modes of publ i c transport. Gi ven the oppor tuni ty.
peopl e reveal wi del y di vergent transport preferences.
but i n many places ci ty authori ti es favor a basic
standard of bus services pr ovi ded by cl osel y con-
tr ol l ed l arge corporati ons.
Thi s approach is of ten justi fi ed by certai n mi scon-
cepti ons. Fi rst, i t is sai d that there are great econo-
mi es of scale i n the size of fi rms pr ovi di ng bus
services. Thi s leads to the assumpti on that i t is
possi bl e to reduce costs by amal gamati ng al l of a
ci ty's transport firms i nto one comprehensi ve under-
taki ng. Pr ovi di ng such an under taki ng wi t h an excl u-
sive franchi se is then rati onal i zed as a means of
protecti ng i t f r om "unf ai r competi ti on" and thus of
i ncreasi ng i ts vi abi l i ty. Second, i t is of ten thought to
be i negal i tari an to pr ovi de speci al services such as
pr emi um or guaranteed seats or express buses i n
r etur n f or hi gher fares. I n other wor ds, vari ety is
condemned.
The economi es-of-scal e argument, however, has
been di scredi ted by both empi ri cal evi dence and
experi ence. The management and l abor probl ems of
l arge bus undertaki ngs that have of ten domi nated the
agendas of ci ti es i n both the devel opi ng and the
i ndustri al wor l ds have reveal ed the di seconomi es of
l arge-scal e operati ons. Smal l , competi ti ve, and hi ghl y
vari egated transport enterpri ses usual l y f i nd i t ef-
20
Publ i c transport systems pr ovi de the most effi ci ent
means of movi ng l arge numbers of peopl e, especi al l y
i n dense ur ban reas. Bus services, i n parti cul ar,
provi de consi derabl e f l exi bi l i ty i n meeti ng demands
f or transport at vari ous levis of qual i ty and quanti ty.
I n many devel opi ng countri es, buses are the choi ce of
a maj or i ty of the communi ty and are the onl y means
of mobi l i ty that can be afforded by the ur ban poor.
A n esti mated 600 mi l l i on tri ps a day were bei ng made
i n buses i n T hi r d Wor l d ci ti es i n 1980. By the year
2000 that figure wi l l have at least doubl ed.
Yet despi te i ts vi tal rol e, bus service i n many places
fal l s far short of demand; systems are of ten severely
overstretched, uncomf ortabl e, and unrel i abl e. Po-
tenti al passengers i ncreasi ngl y tur n to more costl y
modes of transport or have to wal k l ong di stances.
Thi s chapter discusses the reasons f or thi s state of
affai rs and consi ders the condi ti ons that are needed
i f bus services are to cope wi t h the current and
forecast massi ve increases i n demand.
The Cri si s i n Public Transport
Very few publ i c transport systems i n the devel opi ng
ci ti es have been abl e to keep pace wi t h the very r api d
and substanti al increases i n demand of the past few
decades. Bus services i n parti cul ar have deteri orated,
and thei r effi ci ency and output have been f urther
reduced as passengers have turned to pri vate cars and
f i ci ent to oprate smal l vehi cl es rather than the l arge
costl y buses characteri sti cal l y chosen by l arge organ-
i zati ons. Since the monopol i es of ten produce onl y
l ow - qual i ty servi ce, peopl e w ho are w i l l i ng to pay f or
somethi ng better are forced i nto usi ng pri vate cars or
taxi s. Thi s i n tur n increases congesti n so that bus
services deteri rate, and the poor i n parti cul ar are
di sadvantaged.
The l arge, monopol i sti c publ i c transport undertak-
i ngs are decl i ni ng i n many pl aces. Typi cal is the
Transportes de Buenos A i res, a nati onal enterpri se set
up i n 1951 to take over al l publ i c transport services
i n Buenos A i res. Services deteri orated f r om the outset
and by 1959 the system was l osi ng $120,000 a day.
By 1962 the f i nanci al si tuati on was so seri ous and the
qual i ty of services so poor that the enterpri se was
di ssol ved and bus services turned over to pri vate
compani es.
Government regul ati on and contr ol have exacer-
bated the poor operati onal and f i nanci al perf or-
mance of the monopol i es. A s costs ri se, f or exampl e,
transport systems come under financial pressure to
i ncrease fares, but pol i ti ci ans are under contrary
pressure to keep fares at exi sti ng l evi s. Unl ess the
system is subsi di zed, i t w i l l then have to el i mi nate
some of i ts less prof i tabl e servi ces. Once agai n, how -
ever, pol i ti ci ans w i l l be i ncl i ned to yi el d to pressure
f r om those whose services are threatened and to
i nsi st on mai ntai ni ng money-l osi ng operati ons to
certai n standards.
Publ i c offi ci al s may also come under pressure to set
standards when sustai ned demand and revenues are
i nsuffi ci ent to support w hat are consi dered to be
soci al l y or economi cal l y desi rabl e servi ces. These
i ncl ude, f or exampl e, regul ar servi ce to certai n reas
depri ved of transport and at ti mes of t hi n demand;
speci al suppl emental servi ce at peak peri ods to re-
duce over cr owdi ng or excessive w ai ti ng; and speci al
services to meet the needs of persons par ti cul ar l y
dependent on publ i c transport, such as school chi l d-
ren or the aged and handi capped. Publ i c offi ci al s
of ten attach consi derabl e i mportance to meeti ng
these speci al needs. But pr obabl y the most f requent
reason f or i nterventi on is the desi re of the publ i c
offi ci al s to avoi d publ i c outcri es over fare i ncreases.
Thi s desi re is hei ghtened where a uni f or m fare struc-
ture appl i es nati onwi de so that a fare i ncrease w oul d
become a nati onal issue. But attempts to redress
deteri orati on i n transport services by fixing fares and
levi s of servi ce i nevi tabl y l ead to subsi di es. These
usual l y begi n w i t h a wr i te- of f of debt but eventual l y
extend to di rect operati ng subventi ons.
I nterventi ons of thi s type usual l y f al l short of
expectati ons, however, and as transport systems be-
come less abl e to provi de adequate servi ce at accept-
abl e fares, the tendency is to appl y even more con-
trol s and subsi di es. When successive i nterventi ons
f ai l to achi eve the desi red resul ts, i t then becomes a
smal l step to f ul l publ i c ownershi p. A l though publ i c
ownershi p seems to make i t possi bl e to avoi d pol i t i -
cal l y di f f i cul t choi ces, i n most cases i t merel y post-
pones the day of reckoni ng.
Wi t h f ew excepti ons, publ i cl y owned transport
costs more to r un (i n many cases, very much more)
than comparabl e transport systems r un by the pri vate
sector. Wi t hout the pr of i t moti ve and the staff ac-
countabi l i ty that exi st i n the pri vate sector, publ i cl y
owned systems have l i ttl e i ncenti ve to stri ve f or
cost-effecti veness, to compete f or revenues, or to
sustai n the hi gh degree of ef f ort necessary to over-
eme the numerous day-to-day probl ems. Further-
more, government agencies and publ i cl y owned cor-
porati ons of ten l ack the f l exi bi l i ty of organi zati on,
the abi l i ty to hi re and fire staff, or the financial
di screti on needed to adapt speedi l y to changi ng con-
di ti ons.
Several ci ti es have f ound that taki ng over bus
services was so f raught w i t h di ffi cul ti es and such a
burden on thei r resources that they have reverted to
encouragi ng pri vate ownershi p. I n K i ngston, J amai -
ca, f or exampl e, the J amai ca Omni bus Servi ce, w hi ch
had operated successful l y under pri vate ownershi p
f or twenty years, f ound i t i mpossi bl e to cope w i t h a
gr ow i ng obl i gati on to oprate l onger routes and to
serve reas w i t h thi n traffi c at unprof i tabl e fares.
Services deteri orated, and i n 1974 the company was
taken over by the government. Pr oducti vi ty then
dr opped and costs rose, to the extent that by 1983 the
servi ce was costi ng the government over $1 mi l l i on
every month i n dfi ci t financing. A t thi s poi nt the
government leased the assets of the servi ce to the
pri vate sector and i ntroduced measures to encourage
the devel opment of pri vate bus servi ces. Thi s is far
f r om bei ng an i sol ated case. Experi ence i n many
ci ti es w i t h decl i ni ng corporate bus services shows
that, when gi ven the oppor tuni ty, smal l pri vate en-
terpri ses emerge as the major suppl i ers of publ i c
cransport servi ces.
I n some ci ti es, i t is true, wel l -establ i shed publ i c
agencies do pr ovi de notabl y w el l - r un and cost-
effecti ve bus servi ces. I t is i ndeed possi bl e f or a
publ i cl y owned transport system to per f or m sati sfac-
tor i l y, but because of the di f f i cul ty i n pr ovi di ng
appropri ate i ncenti ves and f l exi bi l i ty, i t is not easy.
21
Public Transport Subsidies
A l t hou gh many transi t systems thr oughout devel op-
i ng countri es are sel f-supporti ng, i t is not u ncommon
to find others that are heavi l y subsi di zed. (Urban r ai l
services, al most w i t hou t excepti on, are subsi di zed.)
A uthor i ti es justi fy subsi di es on a number of grounds.
The most common is that the government has a
responsi bi l i ty to pr ovi de the publ i c w i t h sati sfactory
services at affordabl e fares. I n thi s case, of ten over-
l ooked are the opportuni ti es to achi eve the same
resul ts by other means, f or exampl e, by encouragi ng
competi ti on and more cost-effecti ve practi ces.
A nother argument put f or w ar d is that subsi di es
i nduce motori sts to use publ i c transport i nstead of
thei r automobi l es and thus reduce road congesti n.
But the evi dence suggests that i t takes much mor e
than l ow fares or even free ri des on buses to l ure
motori sts f r om the comf or t and conveni ence of thei r
cars.
Frequentl y, economi es of scale are put f or t h as an
argument f or subsi di zi ng hi gh-capaci ty systemsi n
parti cul ar r api d r ai l w aysi n the hope that greater
patronage w i l l l ead to fi nanci al vi abi l i ty. But such
subsi di es of ten di vert patronage f r om more effi ci ent
systems and bui l d pressure to extend the subsi di zed
and less effi ci ent system. Under these ci rcumstances
the more effi ci ent systems may have to be curtai l ed,
may l ose vi abi l i ty, and eventual l y al so may have to
be subsi di zed.
Because the anti ci pated benefi ts of subsi di es usual -
l y f al l far short of expectati ons, more subsi di zati on
is then needed. One of the mai n causes of subsi di es'
f ai l i ng to achi eve expected resul ts is that the exi stence
of subsi di es removes the i ncenti ve to reduce costs or
to i ncrease revenues. Thi s i n t u r n usual l y l eads to
f urther i neffi ci ency, greater dfi ci ts, and a need f or
addi ti onal subsi di es. Such spi ral i ng subsi di es f or pub-
l i c transport can be f ou nd i n a number of ci ti es i n
devel opi ng countri es. The annual subsi dy f or pub-
l i cl y ow ned bus services i n K arachi has reached $5
mi l l i on; i n Cal cutta, $10 mi l l i on; i n Cai r o, $26 mi l -
l i on; and i n Bangkok, $30 mi l l i on. I n Sao Paul o, the
publ i c bus service receives a massi ve annual subsi dy
of $90 mi l l i on, w hi ch is equi val ent to more than
$0.15 f or every passenger t r i p.
M any exampl es of heavi l y subsi di zed urban publ i c
transport can al so be f ound i n the i ndustri al coun-
tri es. I n most cases the goal of the subsi dy has been
onl y par ti al l y achi eved. A study undertaken by the
Transport and Road Research L abor ator y showed:
Where subsidies were i ntroducd, patronage i n-
creased because of more i ntensi ve use by exi sti ng
users rather than because of more users.
Subsidies to attract car dri vers general l y have had
very l i ttl e effect because of the hi gh val u pl aced on
the conveni ence of pri vate cars.
Subsidies desi gned to reduce fares and i mprove
services have had onl y l i mi ted success. Onl y about
hal f the subsi dy was actual l y refl ected i n l ower
fares, and there was l i ttl e i mprovement i n services.
I n most cases, increased subsidies have resul ted i n
l ower producti vi ty and i n substanti al "l eakage" of
the subsi dy i nto l arger staffs, wages, and uni t costs.
I n most of the countri es studi ed, subsidies once
i ntroducd have gr ow n substanti al l y. A s a propor-
t i on of operati ng costs, subsidies are parti cul arl y
hi gh i n such countri es as the Netherl ands (70 per-
cent), Bel gi um (69 percent), France (56 percent).
Uni ted States (46 percent), and A ustral i a and Swe-
den (45 percent).
Despi te the very heavy burden that subsi di es pl ace
on the financial resources of ci ti es, the f u l l i mpl i ca-
ti ons and l ong-term consequences of subsi di es are
rarel y taken i nto account. A revi ew of the transport
sector by the Wor l d Bank reveal ed that subsidies
sel dom are properl y pl anned or apprai sed and that
actual effects i n some cases are qui te di fferent f r om
those i ntended. For exampl e, a 70 percent subsi dy to
the nati onal i zed bus company i n I stanbul ( I E TT) was
desi gned to keep fares dow n f or the ur ban poor.
H owever, many of the poor l i vi ng i n squatter reas
were served pr i mar i l y by unsubsi di zed pri vate enter-
pri se mi ni buses that charged the same fare as I E TT.
The subsi dy resul ted i n overstaffi ng of I E T T buses and
i neffi ci ent use of capi tal stock.
A l t hou gh subsi di es that meet appropri ate and spe-
ci fi c soci al and economi c objecti ves may be justi fi ed.
proposal s f or subsi di es need to be careful l y apprai sed
and thei r true effects understood. The same consi d-
erati on appl i es to exi sti ng subsi di es, w hi ch need to
be reapprai sed f r om ti me to ti me to ensure that thei r
or i gi nal justi f i cati on remai ns val i d. I n many cases,
apprai sal w i l l show that there is l i ttl e to be gai ned
f r om a proposed subsi dy and that el i mi nati on of an
exi sti ng subsi dy is l i kel y to l ead to a more effi ci ent
and cost-effecti ve system.
M or eover , subsi di es are financed f r om taxes l evi ed
on ci ti zens at al l i ncome l evi s, but i t is not at al l cl ear
that a transfer of f undsf or exampl e, f r om the
tax- payi ng farmer to the tax- payi ng ur ban bus user
is soci al l y just.
Demand is gr ow i ng much faster than budget re-
22
venues, and subsi di es cannot go on expandi ng w i t h
demand. A s a resul t, f or many ci ti es i t w i l l be
extremel y di f f i cul t to rel y on subsi di zed publ i c trans-
por t to meet f utur e needs.
Cri teri a for Vi abl e Bus Services
Despi te the magni tude of the probl ems, many publ i c
transport systemsparti cul arl y bus and mi ni bus op-
erati onsdo pr ovi de good servi ce. A compari son of
bus services i n some th i r ty ci ti es and the range of
performance usual l y achi eved by w el l -managed bus
services are set out i n A ppendi x Tabl es A -2 and A -3.
Exami nati on of these and other bus services th r ough -
out the w or l d suggests that they are more l i kel y to be
vi abl e and capabl e of meeti ng gr ow i ng demand w h en
certai n condi ti ons are present.
Ownership
Th e evi dence suggests th at pri vatel y ow ned bus ser-
vices are more l i kel y to cost less per uni t of output
th an publ i cl y ow ned services, al th ough there are
some notabl e excepti ons (see Box 8). But general l y
the qual i ty of pri vate bus service seems to be as good
as, i f not better th an, that of publ i cl y hel d systems.
Studies undertaken by the Wor l d Bank show ed that
i n ci ti es such as Cal cutta, Bangkok, and I stanbul w i t h
both pri vate and publ i cl y ow ned buses, the costs of
pri vate bus service w ere betw een 50 and 60 percent
of the costs of publ i cl y ow ned concerns. A l th ough
empl oyees of pri vatel y ow ned fi rms general l y earn
less th an thei r counterparts i n publ i cl y ow ned com-
pani es, pri vate bus company empl oyees i n the three
ci ti es w ere, i n fact, earni ng average or above average
w ages. Nonethel ess, w age costs per bus h our under
pri vate ow nersh i p are l i kel y to be much l ow er th an
costs i n the publ i c sector because of less restri cti ve
l abor contracts and l ow er absenteei sm and redun-
dancy.
Th e studi es al so f ound l i ttl e concrete evi dence to
support the conventi onal al l egati on th at pri vatel y
ow ned services are less safe th an publ i cl y ow ned
ones. I n addi ti on, the charge that pri vate operators
"sk i m the cr eam" by servi ng onl y the most prof i tabl e
routes does not seem to be supported. I n I stanbul the
publ i cl y ow ned system gets fi rst choi ce of routes; i n
Bangkok the pri vatel y r un mi ni buses serve the nar-
r ow and someti mes unpaved side roads w here regu-
l ar buses cannot oprate.
Box 7. Calcutta: Private and Public Bus Operators
Calcutta provides an opportuni ty to make a direct
comparison between pri vatel y ow ned and publ i cl y
ow ned bus systems.
Public buses are operated by the Calcutta State
Transport Corporati on ( CST C) . The fleet of some 1,200
buses comprises 700 single-deck buses that can carry
about 90 passengers each, and 500 double-deck buses
capable of carryi ng up to 190 passengers each. Usual-
l y, less than 700 of the buses are i n operati on, mai nl y
for w ant of repair and maintenance and sometimes
because of a lack of dri vers. Since C ST C has a staff of
about 11,000, the staffing rati o per operati onal bus is
16. C ST C has also been plagued by fare evasin esti-
mated at more than 15 percent of revenue. As a result
of l ow producti vi ty and fare evasin, the system
requires a subsidy i n the regin of $1 mi l l i on a month.
Revenues cover onl y about hal f of the system's oper-
ati ng costs.
Private buses i n Calcutta number about 1,800.
These buses are operated mai nl y by small companies
or i ndi vi dual owners grouped i nto a number of route
associations. Most of the private buses are similar i n
size to the single-deck buses operated by C ST C . Fares
for private and publ i c bus services are the same.
Despite these similarities, pri vate operators have been
able to survive financially w i thout any subsidy. Thei r
success is attri buted to very hi gh producti vi ty, w hi ch
is reflected i n l ow staffing ratios and high fleet avai l -
abi l i ty. The drivers of private buses receive a percen-
tage of revenue, w hi ch gives them a strong incentive
to combat fare evasin. As a result, fare losses are
extremely l ow . Private bus operations are estimated to
cost roughl y hal f those of the C ST C and are more than
covered by revenues.
A l though the qual i ty of both private and publ i c bus
service i n Calcutta leaves much to be desired, the
pri vate operators are able to provi de more reliable and
frequent service. Thi s is because the route associations
reglate services and apply fines when buses run
behind schedule. The pri vate companies, w hi ch hol d
almost tw o-thi rds of the market, play a major role i n
meeting the demand for transport i n Calcutta and thus
substantially reduce the financial burden on the gov-
ernment.
23
I t is also argued t hat the qual i t y of service det eri or-
ares on routes taken over by pri vat e operators, but thi s
cont ent i on is not supported by the evidence. I n Cal -
cutta (Box 7) buses on routes taken over by pri vat e
operators were more evenly scheduled, margi nal l y
more comfort abl e, less subject t o breakdown, and
consi dered t o have better general appearance and
performance. I n I stanbul i t was f ound that the pri vat e
mi ni buses had faster operat i ng speeds t han the publ i c
buses. I n general, pri vate operators are more i ncl i ned
t o adjust t o changi ng demands t han are publ i cl y hel d
enterpri ses.
I n many countri es publ i cl y owned bus services are
l ong establi shed, and the pol i t i cal and soci al cl i mat e
f or a rapi d move t owar d pri vat i zat i on may not be
appropri at e. Wi t hout l osi ng any opport uni t i es t o
encourage greater pri vat e pr ar t i ci pat i on, careful at-
t ent i on t o the vi abi l i t y and effi ci ency of the publ i cl y
owned services is l i kel y t o reap wor t hwhi l e results.
General l y the performance of publ i cl y owned bus
services can be i mpr oved i f they oprate wi t h a
measure of i ndependence and pursue commerci al
practi ces, i ncl udi ng:
A ccount abi l i t y for performance at al l levis of
management
I ncenti ves t o reduce costs and i mprove service
Cost control s coveri ng operat i on, mai ntenance, ad-
mi ni st rat i on, and route costi ng systems
Rat i onal poli ci es on subsidies, routes, fares, and
staffi ng.
Several publ i cl y owned bus compani es t hat f ol l ow
thi s approach per f or m wel l and are cost-effecti ve. I n
part i cul ar, these successful systems are headed by
dynami c managements t hat are able t o mot vate thei r
staffs t hr ough i ncenti ves. Usual l y const i t ut ed as semi -
i ndependent publ i c corporat i ons, they are able to
select and replace staff and t o keep costs down by
f ol l owi ng sound management techni ques, such as
cost cont r ol and performance measurement. When
such cost-effecti ve operat i ons are not financially vi -
able, i t is usual l y because they do not determi ne fare
Box 8. Bombay: Publ i cl y Owned Bus Company
Greater Bombay, wi t h a populati on of about 8 mi l -
l i on, has one of the largest and most efficient bus
services i n I ndi a. The operator, the Bombay Electric
Supply and Transport Undertaki ng (BEST ), is a semi-
autonomous subsidiary of the Bombay M uni ci pal
Corporati on (BM C ), itself an autonomous authori ty
that provides muni ci pal services i n Greater Bombay.
BEST has a high degree of financial and operational
independence, but increases i n bus fares require the
approval of the B M C and are subject to mximum
li mi ts prescribed by the state government.
BEST has an exclusive franchise for scheduled bus
services wi t hi n Greater Bombay and i n 1984 had a
fleet of 2,325large buses operating on 198 routes wi t h
a total length of 2,423kilometers. The system serves
more than 4 mi l l i on passengers each day and has a
staff of 30,000in the bus segment of its operati on.
The company pursues prudent management and
financial policies and strives to improve efficiency and
vi abi li ty. The bus services are subject to comprehen-
sive moni tori ng and a detailed costing system. A n
i mportant reason for BEST ' S success is its payment of
bonuses to staff members who i mprove their perfor-
mance. Bonuses are based on revenue gains and sav-
ings that result from higher bus uti li zati on and better
fare collecti on. Over the years, BEST has consistently
achieved a high level of output at low cost. Because
bus maintenance activities are effective and well
scheduled, BEST is able to put more than 90 percent of
its fleet i n service on a regular basis and has a
breakdown rate of less than 5 percent. Despite heavy
congestin, each bus averages about 220 kilometers
and carries about 1,800 passengers each day. Although
i t has a comparatively high staffing level of fourteen
employees per bus, producti vi ty is good, and costs, at
approxi mately $0.065per passenger, are parti cularly
l ow.
I n 1976 the Worl d Bank provi ded BEST wi t h a loan
for the purchase of new buses, the construction of new
depots, workshops, and terminis, and management
trai ni ng. Thi s undoubtedly helped the Corporation,
and for short periods BEST has been financially viable.
M ost of the ti me, however, BEST has recorded small
dficits and has had to be cross-subsidized by surplus
revenues from its electricity undertaki ng. BEST ' S dfi-
cits have occurred because the government has con-
sistently held down bus fares. I n 1984, for example,
the average fare was $0.06. I n addi ti on, investment for
expansin has been denied from time to ti me. Service
is generally maintained at a Spartan level, wi t h sub-
stantial overloading and long wai ti ng times, parti cu-
larly duri ng peak periods. Given the authori ty to
establish appropriate fares, there seems to be li ttle
doubt that BEST could achieve total financial vi abi li ty
and provi de better service.
24
l evi s. One notabl y successful publ i cl y owned bus
system is f ound i n Greater Bombay (Box 8).
Competition
A pol i cy to encourage pri vate parti ci pati on i n the
provi si n of bus services shoul d avoi d the use of
regul ati ons or franchi ses that woul d crate pri vate
monopol i es. These tend to be i neffi ci ent and resul t i n
services whi ch suffer most of the drawbacks of pub-
l i cl y owned bus services. I nstead, gi vi ng pri vate op-
erators unrestri cted opportuni ty to enter the market
and compete for business has general l y produced
better transport services at l ower costs. Under com-
peti ti on, operators tend to become more responsi ve
to customers' needs and more i nnovati ve i n finding
ways to cut costs. I n A ccra and M onr ovi a, for
exampl e, hi ghl y competi ti ve operators provi de a
wi de vari ety of services and are abl e to charge fares
bel ow the regul ated mxi mum.
The al l eged di sadvantages of competi ti on (unfai r
competi tors, erosi n of vi abi l i ty, congesti n at bus
stops, l ow safety standards, and negl ect of unprofi t-
abl e routes) sel dom are f ound to be real probl ems
and, i f they do ari se, can usual l y be overeme
by mi ni mal i nterventi on. I f bus movements cause
congesti n, for exampl e, i t can be deal t wi t h by
strengtheni ng pl i ce enforcement of traffi c rul es.
Si mi l arl y, i nspecti on of buses and dri vi ng tests for
bus dri vers can be i ntroducd to i mprove safety.
I n the case of unprofi tabl e routes shunned by the
pri vate sector (the number of these is actual l y l i kel y
to be smal l where there is free competi ti on), publ i c
authori ti es can offer pri vate operators the opportuni -
ty to bi d for operati on of the routes at set standards,
capaci ti es, and fares. Operators bi d on the amount
of money to be pai d ot recei ved by them, dependi ng
on the extent to whi ch they expect the routes to be
profi tabl e or unprofi tabl e. Competi ti ve bi ddi ng ar-
rangements gi ve pri vate operators an i ncenti ve to
keep costs down, and when thi s approach has been
adopted for provi di ng transport services previ ousl y
subsi di zed by the government, the amount of the
subsi dy has i nvari abl y been substanti al l y reduced.
Choice of Vehicle
Smal l vehi cl es are general l y less economi c than l arger
ones i n thei r use of road space and energy per
passenger ki l ometer. Thi s is parti cul arl y so i n the
case of paratransi t vehi cl es (for exampl e, motor and
pedal ri ckshaws, converted vans and pi ckups, shared
taxi s, and mi ni buses) because more vehi cl es (and
dri vers) are needed to carry a gi ven number of
passengers. Because of the congesti n they cause,
certai n sl ow- movi ng types of paratransi t are often
barred f r om ci ty centers.
I n devel opi ng countri es, however, smal l vehi cl es
are often both cost-effecti ve and popul ar wi t h users.
Because less devel oped economi es have l ower l abor
costs, a hi gher rati o of dri vers to vehi cl es is not
necessari l y a si gni fi cant di sadvantage. Other features
that favor the use of smal l vehi cl es are:
I n l ow- densi ty reas smal l vehicles can remai n
financially vi abl e whi l e provi di ng frequent service,
despi te l ow levis of demand.
Smal l buses are usual l y producti on- l i ne vehicles
and cost much less per seat than l arge buses, whi ch
are ordi nari l y custom- bui l t.
Dri vers of smal l buses often have to meet less
stri ngent requi rements for a dri vi ng permi t than do
dri vers of l arge buses and thus can be pai d less.
Mai ntenance and i nspecti on requi rements for smal l
vehicles are usual l y less costl y.
Smal l vehicles can be operated at hi gher speeds,
especially on congested or narrow streets, whi ch
al l ow for qui cker turnaround.
Users of smal l vehicles may benefi t f r om more
frequent service and, i n some cases, door- to- door
service, i n return for hi gher fares.
L arge buses are general l y most sui tabl e on routes
where demand is hi gh enough to sustai n frequent
service and where the f ul l benefi t of thei r economi c
use of road space and energy per passenger can be
real i zed. A l though a ci ty's needs wi l l depend on i ts
parti cul ar ci rcumstances, some combi nati on of l arge,
mdi um, and smal l vehi cl es wi l l usual l y provi de the
best bus servi ce. A mi xed fleet al l ows for more
conveni ent and frequent and better uti l i zed service
throughout the day on both l ow- and hi gh- demand
routes and is more adaptabl e to changi ng ci rcum-
stances than a fleet of buses al l the same size. Thus,
where operators are free to choose whi ch vehi cl es to
use, as i n Cal cutta, Bogot, and A ccra, i t is not
uncommon to find a vari ety of types and sizes of
buses, mi ni buses, and paratransi t vehi cl es. Vehi cl es
chosen by operators wi t h practi cal knowl edge of
road condi ti ons, levis of demand, and operati ng
costs are more l i kel y to be cost-effecti ve and appro-
pri ate than vehi cl es speci fi ed by regul ati on.
25
Variety of Services
Cal cul ati ng the demand f or tr anspor tati on i n ur ban
reas is not si mpl y a matter of deter mi ni ng the
number of peopl e or the amount of goods to be
carri ed f r om poi nt A to poi nt B. Ur ban i nhabi tants
mani fest thei r transport preferences i n terms of thei r
wi l l i ngness to pay f or bei ng transported f r om pl ace
to pl ace. Payment, however, is made not onl y i n coi n
and currency but al so i n ti me, tr oubl e, and di scom-
f or t. Peopl e reveal thei r preferences when they make
tradeoffs between ti me and di scomf or t, on the one
hand, and the amount of money they are wi l l i ng to
pay f or transport, on the other hand. Tradeoffs vary
enormousl y between di fferent peopl e, dependi ng on
thei r ci rcumstances. I ndeed, the tradeoffs of any
i ndi vi dual may vary greatl y f r om one day to the next.
The suppl y pr obl em is to ensure that modes of
transport are depl oyed to meet the users' wi l l i ngness
to pay. The essenti al aspect of suppl y is that i t shoul d
gi ve peopl e the oppor tuni ty to trade up or down i n
comf or t, r el i abi l i ty, frequency, and pri ce.
As i ncomes ri se i n the devel opi ng countri es and
more peopl e are abl e to buy cars, publ i c tr anspon
systems w i l l have to become more attracti ve i f the
road networ k is not to be saturated. Comf or tabl e anc
rel i abl e services, al bei t at fares set at cost, w i l l have
to be establ i shed to attract more affl uent ri ders. A t
Box 9. Hong Kong's Wide Range of Bus Services
Transport demands i n Hong Kong are met by a wi de
range of modes, i ncl udi ng buses, trams, ferry boats,
and taxis run by pri vate enterprise and both surface
and underground rapi d rai l systems operated by gov-
ernment corporati ons. A l l of these transport modes
functi on wi thi n a framework of l i mi ted government
regul ati on designed to stimulate the provisin of cost-
effective, efficient, and safe services.
Buses account for by far the largest number of tri ps
i n Hong Kong. The two mai n franchised bus compan-
ies together carry about 3.4 mi l l i on passengers dai l y
on some 3,000double-deck buses. Fares, whi ch are set
by the government, range between $0.10 and $0.20,
depending on distance.
The Kowl oon Motor Bus Company operates 160
routes i n Kowl oon and the New Terri tori es, carryi ng
about 2.6 mi l l i on passengers i n 2,000 buses. The
Chi na Motor Bus Company operates 102 routes,
mai nl y on Hong Kong I sl and, carryi ng about 0.8
mi l l i on passengers dai l y on 1,000 double-deck buses.
The two companies also compete on fifteen routes
that run through the cross-harbor tunnel . Most of the
buses have a capacity of 120 passengers and generally
oprate throughout the day at hi gh frequencies and
hi gh load factors. Both companies are maki ng increas-
i ng use of super-large double-deck buses that were
developed specifically for Hong Kong and that can
carry up to 170 passengers. These are used on routes
where demand is heavy enough to run almost ful l y
loaded buses frequentl y throughout most of the day.
A t the other end of the scale are 4,350"publ i c l i ght
buses" ( P L BS) . These are fourteen-seat minibuses,
mostly i ndi vi dual l y owned and free to oprate almost
anywhere at whatever fare they decide to charge.
These P L BS compete directly wi th bus and tram ser-
vices and carry more than 1.5 mi l l i on passengers dai l y.
Passengers are guaranteed a seat and pay fares that
may be as much as double those charged on the large
franchised buses, parti cul arl y duri ng peak periods.
Some 800 other P L BS, termed "maxi cabs," have been
franchised to service routes that are not suitable for i
double-deck buses, either because demand is not suf-
ficient to sustain high-frequency service or because the
routes are too hi l l y or too tortuous for large buses.
Maxi cabs oprate on fi xed routes and at fixed fares
that are sl i ghtl y higher than those of the large fran-
chised buses.
To meet the needs of people l i vi ng i n new residential |
developments where service was inadequate, premi um
residential coach services were introducd i n 1982.
These services are run by private operators under |
contract to the developers of the residential reas or
to associations of residents. A l though these services
are regulated to avoi d conflicts wi th the franchses of 1
the mai n bus companies, the fares are not fixed by the
government. Most of the residential coach services use
medium-size buses, usually ai r-condi ti oned, that have 1
a capacity to seat about fifty passengers. The pri vatel y
owned residential coach services and si mi l ar services
for transporti ng factory workers and schoolchildren [
uti l i ze about 3,500buses and 1,600 minibuses.
Hong Kong now has a total bus fleet of some 12,000
vehicles, rangi ng i n size from the fourteen-seat mi ni - |
buses to the 170-passenger double-deck buses. Thi s
comprehensive bus network is able to meet a wi de
variety of demands for transport at di fferent levis of
quanti ty and qual i ty of service.
26
Box 10. Route Associ ati ons
Route Sharing i n Daejeon. Daejeon, i n the Republic
of Korea, provides a good example of a successful
public transport system managed by an association of
private bus owners. A unique f eature of the system is
the route sharing introducd i n 1980 to overeme the
probl em of unprof itable routes. The city is di vi ded
i nto f our geographical reas, each served by 100 buses
supplied by the various bus companies. Each fleet of
100 buses is rotated weekly to serve a dif f erent section
of the city. Thi s has helped to equalize income and has
eliminated the compl ai nt that some bus operators had
more prof itable or easier routes than others.
Thi s arrangement has been successful because of a
high degree of cooperation among the operators them-
selves and between the association and city authori -
ties. There are now sixty bus routes i n the ci ty, twenty
of whi ch oprate at the request of city authorities.
These twenty routes lose money, but each company
serves the routes i n turn, and their losses are equal-
ized.
Al though arrangements that avoid cross-subsidy
mi ght be more equitable to users, there is no doubt
that the system works wel l and is popul ar wi th both
operators and users. The operators make a reasonable
prof i t, whi l e the users benef it f rom good bus service
at acceptable fares.
Colectivos i n Buenos Aires. The public transport
system i n Buenos Aires is also run by i ndi vi dual
private operators wi thi n a f ramework of control exer-
cised by route associations (empresas). Some 13,000
buses, called "col ecti vos," account f or 75 percent of
public transport tri ps i n the city. The buses, wi th a
capacity of sixty passengers each, are usually operated
by owner-drivers. Each empresa is empowered to
serve only one route and usually comprises sixty
buses. Routes f requently overlap those of other em-
presas. The f ormati on of new empresas is governed by
the M i ni stry of Public Works and Services. Al though
the M i ni stry also sets fares and mi ni mum f requeney
of operati on, the empresas select and employ i ndi vi d-
ual operators by contract, set schedules, and provide
administrative services and may assist wi th mainte-
nance, although this is of ten undertaken by owner-
drivers. A n i mportant f uncti on of the empresas is to
assure f air di stri buti on of income among operators,
usually i n accordance wi th vehicle mileage.
The empresas compete vigorously among them-
selves f or patronage. Since fares are fixed, the empre-
sas emphasize qual i ty and f requeney of service, to the
benef it of 8 mi l l i on passengers who use the colectivos
daily.
the same ti me, however, publ i c transport systems wi l l
have to i ncl ude f requent, rel i abl e, and l ow-cost bus
services f or those (l i kel y to be a maj ori ty) who are
wi l l i ng to sacrif ice comf or t f or rel i abi l i ty and l ower
f ares.
Demands f or vari ous levis of service that f al l
between these two extremes are l i kel y to ari se, and
demand f or each type of service can be expected to
change f r om ti me to ti me. I t wi l l theref ore be i mpor -
tant to devel op publ i c transport systems that wi l l
al l ow flexibility i n pr ovi di ng services, and thi s can
best be achi eved by vari ety i n bus services (see Box 9).
Cooperation among Operators
I n a number of ci ti es, cooperati on among bus oper-
ators has resul ted i n the provi si n of better services.
Operators have f ormed route associ ati ons that exer-
cise i nf or mal supervi si n to mi t gate the dangerous
and di srupti ve practi ces of ten attri buted to f ree mar-
ket condi ti ons wi thout reduci ng heal thy competi ti on.
Route associ ati ons, or "empresas," provi de mi crobus
service i n Buenos A i res, f or exampl e. Each empresa
is composed of the owner-operators on a specif ic
route, and i ts members must abi de by the associa-
ti on's rul es. The operators benef i t f r om organi zed
schedul i ng and a standard f are structure whi l e the
publ i c benef i ts f r om the greater f requeney and rel i -
abi l i ty of services and hi gher standards. There is
consi derabl e competi ti on among route associ ati ons,
since passengers have a choi ce of routes. Route
associ ati ons of vari ous ki nds are f ound i n many cities
i n L ati n A meri ca, A f r i ca, and A si a, and also i n the
U ni ted States (see Box 10).
T h e Rol e of Government
General l y, publ i c transport services wor k most ef -
f i ci entl y wi t h a mi ni mum of government contr ol . I n
parti cul ar, the f reedom to set f ares i n response to
market f actors is more l i kel y to mean that suppl y and
demand wi l l bal ance each other. I n addi ti on, an
absence of financial control s by government creates
a f avorabl e cl i mate f or i nvestment i n publ i c trans-
27
por t. Si mi l ar l y, the fr eedom to deter mi ne the routes,
size of vehi cl es, and frequeney of services, par ti cul ar -
l y wher e competi ti on exi sts, enhances the l i kel i hood
of economi c vi abi l i ty and publ i c sati sfacti on (see
Box 11).
I n some cases, of course, a tr anspor t system may
contai n cer tai n routes that f or a var i ety of reasons are
not pr of i tabl e and therefore not attr acti ve to com-
mer ci al oper ator s. I f these are deemed to be soci al l y
or economi cal l y desi rabl e, the gover nment may then
deci de to subsi di ze such services. When subsi di es are
pr ovi ded to users i n a f or m that enables them to
choose between services, however , competi ti on is
r etai ned and oper ator s sti l l have an i ncenti ve to r un
cost-effecti ve services at acceptabl e standards. But
subsi di es to users or to service pr ovi der s that resul t
i n ar ti f i ci al l y l ow fares may l ead to excessive demand
and consequent pressure to pr ovi de greater capaci ty
than woul d other wi se be r equi r ed.
A l t hough there are str ong ar guments f or keepi ng
gover nment contr ol of publ i c tr anspor t to a mi ni -
mum, cer tai n responsi bi l i ti es must be assumed by
gover nments. The greatest of these is the mammot h
task of i mpr ovi ng and extendi ng the r oad networ k.
A s al ready noted, r oad pr i ci ng to compnsate f or
Box 11. Der egul ati on i n Col ombo
I n Col ombo, Sri Lanka, private bus services are sub-
ject to relatively l i ttl e government regul ati on. Bus
operators select their own routes, set their own fares,
and determine when they wi l l begin dai l y operations
and when they wi l l stop. The government does, how-
ever, impose stringent requirements wi th regard to
safety, insurance, and vehicle inspection.
The pri vate transport sector i n Col ombo has bene-
fited greatly fr om the l i beral i zati on of nati onal eco-
nomi c policies i n the late 1970s. Fi rst, the easing of
i mport restrictions stimlated purchases of new vehi-
cles. Then i n 1979 the government put an end to the
Central Transport Board's (C T B ) monopol y on publ i c
transport services.
These actions evoked a strong response fr om pr i -
vate bus operators, who i mported more than 6,000
buses between 1979 and 1981. Some 7,000 pri vate
buses now oprate throughout Sri Lanka, about 3,500
of them i n the Col ombo metropol i tan regin. The
capacity of these private buses ranges fr om 30 to 60
passengers. Meanwhi l e, C T B operates 5,800 buses i n
the metropol i tan regin, each one able to carry be-
i mper fecti ons i n the mar ket w i l l r equi r e consi derabl e
gover nment effor t. Tr affi c r egul ati on and manage-
mentpar ti cul ar l y the adopti on of measures that
gi ve pr i or i t y to publ i c tr anspor t vehi cl esal so must
be the r esponsi bi l i ty of the publ i c sector, as are the
l i censi ng of publ i c tr anspor t dr i ver s and vehi cl es and
the setti ng of safety and envi r onmental standards.
M any ci ti es need to strengthen and refi ne the i nsti tu-
ti ons responsi bl e f or these functi ons and to pr ovi de
adequate tr ai ni ng f or thei r staff. M uch of the discus-
si on on the i nsti tuti onal f r amewor k f or traffi c man-
agement i n Chapter 3 appl i es equal l y to the gov-
er nment author i ti es wi t h publ i c tr anspor t responsi -
bi l i ti es.
I n vi ew of forecasts of r api d gr owt h i n ur ban
popul ati ons and a consequent spread of ur ban reas,
the need f or bus services can be expected to i ntensi fy
greatl y i n the years to come. I f the pr i vate and the
publ i c sectors pl ay thei r appr opr i ate rol es, most
devel opi ng countr i es wi l l have the oppor t uni t y to
devel op vi gor ous and vi abl e publ i c tr anspor t sys-
tems. The magni tude of expected f utur e demands
makes i t i mper ati ve to grasp thi s oppor t uni t y and not
f r i tter i t away.
tween 100 and 120 passengers. Private bus services
have so far managed to capture more than 25 percent
of the market, despite competing wi th the heavily
subsidized and well-established C T B bus services.
A l though the pri vate bus operators are permi tted to
set thei r own fares, these are greatly influenced by C T B
fares, whi ch are held arti fi ci al l y l ow (about $0.015 a
ki l ometer). As a result, some private operators have
found i t di ffi cul t to compete, whi l e others have resort-
ed to overl oadi ng and other malpractices. A few
unprofi tabl e routes have been shunned by pri vate
operators and are served by C T B buses, whi ch have
become chronically overloaded. The government is
formul ati ng special arrangements to overeme this
probl em.
The overall effect of deregulation has been a sub-
stantial increase i n capacity, parti cul arl y at peak peri -
ods, and generally more frequent and less crowded
bus service. C T B 's operations and large subsidy are
l i kel y to be reduced as the pri vate sector increases its
share of the market.
28
Investment
Decisions
Faced w i t h w h at appear t o be i nsurmount abl e trans-
port probl ems, ci ti es i n devel opi ng countri es are
f requent l y t empt ed t o t ur n t o expensi ve i nf rast ruc-
t ure projeets i n the hope t h at a substanti al i nvest-
ment w i l l provi de an effecti ve and compl ete sol ut i on.
These i nvestments general l y take the f or m of expen-
si ve h i gh w ay i nf rast ruct ure or rapi d rai l t ransi t sys-
tems desi gned to provi de a massi ve amount of new
t ransport capaci ty to rel i eve crow ded radi al roads.
But i n vi ew of al l the other demands on thei r re-
sources, ci ti es shoul d careful l y consi der l ow -cost
t ransport al ternati ves.
Investment i n Road Networks
Consi derabl e i ncreases i n bot h the popul at i on and
the rea of a ci ty of t en mean t hat road net w orks must
be substanti al l y i mproved and l engthened. I n Pusan,
K orea, f or exampl e, the met ropol i t an rea grew f r om
370 t o 430 square ki l omet ers betw een 1968 and 1982,
w h i l e t ot al road l ength i ncreased f r om 550 t o 1,600
ki l omet ers. Such extensi ve road i mprovement and
const ruct i on can pl ace a heavy burden on ci t y fi-
nances. Th e choi ce of routes and the desi gns f or new
or i mproved roads sh oul d therefore avoi d excessi ve
standards and be economi cal l y just i f i ed.
Th e greatest benefi ts are achi eved w h en urban
h i gh w ay i nvestment i s di rected t ow ar d the needs of
commerci al traffi c and publ i c t ransport rather t h an
the needs of mot or cars. Experi ence show s t hat such
an approach f or exampl e, the si mpl e pavi ng and
drai nage of bus routes servi ng l ow - i ncome r eas
offers very h i gh rates of ret urn. These i mprovement s
benefi t a rel ati vel y h i gh proport i on of the popul at i on,
mai nl y t h rough faster journeys, reduced fuel con-
sumpt i on and mai ntenance, and few er del ays because
of breakdow ns (see Box 12).
St ri ki ng net benefi ts are obt ai ned si mpl y by keep-
i ng roads i n good condi t i on. But the urban roads i n
many devel opi ng countri es t end t o be rough and
ri ddl ed w i t h pothol es. Th e poor condi t i on i s due t o
a combi nat i on of factors: unexpectedl y l arge traffi c
vol umes, underdesi gn and f aul t y const ruct i on, over-
l oaded t rucks, and, i n part i cul ar, l ack of proper
mai ntenance.
Experi ence show s t hat proper mai ntenance of ci t y
streets produces l arge savi ngs i n ci t y budgets i n the
l ong r un. Mai nt enance prol ongs the l i fe of roads,
postpones the day w h en expensi ve reh abi l i t at i on or
reconst ruct i on i s requi red, and thus can substanti al l y
reduce overal l ci t y expendi tures on roads. Rout i ne
and peri odi c mai ntenance of paved roads costs about
$2,000 t o $4,000 per ki l omet er per year and can
ext end the l i fe of a roadw ay by fifteen t o t w ent y
years. Ful l reh abi l i t at i on of a t w o-l ane road i s l i kel y
t o cost betw een $150,000 and $250,000 per ki l omet er.
Regul ar mai ntenance benefi ts hundreds of t h ou-
sands of road users and reduces vehi cl e operat i ng
29
Box 12. Cities in Brazil : Access to Low-income Areas
Road networks i n l ow-i ncome reas of many Brazilian
cities are largely unpaved. Most motorized trips to
and from such reas are made by buses, but bus
service is often hampered by steep gradients, sharp
bends, ruts, and potholes. Many roads are impassable
i n wet weather. The result is poor service and high
operating costs for buses, as wel l as reduced access for
emergency and service vehicles.
To overeme this si tuati on, the Brazilian govern-
ment (wi th assistance from the Worl d Bank) has
embarked on an extensive program of paving bus
routes serving low-income reas. I n addi ti on, compre-
hensive studies of low-cost paving have been under-
taken.
The i ni ti al results of these studies showed that
substantial benefits could be derived from paving
roads. For example, i t was estimated that the paving
of 800 kilometers of bus routes i n Sao Paulo reduced
vehicle operating costs, fuel consumpti on, and jour-
ney times and produced an average internal rate of
return of more than 37 percent; many sections showed
rates of return i n excess of 100 percent. Guidelines for
selecting the roads to be included i n future paving
programs were then developed. The guidelines suggest
that the roads should be i n low-income reas; they
should be for existing bus routes or should al l ow bus
routes to be extended; they should be paved wi th the
most economical material for both construction and
maintenance; and i n general, the roads should not
exceed 7 meters i n wi dth.
The Programa de Pavimentacao de Baixo Custo en
Areas de Baxia Renda (P R O P AV ) wi l l pave approxi -
mately 500 kilometers of bus routes i n low-income
reas and emphasizes the use of mi ni mal design stan-
dards and low-cost local materials. I nternal rates of
return are expected to be similar to those of the earlier
paving programs. A considerable number of the urban
poor are expected to benefit directly from the pro-
gram.
A pri mary objective of P R O P AV is to establish the
replicability of the program throughout the urban
reas of Brazil. I t has been estimated that some 3,000
kilometers of roads meet the guidelines and need to
be paved. I mportant features of the program are the
strengthening of i nsti tuti onal arrangements and de-
tailed moni tori ng of the system. I n addi ti on, a manual
is being developed that wi l l provide more comprehen-
sive criteria for selecting roads as wel l as guidance on
setting standards and contract procedures. The ult-
mate aim is to enable local authorities to prepare and
finance their own paving programs wi th mi ni mum
outside assistance.
costs anywhere f r om 15 percent to 40 percent. Faster
journeys and smoother ri des also provi de consi der-
able benefits to passengers and goods (see Box 13).
Proper road mai ntenance also reduces the ri sk of
traffi c acci dents.
Mor e and more cities are recogni zi ng the val u of
keepi ng roads i n a good state of repai r and are gi vi ng
road mai ntenance hi gher pr i or i ty than previ ousl y i n
thei r budgets. But i f a ci ty is to reap the f ul l bene-
fits of i ncreased spendi ng on road mai ntenance, the
agency responsi bl e must be effi ci ent and effecti ve.
Road mai ntenance is frequentl y the responsi bi l i ty of
wor k uni ts wi t hi n ci ty departments, but i n recent
ti mes there has been a strong movement towar d
greater use of pri vate contractors. Studies i n Brazi l ,
Kenya, and A rgenti na have shown that mai ntenance
can be done more effecti vel y under contract and at
consi derabl e cost savi ngs. For exampl e, i n Ponta
Grossa, Brazi l , road mai ntenance was 59 percent
more costl y when done by muni ci pal workers than
when done by a pri vate contractor.
The constructi on of maj or roads and other expen-
sive hi ghway i nfrastructure, such as grade-separatec
i ntersecti ons and bri dges, is l i kel y to be unavoi dabl e
as ci ti es gr ow. But an emphasi s on l ow-cost roads
and ti mel y mai ntenance wi l l mean that a greater
pr opor ti on of the popul ati on, parti cul arl y the urbar.
poor, can be better served.
Capital -I ntensive Investments
U nderground rai l ways capabl e of movi ng up to
60,000 passengers an hour i n each di recti on at hi gh
speeds appear to offer a parti cul arl y attracti ve sol u-
ti on to chaoti c road condi ti ons. Pol i ti cal l y speaki ng.
a metro is easily sol d to the publ i c as a symbol of
progress and a si gn that the communi ty has achieved
the status of a maj or wor l d ci ty. I n addi ti on, forei gn
suppl i ers of subway technol ogy are often ready to
make fi nanci ng for constructi on and equi pment read-
i l y avai l abl e; because of unempl oyed resources i n
thei r own economi es, they are able to get export
subsi di es.
A l though rapi d rai l systems may provi de a vi abl e
30
sol uti on to traffi c probl ems under certai n ci r cum-
stances, the f ul l i mpl i cati ons of deci si ons to bui l d
such systems are rarel y understood. Such deci si ons
have on occasi on been based on f aul ty reasoni ng and
i nsuffi ci ent exami nati on of al ternati ves. Construc-
ti on of the Caracas metro, f or exampl e, was justi fi ed
on the basi s of a number of expectati ons whi ch di d
not, i n that case, materi al i ze (see Box 14).
The greatest dr awback of r api d r ai l systems, par-
ti cul ar l y under gr ound systems, is thei r massi ve con-
structi on costs that, i n combi nati on wi t h hi gh op-
erati ng costs, may wel l prove to be excessi vel y bur-
densome on ci ty budgets (see A ppendi x Tabl es A -4
and A -5). Esti mates of the number of peopl e that wi l l
use these l arge-scal e projeets are of ten overl y opt i m-
i sti c, and revenues rarel y are suffi ci ent to cover op-
erati ng costs, l et al one depreci ati on and financing
costs. Rapi d r ai l projeets have of ten shown them-
selves par ti cul ar l y suscepti bl e to cost overruns as
wel l . Even hi ghl y effi ci ent under gr ound systems op-
erati ng under favorabl e demand condi ti ons, such as
the H ong K ong metro, whi ch was constructed on
ti me and wi t hi n budget, have needed a great deal of
assi stance to pay capi tal costs.
W i t h an expensi ve and heavi l y subsi di zed r ai l
system, ci ty authori ti es may be tempted to cur tai l
competi ti on by other f or ms of transport, parti cul arl y
buses, i n order to boost the patronage and revenues
of the r ai l system. Ci ty authori ti es of ten defend such
measures wi t h the argument that i t is necessary to
pr ovi de an i ntegrated system to serve the publ i c. Thi s
approach, however, tends to pl ace the vi abi l i ty of the
competi ng systems i n jeopardy whi l e achi evi ng onl y
a mar gi nal i ncrease i n revenues f or the metro system.
Forced suppressi on of preferred modes si mpl y means
that the publ i c wi l l be served less wel l .
Energy savi ngs may al so f al l wel l short of expecta-
ti ons. The savi ng of combusti bl e fuel is someti mes
gi ven as a justi f i cati on f or l arge i nvestments i n elec-
tri c transport systems, but these savi ngs may be
di sappoi nti ngl y l ow. For exampl e, a study of al terna-
ti ve transport to conserve energy i n Brazi l reveal ed
Box 13. Kingston, Jamaica: Road Maintenance
O n the whol e, the i nfrastructure of pri mary and
secondary roads i n Ki ngston is not i n bad condi ti on.
But, as i n many cities i n devel opi ng countri es, road
surfaces are deteri orati ng, parti cul arl y where drainage
is inadequate or where the roads are used by buses and
heavy trucks, many of whi ch are overl oaded. Car-
riageways are being seriously damaged as a result of
uti l i ty works, trenches for the provisin of services are
i nvari abl y badl y rei nstated, and l eaki ng water mains
are a conti nual cause of pothol es. More than 100 miles
of sidewalks, many of them used by large numbers of
pedestrians, are i n poor condi ti on. Much of thi s state
of affairs is attri buted to lack of proper maintenance,
mai nl y because of deficiencies i n work methods and
materials used and a shortage of maintenance equi p-
ment and pl ants.
To overeme these problems and to avoi d the need
for premature and extensive road reconstructi on, the
authori ti es i n Ki ngston have i ni ti ated a comprehensive
five-year road maintenance program wi th the support
of the Worl d Bank. Thi s program includes the provi -
sin of maintenance equi pment, the resealing and
resurfacing of selected roads and si dewal ks, drainage
i mprovements, and the constructi on of a central
maintenance depot.
The peri odi c maintenance under the program, i n-
cl udi ng the resurfacing of mai n roads and the reseal-
i ng of access roads every ten to fifteen years, is being
carri ed out by pri vate contractors. Routi ne mai nte-
nance, i ncl udi ng the reinstatement of trenches, is
performed by a ci ty l abor forc.
The benefits of the program are expected to be
extremely hi gh, wi th a benefit-cost rati o of 12:1 and an
i nternal rate of return of 185 percent. These projections
are predicated on savings i n vehicle operati ng costs
because of improvements i n road surfaces and the very
large number of vehicles affected i n rel ati on to the
comparatively l ow cost of road maintenance. O f par-
ti cul ar significance to the economy of Jamaica is the
hi gh proporti on of forei gn exchange savings expected
to be derived from reduced operating costs. Foreign
exchange is estimated to represent 100 percent of the
cost of gasoline, diesel l ubri cants, and tires, 89 percent
of the costs of depreciation and maintenance of cars
and taxi s, and 80 percent of the costs of depreciation
and maintenance of minibuses, buses, vans, and trucks.
Since the maintenance program wi l l be targeted at
roads used by buses, the urban poor who make up the
majori ty of publ i c transport passengers wi l l be the
greatest beneficiaries.
31
that an i nvestment of $1.5 bi l l i on i n el ectri c-powered
mass transport systems wou l d resul t i n annual sav-
i ngs equi val ent to onl y 1.2 days of consu mpti on of
petrol eum-based produc s by the countr y as a whol e.
A l thou gh i n some cases heavy i nvestment i n a
metr o may be a techni cal l y feasi bl e sol uti on to a
ci ty's transport probl ems, the system's hi gh costs
mi ght mean the postponement of other i mpor tant
projeets. Theref ore government authori ti es shoul d
careful l y consi der the al ternati ves before deci di ng to
i nvest i n r api d r ai l systems.
Urban Transi t Systems: Exami nati on of Options
A wi de vari ety of techni cal l y feasi bl e ways exi st ta
meet the gr owi ng transport demands of a ci ty. A H
thou gh al l of them may be wor t h some consi derador
most shoul d be screened out at an earl y stage.
To do thi s, i t wi l l usual l y be suffi ci ent to i denti -
the mai n traffi c corri dors and est mate the range I :
f utur e demand. A f ter forecasts of demand and esr-
mates of the costs of each opti on are obtai ned, i t w:_
be possi bl e to deci de whi ch opti ons are wor th more
Box 14. Caracas Metro
The pl ans for the Caracas metro cal i for the construc-
ti on of three lines wi th a total l ength of 40 kil ometers
and thi rty-fi ve stations by 1990. Most of the system
wi l l be underground. The first phase of the firsr l ine,
compri si ng 12 kil ometers and fourteen stations, was
opened in 1983 and cost S1.4 bi l l i on. Extensions of 28
kil ometers are under construction and are due to be
cotnpl eted in 1990. The rest of the system is stil l i n the
pl anni ng and design stages.
Caracas is l ocated in a val l ey between mountai n
ranges that constrain the outward growth of the city.
The shortage of l and avail abl e for devel opment and
the high cost of bui l di ng on hil l sides have resul ted i n
an extremel y high popul ati on density al ong the val l ey.
These generic factors favor the construction of rapi d
rail systems and in this case led city pl anners to select
an underground metro as the best way to meet heavy
demand and overeme severe traffic congestin.
The decisin was made on the grounds that an
underground system woul d dimitate the need to
enlarge substantial l y the capacity of the road network,
a costly al ternative that woul d have required the
demol i ti on of many existing buil dings. The expecta-
ti on of the pl anners was that metro users woul d save
considerabl e amounts of time and that nonusers
woul d benefit from reduced congestin. The scheme
was also justified in part on the ground that the large
number of poor peopl e l i vi ng at the western end of the
metro l ine woul d benefit f rom greater mobi l i ty and
access to job opportuni ti es i n the center city.
But studies have shown that demand for travel by
busa demand that comes al most entirel y from l ow-
income groupsi s concentrated i n the center of the
city and that there is l i ttl e demand among the poor for
the l onger tri ps that coul d be taken on the metro. The
travel patterns of the city's minibuses, whi ch are
favored by mi ddl e-i ncome groups, conform more
closely to the routes that woul d be served by the
metro. Furthermore, the same fat fare on the metro
for both short and l ong tri ps woul d favor commuters
from distant high-income suburban reas. By contrast,
most of those i n l ow-i ncome groups take short jour-
neys and are thus disadvantaged by the metro fare
pol icies. The authorities have i n hand measures that
may, to some extent, overeme these disadvantages of
the system.
The Caracas metro is expected to cause greater
devel opment al ong the corri dors i t serves and thus to
increase popul ati on densities i n the city. Thi s woul d
run contrary to the decl ared pol i cy of spatial and
economic decentral ization to the suburbs. These i n-
creased densities woul d intensify current probl ems i n
provi di ng urban services. Since Caracas has no plans
to place restraints on the use of private cars, the
metro's effect on road congestin wi l l probabl y be
short-l i ved. I t seems clear that the existing congestin
has suppressed some of the demand for road use and
that any road space freed by the diversin of commu-
ters to the metro woul d qui ckl y be oceupied by new
motori sts.
I t has become evident that the metro wi l l cost
several times the ori gi nal estmate. Thi s makes i t l ikel y
that the costs wi l l be wel l beyond the means of many
users, parti cul arl y those i n l ow-i ncome groups. Heavy
subsidies wi l l therefore be needed and wi l l place a
considerabl e and continuous burden on the city's
financial resources.
A l though the decisin to construct the metro was
prompted by an earnest desire to deal effectivcl y wi th
congestin, insufficient consideration was given to
al ternative and less costl y sol utions, such as demand
management and i mproved bus service, i ncl udi ng the
creaton of excl usive busways and other forms of
pri ori ty for bus services.
32
detai l ed exami nati on. Other factors to be consi dered
i n eval uati ng opti ons are thei r flexibility, the ease or
di f f i cul ty of i ntegrati ng them i nto the ci ty's exi sti ng
system, the degree to w hi ch they w i l l di srupt ci ty
acti vi ti es and affect the envi ronment dur i ng and
after i mpl ementati on, and the costs of operati on and
mai ntenance.
Once certai n opti ons have been i denti fi ed as ap-
propri ate, detai l ed feasi bi l i ty studi es can be under-
taken. Of parti cul ar i mportance w i l l be economi c
anal ysi s and fi nanci al pl anni ng to determi ne whether
the new system is w i t hi n the ci ty's fi nanci al means.
I n addi ti on, the most sui tabl e i nsti tuti onal arrange-
ments shoul d be i denti fi ed f or effi ci ent i mpl ementa-
ti on, operati on, and mai ntenance of the system.
The characteri sti cs of the mai n types of avai l abl e
transi t systems are di scussed bel ow and summari zed
i n A ppendi x Tabl e A -6.
Buses
Buses and mi ni buses provi de the cheapest and most
flexible way of meeti ng heavy demand. Systems usi ng
standard-si ze transi t buses, each w i t h a capaci ty of
about 80 passengers, are abl e to carry up to 10,000
passengers an hour per l ae i n mi xed traffi c. Systems
usi ng l arger buses w i t h a capaci ty of 120 or more and
operati ng i n the same condi ti ons can carry up to
15,000 passengers an hour. I f pr i or i ty measures are
put i nto pl ace, these vol umes can be i ncreased to
15,000 passengers an hour f or standard buses and i n
the regi n of 20,000 for the l arger buses; peak-hour
vol umes of 23,000 passengers an hour have been
achi eved by buses operati ng i n reserved l aes. V ol -
umes i n excess of 30,000 passengers an hour can be
reached i n express busways w i t h graded i ntersecti ons
and off-l i ne stati ons. The Porto Al egre express bus-
way (Box 15), even w i t h few graded i ntersecti ons, is
sti l l abl e to carry 28,000 passengers an hour. The cost
of pr ovi di ng pr i or i ty for bus services is mi ni mal .
Usual l y, l i ttl e more is i nvol ved than expendi tures for
road marki ngs and signs and f or enforcement efforts.
Excl usi ve busways w i t h graded i ntersecti ons cost
f r om $2 mi l l i on to $7 mi l l i on per ki l ometer. The cost
of l arge buses ranges f r om $50,000 to $130,000 each.
Passenger costs per ki l ometer range f r om $0.02 to
$0.08 (1985).
El ectri c trol l ey buses provi de capaci ty si mi l ar to
that of conventi onal buses and are envi ronmental l y
attracti ve because they cause less pol l uti on. But costs
are hi gh, parti cul arl y f or the power transmi ssi on
system. I n l i ne w i t h the experi ence of other el ectri c
Box 15. Bus Expressways i n Porto A l egre
Exclusive busways i n Porto Alegre, Brazi l , have met
the demand for high passenger fl ows i n the central
business di stri ct wi thout the high investment requi red
for elevated or underground systems. I n 1978 the ci ty
admnistration, i n an agreement wi th the Worl d Bank
and the Brazi l i an Company for Urban Transport
( E B T U ), designated 30 kilometers of exclusive busways.
These expressways have been paved, bus stops bui l t,
and signs posted at a cost of $500,000 per ki l ometer.
The ri ght-of-way has been made exclusive by way of
curbs or l ow reflecting markers.
The narrowness of the designated espressway pre-
cludes passing at bus stops, and buses were often held
up by those stopped ahead. The sol uti on to thi s
probl em, i mpl emented i n Sao Paulo as wel l as i n Porto
Alegre, was the bus convoy, or C O M O N O R . A t the
beginning of a corri dor, conveys of up to six buses are
formed i n a fixed sequence according to route. The
buses travel together, stop simultaneously, board their
passengers, and depart i n a queue or convoy. A t each
bus stop passengers wai t at substops placed according
to their destination and the l ocati on of the buses i n
the convoy. Because buses are operated privately i n
Porto Alegre, a convoy may be composed of buses run
by several operators.
A convoy can almost double busway capacity m
congested reas. The combined use of the bus express-
way and bus convoys has achieved peak-hour one-
way passenger fl ows of 28,000 passengers on 260 buses
at a speed of 19 kilometers an hour i n the most heavily
traveled corri dor.
Hi gher speeds (wi th l ower flows) have been
achieved on other bus expressways i n Porto Alegre
wi th the use of another i nnovati on, the transfer termi -
nal . I t was found that unnecessary congestin resulted
when feeder routes overlapped i n the downtown rea.
Thi s probl em was solved on one expressway by bui l d-
i ng two transfer terminis, where passengers transfer
between the smaller buses serving feeder lines and
larger, artculated buses serving the bus expressway.
Thi s system resulted i n 20 percent higher bus speeds
and corresponding fuel savings.
33
transport systems, the hi gh i nvestment i n trol l ey
buses is unl i kel y to be j usti f i ed on the basi s of
combusti bl e f uel savi ngs. I n a devel opi ng ci ty, publ i c
transport servi ces of ten need r er outi ng because of
changes i n demand, r oad wor ks, and traf f i c manage-
ment. Trol l ey buses, ti ed to thei r power transmi ssi on
systems, cannot easi l y be rerouted and thus l ack the
consi derabl e f l exi bi l i ty of buses. Neverthel ess, trol l ey
buses may be attracti ve under certai n condi ti onsi n
hi l l y ter r ai n, f or exampl e.
Where buses are the maj or means of meeti ng
demands f or publ i c transport, very l arge numbers of
buses are l i kel y to be i nvol ved. To reduce the danger
of acci dents and pol l uti on, there is a strong need to
i nsti tute and enforce adequate safety and envi r on-
mental standards f or the operati on of buses.
Light Rail Transit
The ter m " l i ght r ai l tr ansi t" refers to a wi de range of
el ectri cal l y power ed r ai l systems. A t one extreme are
trams or streetcars, whi ch oprate on tracks and
share the r oadway w i t h other users. A t the other
extreme are "pr e- metr o" systems operated on excl u-
si ve ri ghts- of - way and of ten desi gned f or conversi n
to r api d r ai l systems when conversi n is war r anted
by demand. The di sti ngui shi ng features of l i ght r ai l
systems are that passengers usual l y boar d f r om the
r oad surface or f r om l ow pl atf or ms, and the vehi cl es
oprate i n si ngl e uni ts or i n short trai ns at modrate
speeds. Trackways may be shared w i t h other traf f i c
and may have secti ons of excl usi ve ri ghts- of - way.
Some systems, l i ke the one i n Hannover (Box 16),
combi ne several types of l i ght r ai l transi t to meet
di f f erent ci rcumstances and l evi s of demand.
L i ght r ai l systems usi ng si ngl e trams, each w i t h a
capaci ty of 100 passengers, are comparati vel y sl ow
and carry up to 6,000 passengers an hour i n mi xed
traf f i c. I f doubl e trams are used, capaci ty can be
i ncreased to 12,000 passengers an hour. Where the
trams oprate on an excl usi ve street track and i nter-
secti ons are l ocated at grade, capaci ty can be boosted
to 15,000 passengers. L i ght r ai l systems w i t h excl u-
si ve r i ght- of - way, grade-separated i ntersecti ons, and
five- or si x- car trai ns can achi eve peak- hour vol umes
of ar ound 36,000 passengers an hour. When con-
Box 16. Hannover Light Rai l Transit
The LJstra system i n Hannover, Federal Republi c of
Germany, embodies the mai n characteristics of l i ght
rai l transi t. At most stati ons, passengers board f rom
the road surface or from a l ow pl atf orm. At some
underground stati ons and some suburban stops pas-
sengers board the trai n from hi gh-l evel pl atforms.
Because of these di fferent boardi ng levis, the vehicles
used i n the system are equi pped wi th fol di ng steps.
Trai ns are usual l y composed of two doubl e arti cul ated
cars, each wi th a capaci ty of 250 passengers. These
vehicles have a top speed of 80 ki l ometers an hour.
The network is 69 ki l ometers l ong, wi th 96 stops and
14 underground stati ons. About 80 percent of the
system operates on an exclusive ri ght-of-way; the
remai nder is wi thi n or adjacent to the roadway.
Headways (the i nterval s between trai ns) of 90 sec-
onds are possible on the exclusive ri ght-of-way, but i n
practi ce the headways are at least 2 mi nutes. Thi s
woul d make i t possible to carry about 15,000 passen-
gers an hour i n each di recti on, but i n practi ce peak
passenger vol umes are about 8,000 an hour i n each
di recti on.
Passengers may buy either single- or mul ti -ri de
ti ckets f rom machines at stations and at other loca-
ti ons. Canceli ng machines are located on the vehicles.
Since passengers are responsible for payi ng the correct
fare and ti ckets are i nfrequentl y inspected, passenger
honesty is i mportant.
Because the system has evolved over a number of
years, i t is di ffi cul t to calclate its ful l capi tal cost. The
1983 pri ce for the doubl e arti cul ated cars was
$800,000. Fares are charged accordi ng to zone and i n
1983 ranged f rom $0.60 to $1 per tri p. I n the same year
the system's operati ng costs and interest were $80
mi l l i on, whi l e annual revenue was $52 mi l l i on. Thi s
l eft an operati ng loss of $28 mi l l i on, whi ch was
covered by a subsidy f rom the l ocal government that
represented $0.17 per passenger. Si xty percent of cap-
i tal expendi ture is covered by the federal government,
25 percent by the state government, and 15percent by
l ocal agencies.
The ori gi nal i ntenti on was to upgrade the l i ght rai l
system to a rapi d rai l subway i n stages as ri dershi p
increased, but because of stagnati on of demand and
fi nanci ng probl ems conversin is now unl i kel y. I n-
stead, the exi sti ng system is to be extended and more
tunnel i ng is pl anned.
34
structed at gr ound l evel , a l i ght r ai l i nfrastructure
composed of tr ackway, si gni s, and power system
wi l l cost between $6 mi l l i on and $10 mi l l i on per
ki l ometer. El evated systems can be expected to cost
between $25 mi l l i on and $40 mi l l i on per ki l ometer,
whi l e underground secti ons may cost between $65
mi l l i on and $110 mi l l i on per ki l ometer. The cost
of l i ght rai l vehi cles i n 1985 was appr oxi matel y
$800,000 each. Costs for surface l i ght r ai l systems
wi t h excl usi ve ri ghts of way are i n the regi n of
$0.10-$0.15 per passenger ki l ometer.
I f a l i ght r ai l system can be establ i shed on an
exi sti ng and excl usi ve r i ght-of -way, or i f such a
ground-l evel r i ght-of -way can be pr ovi ded easi l y, the
cost and capaci ty of a l i ght rai l system, together wi t h
a l ow level of ai r pol l uti on, may make i t an attracti ve
opti on. But a compl etel y di fferent pi cture emerges i f
the system must be el evated or pl aced under gr ound.
To achi eve mxi mum capaci ti es, hi gh-frequency
servi ce is i mperati ve. But hi gh-frequency servi ce i s
l i kel y to i mpai r the f l ow of crossi ng traffi c i f i ntersec-
ti ons are not grade-separated.
General l y l i ght r ai l systems are confi ned to mai n
traffi c corri dors and are not sui tabl e for di str i buti ng
passengers thr oughout secondary and terti ary r oad
networks. The consequent need for many passengers
to change modes dur i ng thei r journeys is a di sti nct
di sadvantage of l i ght r ai l systems. Bus servi ces, by
compari son, serve the enti re road networ k and can
be routed to greatl y reduce the need f or passengers
to change between servi ces.
Rapid Rail Transit
Rapi d r ai l transi t systems (often termed "the sub-
way, " "the under gr ound," or "the metr o") i nvar i -
abl y oprate on compl etel y excl usi ve ri ghts-of-way at
hi gh speeds and provi de the hi ghest transi t capaci ty
currentl y avai l abl e. Peak hour capaci ti es of about
60,000 passengers an hour i n each di recti on have
been achi eved (for exampl e, i n Sao Paul o and H ong
K ong).
To achi eve such hi gh passenger vol umes, rapi d rai l
systems usual l y have sophi sti cated si gnal i ng and con-
tr ol devi ces that al l ow the operators to mai ntai n hi gh
speeds and frequenci es. Rapi d rai l systems usual l y
have hi gh-l evel pl atf orms that faci l tate r api d l oadi ng
and unl oadi ng. Because they crate l i ttl e noi se and
ai r pol l uti on, underground r api d r ai l systems, i n
parti cul ar, are attracti ve envi ronmental l y.
The costs of r api d rai l systems, l i ke those of l i ght
rai l systems, di ffer greatl y, dependi ng on how the
excl usi ve r i ght-of -way was obtai ned. I n a number of
ci ti es, r api d rai l systems were i ntroducd at an earl y
stage and surface ri ghts-of-way were obtai ned wi t h
comparati ve ease and at l ow cost.
I n some cases, pri vate devel opers have bui l t rapi d
rai l systems and have reaped the fi nanci al benefi ts of
Box 17. Osaka's Surface Rapid Rai l way
The H ankyu rai lway system is one of the many
pri vately owned and vi able rapi d rai l systems i n Japan
that run mai nl y on the surface and provi de effi ci ent
service. The H ankyu system serves the urban reas of
Osaka and Kobe and connects wi th K yoto and Tak-
arasuka. The rai l way carries more than 2 mi l l i on
passengers each day on three lines wi th a total length
of 140 ki lometers and 84 stati ons. Passenger volumes
of up to 63,000 an hour i n each di recti on have been
recorded.
The system was established at the tum of the
century, when much of the rea was l i ghtl y or mod-
erately i nhabi ted. The system was then greatly extend-
ed duri ng a peri od when the surface ri ght-of-way
could be provi ded wi th comparati ve ease and at l ow
cost.
The H ankyu Corporati on has been very responsive
to i ncreasi ng demand and has conti nual l y expanded
and i mproved its services whi l e taki ng advantagc of
the most recent developments i n technology. The
Corporati on has also constructed a number of mul ti -
purpose bui ldi ngs and housi ng projeets ci se to i ts
stati ons. Parti cularly si gni fi cant is the thi rty-two-story
bui l di ng housi ng offices, shops, restaurants, and trans-
port i nterchange faci li ti es at the Umeda termi nal .
Fares are charged accordi ng to di stance, and season
ti ckets can be purchased at a substanti al di scount. I n
1982 the average fare was 90 yen ($0.40); for season
ti cket holders the average fare was less than 60 yen.
A l though these are comparati vely l ow fares, the rai l
operati on shows a profi t. I n 1982 there was a profi t of
10,708,127,000 yen ($48 mi l l i on); the operati ng rati o
(revenue di vi ded by cost) was 1.18. The Corporati on
also made a large profi t on its other operati ons and
was able to make substanti al interest payments whi le
payi ng di vi dends to shareholders.
35
transport systems, the hi gh i nvestment i n trol l ey
buses is unl i kel y to be j usti f i ed on the basi s of
combusti bl e f uel savi ngs. I n a devel opi ng ci ty, publ i c
transport servi ces of ten need r er outi ng because of
changes i n demand, r oad wor ks, and traf f i c manage-
ment. Trol l ey buses, ti ed to thei r power transmi ssi on
systems, cannot easi l y be rerouted and thus l ack the
consi derabl e f l exi bi l i ty of buses. Neverthel ess, trol l ey
buses may be attracti ve under certai n condi ti onsi n
hi l l y ter r ai n, f or exampl e.
Where buses are the maj or means of meeti ng
demands f or publ i c transport, very l arge numbers of
buses are l i kel y to be i nvol ved. To reduce the danger
of acci dents and pol l uti on, there is a strong need to
i nsti tute and enforce adequate safety and envi r on-
mental standards f or the operati on of buses.
Light Rail Transit
The term "l i ght rai l tr ansi t" refers to a wi de range of
el ectri cal l y power ed rai l systems. A t one extreme are
trams or streetcars, whi ch oprate on tracks and
share the r oadway w i t h other users. A t the other
extreme are "pr e- metr o" systems operated on excl u-
si ve ri ghts- of - way and of ten desi gned f or conversi n
to r api d rai l systems when conversi n is warranted
by demand. The di sti ngui shi ng features of l i ght rai l
systems are that passengers usual l y board f r om the
r oad surface or f r om l ow pl atf or ms, and the vehi cl es
oprate i n si ngl e uni ts or i n short trai ns at modrate
speeds. Trackways may be shared w i t h other traffi c
and may have secti ons of excl usi ve ri ghts- of - way.
Some systems, l i ke the one i n Hannover (Box 16),
combi ne several types of l i ght r ai l transi t to meet
di f f erent ci rcumstances and l evi s of demand.
L i ght r ai l systems usi ng si ngl e trams, each w i t h a
capaci ty of 100 passengers, are comparati vel y sl ow
and carry up to 6,000 passengers an hour i n mi xed
traf f i c. I f doubl e trams are used, capaci ty can be
i ncreased to 12,000 passengers an hour. Where the
trams oprate on an excl usi ve street track and i nter-
secti ons are l ocated at grade, capaci ty can be boosted
to 15,000 passengers. L i ght r ai l systems w i t h excl u-
si ve r i ght- of - way, grade-separated i ntersecti ons, and
five- or si x- car trai ns can achi eve peak- hour vol umes
of ar ound 36,000 passengers an hour. When con-
Box 16. Hannover Light Rai l Transit
The Ustra system i n Hannover, Federal Republ i c of
Germany, embodies the mai n characteri sti cs of l i ght
rai l transi t. A t most stati ons, passengers board f rom
the road surface or f rom a l ow pl atf orm. A t some
underground stati ons and some suburban stops pas-
sengers board the trai n f rom hi gh-l evel pl atforms.
Because of these di fferent boardi ng levis, the vehicles
used i n the system are equi pped wi th fol di ng steps.
Trai ns ate usually composed of two doubl e arti cul ated
cars, each wi th a capaci ty of 250 passengers. These
vehicles have a top speed of 80 ki l ometers an hour.
The network is 69 ki l ometers l ong, wi th 96 stops and
14 underground stati ons. About 80 percent of the
system operates on an exclusive ri ght-of-way; the
remai nder is wi thi n or adjacent to the roadway.
Headways (the i nterval s between trai ns) of 90 sec-
onds are possible on the exclusive ri ght-of-way, but i n
practice the headways are at least 2 mi nutes. Thi s
woul d make i t possible to carry about 15,000 passen-
gers an hour i n each di recti on, but i n practi ce peak
passenger volumes are about 8,000 an hour i n each
di recti on.
Passengers may buy either single- or mul ti -ri de
tickets f rom machines at stations and at other loca-
BuaaunaaBBai
ti ons. Canceli ng machines are located on the vehicles.
Since passengers are responsible for payi ng the correct
fare and ti ckets are i nfrequentl y inspected, passenger
honesty is i mportant.
Because the system has evolved over a number of
years, i t is di ffi cul t to calclate its ful l capi tal cost. The
1983 pri ce for the doubl e arti cul ated cars was
$800,000. Fares are charged accordi ng to zone and i n
1983 ranged f rom $0.60 to $1 per tri p. I n the same year
the system's operati ng costs and interest were $80
mi l l i on, whi l e annual revenue was $52 mi l l i on. Thi s
l eft an operati ng loss of $28 mi l l i on, whi ch was
covered by a subsidy from the l ocal government that
represented $0.17 per passenger. Sixty percent of cap-
i tal expendi ture is covered by the federal government,
25 percent by the state government, and 15percent by
l ocal agencies.
The ori gi nal i ntenti on was to upgrade the l i ght rai l
system to a rapi d rai l subway i n stages as ri dershi p
increased, but because of stagnati on of demand and
financing probl ems conversin is now unl i kel y. I n-
stead, the exi sti ng system is to be extended and more
tunnel i ng is pl anned.
34
structed at gr ound l evel , a l i ght r ai l i nfrastructure
composed of tr ackway, si gni s, and power system
wi l l cost between $6 mi l l i on and $10 mi l l i on per
ki l ometer. El evated systems can be expected to cost
between $25 mi l l i on and $40 mi l l i on per ki l ometer,
whi l e under gr ound secti ons may cost between $65
mi l l i on and $110 mi l l i on per ki l ometer. The cost
of l i ght rai l vehi cles i n 1985 was appr oxi matel y
$800,000 each. Costs f or surface l i ght r ai l systems
wi t h excl usi ve ri ghts of way are i n the regi n of
$0.10-$0.15 per passenger ki l ometer.
I f a l i ght r ai l system can be establ i shed on an
exi sti ng and excl usi ve r i ght-of -way, or i f such a
ground-l evel r i ght-of -way can be pr ovi ded easi l y, the
cost and capaci ty of a l i ght rai l system, together wi t h
a l ow l evel of ai r pol l uti on, may make i t an attracti ve
opti on. But a compl etel y di fferent pi cture emerges i f
the system must be el evated or pl aced under gr ound.
To achi eve mxi mum capaci ti es, hi gh-frequency
servi ce is i mperati ve. But hi gh-frequency servi ce i s
l i kel y to i mpai r the f l ow of crossi ng traffi c i f i ntersec-
ti ons are not grade-separated.
General l y l i ght r ai l systems are confi ned to mai n
traffi c corri dors and are not sui tabl e for di str i buti ng
passengers thr oughout secondary and terti ary road
networks. The consequent need for many passengers
to change modes dur i ng thei r journeys is a di sti nct
di sadvantage of l i ght rai l systems. Bus servi ces, by
compari son, serve the enti re road networ k and can
be routed to greatl y reduce the need for passengers
to change between servi ces.
Rapid Rail Transit
Rapi d r ai l transi t systems (often termed "the sub-
way, " "the under gr ound," or "the metr o") i nvar i -
abl y oprate on compl etel y excl usi ve ri ghts-of-way at
hi gh speeds and provi de the hi ghest transi t capaci ty
currentl y avai l abl e. Peak hour capaci ti es of about
60,000 passengers an hour i n each di recti on have
been achi eved (for exampl e, i n Sao Paul o and H ong
K ong).
To achi eve such hi gh passenger vol umes, r api d rai l
systems usual l y have sophi sti cated si gnal i ng and con-
tr ol devi ces that al l ow the operators to mai ntai n hi gh
speeds and frequenci es. Rapi d rai l systems usual l y
have hi gh-l evel pl atf orms that faci l i tate r api d l oadi ng
and unl oadi ng. Because they crate l i ttl e noi se and
ai r pol l uti on, underground r api d r ai l systems, i n
parti cul ar, are attracti ve envi ronmental l y.
The costs of r api d rai l systems, l i ke those of l i ght
r ai l systems, di ffer greatl y, dependi ng on how the
excl usi ve r i ght-of -way was obtai ned. I n a number of
ci ti es, r api d rai l systems were i ntroducd at an earl y
stage and surface ri ghts-of-way were obtai ned wi t h
comparati ve ease and at l ow cost.
I n some cases, pri vate devel opers have bui l t r api d
r ai l systems and have reaped the financial benefi ts of
Box 17. Osaka's Surface Rapid Rai l way
The H ankyu rai l way system is one of the many
pri vately owned and vi able rapi d rai l systems i n Japan
that run mai nl y on the surface and provi de effi ci ent
service. The H ankyu system serves the urban reas of
Osaka and Kobe and connects wi th K yoto and Tak-
arasuka. The rai l way carries more than 2 mi l l i on
passengers each day on three lines wi th a total length
of 140 ki lometers and 84 stati ons. Passenger volumes
of up to 63,000 an hour i n each di recti on have been
recorded.
The system was established at the turn of the
century, when much of the rea was l i ghtl y or mod-
erately i nhabi ted. The system was then greatly extend-
ed duri ng a peri od when the surface ri ght-of-way
could be provi ded wi th comparati ve ease and at l ow
cost.
The H ankyu Corporati on has been very responsive
to i ncreasi ng demand and has conti nual l y expanded
and i mproved its services whi l e taki ng advantage of
the most recent developments i n technology. The
corporati on has also constructed a number of mul ti -
purpose bui ldi ngs and housi ng projeets ci se to i ts
stati ons. Parti cularly si gni fi cant is the thi rty-two-story
bui l di ng housi ng offices, shops, restaurants, and trans-
port i nterchange faci li ti es at the Umeda termi nal .
Fares are charged accordi ng to di stance, and season
ti ckets can be purchased at a substanti al di scount. I n
1982 the average fare was 90 yen ($0.40); for season
ti cket holders the average fare was less than 60 yen.
A l though these are comparati vely l ow fares, the rai l
operati on shows a profi t. I n 1982 there was a profi t of
10,708,127,000 yen ($48 mi l l i on); the operati ng rati o
(revenue di vi ded by cost) was 1.18. The corporati on
also made a large profi t on its other operati ons and
was able to make substanti al i nterest payments whi le
payi ng di vi dends to shareholders.
35
devel opment opportuni ti es that the exi stence of the
system created on l and adjacent to the l i nes. A
number of systems i n J apan were devel oped thi s way.
Operated at competi ti ve fares, they have been abl e to
show a pr of i t. A l though some rel y heavi l y on prof i ts
f r om property devel opment, most of them earn pr of -
i ts because they are operated very effi ci entl y (see Box
17). Si mi l ar si tuati ons arise when ur ban secti ons of
an i nterci ty r ai l l i ne or suburban r ai l way can be
upgraded to pr ovi de commuter services. Once agai n,
the cost of pr ovi di ng an excl usi ve r i ght- of - way is
l i kel y to be comparati vel y smal l . The W or l d Bank is
assi sti ng wi t h the upgr adi ng of a number of suburban
r ai l systems (for exampl e, i n Porto A l egre, Tuni s, and
A bi dj an).
The creati on of an excl usi ve r i ght- of - way f or a
surface r api d r ai l system i n many ci ti es i n devel op-
i ng countri es woul d requi re the acqui si ti on of l arge
amounts of l and, the demol i ti on of bui l di ngs, and
damage to the ci ty envi ronment. I t is thus i mpor tant
to establ i sh surface ri ghts-of -way at an earl y stage i n
a ci ty's devel opment.
The costs of under gr ound or el evated r ai l struc-
tures are l i kel y to be wel l beyond the means of most
ci ti es. A n el evated system is l i kel y to cost i n the
regi n of $30 mi l l i on to $45 mi l l i on per ki l ometer,
Box 18. Sao Paulo M et r o
The decisin to construct an underground rapi d rai l
system in Sao Paulo was made i n the late 1960s, at a
ti me when demand for transport was growi ng rapi dl y,
and i t was thought vi tal to relieve pressure on the road
network.
I n 1982 the metropol i tan arca of Sao Paulo had
more than 13 mi l l i on people maki ng nearly 20 mi l l i on
trips daily. Since Sao Paulo has 2 mi l l i on private cars,
38,000 taxis, and 12,000 buses, most of the mai n traffic
i corri dors are cise to total saturation for l ong periods
! of the day. By contrast, the metro provides a rapi d,
i convenient, and safe means of transport.
) The system's north-south line began service i n 1974;
I the east-west line was opened i n 1979. The system's
trains are capable of travel i ng 100 ki l ometers an hour
I and have a capacity of 2,000 passengers each. Very
I hi gh frequencies are mai ntai ned duri ng peak periods.
i Trains oprate at about two-mi nute intervals, and the
j system is able to carry up to 58,000 passengers an hour
I i n each di recti on. Average dai l y ridership exceeds 1.2
j mi l l i on, maki ng the 24.5-kilometer system one of the
, , , , i , , , , . ,
wi t h stati ons costi ng an addi ti onal $2 mi l l i on to Sc
mi l l i on each. A n under gr ound system constructed b
the "cut and cover" method is l i kel y to cost betweer
$65 mi l l i on and $100 mi l l i on per ki l ometer, pl us S*
mi l l i on to $20 mi l l i on f or each stati on. To these mus:
be added the costs of depots and r ol l i ng stock. Rapi c
r ai l vehi cl es cost about $1 mi l l i on each. Thus, i t :s
not surpri si ng to find that new r api d r ai l systems eos:
several bi l l i ons of dol l ars. For exampl e, the Sao Paul :
metro (Box 18), whi ch is 70 percent underground.
cost $2,338 mi l l i on (at 1983 pri ces); the Caracas
metro (Box 14), whi ch is mai nl y under gr ound, :s
esti mated to cost $1,440 mi l l i on f or twel ve ki l ome-
ters, or more than $117 mi l l i on per ki l ometer.
I nvestments and Transport Pl anni ng
M ot or vehi cl es provi de consi derabl e f l exi bi l i ty of
movement and greater f reedom i n the l ocati on of
i ndustr i al , commerci al , and resi denti al devel opmen:
As a resul t, greater wei ght is gi ven to factors such as
i ncome levis and empl oyment and resi denti al oppor-
tuni ti es i n the shapi ng of devel opment. These factors
and the f l exi bi l i ty pr ovi ded by motor vehi cl es need 1
be taken i nto account when mak i ng transport i nves:-
ment deci si ons. N owadays, f or exampl e, car owner-
most intensively used i n the worl d.
A t 1983 prices, the total cost of the system was
$2,338 mi l l i on, or $96 mi l l i on per kilometer. Consid-
erable use was made of commercial loans and supplier
credits from both local and forei gn sources; the Sao
Paulo ci ty and state governments, and the federal
government provi ded substantial capital subsidies.
The system's fares are set to recover at least 70
percent of operati ng costs (excluding depreciation,
amorti zati on, and financial expenses). I n 1982, how-
ever, operati ng revenues covered onl y 62 percent of
operati ng costs; the resulting loss of $26 mi l l i on,
excl udi ng depreciation and interest charges, was cov-
ered by a subsidy equivalent to $0.07 per passenger
tri p.
Current plans cali for the expansin of the system
from 25 kilometers and 26 stations to 95 kilometers
and 80 stations. A l though 16 kilometers of new line
and 11 new stations are under constructi on, further
expansin has been postponed because of di ffi cul ty i n
arrangi ng financing.
36
Box 19. Urban Transport Planning: A Two-Ti ered
I n an attempt to overeme some of the difficulties
experienced i n urban tran sport pl an n i n g, an approach
has been developed that involves di recti on al pl an n i n g
and design pl an n i n g.
Directional planning is an attempt to determine the
directions i n whi ch the land use and tran sport struc-
tures of a ci ty are intended to develop. Such a pl an
specifies the mai n structural elements i n general terms.
These structural elements include the mai n hi ghway
n etwork, fixed track systems, bus service, supply of
parki n g spaces, traffic management policies, and traff-
ic restraint policies. A l though di recti on al pl an n i n g
pertains to the l ong term, no parti cul ar ti me frame is
emphasized, and the method recognizes the need for
fl exi bi l i ty i n the event that growth proceeds differently
from that forecast.
Design planning pertains to the short and mdium
term and is constrained by the di recti on al pl an . The
usual purpose of a design plan is to provi de a complete
Approach
list of projeets i n sufficient detail for inclusin i n a five-
to ten- year rol l i n g program that establishes schedules
and resource needs.
Because of the hi ghl y dyn ami c si tuati on i n many
devel opi n g coun tri es, pl an n i n g shoul d be a con ti n -
uous process, wi th regul ar data col l ecti on , program
mon i tor i n g, and updati n g of pl ans an d i mpl emen ta-
ti on schemes. I n thi s two-ti ered approach, an ade-
quate pl an n i n g organ i zati on woul d n ormal l y re-
qui re a mn date coveri n g l an d use and al l modes of
tran sport i n the exi sti n g and possible future urban
rea. Pol i cy assumpti ons on whi ch to base the pl an s
woul d need to be cl earl y specified, an d the pl an n i n g
un i t woul d need pol i cy gui dance on i mportan t is-
sues as they arise. The machi n ery for thi s woul d
have to be defi n ed, and the organ i zati on responsible
for provi di n g pol i cy gui dance woul d have to be
fi rml y designated.
shi p is l i kel y to have more i n fl uen ce on the resi den ti al
choi ces of hi gh-i n come groups than the provi si n of
n or mal publ i c tr an spor t. Publ i c tran sport services
woul d have to be hi ghl y con ven i en t an d comf or tabl e
an d coupl ed wi t h car use restrai n ts to persuade
motori sts to gi ve up firmly establ i shed use of thei r
cars. I n the case of l ow- i n come groups, the provi si n
of cheap l an d ci se to empl oymen t oppor tun i ti es (or
vi ce versa) may be more i mpor tan t i n thei r choi ce of
resi den ce than the provi si n of tran sport faci l i ti es.
Neverthel ess, authori ti es someti mes justi f y costl y
tran sport i n vestmen ts on the assumpti on that certai n
devel opmen t objecti ves can be achi eved, an d they
may over l ook the i n fl uen ce of other factors. Further-
mor e, the i mpact of tran sport systems on l an d use is
of ten n ot pr oper l y apprai sed, w i t h the resul t that
l an d use probl ems are exacerbated. For exampl e, a
major hi ghway i n I n don esi a was con structed to con -
n ect suburban K ebayoran w i t h the capi tal of J akar-
ta. A l though n ot i n ten ded to i n fl uen ce devel opmen t
al on g i ts route, the hi ghway has been the pr i n ci pal
forc i n shapi n g a l arge part of the rea an d has
presen ted seri ous probl ems. I t has gi ven peopl e l i vi n g
i n suburban hi gh-ri se, hi gh-val ue bui l di n gs ready
access to the ci ty, but the i n ten si ty of l i n ear devel op-
men t has l ed to con gesti n an d overl oaded services
i n a very n ar r ow ban d al on g the r oadway.
A l though i deal i zed model s may show that pl an -
n i n g w i l l en abl e govern men ts to maxi mi ze the n et
ben efi ts of tran sport i n vestmen ts, tran sport pl an n i n g
i n real i ty has pr oved to be di f f i cul t an d un predi ctabl e
i n the devel opi n g coun tri es. Emul ati on of the devel -
oped coun tri es is rarel y the an swer. Con ven ti on al
pl an n i n g methods have l argel y f ai l ed or en joyed on l y
fleeting success i n the devel oped coun tri es an d have
been even more di sappoi n ti n g i n devel opi n g coun -
tri es, where r api d gr owth i n deman d, un certai n ti es
about f utur e i n come an d l an d use pattern s, an d a
dearth of data add to pl an n ers' di ffi cul ti es. I n most
devel opi n g coun tri es tran sport pl an n i n g shoul d em-
phasi ze shor t- ter m needs wi t hi n a br oad l on g- ter m
pl an n i n g f r amewor k. Thi s w i l l hel p avoi d premature
i n vestmen ts that may precl ude effi ci en t l on g- ter m
sol uti on s or set un f avorabl e pattern s f or l on g- ter m
devel opmen t.
A possi bl e pl an n i n g method f or ci ti es i n devel opi n g
coun tri es is bei n g studi ed by the Wor l d Ban k (see Box
19). A l though the method is un l i kel y to find un i f or m
acceptan ce or to be sui tabl e f or al l devel opi n g ci ti es,
i t takes accoun t of the man y un certai n ti es an d pr o-
vi des a l on g- ter m f r amewor k wi t hi n whi ch compati -
bl e shor t- ter m pl an s can be set. The method con si sts
of a two- ti er ed approach, wi t h di recti on al pl an n i n g
f or the l on g ter m an d desi gn pl an n i n g f or the short
ter m.
A uthor i ti es faced wi t h hi gh deman d f or tran sport
37
services can choose f rom a wi de vari ety of opti ons.
When these opti ons are bei ng consi dered, they
shoul d be caref ul l y screened and eval uated. A ny final
decisions to make substanti al i nvestments i n trans-
port systems shoul d be w i t hi n the context of sound
transport pl anni ng. A l though the costs of pl anni ng
may appear to be l arge, they are l i kel y to be negl i gi -
bl e compared w i t h the costs of i l l -concei ved invest-
ments whose adverse i mpacts may have to be en-
dured f or a very l ong ti me. Thi s is parti cul arl y so i n
the case of investments i n heavy i nf rastructure, such
as underground rai l ways and el evated highways
These projeets requi re a l arge and earl y commi tmer
of resources to a ri gi d sol uti on. I t may then becorr.
di f f i cul t to stop the project, even i f new devel opmen:
show i t to be a mi stake.
I n vi ew of the oi f f i cul ti es and pi tf al l s associate.
w i t h maki ng decisions on substanti al investment-
the Bank stands ready to provi de advi ce, techni ci
assistance, and trai ni ng f or the pl anni ng and apprais
al of urban transport projeets.
38
World Bank Involvement
in Urban Transport:
Experience and Directions
Wor l d Bank l endi ng f or ur ban tr anspor t is compar a-
ti vel y recent. A l though the Bank has been i n exi st-
ence since 1945, i t was not unti l 1972 that i t became
i nvol ved i n ur ban tr anspor t projeets. Rapi d ur ban
gr owt h i n al l regi ons of the devel opi ng wor l d was
pl aci ng enor mous demands on publ i c i nsti tuti ons,
whi ch l acked the techni cal experti se, i nsti tuti onal
capaci ty, and f i nanci al resources to cope w i t h these
demands. The Bank's i nvol vement i n tr anspor t ar se
i n response to requests f or assistance f r o m devel op-
i ng countr i es as par t of an ur ban l endi ng pr ogr am
i ni ti ated to address ur ban pr obl ems general l y.
Lendi ng Program, 1972-85
Fr om 1972 to 1985, seventeen ur ban tr anspor t pr oj -
eets wer e appr oved by the Executi ve Di r ector s of the
Bank; another thi r ty - two ur ban projeets had si gni f i -
cant tr anspor t components. The total costs of the
seventeen tr anspor t projeets amounted to $1,900 mi l -
l i on, of whi ch the Bank fi nanced $800 mi l l i on. I n
ad d i ti on, the tr anspor t components of ur ban projeets
cost $520 mi l l i on, of whi ch the Bank financed $240
mi l l i on. I n al l , ur ban tr anspor t l endi ng i n these
two f or ms has amounted to $1,040 mi l l i on. L oan
amounts have r anged f r om $159 mi l l i on f or the
second Br azi l ur ban tr anspor t pr oject i n Por to A l egr e
to $0.3 mi l l i on f or tr anspor t components of the
second ur ban devel opment pr oject i n K enya. Tabl e 1
shows the pr opor ti on of cost attr i buted to the var i ous
types 'of ur ban tr anspor t f unded by the Wor l d Bank
and the number of components i n each category.
Tabl e 1. U r ban Tr anspor t Components Fi nanced by
the W or l d Bank
Percentage Number
of of
Urban transport components cost components
Road construction, improvement, 48.6 34
maintenance
Bus acquisition, facilities, pri ori ty 16.6 21
bus laes
Rai l systems 15.8 3
Traffic management, incl uding road 11.6 30
safety
Training and technical assistance 5.4 39
(road and rail)
Pedestrian facilities 1.0 9
Miscellaneous (mainly vehicles and 1.0 4
equipment)
Total 100.0 140
M u ch of the r oad i nf r astr uctur e i nvestment was
desi gned to benefi t publ i c tr anspor t vehi cl es and
l ow-i ncome r eas. The smal l pr opor ti on of funds
devoted to tr affi c management refl ects the l ow cost
of these measures, whi ch nonethel ess have a hi gh
i mpact. M or e than hal f the tr anspor t components
(traffi c management, tr ai ni ng, and techni cal assis-
tance) wer e devoted to better use of exi sti ng faci l i ti es.
The tabl e al so i l l ustr ates the i mpor tance attached by
39
the Bank to assi sti ng devel opi ng countri es w i t h the
very l arge i nvestments i n road netw orks that are
necessary i n expandi ng ci ti es. Ur ban transport l end-
i ng by ci ty and by sectoral focus is presented i n
A ppendi x Tabl es A -7 and A -8.
A major objecti ve of Wor l d Bank l endi ng for urban
transport has been to achi eve the best use and exten-
si n of avai l abl e faci l i ti es and services thr ough the
use of l ow -cost opti ons. For thi s reason, by far the
greatest emphasi s has been pl aced on:
Rati onal i zati on of the use of urban transport fa-
ci l i ti es, parti cul arl y r oad space
Provi si n of better access thr ough cost-effecti ve
i mprovements and extensi ons of r oad netw orks
I mprovement of the standards and vi abi l i ty of
publ i c transport services.
A more general objecti ve, w hi ch appl i es to al l the
Bank's urban projeets, is to meet the speci al needs of
the urban poor. M ost urban transport projeets do so
because they are desi gned to favor publ i c transport
passengers, w ho are usual l y i n l ow er-i ncome groups.
Other objecti ves of urban transport i nvestment by
the Wor l d Bank are to i mpr ove pl anni ng, pr ogr am-
mi ng, and coor di nati on and to i ntgrate urban trans-
por t pl anni ng w i t h urban devel opment pl anni ng.
By adopti ng the noti on of l earni ng by doi ng and
by bei ng ready to adjust i ts approach w hen neces-
sary, the Bank gai ned a great deal of know l edge f r om
its earl y ur ban transport projeets. Subsequent pr oj -
eets have benefi ted f r om thi s experi ence.
Project I mplementation Experi ence
I t is cl ear f r om experi ence w i t h the ur ban transport
l endi ng programs that institutional arrangements can
determi ne the success or fai l ure of a project. Projeets
i n a number of ci ti es have proceeded sl ow l y, and thi s
is of ten attri buted to the l ack of coor di nati on among
the l arge number of i nsti tuti ons i nvol ved i n ur ban
transport, as w el l as shortages of trai ned staff and
funds. To overeme thi s pr obl em, the Bank has
pl aced great emphasi s on strengtheni ng the agen-
cies responsi bl e f or i mpl ementi ng projeets. Thi s ap-
proach has produced encouragi ng resul ts. I n Brazi l ,
f or exampl e, speci fi c efforts w ere made to strengthen
the federal , metr opol i tan, and muni ci pal agencies
responsi bl e f or urban transport i nvestment, opera-
ti on, and mai ntenance. A s a resul t, l endi ng opera-
ti ons have been very sati sfactory, and the federal
urban transport agency, Empresa Brasi l ei ra dos
Transportes Urbanos ( EB T U ) , has become capara
of establ i shi ng and executi ng w el l -concei ved u r r i ^
transport i nvestment programs.
A number of earl y projeets i ncor por ati ng str er j
policy measures met w i t h si gni fi cant probl ems. a
least dur i ng the i ni ti al years of i mpl ementati on. 7 ra
most stri ki ng exampl es of thi s w ere i n Bangkok ni
K ual a L umpur , w here the transport projeets i ncl ue
measures to restrai n the use of pri vate cars. J-d
menti oned earl i er, these measures w ere very unpopJ
l ar and w ere subsequentl y gi ven up or postponed. |
Other projeets have been desi gned to i mpr oa
traffi c condi ti ons by concentrati ng on traffi c mana;r-j
ment and road safety and i mprovement of pu r . d
transport faci l i ti es. A l though si gni fi cant i mp r o J
ments have been effected i n thi s w ay, the f ul l benerja
have not been real i zed i n many ci ti es because o: m
l ack of proper enforcement of traffic regulations. Fm
exampl e, the i ni ti al success of the bus-onl y laes m
Bangkok and Tuni s has w aned because other re J
users have i gnored the rul es restri cti ng use of : _ r
l aes to buses onl y. Since enforcement is cruci al
the success of traffi c management and road safes!
schemes, much attenti on has been pai d to i mprcv-l
i ng pl i ce operati ons, and notabl e success has betrji
achi eved i n Bombay and San J os.
Recent projeets have also pl aced greater emphassj
on training in urban transport general l y. I n San Jc-aj
and A bi dj an, for exampl e, the tr ai ni ng componer::
pr ovi ded f or setti ng up uni versi ty courses w i thi n rriq
ci vi l engi neeri ng departments of l ocal uni versi ti ed
These courses cover traffi c engi neeri ng and othrr
transport-rel ated subjeets. I n K ual a L umpur , midcuH
l evel engi neers w ere gi ven short courses i n trarre
engi neeri ng and bus pr i or i ty measures. I n Bomb n
and Cal cutta, consul tants pr ovi ded structured tr a::-
i ng programs ( w i th bi l ateral financing i n the case I
Cal cutta) for techni ci ans and mi ddl e management m
both ci vi l i an and pl i ce traffi c agencies. Short ov-~
seas vi si ts and courses w ere also pr ovi ded.
M any governments w ere i ni ti al l y rel uctant to
new techni ques i n traffic management because ther
saw the techni ques as more appl i cabl e to devel opsc
countri es than to thei r ow n ci rcumstances. ThJ
preferred the more vi si bl e but also more costl y so._-
ti ons provi ded by new i nfrastructure. Once i mp.e-
mented, how ever, traffi c management and road sa:;-
ty measures have proved to be very effecti ve and han
caused l ocal authori ti es to be less i ncl i ned tow ar J
costl y i nfrastructure projeets. A good exampl e of tbjs
w as the first Bombay urban transport project, w hi ck
40
i ncl uded i nfrastructure components, i ncl udi ng grade-
separated i ntersecti ons, as w el l as traffi c management
components. A s the authori ti es i n Bombay became
aware of the benefi t of l ow -cost traffi c management,
they repl aced some of the pl anned grade-separated
i ntersecti ons w i t h traffi c si gni s.
L endi ng f or public transport operations, w hi ch has
concentrated on i mpr ov i ng the effi ci ency and v i abi l -
i ty of bus servi ces, has general l y been successful . The
most notabl e successes have been i n Bombay and
Madr as and i n several ci ti es i n Brazi l . I n Bombay the
rati o of revenues to costs has i mpr ov ed si gni fi cantl y,
as have bus operati ons and servi ces. The resul ts i n
Madr as have been si mi l ar.
I n Brazi l , consi derabl e i mprovements i n bus oper-
ati ons have been achi eved i n five metr opol i tan reas
(Sal vador do Bahi a, Cur i ti ba, Reci fe, Bel o H or i zonte,
and Porto A l egre). Physi cal measures i ncl uded the
i ntr oducti on of excl usi ve bus l aes, the constructi on
of bus termi ni s, and the pavi ng of bus routes
i n l ow - i ncome reas. These i mprovements have
achi eved si gni fi cant cost savi ngs, w hi ch i n Cur i ti ba
and Reci fe have been passed on to passengers i n the
f or m of fare reducti ons. By contrast, progress i n
i mpr ov i ng publ i c transport i n Cal cutta has been very
di sappoi nti ng because of staff management pr ob-
l ems.
Si gni fi cant del ays and cost overruns have of ten
been experi enced i n projeets i nv ol v i ng road construc-
tion and road improvements. I n some ci ti es, such as
Cal cutta and Madr as, these probl ems arse because
l and had to be f ound for the rel ocati on of fami l i es
di spl aced by the projeets. Furthermore, some road
i mprovement schemes have been f ound to be too
ambi ti ous. The urban transport project i n Bangkok
cal l ed for the r api d constructi on of up to seven
fl yovers to i mpr ove congested i ntersecti ons and to
provi de addi ti onal capaci ty on roads outsi de a pr o-
posed traffi c restrai nt rea. Feasi bi l i ty studi es subse-
quentl y showed that i t w oul d be di f f i cul t to construct
and oprate these fl yovers, and most of them were
dr opped.
Neverthel ess, road constructi on and road i mprove-
ments are a major part of most ur ban transport
projeets and components and have made si gni fi cant
contri buti ons to the i mprovement of transport con-
di ti ons. Parti cul arl y notew or thy were the consi der-
abl e benefi ts deri ved f r om pavi ng bus routes i n l ow -
i ncome reas i n several ci ti es i n Brazi l and removi ng
severe bottl enecks on 10 ki l ometers of federal hi gh-
w ay i n K ual a L umpur . I n A bi dj an, i nvestment i n
Table 2. Average Economic Rate of Return for Urban
Transport Projeets, 1973-81
Rate of Number
Fiscal returrt3
of
year percent projeets
1973 37.0 1
1974 19.5 2
1975 0 0
1976 30.0 1
1977 28.0 1
1978 34.0 2
1979 28.0 1
1980 23.0 1
1981 50.0 1
a. Rate of return estimated at appraisal; in the case of completed
projeets, the savings have generally equaled and in some cases
exceeded predictions confirming high rates of return.
i nfrastructure has been reduced, and the road con-
structi on that has been undertaken has concentrated
w i t h consi derabl e success on maki ng bus services
more accessi bl e.
That urban transport pl ays a major rol e i n the
economi c effi ci ency of ci ti es is evi dent f r om the
very hi gh economi c rates of return that have been
achi eved, mai nl y f r om the consi derabl e savi ngs i n
ti me and the reducti on i n vehi cl e operati ng costs.
Esti mated rates of return have been hi gh f or al l types
of urban projeets but parti cul arl y f or urban transport
projeets, as is evi dent f r om Tabl e 2.
Policy Issues and Directions
Over the next tw o decades the urban popul ati ons i n
many devel opi ng countri es w i l l more than doubl e; i n
A f r i ca, these popul ati ons are expected to quadrupl e.
One effect of thi s gr ow th w i l l be to worsen the
al ready severe congesti n seen today i n vi r tual l y al l
ci ti es i n devel opi ng countri es. A l though the si tuati on
is seri ous, i t is not hopel ess. M u ch can be done to
al l evi ate, i f not to cure, the arteri al scl erosi s of the
ci ti es. Measures of defi ni te val u have been tested
and tri ed i n both the i ndustri al i zed and the devel op-
i ng countri es.
Because of i ts experi ence i n apprai si ng and financ-
i ng projeets, the Wor l d Bank is i n a posi ti on to hel p
countri es that w ant to prevent a w orseni ng of urban
transport condi ti ons. I ts assi stance is expected to
expand i n ci ti es where congesti n and other trans-
por t probl ems are gr ow i ng. A s i n the past, the Bank
w i l l assist countri es i n maki ng cruci al i nvestment
deci si ons, f or mul ati ng transport pol i cy, and devel op-
41
i n g i n sti tuti on s. The Ban k's experi en ce i s parti cul arl y
i mportan t i n maki n g an i n depen den t apprai sal of
proposed tran sport i n vestmen t prog rams. Proposed
i n vestmen ts are usual l y l arge i n rel ati on to the total
avai l abl e f un ds, an d mi stakes can be very costl y.
H i story shows that attempts to sol ve urban tran sport
probl ems by mean s of l arge con structi on prog rams
are of ten wastef ul an d f rustrati n g . But i n vi ew of the
substan ti al i n vestmen t n eeded to provi de even basi c
tran sport faci l i ti es i n expan di n g ci ti es, the si ze an d
sequen ci n g of the i n vestmen t prog ram must be eval -
uated i n the con text of the g overn men t's overal l
strategy. Thi s i n vol ves pl aci n g the urban tran sport
i n vestmen t fi rmly i n the hi erarchy of the ci ty's an d
the coun try's other i n vestmen t pri ori ti es. T hr oug h i ts
coun try econ omi c an d sector wor k, the Ban k can
assi st member coun tri es i n determi n i n g the most
effi ci en t mean s of provi di n g hi g h- pri ori ty urban
tran sport servi ces, g i ven the con strai n ts on resources.
Ban k assi stance i s most l i kel y to be i n the f or m of
a package of recommen ded measures an d associ ated
i n sti tuti on al compon en ts, wi t h emphasi s on i n expen -
si ve sol uti on s, such as traffi c man ag emen t an d the
i mprovemen t an d exten si n of roads an d exi sti n g
publ i c tran sport operati on s. Measures l i ke these ben -
efi t a l arge secti on of the commun i ty, i n parti cul ar
the urban poor; si nce they hel p to i ncrease capaci ty
an d reduce con g esti n at a rel ati vel y l ow cost, they
have a very hi g h payoff. I n con si deri n g proposal s f or
tran sport i mprovemen ts, the Ban k's focus w i l l be
pri mari l y on i n expen si ve ways of i n creasi n g the ca-
paci ty of the road n etwork, such as by bui l di n g or
i mprovi n g peri pheral roads as wel l as radi al routes
to remove bottl en ecks. Pri ori ty wi l l be g i ven to
provi di n g better road access f or commerci al an d
publ i c tran sport vehi cl es. I n addi ti on , the Ban k i s
l i kel y to emphasi ze certai n aspects of urban tran sport
pol i cy that are too of ten n egl ected, f or exampl e, road
safety measures.
I f devel opi n g coun tri es are to reap the ben efi ts of
such packages, pol i cy an d i n sti tuti on al changes w i l l
n ormal l y be necessary. I n l i g ht of i ts previ ous expe-
ri en ce, the Ban k recogn i zes that sweepi n g changes
of ten are n ot possi bl e. The most effi ci en t use of
resources i s l i kel y to occur when a coun try un der-
takes g radual but progressi ve ref orm of i ts pol i ci es.
Ban k assi stance to urban tran sport projeets must
take i n to accoun t the wi de cul tural , pol i ti cal , soci al ,
an d econ omi c di fferen ces amon g coun tri es, regi on s,
an d someti mes even n ei g hbori n g ci ti es. Despi te these
wi de di fferen ces an d the need f or f l exi bi l i ty, a n um-
ber of the same overri di n g needs appl y to urbar.
tran sport i n most ci ti es i n devel opi n g coun tri es.
Strengthening of I nstitutions
There i s a pressi n g need to stren gthen i n sti tuti on s i r.
the tran sport sector. The i n sti tuti on s respon si bl e f o:
urban tran sport gen eral l y l ack the executi ve, fi nan-
ci al , an d techn i cal ski l l s to cope wi t h exi sti n g si tua-
ti on s, l et al on e emerg i n g tran sport probl ems. Projec:s
must therefore be desi gn ed to i mprove system man -
agemen t an d to i n duce repl i cati on ; that i s, projeets
shoul d hel p i n sti tuti on s become abl e to un dertakt
si mi l ar projeets el sewhere wi t h di mi n i shi n g outsi de
assi stance. Parti cul ar emphasi s needs to be pl aced on
trai n i n g an d techn i cal assi stance to en abl e tran spon
agenci es to prepare an d i mpl emen t soun d pol i ci es
an d prog rams.
Demand Management
The val u of deman d man ag emen t measures, such as
road pri ci n g an d restrai n ts on parki n g , has l on g been
recog n i zed. Except for i mposi n g parki n g con trol s.
however, few ci ti es i n devel opi n g coun tri es have
made si g n i fi can t progress i n man ag i n g deman d.
Caref ul atten ti on needs to be g i ven to the pol ti ca!
as wel l as the physi cal aspects of methods proposec
f or man ag i n g deman d. Pol i cy measures that i n vol ve
restrai n i n g the use of pri vate cars are l i kel y to be
un popul ar wi t h car users, a weal thy an d i n fl uen ti a.
g roup. I n some ci ti es, pri vate motori sts of ten di sre-
g ard even the most basi c reg ul ati on s, such as parki n g
con trol s. Un der these ci rcumstan ces, the fi rst step is
to crate greater publ i c respect f or traffi c regul ati on s
by i n creasi n g the effecti veness of en forcemen t. Bu:
attempts to i n troduce radi cal pol i cy changes are
un l i kel y to achi eve an y resul ts an d may si mpl y sol i -
di f y publ i c opposi ti on . A g radual i st approach of
progressi vel y i n troduci n g restrai n ts on road use.
whi l e at the same ti me i mprovi n g publ i c tran sport, is
more l i kel y to l ead to greater acceptan ce. When ever
the opportun i ty ari ses, however, the Ban k i s preparec
to assi st i n the devel opmen t of such stron g measures
as rea l i cen si n g . Assi stan ce woul d al so be g i ven to
the i n sti tuti on al stren g then i n g necessary f or effecti ve
i mpl emen tati on of such measures.
A l thoug h effecti ve deman d man ag emen t i s a val u-
abl e tool i n combati n g con g esti n , i t can n ot provi de
the total sol uti on . Con si derabl e i n vestmen t i n i n -
creasi n g the capaci ty of tran sport systems wi l l be
42
necessary to cater to the growi ng demands, especi ally
si nce commerci al and publ i c transport malees a v i tal
contri buti on to ci ty devel opment.
Traffic Management, Road Improvements,
and Maintenance
Traffi c management schemes, extensi ons and i m-
provements of basi c road networks, and better road
mai ntenance w i l l conti nu to recei ve much emphasi s
i n f uture projeets financed by the Worl d Bank be-
causeof thei r substanti al benefi ts, l ow costs, and hi gh
rates of return.
I ni ti al l y, a number of the Bank's borrowers were
rel uctant to accept traffi c management measures and
basi c road i mprov ements as an al ternati ve to costl y
i nf rastructure sol uti ons. But now that the val u and
hi gh rates of return of such measures have been
cl earl y demonstrated, these l ow-cost sol uti ons have
been accepted and repl i cated i n subsequent pro-
grams. H owev er, successful traffi c management de-
pends heavi l y on road users' compl i ance w i t h traffi c
regul ati ons and control s. Compl i ance, i n turn, de-
pends on effecti ve enforcement. I n many ci ti es, re-
sponsi bi l i ty f or traffi c management is di v i ded among
several agenci es, and each agency's responsi bi l i ti es
are of ten i l l - def i ned. Traffi c management projeets are
thus expected to focus on bol steri ng i nsti tuti onal
f rameworks and on trai ni ng and techni cal assis-
tance f or pl anni ng, i mpl ementati on, and enforce-
ment agenci es.
Road Safety Measures
Governments rarel y have a clear understandi ng of
the extent and causes of traffi c acci dents or of thei r
costs to the communi ty. Because of thi s, the Bank
i ntends to encouragegovernments to expl ore the root
causes of acci dents and devi se countermeasures.
Public Transport
The great majori ty of motori zed tri ps i n most ci ti es
i n devel opi ng countri es are made i n publ i c transport
vehi cles. Becauseof rapi d growt h i n demand, consi d-
erabl e expansi n of publ i c transport systems i n most
ci ti es w i l l be an absol ute necessi ty. I mprov ed publ i c
transport and more effi ci ent management of demand
can hel p to combat the trend away f rom publ i c
transport vehi cles t oward greater use of pri vate cars.
Bus and mi ni bus services are l i kel y to conti nu to
be the mai n f orm of publ i c transport i n most ci ti es i n
devel opi ng countri es and the onl y f orm of motori zed
conveyance that the urban poor can af f ord. Worl d
Bank l endi ng f or urban devel opment is therefore
expected to gi ve consi derabl e emphasi s to maxi mi z-
i ng the use of publ i c transport, parti cul arl y buses and
mi ni buses.
Experi ence has shown that publ i c transport sys-
tems can be both effi ci ent and financially vi abl e.
Effi ci ency and v i abi l i ty are strongl y i nfl uenced by the
type of ownershi p and management, f reedom of
choi ce of vehi cles, the degree of competi ti on, and the
extent of gov ernment control .
Experi ence also shows that pri v atel y owned bus
compani es are much more l i kel y to be financially
vi abl e. M any countri es w i t h publ i cl y owned systems
mi ght gai n much f rom reduci ng or el i mi nati ng res-
tri cti ons on the operati on of pri vate buses and gi v i ng
i ncenti ves f or pri v ate ownershi p. But i n countri es
where the pol i ti cal and soci al env i ronment may not
be auspi ci ous f or pri v ati zati on, the Bank w i l l encour-
age operati onal i ndependence wi t hi n the f ramework
of publ i c ownershi p. L endi ng assistance w i l l be d i -
rected t oward i ncreasi ng operati onal effi ci ency, i m-
prov i ng management, and rati onal i zi ng subsi di es,
routes, fares, and staffi ng pol i ci es. The establ i shment
of i ncenti ves f or cost reducti ons and servi ce i mprov e-
ments w i l l al ways be a pri ori ty, as w i l l the need to
reduce unnecessary gov ernment i nterv enti on i n the
provi si n of servi ces. Si mi l ar goals w i l l be empha-
si zed when the Bank makes l oans to i mprov e trans-
port systems operated by the pri vate sector.
Capital-Intensive Projeets
Conf ronted w i t h the need to find sol uti ons to urban
transport probl ems, both of f i ci al sources of finance
and pri vate sector consul tants tend to suggest large
capi tal -i ntensi ve projeets. These are commerci al l y
attracti ve to the suppl i ers of equi pment and services
and tempti ng to devel opi ng countri es that may l ack
the experi ence to appreci ate the f ul l i mpl i cati ons of
such projeets. Whether or not Bank l endi ng is i n-
v ol v ed, the Bank is i n a posi ti on to prov i de a broad
perspecti ve on the valu of capi tal -i ntensi ve projeets
i n the context of the pri ori ti es of the country's overal l
publ i c i nvestment program.
I n many cases, the Bank's assessments have cl earl y
shown that i nstead of bui l di ng underground rai l ways
or el evated hi ghways, governments woul d have done
better to have i ncreased the capaci ty of exi sti ng bus
43
services through bus p ri ori ty measures, such as ex-
cl usive busways and better road access. I n some
cities, of course, capi tal -i ntensi ve i nvestments, such
as el evated hi ghways or rap i d rai l systems, may be
the best approach. But when l oans are sought for
projeets of thi s k i nd, borrowers wi l l be encouraged
by theBank to compare these projeets wi t h other and
less expensive opti ons and to careful l y appraise the
i mpl i cati ons of thei nvestments under consi derati on.
Concl usi n
There is an urgent need to give greater emphasis to
urban transport probl ems i n devel opi ng countri es i n
vi ew of:
Thehi gh p rop orti on of economi c gr owth attri but-
ed to urban devel opment
Theconsi derabl e contri buti on that efficient urban
transport makes to urban devel opment and p ro-
ducti vi ty through efficient movement of peopl e
and goods
Predi cted hi gh rates of urban gr owth that wi l l l ead
to rap i d and consi derabl e increases i n demand for
transport
The substanti al p rop orti ons of ci ty budgets al -
ready expended for urban transport.
I n vi ew of theurgent need, theBank is prepared to
expand its urban transport l endi ng p rogram, gi vi ng
parti cul ar attenti on to:
Thestrengtheni ng of urban transport i nsti tuti on
i ncl udi ng techni cal assistance and trai ni ng
L ow-cost sol uti ons, i ncl udi ng demand manag
ment, traffi c management, road i mprovement
safety, and mai ntenance
The provisin of access to publ i c transport ar
p ri ori ty measures such as bus-onl y l aes
Thei mprovement of publ i c transport, i n parti cu-
the rati onal i zati on and upgradi ng of existing si
vices
The i mp rovement of faci l i ti es for commerc
traffi c
Capi tal -i ntensi ve i nvestments, such as major in
provements i n exi sti ng road network s and tran
p ort systems that are l i k el y to produce hi gh rat
of return
A dvi ce and assistance to devel opi ng countries
mak i ng cruci al decisions about transport inves
ments.
The Worl d Bank recognizes theneed to accomnt
date theconsi derabl e differences that exist betwct
cities and to adapt its operati ons to changes i n tren
and emphasis. But whi l e adopti ng a flexible a:
proach, theWorl d Bank w i l l conti nu to support
mai n objective for urban transport: to i mprove a
efficiency and al l eviate poverty by p romoti ng e;
nomi c gr owth and p roducti vi ty through efficient m
cost-effective constructi on, operati on, and manag
ment of transport systems.
44
Appendix Tables
45
Table A - l . Urban Transport Data: Selected Cities
Population
Metro GNP
Cars Buses
Annual rea per Total Per Annual Per
growth rate 1980 capita' number 1,000 growth rate Total 1,000
1980 1970-80 (square 1980 1980 pop. 1970-80 number pop.
City (1,000) (percent) km) (US$) (1,000) 1980 (percent) 1980 1980
A bi djan 1,715 11.0 261 1,150 85 50 10.0 2,410 1.41
A ccra 1,447 6.7 1,390 420 27 19 709 0.49
Ammn 1,125 4.1 36 1,420 81 72 433 0.38
A nkara 1,900 4.4 237 1,470 65 34 14.2 781 0.41
Bangkok 5,154 9.1 1,569 670 367 71 7.9 6,300 1.22
Bogot 4,254 7.1

1,180 180 42 7.8 9,081 2.13
Bombay 8,500 3.7 438 240 180 21 6.1 3,066 0.36
Buenos Aires 10,100 1.7 210 2,390 537 53 10.0 12,089 1.20
Cai ro 7,464 3.1 233 580 239 32 17.0 8,177 1.10
Calcutta 9,500 3.0 1,414 240 95 10 5.6 3,160 0.33
Harare 670 5.2 630 107 160 3.0 504 0.75
Hong Kong 5,067 2.5 1,060 4,240 200 39 7.4 9,278 1.83
Jakarta 6,700 4.0 650 430 222 33 9.8 4,798 0.72
Karachi 5,200 5.2 1,346 300 184 35 8.4 12,064 2.32
Kuala Lumpur 977 3.5 244 1,620 37 38 1,148 1.18
Lagos 1,321 3.1 665 1,010 62 47

Li ma 4,415 4.2 930 333 75 7.2 8,853 2.01
Mani l a 5,925 5.1 636 690 266 45 8.0 31,403 5.30
Medelln 2,078 3.2 1,152 1,180 91 44

4,800 2.31
Mxi co Ci ty 15,056 5.0 1,479 2,090 1,577 105 18,500 1.23
N ai robi 1,275 8.8 690 420 60 47 1,100 0.86
Ri o de Janeiro 9,200 2.4 6,464 2,050 957 104 12.1 11,000 1.20
San J os, C.R. 637 3.5 180 1,730
500 0.78
Sao Paulo 12,800 4.5 1,493 2,050 1,935 151 7.8 16,400 1.28
Seoul 8,366 5.0 627 1,520 127 15 11.7 13,000 1.55
Singapore 2,413 1.5 618 4,430 164 68 6.8 6,512 2.70
Tunis 1,230 6.4 115 1,310 38 31

642 0.52
London 6,851 -0.9 1,579 7,920 1,932 282 2.6 11,479 1.68
N ew York 7,086 -1.0 759 11,360 1,545 218
10,481 1.48
Paris 8,800 0.6 454 11,730 3,240 368 12.3 7,100 0.81
Stockholm 1,528 3.0 6,489 13,520 391 256 3.0 1,850 1.21
Stuttgart 581 -0.8 207 13,590 199 343 2.5 332 0.57
Tokyo 8,352 -5.6 592 9,890 2,219 266 2.5 6,393 0.77
Welli ngton 135 -0.7 266 7,090 61 452

256 1.90
Not available.
a. National data.
b. Somecities have a substantial proportion of pedestrian trips not reflected in the motorized data.
Source: World Bank surveys, studies, and appraisals.
46
Market pnce (1983 US$)
Modal share of motorized tripsb (percent)
regular 5-km Para- Rail or
Economy car gas bus trip Auto Taxi Bus transit subway Other City
6,560 0.80 0.26 33 12 50 5 A bi djan
6,000 0.45 0.18 A ccra
10,850 0.54 0.48 44 11 19 26 0 0 Ammn
7,097 0.50 0.14 23 10 53 9 2 2 A nkara
10,870 0.48 0.09 25 10 55 10 Bangkok
6,075 0.23
14 1 80 0 0 5 Bogot
7,327 0.61 0.05 8 10 34 13 34 Bombay
4,500 0.40 0.11 45 27 28 Buenos Aires
10,002 0.20 0.07 15 15 70 Cai ro
7,922 0.69 0.04 2 67 14 10 4 Calcutta
0.15 Harare
5,833 0.56 0.13 8 13 60 19 Hong Kong
18,697 0.34 0.16 27 51 1 21 Jakarta
10,741 0.46 0.04 3 7 52 18 6 13 Karachi
8,616 0.49 0.15 37 33 17 0 13 Kuala Lumpur
0.45 Lagos
8,000 0.30 45 27 28 Li ma
9,187 0.49 0.07 16 2 16 59 8 Mani l a
6,975 0.23 0.07 6 4 85 5 0 Medel l i n
7,000 0.26 0.09 19 51 13 15 2 Mxi co Ci ty
0.15 45 31 15 0 9 N ai robi
4,506 0.77 0.21 24 2 62 2 11 Ri o de Janeiro
0.07 21 2 75 0 0 2 San J os, C.R.
5,469 0.65 0.26 32 3 54 10 1 Sao Paulo
5,574 0.85 0.16 9 15 68 0 7 0 Seoul
16,563 0.70 0.24 47 53 Singapore
8,106 0.47 0.27 24 4 61 10 Tunis
8,354 0.70 0.61 61 1 23 0 12 2 London
9,000 0.33 0.75 12 2 14 0 72 0 N ew York
4,592 0.54 0.30 56
8 0 21 15 Paris
8,569 0.53
48 53 Stockholm
7,833 0.55 0.82 44 6 33 6 11 Stuttgart
3,516 0.59 0.59 32 6 0 61 0 Tokyo
9,279 0.59 0.67 56 26 5 10 Welli ngton
47
Table A-2. Bus Services: Ci ty Compari sons, 1983
City
Owner-
ship
Number
of
buses'
Avail-
ability
(percent)
Km
perday
Per operating b
Staff
US
Passengers
perday
Annual
operating
costh
(US$ million)
Total
costper
passenger
kilometer^
(US$)
Annual
operating
revenue
(US$ million)
Fare
for 5 km
' (US$)
Operating
revenue/
total
costu
A bi djan M i xed 1,044 85 183 7.1 829 91.29 0.07 69.40 0.26 0.67
Accra Public 44 24 292 28.1 2,092 1.03 0.03 0.63 0.13 0.51
A ccra Private 66.5 73 223 5.5 676 10.43 0.04 17.72 0.18 1.37
A ddi s A baba Public 164 58 205 13.1 2,467 7.96 0.02 6.59 0.07 0.67
A nkara Publi c 899 67 210 5.8 1,273 25.62 0.01 15.31 0.14 0.48
Bombay Public 2,325 92 216 14.0 2,093 81.95 0.01 72.97 0.05 0.77
Cai ro Public 2,454 69 246 14.6 2,417 60.41 0.01 36.19 0.07 0.50
Calcutta Public 981 64 133 18.0 1,641 23.05 0.01 13.09 0.04 0.45
Dakar M i xed 439 70 287 9.6 1,193 22.97 0.04 20.41 0.26 0.76
Guatemala Ci ty Private 1,600 95 304 1,037 29.00 0.02 54.60 0.10 1.55
H ong Kong Private 2,392 85 243 4.7 1,610 117.96 0.03 136.10 0.13 1.00
Karachi Public 646 65 267 9.9 1,135 11.73 0.01 6.73 0.04 0.43
Kuala Lumpur Private 358 80 250 4.3 753 12.03 0.02 12.38 0.17 1.00
Mombasa M i xed 89 90 315 7.5 1,640 3.93 0.03 4.48 0.11 0.96
N ai robi M i xed 295 84 330 9.7 1,762 16.31 0.03 17.98 0.15 1.08
Porto Alegre Private 1,492 95 218 4.3 669 46.68 0.05 65.35 0.23 1.17
San J os, C.R. M i xed 621 80 128 2,013 19.39 0.02 24.24 0.07 1.04
Sao Paulo Public 2,631 83 284 7.4 795 159.51 0.03 75.64 0.26 0.41
Sao Paulo Private 6,590 83 280 5.1 765
0.26 1.00e
Seoul Private 8,310 95 340 3.9 1,326 398.18 0.03 443.43 0.16 1.04
Singapore Private 2,859 91 269 3.9 374 110.23 0.10 147.75 0.24 1.32
Athens Public 1,768 87 245 6.6 910 100.36 0.05 37.39 0.23 0.34
Berli n Public 1,505 85 199 5.8 992 234.99 0.16 130.08 0.78 0.51
Chicago Public 2,275 93 125 3.1 750 339.28 0.08 194.54 0.90 0.52
London Public 4,901 88 202 6.8 842 605.90 0.17 319.21 0.61 0.48
Paris Public 4,005 87 142 4.5 419 512.00 0.25 191.45 0.30 0.37
Sendai Public 777 92 128 2.5 495 57.76 0.11 59.44 0.58 0.96
Not available.
Note: The data cover the principal corporation or group of private operators in each city; they do not include paratransit.
a. The number of buses belonging to the principal corporation or group of private operators covered by the survey. The total number of buses operated in the city as a whole is given in
Tibie A - l .
b. Operating cost exeludes depreciation and interest charges.
c. Total cost includes operating cost, depreciation, and interest charges. For comparative purposes a uniform method of determining depreciation and interest charges was used to obtain
total cost. Passenger kilometers are imputed by using an average trip lcngth of 5 kilometers.
d. Operating revenue includes fare box and advertising revenue but exeludes subsidies.
e. Cost and revenue data for Sao Paulo private operators are not available, but private operators receive no subsidy from the government and are known to at least break even.
Source: World Bank survey of bus operators; studies and appraisals.
Table A-3. Bus Services: Key I ndicators of Performance
1 . Passengers carried per bus per day
Single-deck 1,000-1,200
Double-deck 1,500-1,800
2. Kilometers per bus per day 230-260
3. Staff employed per bus
A dmi ni strati ve 0. 3-0. 4
Maintenance 0.5-1.5
Total 3-8
4. L i ght or dead mileage as a percentage of total mileage 0. 6-1. 0
5. Accidents per 100,000bus kilometers 1.5-3
6. Breakdowns as a percentage of buses in operation 8-10
7. A vai l abi l i ty: buses in service as a percentage of total fleet 80-90
8. Fuel consumpti on: liters per bus per 100 kilometers 30-50
9. Pits, ramps, and lifts per 100 buses 8-10
10. Spares consumption per bus per year: percentage of vehicle cost 7-12
11. Operating rati o: revenue to operating cost (including depreciation) 1. 05:1-1. 08:1
Notes: The indicators of performance have been chosen
because they help assess the efficiency of bus services and are based
on data that should be readily available. The range of vales are
for reasonably well-managed bus companies in developing coun-
tries and take into account varying conditions that may prevail.
The following notes are numbered to correspond to the indica-
tors listed above:
1. The figures are based on single-deck buses with a total crush
capacity of 80 passengers and double-deck buses with a capacity of
120, and assume the exclusin of buses not in service.
2. The figures assume the exclusin of buses not in service.
3. Where labor costs arelow, the higher end of the range can be
expected, and vice versa.
4. Light or dead mileage (mileage that is not revenue earning)
wi l l depend on the location of night parking and maintenance in
relation to routes.
5. The accident rate wi l l indcate the standard of driving and
maintenance but will be greatly influenced by traffic conditions, in
particular the volume of pedestrians. A comparison should there-
fore be madewith the general traffic accident rate for the city.
6. This indicator is based on breakdowns that require assis-
tancefrom a mobile repair unit or repair at the depot.
7. To calclate eet availability the total number of buses run-
ning during the morning or evening peak period is divided by total
fleet size, excluding buses scrapped or cannibalized.
8. Fuel consumption will depend on size of vehicle, engine type,
and gradients and traffic encountered en route.
9. Sufficient pits, ramps, or lifts wi l l be required to cover all
scheduled maintenance, unscheduled repairs, and overhauls.
10. The figures given assume that similar conditions apply to
the procurement of buses and spares. Where special tariffs apply to
one or the other, these need to be taken into account.
11. The operating ratio is calculated by dividing total revenue
by operating costs (including depreciation).
49
Table A-3. Bus Services: Key I ndicators of Performance
1 . Passengers carried per bus per day
Single-deck 1,000-1,200
Double-deck 1,500-1,800
2. Kilometers per bus per day 230-260
3. Staff employed per bus
A dmi ni strati ve 0. 3-0. 4
Maintenance 0.5-1.5
Total 3-8
4. L i ght or dead mileage as a percentage of total mileage 0. 6-1. 0
5. Accidents per 100,000bus kilometers 1.5-3
6. Breakdowns as a percentage of buses i n operation 8-10
7. A vai l abi l i ty: buses i n service as a percentage of total fleet 80-90
8. Fuel consumpti on: liters per bus per 100 kilometers 30-50
9. Pits, ramps, and lifts per 100 buses 8-10
10. Spares consumption per bus per year: percentage of vehicle cost 7-12
11. Operating rati o: revenue to operating cost (including depreciation) 1. 05:1-1. 08:1
Notes: The indicators of performance have been chosen
because they help assess the efficiency of bus services and are based
on data that should be readily available. The range of vales are
for reasonably well-managed bus companies in developing coun-
tries and take into account varying conditions that may prevail.
The following notes are numbered to correspond to the indica-
tors Usted above:
1. The figures are based on single-deck buses with a total crush
capacity of 80 passengers and double-deck buses with a capacity of
120, and assume the exclusin of buses not in service.
2. The figures assume the exclusin of buses not in service.
3. Where labor costs arelow, the higher end of the range can be
expected, and vice versa.
4. Light or dead mileage (mileage that is not revenue earning)
wi l l depend on the location of night parking and maintenance in
relation to routes.
5. The accident rate wi l l indcate the standard of driving and
maintenance but will be greatly influenced by traffic conditions, in
particular the volume of pedestrians. A comparison should there-
fore be madewith the general traffic accident rate for the city.
6. This indicator is based on breakdowns that require assis-
tancefrom a mobile repair unit or repair at the depot.
7. To calclate fleet availability the total number of buses run-
ning during the morning or evening peak period is divided by total
fleet size, excluding buses scrapped or cannibalized.
8. Fuel consumption wi l l depend on size of vehicle, engine type,
and gradients and traffic encountered en route.
9. Sufficient pits, ramps, or lifts will be required to cover all
scheduled maintenance, unscheduled repairs, and overhauls.
10. The figures given assume that similar conditions apply to
the procurement of buses and spares. Where special tariffs apply to
one or the other, these need to be taken into account.
11. The operating ratio is calculated by dividing total revenue
by operating costs (including depreciation).
49
Tabl e A-4. Rai l Servi ces: Ci ty Compari sons, 1983
City
Type of
system
Length
of line
(km)
Percent
below
ground
Total
number of
stations Seated
Capacity per tran
Seated
plus
standing Crush" q
Caracas Metro 12.3 90 14 408 1,265 1,668
Santiago Metro 25.6 81 35 193 844 1,000 - -
Sao Paulo Metro 25.0 70 26 198 666
Tunis Suburban rail 26.0 0 20 500 1,300
Adelaide Suburban rai l 152.1 0 93 556 665 840 -
Baltimore Metro 12.8 56 9 456 540 996 J
Berln Metro 100.8 100 114 228 1,182 1,182
Calgary L ight rail 12.5 10 8 128 324 440 -
Chicago Metro 395.8 9 143 200 1,340
H ong Kong Metro 26.1 77 25 288 2,250 2,250 - 1
L ondon Metro 388.0 42 247 290 750 814
i
Montreal Metro 50.3 100 57 360 1,440 1,440

Nagoya Suburban rail 544.5 0 369 184 520 920 i d
Nagoya City Metro 57.5 96 59 211 603 1,508
N ew York Metro 370.0 0 465 600 1,760 2,200
Osaka Metro 90.9 100 88 370 1,100 2,750 . -3
San Diego L ight rail 25.6 0 18 128 376 800
_ -
San Francisco Metro 113.6 28 34 540 810 1,080 -
Not available.
a. Crush capacity represents the mximum passenj
discomfort.
;ers that can be safely carried in very crow ded conditions but without causing
b. The mximum flow in one direction on the busiest line at the peak rush hour.
c. Operating cost exeludes depreciation and interest charges.
(
50
Totalcost
Total
annual
passengers
(million)
Passenger
fowb
Annual
operating
costc
(US$ million)
Total
annual
cost
(US$ million)
Annual
operating
revenue1
(US$ million)
Tare for
5 km
(us$)
Operating
revenue/
total
costd
per
passenger
kilometer01
(US$) City
80.6 28,700 33 34 120.28 42.16 0.47 0.35 0.332 Caracas
109.0 14,295 15 32 76.89 20.31 0.18 0.26 0.136 Santiago
347.0 58,000 67 15 210.54 40.68 0.07 0.19 0.081 Sao Paulo
24.0 8,000 7 55 11.41 4.05 0.20 0.36 0.044 Tunis
12.9 3,600 31 70 51.88 4.29 0.54 0.08 0.538 Adelaide
7.8 99 20 147.33 48.10 0.75 0.33 2.518 Baltimore
346.2 40,000 126 44 498.15 104.05 0.78 0.21 0.228 Berln
11.9 4,650 5 44 15.43 0.81 0.146 Calgary
149.7 12,395 101 50 388.79 61.30 0.90 0.16 0.221 Chicago
412.0 60,000 60 96 152.06 132.27 0.06 0.87 0.049 H ong Kong
563.0 23,000 440 08 1,094.58 440.99 0.51 0.40 0.259 L ondon
199.9 20,000 92 53 180.38 31.68 0.69 0.18 0.141 Montreal
379.8 37,000 189 34 224.78 261.43 1.16 0.032 Nagoya
330.0 43,697 127 09 326.43 158.73 0.72 0.49 0.432 Nagoya City
952.6 68,000 1,100 00 4,750.99 955.34 0.90 0.20 0.480 New York
856.6 62,696 414 37 780.32 416.49 0.72 0.53 0.182 Osaka
4.7 1,267 5 30 14.86 4.34 0.50 0.29 0.524 San Diego
55.5 15,086 128 20 401.66 69.80 0.60 0.17 0.341 San Francisco
d. Total cost includes operating costs, depreciation, and interest charges. For comparative purposes a uniform method of determining
depreciation and interest charges was used to obtain total cost.
e. Operating revenue includes fare box and advertising revenue but exeludes subsidies.
f. Passenger kilometers where not specified in the survey response are imputed by using an average trip length of 7.5kilometers.
Source: World Bank survey of rail operators, supplemented by World Bank analyses and studies.
51
Table A-5. Rai l Services: Capi tal Cost of Typi cal Rai l Systems
City
Type of rail
and
right of way Section
Length (km)
Under-
Total ground
Stations
(number)
Total
Under-
ground
Total c.
eos
(19
USS nv..
Total :
Existing systems: Recently constructed sections
L I G H T RAI L TR AN SI T (L RT)
San Diego Surface trol l ey Total 25.6 0 18 0 12"
Hanover Surface Total 69.0 12.0 110 14 750
Mani l a Elevated Total 15.0 0 18 0 200
Calgary Elevated Mai n line + extensin 22.3 1.5 24 1 348
Rotterdam L RT/ metro North-South extensin 4.3 0 3 0 86
Tunis Surface Line 1 8.1 0.2 11 1 233
Hanover Tunnel Section of B 2.8 2.8 108
SU BU RBAN RAI L
Nagoya Surface Various lines 414.0 1.7 291 13,668
M E T R O
Santiago Underground Total (2 lines) 25.6 20.8 35 28 1,015
Baltimore Surface/ underground Northwest line + extensin 18.1 6.7 12 6 996
Berlin Underground Extensin (tunnel) 4.6 4.6 5 5 275
Osaka Underground Extensin 14.1 13.8 13 12 898
Hong Kong Underground/ elevated Mai nl and 26.1 20 26 18 1,519
Sao Paulo Underground Total (2 lines) 24.3 17 26 16 2,338
Nagoya Underground Line 3 16.3 16.3 17 17 1,808
Hong Kong Underground/ elevated Island line 12.5 12.5 12 7 1,400
Nagoya Underground Line 6 14.9 14.9 17 17 1,685
Caracas Underground Line 1, phase 1 12.3 11.0 14 12 1,440
Planned systems
L I G H T RAI L
San J os,
U.S.A L R T 32.0 0 316
Toronto L R T 7.1 0 109
M E T R O
Medelln Surface/ elevated Two lines 22.5 0 500
Bangkok Elevated 30.0 0 730
Lagos Elevated 25.7 0 950
Calcutta Underground 16.4 15.0 1,100
Singapore Underground / surface Section 1 17.1 14.6 1,200
Baghdad Underground Section 1 5.5 5.5 450
Caracas Underground Total 1,989 40.0 30.9 3,600
a. Costs of planned systems are estimated.
Source: World Bank survey of operators; studies and appraisals.
52
Table A- 6. Transit System Characteristics
Buses and trolley buses"
Trams LRT
Rapid rail
Private Para- Mixed Bus-only Segregated (mixed (surface Under-
Cbaracteristic cars transit traffic laes busways traffic) exclusive) Surface Elevated ground
Vehicle capacity 4to5 4 80 80
120
100 200 300 300 300
(occupancy to to to
120
to to to to to
1 to2) 20 120 120 200 300 375 375 375
Vehicles per 1 3 4 4 4
trai n n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. to to to to to
2 6 10 10 10
Lane/ track capacity 500 1,000 10,000 15,000 6,000 20,000
(passengers to to to to 30,000 to to 50,000 70,000 70,000
per hour)b 800 4,000 15,000 20,000 12,000 36,000
Journey speed 15 12 10 15 15 10 15 30 30 30
w i th stops to to to to to to to to to to
(km per hour)c 25 20 12 18 30 12 25 35 35 35
Capital cost 5 2 50 50 50 300
(US$1,000 to to to to to to 800 1,000 1,000 1,000
per vehicle) 10 25 100 100 130 600
Cost of complete 2 3 6 20 45 85
system minus n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. to to to to to to
vehicles (US$ 7 5 10 25 55 105
mi l l i on per km)
Total cost including 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.15
interest (US$ per
to to to to to to to to to to
passenger km)
0.24 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.25
Cost recovery: 0.60 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.25 0.15 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.75
fare for 5 km to to to to to to to to to to
(US$)
1.20 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.40 0.50 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.25
n.a. Not applicable.
Note: Cost and performance figures assume high levis of utilization and patronage and efficient operation.
a. For trolley buses add approximately 20 percent to the bus costs.
b. Lane/ track capacity is the mximum number of passengers that can be carried on a single lae or track past a point during one hour.
c. Journey speed is the average overall speed, with oading and unloading time at stops and stations taken into account; journey speed in
mixed traffic may be substantially less in congested conditions.
Source: World Bank studies.
53
Table A-7. Worl d Bank Urban Transport Lendi ng, 1972-85:
Breakdown of Investment Costs
(investment cost in VS$ million)
Country and project ame
Appraisal
date
Road
construction
Street Road
improvement maintenanc
Cost Percent Cost Percent Cost Perce
Mal aysi a: Kual a L umpur Urban Transport 1972
Turkey: I stanbul Urban Program 1972
I rn: Tehern Urban Transport 1973
Tunisia: Tunis Urban Transport 1973
I ndi a: Calcutta Urban Dev. 1973
Korea: Secondary Cities 1974
Mal aysi a: Second Kuala L umpur Urban Transport 1976
Philippines: Mani l a Urban Dev. 1976
I ndi a: Bombay Urban Transport 1976
I vory Coast: Urban Dev. 1976
I ndi a: Madras Urban Dev. 1977
Costa Rica: San J os Urban Transport 1977
I ndi a: Second Calcutta Urban Dev. 1977
Kenya: Second Urban 1978
Brazi l : Urban Transport 1978
Thai l and: Bangkok Urban Transport 1978
Tunisia: Second Urban Dev. 1979
Korea: Second Gwangju 1979
Philippines: Urban Dev. 1980
Brazi l : Second Urban Transport (Porto Alegre) 1980
I ndi a: Calcutta Urban Transport 1980
Mauri ti us: Urban Rehab. and Dev. 1980
I ndi a: Second Madras Urban Dev. 1980
Brazi l : Thi r d Urban Transport 1981
I vory Coast: Second Urban 1981
I ndi a: Kanpur Urban Dev. 1981
Philippines: Urban Engineering 1981
Brazi l : Recife Metro Regin Dev. 1982
Egypt: Greater Cai ro Urban Dev. 1982
Mxi co: Mxi co Ci ty Deconcentrati on 1982
Ethi opi a: Urban Dev. 1982
Tunisia: Thi r d Urban 1982
Cameroon: Urban Dev. 1983
Philippines: Regional Dev. 1983
Brazi l : Paran Market Towns 1983
I ndi a: Thi rd Calcutta Urban Dev. 1983
Domi ni can Republic: Technical Assistance 1983
J ordn: Ammn Urban Transport 1983
I ndi a: Madhya Pradesh Urban Dev. 1983
Korea: Jeonju Regional Dev. 1984
J amaica: Ki ngston Urban Transport 1984
Zi mbabwe: Urban Dev. 1984
Tunisia: Urban Transport I I 1984
Per: Li ma Urban Transport 1984
Madagascar: Urban Dev. 1984
Senegal: Technical Assistance 1984
Thai l and: Regional Cities 1985
Paraguay: Asuncin Muni ci pal Dev. 1985
Korea: Seoul Urban Transport 1985
Total
28.7
1.3
2.8
19.3
14.8
47.6
2.7
7.3
22.7
34.1
3.5
19.2
9.4
4.5
5.7
17.1
18.0
9.2
6.7
22.
0.2
5.5
88.7
391.8
90.8
4.8
100.0
31.2
54.4
91.9
15.0
23.2
59.1
13.7
10.3
100.0
100.0
21.0
2.2
19.9
66.2
20.6
25.1
29.0
10.0
59.6
40.4
16.9
5.0
24.1
23.9
0.5
2.0
15.7
3.5
67.5
4.9
1.8
182.3
31.9
18.9
55.5
26.3
30.7
12.8
0.9
2.2
102.1
612.5
7.6
89.3
38.6
1.0
11.1
49.9
9.1
27.1
14.5
8.4
70.9
35
62.6
94.3
58.7
54.5
47.9
45.0
23.8
46.5
26.4
1
1
11
64
11
0
1
124
54
Traffic Bus rehab. Bus
management and acquisition facilities
Cost Percent Cost Percent Cost Percent Country and project ame
Mal aysi a: Kual a L umpur Urban Transport
Turkey: I stanbul Urban Program
12.6 19.1 34.7 52.7 3.4 5.2 I rn: Tehern Urban Transport
1.6 5.6 11.2 39.2 3.6 12.6 Tunisia: Tunis Urban Transport
0.6 2.2 1.0 3.7 I ndi a: Calcutta Urban Dev.
Korea: Secondary Cities
7.4C 12.0 Mal aysi a: Second Kuala L umpur Urban Transport
4.6 16.9 Philippines: Mani l a Urban Dev.
8.9 17.6 25.3 50.1 11.7d 23.2 I ndi a: Bombay Urban Transport
2.2 4.2 I vory Coast: Urban Dev.
2.5 13.9 5.6 31.1 2.2 12.2 I ndi a: Madras Urban Dev.
4.5 14.3 0.5 1.6 Costa Rica: San J os Urban Transport
8.5 22.1 0.4 1.0 I ndi a: Second Calcutta Urban Dev.
Kenya: Second Urban
27.9 11.2 3.6 1.4 40.9 16.4 Brazi l : Urban Transport
20.5 60.5 Thai l and: Bangkok Urban Transport
0.9 90.0 Tunisia: Second Urban Dev.
Korea: Second Gwangju
Philippines: Urban Dev.
Brazi l : Second Urban Transport (Porto Alegre)
7.6 6.3 38.8 32.1 15.6 12.9 I ndi a: Calcutta Urban Transport
1.9 79.2 Mauri ti us: Urban Rehab. and Dev.
14.3 66.8 0.7 3.3 I ndi a: Second Madras Urban Dev.
33.3 13.0 4.0 1.6 Brazi l : Thi rd Urban Transport
10.0 11.6 12.0 13.9 I vory Coast: Second Urban
1.4 51.3 I ndi a: Kanpur Urban Dev.
Philippines: Urban Engineering
Brazi l : Recife Metro Regin Dev.
18.2 20.2 26.1 28.9 Egypt: Greater Cai ro Urban Dev.
Mxi co: Mxi co Ci ty Deconcentration
Ethi opi a: Urban Dev.
Tunisia: Thi rd Urban
Cameroon: Urban Dev.
1.1 3.6 1.7 5.6 Philippines: Regional Dev.
Brazi l : Paran Market Towns
2.5 5.6 2.5 5.6 I ndi a: Thi rd Calcutta Urban Dev.
0.7 83.7 Domi ni can Republic: Technical Assistance
13.5 24.0 J ordn: Ammn Urban Transport
I ndi a: Madhya Pradesh Urban Dev.
Korea: Jeonju Regional Dev.
13.2 44.3 J amaica: Ki ngston Urban Transport
Zi mbabwe: Urban Dev.
1.6 1.9 8.3 10.1 1.1 1.3 Tunisia: Urban Transport I I
31.4 39.9 Per: Li ma Urban Transport
0.4 57.1 Madagascar: Urban Dev.
0.7 46.7 Senegal: Technical Assistance
0.6 30.0 Thai l and: Regional Cities
Paraguay: Asuncin Muni ci pal Dev.
27.3 12.4 Korea: Seoul Urban Transport
268.1 11.6 141.8 6.1 127.4 5.5 Total
(Table contines on thefollowing page.)
55
Table A-7 (continued)
Bus and HOV'
priorities
Rail
systems
Pedestrian
facilities
Country and project ame Cost Percent Cost Percent Cost Per.
Mal aysi a: Kual a L umpur Urban Transport
Turkey: I stanbul Urban Program
I rn: Tehern Urban Transport
Tunisia: Tunis Urban Transport
I ndi a: Calcutta Urban Dev.
Korea: Secondary Cities
Mal aysi a: Second Kual a L umpur Urban Transport
Philippines: Mani l a Urban Dev.
I ndi a: Bombay Urban Transport
I vory Coast: Urban Dev.
I ndi a: Madras Urban Dev.
Costa Rica: San J os Urban Transport
I ndi a: Second Calcutta Urban Dev.
Kenya: Second Urban
Brazi l : Urban Transport
Thai l and: Bangkok Urban Transport
Tunisia: Second Urban Dev.
Korea: Second Gwangju
Philippines: Urban Dev.
Brazi l : Second Urban Transport (Porto Alegre)
I ndi a: Calcutta Urban Transport
Mauri ti us: Urban Rehab. and Dev.
I ndi a: Second Madras Urban Dev.
Brazi l : Thi rd Urban Transport
I vory Coast: Second Urban
I ndi a: Kanpur Urban Dev.
Philippines: Urban Engineering
Brazi l : Recife Metro Regin Dev.
Egypt: Greater Cai ro Urban Dev.
Mxi co: Mxi co Ci ty Deconcentrati on
Ethi opi a: Urban Dev.
Tunisia: Thi r d Urban
Cameroon: Urban Dev.
Philippines: Regional Dev.
Brazi l : Paran Market Towns
I ndi a: Thi r d Calcutta Urban Dev.
Domi ni can Republic: Technical Assistance
J ordn: Ammn Urban Transport
I ndi a: Madhya Pradesh Urban Dev.
Korea: J eonju Regional Dev.
J amaica: Ki ngston Urban Transport
Zi mbabwe: Urban Dev.
Tunisia: Urban Transport I I
Per: Li ma Urban Transport
Madagascar: Urban Dev.
Senegal: Technical Assistance
Thai l and: Regional Cities
Paraguay: Asuncin Muni ci pal Dev.
Korea: Seoul Urban Transport
Total
66
1
7
25
115.7
7.1
0.4
1.9
26.6
4.4
308
47
3.0
30.0
33
5.0 365.8
32
98.8
39.4
15.8 23.8
0 8 1.3
0 5 i . :
10 0 17.8
1.0
. . . Not included in the project.
a. HOV refers to high-occupancy vehicles.
b. Includes vehicles and equipment.
c. Includes SO.3 million for rea road pricing.
d. Includes $2 million working capital.
e. Includes training.
f. Miscellaneous vehicles and equipment.
g. Truck terminis.
h. Bridge construction.
i . Equipment.
56
Technical
assistance Training Otherb
Cost
2.9
0.6
10.2
2.9
6.9
5.9
1.0e
1.0
1.3
0.3
4.3
3.2
0.1
3.9
10.6
0.5
0.1
21.9
11.3
0.1
2.0
0.4
1.8
0.8
2.6
0.7
0.1
1.1
4.3
0.7
2.4
4.7
0.3
0.8
0.1
1.3
113.1
Percent
9.2
100.0
15.5
10.1
11.1
21.7
2.0
1.9
4.0
100.0
1.7
9.4
10.0
1.2
8.8
20.8
0.5
8.5
13.1
4.8
100.0
19.0
100.0
100.0
8.6
1.6
16.3
2.0
14.4
46.7
2.9
6.0
42.9
53.3
1.1
0.6
4.9
Cost Percent Cost Percent Country and project ame
0
13
7
03
1
7 100
2 2
35
3
53
5
1
0.3
0.6 23
O
27
9.0
.0
1.0
Mal aysi a: Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport
Turkey: I stanbul Urban Program
I rn: Tehern Urban Transport
Tunisia: Tunis Urban Transport
I ndi a: Calcutta Urban Dev.
Korea: Secondary Cities
Mal aysi a: Second Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport
Philippines: Mani l a Urban Dev.
I ndi a: Bombay Urban Transport
I vory Coast: Urban Dev.
I ndi a: Madras Urban Dev.
Costa Rica: San J os Urban Transport
I ndi a: Second Calcutta Urban Dev.
Kenya: Second Urban
Brazi l : Urban Transport
Thai l and: Bangkok Urban Transport
Tunisia: Second Urban Dev.
Korea: Second Gwangju
Philippines: Urban Dev.
Brazi l : Second Urban Transport (Porto Alegre)
I ndi a: Calcutta Urban Transport
Mauri ti us: Urban Rehab. and Dev.
I ndi a: Second Madras Urban Dev.
Brazi l : Thi r d Urban Transport
I vory Coast: Second Urban
I ndi a: Kanpur Urban Dev.
Philippines: Urban Engineering
Brazi l : Recife Metro Regin Dev.
Egypt: Greater Cai ro Urban Dev.
Mxi co: Mxi co Ci ty Deconcentration
Ethi opi a: Urban Dev.
Tunisia: Thi rd Urban
Cameroon: Urban Dev.
Philippines: Regional Dev.
Brazi l : Paran Market Towns
I ndi a: Thi rd Calcutta Urban Dev.
Domi ni can Republic: Technical Assistance
J ordn: Ammn Urban Transport
I ndi a: Madhya Pradesh Urban Dev.
Korea: Jeonju Regional Dev.
J amaica: Ki ngston Urban Transport
Zi mbabwe: Urban Dev.
Tunisia: Urban Transport I I
Per: Li ma Urban Transport
Madagascar: Urban Dev.
Senegal: Technical Assistance
Thai l and: Regional Cities
Paraguay: Asuncin Muni ci pal Dev.
Korea: Seoul Urban Transport
Total
57
Table A-8. World Bank I nvolvement in the Urban Transport Sector, 1972-85
(cost and amount in USS million)
Country and project ame
Appraisal
date
Total
project
cost
Urban transport
sector
Cost Percent
Total
loan
amount
Urban transport sector U-
Amount Percent IBRT>
Urban transport projeets
Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur 1972 31.6 31.6 100.0 16.0 16.0 100.0 16.0
Irn: Tehern 1973 65.9 65.9 100.0 42.0 42.0 100.0 42.1.
Tunisia: Tunis 1973 28.6 28.6 100.0 18.0 18.0 100.0 11.0
Malaysia: Second Kuala Lumpur 1976 72.0 61.9 86.0 26.0 20.4 78.5 20.4
I ndia: Bombay 1976 50.5 50.5 100.0 25.0 25.0 100.0 25.0
Costa Rica: San Jos 1977 31.5 31.5 100.0 16.5 16.5 100.0 16.5
Brazil 1978 248.9 248.9 100.0 88.0 88.0 100.0 88.0
Thailand: Bangkok 1978 34.0 34.0 100.0 16.0 16.0 100.0 16.0
Brazil: Second (Porto Alegre) 1980 312.8 312.8 100.0 159.0 159.0 100.0 159.0
I ndia: Calcutta 1980 121.7 120.8 99.3 56.0 56.0 100.0 0
Brazil: Thi rd 1981 257.0 257.0 100.0 90.0 90.0 100.0 90.0
Egypt: Greater Cairo 1982 116.2 90.3 77.7 60.0 56.6 94.3 56.6
Jordn: Ammn 1983 65.6 56.3 85.8 30.0 26.0 86.7 26.0
Jamaica: Kingston 1984 29.8 29.8 100.0 16.0 16.0 100.0 16.0
Tunisia: I I 1984 82.5 82.5 100.0 33.0 33.0 100.0 33.0
Per: Lima 1984 135.9 78.6 57.8 82.5 43.3 52.5 43.5
Korea: Seoul 1985 219.4 219.4 100.0 69.0 69.0 100.0 69.0
Subtotal 1,903.9 1,800.4 94.6 843.0 790.8 93.8 727. |
Urban projeets
Turkey: Istanbul Urban Program 1972 3.3 0.6 18.2 2.3 0.5 21.7 0
I ndia: Calcutta Urb Dev. 1973 96.9 27.0 27.9 35.0 7.5 21.4 0
Korea: Secondary Cities 1974 25.0 2.8 11.2 15.0 1.4 9.3 1.4
Philippines: Manila Urban Dev. 1976 65.0 27.2 41.8 32.0 14.8 46.3 14.8
Ivory Coast: Urban Dev. 1976 122.3 51.8 42.4 44.0 20.9 47.5 20.9
I ndia: Madras Urban Dev. 1977 52.0 18.0 34.6 24.0 8.7 36.3 0
I ndia: Second Calcutta Urban 1977 180.2 38.4 21.3 87.0 20.0 23.0 0
Kenya: Second Urban 1978 69.4 0.3 0.4 50.0 0.3 0.6 0.2
Tunisia: Second Urban Dev. 1979 45.1 1.0 2.2 19.0 0.5 2.6 0.5
Korea: Second Gwangju 1979 154.8 19.2 12.4 65.0 10.0 15.4 10
Philippines: Thi rd Urban Dev. 1980 120.0 9.4 7.8 72.0 5.6 7.8 5.6
Mauritius: Urban Rehab. and Dev. 1980 24.5 2.4 9.8 15.0 1.8 12.0 1.8
I ndia: Second Madras Urban 1980 87.9 21.4 24.3 42.0 13.0 31.0 0
Ivory Coast: Second Urban Dev. 1981 104.0 86.1 82.8 51.0 41.5 81.4 41.5
I ndia: Kanpur Urban Dev. 1981 51.7 2.7 5.2 25.0 1.9 7.6 0
Philippines: Urban Engineering 1981 11.5 0.7 6.1 8.0 0.7 8.8 0."
Brazil: Recife Metro Regin Dev. 1982 347.8 27.2 7.8 123.9 9.5 7.7 9.5
Mxico: Mxico City
Deconcentration 1982 15.0 2.0 13.3 9.2 1.3 14.1 1.3
Ethiopia: Urban Dev. 1982 27.7 2.1 7.6 20.0 1.4 7.0 0
Tunisia: Thi rd Urban 1983 60.1 1.8 3.0 25.0 1.4 5.6 1.4
Cameroon: Urban Dev. 1983 54.7 0.8 1.5 20.0 0.4 2.0 0.-
Philippines: Regional Dev. 1983 114.6 30.2 26.4 67.0 12.6 18.8 12.6
Brazil: Paran Market Towns 1983 150.2 58.9 39.2 .52.7 20.6 39.1 20.6
I ndia: Thi rd Calcutta Urban Dev. 1983 303.1 44.8 14.8 147.0 20.5 13.9 20.5
Dominican Republic: Technical
Assistance 1983 17.4 0.9 5.2 7.1 0.8 11.3 0.8
I ndia: Madhya Pradesh Urban Dev. 1983 50.1 1.8 3.6 24.1 1.5 6.2 1.5
Korea: Jeonju Regional Dev. 1984 143.3 26.7 18.6 45.0 12.9 28.7 12.9
Senegal: Technical Assistance 1984 6.5 1.5 23.1 6.0 1.5 25.0 0
Zimbabwe: Urban Dev. 1984 112.6 1.5 1.3 43.0 2.7 6.3 2."
Madagascar: Urban Dev. 1984 18.0 0.7 3.9 12.8 0.6 4.7 0.6
Thailand: Regional Cities 1985 50.0 2.0 4.0 27.5 1.2 4.4 1.2
Paraguay: Asuncin Municipal Dev. 1985 31.0 9.2 29.7 20.0 4.6 23.0 4.6
Subtotal 2,715.7 521.1 19.2 1,236.6 242.6 19.6 188
Total 4,619.6 2,321.5 50.3 2,079.6 1,033.4 49.7 915.8
a. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank).
b. International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank.
Source: World Bank appraisal reports.
58