Mauldin June 25

Outside the Box is a free weekly economic e-letter by best-selling author and renowned fnancial expert,
John Mauldin. You can learn more and get your free subscription by visiting www.mauldineconomics.com
1
The Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical Apocalypse
JOHN MAULDIN | June 25, 2014
Ian Bremmer, NYU professor and head of the geopolitical consulting powerhouse Eurasia Group,
consults at the highest levels with both governments and companies because he brings to the table robust
geopolitical analysis and a compelling thesis: that we are witnessing the creative destruction of the old
geopolitical order. We live, as his last book told us, in a G-0 world. In todays Outside the Box, Ian
spells out what that creative destruction means in terms of events on the ground today. As Ian notes, the
most prominent feature of the international landscape this year has been the expansion of geopolitical
confict. Tat expansion is gaining momentum, he says, creating larger-scale crises and sharpening market
volatility.
Hold on to the reins now as Ian take us for a ride with the Four Horsemen of the Geopolitical
Apocalypse. (For more information about the Eurasia Group or to contact Ian Bremmer, please email Kim
Tran at tran@eurasiagroup.net.)
Well follow up Ians piece with an excellent short analysis of the Iraq situation from a Middle East expert at
a large hedge fund I correspond with. Pretty straightforward take on the situation with regard to ISIS. Tis
quagmire has real implications for the world oil supply. (It appears that the Sunni rebel forces are now in
complete control of the key Baiji Refnery, which produces a third of Iraqs output.)
Back in Dallas, its a little hard to focus on geopolitical events when seemingly all the news is about
ongoing domestic crises. But the outrageous IRS loss of emails doesnt really afect our portfolios all that
much. What happens in Iraq or with China does. Teres just not the emotional impact.
One domestic humanitarian crisis that is brewing just south of me is the massive infux of very young
children across the US-Mexican border. When this was frst brought to my attention a few weeks ago, I
must admit that I questioned the credibility of the source. We have had young children walking across the
Texas border for decades but always in rather small numbers. Te frst source I read said that 40,000 had
already come over this year. I just found that to be non-credible, but then with a little reasonable research
it not only became believable but could be a bit low it looks as many as 90,000 children will cross the
border this year.
What in the name of the Wide Wide World of Sports is going on? First of all, how do you cover up
something of this magnitude until it is a true crisis? When the administration and other authorities clearly
knew about it last year? (Te evidence is irrefutable. Tey knew.)
2
I am the father of fve adopted children. In an earlier phase of my life, I was somewhat involved with Child
Protective Services here in Texas. It was an emotionally difcult and heartrending experience. (One of
my children came out of that system and three from outside of the United States). I have no idea how you
care for 90,000 children who dont speak the language and have no connection to their new locale. Forget
the dollar cost, which could run into the tens of billions over time. Tese are children, and they are on
our doorstep and our watch. You simply cant ignore them and say, Tey are not supposed to be here, so
its not our responsibility. Tey are children. Someone, and that means here in the US, is going to have to
fgure out how to take care of them, even if it is only to learn why they try to come and fgure out where to
send them back to. And frankly, trying to to send them back is going to be a logistical and legal nightmare,
not to mention psychologically traumatic to the children.
Maybe someone thought that waiting until there was a crisis to let this information slip out (and we found
out about it because of photos posted anonymously of children packed together in holding cells) would
create momentum for immigration reform. And they may be right. But Im not certain its going to result
in the type of immigration reform they were hoping to get.
I have to admit that Ive been rather tolerant of illegal immigrants over the course of my life. Tere are
a dozen or so key issues that I think this country should focus on, but Ive just never gotten that worked
up about illegal immigration. Te simple fact is that everyone here in the US is either an immigrant
or descended from immigrants. It may be, too, that Ive hired a few undocumented workers here and
there in my life. As an economist, I know that we should be trying to fgure out how to get more capable
immigrants here, not less. What you want are educated young people who are motivated to create and
work, not children as young as four or fve years old who are going to need housing, education, adult
supervision, healthcare, and most of all a loving environment where they can grow up.
It is one thing for undocumented workers to come across the border looking for jobs or for families to
come across together. It is a completely diferent matter when tens of thousands of preteen children come
across the border without parents or supervision. Tey didnt get across 1500 miles of desert without
signifcant support and a great deal of planning. Tis couldnt be happening without the awareness of
authorities in Mexico and the Central American countries from which these children come, and if this is
truly a surprise to Homeland Security, then there is a signifcant failure somewhere in the system.
And if it was not a surprise? Tat begs a whole diferent series of questions.
Tis is a major humanitarian crisis, and it is not in the Middle East or Africa. It is on our border, and we
need to fgure out what to do about it NOW!
I dont care whether you think we need to build a 20-foot-high wall across the southern border of the
United States or give amnesty to anyone who wants to come in (or both), something has to be done with
these children. It is a staggering problem of enormous logistical proportions, and we have a simple human
responsibility to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves.
3
And on that note I will go ahead and hit the send button, and lets focus on the critical geopolitical events
happening around the globe. Iraq is a disaster. Ukraine is a crisis. Whats happening in the China Sea is
troubling. It just seems to come at you from everywhere. Even on a beautiful summer day.
Your stunned by the magnitude of it all analyst,

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
(From Ian Bremmer)
dear john,
were halfway through 2014, and the single most notable feature of the international landscape has been
the expansion of geopolitical confict. why should we care? whats the impact; what does it mean for the
global economy? how should we think about geopolitics?
my thoughts on the topic, looking at the four key geopolitical pieces in playin eurasia, the middle east,
asia, and the transatlantic.
geopolitics
ive written for several years about the root causes of the geopolitical instability the world is presently
experiencing. a new, g-zero world where the united states is less interested in providing global leadership
and nobody else is willing or able to step into that role. that primary leadership vacuum is set against a
context of competing foreign policy priorities from increasingly powerful emerging markets (with very
diferent political and economic systems) and a germany-led europe; challenges to the international system
from a revisionist russia in decline; and difculties in coordination from a proliferation of relevant state
and non-state actors even when interests are aligned. all of this has stirred tensions in the afermath of the
fnancial crisis: instability across the middle east afer a stillborn arab spring; a three-year syrian civil war;
a failed russia reset; rising confict between china and japan; fraying american alliances with countries
like brazil, germany, and saudi arabia.
and yet geopolitical concerns havent particularly changed our views on global markets. each confict has
been small and self-contained (or the spillover wasnt perceived to matter much). geopolitics has been
troubling on the margins but not worth more than a fret.
thats about to change. though perceived as discrete events, the rise of these geopolitical tensions are
all directly linked to the creative destruction of the old geopolitical order. its a process thats gaining
momentum, creating in turn larger-scale crises and broader market volatility. weve now reached the point
where near- to mid-term outcomes of several geopolitical conficts could become major drivers of the
global economy. thats true of russia/ukraine, iraq, the east and south china seas and us/europe. in each,
the status quo is unsustainable (though for very diferent reasons). and so, as it were, the four horsemen of
the geopolitical apocalypse.
4
russia/ukraine
the prospect of losing ukraine was the last straw for a russian government that has been steadily losing
geopolitical infuence since the collapse of the soviet union over two decades ago. moscow sees nato
enlargement, expanded european economic integration, energy diversifcation and the energy revolution
as direct security threats that need to be countered. ukraine is also an opportunity for the kremlin...for
president putin to invigorate a fagging support base at home.
putin intends to raise the economic and military pressure on kiev until, at a minimum, southeast ukraine
is efectively under russian control. the ukrainian governments latest efort in response, a unilateral week-
long cease fre in the southeast, was greeted with lukewarm rhetoric by putin and rejected by russian
separatists in the region, who escalated their attacks against the ukrainian military. meanwhile, thousands
of russian troops recently pulled back from the ukrainian border have now been redeployed there,
bolstered by putin ordering 65,000 russian troops on combat alert in the region.
the choices for kiev are thankless. if they press further, violence intensifes and russian support expands,
either routing the ukrainian military, or taking serious losses and requiring direct formal intervention of
russian troops. if they back of, they lose the southeast, which is critical for their internal legitimacy from
the ukrainian population at large. all the while the ukrainian economy teeters with much of their industrial
base of line, compounded by russian disruptions on customs, trade, and gas supply.
the growing confict will lead to further deterioration of russias relationship with the united states and
europe: gas fow disruptions, expansion of defense spending and nato coordination with poland and the
baltic states, turbulence around moldova and georgia given their european association agreements this
week...and level 3 sectoral sanctions against russia. that in turn means a serious economic downturn in
russia itself...and knock-on economic implications for europe, which has far greater exposure to russia
than the united states does.
for the last several years, the major market concern for europe was economic: the potential for collapse of
the eurozone. thats no longer a worry. the primary risk to europe is now clearly geopolitical, that expanded
russia/ukraine confict hurts europe, in worst case pushing the continent back into recession.
iraq
like so much of the worlds colonial legacy, many of the middle easts borders only worked because
of the combination of secular authoritarian rule and international military and economic support.
that was certainly true of iraqmost recently under decades of control by the baath party, beginning in
1963. saddam husseins ouster forty years later by the united states and great britain, combined with the
dismantling of nearly all of the military and political architecture that supported him (in dramatic contrast
to, say, the ouster of egypts hosni mubarak) undermined iraqs territorial integrity. since then, iraqi
governance could still nominally function given signifcant american military presence and military and
economic aid. once that was removed, there was little lef to keep iraq functioning as a country.
5
sectarianism is the primary form of allegiance in iraq today, both limiting the reach of prime minister
nouri al malikis majority shia government and creating closer ties between iraqs sunni, shia and kurdish
populations and their brethren outside iraqs borders. extremism within iraq has also grown dramatically
as a consequence, particularly among the now disenfranchised sunni population--made worse by their
heavy losses in the war against bashar assad across the largely undefended border with syria. the tipping
point came with the broad attacks by the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis) over the past fortnight,
speeding up a decade-long expansion of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing between iraqs sunni
and shia. the comparatively wealthy and politically stable kurds have done their best to steer clear of the
troubles, seizing a long-sought opportunity for de facto independence.
the american response has been cautious. domestic support for military engagement in iraq diminished
greatly as the war in iraq continued and the economic and human costs mounted. obama repeatedly
promised an end to the occupation and considered full withdrawal a major achievement of his
administration. theres little domestic upside for taking responsibility in the crisis. obamas position has
accordingly been that any direct military involvement requires a change in governance from the iraqis-
-initially sounding like a unity government and increasingly evolving into the replacement of prime
minister maliki. the pressure on maliki has gained momentum with shia grand ayatollah ali al-sistani
calling on the iraqi prime minister to broaden the government to include more kurds and sunnis.
but maliki, having successfully fought constitutional crises and assassination attempts, to say nothing of
decisively winning a democratic election, is unlikely to go. isis poses a threat to the unity of the iraqi state,
but not to malikis rule of iraqs majority shia population, which if anything now stands stronger than it
did before the fghting. and malikis key international sponsor, iran, has little interest in forcing maliki into
compromise as long as theres no threat to baghdad: they see themselves in far better strategic standing
with a maliki-led iraqi government where they exert overwhelming infuence, than over a broader
government where theyre one of many competing international forces. further, even if maliki were
prepared to truly share power with iraqs kurds and sunni (something made more likely by the informal
infuence of 300 us military advisors now arriving in baghdad), hes unlikely to see much enthusiasm
responding to that ofer. the kurds are better of sticking to nominal (and a clearer road to eventual formal)
independence; and sunni leaders that publicly fnd common cause with maliki would better hope all their
family members arent anywhere isis can fnd them.
absent american (or anyone elses) signifcant military engagement, the iraqi government is unlikely to
be able to remove isis from leadership and, accordingly, reassert control over the sunni and kurdish areas
of the country. that will lead to a signifcant increase in extremist violence emanating from the islamic
world, a trend thats already deteriorated signifcantly in recent years (and since obama administration
ofcials announced that cyberattacks were the biggest national security threat to the united states--a claim
president obama overturned during his west point speech last month). since 2010, the number of known
jihadist fghters has more than doubled; attacks by al qaeda afliates have tripled.
the combination of challenging economic conditions, sectarian leadership, and the communications
revolution empowering individuals through narrowing political and ideological demographic lenses all
make this much more likely to expand. thats a greater threat to stability in the poorer middle eastern
markets, but also will morph back into a growing terrorist threat against western assets in the region and
more broadly. that creates, in turn, demand for increased security spending and bigger concerns about fat
tail terrorism in the developed world, particularly in southern and western europe (where large numbers
of unintegrated and unemployed islamic populations will pose more of a direct threat).
6
the broader risk is that sunni/shia confict metastasizes into a single broader war. isis declares an islamic
state across sunni iraq and syria, becoming ground zero for terrorist funding and recruitment from across
the region. the saudi government condemns the absence of international engagement in either confict and
directly opposes an increasingly heavy and public iranian hand in iraqi and syrian rule. the united states
completes a comprehensive nuclear deal with iran and declares victory (but doesnt work meaningfully
with teheran on iraq), steering clear of the growing divide between the middle easts two major powers.
the gulf cooperation council starts to fragment as members see opportunity in economic engagements
with iran. iranian advisors in iraq morph into armed forces; saudi arabia publicly opposes isis, but saudi
money and weapons get into their hands and an abundance of informal links pop up. militarization grows
between an emboldened iran and a more isolated, defensive saudi arabia. thats when the geopolitical
premium around energy prices becomes serious.
east/south china sea
ukraine and iraq are the two major active geopolitical conficts. but there are two more geopolitical points
of tension involving major economies that are becoming signifcant.
in asia, its the consequences of (and reactions to) an increasingly powerful and assertive china. the growth
of chinas infuence remains the worlds most important geopolitical story by a long margin. but, at least to
date, chinas growth is mostly an opportunity for the rest of the world. for the middle east, its the principal
new source of energy demand as the united states becomes more energy independent. for africa, its the
best opportunity to build out long-needed infrastructure across the continent. for europe and even the
united states, its a critical source of credit propping up currency, and a core producer of inexpensive
goods. thats not to argue that there arent signifcant caveats in each of these stories (or that those caveats
arent growing--they are), but rather that overall, china has been primarily perceived as an opportunity
rather than a threat for all of these actors, and so it remains today.
for asia, a rising china has been seen more clearly as a double-edged sword. the greater comparative
importance of the chinese economy has translated into more political infuence (formal and informal) for
beijing, at the expense of other governments in the region. meanwhile, chinas dramatic military buildup
has fundamentally changed the balance of power in asia; its had negligible interest elsewhere.
chinas military assertiveness has also grown in its backyard. in other regions, china continues to promote
itself as a poor country that needs to focus on its own development and stability. in east and southeast
asia china has core interests that it defends, and it is increasingly willing to challenge the status quo as its
infuence becomes asymmetrically greater.
thats been most clear with vietnam, where china frst sent one oil rig to drill in contested waters directly
of vietnams shore--accompanied by several hundred chinese fshing vessels. they announced last week
that they are repositioning four more. unsurprisingly, the vietnamese response has been sharp--anti-
chinese demonstrations, violence, increased naval presence in the region, and coordination with the
philippines.
none of that creates signifcant political risk on its own: vietnam isnt an ally of the united states and so
engenders less support and response from washington than the philippines or japan...which is precisely
why beijing has decided thats the best place to start changing the regional security balance.
7
but tokyo feels diferently. the japanese government understands that a rising china is longer term a
much more existential threat to its own security position in asia, and it isnt prepared to wait to raise
concern until its position weakens further. so prime minister shinzo abe has declared his security support
for vietnam. for americas part, obama has jettisoned the ofcial pivot to asia. but the administration
continues to believe that americas core national security interests, now and in the future, are in asia; and if
china signifcantly escalates tensions in the east and south china seas, the united states is not likely to sit as
idly by as they have on syria or ukraine.
the good news here is that--unlike with the countries driving the tensions in eurasia and the middle east-
-china has solid political stability and isnt looking for international trouble. but the realities of chinese
growth, coupled with strong leadership from japan and (over time) india, along with the persistence of a
strong american footprint are contributing to a much more troublesome geopolitical environment in the
region.
the principle danger to the markets is what happens if the chinese government no longer holds that
perspective. president xi jinpings commitment to transformational economic reform has been strong over
the frst year of his rule, and he has gotten surprisingly little pushback from the countrys entrenched elites.
but the uncertainty around chinas near- to medium-term trajectory is radically greater than that of any of
the worlds other major economies. should signifcant instability emerge in china, very plausible indeed,
chinas willingness to take on a far more assertive (and risk-acceptant) security strategy in the region,
promoting nationalism in the way putin has built his support base of late, would become far more likely.
and then, the east and south china seas move to the top of our list.
us-europe
fnally, the transatlantic relationship. advanced industrial economies with consolidated institutions and
political stability, theres none of the geopolitical confict presently visible in the middle east, eurasia, or
asia. geopolitical tensions have long been absent from the transatlantic relationship, the great success of the
nato alliance. for all the occasional disagreement in europe on us military and security policy both during
the cold war and since (the war in iraq, israel/palestine, counterterrorism and the like), european states
never considered the need for broader security ties as a counterbalance for nato membership.
but the changing nature of geopolitics is creating a rif between the united states and europe. american
global hegemony had security and economic components, and it was collective security that had been
the core element holding together the transatlantic alliance. thats no longer the case--a consequence of
changing priorities for the americans and europeans, and an evolving world order (russia/ukraine a major
blip, but notwithstanding). the transatlantic relationship is much less closely aligned on economics.
its not the conventional wisdom. most observers say that, afer bush, american policy looks more
european these days--less militarist, more multilateralist. but actually, us foreign policy isnt becoming
more like europe, its becoming more like china. its less focused on the military, except on issues of core
security concern (in which case the united states acts with little need to consult allies), while american
economic policy tends to be unilateralist in supporting preferred american geopolitical outcomes--
which is seen most directly in us sanctions behavior (over $15bn in fnes now levied against more than
20 international banks--mostly european) and nsa surveillance policy (with no willingness of the us to
cooperate in a germany requested no spying mutual agreement)
8
transatlantic economic dissonance is also in evidence in a number of more fundamental ways: americas
growth uber alles approach to a downturn in the economy, compared to germanys fxation on fscal
accountability. europes greater alignment between governments and corporations on industrial policy,
as opposed to a more decentralized, private-sector led (and occasionally captured) american policy
environment. a more economy-driven opportunistic european approach to china, russia and other
developing markets; the us government looking focused more on us-led/universalist principles on
industrial espionage, intellectual property, etc.
as the g-zero persists, we will see the united states looking to enforce more unilateral economic standards
that the europeans resent and resist; while the europeans look to other countries more strategically as
counterbalances to american economic hegemony (the german-china relationship is critical in this regard,
but thats also true of europes willingness to support american economic policies in russia and the middle
east). all of this means a much less cooperative trans-atlantic relationship--less universalism (from the
american perspective) and less multilateralism (from the european perspective). more zero-sumness
in the transatlantic relationship is a big change in the geopolitical environment; a precursor to true
multipolarity, but in the interim a more fragmented and much less efcient global marketplace.
* * *
so thats where i see geopolitics emerging as a key factor for the global markets--much more than at any
time since the end of the cold war. theres some good news and bad news here.
the good news is none of these geopolitical risks are likely to have the sort of market implications that
the macro economic risks did afer the fnancial crisis. there are lots of reasons for that. a low interest rate
environment and solid growth from the us and china--plus the eurozone out of recession--along with pent
up demand for investment is leading to signifcant optimism that wont be easily cowed by geopolitics.
the supply/demand energy story is largely bearish, so near-term geopolitical risks from the middle east
wont create sustained high prices. and markets dont know how to price geopolitical risk well; theyre not
covered as clearly analytically, so investors dont pay as much attention (until/unless they have to).
the bad news...that very lack of pressure from the markets means political leaders wont feel as much need
to address these crises even as they expand, particularly in the united states. this is another reason the
worlds geopolitical crises will persist beyond a level that a similar economic crisis would hit before serious
measures start to be taken to mitigate them. these geopolitical factors are going to grow. nows the time to
start paying attention to them.
* * *
every once in a while, its good to take a step back and look at the big picture. hope you found that
worthwhile. ill surely get back in the weeds next monday.
meanwhile, its looking like a decidedly lovely week in new york.
very best,
ian
9
From intel sources:
Dislodging ISIS Will Be a Difcult Task
Te ISIS advance toward Baghdad may be temporarily held of as the government rallies its remaining
security forces and Shia militias organize for the upcoming Battle for Baghdad. Tere is a rather clear
reason why the ISIS leader has renamed himself Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, meaning the Caliph of Baghdad
. ISIS will at a minimum be able to take control of some Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad shortly and
wreak havoc on the city with IEDs, ambushes, single suicide attacks, and suicide assaults that target
civilians, the government, security forces, senior members of government, and foreign installations and
embassies. Additionally, the brutal sectarian slaughter of Sunni and Shia alike that punctuated the violence
in Baghdad from 2005 to 2007 is likely to return as Shia militias and ISIS fghters begin to assert control of
neighborhoods and roam the streets.
Even if Iraqi forces are able to keep ISIS from fully taking Baghdad and areas south, it is unlikely the
beleaguered military and police forces will be able to retake the areas under ISIS control in the north and
west without signifcant external support, as well as the support of the Kurds.
ISIS and its allies are in a position today that closely resembles the position prior to the US surge back
in early 2007. More than 130,000 US troops, partnered with the Sunni Awakening formations and Iraqi
security forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands, were required to clear Anbar, Salahaddin, Diyala,
Ninewa, Baghdad, and the triangle of death. Te concurrent operations took more than a year, and were
supported by the US Air Force, US Army aviation brigades, and US special operations raids that targeted
the jihadists command and control, training camps, and bases, as well as its IED and suicide bomb
factories.
Today, the Iraqis have no US forces on the ground to support them, US air power is absent, the Awakening
is scattered and disjointed, and the Iraqi military has been humiliated badly while surrendering or
retreating in disarray during the lightning fast jihadists campaign from Mosul to the outskirts of Baghdad.
Tis campaign, by the way, has been remarkably and signifcantly faster than the U.S. armored campaign
advance to Baghdad in 2003 . Te US government has indicated that it will not deploy US soldiers in Iraq,
either on the ground or at airbases to conduct air operations. Meanwhile, signifcant amounts of US made
advanced armaments, vehicles, ammunition, and diverse military equipment have fallen into ISIS jihadists
hands .
ISIS is advancing boldly in the looming security vacuum lef by the collapse of the Iraqi security forces
and the Wests refusal to recommit forces to stabilize Iraq. Tis has rendered the country vulnerable to
further incursions by al Qaeda-linked jihadists as well as intervention by interested neighbors such as Iran.
Overt Iranian intervention in Iraq would likely lead any Sunnis still loyal to the government to side with
ISIS and its allies, and would ensure that Iraq would slide even closer to a full-blown civil war and de facto
partition, and risk a wider war throughout the Middle East.
10
Copyright 2014 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved.
Share Your Thoughts on This Article
Post a Comment
Like Outside the Box? Ten we think youll love Johns premium product, Over My Shoulder. Each week
John Mauldin sends his Over My Shoulder subscribers the most interesting items that he personally cherry
picks from the dozens of books, reports, and articles he reads each week as part of his research. Learn more
about Over My Shoulder
Outside the Box is a free weekly economic e-letter by best-selling author and renowned fnancial expert, John Mauldin. You can learn more and get
your free subscription by visiting http://www.mauldineconomics.com.
Please write to subscribers@mauldineconomics.com to inform us of any reproductions, including when and where copy will be reproduced. You must
keep the letter intact, from introduction to disclaimers. If you would like to quote brief portions only, please reference http://www.mauldineconomics.
com.
To subscribe to John Mauldins e-letter, please click here: http://www.mauldineconomics.com/subscribe/
To change your email address, please click here: http://www.mauldineconomics.com/change-address
If you would ALSO like changes applied to the Mauldin Circle e-letter, please include your old and new email address along with a note requesting the
change for both e-letters and send your request to compliance@2000wave.com.
To unsubscribe, please refer to the bottom of the email.
Outside the Box and JohnMauldin.com is not an offering for any investment. It represents only the opinions of John Mauldin and those that he
interviews. Any views expressed are provided for information purposes only and should not be construed in any way as an offer, an endorsement,
or inducement to invest and is not in any way a testimony of, or associated with, Mauldins other frms. John Mauldin is the Chairman of Mauldin
Economics, LLC. He also is the President of Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC (MWA) which is an investment advisory frm registered with multiple
states, President and registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, (MWS) member FINRA, SIPC. MWS is also a Commodity Pool
Operator (CPO) and a Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) registered with the CFTC, as well as an Introducing Broker (IB) and NFA Member. Millennium
Wave Investments is a dba of MWA LLC and MWS LLC. This message may contain information that is confdential or privileged and is intended only
for the individual or entity named above and does not constitute an offer for or advice about any alternative investment product. Such advice can only
be made when accompanied by a prospectus or similar offering document. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Please make sure
to review important disclosures at the end of each article. Mauldin companies may have a marketing relationship with products and services mentioned
in this letter for a fee.
Note: Joining the Mauldin Circle is not an offering for any investment. It represents only the opinions of John Mauldin and Millennium Wave
Investments. It is intended solely for investors who have registered with Millennium Wave Investments and its partners at www.MauldinCircle.com
or directly related websites. The Mauldin Circle may send out material that is provided on a confdential basis, and subscribers to the Mauldin Circle
are not to send this letter to anyone other than their professional investment counselors. Investors should discuss any investment with their personal
investment counsel. John Mauldin is the President of Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC (MWA), which is an investment advisory frm registered with
multiple states. John Mauldin is a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, (MWS), an FINRA registered broker-dealer. MWS
is also a Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) and a Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) registered with the CFTC, as well as an Introducing Broker (IB).
Millennium Wave Investments is a dba of MWA LLC and MWS LLC. Millennium Wave Investments cooperates in the consulting on and marketing of
private and non-private investment offerings with other independent frms such as Altegris Investments; Capital Management Group; Absolute Return
Partners, LLP; Fynn Capital; Nicola Wealth Management; and Plexus Asset Management. Investment offerings recommended by Mauldin may pay
a portion of their fees to these independent frms, who will share 1/3 of those fees with MWS and thus with Mauldin. Any views expressed herein are
provided for information purposes only and should not be construed in any way as an offer, an endorsement, or inducement to invest with any CTA,
fund, or program mentioned here or elsewhere. Before seeking any advisors services or making an investment in a fund, investors must read and
examine thoroughly the respective disclosure document or offering memorandum. Since these frms and Mauldin receive fees from the funds they
recommend/market, they only recommend/market products with which they have been able to negotiate fee arrangements.
11
PAST RESULTS ARE NOT INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. THERE IS RISK OF LOSS AS WELL AS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR GAIN
WHEN INVESTING IN MANAGED FUNDS. WHEN CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, INCLUDING HEDGE FUNDS, YOU SHOULD
CONSIDER VARIOUS RISKS INCLUDING THE FACT THAT SOME PRODUCTS: OFTEN ENGAGE IN LEVERAGING AND OTHER SPECULATIVE
INVESTMENT PRACTICES THAT MAY INCREASE THE RISK OF INVESTMENT LOSS, CAN BE ILLIQUID, ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE
PERIODIC PRICING OR VALUATION INFORMATION TO INVESTORS, MAY INVOLVE COMPLEX TAX STRUCTURES AND DELAYS IN
DISTRIBUTING IMPORTANT TAX INFORMATION, ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE SAME REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AS MUTUAL FUNDS,
OFTEN CHARGE HIGH FEES, AND IN MANY CASES THE UNDERLYING INVESTMENTS ARE NOT TRANSPARENT AND ARE KNOWN ONLY
TO THE INVESTMENT MANAGER. Alternative investment performance can be volatile. An investor could lose all or a substantial amount of his or
her investment. Often, alternative investment fund and account managers have total trading authority over their funds or accounts; the use of a single
advisor applying generally similar trading programs could mean lack of diversifcation and, consequently, higher risk. There is often no secondary
market for an investors interest in alternative investments, and none is expected to develop.
All material presented herein is believed to be reliable but we cannot attest to its accuracy. Opinions expressed in these reports may change without
prior notice. John Mauldin and/or the staffs may or may not have investments in any funds cited above as well as economic interest. John Mauldin can
be reached at 800-829-7273.

Mauldin June 25

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Mauldin June 25

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Outside the Box is a free weekly economic e-letter by best-selling author and renowned fnancial expert,

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi