In The United States Court of Appeals For The Third Circuit: Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, V

No.
14-3048

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

DEB WHITEWOOD, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.

MICHAEL WOLF, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.,
Defendants,
and
THERESA SANTAI-GAFFNEY, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SCHUYLKILL COUNTY
CLERK OF THE ORPHANS COURT AND REGISTER OF WILLS,
Proposed Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (Case No. 1:13-cv-01861-J EJ )

APPELLANT THERESA SANTAI-GAFFNEYS
OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY ACTION

Byron J . Babione
J ames A. Campbell
Kenneth J . Connelly
J . Caleb Dalton
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM
15100 North 90th Street
Scottsdale, AZ 85260
Phone: (480) 444-0020
Fax: (480) 444-0028
bbabione@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
Counsel for Appellant
(additional counsel listed in signature block)
Case: 14-3048 Document: 003111661546 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/25/2014
1
Appellant Theresa Santai-Gaffney, in her official capacity as Schuylkill

County Clerk of the Orphans Court and Register of Wills, (Clerk Gaffney)
hereby responds to the Courts J une 18, 2014 Order and opposes summary action.
Absent an intervening change in circumstances or precedent, neither of which has
occurred here, summary action is appropriate only when no substantial question is
presented. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4. This appeal, however, presents one of the most
important constitutional questions of our day. Therefore, the case is not fit for
summary action.
BACKGROUND
Pennsylvania is one of the many States that continues to define marriage as
the union of one man and one woman. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. 1704. Clerks of the
Orphans Court and Registers of Wills (Clerks) enforce Pennsylvanias marriage
laws. 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. 711(19). They are charged with the statutory duty of
issuing marriage licenses only to man-woman couples. Id.
Each Clerk is an elected county official who operates independently of other
government officers, see 16 Pa. Cons. Stat. 4301, and who swears an oath to
obey the laws, see Pa. Const. art. VI, 3. If a Clerk were to contravene her official
duties, she would be subject to a fine and guilty of a misdemeanor, see 16 Pa.
Cons. Stat. 3411, and possibly face a mandamus action. See Commw., Dept of
Health v. Hanes, 78 A.3d 676, 693-94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
2
Plaintiffs claim that Pennsylvanias man-woman marriage laws violate the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. On May 20, 2014, the
District Court issued its opinion in which it concluded that those laws are
unconstitutional. See Dckt. No. 133.
1
It also entered an order declaring the laws
invalid and enjoining their enforcement. See Dckt. No. 134. Notwithstanding the
weighty constitutional questions decided by the District Court, the named
DefendantsMichael Wolf, Secretary of the Department of Health, Dan Meuser,
Secretary of the Department of Revenue, and Donald Petrille, J r., Register of Wills
and Clerk of the Orphans Court of Bucks Countydid not appeal.
Although the District Courts injunction purports to bind only the named
Defendants, see Dckt. No. 134, the Court elsewhere stated that all Clerks . . . [are]
subject to [its] legal mandate. Dckt. No. 67 at 8. Secretary Wolf has adopted this
broad reading of the District Courts orders by directing all Clerks to perform
[their] duties in accordance with the courts order and to cease enforcing
Pennsylvanias man-woman marriage laws. Dckt. No. 150 at 7. The District Court
stated that Secretary Wolfs directive correctly reflected [t]he effect of [its]
decision. Id. at 6.
On J une 6, well within the time for appealing the District Courts May 20
Opinion and Order, Clerk Gaffney moved to intervene in the District Court for the
1
Unless otherwise noted, all citations to Dckt. No. refer to documents appearing
on the District Courts docket.
3
purpose of appealing. See Dckt. Nos. 139, 140. On J une 18, the District Court
denied Clerk Gaffneys motion to intervene. See Dckt. No. 150.
That same day, Clerk Gaffney appealed from the District Courts May 20
Opinion and Order resolving the merits of Plaintiffs claims (Dckt. Nos. 133, 134)
and the J une 18 Order denying Clerk Gaffneys request to intervene (Dckt. No.
150). See Dckt. No. 152. The intervention issue and the merits of Plaintiffs claims
are thus presented by this appeal.
ARGUMENT
I. The District Court Erred in Denying Clerk Gaffneys Motion to
Intervene, and That Issue Should Not Be Resolved by Summary Action.

An intervention applicant is entitled to intervene as of right if (1) the
application for intervention is timely; (2) the applicant has a sufficient interest in
the litigation; (3) the interest may be affected or impaired, as a practical matter by
the disposition of the action; and (4) the interest is not adequately represented by
an existing party in the litigation. Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir.
1987). The District Court denied Clerk Gaffneys intervention request because it
believed that she did not satisfy the interest or inadequate representation
requirements. It was wrong on both counts.
A. Clerk Gaffney Has Significant Interests in this Action.
It is well settled in this Circuit that a public official ha[s] a sufficient
interest to intervene in cases in which the subject of the suit [falls] within the scope
4
of h[er] official duties. Harris, 820 F.2d at 602; see also id. at 597 (a public
official has a sufficient interest to intervene as of right if his duties . . . may be
affected directly by the disposition of this litigation). And other circuits agree.
See, e.g., Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 1977) (A [public] official
has a sufficient interest in adjudications which will directly affect his own duties
and powers under the state laws.); Hines v. DArtois, 531 F.2d 726, 738 (5th Cir.
1976) (a public official was allowed to intervene as of right [o]n the basis of the
relation between [his] statutory duties and the claims for relief made by
plaintiffs); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (permitting
intervention by the official charged with administering the states . . . laws).
Here, Clerk Gaffney has the statutory duty to issue marriage licenses only to
man-woman couples. See 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. 711(19); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. 1704.
That duty is directly implicated by Plaintiffs claim that Clerks must issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to prevent Clerk Gaffney
from carrying out her duty as prescribed by state law. There is thus no doubt that
the subject of the suit [falls] within the scope of [Clerk Gaffneys] official duties
and that she has a sufficient interest to intervene. See Harris, 820 F.2d at 602.
The District Court, however, ignored this Courts guidance in Harris and the
many cases from other circuits cited above (e.g., Blake and Hines), even though
Clerk Gaffney repeatedly referenced those cases in her briefs. See Dckt. No. 140 at
5
12, Dckt. No. 147 at 3-6. Instead, the District Court disregarded Clerk Gaffneys
interest based on her duty to issue marriage licenses to man-woman couples
because it concluded that her duty is purely ministerial[.] Dckt. No. 150 at 5.
But the District Court did not cite, and Clerk Gaffney has not found, any precedent
suggesting that a public official whose statutory duties will be directly affected by
the disposition of litigation lacks a significant interest if her duties are ministerial
rather than discretionary. On the contrary, a number of federal courts have
concluded that officials whose ministerial duties would be affected by the outcome
of a lawsuit have a significant interest supporting their intervention as of right. See,
e.g., Am. Assn of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 257 F.R.D. 236, 256
(D.N.M. 2008) (This direct effect on what [a county official] can and cannot do as
a county clerk is the direct and substantial effect that is recognized as a legally
protected interest.); Bogaert v. Land, No. 1:08-CV-687, 2008 WL 2952006, at *2-
3 (W.D. Mich. J uly 29, 2008) (permitting county officials to intervene where the
plaintiffs sought an injunction that might change the clerks obligations). The
District Court thus erred in ignoring this Courts precedent and resting its decision
on a novel and unsupported consideration like the ministerial nature of Clerk
Gaffneys duties. This Court should afford full review to that decision.
Clerk Gaffney raised another significant interest supporting her intervention:
her interest in obtaining clarity concerning the effect of the District Courts order
6
on her statutory duty to issue marriage licenses to man-woman couples.

2
The
District Court rejected this interest, stating that Clerk Gaffney can claim no
confusion. Dckt. No. 150 at 7. But the items that the court consideredits
declaration, its injunction, and Secretary Wolfs orderdo not provide Clerk
Gaffney with authoritative guidance. Id. at 6-7.
To begin with, the District Courts declaration states that the challenged
marriage laws are invalid, but a trial-court declaration is not binding precedent
on nonparties or other courts. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7
(2011); see also Young Womens Christian Assn of Princeton, N. J. v. Kugler, 463
F.2d 203, 204 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (In the absence of a class action
determination the declaratory judgment is binding only between [the] individual
parties). And while the injunction indicates that the challenged laws should not be
enforced, on its face it applies only to the named Defendants. See Dckt. No. 134.
Moreover, although Secretary Wolfs order, which was not issued until after Clerk
Gaffney filed her motion to intervene, states that the Clerks should not enforce the
challenged laws, Dckt. No. 150 at 7, he lacks authority to direct the Clerks how to
carry out their duty of issuing marriage licenses, Dckt. No. 147 at 6-7. Thus, Clerk
Gaffney is in a difficult and uncertain position.
2
Clerk Gaffney has decided to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples
because she reasonably fears that she might be subject to prosecution or mandamus
action for failing to do so.
7
If Clerk Gaffney chooses the wrong course, she risks facing misdemeanor
charges, fines, or a mandamus action. See 16 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3411; Hanes, 78
A.3d at 693-94. But by allowing her to intervene, she would obtain clarity in two
ways. First, adding her as a party would make her unequivocally bound by the
injunction, and her duties would be clear. Second, allowing her to appeal would
enable this Court to rule on the merits of Plaintiffs claims and establish binding
precedent for all public officials in Pennsylvania to follow. Consequently, Clerk
Gaffneys interest in obtaining clarity concerning the effect of the District Courts
order on her statutory duty to issue marriage licenses to man-woman couples
amply supports her request to intervene. The District Courts disregard for this
real, tangible interest should be closely reviewed by this Court.
B. Clerk Gaffneys Significant Interests Are Not Adequately
Represented.

The named Defendants failure to seek appellate review constitute[s]
inadequate representation warranting [Clerk Gaffneys] intervention here. See
Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 115 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 1997).
The District Court overlooked this obvious conclusion, reasoning instead that
Clerk Gaffney cannot successfully claim that her rights and interests were not
represented by the Defendants because [she] has no protectable interest. Dckt.
No. 150 at 7. But that analysis, which conflates two separate prongs of the
analysis, contravenes this Courts directive that lower courts take care[] not to
8
blur the interest and representation factors together [b]ecause Rule 24(a)
envisions a separate inquiry into whether the government or other existing parties
will adequately advocate the applicants interest. Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
157 F.3d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1998). Such cursory analysis calls not for summary
disposition, but for careful review by this Court.
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying Clerk
Gaffneys Request for Permissive Intervention.

This Court has previously reversed a lower-court denial of a government
partys permissive-intervention request because that court failed to assess the
appropriate standard and thereby abused its discretion. See Appleton v. C.I.R.,
430 F. Appx 135, 137-39 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished opinion). The District Court
committed the same error here, and this appeal thus warrants plenary review by
this Court. Even though the District Court acknowledged that the permissive-
intervention analysis asks whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the original parties rights, Dckt. No. 150 at 8 (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 24(b)(3)), it did not evaluate those considerations. Rather, the District Court
disparaged Clerk Gaffneys attempt to obtain appellate review of the important
constitutional questions addressed in the May 20 Opinion. Id. at 9 ([W]e have
before us a contrived legal argument by a private citizen . . . .). Ignoring the
relevant analysis while unnecessarily berating a litigant who is acting in her
capacity as a public official constitutes an abuse of discretion.
9
In conclusion, intervention controversies arise in many different contexts,

and require the court to consider the pragmatic consequences of a decision to
permit or deny intervention. Harris, 820 F.2d at 597. The District Courts denial
of Clerk Gaffneys intervention request has the pragmatic consequence of
insulating from appellate review a trial-court decision invalidating Pennsylvanias
man-woman marriage laws. That, however, is an unjust result for the countless
Pennsylvanians who continue to support man-woman marriage in the
Commonwealth. The stakes, therefore, are too high for this Court to decide these
intervention issues through any procedure short of a full review.
II. Clerk Gaffney Has Standing to Appeal, and That Issue Should Not Be
Resolved by Summary Action.

[A]dministrative or executive officers have standing to defend the
constitutionality of legislation which [they are] charged with administering or
enforcing[.] Akron Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ. of Ohio, 490 F.2d 1285,
1296 (6th Cir. 1974); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) (noting
that the government has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute). To
have standing, an appellant must possess a direct stake in the outcome of the
case. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (citation omitted).
According to the District Court, see Dckt. No. 150 at 6-7, its rulings have nullified
Clerk Gaffneys statutory duty to issue marriage licenses only to man-woman
couples. See 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. 711(19); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. 1704. This judicial
10
nullification of her statutory duty to enforce the man-woman marriage laws

constitutes an injury that affords Clerk Gaffney a direct stake in the outcome of the
appeal. See Cobb v. Aytch, 539 F.2d 297, 299-300 (3d Cir. 1976) (concluding that
a county official who was not formally bound by the district-court order had
standing to appeal because that order hindered his ability to carry out his statutory
duties); cf. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662-63 (concluding that a private group
and private individuals lacked standing to appeal where the District Court had not
ordered them to do or refrain from doing anything and they had no rolespecial
or otherwisein the enforcement of [the challenged law]).
III. The District Court Erred in Resolving One of the Most Important
Constitutional Questions of Our DayWhether State Laws May Affirm
Man-Woman Marriageand That Issue Should Not Be Resolved by
Summary Action.

This case presents the question whether the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from maintaining marriage as a man-woman
union. That enduring understanding of marriage reflects the institutions animating
purpose of channeling the presumptive procreative potential of man-woman
relationships into committed unions in order to join children to both their mother
and their father. Millions of people throughout this country continue to support
domestic-relations policies that affirm man-woman marriage because they
reasonably project that redefining marriage from a gendered to a genderless
institution would obscure marriages animating purpose and undermine its social
11
utility. Whether the Constitution bars these citizens from embracing this public
policy is one of the most important legal questions of our day. Deciding that
question demands scrupulous consideration by this Court, and for at least three
reasons, this appeal is not fit for summary action.
3

First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly shown that it considers the
constitutional question presented in this case to be an important issue of law that
should be closely considered by federal appellate courts. A year and a half ago, the
Supreme Court in Hollingsworth granted certiorari to decide the constitutional
question raised here. See Petition for Certiorari at i, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144) (Question Presented: Whether the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State of California from
defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman.); Order, Granting Petition
for Certiorari, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144).
Nearly six months ago, the Supreme Court again affirmed the importance of
the substantive question presented here when it issued a stay pending appeal of a
district-court injunction in a nearly identical case. Order, Herbert v. Kitchen, No.
3
While Clerk Gaffney opposes summary action to decide this appeal, she notes
that the only summary action that might be appropriate is summary reversal of the
District Courts May 20 Opinion and Order in light of the Supreme Courts
decision in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). In that case, the Court dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question claims identical to those brought by
Plaintiffs here. That decision continues to bind all lower courts. Tully v. Griffin,
Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 74 (1976) (stating that a summary disposition remains a
controlling precedent, unless and until re-examined by th[e] [Supreme] Court).
12
13A687 (U.S. J an. 6, 2014). The standard for the Supreme Courts granting a stay
is similar to a likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits standard. See Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (noting that a stay is appropriate if
there is a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse the
judgment below); San Diegans for Mt. Soledad Natl War Meml v. Paulson, 548
U.S. 1301, 1302-03 (2006) (Kennedy, J ., in chambers) (noting that the Supreme
Court rarely grant[s] a stay application, but will do so if it predict[s] that a
majority of the Court would . . . set the [district court] order aside). Thus, the
Supreme Courts order in Herbert signals, at a minimum, that an appellate court
should look circumspectly at a district-court decision invalidating a States man-
woman marriage laws. That order weighs strongly against resolving this appeal
through summary action.
Second, all other circuits to consider the rights of States to maintain man-
woman marriage have given (or are giving) those cases plenary review. The only
two circuits that have addressed the constitutional question presented here arrived
at different conclusions on the merits after conducting full appellate review. See
Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 870-71 (8th Cir. 2006)
(unanimously holding that there is no constitutional right to same-sex marriage);
Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, 2014 WL 2868044, at *32 (10th Cir. J un. 25,
2014) (holding, in a 2-to-1 decision, that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
13
those who wish to marry a person of the same sex be permitted to do so).
Appeals presenting the same or similar questions are currently pending before at
least five other federal circuits. See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, Nos. 14-1167, 14-
1169, 14-1173 (4th Cir.); DeLeon v. Perry, No. 14-50196 (5th Cir.); Bourke v.
Beshear, No. 14-5291 (6th Cir.); Baskin v. Zoeller, No. 14-2037 (7th Cir.); Sevcik
v. Sandoval, No. 12-17668 (9th Cir.). None of those courts have stated or
otherwise implied that the questions presented there are insubstantial. Nor have
any of those circuits attempted to resolve the cases through summary action. On
the contrary, in each of those cases, the courts are carefully reviewing the merits.
Third, the District Court erred in condemning Pennsylvanias man-woman
marriage laws. That legal conclusion and its supporting analysis should be closely
scrutinized by this Court. This appeal does not warrant summary action.
One of the District Courts most egregious analytical missteps when
crediting Plaintiffs fundamental-right claims is its failure to follow the Supreme
Courts directives in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). See
Dckt. No. 133 at 16-21. In Glucksberg, the Court required a careful description of
the asserted fundamental liberty interest, id. at 721 (quotation marks omitted), and
reaffirmed that the carefully described right must be objectively, deeply rooted in
this Nations history and tradition. Id. at 720-21 (quotation marks omitted). Yet
the carefully described right asserted herethe right to marry a person of the same
14
sexis not deeply rooted in, but instead is belied by, this Nations history and
tradition. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) ([M]arriage
between a man and a woman no doubt [has] been thought of by most people as
essential to the very definition of that term and to its role and function throughout
the history of civilization.). The District Courts contrary conclusion conflicts
with the assessment of most appellate courts that have faced this fundamental-right
question under a state constitution or the Federal Constitution.
4
That decision
should be carefully reviewed by this Court.
The District Court also substantially erred in concluding that sexual
orientation is a quasi-suspect classification entitled to heightened scrutiny. See
Dckt. No. 133 at 36. Nearly every circuit that has addressed that question (10 out
of 12) has held that sexual orientation is not a quasi-suspect classification.
5
The
4
See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 675-76 (Tex. Ct. App.
2010); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 624-29 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908
A.2d 196, 211 (N.J . 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9-10 (N.Y. 2006);
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 976-79 (Wash. 2006) (plurality opinion);
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 32-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Standhardt v.
Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44, 57 (Haw. 1993); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973); Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
5
See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2008); Thomasson v. Perry,
80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir.
2004); Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir.
2006); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1996); Citizens for Equal
Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006); PriceCornelison v. Brooks,
524 F.3d 1103, 1113 n.9 (10th Cir. 2008); Lofton v. Secy of Dept of Children and
Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677,
15
District Courts decision to part ways with the vast majority of circuits is not ripe
for summary action, but instead demands a complete review from this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Clerk Gaffney respectfully requests that this
Court not resolve this appeal through summary action.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of J une, 2014.

s/ J . Caleb Dalton
J ames M. Smith (PA Bar No. 82124)
David W. Crossett* (PA Bar No. 313031)
SMITH LAW GROUP, LLC
14133 Kutztown Road
P.O. Box 626
Fleetwood, PA 19522
Phone: (610) 944-8406
Fax: (610) 944-9408
jsmith@smithlawgrp.com
dcrossett@smithlawgrp.com

Randall L. Wenger (PA Bar No. 86537)
INDEPENDENCE LAW CENTER
23 North Front Street, 2nd Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Phone: (717) 657-4990
Fax: (717) 545-8107
rwenger@indlawcenter.org
Byron J . Babione (AZ Bar No. 024320)
J ames A. Campbell (AZ Bar No. 026737)
Kenneth J . Connelly (AZ Bar No. 025420)
J . Caleb Dalton (AZ Bar No. 030539)
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM
15100 North 90th Street
Scottsdale, AZ 85260
Phone: (480) 444-0020
Fax: (480) 444-0028
bbabione@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
jcampbell@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
kconnelly@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
cdalton@alliancedefendingfreedom.org

J effrey A. Conrad (PA Bar No. 85156)
CLYMER MUSSER & CONRAD, P.C.
408 West Chestnut Street
Lancaster, PA 17903
Phone: (717) 299-7101
Fax: (717) 299-5115
jeff.conrad@clymerlaw.com
Counsel for Appellant
* Application for Admission to the Third Circuit Pending
684-85 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on J une 25, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. All participants in the
case are registered CM/ECF users and will be served by the appellate CM/ECF
system.
Dated: J une 25, 2014

s/ J . Caleb Dalton
J . Caleb Dalton


In The United States Court of Appeals For The Third Circuit: Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, V

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In The United States Court of Appeals For The Third Circuit: Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, V

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No.

Appellant Theresa Santai-Gaffney, in her official capacity as Schuylkill

Plaintiffs claim that Pennsylvanias man-woman marriage laws violate the

on her statutory duty to issue marriage licenses to man-woman couples.

In conclusion, intervention controversies arise in many different contexts,

nullification of her statutory duty to enforce the man-woman marriage laws

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