EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997]

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, and
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240,
which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin
taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza,
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third
reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved
it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee
was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21,
1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and
Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack
of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call,
the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of aquorum.
[1]
Rep. Arroyo appealed the
ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor
thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation,
Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of
his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the
session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the
newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee
report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the
question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of
the report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next
week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having
been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of
Rep. Arroyos interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the
session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which
petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of
the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published
version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the
audio-sound recording the word approved, which appears on line 13 in the three other versions,
cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the word no on line 17 appears
only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not
contain the sentence (Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of
the quorum, which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to
discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition,
they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the
respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word approved appears in
the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because
it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the constitutional
mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the
rules of the House,
[2]
the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call
for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo
from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112,
[3]
the Chair deliberately
ignored Rep. Arroyos question, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? and did not repeat Rep. Albanos
motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97,
[4]
the Chair refused to recognize Rep.
Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albanos motion and afterward declared the report
approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109,
[5]
the Chair
suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged, is a point of
order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyos query should have been resolved upon the
resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of
the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996
and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally
challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that
the law had been properly passed, considering the Courts power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of
grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a
reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
[6]
which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled
bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De
Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents defense is anchored on the principle of separation
of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled
bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its
rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they
implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a
bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No.
8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee
reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is
false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the
petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of
November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body
approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198.
[7]
This Journal was approved on
December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.
[8]

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim
that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the
House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision
that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings
[9]
and that for this reason they are
judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided
cases,
[10]
the constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings was
invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative
branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for
the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its
own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights
of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun,
[11]
it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that
the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed
to a particular measure.
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,
[12]
the rule was stated thus: The Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints
or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method
of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment
of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of
time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond
the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
In Crawford v. Gilchrist,
[13]
it was held: The provision that each House shall determine the rules of
its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the
proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints,
and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination
of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any
power, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the
Constitution.
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,
[14]
the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: The
provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of
the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the
subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and
also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for
noncompliance with rules.
In State v. Savings Bank,
[15]
the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows:
The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall
have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of
proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused,
but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion
of the independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because
it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure.
In McDonald v. State,
[16]
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: When it appears that an act was so
passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied
strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final
passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an
act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself, or the
respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such
adjudications, we decline to follow them.
Schweizer v. Territory
[17]
is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma
provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the
legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote,
suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law
punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the
legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite
two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular
manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in accordance with its own rules,
or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a
statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives
its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the
legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner,
might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is
shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be
no reason for the courts refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each
branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its
deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W. 187; State
v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando,
commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be
given to a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative body the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.
[18]

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to
look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate
sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere
comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of
the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcions sponsorship in the
Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, nothing involving abuse of discretion *by
the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial
review.
[19]
Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that
the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and,
therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has
broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide,
such as those relating to national security,
[20]
it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art.
VIII, 1, this Courts function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
[21]

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account
merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not
present a situation in which a branch of the government has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was railroaded. They claim that
Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion
approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee
report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none,
approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that .
. . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albanos motion for the
approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the
individual votes of the Members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is
a legislators nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases
such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the
manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a
unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the
bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the
bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was
answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr.
Tolentino said:
Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the
matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it
has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in.
. . . .
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is
now on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial
compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional
requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the
vote by saying Is there any objection? and nobody objects, then the Chair announces The bill is
approved on second reading. If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have
been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I
believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always
ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against.
[22]

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate and even more just.
[23]
The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do
not present any matter for judicial consideration.
[24]
In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the
deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and
esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed
to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem.
[25]

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time
a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a
bill,
[26]
at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
[27]
and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.
[28]
Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the
Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the
process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the
precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session.
[29]
It would appear, however, that
the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40
p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader
moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least
have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal
of November 21, 1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four
oclock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep.
Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of
submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep.
Arroyos question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyos question was not, in form
or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.
[30]
And even if Rep.
Arroyos question were so, Rep. Albanos motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have
put an end to any further consideration of the question.
[31]

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his
discretion. Indeed, the phrase grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of
power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the
courts by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases where a branch of the government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
[32]

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the
quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
[33]
Rep. Arroyo
waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a quorum.
[34]

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on
November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo,
appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea
did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings.
[35]
Rep. Lagman and Rep.
Zamora objected to the report
[36]
but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting
had been conducted, Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report.
[37]

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House
and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that
it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is
devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To
be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case
[38]
we went behind an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of
the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has
refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the
Constitution had not been obtained, because a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts.
[39]
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following
excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the
misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have
almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of
trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to
violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with
competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to
reflect credit upon the name of popular government.
[40]

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President
contained provisions which had been surreptitiously inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed
have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted
provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled
copy of the bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due
the other two departments of our government.
[41]

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in
violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall
be allowed.
[42]

In other cases,
[43]
this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as
certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text
writers here and abroad.
[44]
The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is
in conformity with the Constitution.
[45]

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our
cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say
that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have
an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano,
Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their
places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and
Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal
of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198,
which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the
Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting
such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall,
at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution
to be recorded therein.
[46]
With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,
[47]
this Court spoke of
the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as public memorials of the most permanent
character, thus: They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of
individuals. As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its
due enactment has been duly proven.
___________________
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its
own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case
[48]
may instead appropriately be made
here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No.
8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather
than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
[49]

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Romero, J., has a separate opinion.
Puno, J., has a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Davide, Jr., J., joined the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Puno.
Vitug, J., has a separate concurring opinion.
Regalado, J., in the result.
Bellosillo, J., took no part due to relationship with parties.
Panganiban, J., took no part. Former counsel of a party.
Torres, Jr., J., on leave during the deliberations.


























EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24806 February 13, 1926
JULIO AGCAOILI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ALBERTO SUGUITAN, defendant-appellee.
The appellant in his own behalf.
The appellee in his own behalf.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte. Its purpose
was to obtain the extraordinary legal writ of quo warranto. The petition was denied by the trial court
and the plaintiff appealed. The question presented by the appeal are:
(a) Is the provision of Act No. 3107, in so far as it provides that "justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years," valid and constitutional, when
applied to justices of the peace appointed under Act No. 2041, section 1, to serve "during good
behavior?" And,
(b) Is the present action barred by the statutes of limitations?
The facts involved in the decision of those questions are as follows:
(a) That the said Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of
Laoag, of the Province of Ilocos Norte, by His Excellency, Francis Burton Harrison, on the 25th
day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to hold the said office with all the powers,
privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to the conditions
prescribed by law.
The conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at the time of his
appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 (vol. 8 Public Laws, 153). Said section is
amendment to section 67 of Act No. 136, and provides among other things for the
"appointment and term of the justices of the peace." It provides that one justice of the peace
and one auxiliary justice shall be appointed by the Governor-General, etc., for each municipality
organized according to the Municipal Code. Said section further provides that "All justices of the
peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior . . . ." Said Act No. 2041 was
adopted, the Philippine Legislature was composed of the United States Commission and the
House of Representatives.
(b) That on the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature, composed of the Senate and
House of Representatives, adopted Act No. 3107, which was "an Act to amend and repeal
certain provisions of the Administrative Code relative to the judiciary in order to reorganize the
latter; increasing the number of judges for certain judicial districts; increasing the salaries of
judges of Courts of First Instance; vesting the Secretary of Justice with authority to detail a
district judge temporarily to a district or province other than his own; regulating the salaries of
justices of the peace; abolishing the municipal court and justice of the peace court of the City of
Manila and creating in lieu thereof a municipal court with three branches; regulating the salaries
of clerks of court and other subordinate employees of Courts of First Instance, and for other
purposes.
Notwithstanding the fact that the title of said Act No. (3107), so far as the same relates to justice of the
peace, provides only for "regulating the salaries of justices of the peace," said Act in section 203
provides for "the appointment and distribution of justices of the peace" with the proviso in said section
". . . That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached
the age of sixty-five years." Attention is here called to the fact again that there is nothing in the title of
the Act, which, in the slightest degree, indicates that said Act contains provisions for "appointment of
justices of the of the peace" nor as to the period during which they may serve after appointment.
Attention is also invited to the fact that the same section (203) contains provisions for the jurisdiction of
justices of the peace while section 207 contains provisions defining the"qualifications for justices of the
peace." Section 210 of said Act provides for the "filling of vacancies in the office of justices of the
peace." There is nothing in the title of the Act which in any way indicates that the Act contains said
provisions. Attention is here called to the provision of the Act of Congress of the 29th day of August,
1916, and to section 3 thereof, which provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject, and that the subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." The effect
of a violation of said provision of said Act of Congress will be discussed later.
(c) That on the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent the following letter to
the said Julio Agcaoili, through the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Third Judicial
District, of the Province of Ilocos Sur. Said letter is in the words and figures following:
MANILA, April 9, 1923
SIR: In view of the provision of section 203 of the Administrative Code as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 3107, which, in part, provides that justices and
auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years, and in view of the fact that the record shows
that you are over sixty-five years of age already, I have the honor to hereby
advise you that, upon receipt hereof, you cease to be a justice of the peace by
operation of said amendment of the Administrative Code.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS P. TORRES
Undersecretary of Justice
Said letter was received by Julio Agcaoili, the justice of the peace, on the 26th day of April, 1923. It was
handed to him by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte.
(d) It will be noted that in the letter of April 9, 1923, the Secretary of Justice directed or ordered Julio
Agcaoili, then justice of the peace, "upon receipt of said letter, to cease to be a justice of the peace."
Against the order contained in said letter of April 9th, Julio Agcaoili entered a protest dated April 28,
1923, in the following language:
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF COURT OF LAOAG, ILOCOS NORTE
P. I.
April 28, 1923
The Hon. LUIS TORRES
Undersecretary of Justice of
the Philippine Islands
SIR: The undersigned, Julio Agcaoili, justice of the peace of Laoag, capital of the Province
of Ilocos Norte, has the honor to state that on April 26, 1923, he received, through the
clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, your communication of April 9, 1923,
informing the undersigned that, having attained the age of 65 years, he ceased to be
justice of the peace of Laoag under the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 3107,
amending section 203 of the Administrative Code, which is Act No. 2711 enacted in the
year 1919, and which section 1 of said Act No. 3107 provides in part that the justices of
the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they attain
the age of 65 years.
With all due respect, the undersigned has the honor to state that he believes that the
aforecited part of the provision of section 1 of Act No. 3107 does not include those
justices of the peace who had already been appointed justices of the peace, like the
undersigned, before the passage and enactment of said Act No. 3107 and the amended
Administrative Code, nor can this be the intention of the legislator, for if it were so, it
should have so stated in order that the justices of the peace already appointed, who
were discharging the functions of the office and who had attained the age of 65 years
when said Act was passed and enacted, should cease from their office.
The undersigned was appointed of the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916, and therefore
under Act No. 2041, enacted February 3, 1911. Section 1 of this Act, which amended
section 67 of Act No. 136, was not amended by any subsequent Act and provides: All
justices if the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior and
those now in office who have not the qualifications required by this Act shall continue in
office until their successors are appointed.
Has section 203 of the Administrative Code amended or repealed section 1 of Act No.
2041? The undersigned believes that it has not, judging from the context of both laws,
nor was it repealed because if this were the case the Governor- General would have
renewed the appointments of all the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the
peace under said section 203 of the Administrative Code.
The undersigned was appointed justice of the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916, under
the said Act No. 2041 and continues in the discharge of the duties of the office up to the
present time, without the Governor-General having renewed his appointment under
said section 203 of the Administrative Code.
Then Act No. 3107 came, section 1 of which amends section 203 of the Administrative
Code.
Has this amendment retroactive effect? In the first place the legislature could not give
or have given this Act such a character, and if it had intended to do so, it would have so
stated; and in the second place, because not only is such express declaration lacking in
the law but Act No. 3107 very clearly provides that the justices of the peace and
auxiliary justices of the peace to be appointed shall hold office until they attain the age
of 65 years.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILI
Justice of the Peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte
A further protest against the said order of the Secretary of Justice was made by Julio Agcaoili on the 7th
day of July, 1923, and is couched in the following language:
I, Julio Agcaoili, Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, do
hereby state that on this day, July 7, 1923, Mr. Buenaventura Ocampo, Provincial Fiscal
of Ilocos Norte, appeared at my office and thereupon showed me the telegram of
Undersecretary of Justice Torres, addressed to said provincial fiscal. After reading said
telegram I asked the provincial fiscal to furnish me a copy thereof and he furnished me a
copy of the telegram.
Said telegram of the Undersecretary of Justice in substance orders the provincial fiscal;
to cause me to deliver the office and all the documents and records thereof to the
auxiliary justice of the peace, because according to said Undersecretary of Justice I must
cease from the office under Act No. 3107, and that I be prosecuted for violation of
article 370 of the Penal Codeshould I fail to comply with the telegram sent to me on the
2d instant by the same Undersecretary of Justice.
I do also state that I have never had any malicious intention to disobey the orders of the
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres, one given telegram and the other by letter. I
only desired to study the spirit of the law and this is the reason why I did not leave the
office until the present time, because I was from the office of the justice of the
peace under the provision of Act No. 2041 under which I was appointed justice of the
peace of the capital, and which Act was not repealed by any subsequent one, nor by Act
No. 3107, which Act No. 2041 provides that the justices of the peace to be appointed
under it, should hold office during good behavior. This Act does not say anything as to
limitation of age, and therefore I believe myself entitled to continue in, and retain the
office.
I do also state that lest the Undersecretary of Justice should think that I do not duly
respect the constituted authorities, I now deliver under protest the office of the justice
of the peace of Laoag and all its documents and records, as well as the furniture therein
contained, to Mr. Alberto Suguitan, auxiliary justice of the peace, in the presence of the
provincial fiscal, in compliance with the telegram of the Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.
Torres, received by me through the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte. I make under protest
the delivery of the office and its documents and records because I think, as I have stated,
that I must not cease from the office of justice of the peace, and in order that my right
may be defined, I shall institute an action in the proper court of justice to decide the
case.
(Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILI
I received the things of the office.
(Sgd.) ALBERTO SUGUITAN
In the presence of:
(Sgd.) BUENA V. OCAMPO Provincial Fiscal
Julio Agcaoili patiently waited in vain for a resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the protest which he
presented on the 28th day of April and on the 7th day of July, 1923; and not having received any reply to
his protest, filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Ilocos Norte on the 23d day of April, 1925, which petition was amended by the filing of another petition
in the same court on the 8th day of September, 1925.
A careful reading of the two protests (April 28, 1923, and July 7, 1923) shows that they contain
arguments in support thereof which, in all equity and justice, demanded a reply, but no reply was
forthcoming. The arguments in support of his protests find a counterpart and are fully supported in the
decision of this court in the case of Segovia vs. Noel, of March 4, 1925 (47 Phil., 543), wherein the
Supreme Court held that the Act No. 3107 could not be applied to and enforced against justices of the
peace who had been appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923. Had the Secretary of Justice
answered said protests, the great injustice which has been done to Julio Agcaoili perhaps might have
been avoided.
(e) That Julio Agcaoili being threatened with a criminal prosecution unless he turned his office over to
the auxiliary justice of the peace, and to avoid scandal, disgrace and humiliation which might come to
him by virtue of said prosecution, on the 7th day of July, 1923, still protesting, delivered the possession
of his office, as justice of the peace, to the auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag. It is
a matter of common knowledge that Julio Agcaoili had been entrusted with the highest office in his
province which the people could confer upon him.
The petitions presented by Julio Agcaoili in the Court of First Instance, the first on the 23d day of July,
1925, and the second on the 8th day of September, 1925, contain, in resume, the foregoing facts. To the
petition the respondent Alberto Suguitan answered and set up the defense of prescription. Upon the
issue thus presented, the Honorable Fermin Mariano, judge, sustained the defense of prescription and
denied the petition for the extraordinary legal remedy of quo warranto. From that judgment Julio
Agcaoili appealed, and now contends in a vigorous and logical argument that his remedy has not
prescribed.
Considering the first question suggested above, attention is again called to one of the provisions of
section 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, vol. 12, Public Laws of the Philippine
Islands). The "Jones Law" is the constitution of the Philippine Islands providing a government therefor.
Subparagraph 16 of section 3 of the Jones law provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Under said
provision, may the legislature adopt a law which contains in the title of the Act? The effect of violating
said provision of the Jones Law has been brought before the courts many times. The effect of violating
said provision has already been passed upon by this court. (Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883, 889.)
In the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, supra, it was decided that said provision of the Jones Law was
mandatory and not directory and its violation was fatal to any provision of the law to which no reference
was made in the title. In the decision of this court in the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, the decisions
of the courts of many of the states of the Union were followed. Many of the constitutions of the States
of the Union contain similar provision to that quoted above from the Jones Law. Among such states may
be mentioned Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
Wyoming.
Mr. Justice Sutherland, now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in his
valuable work on "Statutory Construction," vol. 1, 2nd ed.) at section 111, states the reason and the
purpose of such a constitutional provision. He says:
In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have kept steadily
in view the correction of the mischief against which it was aimed. The object is to prevent the
practice, which was common in all legislative bodies where no such restriction existed, of
embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other, or to the
subject specified in the title, by which measures were often adopted without attracting
attention. Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests, and were combined in order to
unite the members of the legislature who favor either in support of all. These combinations
were corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the state. Such omnibus bills sometimes
included more than a hundred sections on as many different subjects, with a title appropriate to
the first section, and for other purposes.
The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the
legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not
knowingly have approved. And not only were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so that
legislative provisions were stealthily pushed through in the closing hours of a session, which,
having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by popular discussion and
remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The constitutional clause
under discussion is intended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of
incongruous measures, by confining each act to one subject; to prevent surprise and
inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be expressed in the title.
The Supreme court of the State of Alabama, in discussing the effect of the violation of a similar provision
of the constitution of that state in the cases of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) and Lindsay vs. United
States Savings and Loan Association (120 Ala., 156), had the following to say, quoting with approval,
what Mr. Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, at page 143, had said upon that question:
The object sought to be accomplished, and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this
provision, are well known. . . . Legislative assemblies for the dispatch of business often pass bills
by their titles only, without requiring them to be read. A specious title sometimes covered a
legislation which, if its real character had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent.
To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provision was
intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision, the title of a statute was often no
indication of its subject or contents. . . .
An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the
same statute of such things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to
combine in favor of all the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage of several
measures, no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up
his review of the authorities, defining the objects of this provision: It may, therefore, be
assumed as settled, that the purpose of these provisions was: First, to prevent hodge-podge, or
log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by means of
provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people,
through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard
thereon, by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire. (49 Ala., 330, 331.)
The purposes of constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind, when it becomes
necessary to determine whether there has been legislative observance of it. The exposition of
these purposes by Judge Cooley is accepted, we believe, in all the states in which a like
limitation prevails. . . . (120 Ala., 172.)
In the case of People vs. Parks (58 Cal., 624) the Supreme Court of the State of California had occasion to
discuss the question now before us and said:
At the least, then two heterogeneous subjects are embraced in the act, one of which is not
expressed in the title, and they cannot be segregated. The title does not express the objects of
legislation embodied in the provisions of the act. It is, therefore, narrower than the body of the
act, and fails to impart that notice of the measures enacted, which the Constitution requires. To
prohibit such legislation was the sole end and aim of the constitutional requirement. The
practice, says the Supreme Court of Missouri, of comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse and
antagonistic nature, in order to combine in its support members who were in favor of particular
measures, but neither of which could command the requisite majority on its own merits, was
found to be not a corruptive influence in the Legislature itself, but destructive of the best
interests of the State. But this was not more detrimental than that other pernicious practice, by
which, through dexterous and unscrupulous management, designing men inserted clauses in the
bodies of bills, of the true meaning of which the titles gave no indication, and by skillful
maneuvering urged them on to their passage. These things led to fraud and injury, and it was
found necessary to apply a corrective in the shape of a constitutional provision. (City of St. Louis
vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 590.) The provision has been framed in the constitutions of many of the States
of the Union; and the courts, whenever it has come before them, have liberally construed it as
the will of the people in the interests of honest legislation.
Decisions to the same effect are found in the following cases: City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel (42 Mo., 578);
Cannon vs. Mathes (8 Heisk [Tenn.], 504); Ryerson vs. Utley (16 Mich., 269); Board of Public Education
for the City of Americus vs. Barlow (49 Ga., 232); Spier vs. Baker (120 Cal., 370).
Mr. Justice Sutherland, in a further discussion of the question, at section 112 of his work on Statutory
Construction, said:
The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has been pointed
out depends on judicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being regarded
as mandatory, and compliance with it essential to the validity of legislation. The mischief existed
notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of legislators; it might be expected to continue
notwithstanding that the obligation is formulated and emphasized in this constitutional
injunction, if it be construed as addressed exclusively to them, and only directory. It would, in a
general sense, be a dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the provisions of the
constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature, unless
it is clear beyond all question that such was intention of the framers of that instrument. It would
seem to be a lowering of the proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that it descends to
prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may be followed or disregarded at
pleasure. The fact is this: That whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon as directory
merely is very likely to be treated by the legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation, and
to be therefore habitually disregarded.
In the case of Cannon vs. Mathes, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Nicholson, in discussing the effect of the
violation of a constitutional provision like the one before us, said:
* * * This is a direct, positive, and imperative limitation upon the power of the Legislature. It
matters not that a bill has passed through three readings in each house, on three different days,
and has received the approval of the Governor; still it is not a law of the State if it embraces
more than one subject. . . .
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of Walker vs. State, supra, said:
It is settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us unanswerable, that this
provision of the Constitution is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to the general
assembly, but that it is mandatory, and it is the duty of courts to declare void any statute not
conforming to it. . . .
Mr. Justice Cooley in his valuable work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179. 180) states that our courts
have held, without exception, that such constitutional provision is mandatory.
Considering that the great weight of authority is to the effect that the provision like the one above
quoted from the Jones Law is mandatory; and considering that there is nothing in the title of Act No.
3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said Act contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary
justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years," we
are forced to the conclusions that, that provision is illegal, void and contrary to the mandatory provision
of the Jones Law, and that said law (3107) cannot be applied to justices and auxiliary justices of the
peace who were appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio Agcaoili was
forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as justice of the peace, he was
forced to do so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be restored to his position as justice of
the peace of the municipality of Laoag, without delay.
With reference to the second question above suggested, in re prescription or limitation of the action, it
may be said that originally there was no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo
warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and
prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government. The ancient writ of quo
warranto was a high prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by the King against any one who
usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of the crown, to inquire by what authority the usurper
supported his claim, in order to determine the right. Even at the present time in many of the civilized
countries of the world the action is still regarded as a prerogative writ and no limitation or prescription
is permitted to bar the action. As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation,
civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right.
(McPhail vs. People ex rel. Lambert, 160 Ill., 77; 52 Am. St. Rep., 306; People ex rel. Moloney vs.
Pullman's Palace Car Co., 175 Ill., 125; 64 L. R. A., 366.)
In all public matters a writ of quo warranto is a writ of right at the suit of the state, and issues as a
matter of course upon demand of the proper officer (State ex rel. Washington County vs. Stone, 25 Mo.,
555; Commonwealth vs. Allen, 128 Mass., 308), and the court has no authority to withhold leave to file a
petition therefor.
If the statute of limitation or prescription cannot run against the state, it is difficult to understand how in
the same action they may be used as a defense against a public officer who has been forcibly, with
threats and intimidation, ousted from a public office by the Government itself as was done in the
present case. The principle that acts of limitation do not bind the King (the State) or the people, applies
to proceeding by quo warranto, the rule being that the representative of the state may file an
information on behalf of the people at any time; and the lapse of time constitutes no bar to the
proceeding, in conformity with the maxim Nullum tempus occurrit regi. (Catlett vs. People ex rel. States's
Attorney, 151 Ill., 16.) For the state to claim that the statutes of limitation do not apply to it and yet
insist that it may plead such statutes to bar the action of quo warranto brought by one of its public
officials whom it itself has ousted from office, appears to us to be unjust, unfair, unreasonable, and not
within the contemplation of sound jurisprudence.
So much of the general rule concerning limitation of action in quo warranto proceedings. Is there a
statute in the Philippine Islands of limitation, limiting the action of a public official of the Government
who has been duly appointed and qualified, and who has, by force and intimidation, been ousted from
such office, to defeat his action of quo warranto?
On the 7th day of August, 1901, the United States Philippine Commission adopted Act No. 190 which
had been considered privately and publicly for several months theretofore. Its provisions were
published throughout the Philippine Islands long prior to its adoption. While said Act was adopted on
the 7th day of August, 1901, it did not take effect, even though it had been published, until the 1st day
of October, 1901. (Act No. 212.) An examination of said Act (190) shows that it provides remedies for
the usurpation of office or franchise, etc. (secs. 197-216). Said Act No. 190 was published in both English
and Spanish. Section 216, in English, provided that "Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action
against a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after
the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer to be
ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the
office, arose." The same section (216), as published in Spanish, reads as follows: "Ninguna de estas
disposiciones facultara la iniciacion de un juicio contra una corporacion por la perdida de sus derechos de
concesion, a menos que el juicio se lleve a efecto dento de los cinco aos siguente a la comision u
omision del hecho objeto de la accion. Tampocose podra iniciar un juicio la persona que ejerza un cargo
en una corporaciuon para desposeerla, a menos que se lleve a efecto dentro del ao siguente a la fecha
de la comision del hecho que dio motivo a su privacion, o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el
cargo."
Said section (216), as published in Spanish and translated into English, reads as follows: "Nothing herein
contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of its corporate rights, unless the
same be commenced within five years after the commission or omission complained of took place.
Neither may an action be brought against an officer to oust him from office, unless the same is
commenced within one year after the commission of the act which caused the deprivation thereof, or
after the right to hold the office arose."
Said section 216, as above quoted in Spanish, was published in vol. 1 of the Public Laws of the Philippine
Islands and distributed to the public officers throughout the Philippine Islands. It is a fact of general
information that even now, in 1926, the Spanish copy of the Public Laws are consulted by the people in
remote parts of the Philippine Islands for the purpose of knowing what the law is. It is not strange,
therefore, that the appellant did not believe that said section 216 applied to public officers; that it only
applied to officers of corporations as it appeared in the Spanish translation. Is it just and fair and
reasonable for the Government of the Philippine Islands to oust one of its officers from an office to
which he had been legally appointed, by force and intimidation and without just cause, and then to
defeat his action in quo warranto by invoking the provisions of a public statute, different from the one
which the Government itself had furnished its public officers? The appellant is familiar with the Spanish
but not with the English language. He naturally relied upon the Spanish version of the law for his
information as to what the law really was. Not only had the appellant the right to rely upon the
provisions of section 216 as they appeared in Spanish in the Public Laws of the Philippine Islands, but the
reading of the three or four sections immediately preceding section 216 will show that they refer
specifically to corporations only. The appellant, therefore, was justified in believing that said section 216
as it appeared in Spanish was correct. At least the Government should give him credit with having in
good faith.
But, even granting that the appellant is bound by the provisions of section 216 as it appears in English, is
the same applicable to the appellant? By reference to said section above quoted in English, it will be
seen that after the word "committed" there is a semicolon. Does that which follows the semicolon have
reference to the same subject matter which precedes it? A semicolon is a mark of grammatical
punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree
greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must have relation to the
same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A
semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that
expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and
semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences,
the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the
comma. The punctuation used in a law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the
true meaning of a doubtful statute. It follows therefore that, inasmuch as all of the provisions of said
section 216 which precede the semicolon refer to corporations only, that which follows the semicolon
has reference to the same subject matter, or to officers of a corporation.
But even granting, for the sake of the argument, that the word "officer" as used in the latter part of said
section applies to public officers who have been ousted from their position, and not only to officers of
corporations, then we have the question presented: Had the one year mentioned in said section expired
on the 23d day of April, 1925, when the first complaint, was filed in the present action? When did the
year begin to run if said section is applicable to the appellant?
It will be remembered that on the 7th day of July, 1923, the appellant was ousted from his office as
justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag. Not only did he surrender his office on that date under
protest, but also on the 28th day of April, 1923, when he was notified by the Secretary of Justice that he
cease to be a justice of the peace of his municipality, he then protested and gave a long and lucid
argument in support of his protest. In all justice to him, did he not have a right, without any legal action
to protect his right, to await the solution of his protest of the 28th day of April, 1923? He had a right to
believe that the grounds upon which his protest was based would be convincing to the Secretary of
Justice and that he would not be removed. Until this very hour the record contains no reply from the
Secretary of Justice and no answer whatever to the legal grounds presented by the appellant upon his
right to continue as justice of the peace and not to be ousted.
In our opinion even granting that section 216 is applicable to the appellant, the period of prescription
had not begun and run at the time of the commencement of the present action. He was justified in
delaying the commencement of his action until an answer to his protest had been made. He had right to
await the answer to his protest, in the confident belief that it would be resolved in his favor and that
action would unnecessary.
It is contended, however, that the question before us was answered and resolved against the contention
of the appellant in the case of Bautista vs. Fajardo (38 Phil., 624). In that case no question was raised nor
was it even suggested that said section 216 did not apply to a public officer. That question was not
discussed nor referred to by any of the parties interested in that case. It has been frequently decided
that the fact that a statute has been accepted as valid, and invoked and applied for many years in cases
where its validity was not raised or passed on, does not prevent a court from later passing on its validity,
where the question is squarely and properly raised and presented, Where a question passes the court
sub silentio, the case in which the question was so passed is not binding on the Court (McGirr vs.
Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563), nor should it be considered as a precedent. (U. S. vs. Noriega and
Tobias, 31 Phil., 310; Chicote vs. Acasio, 31 Phil., 401; U. S. vs. More, 3 Cranch [U. S.], 159, 172; U. S. vs.
Sanges, 144 U. S., 310, 319; Cross vs. Burke, 146 U. S., 82.) For the reasons given in the case of McGirr vs.
Hamilton and Abreu, supra, the decision in the case of Bautista vs. Fajardo, supra, can have no binding
force in the interpretation of the question presented here.
The present case is anomalous under American sovereignty. An officer was appointed in accordance
with the law to the judiciary to serve "during good behavior." After he had faithfully and honestly served
the Government for a number of years the legislature adopted a new law which arbitrarily, without
giving any reason therefore, provided that said officer cease to be such when he should reach the age of
65 years. Said law contained no express provision or method for its enforcement. The Executive
Department, through its Undersecretary of Justice, without any authority given in said law, notified the
said officer that he was no longer an officer in the judicial department of the Government and must
vacate his office and turn the same over to another, who was designated by said Undersecretary. When
the officer protested against such arbitrary action, giving reasons therefor, and without answering said
protest, he was threatened with a criminal prosecution if he did not immediately vacate his office. The
history of this case reads more like a story of the Arabian Nights than like a procedure under a well-
organized Government. It seems impossible to believe, and we could not believe it, were the facts not
actually supported by the record.
Why the Undersecretary of Justice did not follow the orderly procedure marked out by Act No. 190 is
not explained. The appellant was given no hearing. Even his protest, couched in most humble and
respectful language, fell upon deaf ears. Absolute indifference was shown to the respectful protest and
the able argument given in support thereof. The only answer to his protest was a threat of a criminal
prosecution if he did not vacate his office. His humility was met with austereness. His humble petition
was met with a threat. His patient waiting for a reply to his protest was ended by a demand that he be
prosecuted for refusing to comply with an order by one who was not willing to follow the well-defined
and well-beaten road of "due process of law" by preferring charges and giving the appellant an
opportunity to be heard and to defend his right. Nothing of that character took place. The whole
procedure, from beginning to end, in ousting the appellant from an office to which he had been legally
appointed and against whom no complaint has been made, is anomalous in the jurisprudence under the
American flag.
Believing as I do, that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence to the
fundamentals of the law, I have never yielded, and I hope that I may never yield, to considerations of
expediency in expounding it. There is also some plausible reason for the latitudinarian constructions
which are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring power some evil to be avoided, or some good to
be attained by pushing the powers of the Government beyond their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding
to such influences that the courts and legislatures are gradually undermining and finally overthrowing
constitutions. It is by yielding to such influences that constitutions are gradually undermined and finally
overthrown. It has been, and is my purpose, so far as it is possible for me, to follow the fundamental law
does not work well the people or the legislature may amend it. If, however, the legislature or the courts
undertake to cure defects in the law by forced and unnatural constructions, they inflict a would upon
the constitution of the state which nothing can cure. One step taken by the legislature or the judiciary in
enlarging the powers of the Government, opens the door for another which will be sure to follow; and
so the process goes on until all respect for the fundamental law is lost and the powers of the
Government are just what those in authority are pleased to call them. (Oakley vs. Aspinwall, 3 Comstock
[N. Y.], 547, 568.) I cannot give my consent to a rule or doctrine which will permit a Government to
throw an honest and efficient official out of office without reason and without authority of law, refuse
to consider a protest, and then permit the application of a law to prevent a recovery of that which he
has lost illegally and without reason.
The judgment appealed from should be revoked, and a judgment should be entered ordering the
restoration of the appellant to the office from which he was illegally rejected. We should follow the
effect of the doctrine announced solemnly by this court in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543). So
ordered.
Villamor, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johns, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring and dissenting:
(1) I concur in so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson as relates to the legal issue presented in the
lower court and here, pertaining to the question of whether or not the present action was barred by the
Statute of Limitations, and in entire accord with the reversal of the judgment and the reinstatement of
Julio Agcaoili, the appellant, in his office as justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. My reasons are
these:
(A) Act No. 3107, providing that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to
serve until they have reached the age of 65 years, should not be given retroactive effect. That
was expressly decided in the analogous case of Segovia vs. Noel ([1925], 47 Phil., 543).
(B) Plaintiff's action is not barred by the provisions of section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
That section particularly confines itself to an action "against a corporation." Thereafter following
a semicolon, comes the clause "nor shall an action be brought against an officer," which plainly
relates back to "corporation." Otherwise, the new idea would neither have been expressed in a
separate section or in a separate sentence. That this is true is further borne out by the Spanish
transaction, making use of the phrase "la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporacion,"
which we are privileged to consult to explain an ambiguity in the English text.
(C) Even under the supposition the section 216 of the code of Civil Procedure applies, still it is
not clear that one year has elapse "after the cause of such ouster, . . . arose." In reality, no cause
for ouster has arisen since it was an erroneous interpretation of the law which met with the
disposal of the Supreme Court, which resulted in the attempt to force Mr. Agcaoili out of the
office and to place the auxiliary justice of the peace on office. The most that could be said of the
attempted ouster is that the auxiliary justice of the peace became a justice of the peace de
facto.
(2) I dissent from so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, as discusses the question of whether or
not the provisions of act No. 3107 are costitutional, as unnecessary to a decision, as not submitted for
decision, and so as entirely uncancelled for.
The complaint for quo warranto presented in the court of first Instance contained the usual allegations
without, however, making any reference at all to the constitutionality of Act No. No. 3107. the answer
set up presentation. The trial judge announcing the theories of the parties said: "The defense of the
defendant is that the action brought by the plaintiff has prescribed because since July 7, 1923, when he
left his office, no complaint was filed until April 23, 1925, and, therefore, more than one year had
elapsed. The plaintiff in turn alleges that there is no such prescription," and then proceeded to deny the
petition. On appeal this court, the errors assigned by Mr. Agcaoili as appellant are these:
(1) The lower court erred in holding that the action of the petitioner had prescribed on account
of the same not having been brought within one year from July 7, 1923, when by an illegal order
of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, the petitioner forcibly ceased to discharge the duties
of the office of justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, and respondent assumed said office
and began to act as such justice of the peace.
(2) The lower court erred in applying tot he instant case the provisions of section 216 of act No.
190 (Code of Civil Procedure).
(3) The lower court erred in finding that the period of prescription must be counted from July 7,
1923, instead of March 4, 1925.
(4) The lower court finally erred in not granting the relief invoked by the petitioner; in not
ousting the respondent from the office of justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, in not
reinstating the petitioner in said office and in not sentencing the respondent to pay the costs
and damages caused to the petitioner in the sum of P5,000."
There is not one word either in appellant's brief or in appellee's brief on the subject of the
constitutionality of Act No. 3107.
Had not the constitutional question been discussed and decided without it being suggested anywhere in
the bill of executions, in the assignments of error, on in the briefs, it would hardly be necessary to cite
well known principles as these:
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one
which the judge, cconscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising
in any case where he can consciously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility. . . .
. . . The task . . . is a delicate one, and only to be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation. . .
.
Neither will a court, as a general rule pass a constitutional question, and decided a statute to be
invalid, unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the determination of the
cause. "While courts cannot shun the discussion of constitutional questions when fairly
presented, they will not go out of their way to find such topics. They will not seek to draw in
such weighty matters collaterally, nor on trivial occasions. It is both more proper and more
respectful to a coordinate department to discuss constitutional questions only when that is the
very lis mota . . ." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 227, 228, 231.)
STREET, J., dissenting:
This is an action of quo warranto instituted in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte by Julio Agcaoili
for the purpose of restoring his restoration to the office of justice of peace of Laoag and to secure the
removal of the defendant, Alfredo Saguitan, from the present employment of the same office. Upon
hearing the cause of the trial judge, while recognizing the theoritical right of the plaintiff's right of
section had been barred by the limitation prescribed in section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He
therefore denied the writ, with half costs, and the plaintiff appealed.
It appears that on March 25, 1916, the plaintiff was appointed by the Governor-general to the office of
Justice of the peace of Laoag, in the Province of Ilocos Norte, effective from April 10, 1916, subject to
the conditions prescribed by law. This appointment was approved by the Philippine Senate, and the
plaintiff entered upon the discharged of his duties in due course. At that time there was no age limit
upon the tenure of office of justices of the peace, but on March 17, 1923, act No. 3107 of the Philippine
Legislature went into effect. By this Act, appointment of justices of the peace, was amended by the
addition of a proviso to the first auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they
have reached the age of sixty-five years."
In the year 1923 the plaintiff herein had attained the age of 65; and the Secretary of Justice, supposing
that was applicable to the case, brought Administrative Code was applicable tot he case, brought
administrative pressure to bear upon the plaintiff, with the result that the plaintiff ceased to exercise
the functions of justice of the peace for Laoag and the Governor-General to the same office. This
appointment having been approved by the Senate, the said Suguitan entered upon the discharge of the
duties thereof.
On March 4, 1925, this court promulgated the decision in the case of segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543),
wherein we decided that the amendment contained in Act No. 3107 to section 203 of the Administrative
Code should be given prospective application only, with the result that said provisions is not applicable
to a justice of the peace appointed prior to enactment of the amendatory law. When this decision was
promulgated it came to the attention of the plaintiff, and the present action was stipulated by him
shortly thereafter for the purpose of obtaining his restoration to the office. Practically the only defense
insisted upon in the court below was to the effect that the action had prescribed under the one-year
limitation; and the only question made in this appeal arises upon the application of said section.
It appears from he record that the plaintiff was ousted from office on July 7, 1923, and that the
defendant, as auxiliary justice of the peace, then entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office,
by direction of Governor-General Wood, in the character of a temporary appointee to the vacancy.
Later, as already stated, Suguitan entered upon the discharged of the duties of the office under
commission from the Governor-General, approved by the Philippine Senate, effective from December
13, 1923. It is therefore apparent that more than a full year had elapse between the removal of the
plaintiff from office and the date of the institution of the present action; and more than a year had also
elapsed later the defendant began the discharge of the duties of the office as a regularly commissioned
justice of the peace.
The section of the Code of civil Procedure, the application of which is here in question, reads, in English,
as follows:
SEC. 216. Limitations. Nothing herein continued shall authorized an action against a
corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the
act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer to
be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to
hold the office arose.
The same section as it stands in a current version of the Spanish translation differ somewhat, in the
second member from the English version, a s will be seen by comparing the Spanish version, which reads
as follows:
ART. 216. De las limitaciones. Ninguna de estates disposiciones facultara la perdida de sus
derechos de concesion, a menos que el jioco se lleve a efecto dentro de los cinco anos sigientes
a la comision u omision del hecho objecto de la accion. Tampoco se podra inciar un juicio contra
la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporacion para desposeerla, a menos que se lleve a
fecto dentro del ao siguinte la fecha de la comision del hecho que dio motivo a su privacion, o
que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo.
Upon comparison of these version it will be seen that the word office (cargo) in the second sentenced of
the Spanish version is qualified by the expression "en una corporacion." The plaintiff, relying upon the
Spanish version, insist that the provision is not applicable to a public office, like that of justice of the
peace; and it is further insisted that the whole section deals exclusively with the subject of the writ
of quo warranto as used against a corporation or against a person in possession of a corporate office.
I am unable to accede to this view of the law. Upon examination of section 197 to 216, inclusive, of the
Code of Civil Procedure, it will be found that two subjects are there threated, namely, usurpation of
franchise by corporation and usurpation of office; and the evident purpose of this part of the Code is to
define the conditions under which the writ of quo warranto may be final section (sec. 216) dealing with
the subject, a limitation is prescribe for both. The first member of the section, down as far as the
semicolon in the English version, prescribes a limitation of five years upon any action instituted against a
corporation for forfeiture of its charter. In the matter following the semicolon is found the limitation
appropriate to the case where instituted to oust the incumbent and to secure the office for the person
unlawfully kept from the occupancy thereof. The prescription established for this case is one year.
A careful perusal of the section, in connection with related provisions of the Code, leaves no room for
doubt that have actions over public of the section was instituted to apply to actions over public officer
as well as corporate offices; and in this sense said provision has been applied by this court. (Bautista vs.
Fajardo, 38 Phil., 624.) The author, or authors, of the Code of Civil Procedure could hardly have intended
for this provision to be applied only to corporate officers, since there is a public interest in public offices
which requires there should be a prescriptive provision applicable to actions over these offices no less
than to actions over the offices of corporations. The insertion "en una corporacion" after the word
"cargo" was evidently a mere mistake, resulting from a superficial attention to the context; and it will be
found that in the Spanish edition to the Code of civil Procedure edited by C. M. Recto this phrase has
been dropped. It goes without saying that the English version of the Code of civil Procedure is
controlling, and in case of conflict the courts must be governed by this version. The suggestion
contained in the opinion of the court of the Spanish language is novel and if followed by us in the future
will be the source of much uncertainty in the interpretation and application of our statutes.
The opinion of the court contains a lengthy dissertion intended to demonstrate that the amendment of
section 203 of the Administrative Code contained in act No. 3107 is unconstitutional, for defect in the
title of the Act. With this provision I am also unable to agree. The title to act No. 3107 begins with theses
words: "An Act to amend and repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code in my opinion broad
enough to include the amendment of section 203 relating the analysis of Title IV of the Administrative
Code it will be found that justices of the peace are; and although the provisions of act No. 3107 are
variously, they have this in common, that they deal with different parts of the judiciary establishment
and are intended that a pronouncement as to the constitutionality of the amendment in question was
by no means called for in this case, not only because the point was not raised in the discussion of the
case but for the further reason that we the plaintiff.
RESOLUTION UPON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION
February 26, 1926
The clerk having before it for consideration, (a) the motion of Alberto Suguitan for a reconsideration of
the decision of the court promulgated on February 13, 1926, and (b) the motion of the Secretary of
Justice, praying for leave to appear in the said decision in relation with said motions, it is hereby ordered
and decreed that said decision heretofore announcement, be modified, to the end that the decision of
all the questions involved ins aid decision be limited tot he following alone:
(a) That said act No. 3107 can have no application to the petitioner herein, following the
doctrine heretofore announced in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543); and,
(b) That the defense of the limitation or prescription contended for by the respondent does not
apply to the petitioner under the particular facts of this cause. Modifying the decision
heretofore announced, as herein indicated, and basing the decision upon the two grounds
above-mentioned only the eliminating all remarks made about the action and conduct of the
Acting Secretary of Justice, said motions are hereby denied. Avancea, C. J., Street and Ostrand,
JJ., adhering tot he dissenting opinion heretofore promulgated, concur nevertheless in this
resolution.
Avancea, C.J. and Ostrand, J., concur.

























EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his
capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila,
CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO,
PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO,
JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO
QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE
VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the Municipal
Board,respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor
Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary and
Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic
Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila,
Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred
Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of
Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith
the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces
and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably
recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City
Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in
case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial
amendments to Section 1
1
were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were
approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in
the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House
Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the
letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and
not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of
Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies
thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary
of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the
Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed
copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of
approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City
Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement
that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a
wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through
the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines,
explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well
as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered
his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964
made the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that
the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact
that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses
of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature
on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it
would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the
two Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department
heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers
of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued
an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to
the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a
petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the
Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City
Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill
actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill
itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip, this
Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga
from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of
Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under
any other law until further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of
Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared
as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the
parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United States
Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine
or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before
this Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5,
1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill"
doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein
constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an
amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity
rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran,
Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was
not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our
government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional
question, the reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to
the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill
rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the
Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled
copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section
313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of
Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It
reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the
case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in
existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall
be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the
signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved
bill.
2
It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication,
3
to signify to the Chief
Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his
approval or rejection.
4
The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is
considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the
Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their
absence would render the statute invalid.
5
The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect
giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the
contrary
6
There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the
Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted
to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a
bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as
conclusive proof of its due enactment.
7
Another case however, under the same circumstances, held that
the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence.
8
But in the case of Field vs. Clark,
9
the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is
conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this
point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of
such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through
their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due
form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to
him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress
shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is
deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all billsauthenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if
the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort
to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical
conclusion reached in a number of decisions,
10
although they are silent as to whether the journals may
still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not
require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following
provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior
to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be
allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a
bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government,
11
is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on
the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant
that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when
the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure
any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the
signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill
passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President.
12
In Brown vs.
Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution,
said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a
bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has
"passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof
by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no
attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act
No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry
to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the
statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or
not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking,
13
but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed
and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become
law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the
law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065
entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF
THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The
temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.