Annex A

Process Safety Time in Project lifecycle

A.1 Introduction
Although the workflow process and procedures provided in this GN are primarily
aimed at process safety time assessment for operating assets, they are equally
valid for use during project development stages as well. Following sections
discusses some of the variations which need to be considered while using the
GN during greenfield project development.
A.2 Timing
The figure C.1 outlines where in the overall lifecycle process safety time
assessment would need to be taken up. It also maps key stages of SIS safety
lifecycle defined in IEC- 61511-1
[11]
against the project lifecycle. The proposed
approach identifies the Safety Requirement Specification as a project deliverable
prior to both FSA stage 1 (approved for design) and FSA stage 2 (approved for
construction/use)
Process Safety Time activity is only mandated for Safety Requirement
Specifications and therefore, can be developed during define whilst developing
the SIF architecture for design. This can then be validated during execute
stage, at the end of detailed design, in line with SIF verification activities for
delivering a fully developed Safety Requirement Specification.
During define stage Process Safety Time activity can begin after preliminary
Hazard Analysis, referred as Critical Review of P&IDs using HAZOP approach
(CRPH), and SIF identification using LOPA are complete. Process Safety Times
may be useful in some cases to support Inherently Safer Design (ISD) review
during select phase but the level of engineering definition will limit the suitability
of any calculations prior to Process Hazard Analysis.
Usually at the end of define there is insufficient engineering detail to give final
PST value, therefore, PST calculations may require further iteration in execute
where sufficient details are available to carry out more rigorous calculations. This
is likely to be those hazardous event scenarios requiring transient analysis to
determine whether the SIF response time is adequate (e.g. compressor analysis
& transient overpressure events)









Figure C.1 - Process Safety Time in Major Projects

















A.3 Roles and responsibilities
All the roles and responsibilities identified in the Section 4.0 of this GN are based
on generic organisation structure for an asset or region within Global Operation
Organisation. For a project organisation these can be substituted by equivalent
discipline roles within the project team.
A.4 Input data
All the design data requirements specified in Table A.1 are also valid for projects.
However, the design documents need not reflect the current status of the
facility. Instead, the input documents needs to be Approved for Design for PST
during define stage. While for PST validation during execute phase, the
document needs to be Approved for Construction /Use.
A.5 Study findings and action close out
Unlike operating assets where the actions resulting from the PST study are risk
ranked and prioritised based on the associated risk for continued operation, for
projects, all the actions needs to be addressed prior to design implementation.
SELECT
ISD Review
DEFINE

SELEC
T
Feed
Detailed Design
CRPH
LOPA
PST Development
SRS
(Approved for
Design)
EXECUTE
HAZOP
LOPA
PST Validation
SRS
(Approved for
Construction)
ISD Review
Allocation of
safety
Functions to
protection layers
Design and engineering of
Safety instrumented system
SIS safety life-cycle phases
DEFINE
Stage 1
FSA

Hazard and Risk
Assessment



Design and development of other
means of risk reduction
Stage 2
FSA
However, the focus needs to be on early identification of changes which can
adversely affect the cost and schedule.
It is therefore important that actions with significant design change or hardware
modifications are identified during define stage PST development. Experience
suggests that deferring the PST development in the projects up until the stage
where they are required to be demonstrated for regulatory or standard
compliance results in a situation where corrective actions are difficult to make
and can cause significant cost and schedule impact.