ROSARIO DELOS REYES vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR (A.M. No.

1334 November 28, 1989)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2013Labels: Disbarment, Lawyers, Legal Ethics
FACTS:

Complainant is a second year medical student of the Southwestern University in which
respondent Atty. Aznar is the then Chairman of the College of Medicine. Complainant was compelled
to go to Manila with respondent for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon
the threat of respondent that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would flunk in all her
subjects and she would never become a medical intern. After due investigation, the Solicitor General
found the respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that since the complainant is
partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a
married man ,with children, a rich man and is not practicing his profession before the court, he should
merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposition of the penalty is proper.

HELD: NO.

The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to
bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission
thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the
practice of law.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for disbarment or
suspension from his office as attorney, among others, by grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct
has been defined as that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent to have taken advantage of his position
in asking complainant to go with him under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case
she refused.

Respondent Jose B. Aznar is DISBARRED.
A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her
verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal
knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she
would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became
pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying
any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by
way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University,
the Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp.
11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);
2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to
approach respondent in the latter's house who assured her that she
would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go
with him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42,
50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the
same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they
proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they
stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish
restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp
56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where
respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next
morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because
for her, she would sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her
subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was
suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn,
July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college
of medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed
upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato
fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext that she would be
examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and
an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn,
July 17, 1 975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an
abortion had already been performed upon her and she was weak,
bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ...
... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant
introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10,
1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal
examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of
abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador
Hotel with his wife and children; respondent never came to Manila
except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila
(p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent;
the latter had male companions at the hotel but he did not see any
woman companion of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with
him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13,
1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the
complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's
approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the
school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the
defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the
complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect that
respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with
respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in
all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6,
1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant had every
reason to believe him.
It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to
Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge
of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail
in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6,
1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true
that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent
usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is
not much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and
slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ...
Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his
wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however, are February 12
to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present
case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has been
substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and
uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine
whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p.
69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar
be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously
submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General that
respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is
guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme
Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the offense
imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on
respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained
of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual
intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While
this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really
felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a
fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor
downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439
[1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. ... In the
case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails
to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy
things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek
to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but
actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa
SCRA 439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with
respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent
should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since
a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his
recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a
lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said period
and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to
marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's
marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for
sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral
ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As
chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to
believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would
deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very
rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70),
mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact
that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a
person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2,
Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good
moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality
(Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v.
Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct,
as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly
immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a
lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant
by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children,
disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks
20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken
advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she
would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys.
IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This case stemmed from a petition for disbarment filed with this Court by Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac
against her nephew, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro Manila, for "his failure to
adhere to the standards of mental and moral fitness set up for members of the bar."
[1]

The records show that in January 1985, respondent induced complainant who was then 85 years
old to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to him for safekeeping. Respondent told her
that if she withdraws all her money in the bank, they will be excluded from the estate of her deceased
husband and his other heirs will be precluded from inheriting part of it.
Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all her time deposits with the
Philippine National Bank on January 18, 1985. She withdrew P588,000.00.
Respondent then advised complainant to deposit the money with Union Bank where he was
working. He also urged her to deposit the money in his name to prevent the other heirs of her
husband from tracing the same.
Complainant heeded the advice of respondent. On January 22, 1985, respondent deposited the
amount of P588,000.00 with Union Bank under the name of his wife in trust for seven beneficiaries,
including his son. The maturity date of the time deposit was May 22, 1985.
On May 21, 1985, complainant made a demand on respondent to return the P588,000.00 plus
interest. Respondent told her that he has renewed the deposit for another month and promised to
return the whole amount including interest on June 25, 1985. Respondent, however, failed to return
the money on June 25, 1985.
On August 16, 1985, respondent informed complainant that he could only return P400,000.00 to
be paid on installment. Complainant acceded to respondent's proposal as she was already old and was
in dire need of money.
On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a memorandum of agreement stating:
"WHEREAS, on January 22, 1985, (complainant) entrusted for safekeeping to (respondent) the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P588,000.00) which sum of money was withdrawn
by the parties from the Philippine National Bank on said date.
WHEREAS, the said amount was deposited by (respondent) with the consent of (complainant) with the
UNION BANK, J.P. Rizal Branch, Makati, Metro Manila.
WHEREAS, upon mutual agreement of the parties, they have agreed as they hereby agree on the
following terms for the purpose of disposing of the above sum, to wit:
1. Of the sum of P588,000.00 received in trust, (respondent) shall return only the sum of P400,000.00
to (complainant) in the following manner:
a) P100,000.00 upon execution of this agreement;
b) P200,000.00 on or before October 19, 1985, to be covered by postdated check;
c) P100,000.00 on or before November 19, 1985, to be covered by a postdated check.
2. (Respondent) hereby undertakes and guarantees that at the time the aforesaid postdated checks
fall due, the same should be backed up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis.
3. That the remaining balance of P188,000.00, (respondent) hereby acknowledges the same as his
indebtedness to (complainant) to be paid by the former when able or at his option. (Complainant)
however assures (respondent) that she will not institute any collection suit against (respondent) (sic),
neither will she transmit the same by way of testamentary succession to her heirs, neither are
(respondent's) heirs liable.
4. That the parties have executed this agreement with the view of restoring their previous cordial filial
relationship."
[2]

In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, respondent issued to complainant the
following checks:
1. UCPB Check No. 487974 dated August 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00;
2. UCPB Check No. 487975 dated October 19, 1985 in the amount of P200,000;
3. UCPB Check No. 487976 dated November 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00.
Complainant was not able to encash UCPB Check No. 487974 as it was dishonored due to
insufficient funds.
Respondent, nonetheless, asserted that he was not duty-bound to fund the check because under
paragraph 2 of the memorandum of agreement, he only guaranteed that the checks shall be "backed
up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis." This prompted the other relatives of respondent and
complainant to intervene in the brewing dispute between the two. They begged respondent to pay his
obligation to complainant. Heeding their plea, respondent replaced UCPB Check No. 487974 with two
new checks, one for P64,800.00 and another forP35,200.00. Complainant was able to encash the first
check but not the second because it was dishonored by the drawee bank. The remaining checks, UCPB
Check No. 487975 and UCPB Check No. 487976, were likewise dishonored by the drawee bank for lack
of funds.
On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against respondent and a
corresponding information was filed against him by the provincial fiscal.
Respondent thereafter made a proposal to complainant for an amicable settlement. To pay his
debt, respondent offered to complainant two second hand cars and cash amounting
to P40,000.00. Complainant refused the offer because she needed cash to provide for her daily needs.
The records also show that respondent filed several suits against complainant.
First, in February 1985, respondent filed a criminal case for estafa against complainant. It appears
that respondent has previously told the tenants of a parcel of land owned by complainant that she had
promised to sell them the land and that she had authorized him to negotiate with them. He obtained
from the tenants advance payment for the lots they were occupying. Respondent then prepared a
special power of attorney
[3]
authorizing him to sell the land and asked complainant to sign
it. Complainant, however, refused to sign because she did not intend to make respondent her
attorney-in-fact. Hence, the tenants sued respondent for estafa. Respondent, in turn, sued
complainant for estafa for allegedly reneging on her promise to sell the land.
Then, on April 5, 1986, respondent filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Review Acts of
Administratrix as a Prelude for Formal Motion to (sic) her Discharge" in Special Proceedings No. 5544
for the settlement of the estate of complainant's husband, pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
[4]
Respondent filed the pleading although he was not a party to the case.
Finally, on May 19, 1986, respondent indicted complainant for "falsification by private individuals
and use of falsified documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code" for allegedly making
untruthful statements in her petition for appointment as administratrix of the estate of her deceased
husband.
[5]

Thus, in June 1986, complainant filed with this Court a complaint to disbar respondent on two
grounds: (1) that respondent employed clever scheme to defraud complainant, and (2) that
respondent filed frivolous cases against complainant to harass her.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for disbarment against complainant's counsel, Atty.
Abelardo Viray. The complaint cited four causes of action: (1) assisting client to commit tax fraud; (2)
use of unorthodox collection method; (3) ignorance of the law; and (4) subornation of perjury.
[6]

Both disbarment cases were consolidated and referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The cases were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and
disposition pursuant to Section 20 Rule 139-B which took effect on June 1, 1988.
After investigation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for two years. It also recommended the dismissal of the
complaint to disbar Atty. Viray for lack of merit.
[7]

On January 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XII-96-22 stating:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above entitled case, hereinmade part
of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation therein to be
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Orlando
A. Rayos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and the complaint
against Atty. Abelardo V. Viray is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."
[8]

On June 6, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with regard to Administrative Case
No. 2884.
[9]
The Board of Governors of the IBP, however, denied the motion in Resolution No. XII-96-
193.
[10]

On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion to Lift Suspension for Two
Years, alleging that complainant has executed an affidavit withdrawing the complaint for
disbarment.
[11]

We deny the motion of respondent.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides:
"A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any man's cause."
Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his oath as an attorney
when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him all her money, and later refused to return
the same despite demand. Respondent's wicked deed was aggravated by the series of unfounded suits
he filed against complainant to compel her to withdraw the disbarment case she filed against
him. Indeed, respondent's deceitful conduct makes him unworthy of membership in the legal
profession. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession.
[12]

Considering the depravity of respondent's offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP
to be too mild. Such offense calls for the severance of respondent's privilege to practice law not only
for two years, but for life.
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in
any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven.
[13]
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension
or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of
the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
[14]
Hence, if the evidence on record
warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges. In the instant case, it has been sufficiently proved that respondent has
engaged in deceitful conduct, in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
respondent's record in the Bar Confidant's Office and furnished the IBP and all our courts.
SO ORDERED.