IN RE SHOOP

41 Phil 213

FACTS:

Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the Philippines under Par. 4 of the Rules for the
Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law. It was shown in his application that he
was practicing for more than 5 years in the highest court of the State of New York.

The said rule requires that:New York State by comity confers the privilege of admission without
examination under similar circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands.
(Aside from comity, the satisfactory affidavits of applicants must show they have practiced at least 5
years in any (district or circuit or highest) court of the US or territory of it. But admission is still in the
discretion of the court.)

The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits admission without examination in the discretion
of the Appellate Division in several cases:

1. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a member of the bar in the highest law
court in any other state or territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia
2. The applicant practiced 5 years in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles
of the English Common Law (ECL).

ISSUE:
Whether or not under the New York rule as it exists the principle of comity is established

RULING:
The Philippines is an unorganized territory of the US, under a civil government established by the
Congress.
In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions
in cases not covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories and precedents of
Anglo-American cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of the
Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases where such precedents
are inconsistent with local customs and institutions.New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys
admitted to practice in the Philippines similar to those privileges accorded by the rule of this court.
PETITION GRANTED. Decision is based on the interpretation of the New York rule; does not establish a
precedent with respect to future applications.





GOVERNMENT VS SPRINGER
GR No. L-26979

FACTS:
In 1900s, the National Coal Company was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act
No. 2822) provides that: The voting power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the
Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

In November 1926, the Governor-General Leonard Wood issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting
rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right
should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that
time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO
was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.

In December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker,
notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and
four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the
government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of
NCC.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members
of NC

RULING:

No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the
persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a
government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of
Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of
the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there
are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception
can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch
this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.




FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS
177 SCRA 668

FACTS:
Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. In his deathbed,
petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the
implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under
the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor, according to the petitioners,
may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines

RULING:

The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The president is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the state and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against
threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct
protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is
DISMISSED.












IN RE: CUNANAN

FACTS:

Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In
accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates
who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending
also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have
sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To
avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid

RULING:

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.






Angara v. Electoral Commission,
G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936


FACTS

Jose Angara the petitioner was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 8, 1935, however, private
respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission
of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its
own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before
December 9, 1935. The petitioner sought the dismissal of respondents protest. The Electoral Commission
however denied his motion.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

RULING

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding
the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission. The petition is denied.







MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51 % of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding, only two bidders participated. Petitioner Manila
Prince, a Filipino Corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share and
RenongBerhad, a Malaysian Firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share.
Pending the declaration of RenongBerhad as the winning bidder, petitioner matches the bid price of
P44.00 per share by RenongBerhad. Subsequently, petitioner sent a manager's check as bid security to
match the bid of RenongBerhad which respondent GSIS refuse to accept. Apprehensive that GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated which RenongBerhad,
petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be preferred after it has match the bid offered of Malaysian firm under
Section 10, second paragraph of Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
Article 12, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos." It means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. When the Constitution
speaks of "national patrimony", it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark- a living testimonial of Philippine Heritage. While it was restrictively
an American Hotel when it first opened, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Verily, Manila Hotel
has become part of our national economy and patrimony. Respondents further argue that the
Constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and
distinct personality.
In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of a person distinct from the government are considered "state
action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for
his action; and (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. Without doubt, the
transaction entered into by the GSIS is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command. Therefore, the GSIS is directed to accept the matching bid of petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel.







NITAFAN vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 284

FACTS:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively,
of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit
and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner ofInternal Revenue and the Financial
Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by
said Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to
representations that the Court shall direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes
from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, it was reaffirmed by the Court en banc.

ISSUE:
Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes

HELD:
No. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question
until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by
the framers.

The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution", in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared
discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear
and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that
they have adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the
cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
Therefore, the petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.





FRANCISCO VS. HRET
FACT:
The case at bar is a petition questioning the constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings being held
by the House of Representatives against Chief Justice Davide.
The first impeachment proceeding brought against the Chief Justice, together with other associate
justices, is by Joseph Estrada, for the alleged culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust, and other high crimes. It proceeded due to good form but was later on dismissed due to lack of
substance.
Another impeachment proceeding was being brought against the Chief Justice, in a period less than the
one-year bar provided by the Constitution and the rules of the House of Representatives. This was
initiated by 2 representatives and was endorsed by many other representatives.
This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as associations questioning the
constitutionality of such move by Congress. The petitions were consolidated having raised similar issues.
The petitions contend that the second impeachment proceeding was in culpable violation of the
Constitution wherein there is a one-year bar before one can initiate impeachment proceedings against the
same individual. The first proceeding was less than a year away from the filing of the second proceeding.
Congress mainly contended that the Supreme Court had no power to inquire about the impeachment
proceedings as it is the former which has the power to facilitate or administer impeachment proceedings,
as provided by the Constitution. If the Supreme Court interrupts and inquires about the proceedings, it
will disturb the doctrine of separation of powers as well as the doctrine of checks and balances. The
impeachment proceeding is in itself under the power of the Congress and is a political question.
ISSUE:
1. w/n the second impeachment proceeding against Davide is constitutional?
2. w/n the impeachment proceeding was a political question wherein the SC cannot disturb it?
RULING:
1. It is prevalent that the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice is unconstitutional.
Under Article XI of our present Constitution, it is provided that with regard to the impeachment of public
officials such as the Chief Justice, there is a one-year bar provided. No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official within a period of one year. The term initiate refers to the filing of the
case against the official. It starts when a complaint is filed with the Committee of Justice of the House of
Representatives. It is not initiated during the time when it is verified by the other members of the House
or when it is given to Senate for hearing.
2. It is said that the SC cannot question or inquire about the impeachment proceedings since it will
disturb the separation of power, check and balance between the branches of government, and that the
SC has vested interest in the issue.
The Constitution was equivocal in granting the judiciary, moreover the SC, the duty to settle
controversies that are legally demandable and enforceable. It has been vested the duty to check if there
is any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or office of government. In this petition
wherein the constitutionality of the impeachment proceeding is questioned, no one has the power to
interpret the fundamental law of the land and answer the issue of constitutionality other than the SC.
Given such, even if the legislative that commences and administers impeachment proceedings, it is not a
bar for the SC to inquire about their actions especially if constitutionality is involved.


Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

FACTS:
The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet
members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department
to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional
compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII
prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment.
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor
General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless
otherwise allowed by law which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII,
section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet
member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

ISSUE:

Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the constitution.

RULING:

The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to
prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which
a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants. Thus the phrase unless otherwise provided by the Constitution in Section 13, Article
VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the
legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only
to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as
ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.











MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003

FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the
Philippine Bar, seeking adeclaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual
and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly
and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement in Section
1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be
proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
RULING:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It
disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country.
However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared
for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also
state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for
the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry
of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement inSection 1 Article V of
the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, and a
resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an election.

However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court may have
to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the presumption of
abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is
deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to have lost his domicile by his
physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of
registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or
even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus,
he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to vote, the
Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law is found to
be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congressitself was conscious of this probability and
provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right
of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on
the date of the elections.

Expressumfacitcessaretacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is prevented
from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent of
theConstitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers, which is to grant
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of
suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally
defective.

(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it.
The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for President and Vice
President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section
4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only
for Senators and Party-list Reps.

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules &
Regulations for RA No. 9189,Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of
law unconstitutional.



















CHONGBIAN VS DE LEON
FACTS:
Victoriano Chiongbian in 1985, a Chinese citizen and father of the herein petitioner William Chiongbian,
was elected to and held the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel, Occidental Misamis. This
fact is sufficiently established by the evidence submitted to this Court; by the findings of the National
Bureau of Investigation cited in Opinion No. 27, s. 1948, of the Secretary of Justice; and as admitted by
respondents in their pleadings. It is also shown and admitted that at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was still a minor.
It is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, VictorianoChiongbian, father of herein
petitioner, having been elected to a public office in the Philippines before the adoption of the
Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the Constitution.
William Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino citizen by reason
of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having become a Filipino citizen upon the
adoption of said Constitution. This is also in conformity with the settled rule of our jurisprudence that a
legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his father.
It is argued by respondent that this privilege of citizenship granted by subsection 2 (Article IV,
Constitution) is strictly personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee. In support of this
contention they offer two principal arguments. Firstly, that this subsection was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention merely to grant Filipino citizenship to Delegate Caram and thus obviate the
possibility of a non-Filipino signing the Constitution as one of its framers. Secondly, it is argued that the
original draft of said subsection 2 contained the phrase "and their descendants," which was deleted
from the final draft, thus showing that this privilege of citizenship was intended to be strictly personal to
the one who had been elected to public office and did not extend to his descendants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is a Filipino citizen
RULING:
It may be said that the members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of
our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others.
When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the
full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of
that great document. They adopted said provision fully cognizant of the transmissive essence of
citizenship as provided in subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the transmission of
citizenship in such a particular case, they would have so clearly stated.
The mere deletion of the phrase "and their descendants," is not determinative of any conclusion. It
could have been done because the learned framers of our Constitution considered it superfluous,
knowing full well that the meaning of such a phrase was adequately covered by subsection 3. Deletion in
the preliminary drafts of the Convention are, at best, negative guides, which cannot prevail over the
positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution.