CAYETANO V MONSOD

Facts:
Pres. Aquino nominated Christian Monsod to the position of COMELEC
chairman.
The Commission on Appointments affirmed the nomination and appointed
Monsod to the position.
Renato Cayetano now assails the appointment. He says that Monsod is not
qualified to the position because he has not been engaged in the practice of law
for ten years (requirement is provided by Consti Art. 9-C Sec. 1(1)).
Issue:
W/n Monsod is qualified for the position of COMELEC chairman.
Held:
SC says yes. Monsod passed the bar in 1960 and had been consistently paying
his professional fees. He worked in a law firm for several years after graduating
but after that, had been more engaged in business and politics (for a list of his
jobs, see p.238). Still, the SC said that he can still be considered as practicing law,
if we consider the modern concept of the practice of law. This modern concept
pertains to any act, whether in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
SC now says that since most of Monsods jobs involved the law, even if he has
not been engaged in traditional lawyering (i.e. making pleadings or appearing in
court), he can still be considered as to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Dissents:
Most of the dissents focused on the issue that the Consti requirement pertains to
habitual practice of law. The dissenters pointed out that for the past ten years,
Monsod really seldom practiced law. This group believed that the Consti
required that the practice of law be on a regular basis. Justice Padilla even came
up with qualifications habituality; compensation; application of law, legal
principle, practice or procedure; and atty.-client relationship to determine w/n
a person has been engaged in the practice of law..

4 CUI V CUI

Facts:
The main concern in this case is the respective qualifications of Jesus Cui and
Antonio Cui to the position of administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barii, a
charitable institution established by Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui.
Jesus and Antonio are the sons of Mariano Cui, a nephew of the founders of the
institution. Antonios claim to the position is based on a convenio where then
administrator Teodoro resigned in favor of him. Jesus, however, had no prior
notice of this.
Jesuss claim is that he should be preferred pursuant to the deed of donation
(which recognized their father Mariano as a legitimate descendant to the
position) as he is the older of the two.
The deed, however, gives preference to a descendant who has a titulo de
abogado or a doctor, or a civil engineer, or a pharmacist (in order). Or to the one
who pays the highest taxes. Jesus holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws but is not
a member of the Bar, while Antonio is a member of the Bar (he was formerly
disbarred, though, by the SC and was just reinstated weeks before assuming the
position)

Issue:
Who has a better right to the position of administrator between Jose and Antonio?
What does the term titulo de abogado mean?

Held:
Antonio. The term titulo de abogado is not just mere possession of the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one to the practice of law. Possession of the degree is not indispensable to
qualify as a lawyer since completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some
other way.

It was also argued that Antonio is disqualified for having been previously disbarred
since the deed also provided that an administrator may be removed if found to lack a
sound moral character. However, Antonio was reinstated. This reinstatement is a
recognition of his moral rehabilitation after proving what was required by the Bar.
Antonios restoration to the roll of lawyers wiped out restrictions and disabilities
resulting from the previous disbarment.

5 ALAWI V ALAUYA


PARTIES
ALAWI, sales rep of E.B. Villarosa
ALAUYA, incumbent executive clerk of court
FACTS
Through ALAWIS agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by ALAUYA of a housing unit
A housing loan was also granted to ALAUYA by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
Subsequently, ALAUYA wrote a letter to the President of Villarosa advising
termination of his contract on the grounds that his consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by ALAWI
and proceeded to expound using acerbic language
A copy of the letter, which bore no stamps, was sent to the VP of Villarosa
ALAUYA also wrote the NHMFC repudiating as void his contract with Villarosa
and asking for cancellation of his loan
Finally, ALAUYA wrote 3 other letters to officers of the SC to stop deductions
from his salary regarding the loan from NHMFC
NHMFC also wrote the SC requesting it to stop said deductions
Learning of the letters, ALAWI filed a complaint alleging that ALAUYA
o Committed malicious and libelous charges
o Usurped the title of attorney

ISSUE W/N ALAUYA VIOLATED THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL
STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES

HELD YES, PARTICULARLY SECTION 4

RATIO
Section 4 public officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others,
and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, public order, public safety and
public interest
ALAUYA, being a member of the Sharia Bar and an officer of the Court, may not
use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or otherwise
improper
His radical deviation from these norms cannot be excused

ISSUE W/N ALAUYA BEING A MEMBER OF THE SHARIA BAR CAN USE
THE TITLE ATTORNEY

HELD NO, RESERVED ONLY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS
MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR

RATIO
Court has already had an occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia
Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar and may practice law only
before Sharia courts
ALAUYAS wish of not using counsellor because of confusion with
councilor is immaterial because disinclination to use said title does not warrant
his use of the title attorney

6 IN RE CUNANAN


Facts:
This is the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 case.
As per the Rules of Court. A bar candidate must have a general average of 75% in all
subjects without failing below 50% in any subject.
In spite of this, the court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had
obtained an average of only:
72% in 1946
69% in 1947
70% in 1948
74% in 1949
In 1950 to 53, the 74% was raised to 75%
A few candidates who missed the above marks set by the courts approached Congress.
Congress made a bill, which was allowed by the president to become a law without his
signature. This is RA 972.

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946
to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in
1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules
require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed
since 1950.

A breakdown of the numbers is on page 538.

The additional candidates who want to be admitted claim that they suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and of inadequacy of preparation.


Issue:

W/N RA 972 is valid.


Held:

RA 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession. The public
interest demands of the legal profession, adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely
more so as legal problems evolved by the times become more difficult.

In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be
admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the years
affecting the bar candidates concerned

Although the SC certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons,
it is no less certain that only the SC, and not the legislative nor executive department,
that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its functions, as in this case.


Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the
authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme
Court.


Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
"Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish
increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."

The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the SC equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in the SC.

Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it
would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.

The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or
reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice
of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the
matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession
requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit,
suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal
profession.

There is no motive stated by the authorities for the qualification in RA 972 because of
this, the classification is fatally defective.

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and,
therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers
to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955
inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article
VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without
having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become
final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the Chief Justice may set.

159 IN RE ALMACEN

FACTS:
Atty Almecen is the counsel of yaptinchay in the case of Yaptinchay vs. Calero
The trial court, after the hearing rendered judgment against his client he moved for
reconsideration (MR) and served copy of the motion to the adverse party but failed to
notify the latter of the date and place of the hearing
In the CA, the court moved to also disamiss the case for the reason that the MR does not
contain a notice of time and place of hearing and is nothing but a useless piece of paper
The SC refised to tkae the cse and in a minute resolution denied the appeal
It was at this pont that Atty Almacen filed his "PETITION TO SURRENDER LAWYER'S
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE"
The pleading filed by Atty Almacen is interspersed from beginning to end with
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and deregoratory remarks agaist the
court, as well as its individual members.
Atty Almacen described the court as "a tribunal peopled by men who are calloused to
our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason thier own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. he also referred to his
client as "on who was deeply aggrieved by the court's unjust judgment" and has become
" one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." He also referred to the
member of the court as "justice as administered by the present members of the SUpreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
The court asked Atty Almacen to show cause why no disciplinary actions must be taken
against him
Atty Almacen asked that he be given permission permission to give his answer in an
open and public hearing. He reasoned that since the court is the complainant,
prosecutor and judge, he preferred that he answer and be heard in an open and public
hearing sa that the court could observe its sincerity and candor.
The court allowed Atty Almacen to file a written answer and thereafter be heard in an
oral argument
But his written answer offers no apology but is full of sarcasm and innuendo (SEE
PAGE 569-572)

ISSUE:
W/N Atty Almacen is guilty

HELD:
YES! and he is indefinitely suspended until further order form the SC
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts
and judges. The decisions of the courta public property and the press and the people
have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see
fit.
BUT it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and rpopriety. A wide chasm exist between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and justices thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. it isn such misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action
In his relations with the court, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Statements made by an attorney in a
private conversation or in the course of political campaign, if couched in insulting
language as to bring scorn and disrepute to the administration of justice may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.
post-litigation utterances or publication made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their
juducial actions, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcends the permissible
bounds of fair commetns and legitimate criticism constitute grave professional
misconduct.
there is no comfort in the argument of Atty. Almacen that his utterances were made
after the judgments against his client attained finality. he could still be liable for
contempt as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. THe
pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is of no consequence. the sole objective of
the proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession

22 ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC


FACTS:
Ulep prays the Supreme Court to order the Legal Clinic to cease, issuing
advertisement similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes A and B (p381).
Legal Clinic admits the facts of publication of said advertisement that claims that
it is not engage in the practice of law but in the rendering of legal support
services through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machine.

ISSUE:
W/N the services offered by Legal Clinic as advertised by it constitutes practice
of law
Whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisement complained
of

HELD:
According to the IBP, notwithstanding the manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the 2 terms, legal support services and legal services,
common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. The use of the name the Legal Clinic gives the impression
that the respondent corporation is being managed by lawyers and that it renders
legal services. The advertisement in question is meant to induce the performance
of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy. This is in
violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.02 that is counseling illegal activities.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court which requires that
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience.
Applying the case Cayetano vs. Monsod, the court agrees that the activities of the
respondent Legal Clinic constitute the practice of law. Such a conclusion will not
be altered by the fact that respondent does not represent clients in court since
law practice is not limited merely to court appearances.
Regarding the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Profession Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, and objective information or statement
of facts. The proscription against advertising of legal services rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.
Exceptions:
o Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon
o Ordinary, simple professional card. The card may contain only the
statement of his name, the law firm, address and branch of law practiced.
Considering that Atty. Nogales who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of the legal clinic is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded with a warning that the repetition of the same or similar acts which
are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.