Krivenko vs Register of Deeds, GR No.

L-630,November 15, 1947; 79 Phil 461

(Land Titles and Deeds Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands)

Facts: An alien bought a residential lot and its registration was denied by the Register of Deeds on the ground that being
an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. When the former brought the case to the CFI, the court rendered
judgement sustaining the refusal of the Register of Deeds.
Issue: WON an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.
Held. No. Public agricultural lands mentioned in Sec.
1, Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court stated:
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and with
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose
conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens
themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. Thus Section 5, Article XIII provides: Save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private agricultural lands will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines

Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; GR No. 113472, December 20, 1994
Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011
(Land Titles and Deeds Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands)
Facts: Petitioner and respondent disputed over a parcel of land. Respondent contends that she bought the said land
from a certain Ong Joi Jong, evidenced by a notarized deed of sale; and entrusted the administration of the same to
petitioner, a Chinese citizen and the brother of respondents husband. Petitioner on the other hand claims that she
bought the disputed land from the same vendor and the sale is evidenced by a photocopy of a deed of sale.
Issue: WON an alien may acquire lands in the Philippines by virtue of a Deed of Sale.
Held: No. Whether or not said deed of sale is genuine, the Constitution provides that aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands, hence disqualified also in acquiring private lands.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain.
HALILI vs. CAGR # 113539, MARCH 23, 1998
FACTS:
Private respondents, both American Citizens, inherited real properties from Simeon de Guzman, whodied intestate,
located in the Philippines. His wife, Helen, executed a deed of quit claim assigning, transferring and conveying to their
son, David Rey, all her rights, titles and interests in and over 6 parcels of land which the 2 of them inherited from Simeon
who himself was an AMCIT. David thereafter sold the land to private respondent Emiliano Cataniag. Petitioners,
the adjoining lots owners, questioned the validity and constitutionality of the 2 conveyances, i.e. from Helen to David
and between David and Emiliano. They also claimed ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under
Art.1621, NCC.
HELD:

The SC ruled that although Helens deed of
quit claim -in which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to David all her rights, titles, and interests over the property
she had inherited from her husband-collided with Sec.7, Art. XII of the 87 Constitution. Since the disputed land is now
owned by Cataniag, aFILCIT, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our land in Filipino hands has been served.Non Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or
to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. However, if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured
and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.


Halili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113539, 12March 1998, First Division, J. Panganiban.
Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is deemed cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid. If the rationale of the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by
aliens who subsequently become Filipino citizens by naturalization, or the transfer to Filipino citizens.

JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 124293, November 20, 2000
FACTS:
The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. for the construction, operation and management of the Subic
National Shipyard, Inc., later became the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under theJVA,
NIDC and Kawasaki would maintain shareholding proportion of 60%-40% and that the parties have the right of first
refusal in case of a sale.

Through a series of transfers, NIDCs rights, title and
interest in PHILSECO eventually went to the National Government. In the interest of national economy, it was decided
that PHILSECO should be privatized by selling 87.67% of its total outstanding capital stock to private entities. After
negotiations, it was agreed that
Kawasakis right o
f first refusal under the JVA be
exchanged for the right to top by five percent the
highest bid for said shares. Kawasaki that PhilyardsHoldings, Inc. (PHI), in which it was a stockholder, would exercise this
right in its stead. During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing bidder. Even so, because of the right to top by
5%
percent the highest bid, it was able to top JG Summits
bid. JG Summit protested, contending that PHILSECO,as a shipyard is a public utility and, hence, must observe the 60%-
40% Filipino-foreign capitalization.
By buying 87.67% of PHILSECOs capital stock at
bidding, Kawasaki/PHI in effect now owns more than40% of the stock.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PHILSECO is a public utility Whether or not Kawasaki/PHI can purchase beyond
40% of PHILSECOs stocks

HELD:
In arguing that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, was a public utility, JG Summit relied on sec. 13, CA No.146. On the other hand,
Kawasaki/PHI argued that PD
No. 666 explicitly stated that a shipyard was not apublic utility. But the SC stated that sec. 1 of PD No.
666 was expressly repealed by sec. 20, BP Blg. 391and when BP Blg. 391 was subsequently repealed byEO 226, the latter
law did not revive sec. 1 of PD No.666. Therefore, the law that states that a shipyard is a public utility still stands.

A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law is therefore required to comply with the 60%-40%
capitalization under the Constitution. Likewise, the JVA between NIDC and Kawasaki manifests an intention of the
parties to abide by this constitutional mandate. Thus, under the JVA, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a
third party, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock would not
exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock. The NIDC,on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total
shares. As a government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation, there is nothing to prevent its
purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization.
Kawasaki was bound by its contractual obligation under the JVA that limits its right of first refusal to 40%of the total
capitalization of PHILSECO. Thus, Kawasaki cannot purchase beyond 40% of the capitalization of the joint venture on
account of both constitutional and contractual proscriptions.

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINIA SANTOS Y CANONFAUSTINO, deceased,
plaintiff-appellant, vs.LUI SHE, in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng,
deceased, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
This is the second motion that the defendant-appellant has filed relative to this Court's decision of September 12, 1967.
Accepting the nullity of the other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7), the defendant-appellant nevertheless contended that the
lease contract (Plff Exh. 3) is so separable from the rest of the contracts that it should be saved from invalidation. In
denying the motion, we pointed to the circumstances

that on November 15, 1957, the parties entered into the lease contract (in favour of Wong Heng) for 50years: that ten
days after, they amended the contract so as to make it cover the entire property of JustinaSantos; less than a month
after, they entered into another contract giving Wong Heng the option to buy the leased premises should his pending
petition for naturalization be granted; that on November 18, 1958,after failing to secure naturalization and after finding
that adoption does not confer the citizenship of the adopting parent on the adopted, the parties entered into two other
contracts extending the lease to 99years and fixing the period of the option to buy at 50years which indubitably
demonstrate that each of the contracts in question was designed to carry out JustinaSantos' expressed wish to give the
land to Wong and thereby in effect place its ownership in alien hands, that "as the lease contract was part of a scheme
to violate the Constitution it suffers from the same infirmity that renders the other contracts void and cannot more be
saved from illegality than the rest of thecontracts."The present motion is for a new trial and isbased on three documents
(1 Codicil and 2 wills)executed by Justina Santos which, so it is claimed,constitute newly-discovered material
evidence:Codicil- Justina Santos not only named TitaYaptinchay LaO the administratrix of her estate withthe right to buy
the properties of the estate, but alsoprovided that if the said LaO was legally disqualifiedfrom buying she was to be her
sole heir.Wills- Justina Santos enjoined her heirs to respect thelease contract made, and the conditional option given,in
favor of Wong.
ISSUE:
WON the lease contract executed by Santosis valid.
HELD:
This is a misrepresentation of the grossestsort. The documents were known to the defendant-appellant and her counsel
even before the death of Justina Santos.Nor is there anything in the documents that islikely to alter the result we have
already reached in thiscase. With respect to the 1957 codicil, it is claimed thatJustina Santos could not have intended by
the 99-year lease to give Wong the ownership of the landconsidering that she had earlier devised the propertyto Tita
Yaptinchay LaO.Without passing on the validity of her testamentarydisposition since the issue is one pending before
theprobate court, it suffices to state here that evengranting that Justina Santos had devised the land indispute to LaO,
Justina Santos was not thereby barredor precluded from subsequently giving the land toWong. The execution of the
lease contract which,together with the other contracts, amount to a transfer of ownership to Wong, constitutes an
impliedrevocation of her codicil, at least insofar as thedisposition of the land is concerned. As for the 1959 wills, it is said
that they manifest adesire to abide by the law, as is evident from thestatement therein that Wong's right to buy the land
beallowed "anytime he or his children should be entitledto buy lands in the Philippines (i.e., upon becomingFilipino
citizens)". It seems obvious, however, that thisis nothing but a reiteration of the substance of thelease contract and
conditional option to buy which incompensation, as our decision demonstrates, amountto a conveyance, the
protestation of compliance withthe law notwithstanding. In cases like the one at bar,motives are seldom avowed and
avowals are notalways candid. The problem is not, however,insuperable, especially as in this case the verywitnesses for
the defendant-appellant testified that

Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the timeand her condition, she is a wealthy woman, it is justnatural when
she said. "This is what I want and this willbe done." In particular reference to this contract of lease, when I said "This is
not proper, she said

'you just go ahead, you prepare that, I am the owner, and if there is illegality, I am the only one that can questionthe
illegality.'"The ambition of the old woman before her death,according to her revelation to me, was to see to it thatthese
properties be enjoyed, even to own them, byWong Heng because Doa Justina told me that shedid not have any
relatives, near or far, and sheconsidered Wong Heng as a son and his children her grandchildren; especially her
consolation in life waswhen she would hear the children reciting prayers inTagalog.She was very emphatic in the care of
the seventeen(17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much, andshe told me to see to it that no one could disturb
WongHeng from those properties. That is why we thought of adoption, believing that thru adoption Wong Hengmight
acquired Filipino citizenship, being the adoptedchild of a Filipino citizen.The other points raised in the motion for new
trialeither have already been disposed of in our decision or are so insubstantial to merit any attention. ACCORDINGLY,
the motion for new trial is denied.(lease contract not valid)




Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davaov. LRC (1957)
G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957
FACTS:
October 4, 1954: Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipinocitizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed adeed of sale of a parcel of
land in favor of the RomanCatholic Apostolic Administrator of DavaoInc.(Roman), a corporation sole organized and
existingin accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. ClovisThibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.

The Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, having in mind a previous resolution of theCFI in Carmelite Nuns of
Davao were made to preparean affidavit to the effect that 60% of the members of their corp. were Filipino citizens when
they sought toregister in favor of their congregation of deed of donation of a parcel of land, required it to submit
asimilar affidavit declaring the same.

June 28, 1954: Roman in the letter expressedwillingness to submit an affidavit but not in the sametenor as the Carmelite
Nuns because it had fiveincorporators while as a corporation sole it has onlyone and it was ownership through donation
and thiswas purchased

As the Register of the Land RegistrationCommissioner (LRC) : Deeds has some doubts as tothe registerability, the matter
was referred to the LandRegistration Commissioner en consulta for resolution(section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151)

LRC:o In view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendeewas not
qualified to acquire private lands in thePhilippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital,
property, or assets of the RomanCatholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., wasactually owned or controlled by
Filipino citizens, therebeing no question that the present incumbent of thecorporation sole was a Canadian
citizeno ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao todeny registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof of
compliance with such condition

action for mandamus was instituted by Romanalleging the land is held in true for the benefit of theCatholic population
of a place
ISSUE:
W/N Roman is qualified to acquire privateagricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to theprovisions of Article XIII of
the Constitution
HELD:
YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao isordered to register the deed of sale

A corporation sole consists of one person only,and his successors (who will always be one at a time),in some particular
station, who are incorporated by lawin order to give them some legal capacities andadvantages, particularly that of
perpetuity, which intheir natural persons they could not have had.o In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; sois a
bishop, or dens, distinct from their severalchapters

corporation sole1. composed of only one persons, usually thehead or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is notsubject to
expansion for the purpose of determiningany percentage whatsoever 2. only the administrator and not the owner of the
temporalities located in the territory comprised bysaid corporation sole and such temporalities areadministered for and
on behalf of the faithful residing inthe diocese or territory of the corporation
sole3. has no nationality and the citizenship of theincumbent and ordinary has nothing to do with theoperation,
management or administration of thecorporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of thefaithful connected with their
respective dioceses or corporation sole.

Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should becomposed of Filipino
citizens. (Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple)

undeniable proof that the members of theRoman Catholic Apostolic faith within the territory of Davao are
predominantly Filipino citizenso presented evidence to establish that the clergyand lay members of this religion fully
covers thepercentage of Filipino citizens required by theConstitution

fact that the law thus expressly authorizes thecorporations sole to receive bequests or gifts of realproperties (which
were the main source that the friarshad to acquire their big haciendas during the Spanishregime), is a clear indication
that the requisite thatbequests or gifts of real estate be for charitable,benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in
theopinion of the legislators, considered sufficient andadequate protection against the revitalization of religious
landholdings.

as in respect to the property which they holdfor the corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the courts may
exercise the samesupervision as in other cases of trust

G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMANCATHOLIC BISHOP OF
LUCENA, represented byMsgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL TRIALCOURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY,
respondents.G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988

FACTS:
Background: CFI and IAC: ROMANCATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr.Jose T. Sanchez, applicant vs. the
Director of Landsand the Director, Bureau of Forest Development

Granted to Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena -Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court aquo concluded, on
the basis of acquisitive prescriptionat the very least, that the former had adequatelyshown title to the parcels of land
being claimed.
LOCATION:
Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria,Quezon Province and Barrio Bucal (Taguan), samemunicipality and province
LAND AREA:
Lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSD-65686 andits technical descriptions, and the parcel of landdescribed in plan PSU-112592 and
its technicaldescription, together with whatever improvementsexisting thereon, in the name of the ROMANCATHOLIC
BISHOP of Lucena, Lot 4 - PSU-112592
PARTIES:
1. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF Lucena,represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant-
appellee2. Republic of the Philippines Oppositors-appellantsON WHAT
GROUNDS:3. the applicant claimed title to the variousproperties through either purchase or donation datingas far back
as 19284. Oppositor: that the applicant did not have animperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcel of landbeing
applied for. The issue raised in this caseinvolves the question of whether the Roman CatholicBishop of Lucena, as a
corporation sole is qualified toapply for confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcelsof land subject of this case, that
the Roman CatholicChurch, as a corporation, is disqualified from owningproperties from the public domain based on Art.
XIV,Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution and that theregistration was applied after the effectivity of the 1973constitution.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a corporation sole should betreated as an ordinary private corporation, for purposeof the application
of Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973Constitution.

2. W/N the lots are part of the public domain.
HELD
n 1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed thedoctrine that open, exclusive and undisputedpossession of
alienable public land for the periodprescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby theland, upon completion of the
requisite period ipso jureand without the need of judicial or other sanction,ceases to be public land and becomes'
privateproperty. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p.518).No proof being admissable to overcome a
conclusivepresumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truthbe little more than a formality, at the most limited
toascertaining whether the possession claimed is of therequired character and length of time, and
registrationthereunder would not confer title, but simply recognizea title already vested.We can say the following: A
corporation sole is aspecial form of corporation usually associated with theclergy. A corporation sole consists of one
person only, and hissuccessors (who will always be one at a time),Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68 which reads as follows:Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property.

Any corporation sole may purchase and hold realestate and personal property for its church, charitable,benevolent or
educational purposes, and may receivebequests



G.R. No. 133250: Chavez vs Public Estates Authority and AMARI Corporation
09 July 2002, Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain
The Public Estates Authority is the centralimplementing agency tasked to undertake reclamationprojects nationwide. It
took over the leasing and sellingfunctions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about tobe reclaimed foreshore lands are
concerned.PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a privatecorporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of theFreedom Islands.
PEA also sought to have 290.156hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD:
No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as privatelands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations fromacquiring any kind of alienable land of the
publicdomain.The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectaresof reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands,now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA,are alienable lands of the public domain. The
592.15hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remaininalienable natural resources of the public domain.Since the
Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, aprivate corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of theFreedom Islands,
such transfer is void for beingcontrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private
corporations fromacquiring any kind of alienable land of the publicdomain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA
alsoseeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, suchtransfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, ArticleXII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits thealienation of natural
resources other than agriculturallands of the public domain.