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Thesis Eleven
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DOI: 10.1177/0725513614521484
2014 120: 119 Thesis Eleven
Thomas Klikauer
Conceptions of critique in modern and contemporary philosophy

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Review essay
Karin de Boer and Ruth Sonderegger (eds),
Conceptions of critique in modern and contemporary philosophy
(Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012)
Reviewed by: Thomas Klikauer, University of Western Sydney, Australia
Email: t.klikauer@uws.edu.au
Despite a rather unattractive cover page, Karin de Boer and Ruth Sondereggers
Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy provides an insightful
illumination of the current debate on critique in philosophy. The edition contains an
introduction and 14 chapters written by 14 contributors, an index, but no conclusion.
Perhaps the key question why this edition exists is to answer the initial claim raised in the
introduction, namely critique has run out of steam (Bruno Latour). To a large degree
most authors discuss two forms of critique external and immanent critique. However,
the editors argue that we would suggest that during the 20th century, critique has
developed along three different paths: a radicalisation of 19th century self criticisms
of critical philosophy [with] philosophers such as Benjamin, Adorno, Foucault, and
Derrida; Habermas critique of society [that] gained force by drawing on criteria that
allow the critic to tell right from wrong, true from false or alienation from self-rea-
lisation; and a third path that critique has taken to lead beyond the confines of philo-
sophy . . . Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Jaques Rancie`re and Judith Butler.
Judith Butler distinguishes the domain of the speakable and thinkable from what
Adorno has called the ineffable (see Freyenhagen, Adornos Ethics without the
Ineffable, Telos, no. 155), arguing that critique is . . . protecting the public against
harmful doctrines. To some degree, Butlers article fights a bygone battle against state
intrusion into the domain of academic freedom while the real danger today inside and
outside of universities is managerialism (see Klikauer, Managerialism, Palgrave,
2013). Nevertheless, she hits the nail on the head when arguing that Kant writes that the
philosophy faculty can never lay aside its arms in the face of the danger that threatens the
truth entrusted to its protection, because the higher faculties will never give up their
desire to rule. Kantian philosophy occupies a largely unchallenged position when it
comes to critical philosophy. This is discussed in the introduction by Butler but perhaps
even more so in Tosels Spinoza or the Other Critique. Tosel agrees with Kants
position inside critical philosophy by arguing that any form of critique after Kant has
Thesis Eleven
2014, Vol. 120(1) 119123
The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/0725513614521484
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often been seen as the other critique and as a reflection of Kants seminal trilogy of
critiques (1781, 1788, 1790). Tosel maintains that philosophy, as critique, thus poten-
tially subverts the encyclopaedia of knowledge and, without taking recourse to a utopian
realm of ends, reforms the idea of the good life governed by reason.
One of the collections most delightful chapters is Quadrios Rousseau, Kant and
Philosophical Auto-Criticism: The Practical Ends of Critical Thinking in which he traces
the importance of Rousseaus critical philosophy by asserting the continental tradition of
philosophy is [to be] a civil servant to humanity [with] the task of the philosopher to consist
in serving, to the best of their ability, the end of human emancipation. Quoting Rousseau,
Quadrio highlights what are we to think of commerce, in which the interest of every indi-
vidual dictates to him maxims diametrically opposite to those which the interests of the
community recommend to the body of society. He continues with: we no longer ask if
a man has integrity but rather if he has talent; we do not ask if a book is useful but if it
is well written. Rewards are showered on clever minds, but virtue receives no honours.
Quadrio concludes with what can be said about many: the thing that thinkers fear most
is that they are not the centre of the intellectual world hailed for their theoretical genius.
This is Rousseaus auto-criticism driven to the most exquisite level.
McQuillians Beyond the Limits of Reason: Kant, Critique and Enlightenment
continues this line of argument by focusing on Foucault describing the post-Kantian era
as the genuine age of criticism [perhaps partly because] so long as human beings find
the courage to sue their own understanding without direction from another, Kant consid-
ers them to be enlightened. Hence, Kant insists that everything must submit to the strict
criticism of Enlightenment. Kants immediate German successor Hegel continues
this as outlined in de Boers Hegels Conception of Immanent Critique: Its Sources,
Extent and Limit. She emphasizes that Hegel has argued that a genuine philosophical
critique must assume the very idea of philosophy as its criterion. Boer continues by writ-
ing: Hegel considers so-called philosophies that merely consist of single, unconnected
thoughts to have lost all credit (see Klikauer, Hegels Philosophy, Philosophy and
Social Criticism, 38/6).
But what critique, practical critique, and above all philosophical critique is all about has
been outlined to perfection in Robin Celikates Karl Marx: Critique as Emancipatory
Practice. Written in the Marcuse tradition of critical theory, Celikates emphasizes that his
[Marxs] version of immanent critique focuses on the internal contradictions of the social
order (modern capitalist society) and its social imaginary. Crucially, based on his critique
of idealism, Marxs materialism claims that the consciousness of individuals is
determined, or conditioned, by their social existence and that the superstructure of
society (law, politics, religion, morality, etc.) is determined, or conditioned, by its
economic structure. Hence, the critique of ideology is of fundamental importance to
Marxs project: freeing oneself from ideological illusions is a precondition for enga-
ging in emancipatory action.
Celikates continues by arguing that Marx notes that a focus on redistribution only
leads to cosmetic corrections of the status quo as long as the relations of production (and
the question of just distribution of the means of production) are not tackled. Perhaps this
is not to be seen totally unconnected from the debate on recognition-vs.-redistribution
raging inside critical theory (see Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, Verso,
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2003). Conceivably, Frasers emphasis on redistribution is, at least according to Marx, no
more than placing a bit of cosmetics on capitalisms ugly face, while Honneths suggestion
that critical theory should focus on recognition places even more Botox on capitalisms
repulsive visage. Celikates an associate member of the Institut fur Sozialforschung does
not go into details of this debate but focuses on the subject at hand: critique.
He highlights Marxs contribution to critical philosophy via the analogy of Marxs
critique of religion, emphasizing that human emancipation . . . requires a transformation
of individuals, their social relations and their self-understanding. Similar to Seyla
Benhabib, Celikates notes that the critique of capitalism as inhumane, unjust and
irrational . . . has to be accompanied by a critique of the bourgeois forms of knowledge
which presents a historically specific and politically changeable mode of production as
natural and thus as apolitical and unchangeable. Finally, Celikates continues the
aforementioned concept of immanent critique by outlining immanent critique has to be
based on an analysis of social reality and finds its criteria in social practice, struggles,
experiences and self-understanding.
A quite different approach to critique is presented in Porters contribution of
Nietzsches Genealogy as Performative Critique, highlighting key elements of
Nietzsches thinking such as the slave revolt begins when resentment itself becomes
creative and gives birth to values. Porter concludes that Nietzschean genealogy is a
critical practice whose principle object is the human mind and its endless capacities for
(self-)delusion. Drilling even deeper into the human mind is Rottenbergs part on
Psychoanalytic Critique and Beyond, focusing on Kant and Freud. Rottenberg high-
lights that psychoanalysis must purify through criticism the minds natural but illegi-
timate demands for consolatory illusion. She also observes that Freud has, in a sense,
returned us to a notion of critique in which destruction takes centre stage . . . raising the
spectre of Freud the all-destroyer, of a Freud interested first and foremost in
destroying illusions.
Destroying illusions and myths is also a task set by Walter Benjamin as Lijsters
enjoyable chapter on The Interruption of Myth: Walter Benjamins Concept of Critique
shows. Lijster simply states Benjaminian critique is immanent . . . it is a critique of
myth. Hence every critical review should be at the same time a philosophy of criti-
cism. Crucial to understand Benjamins take on critique is his Critique of Violence
(1921). Lijster notes: in Greek mythology, the gods use violence against man not to
punish him for breaking the laws, but to manifest their existence [and] for the
exercise over life and death, more than in any other legal acts, the law reaffirms itself
(Benjamin). In other words, hundreds of death row inmates had to die so that American
penal law could reaffirm itself. But not only law is mythical, capitalist culture in all its
facets contains mythical elements . . . capitalism reproduces this temporary hell, for
instance, in the form of factory labour. The worker on the assembly line, like a modern
Sisyphus, has to repeat the same action over and over again.
In a 1939 essay Benjamin describes
the shift from Erfahrung to Erlebnis, whereas the first term denotes meaningful, embedded
experiences, the second refers to reified, isolated experiences. Traditionally, the individu-
als experience of time went hand in hand with collective experience. His life is embedded
Review essay 121
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within tradition, and is measured by the religious calendar, which lifts certain moments out
of the historical continuum. In modernity, tradition is no longer self-evident. Life is mea-
sured by the clock, of which its succeeding seconds represent merely the ever-the-same.
Within this empty, homogeneous time, experience in its traditional sense is no longer
possible.
In line with that, Benjamin argues that Marx says that revolutions are the locomotives of
world history. But perhaps it is quite otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the
passengers on this train namely, the human race to activate the emergency brake.
Yet another highlight of the collection is Freyenhagens Adornos Critique of Late
Capitalism: Negative, Explanatory and Practical. However, focusing unilaterally on
Adorno might cut the highly fruitful and collaborative Adorno-Horkheimer relation-
ship out of which fundamental aspects of critical theory developed a bit short. Crit-
ical theory not only significantly enhanced Kants project of Enlightenment and
critique itself (Kant) but also developed critique into a proper theory, namely critical
theory. Simultaneously, critical theory remains closely linked to critical philosophy. In
his part, Freyenhagen argues that Adornos theory is a form of radical social critique
in that it aims at changing not merely specific aspects of contemporary society, but its
whole social structure. While not neglecting the Adorno-Horkheimer collaboration,
Freyenhagen writes:
Adorno wholeheartedly endorsed Horkheimers programmatic statement, according to
which critical theorys objective is not simply to eliminate one or other abuses, for it regards
such abuses as necessarily connected with the entire setup of the social structure. Although
it itself emerges from the social structure, its purpose is not, either in its conscious intention
or in its objective significance, the better function of any element in the structure. On the
contrary, it is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and
valuable, as these are understood in the present order, and refuses to take them as non-
scientific presuppositions about which it can do nothing.
This rather lengthy quote reminds us once again what the task of critical theory is.
Crucially, Freyenhagen emphasizes that Adorno, in fact, doubts that the strict division
between immanent and external critique can be maintained. Not least because late
capitalism has become so delusional and has affected our faculties so much that we
cannot even imagine what a really different society would be like (e.g. Brinks
Damaged Life in Brink and Owen, Recognition and Power, Cambridge University
Press, 2010). Feyenhagen closes with Lukacs famous objection that often theory
amounts to the lament of a few intellectuals lodging in the Grand Hotel Abyss and
contemplating the end of civilisation.
Perhaps more than contemplating civilization is shown in Habermas Social Theory:
The Critical Power of Communicative Rationality, as Cooke explains by arguing the
linguistically focused critical approach on society [has been exposed to] the accusation
that this critical perspective is insufficiently robust too thin and too weak to do justice
to the forms of suffering and subordination characteristic of contemporary modern
societies. Axel Honneth is representative of this line of criticism. Having outlined
several major critiques of Habermas version of critical theory, Cooke concludes that
122 Thesis Eleven 120(1)
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these objections to the concept of communicative rationality offer no compelling
reason to Habermas to abandon his critical project. Habermas critical project is
somewhat different from Foucaults project but it also contains a few meeting points
(see Habermas, Foucaults Lecture on Kant, Thesis Eleven, 1986).
A Foucauldian version of critique is presented in Hendricks Prophecy and Parresia:
Foucauldian Critique and the Political Role of Intellectuals. To some degree it
represents a continuation of Lukacs intellectuals lodging in the Grand Hotel Abyss.
Hendricks argues that according to Foucault, intellectuals can contribute to political
change by employing critique to undermine what appears in the present to be stable,
certain or necessary. Important is Foucaults concept of genealogical critique on which
Hendricks writes: according to Foucault, genealogical critique is at one and the same
time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with
the possibility of going beyond them. It also involves Parresia. In contrast to Kant,
Hegel, Marx and critical theory, Parresia does not involve demonstrating the truth but is
instead a form of critics, including those who are more powerful that the speaker.
Hendricks Parresia therefore involves risks and requires courage. Her conclusion
Parresia is courageous truth-telling as critique in the face of risk is somewhat contra-
dictory to her Parresia which does not involve demonstrating the truth.
Foucault has often been associated with what has been called post-modernism and so
has Derrida, who is the subject of Custers Derrida: Echoes of the Forthcoming in
which Custer quotes Derrida when writing he [Derrida] insists that deconstruction is not
a critique in a general sense or in a Kantian sense. Nevertheless, Derrida gives us all the
goals to see in these foundations of critique also the foundations of imperialism and
colonialism the dark side of Enlightenment, that which we must not settle for. Custer
concludes by re-emphasizing that deconstruction is not critique. That is, deconstruction
is all about not being critique.
Sondereggers Negative versus Affirmative Critique: On Pierre Bourdieu and
Jacques Rancie`re argues that according to Bourdieu, structures of domination remain in
place, and oftentimes even go unrecognised by those who suffer from them. Key to
Bourdieus idea is, however, that people living in poor conditions . . . are prepared to
accept much more than we would have believed . . . They put up with a great deal, and
this is what I mean by doxa that there are many things people accept without knowing.
Sonderegger highlights that Rancie`re saw Bourdieus ideas as anti-emancipatory
sociology, arguing that Bourdieus theory of practice is yet another variant of author-
itarian ideology critique. Rancie`re later on developed a theory of emancipatory dis-
agreement (mesentente). Sonderegger notes: Rancie`re holds that the critical theorist
should almost disappear so as to give voice to actual practitioners of critical disagree-
ment as outlined in his The Ignorant Schoolmaster (e.g. wikipedia.org/wiki/Marx_
Reloaded). The Boer/Sonderegger collection ends without a conclusion on the con-
ceptions of critique in modern and contemporary philosophy. Despite this, their semi-
nal edition is one of the most meaningful contributions to the discussion of critical
philosophy.
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