DE LA CAMARA vs ENAGE

FACTS : Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay,

Misamis Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the
Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen
and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at
Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968.

Thereafter, on November 25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with
the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder 2 and
another for multiple murder 3 against petitioner, his co-accused Nambinalot
Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then
on January 14, 1969, came an application for bail filed by petitioner with the
lower court

Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's
application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the
prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the
opportunity,but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of
P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple
murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder.

Then came the allegation that on August 12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice,
Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to
respondent Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and
suggesting that a P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be
reasonable. There was likewise a motion for reconsideration to reduce the
amount. Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence this petition.

ISSUE : WON the right to bail is violated

FACTS : Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with
capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Where, however, the
right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that
is excessive. So the Constitution commands. As construed in the latest
American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure
the accused's presence at trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure
than an amount reasonablycalculated to fulfill thus purpose is "excessive"

The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of
Justice Sanchez, as follows:
(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense;
(3) penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the accused;
(5) health of the accused;
(6) character and strength of the evidence;
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(8) forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.

Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration
appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the
court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however,
that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount
to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will
not hesitate to exercise our supervisorypowers to provide the required
remedy."




















YAP vs CA

FACTS : For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00,
petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City1
and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correctional, as
minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1)
year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case
shall it exceed twenty (20) years."2 He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to
be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the
proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated
February 17,1999.

After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals,
petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional
Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment
on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to
post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a
resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant."3 Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that the
proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive
bail.

ISSUE : WON the right to bail is violated

FACTS : The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the
Constitution. The obvious rationale is that imposing bail in an excessive
amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, the court has wide
latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump
bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the
same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level,
or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an
accounting of his movements

Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions
have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement
that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his
whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on
appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at
P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective
denial of petitioner's right to bail.

The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the Court. To fix bail at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case,
P5,500,000.00).is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an
exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow
because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil
liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear that although the
grant of bail on appeal is non-capital offenses is discretionary, when the
penalty imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years and
circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail,
then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should
be cancelled.18 In the same vein, the Court has held that the discretion to
extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact
convicted by the trial court

The setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no
legal nor factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and
the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of
P200,000.00 is more reasonable












Obosa Vs Ca & PP

FACTS : On December 4, 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe
charged the accused Jose T. Obosa and three others with murder on two
counts. During the trial of the two cases, which were consolidated and tried
jointly, the accused Obosa was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig,
Metro Manila. Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge of
the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon, accused Obosa was escorted
out of prison to appear before said judge on the pretext that the judge
needed his presence so that the judge could inquire about the whereabouts
of the accused therein. In its decision dated May 25, 1990, the lower court
found the accused Obosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide on two
Counts

On May 31, 1990, the lower court promulgated its decision and on the same
occasion, accused Obosa manifested his intention to appeal and asked the
Court to allow him to post bail for his provisional liberty. Immediately, the
lower court granted accused Obosa's motion and fixed bail at P20,000.00, in
each case. On June 1, 1990, accused Obosa filed a written notice of appeal,
dated June 4, 1990, thereby perfecting appeal from the decision. On June 4,
1990, accused Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount of P40,000.00, through
Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company, which the lower court approved

On September 6, 1993, respondent People, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed with respondent Court an urgent motion, 13 praying for
cancellation of petitioner's bail bond.


Petitioner promptly filed an opposition, 14 to which respondent People
submitted a reply. 15 Thereupon, respondent Court issued its first questioned
Resolution dated November 19, 1993: 16 a) canceling petitioner's bail bond,
b) nullifying the trial court's order of May 31, 1990 which granted bail to
petitioner, and c) issuing a warrant for his immediate arrest

ISSUE : 1) Whether or not the trial court still have (sic) jurisdiction over the
case when it approved petitioner's bail bond on June 4, 1990.

2) Considering that the murder charge against petitioner still stands
pending his appeal and strong evidence of guilt actually exists based on
respondent Court of Appeals' own preliminary determination and the lower
court's initial finding as well, is petitioner entitled to bail as a matter of right
pending review of his conviction for homicide?

HELD : First Issue -- But it should be noted that the bail was granted on May
31, 1990 by the trial Court. The validity and effectivity of the subsequent
approval of the bail bond by the trial court on June 4, 1990 is therefore the
matter at issue. We agree with respondent Court and respondent People
that, while bail was granted by the trial court when it had jurisdiction, the
approval of the bail bond was done without authority, because by then, the
appeal had already been perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction.
Needless to say, the situation would have been different had bail been
granted and approval thereof given before the notice of appeal was filed.

Second Issue -- Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly,
if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but
not more than twenty (20) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except
when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. But when the accused is
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall be
denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor a discretion. If the evidence,
however, is not strong bail becomes a matter of right.

It will be readily noted that, pursuant to the foregoing amendments, not only
does the conviction of petitioner for two counts of homicide disqualify him
from being admitted to bail as a matter of right and subject his bail
application to the sound discretion of the court, but more significantly, the
circumstances enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e above, which are
present in petitioner's situation, would have justified and warranted the denial
of bail, except that a retroactive application of the said circular in the instant
case is barred as it would obviously be unfavorable to petitioner.





Pp Vs Mingoa

FACTS : Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the
municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the
missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor,
the defendant Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation
of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon, and having been
found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he
appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case here on
the ground that it involved a constitutional question.

ISSUE : WON the constitutional right of the accused has been violated

HELD : In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the
legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proven they shall be
prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the
burden of proof provided there be rational connection between that facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from
proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience.

The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain
facts are proved. It makes the failure of public officer to have duly
forthcoming, upon proper demaand, any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. The ultimate fact presumed is that officer has
malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the
presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet
he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the
fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it
cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two.
Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus
giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The
presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the
above citations.













































PP vs Lumague


FACTS : The postmortem examination revealed that he had fourteen incised
wounds, two lacerated wounds, ten punctured wounds and ten stab wounds,
or thirty-six wounds in all, eight of which were fatal because they affected his
vital organs like his lungs, liver, heart and intestines (Exh. A). The wounds
were located in different parts of his body: front and back, head, arms, legs,
abdomen, knees, chest and shoulders (Exh. B). Obviously, he had been
assaulted by more than one person.

The Marikina police could not solve the crime. At the request of Mrs.
Regalado, General Espino referred the case to the Constabulary criminal
investigation service (CIS) at Camp Crame.

As a result of the investigation, the four Lumague brothers, Ponciano, Jr., 27,
Rolando, 25, Mario, 23, and Juanito 21, and their brother-in-law, Rodolfo de
la Cruz, were charged with murder for the killing of Regalado. Ponciano,
Rolando and Mario were arrest on August 20, 1977. Juanito was arrested on
October 10, 1977 when the prosecution had already finished the presentation
of its evidence against his three brothers. De la Cruz is at large.

On January 31, 1978, defense counsel Galvan announced that he would
present the accused as witnesses at the next hearing scheduled on February
24. That hearing was not held. The case was reset for March 14. No hearing
was held on that date for reasons not shown in the record.

On that date, the trial court issued an order requiring the prosecution to
present its memorandum within ten days and giving defense counsel Galvan
five days within which to file a reply memorandum. It scheduled on April 18
the promulgation of its sentence..

The trial court in its decision explained that the defense waived its right to
present further evidence after it failed to present such evidence in spite of
numerious postponements and when defense counsel failed to appear in
court despite due notice.

Separate trial and decision in Juanito Lumague's case. As priorly noted,
Juanito was arrested in Barrio ambangonan, on October 10, 1977 when the
prosecution had finished the presentation of its evidence against his brothers
Ponciano, Roland and Mario. When arraigned on October 19, Juanito
pleaded not guilty. He was given a separate trial. Juanito's counsel did not
present any evidence. On July 5, 1978, the trial court rendered in Juanito's
case a decision similar to its previous decision. It convicted him of murder,
sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay the same indemnity

ISSUE : 1) WON the constitutional right of Juanito has been violated
2) WON the Lumagues Constitutional Right has been vilated

HELD : First Issue -- With respect to Juanita Lumague, who withdrew his
plea of not guilty, who was tried separately and whose guilt was also
established by means of the evidence presented against him, we find that the
counsel's contentions are devoid of merit. Juanito's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. His plea of guilty and the evidence introduced by the
prosecution destroyed the presumption of innocence in his favor.

There is conclusive evidence that he was the one who stabbed Regalado. In
doing so, he conspired with the other assailants of the victim particularly with
the assailant who treacherously struck Regalado on the back with a hoe
Even Juanito's mother admitted that he took part in the assault (408-9, 413-
4). And, of course, the fact that Juanita was a fugitive from justice for several
months is an indication of his guilt.

Second Issue -- With respect to the other three accused, Ponciano,
Mario and Rolando Lumague, who pleaded not guilty and who were tried
ahead of Juanito, there is merit in their contention that they were denied due
process of law because they were not given a chance to testify in their behalf
and to present additional evidence. An accused has the constitutional right
"to be heard by himself and counsel" and the right "to testify as a witness in
his own behalf ". The denial of such rights is a denial of due process, as held
in People vs. Santiago. Due process of law in a criminal prosecution consists
of a law creating or defining the offense, an impartial tribunal of competent
jurisdiction accusation in due form. notice and opportunity to defend, trial
according to established procedure, and discharge unless found guilty. The
constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. "No
court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive
him of that right.". Fundamental fairness, which is the essence of due
process, requires that the three accused should be allowed to testify on their
defenses and to present additional evidence to prove their innocence.

Flores Vs Ruiz

FACTS : appears that petitioner was actually arrested on August 28, 1972
and has since been detained in the Provincial Jail of Cagayan until his
release by virtue of a bond of P500.00 which he was allowed to file by this
Court in its Resolution dated October 31, 1972

The land in question was levied upon and sold on execution on November
28, 1978 to satisfy the award of damages in favor of Leonardo Mandac
against petitioner and his father, Doroteo Flores, as defendants and the
losing parties in said case. They failed to redeem the property sold to the
heirs of Leonardo Mandac in the auction sale. Hence, the respondent court
ordered petitioner to place in possession the heirs of Leonardo Mandac who
had in the meantime died. For his refusal to vacate the land in favor of the
heirs of Mandac, contempt proceedings were instituted against petitioner on
motion of Atty. Antonio N. Laggui as counsel of the aforementioned heirs. As
previously stated, these contempt proceedings led to his arrest and
detention.

Petitioner, however, questions the legality of the proceedings for not having
been assisted by counsel during the hearing of the motion for contempt, and
for not having been duly informed of the contempt charge by being furnished
a copy of the motion, or properly "arraigned" before trial.

ISSUE : WON the accused constitutional right has been violated

HELD In spite of the plan of petitioner that the hearing on that date be
postponed so that his counsel of record could appear for him or that a new
counsel would be hired to appear in his behalf, the respondent judge,
however, demurred, and with the assistance of a certain Atty. Joshua
Pastores, petitioner was made to sign an understanding to deliver up the
premises within the period indicated by the judge on pain of being
imprisoned.:

The right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has never been
considered subject to waiver. The practice has always been for the trial court
to provide the accused with a counsel de officio, if he has no counsel of his
own choice, or cannot afford one

It cannot be disputed that the respondent court failed in its duty designed to
satisfy the constitutional right of an accused to counsel. Petitioner, as the
respondent in the contempt charge, a proceedings that partake of the nature
of a criminal prosecution, was thus denied due process

This is more so as petitioner does not appear to have been duly notified of
the contempt charge, nor was properly "arraigned," since he was not
assisted by counsel during the hearing

Admittedly with a counsel of record, petitioner could not have willingly
submitted to go to trial when his counsel failed to appear. It is certainly much
easier to believe, that, as petitioner alleges, he asked for postponement,
because of the absence of his counsel, but that the respondent judge denied
the plea, a fact not expressly traversed in the respondent judge's comment

Neither has he denied the allegation in the petition that there was a denial of
petitioner's right to due process for not having been duly informed of the
contempt charge, nor was his counsel furnished a copy thereof, as he is
entitled to one as a matter of right and as a matter-of duty of the court. All
that respondent judge said in his comment is that "defendant Flores has
been granted his day in court to defend himself from the charges presented
by reason of his contumacious acts

We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the proceedings on the contempt
charge has been vitiated by lack of due process, entitling petitioner to the writ
of habeas corpus he seeks.














Pp Vs Malunsing

FACTS : . As therein shown, Attorney Geronimo Pajarito explicitly manifested
in the opening of the trial that appellant intimated to him that he had his own
lawyer. 3 There was an admission that he did appear for him in the
preliminary investigation but only because there was no other counsel.

To resume, the lower court at this stage then asked whether the appellant
notified Attorney Pajarito about his change of mind. When he answered in
the negative, the Court stated: "All right, you have a lawyer who is appearing
for you."

Appellant was informed that "the Court will give you a lawyer. Atty. Pajarito is
appointed as counsel de oficio for you. We will proceed with the trial." 8 After
marking it of record that he was appointed as such counsel de oficio, the
attorney was asked whether he wanted to confer with appellant. This was the
answer: "I think I know the case." 9 The Court then immediately proceeded
with the hearing, having the first witness called. 10 In the decision itself, there
is this meaningful admission by the court: "No evidence was presented for
and in behalf of Manuel Villegas."

The appellant is a very old man, ignorant and unlettered; during the entire
proceedings in the case, the appellant while present did not know what was
going on. the trial court never apprised the appellant of his fundamental right
to be assisted by a lawyer; the trial court did not even bother inquiring why
the appellant Manuel Villegas did not take the witness stand, [something out
of the ordinary as] all defendants, except the appellant, had testified; and the
trial court went on throughout the proceedings of the case without knowing
why the appellant did not testify, that if the appellant testified what would his
testimony be like, what would be his demeanor during his testimony, ..." 12
Hence, his insistence that no deference was shown to the constitutional right
to counsel.

Issue : WON the constitutional right of Manuel Has been Violated

HELD : It is not enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed, especially so
as here, where the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his
choice

, instead of conferring with the accused, would just blithely inform the judge
that he was already fully prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was
unintended, of course, but the result could not rightly be distinguished from
pure travesty

He is entitled at the most to a new trial where he can be duly represented
either by a counsel of his choice or by one appointed de oficio, one who
would discharge his task in a much more diligent and conscientious manner
and would not readily assume that he need not bother himself unduly with
familiarizing himself further with all aspects of the case. For only in such a
way may there be an intelligent defense

In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given
an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little
avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and
it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough
to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor
or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own














People Vs Abino

FACTS : That on or about April 6, 1996, in the Municipality of Los Baos,
Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there have carnal knowledge of his
daughter, the minor DANIELA ABINO y MERCADO, who was then asleep
and unconscious, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

On the evening of April 6, 1996, appellant came home drunk. He took a bath
and told Daniela to prepare his things for the market. Daniela obeyed him
and went to the second floor of their house to fix her father's things.
Appellant followed Daniela clad only in his underwear with a towel wrapped
around his waist. He embraced Daniela and pressed his penis against her
buttocks. Daniela pulled herself away from appellant and went downstairs

Daniela was fast asleep in her bed when she felt somebody on top of her and
kissing her. She opened her eyes and saw appellant who was naked.
Daniela found herself naked too as she no longer had her panty and shorts
on. When Daniela woke up and moved, appellant stood up, dressed himself
and then left. Daniela felt intense pain in her vagina and cried

The court a quo found complainant's testimony "strong, credible and
competent." It "could not fathom any justifiable reason why she at so young
an age would accuse her own father and portray the latter as a beast who
deflowered her if the same be not true." Finding carnal knowledge to have
taken place between them, it sentenced appellant to death

ISSUE : WON the accused constitutional rights has benn violated

HELD : In attempting to clarify and consolidate its case against appellant, the
prosecution succeeded only in destroying the testimony of its star witness. In
the process, it further strengthened the premise that, other than lying on top
of Daniela and kissing her, appellant did "nothing more" on April 6, 1996.

There is no evidence to show that Daniela was knocked out, drugged,
intoxicated, tired and worn out or in any similar condition that would induce
such a heavy sleep. There was therefore nothing that would account for her
insensitivity to appellant's supposed act of inserting his penis into her vagina,
if this really happened on April 6, 1996.

. It is simply incredible that the pain that can reasonably be expected from
such insertion of a penis into her young, virginal vaginal canal would fail to
wake her up. How could she have slept through the entry of her father's
penis into her vagina and its exit therefrom from beginning to end and
awakened only after the alleged completion of the crime, as the prosecution
would have us believe? It may have been possible if she had been drugged,
but a case must rest on evidence, not on mere possibility.

It is more reasonable to believe, that, as Daniela herself testified, appellant
kissed her on the night of April 6, 1996 but did nothing more; or, as can
reasonably be inferred from the records, he had carnal knowledge of her, but
she was conscious and willing.

It is claimed that appellant had carnal knowledge of his daughter on a day
other than on April 6, 1996, and under some circumstance other than while
she was asleep. Aside from speculation and conjecture, this argument finds
no factual support. And even if true, such circumstance cannot convict him of
the rape charged in the Information

Neither can we, in these proceedings, convict appellant of rape committed
through intimidation as a result of his moral ascendancy, even if it were
proven beyond reasonable doubt. He was charged and tried on an
Information alleging rape of a woman who was "asleep and unconscious."
Convicting him of rape done by intimidation would violate his constitutional
right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him















People Vs Ortega

FACTS : Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that on October 15, 1992
at about 5:30 in the afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel
Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a drinking spree
in the compound near the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal,
Dalandanan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

That victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to
the back portion of the house. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed
him and later they [referring to the participants in the drinking session] heard
the victim Andre Mar shouted, "Don't, help me!"

That he and Ariel Caranto ran towards the back portion of the house and
[they] saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of Andre Mar Masangkay
who was lying down in a canal with his face up and stabbing the latter with a
long bladed weapon.

Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal and brought
Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latter inside the well. That Romeo
Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia then dropped stones
measuring 11 to 12 inches high, 2 feet in length and 11 to 12 inches in
weight to the body of Andre Mar Masangkay inside the well.

ISSUE : WON Garicias right to be informed of the charge against him has
been violated

HELD : The Court has listened intently to the narration of the accused and
their witnesses and the prosecution witnesses and has keenly observed their
behavior and demeanor on the witness stand and is convinced that the story
of the prosecution is the more believable version. Prosecution eyewitness
Diosdado Quitlong appeared and sounded credible and his credibility is
reinforced by the fact that he has no reason to testify falsely against the
accused. It was Diosdado Quitlong who reported the stabbing incident to the
police authorities. If Quitlong stabbed and killed the victim Masangkay, he will
keep away from the police authorities and will go in hiding

The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of
"attack[ing], assault[ing], and stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed weapon on
the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA."
The prosecution's evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with
the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His
responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the
resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our
jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is
clearly charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or
information would be a violation of this constitutional right.































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21741 January 25, 1924

AURELIA CONDE, petitioner,
vs.
PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal of Tayabas, and
FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas,
respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been
forced to respond to no less than five informations for various crimes and
misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no
less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has
twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now,
after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first
information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her
troubles as she was when originally charged.

Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia
Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order
that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in
defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to
dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily
postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a
detriment to the public. By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution
could have settled upon the appropriate information, could have attended to
the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a
trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

Once before, as intimidated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of
her grievances. We thought then we had pointed out the way for the parties.
But it seems not. Once again therefore and finally, we hope, we propose to
do all in our power to assist this poor woman to obtain justice. On the one
hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but
fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been
the Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the last to set an
example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is
thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come
to an end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.

We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without
good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his
protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than
a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by
habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of
Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further
our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth
Judicial District, and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236.1

The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall
abstain from further attempts to prosecute the accused pursuant to
informations growing out of the facts set forth in previous informations, and
the charges now pending before the justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas,
are ordered dismissed, with cost against the respondent fiscal. We append to
our order the observation that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being
fully cognizant of the facts of record, will take such administrative action as to
him seems proper to the end that incidents of this character may not recur.
So ordered.










Martin Vs Fabian

FACTS : Pvt. Martin was an enlisted man in the Philippine Army. On or about
April 14, 1981, when he was still in the service, he allegedly sold two
grenades to one Rogelio Cruz at P50.00 each, one of which exploded during
a picnic in Laoag City on April 17, 1981 causing the death of three persons,
including Rogelio Cruz, and injuries to three others.

On May 5, 1981, Pvt. Martin was arrested and confined (restricted to
barracks) at Fort Bonifacio pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, infra.
The following year, he was discharged from the service effective as of May 5,
1982. On November 17, 1982 the instant petition was filed

ISSUE : WON the right of speedy trial has been violated

HELD : The fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution apply to all
persons, including those subject to military law. The Constitution is a law for
rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield
of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all circumstances

There was no such denial. As stated by this Court in a per curiam decision:
"x... the test of violation of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin
counting the delay from the time the information is filed, not before the filing.
The delay in the filing of the information, which in the instant case has not
been without reasonable cause, is therefore not to be reckoned with in
determining whether there has been a denial of the right to speedy trial.

At any rate, whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not
susceptible to precise quantification. At best, the constitutional right of
speedy trial is relative, consistent with reasonable delays, taking into account
the circumstances of each case.

a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject
to a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant are weighed, and courts should consider such factors as length of
the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, in
determining whether defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied

Returning to the case at hand, the criminal act imputed to the petitioner
unfortunately resulted in the death of three persons (including Rogelio Cruz
who allegedly bought the handgrenades from the petitioner) and very serious
injuries to three others whose testimony is vital to the preferment of charges
and prosecution of the petitioner. It is therefore not unreasonable to heed the
claim of respondents that the delay complained of was occasioned by the
unavailability of witnesses, a claim which has not at all been challenged or
denied by the petitioner.
































Uy Vs Adriano

FACTS : a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Tarlac City on March 23, 1994, charging petitioner Henry Uy with violation of
Article 189 (Unfair Competition) of the Revised Penal Code.

On January 30, 1995, the court issued a warrant of arrest against petitioners.
On July 10, 1995, petitioners were arraigned, assisted by counsel, and
pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Petitioners, through counsel, waived the pre-trial conference on October 25,
1995. The initial trial was set on November 27, 1995.

However, it was only on February 26, 1996 that the first witness of the
prosecution, Atty. Estavillo of the NBI, testified.

In October 1996, this Court issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 104-96
providing, inter alia, that the RTC shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
violations of Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 166

Despite the administrative order of the Court, the MTC continued with the
trial. Gloria P. Tomboc, Analyst of the Bureau of Food and Drugs
Administration (BFAD), testified on August 25, 1997

On December 12, 1999, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence. In
the meantime, on October 22, 1999, Atty. Joselito L. Lim had moved to
withdraw his appearance as counsel for petitioners;15 the court had granted
the motion on October 25, 1999; and the new counsel of petitioners,
Balbastro and Associates, had entered its appearance on November 24,
1999.

On February 15, 2000, the court resolved to admit the documentary evidence
of the prosecution. On March 10, 2000, petitioners, through their new
counsel, filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence

In its Resolution dated May 16, 2000,22 the court held that there was prima
facie evidence which, if unrebutted or not contradicted, would be sufficient to
warrant the conviction of petitioners. However, the court ruled that the RTC
was vested by law with the exclusive and original jurisdiction to try and
decide charges for violation of R.A. No. 166 as amended by R.A. No. 8293

The City Prosecutor forwarded the case records to the Clerk of Court of RTC,
Br. 63, Tarlac City.23 On June 19, 2000, the RTC ordered the City
Prosecutor to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation and to file the
necessary Information if he found probable cause against petitioners.

The City Prosecutor found probable cause based on the findings of the MTC
in its May 16, 2000 Resolution that there was a prima facie case against
petitioners.24 He filed an Information in the RTC on July 18, 2000 for
violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.25 The Information reads


Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information,27 alleging that their
rights to due process and speedy trial had been violated

On September 8, 2000, the court issued an Order denying the motion to
quash.

ISSUE : WON the right to speedy disposition of the case has been violated

HELD : Not only the petitioners but the State as well were prejudiced by the
inordinate delay in the trial of the case. It took the prosecution more than four
years to rest its case after presenting only three witnesses.

The mistake of the City Prosecutor and the failure of the MTC to dismiss the
case motu proprio should not prejudice the interest of the State to prosecute
criminal offenses and, more importantly, defeat the right of the offended party
to redress for its grievance. Significantly, petitioners do not attribute to the
prosecution or to the MTC any malice aforethought or conscious disregard of
their right to a speedy trial; nor have substantially proven the same by clear
and convincing evidence. Hence, absent showing of bad faith or gross
negligence, delay caused by the lapse of the prosecution is not in itself
violative of the right to a speedy trial.

Certainly, the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the
same would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. It
should not operate in depriving the State of its inherent prerogative to
prosecute criminal cases or generally in seeing to it that all those who
approach the bar of justice is afforded fair opportunity to present their side.69
For it is not only the State; more so, the offended party who is entitled to due
process in criminal cases

In the same vein, one's failure to timely question the delay in the trial of a
case would be an implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right
to question the same. Except when otherwise expressly so provided, the
speedy trial right, like any other right conferred by the Constitution or statute,
may be waived when not positively asserted

the different interests of a defendant which may be affected by the violation
of the right to a speedy trial were identified. It was held that prejudice should
be assessed in the light of the interests of a defendant which the speedy trial
right was designed to protect, namely: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to
limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired

A perusal of the records failed to reveal that the delay in bringing petitioners
to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction caused them any prejudice
tantamount to deprivation of their right to a speedy trial. Petitioners in this
case were not subjected to pretrial incarceration, oppressive or otherwise,
thus eliminating the first Barker consideration bearing on prejudice.

As to the minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused, there is no
showing that petitioners suffered undue pressures in this respect


There is no factual basis for the claim of petitioners that we are not supplied
with any specific allegation in the record, nor witnesses or evidence may
become unavailable because of the delays in this case. To repeat, the claim
of impairment of defense because of delay must be specific and not by mere
conjecture
















































Castillo Vs SandiganBayan

FACTS : On August 25, 1986, concerned employees of the Commission on
Audit (COA) filed a Complaint before the Tanodbayan,3 against Ricardo
Castillo, Rodolfo Agdeppa and Demetrio Cabison Jr., COA Auditor VIII, COA
Auditor II, and COA Auditor III, respectively, all assigned at the National
Housing Authority (NHA), for alleged "submittal of initial very derogatory
reports which became the basis for the filing of cases with the Tanodbayan
and the reversals of their initial recommendations for contractors." Petitioners
were notified of the Complaint on September 22, 1986 when they were
directed by the Tanodbayan to file their counter-affidavits, which they did on
September 30, 1986.

Without acting upon the Motion for Reinvestigation and Motion to Resolve
Motion for Reinvestigation, an Information was filed on November 5, 1990,
before the Sandiganbayan,

Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. After the prosecution rested its case,
petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence but the same was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated December 11, 1992.8 Petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated
January 20, 1993.9

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss 10 dated February 15, 1993
citing lack of jurisdiction and violation of due process, but the same was
denied by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners' Motion Reconsideration 11 was
also denied.

ISSUE : WON the right to speedy disposition of the case has been violated

HELD : The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are the length of delay, the reason for such delay
and the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay

that the incumbent Tanodbayan lost his right to conduct preliminary
investigation and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan
effective February 2, 1987. As a result, complaints (including that involved in
the present petition), resolutions and other legal papers awaiting action
during that period remained pending the appointment of an Ombudsman.

When the Ombudsman was appointed in 1988, it took some time still before
his Office could become fully constituted and operational. Because of the
unavoidable delay caused by the aforementioned circumstances, the
corresponding Information in the criminal case involved was filed and
approved only in 1990.

Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court finds no violation of petitioners'
right to a speedy disposition of their case. The delay was not vexatious,
capricious, nor oppressive, considering the factual milieu of this case, namely
the structural reorganizations and procedural changes brought about by
frequent amendments of procedural laws in the initial stages of this case

While petitioners certainly have the right to a speedy disposition of their case,
the structural reorganization of the prosecutorial agencies, the procedural
changes brought about by the Zaldivar case as well as the Sandiganbayan's
heavy caseload certainly are valid reasons for the delay in the disposition of
petitioners' case. For those reasons, the delay certainly cannot be
considered as vexatious, capricious and oppressive. Neither is it
unreasonable nor inordinate


















Garcia Vs Domingo

FACTS : It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I the City
Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced,
by appropriate informations all dated January 16, 1968, eight (8) criminal
actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and
Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana

All the fourteen (14) trial dates except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968
fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon
the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel

The trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the
accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia

Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was filed with
respondent Judge: "Early in the morning of October 1, 1968,

petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction ... [alleging jurisdictional defects]." 9
Respondent Judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining
order thus causing the deferment of the promulgation of the judgment. After
proceedings duly had, there was an order from him "declaring that 'the
constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated,
adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the
trial of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and
not in the court room open the public';"

The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the
accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted
with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.

Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative of this right? The
answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was
thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the
Judge would reduce the number of those who could be our present. Such a
fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are
not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as
admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to
satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his
friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may
be charged."

Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least
fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without
objection on the part of respondent policemen

As a result the attendance of the general public is much more in evidence;
nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the
occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but
taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of
public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied
whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge,
with the eyes of the alert court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would
run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters,
just because, as did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a
city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.























Tatad Vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS : Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with
the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October
1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against
then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was
made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became
widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12,
1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint
filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The
Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two
months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos
by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for
investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to
the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt
practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October
25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for
disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a
resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the
corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad.
Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12,
1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.

ISSUE : WON the right to speedy disposition of the case has been violated

HELD : We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the
constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to
the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental
law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under
the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions),
the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A
delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable
in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a
painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution
of a former high ranking government official." In the first place, such a
statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and
gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in
terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to
alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while
presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant
or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve
the case.

























People Vs Salas

FACTS : Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was
reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. 1 As a result of the
reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail
recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. 2 Trial commenced, but while
it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for
homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail
and ordering his release; and so he escaped. 3 The respondent judge,
learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered
Abong's re-arrest. 4 But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved
that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision
authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. 5 The respondent
judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the
return of the accused. 6 The order of the trial court is now before us on
certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE : WON the Trial judge erred in suspending the case

HELD : The prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has
been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to
appear is unjustified.

The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he
ruled that trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could
not be duly notified under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is now
deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and
it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified.
Escape can never be a legal justification

Under the present rule, his escape will, legally speaking, operate to Ms
disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial, which will continue
even in his absence and most likely result in his conviction

The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except
only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present
witnesses who will Identify the accused. 9 Under Section 19, the
defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and
the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings
will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be
deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his
escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he
has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and
protection, of the law.

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is
apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the
letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is not really
that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must look beyond and
not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by
our own lights, the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That
we may properly apply it according to its ends, we need and
must use not only learning but also vision
























Borja Vs Mendoza

FACTS : The jurisdictional infirmity imputer to respondent Judge Romulo R.
Senining of the City of Cebu which was not remedied by respondent Judge
Rafael T. Mendoza of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in this certionrari
proceeding was the absence of an arrainment of petitioner Manuel Borja,
who was accused of slight physical injuries. This notwithstanding respondent
Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in abssentia and thereafter, in a
decision promulgated on August 18, 1976, found him guilty of such offense
and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days of
arresto menor. 1 Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court of
First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. 2 It was then
alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to
submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on
November 16, 1976 petitioner that the failure to arraign him is violative of his
constitutional right to procedural due process, 3 more specifically of his right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of
his right to be heard by himself and counsel. 4 Ther was thus, at the very
least, a graveabuse of discretion. The Solicitor General, 5 when asked to
comment, agreed that the procedural defect was of such gravity as to render
void the decision of the City Court affirmed by the Court of First Instance.
The comment was considered as answer, with the case being submitted for
decision.

ISSUE : WON the trial in absentia made by the respondent judge valid

HELD : It requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed
as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be
convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt
with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him

An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing the
accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to meet ... "

there is a duty laid by the Code [now the Rules of Court] upon the court to
inform [him] of certain rights and to extend to him, on his demand, certain
others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its own motion,
must perform, unless waive

Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly
arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner
required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative
that he is thus made fully aware of Possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him

It could then conclude: :Verily the records clearly show that petitioner was not
arraigned at all and was not represented by counsel throughout the whole
proceedings in the respondent City Court." 15 It is indisputable then that
there was a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to be heard by himself
and counsel

However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified." 21 As pointed out then by the Solicitor General, the
indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come "after
arraignment." The express mention in the present Constitution of the need
for such a step emphasizes its importance in the procedural scheme to
accord an accused due process. Without the accused having been
arraigned, it becomes academic to discuss the applicability of this exception
to the basic constitutional right that the accused should be heard by himself
and counsel

















People Vs Seneris

FATCS: On February 8, 1978, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Camilo E. Tamin,
who was then on official detail with the office of the City Fiscal, Zamboanga
City, filed with the Court of First Instance, Sixteenth Judicial District,
Zamboanga City, an amended information for parricide in Criminal Case No.
1742, charging herein private respondent as principal by inducement, Mario
Nemenio y delos Santos and Salim Doe as principals by direct participation
and Moises Andaya y Julkanain, as accomplice, in the fatal stabbing on
September 6, 1977 in Zamboanga City of Eduardo Pimentel y Orario, the
lawful husband of private respondent

On February 22, 1978, the accused Mario Nemenio y delos Santos, assisted
by his counsel de oficio, entered on arraignment a plea of guilty. Respondent
judge thereafter rendered judgment convicting accused Mario Nemenio y
delos Santos of murder

Immediately after promulgation of judgment, accused Mario Nemenio y delos
Santos offered to testify against his co-accused, herein private respondent.
He testified as prosecution witness on February 28, March 6, and March 22,
1978

But on April 19, 1978, aforesaid prosecution witness failed to appear
because he was not served with a subpoena (p. 108, rec.). Consequently,
the hearing was reset for June 7, 1978 (ibid.)

On June 7, 1978, counsel for private respondent commenced his cross-
examination of prosecution witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos, which
cross-examination however was not completed on that session for lack of
material time

However, prosecution witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos was shot dead
by the Integrated National Police patrols on June 21, 1978 while allegedly
escaping from the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm, Zamboanga City,
where he was then serving his sentence. Consequently, the completion of his
cross-examination became an impossibility

On July 20, 1978, petitioner, without any motion on the part of the defense
for the striking out of the deceased witness's testimony. On August 4, 1978,
respondent judge issued an order declaring as inadmissible the entire
testimony of the deceased witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos on the
principal ground "... that the defense was not able to complete its cross-
examination of said witness ...", relying on the case of Ortigas, Jr. vs.
Lufthansa,

ISSUE : WON the testimony should be stricken down

HELD : . Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine an
opposing witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the
right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record

that where the right to cross examine is lost wholly or in part through the fault
of the cross-examiner, then the testimony on direct examination may be
taken into account; but when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or
completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent

private respondent advanced in this action the cavalier theory that the failure
of her counsel to complete his cross-examination of petitioner's witness was
due to the fault of or was attributable to the petitioner, People of the
Philippines, because it was the very agents of State who killed its own
witness; hence, making the questioned testimony of petitioner's witness
inadmissible. The contention does not deserve serious consideration. There
was no finding nor any showing as the same is farfetched or inconceivable
that the killing of the witness of petitioner by its own agents was ill-motivated

On the other hand, WE find no merit in petitioner's contention that the
testimony of its deceased witness is admissible on the ground that private
respondent had waived her right to cross-examine the witness and that the
cause of non-completion was attributable to said private respondent.
because while it is true that her counsel did not immediately start with his
cross-examination of the deceased witness on March 22, 1978, he did avail,
however, of such right on the same day by initially obtaining an opportunity to
make preparations for an effective exercise thereof considering the nature of
the case a capital one and the length of the direct examination. .
Moreover, the deferment of the cross-examination of the witness requested
by private respondent on March 22, 1978 was approved by respondent judge
without any objection on the part of petitioner. And on the date for the cross-
examination of the witness Mario Nemenio or on April 19, 1978, counsel for
private respondent failed to cross-examine the said witness not of his own
design but because said witness failed to appear on that date for the reason
that due to the oversight of the court's personnel the subpoena for said
witness was not served on him at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm. It
is thus apparent that no fault can be imputed to the private respondent for the
length of time that elapsed before her counsel was able to commence his
cross-examination of the witness.

There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that the questioned
testimony of its deceased witness is admissible in evidence because private
respondent's counsel had already "... rigorously and extensively cross-
examined witness Mario Nemenio on all essential elements of the crime
charged (parricide), all of which have been testified upon by said witness in
his direct examination-in-chief, and consequently, the cross-examination-in-
chief, has already been concluded."

The cross-examination was completed insofar as the essential elements of
the crime charged parricide, fact of killing-is concerned. What remained
was merely the cross-examination regarding the price or reward, which is not
an element of parricide, but only an aggravating circumstance.




























































People Vs Gorospe

FACTS : In a verified complaint filed on October 8, 1974, with the Municipal
Court of Pulilan, Bulacan, ANASTACIA DE JESUS accused GERARDO
FAJARDO, RUFINO BULANADI and FELICIANO GOROSPE of the crime of
forcible abduction with rape

Municipal Judge Alfredo V. Granados of the Municipal Court of Pulilan
received the complaint and conducted a preliminary investigation, first stage.

On October 25, 1974, the Complaint was amended. Rufino Bulanadi and
Feliciano Gorospe were again named but Gerardo Fajardo was dropped and
OSCAR ALVARAN was named instead. Again Judge Granados conducted a
preliminary investigation and on November 18, 1974

The second stage of the preliminary investigation was set on February 5,
1975, but on that day neither Bulanadi or Gorospe appeared for which
reason Judge Granados declared that they had waived their right thereto and
elevated the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

On March 19, 1975, Provincial Fiscal Pascual C. Kliatchko filed with the CFI
of Bulacan an information for forcible abduction with rape against Gorospe
and Bulanadi.

Judge Nelly L. Romero Valdellon started the trial of the case on October 15,
1975. The accused and their counsel de parte had long been notified that the
case was to be tried on that day but they did not appear so the former were
tried in absentia.

The complainant, Judge Valdellon was transferred to Metro Manila and she
was replaced by Judge Fidel P. Purisima who finished the trial. But Judge
Purisima issued an order on March 10, 1976, wherein he inhibited himself
from deciding the case.

So it was Judge Jesus R. de Vega who decided the case and rendered the
following judgment.

ISSUE : WON the cross examination can be held admissible

The trial court committed no error in admitting the testimony of Fajardo
although the defense had not finished its cross-examination. An examination
of the transcript of Fajardo's testimony shows that he was subjected to
detailed cross-examination on material points. In fact, the cross-examination
was lengthier than the direct examination. The failure of the said counsel to
do so indicates that every material point has been asked from Fajardo during
the time he was under examination.

While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is not
absolute in the sense that a cross-examiner could determine for himself the
length and scope of his cross-examination of a witness. The court has
always the discretion to limit the cross examination and to consider it
terminated donated if it would serve the ends of justice.

The Court, therefore, hereby resolves to admit the testimony of Fajardo. This
resolution finds support, though indirectly, from Section 6, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court, which empowers the court to stop the introduction of further
testimony upon a particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full
that more to the same point cannot reasonably be expected to be additionally
persuasive.




















People Vs Miyake

FACTS : Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on a complaint
initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In
addition, she was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same
court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan alone.

The evidence presented by the parties were thus contradictory but the trial
court found the prosecution's evidence more credible. On December 17,
1993, judgment was rendered by said court convicting appellant of both
crimes as charged. 22

In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court
adopted a previous decision of Branch 78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Paraaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a
conviction for estafa promulgated on July 26, 1993, 23 rendered in Criminal
Cases Nos. 74852-53, involving the same circumstances in the instant case,
wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two
counts of estafa

ISSUE : WON the right of confrontation has been violated

HELD : This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is
sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already
testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is
made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the
hearsay rule. 28 The previous testimony is made admissible because it
makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious. 29

Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in
the decision of the Paraaque trial court does not fall under the exception to
the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only
the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous
proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or
judgments.

In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by
complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead,
what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the
conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous
decision in the estafa case.

A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only
prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. 30 It may not be
used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent
case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime,
as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis
for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of
the accused to confront the witnesses against him.

As earlier stated, the Makati court's utilization of and reliance on the previous
decision of the Paraaque court must be rejected. Every conviction must be
based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its
appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely
on the findings of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is
only its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who
testified therein and upon which the decision is based






















People Vs narca

FACTS : For the death of Mauro Reglos, Jr. (hereinafter victim), defendants-
appellants Rodencio @ "Rudy", Benjamin, Rogelio all surnamed Narca and
their brother-in-law Jaime @ Benjamin Baldelamar were charged 1 with the
following information for murder

When appellants' failed in their motion to quash the above information, they
filed a motion for bail. 3 During the bail hearings on September 19, 1990, the
victim's wife Elizabeth Reglos, who was with him on that fateful night,
testified on direct examination. Defense counsel requested the court that his
cross-examination of Elizabeth be conducted on the next hearing, October 4,
1990. 4 Such cross-examination on said date never took place because
Elizabeth and her son were bludgeoned to death on September 28, 1990. 5
After hearing, the lower court denied bail

ISSUE : WON the statement of Elizabeth in the bail hearing admissible

HELD : Besides, mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the
essence of the right to cross-examine. 21 Appellants lost such opportunity
when they sought the deferment of their cross-examination of Elizabeth, and
they only have themselves to blame in forever losing that right by reason of
Elizabeth's demise

This Court hold that the right to cross-examination

is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a
party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or
allowed to remain in the record. . . . (W)aiver of the right to cross-examine
may take various forms. But the common basic principle underlying the
application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to
fake advantage of if for reasons attributable to himself alone

We also find unmeritorious appellants' argument that Elizabeth's testimony,
having been taken during the bail hearings, cannot be used against them.
Section 1(f) of Rule 115 provides that "either party may utilize as part of its
evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased . . . given in another
case or proceeding", and under Section 8 Rule 114 23 as amended by
Circular 12-94 24, "evidence presented during the bail hearings," like the
testimony of deceased witness Elizabeth, are "considered automatically
reproduced at the trial" subject only to the possible recall of the "witness for
additional examination unless the witness is dead outside the Philippines or
otherwise unable to testify

































People Vs Bardeja

FACTS : On December 20, 1965, MARCELINA Cuizon lodged the following
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Samar against ADELINO and
five (5) others 'namely, Lucio Malate, Pedro Odal, Adriano Odal, Silvino Odal
and Fidel Ansuas

The undersigned complainant, after having been duly sworn to according to
law, accuses Adelino Bardaje, Lucio Malate, Pedro Odal, Adriano Odal,
Silvino Odal and Fidel Ansuas of the crime of Rape

ADELINO was arrested on December 17th, and it was on December 20th,
when he signed the alleged confession, Exhibit "C", admitting having
kidnapped and molested MARCELINA

It will be noted that the complaint filed directly by MARCELINA with the Court
was amended by the Fiscal in the Information. While MARCELINA charged
ADELINO only with Rape, the Fiscal charged him with "Rape with Illegal
Detention"

On June 2, 1966, before the arraignment of ADELINO, the Information was
amended to include the allegation that MARCELINA was detained and
deprived of liberty for a period of th0ree (3) days, which allegation could be
taken into account in connection with Illegal Detention 2 but not in connection
with Forcible Abduction


The following day, July 28, 1967, the trial Court found ADELINO guilty of
Forcible Abduction with Rape with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling
and aid of armed men, and sentenced him to death.

ISSUE : WON the right of the accused has been violated

HELD : One of the rights of an accused is "to have compulsory process
issued to secure the attendance of witnesses on his behalf. 14 ADELINO had
stated that, while MARCELINA was in the house of Ceferino Armada, she
curled the hair of Narita. one of the latter's children, as well as the hair of
other girls in the vicinity.

Considering that this case involved a prosecution for a capital offense, the
lower Court acted precipitously in not having Narita brought to Court, by
ordering her arrest if necessary ADELINO was deprived of his right "to have
compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses on his
behalf."

It would have been advisable if the lower Court had right then and there
asked for the production of the written statement of MARCELINA.

The medical report, Exhibit "B", implied that MARCELINA could have had
sexual intercourse previous to December 14th. On the other hand, ADELINO
had testified that he and MARCELINA used to go together to Tacloban, and
while there several times, "we had sexual intercourse because she likes it."
17 Considering the possible infliction of the death penalty on ADELINO, the
lower Court could have asked MARCELINA if she had had sexual
intercourse prior to December 14th and, if so, if it was with ADELINO.

Further, there was possibility that ADELINO and MARCELINA had really
been sweethearts. The lower Court could have asked MARCELINA if she
realized that, charging ADELINO with Rape with Illegal Detention, the latter
could be sentenced to death. If that had been explained to her clearly by the
lower Court, she might then have admitted that she was neither raped nor
"kidnapped" nor illegally detained

MARCELINA could had been examined on the two matters mentioned
above, with the Court excluding the public from the hearing under the
provisions of Rule 119, Section 14. MARCELINA might have testified without
feeling the pressure of her relatives or other persons, if such pressure had in
fact existed

It may not be amiss to state then that just as in pleas of guilty where a grave
offense is charged trial Judges have been enjoined to refrain from accepting
them with alacrity but to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that an accused
fully understands the import of his plea, so also, in prosecutions for capital
offenses, it behooves the trial Courts to exercise greater care in safeguarding
the rights of an accused. The trial Judge should also take a more active role
by means of searching questions in the examination of witnesses for the
ascertainment of the truth and credibility of their testimonies so that any
judgment of conviction imposing the supreme penalty may rest on firm and
unequivocal grounds. The life and liberty of an individual demand no less.