G.R. No.

L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-
appellees.

FACTS: Defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, killed Agapito Elcano. He
was apprehended and charged appropriately before CFI. He acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.

Consequently, the parents of Agapito Elcano, filed a complaint for recovery of damages against the defendant
and his father, Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that: first, the civil action is barred by the
acquittal of Reginald, and; second, the father cannot be held liable for the act of his son because the latter is
already married at the time of the commission, thus, is already emancipated.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not quasi-delict is restricted to negligence and cannot apply to voluntary acts or
omissions producing injury (or felony).

Whether or not a father may be held liable for the act of his emancipated child constituting quasi-delict.

RULING: NO. Citing Barredo case, under Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana although
it mentions the word negligence but according to Justice Bocobo it must be construed according to the
spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed
in applying the same. Criminal prosecution and civil action are two different things.

On the second issue (obsolete), YES. The father may be held liable. While it is true that marriage of a child
emancipates him from the parental authority of his parents, what matters really is whether or not such minor
is completely emancipated as defined by law. In the case at bar, his emancipation is only partial for as
provided by law he can sue and be sued in court with the assistance of his parents, he cannot manage his own
properties without the approval of his parents, and third as in the facts, he relies for subsistence from his
parents.

EDGARDO E. MENDOZA vs. HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court
of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR
G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979


FACTS: Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge in
Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino
Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.

On October 22 a three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan,
involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent
Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie
Montoya. Two separate Information for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against
Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya. The cause of action was due to how truck-driver Montoya was for
causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep
to hit and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-
owner-driver Salazar, was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment finding the accused Freddie Montoya guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-
driver Salazar of any liabilityin view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's
car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither
was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against
jeep-owner. After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a civil case against respondents jeep-
owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by
Montoya, for identification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision. Jeep-owner-driver
Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum. Truck-
owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in
the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
In an order respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the
afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which
petition we gave due course.Upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also dismissed the
case as against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent civil
action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal
action for the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964,
requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same
would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied
in the order dated with respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more
decisive interpretation of the rule.

Petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition to review the last two mentioned orders that required jeep-
owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.

ISSUE: Wheter or not the action against respondents is barred because of a prior judgment.

RULING: Petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible
error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
The court held- it is a well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the
following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and
Identity of cause of action.

It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree with petitioner that
there is no Identity of cause of action between the criminal case and the civil case. Obvious is the fact that in
said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to
the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the owner
of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a
complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in the criminal case. And more importantly, in the criminal cases,
the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article l
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil case is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code
Petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals
in the complaint . The court declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, the civil
case is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an
independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

From Jurado: in Elcano vs. Hill,73 where the fi rst defendant had been
previously charged with the criminal offense of homicide and subsequently
acquitted on the ground that his act is not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill,
= coupled with a mistake, the Supreme Court held, despite the fact that the
plaintiffs (who are the parents of the alleged victim) failed to make a reservation of
their right to institute the civil action separately, that such acquittal of the
defendant in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict
under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code; hence, that acquittal is not a bar to the civil
action against him. The same ruling was applied in Mendoza vs. Arrieta.74